From Monsters to Patients

A History of Disability

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses the tendency among some disability scholars to overlook the importance of congenital deformity and disability in the pre-modern West. It argues that congenital deformity and disability deviated so greatly from able-bodied norms that they have played a pivotal role in the history of Western Civilization. In particular, it explores the evolution of two seemingly separate, but ultimately related, ideas from classical antiquity through the First World War: (1) the idea that there was some type of significance, whether supernatural or natural, to the existence of congenital deformity and (2) the idea that the existence of disabled people has resulted in a disability problem for western societies because many disabilities can hinder labor productivity to such an extent that large numbers of the disabled cannot survive without taking precious resources from their more productive, able-bodied counterparts. It also looks at how certain categories of disabled people, including, monsters, hunchbacks, cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs, which signified aesthetic and functional deviations from able-bodied norms, often reinforced able-bodied prejudices against the disabled.
DEDICATION

To my wife, Melinda, and my sons, Brendan and Julian, who sacrificed so much while I conducted my research and wrote this dissertation.
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There are so many people that have helped to make this dissertation a reality. Rachel Fuchs took me under her wing as an undergraduate student nearly twenty years ago and taught me how to write. Without her, I never could have succeeded in law school or graduate school. Her expertise has likewise been invaluable during the research and writing process of my dissertation. She also helped to keep my stress levels low when my wife and son had significant health problems during graduate school. Kent Wright has also been helping me to improve as a student since I was an undergraduate. While researching my dissertation, moreover, he helped me to navigate through many of the complex debates of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson broadened my horizons in many ways. Perhaps her most important contribution to my intellectual development was showing me how to utilize theory in my work. As fate would have it, shortly after reading my dissertation, she was hit by a car, suffering serious injuries to her leg and spine. I learned a lot about disability and how people cope with serious injuries while talking with her in rehabilitation. Finally, I learned so much about medieval history and the history of diseases from Monica Green. Without her guidance, my understanding of medicine and science in both the pre-modern and modern world would have suffered greatly.
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This dissertation is a history of disability from classical antiquity through the First World War. Some might wonder why, in an age when historians are looking more at global history than the history of Western Civilization, I would attempt to write such a seemingly ethnocentric history. Disability studies, however, is far too undeveloped to permit such a grand historical synthesis. Once enough work has been done on disability history in both the East and West, of course, scholars should indeed attempt such a global history of disability. One of the purposes of this dissertation, in fact, is to lay the groundwork for eventual attempts to compare and contrast the history of disability of the West with other areas.

The history of disability in other portions of the globe is not the only history of disability that I neglect in this dissertation. I have also decided, for the most part, not to incorporate the history of mental disability into my history of disability in the West. Disability, of course, is a social construction, and the West has socially constructed mental disability in a matter that differs so significantly from physical disability that I feel that is necessary, at least in the early stages of the disability history movement, to examine them separately. After scholars conduct enough research on both the history of physical disability and the history of mental disability, disability scholars will be better able to write a combined history of mental and physical disability.

My repeated use of the term “disability” in this preface, as well as throughout my dissertation, might bother some disability scholars who continue to follow the social model of disability, which, as I discuss in my chapter on historiography, views
“impairment” as a physical limitation and “disability” as a socially constructed exclusion of disabled people from able-bodied society. Although I admire the social model of disability as an effective counter-discursive strategy, the current trend in disability studies, at least outside of Britain, is a rejection of the distinction between “impairment” and “disability.” For my part, I reject the distinction between “impairment” and “disability,” to borrow from Joan Wallach Scott, as unhelpful categories of historical analysis.

I do, however, make distinctions between “congenital deformity” and “disability.” When I refer to “congenital deformity,” I mean birth defects that deviate from aesthetic and/or functional norms. I recognize, as did the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) in 1976, that some deviations from able-bodied norms are more culturally significant than others. A slight congenital deformity that is only aesthetic in nature, for instance, might carry considerably less stigma than a substantial congenital deformity involving both aesthetic and functional deviations from able-bodied norms. When I use the term “disability,” I mean any congenital or postnatally acquired condition that deviates from aesthetic and/or functional norms. These distinctions are important because western thinkers have treated the two categories differently. The existence of congenital deformity has long challenged the idea that the natural world is governed by order. Indeed, defenders of rational design, as early as classical antiquity, have attempted to fit congenital deformity into their world views. Those who would deny that there is any rational order to the universe, meanwhile, have looked to congenital deformity when arguing that the natural world is governed by chance. At the same time, however, the West has long pondered its “disability problem,” characterized by the limited resources
of any given society coupled with the limited labor capacity of “disabled people,” *i.e.*, those who have either a congenital or postnatally acquired condition that deviates from aesthetic/and or functional norms. Because many disabled people have not been able to provide adequately for themselves or their families without assistance in the western tradition, due in large part to how able-bodied people have socially constructed their societies, some cultures have deemed it necessary to limit the absolute numbers of disabled people by killing the disabled, generally infants and children with severe congenital deformities but sometimes even older people with disabilities. Other cultures have adopted more humane approaches, providing the disabled with some kind of beneficence, including religious, private, and/or public assistance.

I should also point out that I refer to disabled people throughout this dissertation by using terms that modern observers often consider offensive, including monstrosity, hunchback, cripple, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs, even though these ostensibly offensive categories continue to proliferate in modern discourse. To understand the development of modern disability discourse, it is important to look at how these categories have persisted throughout the recorded history of the West, even if it makes some people uncomfortable to confront these dehumanizing categories.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In the first half of the nineteenth century, Søren Kierkegaard, the hunchback philosopher widely considered to be the first existentialist, encouraged his physically deformed cousin, Hans Peter Kierkegaard, whom an acquaintance once called “a complete cripple,”¹ to remember always that the lives of deformed people are every bit as important as the lives of others:

Above all, never forget the duty of loving yourself. Do not let the fact that you have in a way been set apart from life, that you have been hindered from taking an active part in it, and that in the eyes of the dim-witted and busy world, you are superfluous—above all, do not let this deprive you of your notion of yourself, as if, in the eyes of all-knowing Governance, your life, if it is lived in inwardness, did not have just as much significance and worth as every other person’s.²

Some disability scholars, such as Lennard J. Davis, one of the most important figures in disability studies, might point to Kierkegaard’s exhortation to his cousin as evidence of an inchoate epiphany in the West that there were substantial differences between disabled and able-bodied people, an epiphany that the rise of either the capitalist mode of production or the modern nation-state thrust upon western culture, which, for the most part, had previously welcomed the disabled into its fold.³ In “Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and the Discourse of Disability,” for instance, Davis applies his interpretation of disability history to the life of Samuel Johnson, arguing that the manner in which able-bodied society interacted with the disabled Johnson demonstrates that much of the stigma and discrimination so often associated with disability are essentially modern phenomena.⁴ Indeed, Davis contends that the dearth of references by Johnson’s contemporaries to his disabilities, and the “casual and literary manner” in which they referred to his physical abnormalities when they did broach the subject, suggest that disability was only beginning to assume negative connotations.⁵ According to Davis, we can see in Johnson’s
life “traces of both earlier and later formulations of disability. In other words, we can see
the contradiction of an earlier sense in which disability per se did not exist and of a later
one in which disability is a modality used to explain a great deal.”

Davis has certain post-structuralist ideas about the modern discursivity of
disability in mind when making these distinctions between disability in the pre-modern
and modern world. For Davis, “the term disability” is a socially constructed
“categorization tied to the development of discourses that aim to cure, remediate, or
catalog variations in bodies.” Davis is on solid ground when suggesting that the absence
of any tendency among pre-modern thinkers to categorize, through modern discursive
processes, people with various physical defects under a term akin to the modern
understanding of “disability” highlights the differences between pre-modern and modern
notions of disability. Davis correctly points out, for example, that people before the
eighteenth century were more interested in deformity than “disability,” but he goes too
far in asserting that “only a few writers comment on the subject at all—notably
Castiglione, Montaigne, and Bacon.” He does acknowledge that Castiglione, Montaigne,
and Bacon all expressed negative attitudes toward people with deformities. Castiglione,
Davis observes, identified a tendency in his own day to associate deformity with evil,
relying on the following passage from Castiglione to illustrate his point:

Thus everyone tries hard to conceal his natural defects of mind or body, as we see
in the case of the blind, lame, the crippled and all those who are maimed and ugly.
For although these defects can be imputed to Nature, yet no one likes to think he
has them, since then it seems that Nature herself has caused them deliberately as a
seal and token of wickedness.

Putting aside the fact that Castiglione, here, seemingly views various types of deformed
people as comprising a distinct group because they differ from the able-bodied norm in
similar ways, albeit not in accordance with the modern conception of “disability,”
Castiglione does indeed express negative views about the deformed. Davis likewise notes
that Montaigne acknowledged the association of deformity with divine purpose. Even
the rationalist Bacon who, according to Davis, “sees deformity ‘not as a sign’ of divine
intervention or marking of the body, but as a ‘cause’ of personality and behavior,”
exhibits some negative stereotypes about disabled people, including the idea that
“deformed people are ambitious, ‘void of natural affection,’ good spies, and advantaged
in ‘rising’ in court.”

William Hay, a hunchback member of Parliament in the eighteenth century, later
defended himself and other deformed people against Bacon’s claims in Deformity: an
essay by proclaiming that deformity does not affect a person’s mind in the ways that
Bacon had assumed. Bacon could not hope to understand deformed people, in Hay’s
view, because “Bodily Deformity is visible to every Eye; but the Effects of it are known
to very few; intimately known to none but those, who feel them; and they generally are
not inclined to reveal them.” Indeed, in an argument that disability rights advocates
would later make in the latter half of the twentieth century, Hay suggests that it is not
deformity that hinders deformed people from leading normal lives but rather the
prejudices of able-bodied people, contending that “deformed Persons set out in the World
to a Disadvantage, and they must first surmount the Prejudices of Mankind before they
can be upon a Par with others.”

Davis does recognize that the negative stereotypes that Hay criticizes in Bacon
might have had the capacity to impact negatively able-bodied society’s view of
deformity. Davis maintains, for instance, that “Shakespeare, clearly holding to all these
opinions [of Castiglione, Montaigne, and Bacon], depicts Richard III as a crooked-backed, limping sexual villain,” who endeavors to become a villain because his deformed body has prevented him from becoming a lover.16 Yet Davis errs in arguing that such negative attitudes about disabled people had little impact in the pre-modern world because “mentions of deformity [were] sporadic” prior to the eighteenth century.17

The problems with this interpretation of disability history become readily apparent when examining Davis’ argument that Johnson’s life marked a transition to a period where disability was becoming increasingly important to eighteenth-century observers. Indeed, if Davis had looked at the generation that directly preceded Johnson’s more closely, he likely would have discovered that Alexander Pope’s enemies, as I discuss in chapter 6, were virtually obsessed with Pope’s many deformities. Indeed, the hunchback Pope, who, incidentally, wrote in a 1739 letter that Johnson “has an Infirmitry of the convulsive kind, that attacks him sometimes, so as to make Him a sad Spectacle,” was the subject of repeated public attacks on account of his deformities.18 John Dennis, for instance, begins his Reflections Critical and Satyrical, Upon a Late Rhapsody, Call’d An Essay on Criticism by ridiculing Pope’s deformities, proclaiming, “As there is no Creature so venomous, there is nothing so stupid and impotent as a hunch-back’d Toad.”19 Pope, however, was not the first disabled Englishman to suffer public ridicule on account of his disabilities. According to Roger Lund, the able-bodied contemporaries of the First Earl of Shaftesbury, mockingly called him “‘Count Tapsky’” because he was not only crippled with gout and ague but also outfitted with a silver tap (inserted in 1668) to drain a suppurating liver cyst.”20
Davis’ assertion that Johnson’s contemporaries did not pay much attention to his disabilities because the people of his day were only beginning to become aware of differences between able-bodied and disabled people, then, does not seem tenable in light of the very public and protracted ridicule of Pope on account of his disabilities, which began when Johnson was a toddler, not to mention the earlier ridicule of the First Earl of Shaftesbury. Indeed, there may have been other reasons why Shaftesbury’s and Pope’s enemies consciously employed the power of stigma associated with disability in their attempts to ridicule and marginalize them, while few of Johnson’s contemporaries referred to his disabilities. It may simply have been the First Earl of Shaftesbury’s political ambitions, particularly his prominent role among the Whigs, that made his disabilities easy targets for his political enemies.\(^{21}\) Pope’s sour disposition and proclivity for engaging in satirical attacks against his own enemies, meanwhile, may have made his disabilities polemical targets. After all, even Voltaire, one of Pope’s close friends, called him “un peu malin” (a little malicious).\(^{22}\) It is quite possible that Pope so enraged his enemies that they lashed out in a manner that they knew would hurt Pope the most. As I demonstrate in chapter 8, *The Corsair*, a Danish tabloid, subjected Kierkegaard to similar public humiliation because of Kierkegaard’s irascible disposition. Johnson, by contrast, although of a morose disposition that perhaps equaled Pope’s and Kierkegaard’s, did not engender such enduring bitterness, which perhaps explains why he was not the target of similar attacks.\(^{23}\) Johnson’s contemporaries may also have concluded that it was simply impolite to mention his disabilities in public just as Joseph Denis Odevaere evidently considered it polite to obscure Lord Byron’s club-foot in his painting *Lord Byron on his Death-bed* (1826).
One of the primary purposes of this dissertation, then, is to refute Davis’ tendency of discounting the importance of ideas about deformity and disability in the pre-modern world. I argue, instead, that the evolution of ideas about congenital deformity and disability from classical antiquity through World War I has played a significant role in the history of the West. In particular, I look at the evolution of two seemingly separate, but ultimately related, ideas: (1) the idea that there was some type of significance, whether supernatural or natural, to the existence of congenital deformity and (2) the idea that the existence of disabled people has resulted in a disability problem for western societies because many disabilities can hinder labor productivity to such an extent that large numbers of the disabled cannot survive without taking precious resources from their more productive, able-bodied counterparts. To address the significance of congenital deformity in the western tradition, I look at what various thinkers have written about congenital deformity. To address the disability problem, I explore not only what people in the past wrote about the problem but also those measures that able-bodied communities adopted to ameliorate the problem. My approach is not entirely new. In 1982, Henri-Jacques Stiker, a French historian, published the seminal work in disability history, *Corps infirmes et sociétés*, an English translation of which appeared in 1997 under the title *A History of Disability*. In that work, Stiker identifies a “long polemic on monstrosity” in the western tradition. At the same time, Stiker contends, the West had to address “what was being done for those who, even if not monstrous, were nonetheless referred to monstrosity by their disability. . . .”24 He further notes that, at least during the seventeenth century, “there were attempts to resolve both questions at once, the problem of monstrosity and that of the disabled.”25
The connection between both the problem of monstrosity and the disability problem might not always be readily apparent to modern observers. Stiker himself expresses trepidation in connecting the two ideas, wondering whether the problem of monstrosity and the problem of disability are “two incommensurable quantities.” Yet despite difficulties in ascertaining the precise ways in which westerners viewed the problem of congenital deformity and the problem of disability as related in periods other than the seventeenth century, there have been periods when the connection has been unmistakable. In the middle of the eighteenth century, for example, as Marjolein Degenaar has observed, “theoretical interest in the deaf and blind was combined with a humanitarian interest which led to philanthropists such as l’abbé de L’Épée and Valentin Haüy being able to put through social reforms, including provision of care and education for deaf mutes and the blind.” There was undoubtedly a strong connection between the problem of monstrosity and the problem of disability, moreover, during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Beginning with Empedocles in the fifth century B.C.E., some of the most important thinkers in the western tradition had pondered what secrets the existence of congenital deformity might reveal about the nature of things. When Charles Darwin finally unveiled his theory of natural selection in 1859, one of his most important underlying assumptions, as I discuss in chapter 7, was that people with severe congenital deformities, often called monsters or monstrosities both before and after Darwin, were simply people with mutations indicative of progressive processes that have resulted in the evolution of species. As anyone familiar with disability history might expect, it did not take long for his contemporaries to use that knowledge, along with advances in medicine and techniques long used in animal husbandry and horticulture, to address the disability
problem. Indeed, Darwin’s own half-cousin, Sir Francis Galton, was instrumental in creating the eugenics movement, which, in part, attempted to eradicate certain types of undesirable disabled people from the gene pool. Disability scholars, of course, understand well that the advent of the eugenics movement had a profound effect on how able-bodied people viewed disability. Sharon L. Snyder and David L. Mitchell, for example, argue that it is possible to trace negative attitudes “to the eugenics era, when disability began to be construed as an undesirable deviation from normative existence,” even if they are too quick to discount negative stereotypes about disability in the pre-modern West.\textsuperscript{28}

Disability scholars, however, have yet to explore how the evolution of ideas about congenital deformity from classical antiquity to the nineteenth century contributed to the birth of the eugenics movement itself.

In any event, as Darwin was explaining how chance and monstrosity fit into his theory of natural selection and eugenicists were attempting to use that knowledge to improve the gene pool, the West was simultaneously looking for other ways of dealing with the disability problem. These efforts included medical intervention and increased involvement by the state in providing assistance directly to the disabled. The ways in which able-bodied people viewed congenital deformity and disability were thus in the midst of rapid change during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as were the ways in which able-bodied society was addressing its disability problem.

Exploring these changes and how disabled people have reacted to them, and continue to react to them, of course, would become an important aspect of the disability rights movement, including disability studies, which arose during the 1960s and 1970s. If I were to explore only the evolution of ideas about disability, however, my work would
completely fail to take into consideration one of the most crucial developments in the brief history of disability studies. When Davis published his groundbreaking *Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body* in 1995, while the nascent disability studies movement was searching not only for a way to conceptualize disability but also for a voice in academia and beyond, Davis succeeded in demonstrating to disability scholars the important implications of post-structuralist theory, particularly the theories of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. The implications of these post-structural theories, particularly the Foucauldian understanding of disability history, have become so important to the disability studies movement in recent years that they have become virtually impossible to ignore. In *Enforcing Normalcy*, Davis explains his view of the Foucauldian interpretation of disability history, arguing that “[p]reindustrial societies tended to treat people with impairments as part of the social fabric, although admittedly not kindly, while postindustrial societies, instituting ‘kindness,’ ended up segregating and ostracizing such individuals through the discursivity of disability.”

Much of my dissertation, particularly the final four chapters, builds upon this Foucauldian view of disability history. I am not as quick as Davis, however, to view disabled people as part of the social fabric in the preindustrial world or to conclude that efforts to institute “kindness” were always behind the segregation and ostracism of disabled people in postindustrial societies, particularly with respect to the eugenics movement. Indeed, I argue that disabled people were not as integrated into preindustrial societies as Davis assumes and that much of the treatment of disabled people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was anything but kind.
Developments in linguistics from Ferdinand de Saussure to Derrida, although not as influential within disability studies as the Foucauldian understanding of history, are likewise important when attempting to theorize disability. As Frederic Jameson explains in *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, one of the most important developments of Saussurean structural linguistics is “the proposition that meaning is not a one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified, between the materiality of language, between a word or name, and its referent or concept.” According to Jameson, meaning after Saussure, “is generated by the movement from signifier to signifier. What we generically call the signified—the meaning or conceptual content of an utterance—is now rather to be seen as a meaning-effect, as that objective mirage of signification generated and projected by the relationship of signifiers among themselves.”

Derrida, of course, went beyond Saussure in exploring, and deconstructing, binary oppositions, demonstrating that there can be no obvious line of demarcation that separates one from the other. The result is that after Saussure and Derrida, despite the often justifiable reluctance of many scholars to utilize deconstruction in their own work, it is no longer possible to understand any signifier of disability, either in the present or in the past, without reference to the myriad signifiers that express not only aesthetic and functional norms but also deviations from those norms. In addition, many signifiers that seemingly have nothing to do with disability, especially signifiers denoting deviations from male, heterosexual norms, can reinforce negative attitudes regarding disability because, as Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has noted, the West “has long conflated femaleness and disability, understanding both as defective departures from a valued standard.”

Davis proposes an even more expansive view of the relationship between the term disability and
other categories, arguing that “disability is part of a continuum that includes differences in gender, as well as bodily features indicative of race, sexual preference, and even of class.”

Once again, it was Davis who led the way in demonstrating the precise ways in which Derridean insights into language, combined with Foucauldian insights about power and knowledge, might provide a deeper understanding of disability history. In *Enforcing Normalcy*, Davis seemingly acknowledges some utility in examining binary oppositions when attempting to conceptualize disability but argues against “the routine assumptions made about the ‘clear’ polarities of deafness and hearing, of disabled and abled.” He points out, moreover, that “binarism,” whether “straight-gay, male-female, rich-poor,” forms “part of an ideology of containment and a politics of power and fear.” Davis echoes, here, the work of Stiker, who likewise sees the politics of power and fear in “the existence of these multiple diminutions or insufficiencies: mal-formation, dis-ability, de-bility, im-potence,” even though he does not examine those historical categories in any detail. According to Stiker, all such words, “curiously negative (negating what?), evoke a fear. At its lowest level . . . this fear produces an almost visceral reaction to the disruption that has been caused. We organize the world . . . for a kind of average person, designated normal.” Because disabled people cannot exist in that world comfortably, Stiker argues, disabled people threaten to “modify or remake” that world.” For Stiker, being confronted with disability thus “creates a disorganization that is both concrete and social. But from this vantage point we perceive yet another disorganization, much deeper and more painful: the disorganization of our acquired understandings, of our established values.”
Davis, like Stiker, recognizes that modern, discursive categories which distinguish the disabled from the able-bodied have played an integral role in shaping our understanding of the world. “While many progressive intellectuals have stepped forward to decry racism, sexism, and class bias,” he posits, “it has not occurred to most of them that the very foundations on which their information systems are built, their very practices of reading and writing, seeing, thinking, and moving are themselves laden with assumptions about hearing, deafness, blindness, normalcy, paraplegia, and ability and disability in general.”

To demonstrate the extent to which disability impacts information systems, he points out that “our language is peppered with words and phrases like ‘lame,’ ‘blind,’ ‘deaf and dumb,’ ‘deaf, dumb, and blind,’ ‘idiotic,’ and so on that carry with them moral and ethical implications.” Davis is not only referring here to the use of such words as signifiers of actual disabled people, but also to the metaphorical use of language, whereby we use words associated with disability to express the inadequacies of someone or something.

I take Davis’ argument one step further, agreeing with Stiker that the categories which Davis sees as so important for modern information systems likewise played a pivotal role in the construction and evolution of ideas about disability from classical antiquity through World War I. Indeed, when pre-modern and early modern thinkers addressed the significance of congenital deformity and/or the disability problem, their ideas were influenced by similar, though not identical, forms of stigma and discrimination associated with many of the categories that Davis sees as so influential to the development of modern information systems. Accordingly, this dissertation examines not only the idea that there was some type of significance to congenital deformity and the
idea that there was a disability problem, but also the categorization of disabled people as
monsters, dwarfs, hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the deaf and dumb in
order to demonstrate that the evolution of ideas about disability, particularly ideas about
congenital deformity, could not have been value-free. Indeed, negative depictions of
congenitally deformed people, expressed through the same types of categories identified
by Davis, have abounded since the beginnings of Western Civilization, subtly influencing
how able-bodied people have viewed the congenitally deformed and disabled. I do argue,
however, that there were important changes during the long nineteenth century that
modified the western understanding of those categories. The emerging disability
discourse of the long nineteenth century, I contend, continued to utilize the pre-modern
and early modern categories for disabled people but did so in slightly different ways that
reflected the new Darwinian understanding of congenital deformity and new, modern
approaches to the disability problem. I should note, however, that my intention in
exploring these categories is not to analyze every single known text in the western
tradition that ever used those categories in a disparaging manner. Such a compilation
would take hundreds, if not thousands, of pages. My aim is to demonstrate only how
those categories have contributed to the stigma and discrimination associated with
disability by exploring what are, in my estimation, some the more influential and
interesting texts in the western tradition.

Davis warns disability scholars that those unfamiliar with disability studies may
reject the notion that negative biases about disability, many of which are perpetuated by
the categories that Davis has identified, inevitably creep into the ways in which human
beings perceive their world. Davis notes, for example, that although it has indeed
“become a mark of commonplace courtesy and intellectual rigor to note occasions when racism, sexism, or class bias creep into discourse,” there remains “a strange and really unaccountable silence when the issue of disability is raised (or, more to the point, never raised); the silence is stranger, too, since much of left criticism has devoted itself to the issue of the body, of the social construction of sexuality and gender.”

Although some scholars, including Susan Wendell, Barbara Fawcett, Bonnie Smith, Sumi Colligan, and Robert McRuer, have attempted to bridge the gap between gender studies, queer studies, and disability studies, many of Davis’s criticisms remain as valid today as when he made them in 1995. One can only hope that as more disability scholars build upon the work of Davis, we can convince those scholars outside of disability studies about the importance of disability bias and those categories that have played such an important role in perpetuating that bias throughout the recorded history of the West.

Returning to the question of whether the hunchback Kierkegaard believed that he was witnessing the development of a new type of disability discourse that marginalized people like him and his crippled cousin, then, is far more complex than many disability scholars might assume. There is no question that developments from classical antiquity to the aftermath of World War I altered able-bodied society’s views about disability in significant ways. Cultural representations of disability from the French Revolution through World War I, as I discuss in chapter 8, often differed greatly from earlier representations. The various categories for disabled people, along with the stigma and discrimination associated with them, did not disappear during this period, even as the western world experienced a wide array of rapid changes. Indeed, able-bodied society continued to marginalize disabled people by referring to them as monsters, dwarfs,
hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the deaf and dumb. Yet the advent of modernity did alter the precise ways in which able-bodied people understood and employed those ancient categories. In addition, able-bodied society increasingly placed disabled people in new categories such as degenerates, patients, and welfare recipients. The story of this dissertation, then, is how the evolution of ideas about disability from classical antiquity through World War I contributed to the advent of modern disability discourse, against which, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, the disability rights movement would launch a counter-discursive assault.

Organization

After discussing disability historiography in chapter 2 and my methodology in chapter 3, I begin my fourth chapter by exploring the significance of congenital deformity and the disability problem in classical antiquity. Some Greeks and Romans attributed congenital deformity to supernatural forces. Philosophers, however, often rejected supernatural reasons for congenital deformity, generally contending that monstrous births were mere accidents that deviated from the ordinary rationality of nature. Yet some philosophers rejected the idea that there was any such rationality in the natural world, arguing instead that chance produced natural phenomena, including congenital deformity. Empedocles, a Presocratic with a wide range of interests, for example, attributed congenital deformity to spontaneous generation and chance. According to Empedocles, body parts spring from the earth through spontaneous generation and randomly attach to other body parts. Eventually, he posited, the random combination of body parts results in complete organisms able to survive and reproduce, while imperfect monstrosities are unable to propagate their kind. Epicureans, including Lucretius, who adopted the
atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, likewise attributed congenital deformity to chance. Hippocratic authors, by contrast, criticized both superstitious explanations for illnesses, diseases, and congenital deformities as well as the wild speculations of philosophers such as Empedocles who attempted to ascertain the origins of human beings. Despite this wide range of views with respect to the significance of congenital deformity, there was always a tremendous amount of stigma and discrimination that accompanied categories for disabled people in classical antiquity. In the second part of chapter 4, I explore classical solutions to the disability problem, which ranged from mandatory infanticide to begging and state-sponsored disability pension systems.

The fifth chapter looks at the significance of congenital deformity and the disability problem from the reigns of Constantine’s immediate successors to the middle of the seventeenth century. Before addressing those two ideas, however, I follow Stiker in examining what the Hebrew Bible and Christian scriptures reveal about disabled people in the Judeo-Christian tradition, agreeing with Stiker that those texts have been particularly important for Christian ideas about disability, which, of course, highly influenced the western understanding of disability from late antiquity to the middle of the seventeenth century. I then explore Saint Augustine’s and Saint Isidore of Seville’s view that deformity was part of God’s plan for the natural world as well as a means of communicating with mortals. In addressing the disability problem in what essentially amounts to the Christian tradition, I once again follow Stiker, who has observed that Latin Christendom primarily addressed its disability problem by creating a system that relied on both begging and institutional care. According to Zina Weygand, moreover, Louis IX, more commonly called Saint Louis, paved the way for greater state
involvement in providing aid directly to disabled people as a means of addressing the disability problem when he founded the Quinz-Vignts, the legendary hospice for the blind, in 1256.

The sixth chapter examines congenital deformity and the disability problem from the middle of the seventeenth century to the French Revolution, a period that encompasses both the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. For purposes of discussions about the significance of congenital deformity, there were three major inquires during this time period. First, a number of thinkers looked at congenital deformity when exploring the emerging mechanistic world view, which envisioned nature as a machine created by God. Descartes, for example, used the example of the man born blind to understand the sense of sight and light. Second, philosophers and poets such as Leibniz, Pope, and Voltaire, influenced by the mechanistic world view, explored the significance of congenital deformity when addressing the problem of theodicy, i.e., why God permits evil to exist if He is both perfectly good and omnipotent. Third, some radical philosophers of the Enlightenment looked to Epicurus, Lucretius, Spinoza, and Hobbes to challenge the Christian and Deist understanding of nature and deformity. Epicurean ideas would prove to be a particularly perplexing problem for Christians and Deists. Radicals reexamined the old Epicurean belief that matter in motion, governed by chance, was responsible for the diversity of the natural world, including congenital deformity. Radicals such as La Mettrie, Diderot, and Maupertuis, for instance, relied, in part, on Epicurean materialism to challenge the idea that nature was the product of design. In his famous Letter on the Blind, Diderot offered a proto-evolutionary explanation of congenital deformity, based on Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, as well as a
fictional account of the blind mathematician Nicholas Saunderson to mount a powerful challenge both to the traditional Christian view of nature as well as the idea of design. In addition, Diderot relied on the materialism of Lucretius to offer his views on the problem of theodicy, suggesting that an enlightened person with a serious disability could never believe in a natural world governed by design. The French authorities, of course, recognizing the potential danger in Diderot’s arguments, famously arrested and imprisoned him.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, meanwhile, a growing number of westerners were coming to the realization that the traditional Christian system of almsgiving and institutional care was not adequately dealing with the disability problem. After the devastation wrought by the Thirty Years’ War, Louis XIV constructed the Hôtel des Invalides not only to provide meaningful assistance to disabled veterans in need but also to protect the countryside from marauding veterans who, because of their military training, could terrorize civilians in spite of their disabilities. Eighteenth-century philanthropists such as Abbé Charles-Michel de L’Epée and Valentin Haüy, moreover, concluded that the best way to address the disability problem with respect to the deaf and dumb and the blind was to educate them.

The seventh chapter looks at the significance of congenital deformity and the disability problem from the French Revolution through World War I. It examines how Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection finally offered a materialist explanation for the nature of things, one that viewed congenital deformities as mutations indicative of progressive processes that have resulted in the evolution of species. It further looks at how others employed the Darwinian understanding of nature to address the disability
problem. Indeed, Sir Francis Galton, Darwin’s own half-cousin, used insights gleaned from Darwin’s works to found the eugenics movement, which, in part, attempted to combine Darwin’s ideas about mutations and the evolution of species with techniques perfected in animal husbandry and horticulture to decrease the number of burdensome people with congenital deformities who, by their very existence, weakened the strength of their nation. Other developments during the nineteenth century, including the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the growth of capitalism, the increasing power of the medical profession, the rise of the modern nation-state, and the unprecedented industrial slaughter of World War I, likewise added new dimensions to the disability problem. In general, both doctors and the state would assume an increasing amount of control over the daily lives of people with disabilities, even if religious charity and private philanthropy continued to play a significant role in providing aid to the disabled. It was not until the birth of the disabled rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s that disabled people would begin to regain some of their autonomy lost to the medical profession and the state during this period.

The eighth chapter examines how able-bodied people during the long nineteenth century continued to use pre-modern and early modern categories for disabled people, albeit often in new ways that recognized the swift changes from the French Revolution through World War I. Indeed, deformed and disabled people still had to endure the stigma and discrimination associated with categories such as monsters, hunchbacks, cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs, even as able-bodied observers explored new conceptions of deformity and disability. The result was a hybrid disability
discourse that juxtaposed pre-modern and early modern ideas about disability with the nascent, modern understanding of disability.

6 Ibid., 56.
7 Ibid.
9 Davis argues, for instance, that even “dramatic deformities” in the pre-modern world . . . were met with a strange calm affect. . . . Those who saw monsters in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not spell out their reactions in any great emotional detail.” Davis, “Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and the Discourse of Disability in the Eighteenth Century,” 59.
10 Ibid., 58.
11 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 29-30.
17 Ibid.
21 See ibid.
22 Voltaire, Correspondence 101:XVII, 1756-1757: D6738.
23 For Johnson’s problems with depression, see Davis, “Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and the Discourse of Disability in the Eighteenth Century,” 55.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 According to Saussurean structural linguistics, of course, a sign is comprised of both a signifier and a signified.
34 Davis, Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and the Discourse of Disability in the Eighteenth Century,” 56.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Davis, *Enforcing Normalcy*, 4-5.
42 Ibid., 5.
44 For Davis’ view of categories such as “giantism, dwarfism or hunchback formations,” see Davis, “Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and the Discourse of Disability in the Eighteenth Century,” 58.
Chapter 2: Historiography

The Problem with Disability History

Promising Beginnings: The Rise of Disability History Alongside the Histories of other Marginalized Groups

Before the 1960s, historians of the West focused primarily on high politics and high culture, banishing marginalized groups to the penumbras of the historical metanarrative. Three developments during the 1960s and 1970s, however, opened the way for marginalized groups to explore finally their own histories in an academic setting. First, in 1963, E.P. Thompson’s *The Making of the English Working Class*, steeped in the Marxist tradition that lauded the virtues of the working class and excoriated the bourgeoisie that oppressed it, virtually invented social history by introducing a new generation of historians to “history from below.”¹ This new generation adopted Thompson’s approach with alacrity, creating a new zeitgeist of historical inquiry by seeking to uncover the forgotten lives of ordinary people belonging to marginalized groups. To a large extent, these efforts proved to be successful, as the new practice of social history lifted “from obscurity the lives of those who had been swept to the sidelines in the metahistory of progress.”²

Second, the linguistic turn, the origins of which lay in the works of several linguists and philosophers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ferdinand de Saussure, Roland Barthes, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Clifford Geertz, demonstrated to scholars that language creates considerable obstacles in attempting to reconstruct the past.³ Whereas scholars were once convinced that they could study languages of the past, read texts in those languages, and then make concrete truth claims based on what they perceived to be objective readings of those texts, scholars after the linguistic turn became increasingly...
aware that language did not operate in such a simple manner. Indeed, scholars became
less convinced of the universal character of language and hence of our ability to decipher
it. The problem was particularly strong with respect to historical inquiry, a process that
necessarily requires historians to amalgamate historical “facts” with not only their own
understanding of language but also their preconceived notions of history.

The linguistic turn itself, of course, was not responsible for the notion that
historical facts were problematic. David Hume, after all, pointed out in 1757 that a
“historical fact, while it passes by oral tradition from eye-witnesses and contemporaries,
is disguised in every successive narration, and may at last retain but very small, if any,
resemblance of the original truth, on which it was founded.”

In 1938, before the
linguistic turn revolutionized historical research, Jean-Paul Sartre likewise explored the
problem of language and truth claims in *Nausea*, a novel purporting to be a diary from
the fictional Antoine Roquentin, a historian writing a biography of Marquis de Rollebon.
After trying desperately to prove events in Marquis de Rollebon’s life, Roquentin realizes
that a historian can never truly prove anything because writing history is more about
constructing fictional narratives than representing the past as it actually occurred:

> Well, yes [Marquis de Rollebon] could have done all that, but it is not proved: I
am beginning to believe that nothing can ever be proved. These are honest
hypotheses which take the facts into account; but I sense so definitely that they
come from me, and that they are simply a way of unifying my own knowledge.
Not a glimmer comes from Rollebon’s side. Slow, lazy, sulky, the facts adapt
themselves to the rigour of the order I wish to give them; but it remains outside of
them. I have the feeling of doing a work of pure imagination. And I am certain
that the characters in a novel would have a more genuine appearance. . . .

Hans-Georg Gadamer, relying heavily on Martin Heidegger’s reworking of the
hermeneutic circle, moreover, demonstrated convincingly that all historians have
prejudices or prej udgments that invariably permeate their historical accounts. According
to Gadamer, we are all offspring of traditions—whether cultural, religious, economic, etc.—and we should not pretend that we can somehow stand aloof from them. Instead, through a conversation with texts, we can fuse together our present historical consciousness with the horizons of the past to create a fusion of horizons. This fusion amounts to “one great horizon that moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of our self-consciousness.” As Gadamer proclaimed, “[o]ur past, and that other past towards which our historical consciousness is directed, help to shape this moving horizon out of which human life always lives, and which determines it as tradition.”

The linguistic turn, however, unquestionably heightened historians’ awareness of the problem of language and truth claims in the latter half of the twentieth century. Hayden White’s *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (1973), for instance, examined the precise ways in which nineteenth-century historians used their imaginations to construct historical narratives, analyzing how those historians employed a variety of different tropes, which effectively injected their own imaginations into the histories that they thought were objective. By the 1980s, few historians were brazen enough to proclaim that it was a simple task to produce objective historical narratives.

This nascent understanding of language vis-à-vis history provided post-Thompson historians with exciting new tools for examining the ways in which the metanarrative has excluded certain groups. More importantly, as historians learned how language has contributed to the further marginalization of historically disadvantaged groups, they were better able to launch effective attacks on the inadequacies of the metanarrative. Indeed,
by unveiling, in meticulous detail, how a myriad of unfounded assumptions had led to fundamental misunderstandings with respect to the operation of language, historians of marginalized groups were able to demonstrate specific ways in which improper conceptions of language had resulted in a flawed metanarrative.

The final development was the proliferation of Foucault’s arguments regarding knowledge and power, which, of course, were inextricably intertwined with the linguistic turn. Foucault showed historians that there was no single “truth” that history could reveal but rather only a multiplicity of “truths.” Foucault, in a sense, inverted the old adage “knowledge is power” when delineating his concept of power-knowledge, demonstrating that power creates knowledge by determining “the conditions in which particular knowledge-forms (‘epistemes, as he called them’) come into being and find sustenance.”

For Foucauldians, then, historical knowledge or historical “truth,” invariably reflects power relationships in any given society. This is not so say, of course, that Foucault was the first relativist. As White recognized in *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, the skeptics of antiquity were likewise proud proponents of relativism. Yet the ingenious way in which Foucault described relativism in the context of power relationships catapulted relativism into the debate over history, power, and knowledge. Joan Wallach Scott, for example, has argued that a proper understanding of the processes through which we create knowledge—and thus history—strengthens the feminist assault on male-dominated hierarchies by promoting a different political agenda, one that rejects the traditional power relationships between the sexes. And indeed, as Scott has unabashedly proclaimed, her ultimate goal as a historian “is one I share with
other feminists and it is avowedly political: to point out and change inequalities between women and men.”

This flurry of challenges to the traditional metanarrative, then, produced new ways of writing history as well as new ways of thinking about history, including the nascent field of disability history. So little work has been done on disability historiography, however, that it is virtually impossible to understand disability historiography without reference to the historiography of other marginalized groups. Although some disability scholars might consider this as yet another example of the troubled state of disability studies, proof that disability history lags far behind other types of history even with respect to a consciousness of its own past, it is, in fact, a remarkable opportunity. Indeed, disability historiographers, in the very first analyses of disability historiography, are able to compare disability historiography to the historiographies of other marginalized groups to determine what similarities and differences there may be.

Women’s history, along with its progeny, gender history, as well as the history of homosexuality are perhaps the best models for understanding disability historiography. For obvious reasons, the relationship between the normal body and the deviant body is one of the most salient features of disability history. Women’s history, gender history, and the history of homosexuality likewise recognize the importance of the body, including the deviant body. This shared interest in the body, in fact, has resulted in at least some shared theoretical and methodological commonalities, which perhaps explain the growing interest in disability studies among both gender scholars and gay and lesbian scholars. In 2004, for example, Bonnie Smith co-edited and wrote the introduction of *Gendering Disability*, which contains seventeen essays that explore the relationship
between gender and disability. Robert McRuer’s *Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability*, as the name suggests, builds on queer theory to gain a better understanding of disability studies. Sumi Colligan’s essay in *Gendering Disability*, “Why the Intersexed Shouldn’t Be Fixed: Insights from Queer Theory and Disability Studies,” goes even further, demonstrating the interrelatedness of gender theory, queer theory, and disability theory. In 2011, Kim Q. Hall edited *Feminist Disability Studies*, which further demonstrates the close relationship between disability studies and gender and queer studies. Accordingly, examining the ways in which disability history has mirrored women’s history, gender history, and the history of homosexuality as well as the ways in which it has differed from them can reveal a great deal about the past and future trajectories of disability historiography.

Women’s history, as Natalie Zemon Davis has pointed out, did not begin in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather, “[i]n one form it goes back to Plutarch, who composed little biographies of virtuous women, intended to show that the female sex could and should profit by education.” According to Davis, this type of history resurfaced with Boccaccio in the fourteenth century with accounts of “Women Worthies,” which, Davis contends, continued to be an important component of women’s history in the 1970s. But in the decade after E.P. Thompson, women historians went beyond the study of such prominent women, commencing the women’s history movement. Alice Kessler-Harris, a pioneer of women’s history, recently discussed the emergence of the field in the late 1960s and early 1970s:

> When I entered the profession in the late 1960s, there was no such field as “women’s history,” and only a few enterprising souls were willing to explore the arena. I was part of that lucky generation of scholars positioned to open up
professional organizations, to place women in their governing bodies, to ensure that their programs and journals provided outlets for the history of women.\textsuperscript{14}

By the early 1970s, she observes, “historians of women linked such issues of equity to increasing interest in the history of women — and the field of women's history was born.”\textsuperscript{15} In the early days of the movement, feminist historians were primarily concerned with uncovering the history of women and thus demonstrated relatively little concern with all-encompassing theoretical frameworks that would help historians understand the historical data that they were uncovering.\textsuperscript{16} By the mid-1980s, however, they began to construct theoretical frameworks with which to understand better the history of women.

The most important theoretical shift was the move away from “women’s history” to the study of “gender history.”\textsuperscript{17} In her introduction to \textit{Gender and the Politics of History}, for example, Scott explains how Foucauldian notions of power-knowledge enabled feminists to define “sex” as biological differences and to define “gender” as “knowledge about sexual difference” and “the social organization of sexual difference.”\textsuperscript{18} What is so important about this development for the understanding of disability historiography is that historians of women benefited from years of research about the history of women before attempting to tackle difficult theoretical frameworks. Accordingly, when scholars did shift their focus from women to gender, they did so with access to a wide array of historical accounts of both “Women Worthies” and ordinary women.

The history of homosexuality, like women’s history, may have had its equivalent to “Worthies.” Historians, after all, have often discussed the homosexuality of such figures as Sappho, Hadrian, and Oscar Wilde. The history of homosexuality as a distinct field of study, however, did not originate until the 1970s and 1980s. When it did, it followed in the footsteps of women’s history by uncovering the history of homosexuality
without relying on theoretical frameworks. Indeed, there is very little theory in the two seminal works on the history of homosexuality, K.J. Dover’s *Greek Homosexuality* (1978) and John Boswell’s *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century* (1980). Boswell, in fact, expressly argued that historians of marginalized groups should avoid the use of theory in a historical context until there is ample historical data upon which to base those theories. According to Boswell, from the historian’s perspective,

*general theories are of little value unless rooted in and supported by specific studies of particular cases, and since there are so few of these at present to substantiate ideas regarding intolerance, it has seemed more useful to provide data for eventual synthetic analysis by others than to embark prematurely on the analysis itself. This approach has the egregious disadvantage of producing in effect, an elaborate description of a single piece of an unassembled puzzle, but given the extreme difficulty of even identifying, much less assembling, all the other pieces, it appears to be the most constructive effort possible at present. It has, moreover, the compensating advantage of allowing the data assembled to be employed within any larger theoretical framework, historical or scientific, current or subsequent, since there is little built-in theoretical bias.*

Boswell, of course, did adopt somewhat of a theoretical framework in distinguishing between people who are gay and people who engage in homosexual behavior. Boswell used the adjective “gay” to refer “to persons who are conscious of erotic inclination toward their own gender as a distinguishing characteristic” and “homosexual” to refer to “all sexual phenomena between persons of the same gender, whether the result of conscious preference, subliminal desire, or circumstantial exigency.” Boswell, however, consciously rejected the use of Foucauldian notions of sexuality and other all-encompassing theories that, in his mind, likely would have distorted his historical data. Foucault himself recognized the importance of Boswell’s approach, explaining that

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“‘Boswell’s book has provided me with a guide for what to look for in the meaning people attached to their sexual behavior.’”  

Disability history likewise had its “Worthies,” including Homer, Aesop, Agesilaus II, Claudius, Didymus, John Milton, Alexander Pope, Georges Couthon, Kierkegaard, Lord Byron, Helen Keller, and others. When the disability rights movement itself came into existence between the 1960s and 1970s, then, disability history could have followed the same course as women’s history and the history of homosexuality. Indeed, the early disability historians could have attempted to uncover the history of disability before tackling complex theories. In 1982, Stiker succeeded in doing just that when he published *A History of Disability*. Although Stiker utilized some theory and was familiar with Foucault, he generally restricted his efforts to the uncovering of disability history without attempting to fit his historical data into any overarching theoretical framework. With little theoretical bias woven into his narrative, Stiker examined the history of disability from classical antiquity and the Bible to later attempts to rehabilitate disabled people in the modern world. As David T. Mitchell recognizes in the forward to the 1997 edition, “unlike Foucault, Stiker works against a view of history as a series of ruptures or breaks in the construction of disability. Instead, he argues for a continuum of effects in which one epoch’s beliefs continue to inform the practices of succeeding generations.” Stiker, however, does see some ruptures in disability history. As I explain in chapter 5, Stiker views the *vitae* of Zotikos as a major rupture between disability in classical antiquity and the Christian view of disability.
The “Disability Turn”: A Successful Counter-Discursive Strategy, but a Wrong Turn for Disability History

Although Stiker’s book might have inspired disability historians to undertake similar efforts to uncover the history of disability relatively free from theoretical bias, at least two developments diverted disability history from that course. First, for reasons that escape even Stiker, French historians seemed relatively uninterested in disability history in the 1980s and 1990s. This lack of interest among French historians left Anglo-American historians as the primary progenitors of western disability history for quite some time. Second, developments in the Anglo-American disability movement that had been brewing since the 1960s produced a generation of disability scholars who were far more concerned with creating a theoretical framework for understanding disability than emulating Stiker’s approach of uncovering disability history relatively free from theoretical constraints. In particular, disability activists and scholars adopted a counter-discursive strategy against the able-bodied establishment in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, which culminated in what I call the “disability turn,” a fundamental transformation in the concept of “disability.”

Prior to the 1960s and 1970s, able-bodied doctors, healthcare providers, medical sociologists, lawyers, and educators, among others, subscribed to the medical model of disability, which “employs objective, clear-cut, standardized measures and, as the name suggests, uses experts such as physicians, to provide defining characteristics, causes, prognoses, and methods of treatment.” In the 1960s, disability activists and scholars, primarily from England, began to question the medical model’s definition of disability. In 1966, for example, twelve disability activists and scholars, all of whom had some type of physical disability, contributed to *Stigma: The Experience of Disability.* While the
anthology’s authors did not, for the most part, directly challenge the medical model, they did attempt to inculcate the importance of examining stigma and discrimination when attempting to understand the experience of disability. Over time, however, disability activists and scholars became increasingly frustrated that their efforts had failed to captivate the attention of the medical, legal, educational, and academic establishments. Indeed, instead of acknowledging stigma and discrimination as important aspects of the experience of disability, able-bodied people in positions of power stubbornly clung to their medical model of disability, as if they somehow understood the experience of disability better than disabled people themselves.

In 1972, Paul Hunt, editor of *Stigma: The Experience of Disability*, with the help of Vic Finkelstein, a disabled activist and scholar from South Africa exiled to the United Kingdom because of his opposition to Apartheid, and others, formed the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) to assert the interests of the disabled. In 1976, in a counter-discursive stratagem of sheer brilliance that in some ways resembles the feminist distinction between sex and gender, UPIAS issued a *Statement of Fundamental Principles*, which reiterated the importance of stigma and discrimination by rejecting the medical model’s definition of disability out of hand. What the medical model defined as “disability,” UPIAS argued, was better understood as “impairment,” while “disability” was the stigma and discrimination that accompanies impairment:

In our view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. To understand this it is necessary to grasp the distinction between the physical impairment and the social situation, called “disability”, of people with such impairment. Thus we define impairment as lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, organism or mechanism of the body: and disability as the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organisation of activity
caused by a contemporary social organisation which takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them in the mainstream of social activities. Physical disability is therefore a particular form of social oppression. . . .

It is clear that our social organisation does not discriminate equally against all physical impairments and hence there arises the appearance of degrees of exclusion (degrees of disability). For example people having mild visual impairments (wearing glasses) are doubtless not more impoverished than their visually unimpaired peers. Our social organisation does not exclude people using glasses to the same extent that it excludes people who are blind, or deaf, or cannot speak, or who have brain damage, or who use wheelchairs. Nevertheless it is the same society which disables people whatever their type, or degree of physical impairment, and therefore there is a single cause within in the organisation of society that is responsible for the creation of disability of physically impaired people. . . .

The substantive argument behind the Statement of Fundamental Principles, of course, had not deviated greatly from the work of disability activists and scholars in the 1960s and early 1970s. UPIAS continued to acknowledge, as had previous disability activists and scholars, that there was some merit to the medical model’s definition of disability, namely the incontrovertible fact that serious physical conditions can profoundly impact a person’s life irrespective of the ways in which society treats that person. Indeed, UPIAS was merely reiterating the longstanding argument that any disability model that disregards the ways in which society stigmatizes and discriminates against disabled people cannot possibly hope to define “disability.”

It was the counter-discursive strategy devised by UPIAS to reformulate the argument, far more than substance of the argument itself, which would alter the meaning of “disability.” By redefining, on the one hand, the word “disability” to denote stigma and discrimination and, on the other, the term “physical impairment” to denote physical conditions, emphasizing, of course, the importance of the former over the latter, UPIAS’s approach presented disability activists and scholars with an opportunity to force the
proponents of the medical model to take notice and defend their own definition of
disability. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, disability activists and scholars increasingly
used UPIAS’s distinction between “disability” and “physical impairment” as a counter-
 discursive tool in the battle to assert their independence from those whom they
considered their able-bodied overlords.

The most important disabled person to embrace UPIAS’s model of disability was
Michael Oliver, perhaps the single most influential disability scholar in the brief history
of the disability studies movement. In his 1983 book, Social Work with Disabled People,
Oliver lent further academic credibility to UPIAS’s distinction between “disability” and
“impairment” by promulgating his social model of disability.\(^\text{30}\) Oliver, like UPIAS,
attempted to “switch away from focusing on the physical limitations of particular
individuals to the way the physical and social environments impose limitations on certain
groups or categories of people.”\(^\text{31}\) According to Oliver, the medical model is an improper
“individual model” because it first “locates the ‘problem’ of disability within the
individual” and second “sees the causes of this problem as stemming from the functional
limitations or psychological losses which are assumed to arise from disability.”\(^\text{32}\) Oliver’s
social model, by contrast, was the creation of disabled people themselves, reflecting their
recognition that disability is much more than an individual’s experience with impairment.
Indeed, as Oliver has explained, the “genesis, development and articulation of the social
model of disability by disabled people themselves is a rejection of all of [the
fundamentals of the individual model].”\(^\text{33}\)

Within a relatively short period of time, Oliver’s social model of disability
became so popular among disabled people that the able-bodied establishment had no
choice but finally to enter into a dialogue regarding the experience of disability. This does not mean, of course, that able-bodied society completely abandoned its former views about disability to embrace enthusiastically the social model. Indeed, as Leslie Pickering Francis has demonstrated, disability policy debates about what justice requires of able-bodied society with respect to disability continue to focus on both the medical model, which views disability as an undesirable impairment in need of treatment, and the social model, which emphasizes societal exclusion. The counter-discursive power of the social model, however, has proved resilient enough that ethical and policy debates about disability and justice rarely rely on the medical model of disability to the exclusion of the social model.

The prolonged struggle with the able-bodied establishment over the meaning of disability has had an equally important impact on the formation of disability identity. Indeed, in the process of asserting disability rights via the social model of disability, a new consciousness of disability arose among some people with disabilities, one that recognized the rhetorical and political power of amalgamating under the rubric “disability.” Before long, it was possible, for the first time, to discuss seriously the emergence of a nascent “disabled” community and a “disabled” culture, although some groups, particularly the deaf, attempted to distance themselves from any association with disability. As Davis points out in Enforcing Normalcy, however, it is not yet possible “to capitalize disabled.” Indeed, although “[t]o be culturally Deaf is a reality, to be culturally Disabled is at this point perhaps only a Utopian wish that is gaining ground.” It is this turn of events, then, that I call the disability turn, one of those rare instances in human history in which a marginalized group has succeeded in manipulating the
language of those in power to subvert—through the application of a conscious, counter-
discursive strategy—the very power that language should have protected.

As is so often the case with such revolutionary developments, however, there
were some unfortunate, yet perhaps inevitable and necessary, consequences—inevitable
and necessary not in a teleological sense but rather in the sense that it may have been
impossible to force the able-bodied establishment into a discourse about stigma and
discrimination without them. By delving into a theoretical framework of what constituted
disability at the very beginning of the disability studies movement, disability activists and
scholars had opened Pandora’s Box; as disability activists and scholars waged counter-
discursive warfare over the meaning of disability, they naturally looked to theories that
could explain, historically, how able-bodied people had distorted the true experience of
disability. Rather than simply attempting to uncover the neglected history of disability
and disabled people as historians of women and homosexuality had done, disability
scholars sought to explain how and why this distortion occurred. In particular, they
attempted to explain that what able-bodied people considered the “traditional”
discrimination of disabled people was nothing of the sort. In essence, they waged a bitter
struggle against the potential dangers of adherence to tradition that Heidegger identified
in Being and Time:

Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-confidence; it blocks our access to those primordial “sources” from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed, it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to the sources is something which we need not even understand.
In particular, disability scholars battled against what they perceived to be the prevailing notion among able-bodied people that the systematic exclusion of the disabled from society was justified because such exclusion was the result of human nature and thus had always existed. Disabled people, of course, were understandably furious at the notion of being deprived of so many rights in accordance with tradition. Just as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once famously declared that “[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV,” so too is it disheartening for a group of people to find themselves excluded from society on the basis of mindless adherence to tradition.

Unfortunately, however, disability scholars sometimes put the proverbial cart before the horse in their attempts to overcome traditional conceptions of disability. Although they should have followed Stiker’s lead in uncovering the history of disabled people before submerging themselves in complex theoretical frameworks, theory often guided their historical inquiries from the outset. Such theoretically driven historical inquiries are problematic because, as Boswell noted in the context of homosexuality, the application of theory can predetermine the result of any inquiry, historical or otherwise. “Every inquiry is a seeking [Suchen],” Heidegger reminds us, and “[e]very seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought.” Accordingly, when historians consciously employ theory in any historical inquiry so as to prove that theory or disprove another, rather than simply explore the past free from excessive theoretical bias, they invariably increase the risk of substantially distorting their historical accounts. I am not arguing, of course, that it is ever truly possible for historians to overcome the problem of injecting
bias into our historical accounts, but the dogmatic application of theory unduly exacerbates the already considerable problem of historical bias.

The first scholars to apply theory to disability history were not disability historians but those scholars and activists in Britain, including Oliver and Finkelstein, who helped effect the disability turn in the first place. Oliver and Finkelstein, perhaps familiar with the Marxist revolution in history that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, seemingly applied some Marxist concepts to disability history. Finkelstein, for example, argued in *Attitudes and Disabled People* (1980) that disability was the direct result of capitalism. Oliver agreed, contending that “the dominant social perception of disabled people as ‘dependent’ stems not from their inability to work because of their physical limitations but because of the way in which work is organized in a modern industrial society.” These scholars, who virtually created the field of disability studies as we know it today, continued to wield enormous influence within the disability movement for many years. This was especially true with respect to Oliver as the progenitor of the social model of disability. Davis, for instance, has noted the importance of Oliver’s ideas regarding capitalism and impairment, explaining that “[m]any historians, including Michael Oliver . . . see a profound change in conceptions of normalcy and the body when industrialization made the standardized body necessary for both the factory line and its products while relegating the ‘abnormal body’ to the welfare rolls.” Irina Metzler, moreover, relies on Oliver’s social model of disability to distinguish between disabled people in medieval Europe and disabled people in the modern world.

After Marxism’s influence over history began to wane in the late-1980s and early-1990s, disability scholars increasingly began to embrace Foucault and to question the
social model of disability, setting the stage for the application of today’s influential theory—Foucault’s notions of power-knowledge and bio-power—to disability history with the unfortunate effect, at times, of reinforcing the notion that the stigmatization of disability is a modern phenomenon. This is not to assert, of course, that the concepts of power-knowledge and bio-power are irrelevant. Just as capitalism no doubt had profound implications for disabled people, so too can a proper interpretation of both power-knowledge and bio-power augment our historical analyses. Unfortunately, however, many disability historians who apply Foucauldian concepts, like adherents to the social model of disability who have blamed capitalism and industrialization for negative attitudes about the disabled, are too quick to attribute the stigma and discrimination associated with disability to Foucauldian concepts of the modern disciplines and bio-power with little more than a cursory examination of disability before the rise of the “great confinement” and the birth of the modern nation-state.

The transition from the social model of disability to a Foucauldian understanding of disability is evident in the work of Lennard Davis. In “Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and the Discourse of Disability,” Davis notes that “[c]ontemporary theoreticians of disability distinguish between an impairment and a disability. An impairment is a physical fact, but a disability is a social construction.” Davis, however, builds on the social model of disability to emphasize what he has called a “constructionist model” which, as Edward Wheatley has observed, highlights the artificiality of the process through which people with impairments become disabled. Foucault, of course, is critically important for Davis’ “constructionist model.” Indeed, in explaining the importance of social constructions with respect to disability, Davis demonstrates his reliance on Foucault,
contending that “[t]he term *disability* is a categorization tied to the development of discourses that aim to cure, remediate, or catalog variations in bodies.”

Shelley Tremain, perhaps the most important Foucauldian scholar in the disability movement, has further attempted to fashion a Foucauldian understanding of disability. She cogently defines bio-power as “the strategic tendency of relatively recent forms of power/knowledge to work toward an increasingly comprehensive management of life: both the life of the individual and the life of the species.” Tremain, moreover, argues that over the “past two centuries, in particular, a vast apparatus, erected to secure the well-being of the general population, has caused the contemporary disabled subject to emerge into discourse and social existence.” This apparatus, Tremain contends, has “created, classified, and codified, managed, and controlled social anomalies through which some people have been divided from others and *objectivized* as (for instance) physically impaired, insane, handicapped, mentally ill, retarded, and deaf.” For Tremain, then, the “division, classification, and ordering around a norm,” —in this case the able-bodied norm—has, as John Rajchman has argued, “become the means through which to identify subjects and to make them identify themselves in order to make them governable.”

Tremain’s application of Foucault to disability history itself is not problematic. She is careful to explain that bio-power created “the *contemporary* disabled subject,” apparently concluding, as Foucault surely would have as well, that disabled people must have experienced stigma and discrimination before the eighteenth century. For Tremain, then, although the ways in which society stigmatized and discriminated against the disabled changed from pre-modern to modern times, bio-power did not *create* stigma and
discrimination. But some disability scholars who apply Foucault to disability history have, at times, underestimated the extent to which stigma and discrimination accompanied disability in the pre-modern world. We have already seen how Davis, applying a Foucauldian understanding of history, has sometimes too readily found in pre-modern societies a willingness to embrace the disabled even though he admits that able-bodied people in preindustrial societies did not treat disabled people “kindly.” In my view, however, Davis is perfectly capable of making the case that “disability, as we know the concept, is really a socially driven relation to the body that became relatively organized in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,” without going so far as to conclude that able-bodied people in preindustrial societies welcomed the disabled into the “social fabric.” Davis’ Foucauldian understanding of history likewise appears to be behind his claim that, based on lexicographical evidence, “it is possible to date the coming into consciousness in English of an idea of ‘the norm’ over the period 1840-1860.” According to Davis, “the word ‘normal’ as ‘constituting, conforming to, not deviating or different from, the common type or standard, regular usual,’ only enters the English language around 1840.” Before the advent of the norm, Davis argues, pre-modern languages differentiated between deviant, deformed bodies by viewing them as grotesque rather than disabled. “The grotesque,” according to Davis, “permeated culture and signified a common humanity, whereas the disabled body, a later concept, was formulated as by definition excluded from culture, society, the norm.” I agree that industrial societies did indeed exclude disabled people by fashioning a new understanding of disability that distinguished the deformed and the disabled from the able-bodied norm. Yet able-bodied people in preindustrial societies likewise segregated
and ostracized the disabled by creating a pre-modern disability discourse centered around (1) the idea that there was something significant about the existence of congenital deformity, (2) the idea that there was a disability problem, and (3) the pervasiveness of categories such as monsters, dwarfs, hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the deaf and dumb.

When the ancient Greeks and Romans referred to people with serious congenital deformities as monsters, for instance, they were expressing strong prejudices against congenital deformity and the congenitally deformed. Indeed, by calling a human infant a “monster” so as to explain how he or she deviated from an ordinary, able-bodied infant, the Greeks and Romans were not using the term “monster” as a value-free label to describe congenitally deformed people. “Monster,” after all, comes about as close as possible to forming a binary opposition with “human”; to be a monster is to be something other than a human being. As Aristotle proclaims in *Generation of Animals*, “[m]ales take after their father more than their mother, females after their mother. Some take after none of their kindred, although they take after a human being at any rate; others do not take after a human being at all in their appearance, but have gone so far that they resemble a monster (*terati*). . . .” When Aristotle contends just a few lines later, then, that women are a type of “monster” because they deviate from the male norm, he is most certainly expressing the view of able-bodied, Greek males that both women and congenitally deformed people are inferior to the able-bodied, male standard.

“Cripple,” moreover, differentiated a person who had ambulatory difficulties from people who ambulated normally long before the transition to the capitalist mode of production or the rise of the modern nation-state. The same is true for terms such as
hunchbacks, dwarfs, the blind, and the deaf and dumb, all of which have denoted some stigmatized deviation from aesthetic or functional norms throughout the recorded history of the West. Contrary to Davis’ assertions, then, English never needed the word “norm” to be in a lexicon for English speakers to express deviations from aesthetic and functional norms and thus to stigmatize disability because nearly every word that denotes physical disability, in nearly every language and in nearly every time period, rests upon some hierarchical understanding of normal and abnormal bodies. Indeed, as Scott has noted, “hierarchy and power are inherent” in the construction of language.63

In any event, Foucault himself never argued that the stigma and discrimination associated with disability suddenly came into existence with the advent of industrialization or the modern disciplines. In Discipline and Punish, for example, Foucault argues that “[a]ll mechanisms of power which, even today, are disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him, are composed of those two forms from which they distantly derive.”64 For Foucault, the first form was the ritualistic exclusion of lepers from the able-bodied, clean community, which Foucault identifies as the “binary division between one set of people and another” that would, “to a certain extent,” provide “the model for and general form of the great Confinement.”65 The second form, associated with how Europeans reacted to the plague in the seventeenth century, was the “tactical partitioning in which individual differentiations were the constricting effects of a power that multiplied, articulated and subdivided itself.”66 According to Foucault, then, authorities who exercised “individual control function” generally did so according to a “double mode; that of binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal); and that of coercive assignment, of
differential distribution (who he is; where he must be; how he is to be characterized; how he is to be recognized; how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him in an individual way, etc.).”  

“Treat ‘lepers’ as ‘plague victims,’ project the subtle segmentations of discipline onto the confused space of internment, combine it with methods of analytical distribution proper to power, individualize the excluded, but use procedures of individualization to mark exclusion—this,” according to Foucault, “is what was operated regularly by disciplinary power from the beginning of the of the nineteenth century in the psychiatric asylum the penitentiary, the reformatory, the approved school, and to some extent, the hospital.” For Foucault, then, “[t]he constant division between the normal and the abnormal, to which every individual is subjected, brings us back to our own time, by applying the binary branding and exile of the leper to quite different objects. . . .” Indeed, “the existence of a whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal brings into play the disciplinary mechanisms to which the fear of the plague gave rise.”  

Foucault thus does not suggest in *Discipline and Punish* that lepers in the pre-modern world were free from stigma and discrimination. Instead, Foucault considers their separation from able-bodied society to be indicative of a great binary division separating one type of human being from another. Disability scholars should be careful, of course, when relying on Foucault’s historical accounts. Because Foucault was not a historian, he exaggerates the extent to which medieval Europe separated lepers from able-bodied society. Disability historian Herbert C. Covey, for instance, has noted that although some communities “passed laws to restrict the personal freedoms of people with leprosy,
including mobility,” laws differed by locality. Relying on Jacques Le Goff, moreover, Covey explains that in medieval France lepers had the same legal rights as “healthy people except in Normandy and Beauvaisis.” He also observes that “many medieval people with leprosy resisted efforts to place them in hospitals because of the decayed and deplorable conditions they found in these facilities.” He thus seemingly agrees with R.M. Clay who long ago characterized the contacts of lepers “with the outside world as, a various ‘... mixture of strictness and laxity.’”

Yet there remains a great deal of merit to Foucault’s claim that medieval Europeans considered lepers to be outside the realm of normal human existence even if we do not go so far as to consider lepers/humans to be a great binary division. The common practice of referring to the congenitally deformed as “monsters,” along with the intermittent practice of killing such infants, which, we shall see, continued to occur even into the seventeenth century, likewise created something akin to a binary division between people with serious congenital deformities and normal, able-bodied human beings, even if that binary division was never absolute. In addition, the proliferation of other categories such as dwarfs, hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the deaf and dumb tended to reinforce the notion that congenitally deformed people were inferior to the able-bodied. To be sure, the modern world changed substantially the ways in which able-bodied people categorized, disciplined, and segregated disabled people from their able-bodied counterparts. Yet modernity simply did not give rise to the strong stigma and discrimination accompanying deformity and disability in the West.

In my view, then, the Foucauldian view of disability and disability history is not necessarily incorrect. Indeed, the Foucauldian understanding of the discursivity of
disability can provide meaningful insights into disability history. Snyder and Mitchell, moreover, make an important point about the discursivity of disability when arguing that it is possible to trace at least some negative attitudes “to the eugenics era, when disability began to be construed as an undesirable deviation from normative existence.” I simply urge scholars such as Davis, Snyder, and Mitchell not to discount the stigma and discrimination that accompanied disability in the pre-modern and early modern world.

In any event, although Stiker recognized that able-bodied westerners have always stigmatized disability, subsequent disability historians, whether because they embraced the social model of disability or Foucauldian notions of disability, were relatively uninterested in disability in the pre-modern world. In 2003, in “Why We Need Another ‘Other,’” which Wheatley has rightly recognized as an important work on disability historiography, Catherine Kudlick surveyed over 100 articles and books on disability history, mentioning only three books and three articles that addressed disability history in the pre-modern West. Since the publication of Kudlick’s article, some additional works on pre-modern disability have emerged. Combined with the existing works identified by Kudlick, there is finally sufficient historical evidence with which to begin a proper exploration of disability in the pre-modern world.

There are two important works on disability in classical antiquity. The first, Robert Garland’s 1995 *The Eye of the Beholder: Deformity and Disability in the Greco-Roman World*, explores at great length the stigmatization and discrimination of disabled people in classical antiquity. Topics that Garland covers include the killing of congenitally deformed infants, the extent to which the disabled lived half-lives, and the derision of disabled people. The second, Martha Rose’s *The Staff of Oedipus*: 
Transforming Disability in Ancient Greece, relies on Garland in arguing that, “[g]iven the Greek philosophical ideal of symmetry and balance, it is not surprising that physical deformity usually resulted in negative aesthetic evaluation.” She rightly cautions disability scholars, however, not to assume that disabled people in ancient Greece experienced the same types of stigmatization and discrimination that disabled people encounter in the modern world. Rose’s call to proceed with caution when exploring negative attitudes about disability in the pre-modern world has influenced a number of influential disability scholars. Yet Rose has sometimes presented an overly idyllic picture of disability in ancient Greece that has contributed to the idea that the stigma and discrimination associated with deformity and disability are essentially modern phenomena. David L. Braddock and Susan L. Parish, for instance, cite Rose in claiming that “the scant documentary records from ancient Greece indicates that deformity was not perceived as absolutely negative by the Greeks but that this perspective was developed by historians during the nineteenth century, who applied contemporary contempt for people with disabilities to their assessment of the ancient world.” Lennard Davis, moreover, has cited Rose in maintaining that it is simply a myth that “people with disabilities are better off in the twentieth century than in the past.”

A handful of scholars have likewise explored negative attitudes toward disability in the Judeo-Christian tradition. According to Rabbi Judith Z. Abrams, Temple priests needed to be physically perfect because they mediated “between heaven and earth, between holy and profane.” Accordingly, deformed or disabled priests, solely on account of their physical imperfections, could not perform priestly functions in the Temple. Wheatley, who has explored blindness in medieval Europe, argues that
although disability scholars who are now attempting to recover the history of disability in the Middle Ages are limited by a lack of “detailed historical sources,” some “peculiar aspects of medieval law and customs . . . made the full integration of blind people in medieval European societies problematic at best.”\textsuperscript{84} Mark P. O’Tool has agreed that the blind struggled to find acceptance among the sighted, observing that medieval French farce perpetuated the “image of quarrelsome and sexually grotesque blind beggars. . . .”\textsuperscript{85} Zina Weygand, moreover, has noted that \textit{The Boy and the Blind Man}, “one of the first examples of profane theater in French,” negatively depicts its blind character “as a hypocrite who feigns piety in order to better collect alms” and becomes “rich by public charity.”\textsuperscript{86} The blind man slowly demonstrates to his valet that he is “a drunkard and a glutton,” who is “coarse, cynical, and debauched.”\textsuperscript{87} Ultimately, the valet takes the blind man’s possessions, saying to him: “‘Shame on you! . . . To me, you are nothing but a piece of shit. You’re deceptive and envious . . . If you don’t like it, come and get me!’”\textsuperscript{88} Weygand does point out, however, that such negative depictions existed simultaneously with a strong tradition of providing alms and institutional aid to blind people.\textsuperscript{89} Metzler, meanwhile, has noted that the decretals promulgated by Pope Gregory IX, prohibited people from serving in the higher orders solely on account of their physical deformities, mutilations, and serious blemishes.\textsuperscript{90} Yet she wisely follows Rose in cautioning against applying our own biases about disability to our historical research, contending that “[t]he passage from Leviticus relating to the prohibition on ‘blemished’ men becoming priests has always been over-emphasised, in that there has been an assumption by scholars that this prohibition against disabled people was always strictly adhered to throughout the Middle Ages.”\textsuperscript{91} She points out, for example, that “[t]he \textit{Apostolic Constitutions}, dated to
the fourth and fifth centuries, include a passage requiring that bishops must not be prevented from holding their office because of physical impairment or deformity.”

Finally, Julie Crawford, in *Marvelous Protestantism: Monstrous Births in Post-Reformation England*, notes how Protestants later used examples of monstrosity to attack Catholicism.

In “Why We Need Another ‘Other,’” meanwhile, Kudlick herself traces negative stereotypes about disability to Aristotle and the classical idea of the “perfect human body.” She further notes that “[t]he specter of disability . . . came through in religious writings and eventually would underpin scientific notions of progress and evolution’s ‘survival of the fittest.’” Although there has been more research on disability in the pre-modern world since the appearance of Kudlick’s article, disability historians have yet to explore how this research challenges the underlying assumption among many works of disability history that the stigma and discrimination associated with disability are modern phenomena.

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7 Ibid.
13 Ibid. Davis discusses other types of early women’s history, including “the biography of the individual woman—the religious or political luminary,” which, Davis observed, likewise occupied a prominent position in women’s history in the 1970s. Ibid., 83-4. She also examines important works in women’s historiography by discussing Alice Clark’s Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century (1919) and Léon Abensour’s La Femme et le féminisme en France avant la Révolution (1923). Ibid., 85.
15 Ibid.
16 See ibid., B7.
17 See ibid.
18 Scott, Gender and the Politics of History, 2.
20 See ibid., 5, fn.5, 41-6.
21 Ibid., 44.
23 Disability historians generally point to the 1960s as the start of the disability rights movement. See, e.g., Edward Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind: Medieval Constructions of a Disability (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2010), 4.
26 Julie Smart, Disability, Society, and the Individual (Gaithersburg: Aspen Publishers, 2001), 34.
28 Lennard Davis has likewise consciously adopted counter-discursive tactics. See Davis, Enforcing Normalcy, 4.
29 UPIAS, 1976 Statement of Fundamental Principles, as quoted in Michael Oliver, Understanding Disability (London: The MacMillan Press, 1996), 24. Although UPIAS focused primarily on physical impairments, its observations apply equally to mental impairments. Indeed, the distinction between physical and mental impairments is simply a construction that differentiates impairments of the brain from impairments affecting other regions of the body.
30 As Davis has noted, Irving Kenneth Zola of Brandeis University likewise gave academic credibility to the idea that there was a difference between impairment and disability. See Davis, “Crips Strike Back,” 506-7.
33 Oliver, Understanding Disability, 32. For more on the medical model of disability, the social model of disability, and problems with the word “disability,” see Simon Brisenden, “Independent Living and the Medical Model of Disability,” in The Disability Reader: Social Science Perspectives, ed., Tom Shakespeare. (London: Cassell, 1998); Carol Thomas and Mairian Corker, “A Journey Around the Social


36 See ibid.

37 For the question of whether deaf people are “disabled,” see Davis, Enforcing Normalcy, xiv-xv.

38 Ibid., xiv.

39 Ibid.


41 Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897). It is somewhat ironic to quote Holmes here considering that he wrote the majority opinion in Buck v. Bell, which upheld the forced sterilization of Carrie Buck, “a feeble-minded” woman, famously proclaiming that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.” 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).

42 Heidegger, Being and Time, 24.


46 Irina Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe: Thinking About Physical Impairment During the High Middle Ages, c. 1100-1400 (London: Routledge, 2006), 2.

47 For a good explanation of the social model of disability and Davis’s strong challenge to it, see Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 6-8.

48 Not all disability historians who cite Foucault positively do so without looking at the epochs that came before Foucault’s Great Confinement. Henri-Jacques Stiker, for example, whose A History of Disability, written in 1980, remains perhaps the most important book in disability history, agrees with many of Foucault’s ideas. But he devotes three entire chapters to disability history before the seventeenth century. See Stiker, A History of Disability, 96-101.


50 Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 7.


53 Shelley Tremain, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critical Disability Theory,” in Foucault and the Government of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 5. According to Tremain, the apparatus is an amalgamation of a variety different institutions, policies, and practices that govern the lives of disabled people: “asylums, income support programs, quality of life assessments, workers’ compensation benefits, special education programs, regimes of rehabilitation, parallel transit systems, prostheses, home care services, telethons, sheltered workshops, poster child campaigns, and prenatal diagnosis.” Ibid.

54 Ibid., 6.

55 Ibid.
57 Ibid. Davis likens the discursivity of disability to “other aspects of the regulation of the body that we have come to call crime, sexuality, gender, disease, subalternity, and so on.” Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*, trans. A.L. Peck (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 401 (767b5). I translated *terat* as “monster” rather than following Peck’s lead in translating it as “monstrosity.” Although English speakers use the word “monstrosity,” the Greeks did not differentiate between a “monster” and a “monstrosity.” Aristotle also compares monsters to animals. Ibid., 416 (769b5-10).
65 Ibid., 198.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 199.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 79.
82 Judith Z. Abrams, *Judaism and Disability: Portrayals in Ancient Texts from the Tanach through the Bavli* (Washington D.C., 1998), 23. For the connection between physical perfection and God, see books 21 and 22 of Leviticus.
83 According to Abrams, “although disabilities disqualify a priest from officiating in the cult, he is still considered a priest in all other respects.” Ibid., 26. As Abrams, notes, the prohibitions in book 21 of Leviticus do not contain a prohibition on deafness, mental illness, or mental disability “perhaps because they were not considered readily visible defects.” Abrams notes, however, that these disabilities became important under the rabbinic system, which developed after the destruction of the Second Temple. Ibid., 9, 23.


87 Ibid.


89 Ibid., 17-23.

90 Metzler, *Disability in Medieval Europe* 40-1.

91 Ibid., 40.

92 Ibid.


95 Ibid. This growing body of work on disability in the pre-modern world, coupled with the already strong body of work on disability in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, are making it easier for disability scholars to explore the continuities and discontinuities of disability history in the West. Some recent studies have been particularly helpful in that regard. See David L. Braddock and Susan L. Parish, “An Institutional History of Disability,” in *Handbook of Disability Studies*, eds., Gary L. Albrecht, Katherine D. Seelman, and Michael Bury (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001), 11-68. The article is also contained in David Braddock, *Disability at the Dawn of the 21st Century: and The State of the States* (Washington D.C., American Association on Mental Retardation, 2002), 3-61.
Chapter 3: Methodology

Because disability studies is still in its infancy, disability historians do not have a plethora of sources from which to draw when attempting to understand disability in the past. Indeed, the role of the disability historian in this early stage of disability history is to uncover as many primary sources as possible, while simultaneously acknowledging that a lack of sources invariably detracts from our ability to explore every facet of disability history. We must also recognize the paucity of extant sources in which disabled people themselves provide first-hand accounts of their lives. When a historical text mentions disability, it is far more common for the author of that text to be able-bodied than disabled. This inevitably leaves disability historians in the unenviable position of sifting through texts riddled with able-bodied prejudices to determine what life was like for disabled people in the past. Disability scholars, then, must pay particular attention to those texts in which disabled authors discuss their thoughts on the existence of congenital deformity or the experience of disability.

While attempting to uncover more primary sources that are relevant to disability studies, disability historians must also grapple with various theories, particularly Marxism and post-structuralist notions of power and language. Indeed, even if it would have been preferable for disability historians to conduct historical inquiries without getting bogged down in attempting to prove how historical evidence proves or disproves certain theories, a methodology that Boswell favored when attempting to uncover the history of homosexuality, such historical accounts would likely be ignored by most disability scholars today. Marxist ideas about labor and disability in the capitalist mode of production and, especially, the post-structuralist understanding of language and power are
so pervasive in disability studies that it has essentially become a requirement for all disability historians to explain, at least briefly, how their arguments relate to such theories.

This dissertation rejects any understanding of disability history, whether grounded in Marxism or any other theoretical framework, that views the capitalist mode of production as *creating* the idea that disabled bodies hindered labor productivity to such an extent that the needs of able-bodied society were better served by offering some type of assistance to disabled people, whether public assistance or private charity, rather than abandoning them to fend for themselves among able-bodied laborers. Such arguments, bordering on the economic determinism of vulgar Marxism, have no place in today’s disability history. As I demonstrate in chapters 4, 5, and 6, able-bodied people in the pre-modern and early modern West had understood long before the rise of capitalism that many types of disability so severely restricted the labor capacity of some disabled people that many of them required some form of assistance. I also reject any argument that attributes the capitalist mode of production to the advent of negative stereotypes about disability. This dissertation likewise rejects the dogmatic application of Foucauldian notions of the discursivity of disability to the history of disability. Indeed, while Lennard Davis and others are correct in asserting that the long nineteenth century witnessed the genesis of a new type of disability discourse, the rapidly changing world of the long nineteenth century did not *create* categories for disabled people infused with able-bodied prejudices against the disabled. Instead, categories such as monsters, hunchbacks, cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs have proliferated in the West since the beginning of recorded history, continuously reinforcing the notion that the congenitally
deformed and the disabled are inferior to their able-bodied counterparts. The new
disability discourse of the long nineteenth century, then, was a hybrid comprised of old
prejudices associated with the pre-modern and early modern categories of disability and
the new notions of disability associated with a variety of developments during the long
nineteenth century, including the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the
growth of capitalism, the increasing power of the medical profession, the rise of the
modern nation-state, Darwinism, the advent of the eugenics movement, and attempts to
reintegrate disabled veterans back into able-bodied society after World War I

This dissertation, including my methodology in uncovering primary sources and
interpreting secondary sources, like the works of other disabled scholars, is largely the
product of my life as a disabled person.¹ I became paralyzed in a go cart accident when I
was eleven years old and discovered that the world had changed. People no longer looked
at me or talked to me as they had just months before my accident. After missing
substantial portions of sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth grades because of complications
from my paralysis and the death of my mother, I decided to set two disability-related
goals. First, I decided to attempt to break the wheelchair 100m world record and to medal
at the Paralympics (T53 class). Second, I set out to write a history of disability that would
address some of the issues that I had pondered ever since I had spent several weeks in
ICU and several additional weeks in rehabilitation. I eventually became a Paralympic
medalist and world record holder in the 100m, which exposed me to disabled people
around the world and how their own communities often viewed them as pariahs. Over the
years, I watched in perplexed consternation as countless able-bodied people belittled my
congenitally deformed friends in the international wheelchair racing community. Some
even attributed my friends’ deformities to divine wrath. I simply could not understand how people could say such horrible things to people who were trying to make the most of their physical limitations, particularly in the modern age. My hope, however, was that my historical research might give me some clues as to how people who were unquestionably good people in other aspects of their lives could become so hostile and condescending when confronted with congenital deformity and disability.

Because elite wheelchair racing requires a great deal of travel, I had plenty of time alone on airplanes and in hotel rooms to conduct the initial phases of my research. As I read works widely considered to be important in the western canon, I created a running list of references, both historical and contemporary, to disability. When I had the chance in between races and school, I researched those people, religious discussions, philosophical debates, events, and texts that I believed could expand my understanding of disability. By the time I had finished law school in 2004, ten years after I had set my first world record at the world championships in Berlin, Germany, I had collected hundreds of pages of notes.

As I attempted to make sense of everything that I had compiled about disability in the West, I realized the importance of the idea that there was some type of significance, whether supernatural or natural, to the existence of congenital deformity. I further recognized that able-bodied society had concluded that the existence of disabled people created a disability problem because their labor productivity was generally far lower than that of able-bodied laborers. In the mid-1990s, when reading about the eugenics movement in Rachel Fuchs’ undergraduate class about modern France, I further discovered that ideas about congenital deformity became inextricably intertwined with
the disability problem during the nineteenth century. When it ultimately came time to write my dissertation, then, I decided to explore the evolution of ideas about congenital deformity and the disability problem from classical antiquity through World War I, while still paying particular attention to the stigma and discrimination associated with pre-modern and early modern categories of disability.

Before writing my dissertation, I studied the major theoretical debates in the disability studies movement. It was this research that convinced me that many disability scholars had been too quick to apply theory dogmatically in their initial accounts of disability history. Once I felt that I had a firm grasp of disability theory, I began my research about the history of disability and ideas, research informed by years of my earlier research about disability and history in a more general sense. Throughout the researching and writing process, my methodology remained relatively constant. I began my research for each chapter by attempting to find secondary sources that discussed disability. Because disability scholars understandably tend to pay closer attention to examples of disability in historical texts than scholars unfamiliar with disability history, my initial research focused on works by disability historians. I did, of course, read a number of authors who were not involved in disability studies in any way, but the simple fact of the matter is that mainstream scholars have often overlooked disability. As I read works by some of the more influential disability historians, I noted many of the important issues that have interested them. I also took note of primary sources that they used to uncover various beliefs about disability and disabled people in the past. I then went to many of the original sources themselves to determine how those texts portrayed disability. These primary sources, combined with my own research that I had been
conducting since my undergraduate days in the 1990s, when Martha Rose, now a prominent disability scholar, first helped me with my inquiries into disability in classical antiquity while she was still in graduate school, provided me with enough texts to begin.

Although I obviously did not have time to uncover every text ever written in the western tradition about disability, I did feel that my methodology provided me with an adequate amount of primary and secondary sources with which to address the evolution of ideas about disability. I recognize that this project likely would have been easier if I had waited an additional twenty to thirty years to begin. Indeed, over the next few decades, disability historians will no doubt uncover countless primary documents and produce a number of important books and articles that increase our understanding of disability in the past. My hope, however, is that I have been able to uncover and to analyze enough primary and secondary sources to aid the next generation of disability historians in their efforts.

My starting point for the fourth chapter, which looks at ideas about disability in classical antiquity, was Garland’s *The Eye of the Beholder: Deformity and Disability in the Graeco-Roman World*, Rose’s *The Staff of Oedipus: Transforming Disability in Ancient Greece*, and Stiker’s *A History of Disability*. Garland, Rose, and Stiker look at several important classical works that mention disability. Their discussions of disability in classical antiquity provided me with a strong foundation on which to build my own argument. I found additional sources primarily by using Lindell and Scott’s *A Greek-English Lexicon* and the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. Under entries for each word, the lexicon and dictionary directs the reader to various historical texts which contain that word. By looking up Greek and Latin words that describe certain types of disabilities, I
was thus able to find several classical sources that discussed disability without having to read every text from classical antiquity.

In the fifth chapter, I build upon Stiker’s *A History of Disability* to explore ideas about disability from the late antiquity to the middle of the seventeenth century. Because it would be too complicated to look at the evolution of both Christian and Jewish ideas about disability during this period, I follow Stiker in looking at the history of disability and Judaism primarily to determine its impact on the development of Christian ideas about disability. In any case, I do not have the expertise to add anything meaningful to Abrams’ informative *Judaism and Disability: Portrayals in Ancient Texts from the Tanach through the Bavli*. In addition to my reliance on Stiker and Abrams, I base many of my arguments in this chapter on Andrew Crislip’s *From Monastery to Hospital: Christian Monasticism and the Transformation of Health Care in Late Antiquity*, Irina Metzler’s *Disability in Medieval Europe: Thinking About Physical Impairment During the High Middle Ages, c. 1100-1400*, Edward Wheatley’s *Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind: Medieval Constructions of a Disability*, Zina Weygand’s *The Blind in French Society from the Middle Ages to the Century of Louis Braille*, and Colin Barnes’ *Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination: A Case for Anti-Discrimination Legislation*. I also found Lorraine Daston’s and Katharine Park’s *Wonders and the Order of Nature 1150-1150* particularly helpful for finding primary sources about congenital deformity and nature. The most important primary sources for this chapter were Augustine’s and Isidore of Seville’s highly influential observations about congenital deformity.

The starting point for the sixth chapter, which explores ideas about disability from the middle of the seventeenth century to the French Revolution, was Diderot’s *Letter on
the Blind. I was familiar with Diderot’s letter, of course, because it is one of the most important texts for disability historians, particularly historians of blindness. In that letter, Diderot discusses Descartes, Molyneux’s problem, and the problem of theodicy. In addition, Diderot provides an Epicurean account of the development of living organisms. As I read Diderot’s letter, I recognized that if Descartes, Molyneux, and Diderot all recognized that exploring congenital deformity might reveal something important about nature, then other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers must also have delved into the significance of congenital deformity. To learn about which seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors might have mentioned deformity in their works, I consulted Daston’s and Park’s Wonders and the Order of Nature 1150-1150, Henry Fairfield Osborn’s From the Greeks to Darwin: An Outline of the Development of the Evolution Idea, Peter J. Bowler’s Evolution: The History of an Idea, and Marjolein Degenaar’s Molyneux’s Problem: Three Centuries of Discussion on the Perception of Forms (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996). Somewhat to my surprise, I learned during my research that Alexander Pope, the hunchback poet, played an important role in discussions about the significance of deformity in the eighteenth century. Pope, then, is one of the rare examples of a disabled person who engaged with able-bodied people about the significance of disability. Before I started looking at Pope’s poems and letters, however, I read Maynard Mack’s Alexander Pope: A Life and “‘The Least Thing like a Man in England’: Some Effects of Pope’s Physical Disability on His Life and Literary Career,” in Collected in Himself, and Helen Deutsch’s Resemblance and Disgrace: Alexander Pope and the Deformation of Culture to gain a better understanding of Pope and his works. I consulted a variety of works about the disability problem during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including Anne Muratori-Philip’s *Les Grandes Heures des Invalides*, Isser Woloch’s *The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration*, C.G.T. Dean’s *The Royal Hospital Chelsea*, Dan Cruickshank’s *The Royal Hospital Chelsea: The Place and the People*, Gordon Phillips’ *The Blind in British Society: Charity, State and Community, c. 1780-1930*, Anne T. Quartararo’s *Deaf Identity and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century France*, and Weygand’s *The Blind in French Society from the Middle Ages to the Century of Louis Braille*.

I began my research for the seventh chapter, which looks at ideas about disability during the long nineteenth century by examining Elof Axel Carlson’s *Mutation: The History of an Idea From Darwin to Genomics*, Osborn’s *From the Greeks to Darwin: An Outline of the Development of the Evolution Idea*, and Bowler’s *Evolution: The History of an Idea*. I then looked at the writings of Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin, and Sir Francis Galton to determine if they considered the existence of congenital deformity to be important. Once I recognized that they did indeed view the existence of congenital deformity to be an essential topic of inquiry when attempting to unlock the secrets of the nature of things, I sought out to determine the extent to which ideas about congenital deformity became particularly germane to the disability problem during the nineteenth century. I began my research into the connection between ideas about congenital deformity and the disability problem by looking closely at the works of Sir Francis Galton and Daniel J. Kevles’ *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity*. I relied on Quartararo’s *Deaf Identity and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century France* and Weygand’s *The Blind in French Society from the Middle Ages to the Century of Louis Braille* to gain a better understanding of sensory disabilities and the disability

I use a variety of primary documents to argue in the eighth chapter that disability discourse in the long nineteenth century reflects the evolution of ideas about congenital deformity and the disability problem. I have tried, when possible, to rely on works that are well known within disability studies. I follow Davis, for example, in using Émile Zola and Gustave Flaubert to demonstrate the growing fear of degeneration and the increasing role of doctors in the lives of disabled people. I use Sir Frederick Treves’ memoir, *The Elephant Man and Other Reminiscences*, because it is a first-hand account of how the circus freak Joseph Merrick, better known as the Elephant Man, became a hospital patient. I use *All Quiet on the Western Front* because it contains so many important discussions of disability and modern warfare. I do find one work, Lord Byron’s *Deformed Transformed*, particularly illuminating in this chapter because it is the product of a brilliant poet with a clubfoot. Indeed, Byron’s *Deformed Transformed* is a literary depiction of the types of stigma and discrimination that Kierkegaard, a real hunchback, as well as Lord Byron himself, experienced in their interactions with the able-bodied world during the nineteenth century.
I recognize that many disability scholars in the United States and even in Europe are not historians and thus are not always proficient in multiple languages. I have thus attempted to use readily available English translations. There were times, however, when I did not have access to an English translation or when there was no English translation available. In those circumstances, translations are my own unless otherwise noted. I did have to make an exception for Greek and Latin texts, concluding that I would generally have to use my own translations because the translations from the Loeb Classical Library, which most disability scholars use when exploring disability in antiquity, are too archaic to be of much use, particularly since language is such an important component of disability studies. Loeb translations, moreover, often use a variety of different translations for various terms associated with disability. Arthur S. Way, for instance, translates *teras* in Euripides’ *Phoenician Maidens* as “portent” rather than “monster.”¹¹ Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M Cornford translate things “produced contrary to nature” as “unnatural monstrosities.”¹² H. Rackham, meanwhile, translates “*ostenta monstra portenta prodigia*” in Cicero’s *De Natura Deorum* as “‘apparition,’ ‘warning,’ ‘portent,’ ‘prodigy,’” while William Armistead Falconer translates “*ostenta, portenta, monstra, prodigia,*” in Cicero’s *De Divinatione* as “‘manifestations,’ ‘portents,’ ‘intimations,’ and ‘prodigies.’”¹³ While such translations may not be problematic for those proficient in Greek and Latin, they can be hopelessly confusing to disability scholars attempting to ascertain the precise ways in which people in classical antiquity used language to distinguish the congenitally deformed from able-bodied people.¹⁴ Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, Greek and Latin translations are my own. To make it easier for non-classicists to find the primary sources upon which I rely, I have used citation forms
familiar to both non-classicists and classicists alike, the latter of which I enclose in
parentheses after I provide the Loeb page number.

1 Lennard Davis, for example, felt it necessary in the preface to Enforcing Normalcy to explain “the status of at least some portion of my own body.” Indeed, he recognizes in that work that there are some people within the disability studies movement who would prefer that able-bodied people stay away from disability studies, a ridiculous notion that he is right to reject. Yet neither Davis nor I can escape our own life circumstances or pretend that they did not influence our views of disability. Although Davis himself is not disabled, he explains that he is intimately familiar with disability because his parents are deaf. Indeed, Davis explains that he “grew up in a Deaf world, in a Deaf culture, and with a Deaf sensibility.” Davis, Enforcing Normalcy, xvi-xvii. In any event, just as both men and women have a place in gender studies, despite its obvious connection to feminism, so too are both disabled and able-bodied perspectives critically important for any serious attempt to understand disability. See ibid., xvi-xix. Swain and Cameron likewise understand the importance of identity politics in the disability studies movement. See Swain and Cameron, “Unless Otherwise Stated: Discourses of Labeling and Identity in Coming out,” in Disability Discourse, 69-77.


10 See Davis, “Constructing Normalcy,” 12-3.


John Boswell has likewise found the Loeb Classical Library problematic for “accounts of gay sexuality.” See Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality*, 19-21.
Chapter 4: The Monsters and Beggars of Classical Antiquity

Any attempt to reduce disability discourse in classical antiquity to one dominant idea or theme is destined to end in disappointment. The Greeks and Romans, like people in the modern world, evinced remarkably complex and often contradictory notions about disability and people with disabilities. In his posthumous *The Idea of Nature*, R.G. Collingwood identified “three periods of constructive cosmological thinking; three periods that is to say, when the idea of nature has come into focus of thought, become the subject of intense and protracted reflection, and consequently acquired new characteristics which in their turn have given a new aspect to the detailed science of nature that has been based upon it.”¹ The Greeks, Collingwood explained, ushered in the first period by fashioning an understanding of natural science “based on the principle that the world of nature is saturated or permeated by mind,” which was “the source of that regularity or orderliness whose presence made a science of nature possible.”² They perceived nature to be in a constant state of motion and “therefore alive.”³ Yet because motion appeared to be “orderly and regular,” they argued that “the world of nature is not only alive but intelligent; not only a vast animal with a ‘soul’ or life of its own, but a rational animal with a ‘mind’ of its own.”⁴ The Greeks, moreover, believed that observable changes in nature were cyclical, *i.e.*, “[a] change from state α to state β . . . is always one part of a process which completes itself by a return from state β to state α.”⁵

Not all Greeks and Romans, however, agreed with these general observations about the natural world. Indeed, both the Presocratic Empedocles and the Epicureans attributed the diversity of the natural world to chance rather than rationality. The idea that chance governed nature was certainly a minority position in the Greek and Roman world,
as it was when the Epicurean tradition once again began to assert itself during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, perhaps most notably in the works of Pierre Gessendi and Diderot. Yet it was this minority tradition that would influence the materialism of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and even nineteenth centuries until “it was finally destroyed by the new theory of matter which grew up in the late nineteenth century.”

The various Greek ideas about nature, as one might expect, produced different views about the significance of the existence of deformity. Greeks and Romans with more superstitious proclivities looked not to nature to understand congenital deformity but rather to the gods, viewing congenital deformities as manifestations of divine will. Others, whether they believed in nature as a rational organism or in nature governed by chance, viewed congenital deformities as naturally recurring anomalies devoid of supernatural significance. One thing, however, remained constant throughout the classical period: people with congenital deformities and disabilities experienced widespread stigma and discrimination because they exhibited physical and aesthetic deviations from the able-bodied norm. In a world that prized the ideal body and ideal health, extraordinary deviations from those ideals routinely inspired negative reactions, and sometimes even outright odium, among the able-bodied population. The Greeks and Romans routinely used a variety of different categories to separate congenitally deformed and disabled people from their able-bodied counterparts. Some people in classical antiquity even used terminology associated with disability to disparage slight deviations from the ideal physical body. Celsus, a Roman thinker well acquainted with Hippocratic medicine, for example, claimed that thin people were less healthy than those with ideal
bodies and that thinness was thus a type of infirmity. Some disabled people, of course, were able to navigate through this morass of contempt to attain remarkable levels of prestige and power. Agesilaus, after all, became king of Sparta despite a congenital deformity that rendered him lame in one leg, and Claudius succeeded Caligula as emperor of Rome even though his own family had long attempted to limit his involvement in public affairs on account of his many congenital deformities. Yet there is no question that the congenital deformities of Agesilaus and Claudius presented significant obstacles to their political ambitions. The often fragmentary evidence dealing with the lives of ordinary disabled people demonstrates that they, too, encountered negative stereotypes that continuously threatened to relegate them to the penumbras of society.

When it came to addressing the idea that there was a disability problem, the Greeks and Romans likewise held widely divergent views. The Spartans, Romans, and even some influential Athenians, for instance, supported, in theory at least, the killing of congenitally deformed infants, while Athens created a pension system for disabled people, including people with congenital deformities, who were not able financially to support themselves or their families. The Romans, meanwhile, concluded that the best way to deal with disabled people within their midst was through begging and almsgiving.

**The Enigma of Congenital Deformity in the Greco-Roman World**

Views regarding the causes of congenital deformity varied greatly in classical antiquity. Many people considered congenital deformity to be some type of message from the gods. As Robert Garland has observed, a society that “has no tradition of scientific inquiry or one in which that tradition operates at the outskirts of the popular
consciousness will tend to view [congenital deformity] as an example of the capacity of the divine to violate natural law." One of the most common manifestations of such a capacity was divine punishment. Not everyone in classical antiquity, however, attributed congenital deformity to an ongoing process of divine intervention into the nature of things. Some Greeks and Romans looked instead to the natural world to explain congenital deformity. Yet the modern dichotomy between religious and scientific explanations of the universe did not exist in Greco-Roman thought. Although some Greeks and Romans, particularly the Epicureans, did evince materialistic tendencies, few classical thinkers who explored natural phenomena in general, and congenital deformity in particular, completely rejected religious explanations of the natural world. 

Hippocratic physicians, meanwhile, argued that efforts to understand what human beings are by looking at how they evolved could contribute little to a proper understanding of nature, maintaining that physicians can learn more about the natural world through clinical experience than through philosophical speculation.

Congenital Deformity and the Divine

The idea that the gods punished mortals for their transgressions, of course, was common in classical antiquity. In the Odyssey, for instance, Nestor tells Telemachus that many Argives were destined to suffer on their return to Greece after the Trojan War because “Zeus planned in his heart a baneful return home for the Argives, since not all of them were thoughtful or righteous.” A few moments later, Nestor reiterates Zeus’ desire to punish the Argives, explaining that “Zeus was [sending] an evil calamity against us.” The gods likewise punished Appius Claudius Caecus, the famous consul and censor who not only was responsible for the construction of the Appian Way but also the person who
convinced the Romans to continue the war against Pyrrhus of Epirus despite his peerless generalship. Appius’ punishment occurred after the Potitian clan, under the authority of Appius, taught religious secrets to “public slaves.” The gods indicated their displeasure by eradicating the clan and striking Appius with blindness.

One of the most horrific punishments that the gods could inflict on mortals was to make them produce congenitally deformed children whom the Greeks called terata (monsters) almost certainly because severely deformed infants, before the advent of modern genetics, seemed to resemble mythological monsters. Hesiod himself suggests in his Works and Days that when men are righteous, their “women bear children like those who begot them,” which, Garland notes, became a common euphemism for “whole-bodied” in later periods. The obvious implication of Hesiod’s claim, even in his own day, was that the gods sometimes punish the unrighteous by making them bear deformed children. In Against Ctesiphon, a speech delivered in 330 B.C.E., ostensibly as a prosecution against Ctesiphon but in reality an attack on Aeschines’ rival, Demosthenes, Aeschines suggests that the Athenians had equated congenitally deformed people with divine wrath since at least the sixth century B.C.E. In that speech, Aeschines admonishes the Athenians to be mindful of an oath taken during the time of Solon, who was eponymous archon in 594/3:

“If anyone,” it says, “transgresses this [oath], whether city, or private person, or tribe, let him be under a curse,” it says, “of Apollo and of Artemis and of Leto and of Athena Pronaea.” And it imprecates upon them that the earth not bear them fruit, that their wives produce children not like those who produced them, but monsters (terata) . . .”

When the Greeks used the word teras to refer to congenitally deformed people, they were not simply using colorful, value-free language to identify people with
deformities. Instead, they were overtly comparing abnormal, congenitally deformed bodies to the frightening, inhuman abominations of Greek mythology. Some of the most illustrious works in the Greek literary tradition, after all, depicted terata as terrifying blights on human existence. The Iliad, one of the most famous pieces of ancient Greek literature—so famous that Alexander the Great slept with a copy of it, along with a dagger, under his pillow—refers to the Gorgon’s head as “the monster [teras] of aegis-bearing Zeus.”

The Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo praises Apollo for killing the “great, well-fed she-dragon, a savage monster [teras], who has done many wicked things to men upon the earth.” Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound calls Typhon a “destructive hundred-headed monster [teras].” Sophocles’ The Women of Trachis refers to Cerberus as “the three-headed dog of Hades under the earth, an irresistible monster [teras].” Euripides’ Phoenician Maidens, meanwhile, labels the Sphinx a “mountain-haunting monster [teras].”

Greeks with superstitious inclinations further believed that there was a reason for the existence of infants with severe congenital deformities, even when their deformities were not some type of divine punishment. Indeed, many Greeks firmly believed that the gods routinely created congenitally deformed people to be signs or portents for their able-bodied counterparts. The connection between terata (monsters) and divination was so strong, in fact, that the Greeks often used variations of teras (monster) to denote a sign or portent even when that sign or portent was neither a mythological monster nor a congenitally deformed person. In the Iliad, for example, Calchas uses teras when referring to a serpent sent by Zeus, apparently ordinary in appearance yet portentous in its actions. “All-wise Zeus,” Calchas proclaims, “made the great teras (portentous
monster) appear to us. . . .”

Calchas then interprets the sign, explaining that Zeus made the *teras*, which killed eight sparrow chicks and their mother in front of the Achaeans, in order to inform the Achaeans that they would not prevail in the war against Troy until the tenth year. In the *Odyssey*, Nestor explains to Telemachus how the Achaeans, frustrated by their inability to return home after the sack of Troy, asked “the god to show [them] a *teras* (sign).”

The chorus in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* uses the verb *terazdein* (to interpret monsters/portents/signs) when describing how Calchas interpreted two birds eating a pregnant hare as a prophecy about Agamemnon and Menelaus: “The trustworthy prophet of the army . . . , interpreting the portent (*terazdōn*), spoke. . . .”

Xenophon notes in his *Memorabilia*, moreover, that the gods “give warnings through *terata* (signs) sent to the Hellenes.”

The connection between congenital deformity and divinity was equally obvious to the Romans, who referred to both people and animals with severe congenital deformities as *monstra*, *prodigia*, *ostenta*, and *portenta*, all of which suggested supernatural causation. According to Cicero, deformed people and animals, along with other types of phenomena, “are called *ostenta*, *portenta*, *monstra*, and *prodigia*” because “they make something known (*ostendunt*), indicate a future event (*portendunt*), show the way (*monstrant*), and predict (*praedicunt*).”

Saint Augustine, as discussed in the next chapter, later proffered a similar etymology of *monstra*, *ostenta*, *portenta*, and *prodigia*. He explains in the *City of God*, for instance, that *monstra* comes from the verb *monstrare* (“to show”) “because [monsters] show something by a sign.” And although human beings might not understand precisely what such phenomena were supposed to show or to predict, many Romans appear to have been relatively certain that the gods, for
whatever reason, were responsible for creating them. Cicero, for example, although skeptical of divination, explains in *De Haruspicium Responsis* that the discord then driving Romans into a “frenzy” had been the subject of a warning in the form of “recent prodigies [prodigiis] by the immortal gods.” In the dialogue *De Divinatione*, Cicero, moreover, alludes to the purported divine nature of *ostenta* when explaining that the Etruscan soothsayers were adept at interpreting the meaning of both humans and livestock deformed “from conception and the act of procreation.”

Roman literary figures were just as accustomed as their Greek counterparts to depict monsters and prodigies as terrifying, inhuman beasts who acted as both harbingers and instruments of human destruction. Virgil notes how the lame god Vulcan had produced the horrid Cacus, explaining that “Vulcan was father to this monster.” Ovid describes the dreadful, three-headed monster Geryon as “the threefold prodigy.” The Romans considered mythological monsters and prodigies to be so dangerous that they often demonized criminals, political opponents, and unpopular historical figures by comparing them to monsters and prodigies. In the dialogue *Mendici Debilitati*, the elder Seneca’s Albuci Sili calls an able-bodied man who mutilated children under his control so as to make them more efficient beggars a “strange monster,” suggesting that such shameful exploitation was an unnatural abomination among the Romans. In 49 B.C.E., Cicero wrote a letter to his friend Atticus, calling Julius Caesar a *teras*, the Greek word for monster, while Caesar was marching on Brundisium to confront Pompey: “But this monster [*teras*] is terrifyingly sleepless, swift, and assiduous. I am utterly unable to know what the future will bring.” For Cicero, referring to Caesar as a despicable despot could not adequately express his fear and hatred of the man who threatened the Republic. Only
a word such as *teras*, which completely denied Caesar’s humanity by comparing him to a mythological monster, would suffice. After Catiline had left Rome, moreover, Cicero proclaimed that “now, no destruction of our walls will be devised from within these very walls by that monstrosity and prodigy [*a monstro atque prodigio*].”

On another occasion, Cicero defended Sextus Rocius against charges that he had murdered his father by calling such a crime so “atrocious” and “unusual” that “any time it is heard of it is treated like a portent [*portenti*] or prodigy [*prodigii*].” Cicero likewise vilified two additional opponents by calling them “two oppressive prodigies.”

Tacitus embraced this tradition, seemingly blaming Vitellius’ unsavory character for his ignominious end by proclaiming that “Vitellius himself was a manifestation of future events [*ostentum*] surpassing all others.”

Accordingly, when Greeks or Romans used words such as *teras, monstrum,* *prodigium, portentum,* or *ostentum* to refer to an actual person with a severe congenital deformity, they were invoking a visceral fear and trembling otherwise reserved for mythological monsters or people that had committed such heinous crimes that they could scarcely be considered human. The implication of this disability discourse was that people with severe congenital deformities, people with bodies that resembled mythological monsters, were likewise less than human and even something to be feared. It is impossible, of course, to determine the extent to which this aspect of disability discourse adversely impacted the lives of people with congenital deformities, but such a dehumanizing use of language must have contributed to the stigma and discrimination that congenitally deformed people experienced in their daily lives.
The dehumanization and fear of congenitally deformed people is plainly evident in the *Life of Aesop*, which repeatedly uses the word *teras* to demonstrate the extent to which Aesop’s purported contemporaries rejected his humanity. When the philosopher Xanthus brings Aesop to his house after buying him from a slave-dealer, Xanthus tells Aesop to wait outside while he goes in to tell his wife that he has bought a deformed slave: “Aesop, my wife is without blemish. Wait in front of the house-door until I explain the situation to her, so that she does not demand that her dowry be returned to her and flee the moment that she sees your rotten body.”45 When Xanthus’ wife eventually does see Aesop, she proves her husband correct, believing that he has purchased the deformed slave as a way of getting her to leave him on her own accord so that he can find another wife.46 While Xanthus is inside telling his wife about Aesop, a young female slave comes outside to see the new slave that Xanthus has purchased. When she sees Aesop’s deformities, she reiterates Xanthus’ command to stay outside, calling him a monster: “Stay where you are. Or else you will enter and they will all flee upon seeing such a monster [*teras*].”47 Croesus, king of the Lydians, likewise calls Aesop a *teras* after Aesop thwarts his plans of receiving tribute from the Samians. Croesus, in return, orders the Samians to hand Aesop over to him. Although Aesop convinces them that it would be unwise to deliver him to Croesus, he decides freely to meet with the king. Once there, Croesus witnesses Aesop’s deformities and laments that such a person could thwart his plans: “And the king, seeing Aesop, was vexed and said, ‘Look who prevented me from subjugating a city, and did not permit me to receive my payment. And it would not be so difficult to deal with if it were a man rather than a riddle and monster [*teras*] of men.”48
The Greeks appear to have extended their fears about congenital deformity to people with physical conditions that seemed to have some particular connection to the gods. According to Theophrastus, for example, upon “seeing a madman or epileptic, [the superstitious man], in a shivering-fit, spits at his chest,” a ritual by which the Greeks attempted to protect themselves against bad omens. Because superstitious people, in Theophrastus’ view, would not look for the natural causes of mental illness or epilepsy, the sacred disease, they would naturally tremble when pondering the impending doom that a “madman” or epileptic might presage. While a lack of sources makes it nearly impossible to know how much discrimination and stigma actual people with mental illness or epilepsy experienced in their daily lives, they probably would not have been welcome dinner guests at the home of a person who shared the beliefs of Theophrastus’ “superstitious man.”

Romans were particularly averse to people whom they considered monsters and prodigies, often conflating their congenital deformities with the horrible events that they supposedly foretold, particularly during times of crisis. Romans especially feared hermaphroditic prodigies, deciding during the upheavals of the late third century B.C.E. that the able-bodied community would benefit from ritually sacrificing them. In 207 B.C.E., during the Second Punic War, after the people had recently averted disasters foretold by a series of prodigies, a woman in Frusino gave birth to a terrifying hermaphrodite. “Their minds having been freed from religion,” Livy observed, “the report of the birth of an infant at Frusino equaling the size of a four year old once again agitated the people, not so much because it was remarkable in size [but because], in the same way as at Sinuessa two years before, it was uncertain whether the infant was born
male or female.” The diviners from Etruria declared that it was a “loathsome and disgusting prodigy,” which should be “banished from Roman land, far away from contact with land,” and “drowned in the open sea.” The Romans heeded the superstitious warning, putting “the still-living infant into a coffin, conveyed it out to sea, and threw it into the water.” During the Gallic Revolt seven years later, which, Garland notes, “sent shock waves through the Roman psyche,” the Romans discovered more prodigies:

At this time, ill-omened [and disgusting] births of creatures [animalium] were reported in very many places: among the Sabines, an infant was born and it was uncertain whether it was male or female, and another of ambiguous sex, this one sixteen years old, was likewise discovered; at Frusino a lamb with a pig’s head was born, at Sinuessa a pig with a human head, and in Lucania, on the public land, a foal with five feet.

According to Livy, although the Romans considered “all of these loathsome and deformed creatures” to be unnatural, “above all, the half-males [semimares] were abhorred and thrown into the sea” in accordance with the ritual sacrifice of the Hermaphroditic prodigy seven years earlier.

The Romans were likewise averse to deformed and disabled priests. According to one side of the controversy in the elder Seneca’s Metellus Caecatus, “a priest with an impaired body ought to be avoided as though a thing of ill omen.” Many Romans, after all, considered a deformity or disability to be a “sign of disapproval even in animals offered [to the gods]; how much more in priests? After a person becomes a priest, it is more important that any infirmity be observed; for a priest is not made infirm without the anger of the gods.” Indeed, as many Romans would no doubt agree, “it is obvious that the gods are not favorably inclined to a priest whom they do not preserve intact. . . .”
Despite these widespread beliefs about the connection between the gods and congenital deformity, many philosophers, both Greek and Roman, attempted to fashion more nuanced explanations for such aberrations of nature. A lack of sources for the early Greek period makes it difficult to determine exactly when Greek philosophers first began to explore congenital deformity in an attempt to make sense of natural phenomena without resorting to superstition, but the tradition likely began with the Presocratic philosophers. As M.R. Wright has observed, the Presocratics endeavored, “from different viewpoints, to find a rational and comprehensive explanation of the world which adapted or discounted theological tradition.”

Empedocles, a Presocratic philosopher who, according to Diogenes Laertius, was also a poet, physician, and orator, emulated his Presocratic predecessors in attempting to explain the origins of life, but he took the ingenious step of injecting congenital deformity into the debate. It is impossible to know everything that Empedocles believed about congenital deformity because there are so few extent fragments of his work. In 1981, for example, Wright estimated that the extent 450 lines and ten phrases of Empedocles comprised a mere sixteen to twenty percent of what he actually wrote. To make matters worse, scholars cannot agree whether Empedocles wrote two poems or one, first, because some ancient commentators referred to two separate poems while others did not and, second, because there is considerable disagreement whether the seemingly contradictory fragments could have come from one poem. The traditional view is that Empedocles wrote one poem called either Physics or On Nature, which explored natural phenomena, and another called the Kartharmoi (Purifications), which exhibited a religious motif.
Osborne and Brad Inwood, have challenged that view, arguing that it is more likely that Empedocles wrote only one poem, which expressed not merely reconcilable but unitary views with respect to natural phenomena and religion.66

Whatever the case, it is possible to reconstruct some of Empedocles’ most important ideas about deformity. At the heart of Empedocles’ understanding of the cosmos was his dualistic conception of Love and Strife, two contradictory forces of nature striving against each other in an endless cycle. The function of Love, Empedocles believed, was to bring unity to the universe, while the role of Strife was to unravel that potential unity. Long ago, when Strife had the upper hand, there was no life as we know it until the earth began to produce life forms via spontaneous generation. At that time, Empedocles proclaims, “Many heads without necks sprouted up on the earth. Bare arms lacking shoulders wandered, and eyes deprived of foreheads strayed alone.”67 When Love began to bring those disparate body parts together, it did so by chance rather than by design, thus creating numerous types of terata. As Empedocles surmises, “[m]any double-faced and double-breasted beings were produced; oxen with the face of a man and, contrariwise, human-shaped yet ox-headed creatures sprang up, [along with others] mixed [with parts] from men and [with parts] female by nature, furnished with dark-colored limbs.”68 Most of these terata, of course, would not have been able to survive for long because they lacked the vital organs and requisite limbs to sustain themselves. Eventually, however, chance led to the formation of “whole-natured outlines, which “sprang from the earth.”69 These nearly complete beings were certainly more viable than their more seriously deformed predecessors, but “they did not yet exhibit any lovely bodily frame of limbs, nor voice nor . . . a limb native to man [i.e., a phallus].”70
Although the extant fragments do not inform us precisely what Empedocles thought happened next, he apparently believed that chance—as the stage in which Love predominates was approaching its apogee—fitted these beings with the last few organs needed to become truly “whole.” One of the most important factors in the development of living beings, Empedocles believed, was chance’s bestowal not only of the means to reproduce offspring but also the desire. In an important fragment upon which Lucretius would later expand, Empedocles observes that “upon him also comes, through sight, desire to have intercourse.”  

Empedocles recognizes here that reproduction entails more than simply possessing sexual organs. Indeed, what sexually attracts one person to one another is not merely the knowledge that both people possess sexual organs, which can provide for mutual pleasure through intercourse; rather, at least for the sighted, physical appearance is often an important factor in whether one person is sexually attracted to another. As Plutarch would later remark in *Table-Talk (Symposiakōn biblia)*, “sight is responsible (*endidōsin*) for the origin of love.” Empedocles may even have believed that the desire for sexual intercourse was such an important development that it contributed to the extinction of hybrid *terata*, *i.e.*, beings comprised of both human and animal body parts. After all, if physical appearance is one of the most important factors in selecting a mate, and living beings tend to be more comfortable around their own kind, it follows that Empedocles’ emerging species would seek to procreate with other “whole-natured” beings of the same species rather than with unsightly amalgamations of different species. Empedocles thus may have relegated the hybrid *terata* of mythology primarily to a previous stage in the development of living beings based on an understanding of sexual
desire that comes remarkably close to anticipating some concepts of modern evolutionary psychology.\textsuperscript{75}

What we cannot know for certain is whether Empedocles pondered the existence of actual terata during his own lifetime when discussing the role of deformity and chance in the development of living beings. Garland points to a passage from Aristotle’s \textit{Physics} to suggest that Empedocles’ thought “may conceivably have derived part of its inspiration from the experience of mutant forms.”\textsuperscript{76} In that passage, Aristotle observes that “[w]herever . . . all things resulted as they would have if there had been a purpose, these creatures, having been made fit by chance, survived; but those who did not [come together] in this way, perished \textit{and still perish}, just as Empedocles says about oxen with a man’s face.”\textsuperscript{77} If we accept Aristotle’s interpretation, then, Empedocles was well aware that \textit{terata} continued to come into existence in his own day, although it is unclear whether Empedocles believed that such \textit{terata} sprang directly from the earth through spontaneous generation or were the products of sexual reproduction.\textsuperscript{78}

Scholars have long noted the obvious similarities between Empedocles’ ideas and Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection. In 1913, for example, Henry Fairfield Osborn surmised that Empedocles “may justly be called the father of the Evolution idea.”\textsuperscript{79} More recently, Garland has argued that Empedocles’ \textit{terata} were “relegated to the margins of contemporary zoology by a principle akin to that of Darwin’s theory of natural selection.”\textsuperscript{80} As Wright has pointed out, however, “[i]t is an exaggeration to read Darwinism back into [Empedocles]” because in Empedocles “we do not find an understanding of selection and mutation with divergence of parts of the species from the original stock, or new functions and organs developing out of old ones, with the passing
on of heritable variations. . . .” Yet Osborn and Garland are certainly correct that Empedocles contributed to the development of the evolution idea because he believed that (1) chance, rather than a rational mind or design, is responsible for the development of living beings and (2) more advanced beings gradually replace those beings less suited for survival and reproduction, at least until Strife unravels the work of Love.82

Both Plato and Aristotle rejected Empedocles’ idea that chance could have brought about the amazingly complex diversity of the earth’s biota, arguing instead that the natural world is the product of rationality. In the *Timaeus*, Plato famously argued that the gods, themselves created by the Demiurge, took a direct role in creating the physical forms of human beings.83 Rational purpose is likewise evident in Aristotle’s four causes: (1) the material cause; (2) the formal cause; (3) the efficient cause; (4) and the final cause.84 These four causes, however, did not preclude accidental, monstrous births.85 For Aristotle, “all the imperfections of Nature” were the result of “the struggle between material and formal causes.”86 In particular, Aristotle argued that there was “a resistance of matter to form.”87 Monstrous births, then, did not happen for a “reason” but were simply accidents, even if they ultimately originated from an efficient cause and were an integral component of a system permeated by rationality. In *Physics*, Aristotle alludes to these views when distinguishing between *tychē* (fortune) and *automaton* (accident), surmising that “the accident (*automaton*), in accordance with the word itself, occurs ‘by itself’ (*auto*) for ‘no reason’ (*maten*).”88 He then goes on to conclude that “[d]istinguishing between accident and fortune is best in instances where things are produced [contrary to nature]; for whenever something is produced contrary to nature (*para phisin, e.g.*, a *teras*), we assert that it was produced not from fortune but rather
from accident.” To his credit, Aristotle did not believe that it was acceptable to scorn congenitally deformed people simply because they were accidents of birth. In _Nicomachean Ethics_, Aristotle contends that “no one would reproach a man blind by nature [i.e., a man born blind] or from a sickness or from a blow, but rather would have pity on him.” Aristotle contends, however, that people would rightly blame a person whose foolishness resulted in blindness or another type of deformity.

The Epicureans dismissed both the Platonic and the Aristotelian notions of nature, arguing that natural phenomena, including congenital deformity, were indeed the product of chance. Epicurus, who was a young man when Aristotle died, built on the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus to construct a materialist system that denied divine causation for natural phenomena. The Epicurean system was far more materialist than Empedocles’ view of nature, but Epicurus and Empedocles apparently had somewhat compatible views with respect to congenital deformity. In a passage from _De Rerum Natura_ that would later form the basis of Denis Diderot’s materialist assault on design in his _Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who See_ (1749), Lucretius, the Roman poet and follower of Epicurus, integrates Empedocles’ view of congenital deformity into the Epicurean system. The Epicurean concept of motion likely made Lucretius receptive to Empedocles’ ideas about congenital deformity. Epicurus himself proclaims in his _Letter to Herodotus_, preserved in book ten of Diogenes Laertius’ _Lives of the Eminent Philosophers_, that “atoms are continuously in motion.” Lucretius later elaborated on the implications of matter in perpetual motion, arguing that “the passage of time changes the nature of the entire world, and one physical state of things must proceed to another, and nothing at all remains unchanged: all things move, nature changes all things and drives
them together to turn them into something else. After explaining the Epicurean concept of matter and change in his famed poem, Lucretius adopts many of Empedocles’ ideas about congenital deformity. According to Lucretius,

[t]he earth then attempted also to create many portents [portenta], having come into being with extraordinary physical appearance and limbs: the hermaphrodite [androgyne], in between the two extremes and yet neither, far removed in function at both ends; some bereft of feet, others, in turn, deprived of hands; some were mute and even lacked a mouth, others were found to be blind without a face; some were bound together with their limbs completely adhering to their bodies, so that they were neither able to do anything at all nor able to go anywhere, neither able to avoid evil nor able to take what might be needed.

Such deformities, Lucretius contends, prevented these monsters (monstra) from thriving and procreating, thus precluding them from producing a new race of people:

And [the earth] was creating the rest of the monsters (monstra) and portents (portenta) of this race to no avail; because nature deterred their growth, they could not reach the blossoming of youth nor find food nor join in sexual intercourse. We see that it is necessary for creatures to have many things come together simultaneously, so that they might, by producing offspring, forge the succession of generations: first, there must be food; next, it is necessary that the reproductive seeds can pass through the sexual organs by which they might flow out from the relaxed body; and [finally] so that a female might be joined sexually with males, it is necessary for each to have what is required to exchange mutual physical delights with one another.

Lucretius proceeds to apply these Empedoclean concepts to the extinction of certain types of animals, who, because of the ways in which nature fashioned them, were unable to reproduce in sufficient quantities to propagate their kind.

Although Epicurean ideas would influence how some philosophers and naturalists viewed nature during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and even nineteenth centuries, many people in classical antiquity rejected Lucretius’ ideas about nature, chance, and congenital deformity. Cicero, after all, admired Lucretius’ poetic genius but believed, like Plato and Aristotle, that the natural world was indicative of rationality rather than chance.
In *De Natura Deorum*, Cicero argues that chance could no sooner produce the complexities of the natural world than it would be possible to recreate the *Annales* of Quintus Ennius by scattering an innumerable amount of the twenty-one letters of the Latin language onto the ground. Cicero, however, did agree with the Epicureans in two ways. First, he too viewed congenital deformity as a natural rather than supernatural phenomenon, believing that it was foolish to equate congenital deformity with divination. In the dialogue *De Divinatione*, for example, Cicero contends that there is no reason to fear “portentous births, whether from an animal or human,” because there is “is one reason for all [portents]: whatever comes into existence, of whatever sort it is, necessarily must have its cause in nature.” According to Cicero, “even if something exists contrary to normal experience, it nevertheless cannot exist contrary to nature.” As one might expect for a dialogue on divination, Cicero returns to the existence of portentous births a short time later, arguing that there is no connection between portents and the purported mystical properties of heavenly bodies because the efforts of congenitally deformed people themselves, surgeons, and even the mere passage of time often correct congenital deformity. To drive his point home, Cicero points to the example of Demosthenes, who famously managed to overcome his speech impediment—the inability to pronounce the letter *rho*—to become one of the greatest orators of classical antiquity. If heavenly bodies actually had the power to afflict some people with birth defects, Cicero reasons, neither the passage of time nor human effort could make such unfortunate people whole. Second, Cicero agreed with Lucretius that learned inquiries into congenital deformity could help to unravel the mysteries of the natural and supernatural world. In yet another passage of *De Divinatione*, Cicero envisions a type of experiment to
determine the efficacy of divination, wondering (1) whether there was any actual diviner who, although blind like Tiresias, could distinguish between black and white or (2) whether there was a diviner who, although deaf, could distinguish between various words or tones. If such a blind or deaf person could be found, Cicero suggests, it would prove that divination is real.

Plutarch, a Roman citizen and one of the most famous Platonists in classical antiquity, later entered the intellectual fray, siding with Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero over Empedocles, Epicurus, and Lucretius. Plutarch did not come to this conclusion lightly; rather, he went to great lengths to understand the ideas of his intellectual opponents. He was particularly familiar with Empedoclean views about chance and congenital deformity, quoting Empedocles throughout his works, apparently writing a ten-volume work on Empedocles, and even discussing the monsters (terasmasin) of Empedocles in his Reply to Colotes. Plutarch was also well aware of the Epicurean view of nature, criticizing the natural philosophy of the Epicureans in his own work. It is hardly surprising, then, that Plutarch, in addressing the concept of chance, felt it necessary to respond to those people in classical antiquity who, like Empedocles and the Epicureans, contended that chance was responsible for natural phenomena. Nor is it surprising, given that congenital deformity provided the perfect means of testing hypotheses about the natural world, that Plutarch referred both to blindness and deafness when attempting to prove that the natural world was indicative of a rational mind, just as Cicero had done when exploring the validity of divination.

In On Chance (Peri tychês), Plutarch contends that nature gave humans superior intelligence so that they would not be helpless against the physically superior attributes of
Plutarch then launches a preemptive rebuttal to the inevitable criticisms that the proponents of chance would direct at his argument by asking rhetorically, “[W]hat is to be discovered or learned by mankind if all things are accomplished by chance?” He then proceeds to construct an elaborate metaphor for blindness and deafness to argue against the notion that chance plays a more important role in human affairs than wisdom. Human beings, Plutarch maintains, generally “rebuke” the idea of chance because to attribute everything in our world to chance would render us nothing more than “blind men stumbling against it.” “How would we not be destined to be so,” continues Plutarch, “when, cutting out prudence as it were our own eyes, we take a blind guide for our lives?” Plutarch next begins to apply his metaphor to the idea of rational design by telling his readers to “suppose that one of us were to say that the business of seeing is chance, and not sight nor [the use of] ‘light-bringing eyes,’ as Plato says, and that the business of hearing is chance, and not the ability to apprehend impressions in the air which are borne through to the brain.” If that were the case, Plutarch concedes, “it would be well, as it seems, to be cautious of sense-perception.” Plutarch, however, quickly dismisses such conclusions with respect to chance and the senses, proclaiming that “nature conveyed to us sight, hearing, taste, smell, and the rest of our body and our abilities to be the servants of prudence and wisdom.” Plutarch concludes his metaphor-based argument by elaborating on Epicharmus’ claim that “‘mind has sight and mind has hearing,’ and ‘all else is deaf (kōpha) and blind (typhla).’” According to Plutarch, if nature had not given sight and hearing to human beings, and “man” thus “had neither mind nor reason (ei mē noyn mēdē logon ho anthropos eschen), he would not be different in life from wild beasts.”
Plutarch’s repeated use of his metaphor for blindness and deafness to argue in favor of rational design provides one of the more ironic moments in the history of disability. Although Plutarch employs his metaphor for blindness and deafness to suggest that the reciprocity between the senses and knowledge is so strong that it could not have arisen through chance, he fails to identify two important implications with regard to the existence of blindness and deafness. First, whereas Cicero had explored blindness and deafness when addressing the question of whether there could be any truth to the claims of soothsayers, Plutarch does not examine what the existence of blindness and deafness might reveal about the natural mechanisms responsible for sight and hearing, let alone other aspects of the natural world. Second, he seems unaware that Epicureans or likeminded materialists could make a strong argument that blindness and deafness undermine the philosophical underpinnings of the idea of rational design because that idea could not explain why, if our senses are the result of rationality, some people are born without one or more of them for no apparent reason.

The reasons why Plutarch did not delve more deeply into the implications of congenital blindness and deafness are not readily apparent. Plutarch, like Plato and Aristotle, believed that although infants born with severe congenital deformities were accidents of birth produced “contrary to nature,” they were nevertheless part of an ordered system. In a dialogue in *Table-Talk*, for instance, Plutarch’s Diogenianus argues that “in a way, even things contrary to nature are contained within nature.”\(^{119}\) Plutarch, moreover, recognized that philosophers and physicians could learn a great deal about nature by attempting to reconcile the apparent order of the universe with congenital deformity, the antithesis of that order. Indeed, in the same dialogue in *Table-Talk*,

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Diogenianus attempts to answer the question whether new diseases can suddenly come into existence by comparing them to monstrosities.120 “The writers of myths,” Diogenianus contends, attributing congenital deformity to astrological forces as Ptolemy would later do in *Tetrabiblos*, “are experts in [how things contrary to nature are actually contained within nature]; for all in all they say that unnatural and monstrous (*terastia*) living beings were produced during the battle of the gods and giants, when the moon was diverted from its course and did not rise in the same quarter as it is [otherwise] accustomed to do in accordance with the qualities with which it has been endowed.”121 But those who argue that nature has the capacity to create new diseases, Diogenianus continues, “maintain that nature produces new diseases as if producing *terata*, without imagining a cause, either plausible or implausible, of this complete change, declaring, instead, that some ailment that is stronger and worse than ordinary manifestations of existing diseases is a completely novel and different type of disease.”122 Plutarch, then, understood well that exploring congenital deformity could provide valuable insights into how nature operates.

Although it is impossible to understand why Plutarch did not delve further into the significance of congenital deformity, the time would come when thinkers during the eighteenth century, particularly Diderot and La Mettrie, would point to congenital deformity in challenging the mechanistic world view that originated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Diderot, as discussed in chapter 6, would demonstrate the irony in Plutarch’s use of blindness and deafness to prove his position with respect to matter and rationality, constructing a fictional account of the blind mathematician Nicholas Saunderson in his *Letter on the Blind* to impugn both the Christian and Deist views of
congenital deformity. Diderot, as well as the French authorities who imprisoned him for writing the *Letter on the Blind*, recognized that the existence of blindness and deafness could provide radical, materialist opponents of religion and even the idea of design with strong ammunition in their polemical war against what they considered to be outdated superstitions. If Plutarch had foreseen that materialists would use blindness and deafness in this manner, perhaps he would have used a different metaphor.

Some modern observers might assume that both Greek and Roman philosophers would have been less likely than the superstitious masses to stigmatize congenital deformity. Yet some of the most brilliant minds in classical antiquity relied on their understanding of natural philosophy to reject the humanity of congenitally deformed people. In Plato’s *Cratylus*, for example, Socrates argues,

> It appears to me, at any rate, that it is right to call a lion’s offspring a lion and a horse’s offspring a horse. I am not speaking about some monster [teras], as for instance something that is born of a horse that is not a horse . . . . If, contrary to nature, a horse produces a calf, the natural offspring of a cow, it is called not a colt but a calf, nor, in my estimation, should any offspring born of a human that is not human itself be called a human. . . .

Shortly thereafter, Socrates further explains his ideas regarding “natural” and “unnatural” births, arguing that “a king will usually be born from a king, a good man from a good man, and a handsome man from a handsome man, and thus in all things; the offspring of each stock will be of the same stock, unless it is a monster [teras] that is born. . . .”

In *Generation of Animals*, Aristotle likewise recognizes the inhumanity of congenitally deformed people, noting that “sometimes [the offspring has deviated from its parents and ancestors] to such an extent that, ultimately, it does not even appear that a human being has been born but rather an animal only; indeed, they are called monsters [terata].”

In *Pro Murena*, while Cicero does not go so far as to reject entirely the humanity of
congenitally deformed people, he does evince a belief that deformed people are aesthetically inferior to ordinary human beings. In that work, he criticizes Cato for his literal interpretation of Zeno’s teachings, including his claims that “wise men alone are handsome, even if they are as deformed as possible [distortissimi], rich, even if completely destitute, kings, even if reduced to slavery.” The implication of Cicero’s criticisms with respect to deformity is that it would be ridiculous to consider a deformed man handsome, no matter how much wisdom he possessed, because a deformed man is the antithesis of a handsome man, just as a destitute man is the opposite of a rich man and a slave is the opposite of a king.

_Hippocratic Physicians and Congenital Deformity: Critical of Superstition and Philosophy_

Hippocratic physicians added further complexity to ideas about congenital deformity in classical antiquity. The Hippocratic physicians followed philosophers in criticizing superstition in their attempts to advance the practice of medicine, but were likewise critical of philosophers. In fact, the Hippocratics waged a two-front, polemical war against both the superstitions of the masses and what they considered to be the wild speculations of philosophers. The most famous example of the Hippocratic struggle against superstition was _On the Sacred Disease_, which attacked the widely held belief among the Greeks that epilepsy was a “sacred disease” because of its seemingly inexplicable symptoms. In that text, the Hippocratic author attributes the sacred disease to nature, contending that although its “origin, like other diseases, is in accordance with heredity,” laypeople “consider it to be something divine because of their inexperience and its marvelous quality.” According to the author, however, if the disease is “to be deemed divine because it is marvelous, there are many sacred diseases and not one, for
will demonstrate that other diseases are no less marvelous and portentous/monstrous (*teratōdea*) even though “no one considers them to be ‘sacred.’”129 “It seems to me,” the author surmises, “that those men who first made this disease ‘sacred’ were like the charlatans, purifiers, begging priests, and quacks of our day, those who pretend with vehemence to be religious and to know something to a greater extent.”130 Because these men could not offer effective remedies for the disease, they “wrapped themselves in a cloak of the divine and held the divine in front of themselves as a means of protection,” proclaiming that the disease was sacred.131

Despite the author’s repeated attacks on superstition in *On the Sacred Disease*, it is important to recognize that neither he nor other Hippocratic physicians and writers rejected all religious modes of thought.132 The author of *On the Sacred Disease*, for instance, apparently did believe that something divine was ultimately responsible for the natural causes of disease. He argues that although “this disease called sacred comes into being from the same causes as the rest, from what comes to and goes away from [the body], from cold and sunshine, and from shifting winds which are never still,” such causes are themselves “divine.”133 In fact, one of author’s most poignant attacks on the charlatans who, in his view, tricked people into believing that the “sacred disease” had a divine cause is that their impious acts advanced the idea that “there are no gods.”134 The author, then, apparently believed that diseases were not contingent upon the will of some deity but rather an integral part of an ordered system of nature that was itself the product of the divine.135 The author of *Decorum* goes even further in connecting the gods to the medical art, contending that “most knowledge about the gods is woven into the mind by medicine.”136 The author then goes on to suggest, in language similar to the famous
observation of sixteenth-century surgeon Ambroise Paré that “I cared for him; God cured him,” that although “physicians may be the means, the gods are the cause, of cures in medicine and surgery. The gods confer this honor on medicine, and medical men must realize that the gods are their masters.”

Hippocratic physicians likewise rejected philosophical debates about the origins of human beings, concluding that such speculation could not provide meaningful insights into nature. In On Ancient Medicine, the Hippocratic author observes that “some physicians and philosophers say that it is not possible for someone who does not know what man is to know medicine.” The author rejects such an approach, contending that inquiries into the origin of human beings is the domain of philosophers, who, “like Empedocles or others, have written about nature and what man is from the beginning, both how he first came into being and from what he was put together.” He concludes that “however much philosophers or physicians have said or written about nature [is] as little a concern to the medical art as to painting” and that “there is no clear knowledge about nature from any source other than medicine.” These Hippocratic ideas proved to be so enduring in classical antiquity that many medical writers and physicians continued to proclaim for centuries that experience rather than speculation was the proper domain of medicine. According to Celsus, for instance, the Empirici argued that experience rather than rational, philosophical inquiry was the proper basis of medicine. Galen, likewise an admirer of Hippocrates, asserted that physicians were better equipped than philosophers to understand nature, criticizing the philosopher Asclepiades for having the audacity to argue with physicians about the function of the kidneys and bladder even
though it was unlikely that Asclepiades had ever observed someone suffering from kidney or bladder disease attempt to pass a stone.\textsuperscript{143}

Hippocratic authors did, however, write about congenital deformity in accordance with their understanding of the medical art. The author of \textit{On the Sacred Disease} suggests that the “sacred disease” is a congenital deformity stemming from an improper “purging” of the embryo’s brain.\textsuperscript{144} He likewise explains how, according to the Hippocratic understanding of humors, “some become hunchbacked (\textit{kuphoi})” when what is supposed to be purged from the brain in utero flows into the heart instead.\textsuperscript{145} In \textit{Airs Waters Places}, the author discusses what he believed to be an example of the heritability of acquired deformity. Although it was once the custom of the Longheads, he claims, to lengthen the heads of their children, their deformities eventually “became natural (\textit{tēn physin egeneto}).”\textsuperscript{146} It goes without saying that the Longheads would not suddenly have considered such deformities undesirable had they actually become congenital as the author claimed. Indeed, the author perspicaciously recognizes, as Garland would in the twentieth century when writing about disability in the classical world, that beauty is in the “eye of the beholder,” pointing out that the Longheads “deemed those with the longest heads to be the most noble.”\textsuperscript{147}

\textit{Congenital Deformity and Stigma Associated with Various Categories of Disabled People}

Even if beauty was in the eye of the beholder, however, it was normal, able-bodied Greeks and Romans who created the standard of beauty in the classical world. Accordingly, even people whose congenital deformities were not severe enough to be classified as monsters experienced considerable stigma and discrimination. Indeed, the Greeks and Romans constructed a variety of categories to denote people with disabilities,
many of which were congenital deformities. The dwarfs of classical antiquity perhaps best illustrate how these categories stigmatized those people with congenital deformities not necessarily serious enough to thrust them into the category of monsters. Aristotle, in fact, constructed a human/dwarf binary opposition to distinguish between humans and animals. For Aristotle, dwarfs were such a significant deviation from the natural human form that he defined all animals other than human beings as dwarfs.148 “As compared with man,” Aristotle proclaims in *On Parts of Animals*, “all other animals are dwarfish.”149 Aristotle even considered human children to be dwarfs because their bodies and limbs have not yet grown to their full potential.150 Aristotle’s human/dwarf binary opposition, like most binary oppositions, was not a value-neutral classification but rather one that rested on the idea that dwarfs were inferior to ordinary human beings. Indeed, Aristotle further asserts in *On Parts of Animals* that “all animals are more foolish than men” because they are dwarfish, reasoning that even with respect to human beings, “children, as compared to men, and dwarfs in the prime of life as compared to the natural form of others, lack intellect, even if they have some other extraordinary ability.”151

Negative attitudes towards dwarfs were not only a component of natural philosophy but also colloquial discourse. The size of dwarf genitalia, for instance, fascinated natural philosophers and ordinary people alike. In *History of Animals*, Aristotle notes that both small mules and dwarfs have disproportionately large genitalia.152 The popularity of phallic dwarfs, statues of dwarfs with abnormally large penises, suggests that dwarf genitalia were just as intriguing to ordinary people not well versed in natural philosophy.153 Colloquial discourse likewise agreed with natural philosophers that dwarfs and extremely small people were inferior to people of normal
stature. According to Plutarch, the Spartan ephors reportedly “fined Archidamus for marrying a little woman,” because they believed that someone of her size would produce “not kings but tiny kings.” The imperial family of Rome also viewed dwarfs, along with other congenitally deformed people, as inferior. Not every emperor, however, interacted with dwarfs in the same way. Augustus preferred the company of “small boys” to deformed jesters because he “abhorred dwarfs, the deformed, and everything of the same sort as playthings of nature and ill omen.” Tiberius, by contrast, apparently saw nothing wrong with dwarf jesters. Tiberius, in fact, may have valued the opinion of such a jester. On one occasion, “a dwarf standing by a table among the jesters suddenly and loudly” asked Tiberius “why Paconius, charged with high treason,” was still alive. Tiberius immediately rebuked the dwarf for his impudence but ordered the senate a few days later to expedite its decision about the appropriate punishment for Paconius.

Two other groups that constituted important categories in the disability discourse of classical antiquity were the deaf and dumb and the blind. Deafness and blindness, which the western world has traditionally viewed as related because each disability affects the senses, were particularly devastating to the Greeks, whose language and philosophy expressly equated hearing, speech, and sight with knowledge. In Being and Time, Heidegger famously recognized the importance of the ability to speak, which ordinarily would have required at least some limited capacity to hear in classical antiquity, for both the Greeks and their intellectual and cultural progeny when defining Dasein, “man’s Being,” as the “ζῶον λόγον εχον” (animal having speech). The ability to speak was so important in classical antiquity that the anonymous author of the Life of Aesop considers the speechlessness of the seriously deformed Aesop to be his most
debilitating disability. In Cicero’s *De Rerum Deorum*, moreover, Balbus suggests that those people in classical antiquity familiar with Greek philosophy differentiated between gods and human beings, on the one hand, and animals, on the other, because the latter were dumb, unintelligent, and irrational.

Yet as both Epicharmus’ assertion that ‘‘mind has sight and mind has hearing,’ and ‘all else is deaf (κȫpha) and blind (τυφλα)’’ as well as Plutarch’s favorable recitation of it in *Moralia* suggest, sight was also inextricably intertwined with the Greek conception of knowledge, without which there could be no meaningful speech. The confrontation between Oedipus and the blind seer Tiresias in Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus* (Oedipus Rex), in fact, demonstrates that the Greeks viewed sight, hearing, and knowledge as related phenomena. After Tiresias informs Oedipus that it was he who killed Laius, Oedipus responds by calling Tiresias blind in his “ears, mind, and eyes.” For Oedipus, sight is such an integral component of knowledge that a person can be “blind” with respect to both the ears and the mind. In fact, the Greek language itself suggested that there was a close connection between sight and knowledge. When a Greek said “I know” (oida), for example, he or she was literally saying “I have seen.” Accordingly, most Greeks would have considered not only deafness and speechlessness but also blindness to be major impediments to the acquisition of knowledge, which the Greeks considered indispensable to living a normal, human existence.

The Romans likewise equated hearing and speech with knowledge. In book five of *De Rerum Natura*, Lucretius discusses both deafness and dumbness when addressing the issue of whether one human being, supernaturally possessing the gift of language, could have taught language to other humans or whether language must have developed
incrementally over time with contributions from countless humans. Lucretius concludes that it would have been impossible for one person to have bestowed language on all of humankind because people with absolutely no ability to use various sounds as simple signifiers would not have been able to comprehend the hypothetical progenitor of language. According to Lucretius, “it is not easy to teach the deaf by any method or to attempt to persuade them to do what needs to be done.”¹⁶⁶ Lucretius, of course, did not believe that there ever was a time when human beings did not possess at least a limited capacity to use sounds to communicate with one another. For Lucretius, the fact that even “dumb animals” are able to use different sounds to express simple emotions makes it almost a certainty that early human beings would have employed simple sounds for rudimentary communication.¹⁶⁷ “If various emotions drive animals to utter various sounds,” Lucretius proclaims, “how much more likely is it that mortal men in the past would have been able to put identifying signs on different things through this or that sound!”¹⁶⁸ In any event, Lucretius’ comparisons of hypothetical, speechless people to the deaf and dumb suggests that he did not believe that deaf and dumb people could realistically hope to possess ordinary, human knowledge, and thus that they could not experience normal, human existence.

Negative stereotypes about deafness, dumbness, and blindness in classical antiquity, of course, extended beyond questions of epistemology. The most well-known, negative portrayal of deafness in antiquity is Herodotus’ depiction of Croesus’ deaf and dumb son as an unnatural prodigy whom his father could never accept.¹⁶⁹ According to Herodotus, Croesus had two sons, his prized Atys and a deaf and dumb son whom Herodotus does not even name. Herodotus calls the anonymous son “malformed
(diephtharto), for he was deaf and dumb.” and claims that Croesus did not value him simply because of his disability.\textsuperscript{170} Croesus even told his able-bodied son Atys that he was his only son because “I do not consider the other one, malformed with respect to the sense of hearing, to be my son.”\textsuperscript{171} Yet it is difficult to tell exactly what Herodotus intends Croesus to mean by this seemingly harsh statement about his anonymous son. Indeed, Herodotus later suggests that Croesus might not have been such a coldhearted father to his disabled son, recounting how Croesus, before his defeat at the hands of the Persians, had reportedly “done everything for him,” including sending him to Delphi in an apparent attempt to find a cure.\textsuperscript{172}

Able-bodied society stigmatized blindness, meanwhile, by associating it with divine punishment even when a particular person’s blindness was not congenital. As Garland has demonstrated, the Greek tradition found examples of blindness as divine punishment in the works of both Homer and Hesiod, the two most influential poets of the early Greek period.\textsuperscript{173} In the \textit{Iliad}, Homer explains how the muses became so enraged at the bard Thamyris for boasting that he could best them in a singing contest that they “maimed him [in the eyes] and, moreover, deprived him of his divine-sounding art of singing, and made him forget utterly the art of playing the cithara.”\textsuperscript{174} Not every Greek agreed that the blindness of Thamyris was the result of divine wrath. Pausanias stated his belief that Thamyris, like Homer himself, became blind after suffering from some type of disease.\textsuperscript{175} According to Apollodorus, Hesiod attributed the blindness of Tiresias to divine wrath. In Hesiod, Apollodorus observes, Tiresias found himself caught between Hera and Zeus in the midst of one of their legendary arguments, this time over whether men or women receive more pleasure during sexual intercourse. Zeus, the notorious
philanderer, predictably argued that intercourse is more pleasurable for women, while Hera vehemently disagreed. Tiresias, who had once been turned into a woman and thus had experienced intercourse as both a man and a woman, proclaimed that women receive greater pleasure. Hera was so furious with Tiresias for supporting Zeus that she struck him with blindness. The Greeks fashioned a host of other explanations for Tiresias’ blindness, as Apollodorus notes, but the common denominator of these myths was the idea that Tiresias’ blindness was the result of some type of transgression against the gods.

It is exceedingly difficult to assess the impact of these well-known incidents of blindness as divine punishment on classical disability discourse. Homer’s and Hesiod’s accounts may have contributed to the tradition that Stesichorus, the renowned Greek lyric poet, became blind after composing unflattering poetry about Helen. Their accounts may also have contributed to the notion that some blind people were inferior to sighted people, both morally and intellectually, because they were somehow responsible for their own wretched conditions. In Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae, for instance, Chremes tells Blepyrus about the time when the “blear-eyed Neocleides” attempted to speak before his fellow Athenians about how best to preserve the State. When Neocleides attempted to speak, Chremes explains, the people mocked him, shouting, “What a scandal that this man, who has not saved his eyesight for himself, would dare to speak in the assembly about the question of preserving the State.” Neocleides, likely well inured to such abuse, ignored their taunts and proceeded to speak. Aristophanes, however, never gives his audience the opportunity to hear Neocleides’ advice. Instead, Blepyrus interjects, contending that, had he been present, he would have mocked Neocleides by telling him to
rub an ointment on his eyes every night, which was probably a contemporary treatment for people with certain afflictions of the eye.\textsuperscript{180} The Homeric and Hesiodic tradition, however, may have had a limited impact on Aristophanes’ prejudices against the blind. Neocleides may simply be a comical representation of Athenian prejudices about the diminished intelligence of blind people. Aristophanes’ characterization of Neocleides as a blind fool is so pronounced, after all, that Benjamin Bickley Rogers’ translation rightly refers to Neocleides as an “oaf” on more than one occasion.\textsuperscript{181} Yet it remains a distinct possibility that the Homeric and Hesiodic tradition of blaming the blind for their own misfortunes could have reinforced the type of negative stereotypes about blindness and intelligence that permeate Aristophanes’ \textit{Ecclesiazusae}.

The Homeric and Hesiodic precedents of blindness as manifestations of divine wrath may also have helped, paradoxically, to lay the foundation for the idea in classical antiquity that some blind people possessed extraordinary powers of divination and uncanny intelligence. According to Apollodorus’ rendition of Hesiod, for example, Zeus compensated Tiresias for his blindness by endowing him with unprecedented prophetic powers. In book eleven of the \textit{Odyssey}, although Homer does not broach the subject of the cause of Tiresias’ blindness, Tiresias retains his remarkable divination abilities even in death. When Odysseus travels to the underworld, Tiresias informs Odysseus that he and his comrades may be able to return home one day even though Poseidon is angry at Odysseus for having blinded his son Polyphemus.\textsuperscript{182} Later poets, of course, built upon this tradition, incorporating the blind Tiresias into their works. The most famous is undoubtedly Sophocles’ \textit{Oedipus Tyrannus}, in which Tiresias appears to inform Oedipus of the horrible fate that awaits him.\textsuperscript{183} Tiresias also demonstrates his extraordinary
powers of divination in Eurpides’ *Bacchae*, in which he warns Pentheus against blasphemying the new god Dionysius.\(^{184}\)

Examples of actual blind people, of course, almost certainly contributed to the idea in classical antiquity that some blind people possessed marvelous intellectual capabilities. The Greeks and Romans, after all, believed that Homer was blind.\(^{185}\) Homer was so ubiquitous in classical antiquity, moreover, that he served as a constant reminder to the Greeks and Romans that some blind people could possess prodigious minds.\(^{186}\) Dio Chrysostom’s Callistratus, for example, quips that both Homer and Homer’s blindness were so famous in classical antiquity that “all these [poets] are blind, and they do not believe that it is possible to become a poet otherwise.”\(^{187}\) Diderot, meanwhile, later maintained that Tiresias himself was a historical figure who had exhibited uncanny intelligence: “For what was Tiresias, who had penetrated the secrets of the gods, but a blind philosopher whose memory has been handed down to us by fable?”\(^{188}\) Homer and Tiresias, assuming that Diderot was correct in his assessment of the renowned Greek seer, were not the only blind people in classical antiquity to impress the sighted. We have already seen that Appius Claudius Caecus was famous throughout the Roman world for having saved the Romans from entering into an ignominious peace agreement with Pyrrhus of Epirus.\(^{189}\) In his *Tusculanae Disputationes*, moreover, Cicero discusses the mental abilities of his blind friend and mentor, the Stoic Diodotus, who lived with Cicero for “many years.”\(^{190}\) Cicero expresses his amazement that Diodotus, a precursor to Nicholas Saunderson, the blind mathematician who became the fourth Lucasian Chair of Mathematics at Cambridge in 1711, was so intelligent that he was able to teach geometry to sighted students.\(^{191}\) It may have been his friendship with Diodotus that led Cicero to
defend the capabilities of the deaf and blind in book five of the dialogue *Tusculanae Disputationes*, just as Diderot’s friendship with the blind man of Puisaux enabled Diderot to explain the intellectual capabilities of educated blind people in his *Letter on the Blind*. In *Tusculanae Disputationes*, when Cicero points to Epicurus’ belief that the “wise man is always happy,” his interlocutor responds, “Even if he will be deprived of the senses of sight and hearing?” Cicero, setting aside his usual dislike of Epicurean ideas, responds that even deaf and blind people can be virtuous and happy because there are so many things that deaf and blind people can accomplish in spite of their disabilities. Yet Cicero does acknowledge that a deaf and blind person who also suffered from unbearable pain might be happier dead than alive. For Cicero, then, deafness and blindness were apparently afflictions that the deaf and blind could overcome to some extent, provided that fortune did not heap additional calamities upon them.

Notwithstanding anomalies such as Diodotus, it is doubtful that able-bodied people in classical antiquity considered most ordinary blind people to have powers of divination or extraordinary intelligence. Indeed, as both the elder Seneca’s and the younger Seneca’s discussions about blindness demonstrate, blindness not only could disqualify a person from holding the priesthood but also accentuate a person’s mental shortcomings. In Seneca the Elder’s controversy, *Metellus Caecatus*, the priest Metellus loses his sight while saving the Palladium from a fire, which raises the question of whether the prohibition on disabled people acting as priests should disqualify him from remaining in the priesthood. If the Romans had considered all instances of blindness to be a direct link to the gods, there likely would have been no controversy at all because Metellus’ contemporaries would have seen his blindness as enhancing his ability to act as...
an intermediary between the gods and mortals rather than question whether his disability was proof of divine disfavor. In one of his many epistles, meanwhile, Seneca the Younger demonstrates how an already mentally deficient person could seem even more stupid if she were to become blind. In that epistle, Seneca compares ordinary human ignorance to the example of his wife’s buffoon, whose blindness unquestionably exacerbates her stupidity. After expressing his displeasure with the Roman practice of keeping such prodigies as a means of entertainment, Seneca explains how the buffoon was unable to understand what had happened to her when she suddenly lost her sight. She was so moronic, Seneca claims, that she did not even “know that she was blind.” Instead, she repeatedly asked for a new living arrangement because she believed that her home had become “shrouded in darkness.”

Two other prominent categories for disabled people in classical antiquity were hunchbacks and the lame, two distinct disabilities often viewed as related in the western tradition because people with kyphosis—the modern name for the condition that results in a humped back—can also be lame. Among the Greeks, the two figures that best exemplified able-bodied prejudices against hunchbacks suffering from concomitant lameness were Thersites, who chastises Agamemnon for dishonoring Achilles in book two of the *Iliad*, and the renowned Aesop, both of whom, according to Greek tradition, exhibited a number of unsightly deformities in addition to their hunchbacks and feeble legs. The literary depictions of Thersites and Aesop demonstrate that able-bodied people considered those afflicted with such serious deformities to be aesthetically inferior. According to Homer, Thersites was the “ugliest man who came beneath Ilium” because he “dragged one foot, being lame (*chōlos*) in one leg. His shoulders were hunched (*kurtō*)
and they were gathered around his chest. His head above was pointed (phoxos), and straggly, woolly hair sprouted therefrom."¹⁹⁹ The Life of Aesop characterizes Aesop in a similar manner, describing him as “a loathsome thing to see, unsound with regard to being a servant, pot-bellied, sugarloaf-headed, snub-nosed, swarthy, dwarfish, bandy-legged, short-armed, squint-eyed, large-mouthed, [and] a portentous failure [of nature]."²⁰⁰

It is difficult to determine whether Thersites’ deformities play any role in Odysseus’ decision to upbraid Thersites and to strike his back and shoulders with a staff for criticizing Agamemnon.²⁰¹ Homer never gives any indication whatsoever that Odysseus is motivated by a disdain for the deformed. Indeed, when Odysseus defends Agamemnon and beats Thersites, he does not, as one might expect, mock his deformities. Instead, the object of Odysseus’ ire is merely the audacious insubordination that Thersites displays in speaking against Agamemnon. Although Thersites was unquestionably an ugly deviation from the able-bodied norm, Homer may have felt that it was unnecessary to mock his deformities in order to inflict emotional pain on him, even in the midst of a vehement disagreement.²⁰² Still, however, Homer may well have foreseen that his audience would conclude that Thersites’ ugliness had exacerbated Odysseus’ anger over Thersites insubordination. There is no such ambiguity in the Life of Aesop, in which Aesop must endure numerous taunts because of his deformities. When Aesop attempts to help Xanthus interpret an omen, for example, the Samians reveal that they do not consider the deformed slave to be a normal human being, mocking him and repeatedly comparing him to various animals:

And the Samians, seeing Aesop, laughed scornfully at him and exclaimed, “Bring another diviner so that this omen can be solved. This is a monster [teras] of
appearance! He is a frog, a hedgehog, or a wine-jar having a protruding hump, or a senior centurion of monkeys, or a molded flask, or the arsenal of a cook, or a dog in a wicker-basket.”^203

The author of the *Life of Aesop*, however, allows Aesop to retain his dignity in the face of those taunts. Indeed, Aesop repeatedly outwits those who mock him, demonstrating, at the very least, that the author of the *Life of Aesop*, as well as his readers, must have realized that congenital deformity alone does not diminish a person’s acumen.

The literary depictions of Thersites and Aesop raise the interesting question of whether the ridicule that they endure makes them ridiculous figures. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, the famed eighteenth-century philosopher and literary critic, brilliantly analyzes the relationship between the ridicule of the deformed and the ridiculous vis-à-vis Thersites and Aesop in *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry*, one of the most important discussions of the two hunchbacks in the western corpus. For Lessing, the ridicule that permeates Homer’s account of Thersites corresponds to his ridiculousness, while the even more vicious ridicule in the *Life of Aesop* does nothing to detract from Aesop’s wisdom.^204 Lessing views both Thersites and Aesop as ugly, of course, concluding that hunchbacks are “extreme” examples of ugliness.^205 Yet for Lessing, Thersites is both ugly and ridiculous, while Aesop is merely ugly. Thersites is ridiculous, Lessing contends, because of “the ugliness of his person corresponding with that of his character, and both contrasting with the idea he entertains of his own importance, together with the harmlessness, except to himself, of his malicious tongue.”^207 The “wise and virtuous Aesop,” by contrast, was never a ridiculous figure on account of his hunchback and revolting ugliness, even if various antagonists in the *Life of Aesop* ridiculed him.^208 The *Life of Aesop*, in fact, leaves the reader with the distinct
impression that it is Aesop’s adversaries—those with perfect bodies but doltish and malicious minds—who are ridiculous because Aesop bests them at every turn.

Different renderings of Thersites, Lessing rightly observes, could have detracted from the ridiculous. If, for example, Thersites’ able-bodied superiors had inflicted a particularly savage punishment on him, then he would cease to be ridiculous. If Agamemnon or Odysseus had responded to Thersites by killing him, “then we should cease to laugh at him.”

Quintus Smyrnaeus’ *Posthomerica*, in which Achilles mercilessly kills Thersites after he slanders Achilles’ love for Penthesilea whom Achilles has just slain, and the earlier version of the tale that appears in Apollodorus’ *Epitome*, are perhaps the best examples of Thersites as a pitiful rather than ridiculous figure. The “angry, murderous Achilles” of *Posthomerica*, Lessing proclaims, “becomes more an object of hate to me than the tricky, snarling Thersites” and the “shout of delight raised by the Greeks offends me.” Indeed, Lessing identifies more with Diomedes, who quickly draws his sword to defend his fallen kinsman, because “Thersites as a man is of my kin also.” According to Lessing, Thersites also could have lost his ridiculousness if he had succeeded in causing his fellow soldiers to rebel against their commanders, causing the destruction of the fleet and his fellow Achaeans. “Although harmless ugliness may be ridiculous,” Lessing observes, “hurtful ugliness is always horrible.”

The Greeks likewise stigmatized and discriminated against figures whose only disability was lameness. The most famous cripple in classical antiquity, the god Hephaestus, struggled to find acceptance among the able-bodied Olympians. As Zeus and Hera are about to come to blows in book one of the *Iliad*, for example, Hephaestus alleviates the tension merely by serving nectar to the gods because the sight of the lame
god laboring to serve the other gods is evidently such a comical sight that the gods cannot help but laugh. As Homer explains, “unquenchable laughter erupted among the blessed gods, as they saw Hephaestus bustling about through the hall.” In book eight of the *Odyssey*, the blind bard Demodocus reveals how poorly Hephaestus coped with being mocked by his fellow gods when he tells the story of how Hephaestus snared both his wife Aphrodite and her lover Apollo after catching them *in flagrante delicto*. Hephaestus, Demodocus explains, blamed the affair on his disability, lamenting that “Aphrodite, daughter of Zeus, always deems me unworthy because I lame (*chōlon*), and she loves destructive Ares because he is both handsome and swift-footed, whereas I was born halting (*ēpedanos*).” Hephaestus, overcome with sorrow and frustration at his sorry lot in life, then complains that “there is not anyone responsible [for my deformity] other than my two parents; would that they had never given birth to me.” In the *Homerid Hymn to Pythian Apollo*, moreover, Hera reveals that she, too, would have preferred not to have given birth to a deformed son. Hera laments the fact that Zeus was able to father Athena by himself, while Hera could produce only the cripple Hephaestus parthenogenetically. After rebuking Zeus for dishonoring her and their marriage, she explains how she tried to discard Hephaestus by throwing him into the sea. If Hera ever felt any sorrow for attempting to kill her son, she never shows it. In fact, she criticizes Thetis for rescuing Hephaestus, proclaiming that she would have preferred Thetis to have “offered another type of help to the gods.”

Crippled mortals likewise experienced considerable stigma and discrimination, even when they came from wealthy and powerful families. The lame Medon, the legendary first archon of Athens, faced opposition from his own family when he
attempted to secure his archonship. After the death of Codrus, the last king of Athens, his
two eldest sons, Medon and Neileus, both sought the archonship. According to Pausanias,
“Neileus asserted that he would not endure having Medon rule over him because Medon
was lame in one of his feet.”\textsuperscript{218} The brothers thus decided “to refer the matter to the
oracle at Delphi, and the Pythian priestess gave the Athenian kingdom to Medon.”\textsuperscript{219}
After Medon prevailed, Neileus did indeed refuse to allow his lame brother to rule over
him, leaving Athens with the rest of his brothers to establish their own colony.\textsuperscript{220}

Several centuries later, the club-footed Agesilaus had to overcome similar
prejudices in order to become king of Sparta. When Agesilaus was a child, few Spartans
would have feared that they might one day have a lame king. Because Agesilaus’ older
brother, Agis, was the rightful heir to the kingdom, as Plutarch notes in his \textit{Life of
Agesilaus}, “it was thought that Agesilaus would live as a private person.”\textsuperscript{221} Agesilaus’
family thus decided that he should receive the traditional Spartan education alongside
other Spartan youths, notwithstanding his disability. As he received his education, some
able-bodied Spartans began to realize that Agesilaus’ lameness would not prevent him
from being a successful king. According to Plutarch, “the beauty of Agesilaus’ body, in
the bloom of youth, concealed his maimed legs, and he bore this misfortune so easily and
cheerfully, being the first to jest and mock himself, that he did more than a little to
ameliorate his condition.”\textsuperscript{222} In fact, Plutarch claims that because Agesilaus “renounced
no toil or undertaking on account of his lameness,” his disability “made his ambition
more conspicuous.”\textsuperscript{223}

When Agis died, Sparta had to decide whether to bestow the kingdom on
Leotychides, Agis’ son, or Agesilaus. Leotychides was confident that he would prevail
because, under Spartan law, the kingship should have gone to the son of the king.\textsuperscript{224} Agis, however, had long known that his wife, Timaea, had had an affair with Alcibiades and that Leotychides was not his legitimate heir.\textsuperscript{225} According to Xenophon, Agesilaus defended his own right to the kingship by reminding Leotychides that Agis had last had sexual intercourse with Timaea ten months before his birth, the night of a memorable earthquake.\textsuperscript{226} To make matters worse, Timaea secretly called her son Alcibiades, the name of his biological father, when they were in the company of her confidants.\textsuperscript{227} Alcibiades, moreover, reportedly used to boast that he had seduced Timaea “so that his offspring would be kings of the Lacedaemonians.”\textsuperscript{228} As Plutarch explains in his Life of Lysander, Agis refused to accept Leotychides as his heir for many years, no doubt furious at Timaea for her betrayal.\textsuperscript{229} While Agis lay dying, however, Leotychides begged him to relent, and Agis, “having been moved by the entreaties of the young man himself as well as friends,” finally acknowledged Leotychides as his heir.\textsuperscript{230} Agis realized, of course, that many Spartans would continue to consider Leotychides a bastard and thus asked those present to spread word of his decision.\textsuperscript{231}

As the day approached when Sparta would have to decide whether to give the kingdom to a bastard or a cripple, the most eminent people in the kingdom chose sides. Lysander, the powerful Spartan general who had finally brought an end to the Peloponnesian War and had dismantled the Athenian democracy after having defeated the Athenians at sea, supported Agesilaus, his former lover, on the grounds that it was better to have a disabled king than an illegitimate king.\textsuperscript{232} Meanwhile, the soothsayer Diopeithes, “filled with ancient powers of divination and thought to be remarkably wise about matters of religion,” supported Leotychides.\textsuperscript{233} Diopeithes “proclaimed that
customary law did not permit a lame man to become king of Lacedaemon, and read aloud the following oracle in the trial” to determine which of the two should be king: “beware now, Sparta, although you are boastful, lest you, swift of foot, bring forth a lame kingdom; for long will unexpected diseases and rolling waves of man-destroying war afflict you.”

Initially, it appeared that Diopeithes had proven himself to be a successful kingmaker, as “many Spartans, submitting to the oracle, were turned into supporters of Leotychides.” Yet Lysander, as capable as any Shakespearean devil of citing oracles for his purpose, deftly turned the cryptic warning against Leotychides, arguing that “it made no difference to the god [Apollo] if someone who stumbled because of his foot became king.” An able-bodied king, after all, could become lame through injury, and it was simply ridiculous to think that the gods would punish warlike Sparta for having an injured king. When the oracle had warned against allowing the “kingdom to become lame,” Lysander argued, Apollo was instructing the Spartans not to make Leotychides king because he “was neither lawfully begotten nor even a descendent of Heracles.”

Agesilaus and Lysander ultimately prevailed despite Spartan apprehensions about submitting to the rule of a lame king.

When even the lame sons of archons and kings experienced substantial stigma and discrimination on account of their disabilities, it is understandable that able-bodied Greeks would exclude ordinary lame people from performing certain functions in society. By the late fifth century B.C.E., for instance, Athenian law prohibited the disabled, including cripples, from holding an archonship, even though the first archon of Athens had been lame in one foot. In Lysias’ speech in defense of the lame man’s pension, the
lame man argues that if the Council were to determine that his lameness did not qualify him to be among the *adunatoi* (incapables or disabled ones), then he would be eligible to be archon. Indeed, if the Council refuses to classify him as disabled, he argues, “what hinders me from drawing lots to be one of the nine archons? . . . For surely, after this sum that has been granted to me has been taken away by you because I am able-bodied, the lawgivers will not hinder me from drawing lots because I am disabled.” It is impossible, of course, to know for certain why the Athenians withheld the archonships from cripples when Medon himself was lame. It is possible that the stigma associated with lameness, not to mention other disabilities, was so great that the Athenians overlooked their legendary ancestor when concluding that a lame man could not perform the functions of archon.

There might not have been a Roman equivalent to Thersites or Aesop—legendary figures who were both hunchbacks and lame—but there were some intriguing parallels between the lives of hunchbacks and cripples in Greece and Rome. Clesippus, who, according to Pliny the Elder, was “a hunchback and repulsive in appearance in other ways as well” endured the same type of derision that permeates the *Life of Aesop*. Like Aesop, Clesippus was a slave whom able-bodied people mocked because of his hunchback. When the wealthy Gegania purchased him, she threw a dinner-party where she paraded Clesippus, “having been stripped naked for the sake of mockery,” before her guests. At some point, Gegania, like the wife of Aesop’s master Xanthus, became sexually attracted to Clesippus and took him into her bed. Gegania appears not to have treated Clesippus as a bizarre sexual plaything but rather as a loving companion. She had such a strong bond with Clesippus, in fact, that she included him in her will, which
made Clesippus “outstandingly rich” when she died.\textsuperscript{243} Clesippus’ newfound riches, however, could not shield him from the disdain of some able-bodied people. Pliny, for instance, castigates Gegania for the “shamelessness of her lust” and claims that the tomb that Clesippus erected for his departed lover “kept alive the memory of shameful Gegania.”\textsuperscript{244}

Rome also had its own equivalent to Medon and Agesilaus, the crippled Claudius who managed to overcome Roman prejudices against disabled people to become emperor. Born with what was probably some type of neurological disorder that resulted in a limp and speech difficulties, Claudius learned at an early age that many able-bodied people would never consider him to be their equal.\textsuperscript{245} Indeed, Claudius’ own family scorned him because of his congenital deformities. According to Suetonius, his mother “habitually called him a portent of a man, not fully developed by nature, but only begun.”\textsuperscript{246} His grandmother “always had the utmost contempt for him, speaking to him only rarely. . . .”\textsuperscript{247} His family was so ashamed of Claudius, in fact, that they attempted to conceal his deformities when he appeared in public. When, for example, he and his brother, the famed Germanicus, presided over the gladiatorial games in memory of their father, Claudius appeared “wearing a cloak because of the condition of his body.”\textsuperscript{248} In addition, “on the day that he received the toga of manhood, he was brought in a litter to the Capitol around midnight without the customary ceremony.”\textsuperscript{249}

Claudius understandably bristled over such ignominious treatment and became increasingly dejected as his family deprived him of the opportunity to hold public office. When he reached the age of maturity, Suetonius explains, “he was considered unfit for public and private duties.”\textsuperscript{250} Indeed, even after he had reached the age of majority, his
family forced him to live for quite some time “under the tutelage of a guardian,” a patronizing existence about which Claudius complained in one of his short books. It is hardly a surprise, then, that when Claudius’ sister heard a rumor that he would “someday be emperor, she openly and loudly attempted to avert such an unfavorable and underserved fortune from befalling the Roman people by offering an utterance of entreaty to the gods.”

Over time, however, Claudius demonstrated enough ability that some members of his family had to reconsider whether he was fit for public office. In a series of three letters to Claudius’ grandmother, Augustus discusses the issue at some length. “Now each of us agrees,” writes Augustus, “that we must decide once and for all what plan we should follow with respect to [Claudius]. For if he is sound in mind and body, which is to say sound in all respects, why should we doubt that he should be advanced through the same junctures and steps through which his brother was advanced?” Augustus then reveals that one of his primary concerns in coming to a resolution was to protect his family, including Claudius himself, from the jeers of the public who, in Augustus’ estimation, would think that it was ridiculous to allow a congenitally deformed man to participate in public life. “But if we recognize that he is inferior and disabled with respect to the soundness of both his body and mind,” Augustus maintains, “the material for deriding both him and us must not be provided to men accustomed to mocking and sneering at such things.”

Augustus does not decide in the exchange of letters how best to deal with the situation which, in his words, had left his family “always fluctuating between hope and fear.” He does, however, write that although he was not against Claudius being in
charge of “the dining-room of the priests at the games of Mars,” provided that he listened
to the advice of his family in order to avoid doing anything that would make it possible
for him “to be seen or to be derided,” he disapproved of Claudius sitting near Augustus
and the rest of the family at the games of the Circus out of fear that his deformities would
be too visible.\textsuperscript{256} Augustus and his family ultimately decided to keep Claudius from
holding any meaningful public position, permitting him to hold only “the office of the
augural priesthood.”\textsuperscript{257} After the death of Augustus, Claudius’ uncle, emperor Tiberius,
likewise excluded Claudius from holding public office.\textsuperscript{258} As might have been expected,
Claudius eventually gave up hope of ever attaining a meaningful public position and
“surrendered to idleness.”\textsuperscript{259}

Yet Claudius was astute enough to maintain the support of large segments of the
public despite his deformities and unhappy retreat into a life of drinking and gambling.
According to Suetonius, even after Claudius began to drink and gamble excessively, he
“never lacked either help from individuals or respect from the public.”\textsuperscript{260} The equestrian
order twice made him its patron, and its members were accustomed “to rising to their feet
as a show of respect and to taking off their cloaks when he appeared at public shows.”\textsuperscript{261}
The senate likewise paid its respect to Claudius, appointing him to be a member of the
cult of Augustus, a position that was ordinarily assigned by lot.\textsuperscript{262} After Tiberius’s death,
emperor Caligula, Claudius’ nephew, attempted to benefit from Claudius’ popularity and
finally gave Claudius an opportunity to participate in public affairs, allowing him to serve
alongside him as consul for two months.\textsuperscript{263} Claudius again held the consulship four years
later. Just as Caligula had hoped, Claudius’ entrance into public affairs was popular with
the people. When Claudius “sometimes presided at public shows in place of Caligula, the
people shouted, ‘Good fortune’ not only ‘to the uncle of the emperor’ but also ‘to the brother of Germanicus!’”

Claudius’ consulships and popularity with the people, however, could never remove the stigma of living as a congenitally deformed man in an able-bodied society. The emperor’s uncle and brother of Germanicus thus “continued to live on beset by insults.” Like Hephaestus, Claudius was particularly vulnerable to insults while dining with his able-bodied associates. According to Suetonius, Claudius endured two separate types of ridicule during dinner. First, “if he arrived at dinner a little after the proper time, he was not received unless he walked feebly (aegre) around the entire dining-room.” Suetonius does not explain exactly how this amounted to an insult, but he likely intended his readers to infer that the able-bodied people present in the dining-room would mock Claudius’ limping gait, just as the able-bodied Olympians laughed as Hephaestus bustled about the dining hall to serve them nectar. There would be no reason, after all, to force Claudius to limp around the entire dining-room unless his able-bodied associates considered the forced trek to be not only ridiculous but humiliating to Claudius. Second, “whenever he fell asleep after a meal, which almost always used to happen to him, he was bombarded with stones of olives and dates, and occasionally he was awakened by jesters with a stick or a whip, as if it were a sport.” It was also commonplace for “slippers to be put on his hands as he snored so that he might rub himself with them after having been suddenly awoken.”

After the assassination of Caligula, few would have considered Claudius to have had any chance of becoming emperor. Yet Claudius benefited from his two greatest strengths—his popularity with the public and his intelligence—in his meteoric rise to
power. On the night of the assassination, so the story goes, a soldier found Claudius hiding behind a curtain and proclaimed him to be emperor.\textsuperscript{271} If Claudius had not been so popular with the public, he might have been killed along with Caligula. His popularity alone, however, would not have been enough to enable him to take action against Caligula’s assassins while, at the same time, securing his hold on power. Only a shrewd, intelligent politician could have navigated through that political morass, and Claudius was without question such a politician. Even before Caligula had given Claudius an opportunity to gain practical experience in political affairs, Augustus had recognized Claudius’ intellectual capabilities, marveling in his letters to Claudius’ grandmother that a person so awkward in everyday conversation could so thoroughly transform himself into an accomplished orator when declaiming on weighty topics.\textsuperscript{272} Augustus apparently did not understand that the way that the imperial family treated Claudius on account of his deformities would almost certainly have resulted in his awkward personality in social gatherings. In any event, Claudius masterfully used his intellect and political savvy to convince both the senate and the army to submit to the rule of a deformed emperor, at least until his own assassination at the hands of his wife.\textsuperscript{273}

**Classical Solutions to the Disability Problem: Infanticide, Public Assistance, and Begging**

Just as there was no dominant view about the causes of congenital deformity in classical antiquity, there was no dominant approach to solving what able-bodied society considered to be the disability problem. Attempts to address the disability problem in classical antiquity, of course, often differed significantly from modern approaches. While most people today would turn to doctors to find treatments and cures for disabilities, medicine had not yet advanced enough to offer meaningful treatments, let alone cures, for
most chronic disabilities.\textsuperscript{274} The Hippocratic author of \textit{On Joints}, for example, did offer some advice about treating hunchbacks but acknowledged that there was little hope of actually “curing” severe cases.\textsuperscript{275} As Nicholas Vlahogiannis has observed, this left divine intervention and magic as the only viable options when seeking a cure for a particular affliction.\textsuperscript{276} Indeed, if the gods could afflict mortals with certain disabilities, it followed that the gods could miraculously cure them.\textsuperscript{277}

The Greeks originally attributed healing powers to Apollo and later to his son Asklepios.\textsuperscript{278} The Hippocratic Oath begins with an invocation to both Apollo and Asklepios,\textsuperscript{279} and temples of Asklepios were popular throughout the Greek-speaking world.\textsuperscript{280} In Aristophanes’ \textit{Plutus}, for instance, the visually impaired Neocleides and a host of others wait outside the Temple of Aesclepius in search of a cure for their disabilities and illnesses.\textsuperscript{281} But healing powers were not the sole domain of Apollo and his progeny.\textsuperscript{282} According to the \textit{Life of Aesop}, which prominent Aesop scholar B.E. Perry once described as a “naïve, popular, and anonymous book, composed for the entertainment and edification of the common people rather than for educated men, and making little or no pretense to historical accuracy or literary elegance,”\textsuperscript{283} Isis cures Aesop of his speechlessness for showing pious kindness to one of her priestesses.\textsuperscript{284} The Romans likewise believed that the gods, including Asklepios, whom they called Aesculapius, could cure portentous afflictions, whether in the form of disabilities or pestilence.\textsuperscript{285} During a pestilence so severe that the Romans began to consider it a portent, Livy recorded that the soothsayers attempted to use the Sibyline Books to determine “what end or what remedy was provided by the gods for this evil,” ultimately concluding that “Aesculapius had to be summoned from Epidaurus to Rome.”\textsuperscript{286}
Although the consuls could not take immediate action because they were “occupied with war,” the Romans did observe “a one-day supplication to Aesculapius” in an effort to alleviate their sufferings.

Yet despite the importance of miracles in classical antiquity, there is little evidence that either the Greeks or the Romans viewed such miraculous healing as a potential solution to a societal disability problem. Classical discussions of miraculous healing, for instance, are silent about the capacity of healing shrines to lessen the burden of caring for disabled members of the community. Instead, both the Greeks and Romans sought various solutions to the disability problem that differed from culture to culture.

**Greek Solutions: Infanticide and Athenian Public Assistance**

Some Greeks believed that society could substantially lessen its burden of having to care for the disabled by killing seriously deformed infants. Although widespread infanticide could not alleviate the burden of caring for those who became disabled later in life through disease, military injuries, or accidents, a society that practiced infanticide against seriously deformed infants could better allocate its limited resources to those whom it deemed productive members of the community. Sparta famously chose this approach by adopting the legendary law code of Lycurgus, which ordered the Spartans to kill their congenitally deformed infants by flinging them into a deep chasm. According to Plutarch’s *Life of Lycurgus*, the law code required a Spartan father to bring his infant before “the elders of the tribes who, acting as judges, observed the infant.” If the infant was “well formed and strong,” it could take its place among other well-born Spartans. “If it was ill born and deformed,” Plutarch notes, “it was sent off to what is called the Apothetae, an abyss-like place near Mount Taýgetus,” in the belief that “it was good
neither for the infant itself nor the state” to rear an infant “not well born from the very
beginning for good health and bodily strength.” Martha Rose, however, has rightly
cautioned scholars not to assume that infanticide was as common as our ancient sources
seem to suggest. Indeed, the reign of the club-footed, Spartan king Agesilaus suggests
one of two things about the practice of Spartan infanticide. First, the Spartans may not
have considered all deformities equally deleterious to the state. Instead, they may have
interpreted the law code to mandate the killing only of infants with serious congenital
deformities, not relatively minor deformities such as club-foot. Second, as king of Sparta,
Agesilaus’ father, Archidamus, may have been able to protect his son from the mandate
to kill congenitally deformed infants. In any event, that mandate remained one of the
most draconian methods of dealing with the disability problem in classical antiquity.

Some of Athens’ most accomplished philosophers advocated for the Spartan
model of killing deformed infants. In the Theaetetus, Plato’s Socrates supports the
practice of exposing infants “not worthy of rearing.” Aristotle, meanwhile, supported a
mandate to kill deformed offspring, proclaiming in Politics that “concerning exposure
and the rearing of children born, let there be a law that not one deformed child be
reared.” Plato and Aristotle, however, seemingly recognized that there was some
opposition in Athens to such practices. In the Theaetetus, for instance, Socrates wonders
if Theaetetus believes that “it is necessary to rear your offspring and not expose it” and
asks him whether he will “bear to see it examined, and not be exceedingly angry if even
your first-born is taken away from you.” As Garland has pointed out, Socrates’
questioning of Theaetetus may reflect the hesitation of Athenian parents to expose their
first-born. Garland further observes that “[t]he fact that Aristotle found it necessary to
recommend that there should be a law” to prohibit the rearing of deformed children
“demonstrates that some parents were inclined, albeit deplorably in his view, to rear
them.”

Athens thus had to devise a means of dealing with a disability problem
exacerbated by its refusal to mandate the killing of congenitally deformed infants.
Disabled people likely relied on informal networks that facilitated begging regardless of
the city-state in which they dwelled. Athens, however, took the additional step of
providing public assistance to some disabled people. Solon himself may have
established the precedent of providing aid to the disabled. Heraclides, Plutarch explains
in his Life of Solon, claimed that Solon had secured public assistance for Thersippus, a
soldier who had been “maimed.” Heraclides further observed that Peisistratus had later
issued a general decree based on Solon’s specific one, ordering that “those maimed in
war be maintained at the public expense.” At some point, the Athenians enacted a
similar law that provided public assistance for disabled civilians who did not have
sufficient financial means to support themselves or their families. It is impossible to
know for certain whether the law for disabled civilians was an expansion of Solon’s and
Peisistratus’ decrees for maimed soldiers, but Garland seems to be on solid ground when
suggesting that there may have been some connection between the two related types of
public assistance. Indeed, even if the public assistance law for disabled civilians was
not a direct expansion of Solon’s and Peisistratus’ decrees, Athenian lawmakers may
have been aware that they were doing for disabled civilians what Athens had already
done for disabled veterans.
Uncertainties about the Athenian public assistance law for disabled civilians extend beyond what jurists today would call its legislative history. The particulars of the law itself remain obscured by three somewhat contradictory texts written between the late fifth century B.C.E. and the first half of the third century B.C.E. The famed orator Lysias wrote the first, a speech, sometime around 403 B.C.E. in defense of a disabled man accused of wrongfully receiving public assistance. Lysias acted as the disabled man’s speechwriter, using his formidable skills to construct an argument that would give the disabled man his best chance of swaying the Athenian Council to permit him to keep his pension. According to the speech that the disabled man himself would have delivered before the Council, there was a two-part eligibility test under Athenian law: a person (1) had to be classified as *adunatos* (incapable or disabled) and (2) had to be relatively poor. This two-part test is plainly evident when the disabled man, in addressing the accusations against him, notes, “The accuser says that I receive my small, fixed sum of money from the city unjustly; for he says that I am able-bodied (*tō sōmati dynasthai*) and not one of the incapables (*adunatoi*) and that I am skilled enough in a craft that I can live without this grant.” I thus disagree with Rose who contends that what qualified someone to be among the *adunatoi* was being disabled or having “very little wealth.” The disabled man then goes on to argue that not only his use of “two canes” but also the fact that he sometimes mounts horses to facilitate travel demonstrate that he is indeed an incapable. He further contends that his inability to purchase his own mule, which forces him to borrow other people’s horses when he needs to travel somewhere, is proof that his craft is not lucrative enough to disqualify him from receiving his grant. The law that emerges from the speech, then, appears to be one that provided supplemental
income to people classified among the incapables if they were not fortunate enough to practice a craft that would permit them to live without public assistance.

_The Constitution of Athens_, written by Aristotle or one of his followers in the 330s, provided a grant, which by this time was two obols per day, to incapables who were not able to perform any work whatsoever. According to _The Constitution of Athens_, “the Council examines the incapables (_tous adunatous_); for there is a law which requires the Council (1) to examine those who have acquired less than three minae _and_ have been incapacitated with respect to the body to such an extent that they are unable to do any work at all and (2) to give each of them two obols per day for food at the public expense.” In the third century, Philochorus referred to the same provision of Athenian law, which at that time granted five obols per day, likewise defining the incapables as those “who have been smitten in some part of the body to such an extent that they are unable to do any work.”

Because one of the primary functions of historians is to try to document changes over time, it might be tempting for some historians to question whether an amendment to Athenian law was responsible for the obvious discrepancies between the three different descriptions of the law’s eligibility requirements, namely Lysias’ suggestion that disabled people could receive a pension even if they were able to perform some work as opposed to the law as described by _The Constitution of Athens_ and Philochorus, which provides assistance only to disabled people completely unable to work. Without the discovery of additional sources from the fourth century B.C.E., however, it is perhaps impossible to resolve such a question. Although it is possible that the Athenians amended their public assistance law during the fourth century B.C.E. to prohibit disabled people who could
perform some work from receiving a pension, scholars should be wary of too readily accepting everything in Lysias’ speech at face value. Just as few people today would consider a lawyer’s remarks about a particular law in the context of representing his or her client to be an accurate portrayal of that law, so too should scholars recognize that Lysias may have taken some liberties with the law when representing the disabled pensioner. Lysias, for example, may have been attempting to bypass the technicalities of the law’s eligibility requirements by appealing to the Council’s pity for the disabled despite no precedent of the Council actually disregarding those requirements. The disabled man does, in fact, refer in the speech to the Council’s tendency to “show the utmost pity” even “to those having no misfortune.” It is equally possible, however, that the Council may have traditionally disregarded the technical provisions of the law in pursuit of providing aid to those who truly needed it. Indeed, while a de jure interpretation of the law in Lysias’ day may well have required the Council to withhold public assistance from incapables who were able to perform some work, the de facto execution of the law may have been grounded in the concept of what jurists today call equity. If that were the case, then Lysias may simply have been following ordinary protocol by appealing to the Council’s pity. The only thing that we can know for certain is that the Athenians considered public assistance to the disabled to be so important that they provided a “treasurer for [the incapables] appointed by lot.”

Roman Solutions: Infanticide and Private Charity

The Romans, like the Greeks, dealt with the disability problem, in part, by experimenting with infanticide. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, although Romulus forbade Roman parents to kill their children under the age of three in an effort
to increase the size and power of Rome, he made an exception for “any child that was maimed or a monster (teras) from the moment of birth.”

Romulus reportedly did specify, however, that parents could not kill a congenitally deformed infant or a disabled child until they showed the child “to five men who lived nearest to them and gained their approval.”

Garland has rightly pointed out that it is “highly questionable” whether such a law actually existed, noting that Dionysius’ observation “is based on no known source, was written seven centuries after the event it describes, and is not supported by any other author.”

Nevertheless, it remains a distinct possibility that Roman infanticide laws of later periods grew out of earlier infanticide laws like the one described by Dionysius.

In any event, around the middle of the fifth century, the Romans went far beyond the purported policy of Romulus by enacting Table IV of the Twelve Tables, which mandated the killing of congenitally deformed infants. It is unclear, however, how widespread the killing of congenitally deformed infants was in the Roman world. The Romans, after all, may have disregarded the mandate of the Twelve Tables to give fathers some discretion in determining whether to kill their congenitally deformed infants. As John Boswell points out in *The Kindness of Strangers*, the existence of Roman statutes or decrees “does not mean that they are enforced, or even taken seriously. . . .”

In *De Legibus*, Cicero suggests that some Romans actually did kill their congenitally deformed infants in accordance with that infanticide provision, comparing the law establishing “the power of the tribunes of the plebeians” to physical deformity, proclaiming that a period of civil unrest ushered in by the tribunes “had been killed quickly, just as the Twelve Tables establishes for deformed infants.”

By the time that Seneca the Elder began to write his *Controversiae* in the first half of the first century C.E., it appears that many
Romans did indeed kill their congenitally deformed infants. In that dialogue, Clodius Turrinus claims that “many fathers customarily expose useless (inutiles) offspring,” explaining that “a certain number of them are born right from the start mutilated in some part of the body, weak, and unfit for having any hope, whose parents throw them out more than expose them.”

Seneca the Younger, son of Seneca the Elder, suggests in De Ira that his generation of Romans continued to kill congenitally deformed infants with alacrity, explaining that “portentous offspring we annihilate, even if they are free; if they have been born weak and monstrous, we drown them.” If Phlegon of Tralles’ account of a monstrous birth is accurate, moreover, the Romans continued to kill infants with severe congenital deformities during the reign of Trajan. “In Rome,” Phlegon claims, “a certain woman brought forth a two-headed baby, which on the advice of the sacrificing priests was cast into the River Tiber.”

Notwithstanding these important observations about infanticide, a lack of additional sources makes it difficult to draw concrete conclusions about the killing of congenitally deformed infants in Roman history from one generation to the next. It does appear that the Romans, at some point, backed away from the draconian mandate of Table IV of the Twelve Tables but continued to permit fathers to kill their congenitally deformed infants if they determined that the family would be better off without a deformed family member. As Boswell has suggested, moreover, Roman families almost certainly abandoned their children at times instead of killing them. Beyond that, however, we can only speculate about the evolution of the Roman practice of killing and abandoning congenitally deformed infants.
A lack of sources likewise makes it difficult to uncover Roman efforts to extend charity to disabled people. Garland has rightly observed that there is “very little evidence to suggest that the disabled received any public welfare in the Roman world.” There is evidence, however, that some Romans grappled with both practical and moral issues associated with extending charity to disabled people as a means of dealing with the disability problem. Perhaps the best discussion of these issues is the elder Seneca’s debate over what Garland has called a “hypothetical” law, which would have provided a one-time payment to blind men. The debate begins with a recitation of the law, which provides, “Let a blind man receive one thousand denarii from the public.” It then discusses the underlying facts of the hypothetical controversy as if the controversy had actually occurred. Ten young men, Seneca explains, squandered their financial resources and decided to draw lots to determine which one would be blinded by the others. The unlucky young man was then supposed to distribute equal shares to his associates. After they drew lots and blinded the unfortunate young man against his will, however, they learned that the state would not reward such behavior.

Once he establishes the facts of the case, Seneca turns to the ultimate question of whether such a law providing assistance to blind people in all cases would be bad public policy or a moral imperative. The primary reason that such a law could be bad public policy, Seneca argues, is the possibility that it could encourage people to blind themselves or others in an attempt to receive the payment. Seneca warns that the young blind man will not be “the only one who pursues alms, but the first” and contends that “it is more advantageous to the Republic for one blind man to be spurned than for nine men to be blinded.” “What a law; if it blinds men,” Seneca concludes, “it should be
repealed.” Even while discussing the drawbacks of the law, however, Seneca felt that it was necessary to discuss what he seemingly believed was the moral imperative of helping disabled people who were honest and deserving of aid. Although Seneca reminds his readers that “the Republic consoles infirmity—it does not purchase it,” he proclaims, “I shall feed the man who is being fed because of his infirmity; I shall not feed the man who becomes infirm because he needs alms to eat.” When he turns to presenting the other side of the argument, Seneca comes even closer to suggesting that society has a moral obligation to help the disabled who are too poor to support themselves. He acknowledges that the young man should pursue some type of legal remedy against his former associates, particularly because they diabolically arranged the lots to ensure that fate would “choose” him to be blinded. But Seneca remains concerned that the young man will have no means of sustenance while pursuing such a remedy unless he receives some kind of assistance. Seneca thus declares, “We shall see [whether the young man can prevail in a legal dispute against his former associates]; first, let him have something by which he might live.” According to this side of the controversy, even though the young man was clearly complicit in the plot to bilk the state of a thousand denarii, he is still a blind man in dire need of assistance.

Although Seneca never resolves the controversy, the two opposing positions that he takes during the debate illustrate what a quandary the disability problem posed for Romans. If the state had provided public assistance to the disabled, there obviously would have been some opportunists who would have attempted fraudulently to abuse the system. Just as many opponents of welfare programs in the modern world undermine support for aid to the poor and disabled by pointing to examples of fraud, Seneca
recognized that Roman fears of fraud and abuse would present a significant obstacle for anyone in favor of allocating public resources to the disabled unconditionally. If the Romans had created a public assistance program for the disabled, then, they likely would have felt the need to create a bureaucracy to determine who was truly eligible and who was attempting to receive a pension fraudulently.

The Romans attempted to deal with the problem, instead, by relying on a system of begging and private charity that amounted to a reconciliation of Seneca’s two different positions. That system could potentially prevent fraud by relying on the supervision of the local networks that facilitated begging while still providing aid to disabled people who could not survive without it. That such a system existed is evident in Seneca’s controversy, *Mendici Debilitati*, a dialogue that discusses the case of a man who mutilated abandoned children so that he could profit from their misfortune. Everyone in the dialogue assumes that he has reduced the children to a life of begging because they apparently associate disabled people—or at least disabled children—with begging. Cestius Pius, for example, says that none of the mutilated children whom he is representing have asked him to plead their case; “for what do wretched people know to ask for except alms?” In addition, Triarius seems to suggest that wealthy Romans feel, or at least should feel, a moral obligation to provide alms to poor disabled people when he says, “You have learned from experience, I think, that we are not cruel; yet every one of us, on every occasion that we offered alms to these wretched children, prayed for their deaths.”

Some Romans, however, may have recognized that state intervention, at least under extraordinary circumstances, was necessary to deal with the disability problem.
Severus Alexander, for example, had to find something to do with a large contingent of
disabled people left over from the court of Elagabalus, his eccentric predecessor. Once
Severus Alexander came to power, he decided to give the disabled entertainers—“male
and female dwarfs” and “fools”—to the people. Yet there still remained a large number
of disabled people whom Severus Alexander considered useless, apparently because they
lacked entertainment value. He wanted to rid his court of such a motley contingent by
dispersing them back into society but recognized that no single community could absorb
so many disabled beggars without enduring substantial economic hardship. As
Lampridius would later explain, Severus Alexander sent those disabled people who
needed alms to separate communities “so that no single community would be burdened
by this sort of beggar.” He thus used the power of the state to enable the Empire as a
whole to absorb the costs of reintegrating the disabled people of Elagabalus’ court back
into society rather than burdening one or two local communities with administering alms
to them.

**The Disability Problem and Increased Stigma Associated with Disability**

Debates that focused on finding solutions to the disability problem, as one might
expect, contributed to the stigma and discrimination associated with disability. Cultures
that viewed infanticide as a means of dealing with the disability problem obviously
stigmatized and discriminated against congenitally deformed people in a particularly
dangerous way. Although the primary impetus for Sparta’s mandate to kill deformed
infants as well as the similar requirement under Table IV of the Twelve Tables was
almost certainly a desire to protect the state’s limited resources from people with serious
congenital deformities, some Spartans and Romans justified what we today would
consider the inhumane killing of defenseless children by suggesting that infanticide was in the best interest of congenitally deformed infants themselves. Plutarch, after all, observes in his *Life of Lycurgus* that the Spartans killed deformed children because they believed that “it was good neither for the infant itself nor the state” to rear an infant “not well born from the very beginning for good health and bodily strength.” Seneca the Elder likewise indicates that some Romans would have considered the killing of congenitally deformed infants to benefit the infants themselves. In the controversy *Mendici Debilitati*, Seneca’s Albucius Silus refers to the group of children mutilated by the man who exploited their disabilities for his own gain and asks, “Are they not more unfortunate to survive in this way than if they had perished?” He answers his own rhetorical question by saying that it would have been better for them to have perished and, to drive the point home, tells his associates to “[a]sk the fathers which they would have preferred.” Triarius agrees that it would have better for the children to have perished. Porcius Latro likewise proclaims that “nothing was more wretched [for the children] than to be reared. . . .” Seneca the Younger, however, supports the killing of congenitally deformed infants in *De Ira* only because such killings would protect the community. According to Seneca, when Romans killed deformed infants, there was no “no anger there, but rather a pitiful treatment [for Rome].”

Cultures that routinely killed their congenitally deformed infants, such as Sparta and Rome, likewise stigmatized deformed people by making the mere existence of an adult with a severe congenital deformity an oddity. When Pliny the Elder, the Roman natural philosopher, discusses *portenta* in book eleven of his *Natural History*, for example, he seems to suggest that it was rare to raise a child with a severe congenital
deformity. Pliny first points out that “extra limbs are useless to animals, just as a sixth finger always is to a human being.” He then intimates that at least some people in the ancient world considered it a waste of time to rear a person with serious congenital deformities, explaining that “[i]n Egypt, it was agreed upon to rear a portent (portentum), a human being with a pair eyes situated in the back part of the head, but he could not see with them.” It is somewhat difficult to interpret this passage because Pliny is discussing a congenitally deformed child born in Egypt rather than in Greece or Rome, even though he did not specify whether the child was born to Egyptian, Greek, or Roman parents. Pliny, however, likely believed that his readers would have found something novel in the decision to rear such a wretched child.

Even debates about attempts to provide public assistance or private charity to disabled people could increase the amount of stigma and discrimination that they experienced by reinforcing the negative stereotype that disabled people were weak and helpless. To some extent, this may have been an unavoidable corollary of any attempt to provide public assistance or private charity to the disabled. Indeed, if disabled people were physically capable of doing everything that an able-bodied person could do, then there would be little reason to count them among the deserving poor or to provide public assistance or private charity to them in the first place. Nevertheless, discussions of disability that constantly highlight the weakness and helplessness of disabled people naturally reinforce the idea that they are, to some extent, incapable of living normal lives.

Lysias’ speech in defense of the disabled Athenian’s pension is indicative of how public assistance can reinforce the idea that disabled people are weak and helpless. In that
speech, the disabled man attempts to convince the Council to renew his pension, in part, by reminding them that disabled people are weak and deserving of pity, despite the fact that both Garland and Rose have argued that the disabled pensioner makes no appeals to pity.\textsuperscript{348} The pensioner questions, for instance, why his accuser would begrudge him his pension when other people “pity” him,\textsuperscript{349} argues that Athens created the pension to help disabled people like him because “the divine power has deprived us of the greatest things,”\textsuperscript{350} calls his disability “a misfortune” (symphora),\textsuperscript{351} and says that “he has been deprived of the most beautiful and greatest things on account of [that] misfortune.”\textsuperscript{352} Even when the disabled man attacks his accuser, he appeals to the Council’s compassion for disabled people. The disabled man, for example, excoriates his accuser for acting “savagely to people who are pitied even by their enemies.”\textsuperscript{353} He concludes his speech, moreover, by pleading with the Council to renew his pension so that “this man will learn in the future not to plot against those who are weaker than him, but to seek an advantage [only] over those who are equal to him.”\textsuperscript{354}

Lysias and his disabled pensioner apparently believed, then, that the Council would be most likely to renew the man’s pension if it believed that his disability had left him weaker and more vulnerable than able-bodied people. It is easy to see how this type of legal strategy would increase the amount of stigma and discrimination that disabled Athenians experienced. Any public assistance system that requires disabled people to express publicly their own inferiority in order to receive their pensions necessarily reinforces negative stereotypes about disability. This demeaning strategy may even have contributed to the prohibition on disabled archons. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that the same Council that required disabled people to prove their inferiority in order to receive
their disability pensions would prohibit those supposedly inferior disabled people from becoming archons.

The elder Seneca’s *Mendici Debilitati* demonstrates how a system of private charity likewise can reinforce the idea that disabled people are weak and deserving of pity. In that dialogue, Porcius Latro says that the cruel man who mutilated children and then made them beg for him did so because able-bodied people would be more likely to feel pity for disabled beggars. As Porcius Latro explains, “the cruelty of that man yielded him more income because all of us, except that man, are compassionate.” Triarius also discusses the pity that his able-bodied companions feel for the children, implying that a number of the people participating in the dialogue had “offered alms to these wretched children,” even as they “prayed for their deaths.” Cestius Pius even suggests that disabled beggars can do little except beg, asking rhetorically, “what do wretched people know to ask for except alms?” The discourse surrounding almsgiving to the disabled in Rome thus perpetuated the notion that such wretched beggars were incapable of living ordinary lives. As Seneca’s Clodius Turrinus proclaims, “it is a loathsome thing to have beggars in one’s company, to be fed by beggars, to live among the crippled.”

**Conclusion**

Ideas about disability in classical antiquity thus reflected a variety of different world views. Most people in the Greco-Roman world likely attributed supernatural significance to the existence of congenital deformity. The most common terms for people with severe congenital deformity, after all, were *teras, monstrum, prodigium, portentum,* and *ostentum,* all of which signified some type of divine significance. These ideas would endure in the Christian tradition in large part because Augustine, one of the most
important Christian thinkers to address congenital deformity, agreed that there was divine significance to monstrosity. Classical philosophers, of course, tended to reject supernatural explanations for congenital deformity, looking at congenital deformity when attempting to understand the natural world. Yet philosophers themselves did not agree about the nature of things. Two important underlying assumptions about nature often determined how philosophers viewed congenital deformity. The majority view was that nature was a rational, living organism that sometimes produced beings contrary to nature. There was, however, a strong minority view, advanced most notably by both the Presocratic Empedocles and the Epicureans, which rejected the idea that the natural world was the product of rational design, arguing instead that matter, motion, and chance have driven the development of living beings. This debate, whether the natural world was the product of rational design or chance, would resurface during the eighteenth century, as Deists and materialists likewise pondered the existence of congenital deformity when presenting their views on design and chance. Hippocratic physicians, meanwhile, rejected the speculations of philosophers, contending that clinical experience was the best source of knowledge about the natural world. One thing, however, remained relatively constant throughout classical antiquity: various categories for disabled people, including monsters, dwarfs, the deaf and dumb and the blind, hunchbacks, and cripples, all of which could reflect deviations from both aesthetic and functional norms, perpetuated the stigma and discrimination associated with disability, particularly congenital deformity. Accordingly, when the Greeks or Romans discussed the significance of congenital deformity in attempting to unlock the secrets of nature, they often did so under the influence of pervasive negative stereotypes about disabled people.
These categories almost certainly influenced debates with respect to the idea that there was a disability problem as well, particularly the draconian infanticide policies of Sparta and the Twelve Tables of Rome. Yet the disability problem obviously went beyond the mere hierarchical construction of language. Disability in the classical world, in no small part due to the ways in which the Greeks and Romans socially constructed their societies, could drastically hinder labor productivity. Both the Spartans and Romans, then, were not without their reasons for mandating the killing of infants with severe congenital deformities. Whether those reasons had any ethical justification, however, is a different matter. Yet not everyone in classical antiquity believed in addressing the disability problem through infanticide. The Athenians refused to mandate the killing of the congenitally deformed and even created a disability pension system for disabled people who were sufficiently disabled and sufficiently poor. Some disabled people throughout the Greco-Roman world, moreover, likely survived through begging. Both the killing of monstrosities and charitable undertakings to assist disabled people continued with the coming of Christian hegemony, even if Christian elites condemned infanticide and inculcated the importance of almsgiving to a greater degree than we ordinarily see in classical antiquity.

2 Ibid., 3.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 See ibid., 104.
7 Ibid.
9 Celsus, *De Medicina*, vol. 1, W.G. Spencer, trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994 [1933]), 88-9 (Cels.2.1.5). In particular, Celsus argued that both thin (gracile) and fat (obesum) people constituted deviations from the ideal body. Ibid.


11 In classical antiquity, there was a debate whether Epicurus, in fact, had believed in the gods, despite Epicurus’ concept of *prolepsis*, a purported universal belief in the gods which, according to Epicurus, supposedly proved their existence. See Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 44-5, 60-3, 110-3, 116-9, 196-7, 286-9 (Cic.*N.D*.1.43, 62-4, 115-17, 121, 123, 2.76, 3.3). In Cicero’s *De Natura Deorum*, for example, Cotta suggests that Posidonius may have been correct that Epicurus’ theories about the gods were simply a way to conceal his true beliefs from those not willing to accept atheism as a legitimate idea. Ibid., 118-9 (Cic.*N.D*.1.123). And indeed, Protagoras’ experience in Athens, not to mention Socrates’ famous execution, almost certainly would have discouraged many atheists who happened to reside in Athens, as Epicurus did, from espousing their true beliefs. See ibid., 60-3 (Cic.*N.D*.1.63). While scholars today, like thinkers in classical antiquity, can debate whether Epicurus was an atheist, there is little doubt that some classical thinkers did evince atheistic ideas. According to Burkert, the “discovery of atheism,” which Burkert identifies as “one of the most important events in the history of religion,” was well under way before the third century B.C.E. As Burkert has pointed out, “[w]ith Protagoras, Prodikos, and Kritias theoretical atheism appears at least as a possibility, and even if it is not directly expressed, neither can it be overlooked or eliminated.” Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion*, trans., John Raffan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 315. In addition, Burkert points to a number of thinkers from the fifth century B.C.E., most notably Diogoras of Melos, with unmistakable atheistic tendencies. Ibid., 316. Burkert even goes so far as to proclaim that by the time Anaxagoras was forced to leave Athens for arguing that the sun was metal in violation of Athenian law, it was becoming clear that “the conflict between piety and natural science, and indeed wisdom of all kinds, had come to stay.” Ibid., 316. Cicero himself, of course, identified Diogoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene as atheists in the beginning of *De Natura Deorum*. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 4-5 (Cic.*N.D*.1.2).


16 The singular form of the noun is *teras*.


The serpent here was not a mythological monster but simply a snake.

Homer, Iliad, 84-5 (Hom.II.2.324-5).

Ibid. (Hom.II.2.326-329).


Xenophon, Memorabilia, trans., E.C. Marchant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 [1923]), 62-3 (X.Mem.1.4.15). Xenophon, however, does not always use the word teras when addressing divine signs. When discussing Socrates’ famous daimonion (divine power), for example, he uses the verb sēmainein (to give a sign). Ibid., 4-5 (X.Mem.1.1.4).


Cicero, De Divinatione, 324-5 (Cic.Div.1.93). This parallels an earlier passage from De Natura Deorum, in which Cicero likewise discusses ostenta, monstra, portenta, and prodigia. See Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 128-9 (Cic.N.D.2.7). In both works, Cicero is likely using prodigia in a broad sense, encompassing both human and animal prodigies as well as other types of prodigies. Indeed, in De Divinatione, just two sentences before his observation about ostenta, portenta, monstra, and prodigia, Cicero makes it clear that his discussion of prodigies applies not only to inanimate prodigies but also to human and livestock prodigies, although he calls them ostenta rather than prodigia. Cicero, De Divinatione, 324-5 (Cic.Div.1.93).

Augustine, The City of God, trans., William M. Green (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995 [1972]), 56-7. (August.C.D.21.8). His definitions of ostenta, portenta, and prodigia are somewhat more circular but nevertheless comport with the definitions used by classical figures such as Cicero.


Ibid., 324-5 (Cic.Div.1.93).


Ibid., 46 (Vit.Aesop.(G) 31).

Ibid., 45-6 (Vit.Aesop.(G) 29).


Garland points out that “reports of monstrous births tended to proliferate at periods of intense social and political upheaval.” Garland, *The Eye of the Beholder*, 68. Garland cites the second book of Cicero’s *De Divinatione* for this proposition: “Such phenomena, which in wartime appear to the fearful to be more numerous and greater, are hardly noted in peacetime. In addition, the reports are not only more readily believed in times of anxiety and danger, but also invented with greater impunity.” Cicero, *De Divinatione*, 436-7 (Cic.Div.2.58), as translated in Garland, 69. Cicero, however, was not referring to monstrous births in this passage but rather to claims that “blood fell like rain” and that “the river Atratus even flowed with blood,” and that “statues of the gods perspired.” Cicero, *De Divinatione*, 436-7 (Cic.Div.2.58). But Garland’s larger point, that credulous Romans were far more likely to perceive prodigies during periods of intense crisis, is almost certainly correct.


Ibid. (Liv.27.37.6).

Ibid., (Liv.27.37.6-7).


Livy, vol. 9, trans., Evan T. Sage (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985 [1935], 38-9 (Liv.31.12.6-8). Something that was obscurus was ill-omened in the sense that it was disgusting on account of its polluted, filthy, and loathsome nature. I believe that “creature” is a better translation of animal here because the passage is referring both to animals and deformed humans.

Ibid. (Liv.31.12.8-9).

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Henry Fairfield Osborn noted in 1913 that Empedocles, the first Presocratic to discuss congenital deformity vis-à-vis matter and change, derived many of his ideas from his Presocratic predecessors. See Henry Fairfield Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin: An Outline of the Development of the Evolution Idea* (London: The MacMillan Co., 1913), 33-40. Although many of Osborn’s assumptions and ideas are clearly dated, his basic outline with respect to the Presocratics and Empedocles remains instructive.


64 Ancient commentators did attribute other poems to Empedocles, but even when there is some evidence of other potential works by Empedocles, there is so little extent evidence for them that scholars can offer little more than tentative speculations about whether such works even existed. See, e.g., Ibid., 17-20.

65 See Inwood, *The Poem of Empedocles*, 8-19; Wright, *Empedocles: The Extent Remains*, 17-21. Scholars such as Osborne and Inwood, both of whom argue that Empedocles likely wrote only one poem, believe that it is more probable than not that later commentators, for whatever reason, divided Empedocles’ poem into two parts, which, at some point, assumed their traditional “titles.” See Inwood, *The Poem of Empedocles*, 13-4; Osborne, “Empedocles Recycled,” 24-31. Osborne argues that the evidence suggests only “one fixed title, *Kartharmoi,*” with *Physics* and *On Nature* being mere conventional classifications. Osborne, “Empedocles Recycled,” 27. And even some adherents to the traditional view believe that the traditional titles attributed to Empedocles “may not have been his own.” Wright, *Empedocles: The Extent Remains*, 20.


71 Empedocles 64, in Inwood, *The Poem of Empedocles*, 236-7. In the passive voice, the verb *anameignymi*, here in the poetic form *ammisgesthai*, means “to be mixed,” which, in this fragment, is a euphemism for “to have sexual intercourse.”

72 Animals obviously do not rely solely on their other sense of sight in choosing a mate. It is unclear, however, whether Empedocles knew that animals rely on other senses during mate selection. One fragment is simply not sufficient to apprehend all of the nuances of Empedocles’ understanding of desire.
Plutarch, _Moralia_, vol. 8, trans., Paul A. Clement and Herbert B. Hoffleit (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998 [1969]), 420-1 (Plu._Moralia_.681A). I did not employ a literal translation of the verb _endidōsin_, which has a variety of meanings, because I concluded that a literal translation would not adequately convey Plutarch’s claim to English readers.

In a dialogue that some attribute to Plutarch, Gryllus tells Odysseus that hybrid _terata_, such as minotaurs and centaurs, came into existence when human beings sought to have unnatural sex with animals. Plutarch argues that this unnatural lust is similar to what he considered unnatural homosexual lust. Plutarch, _Moralia_, vol. 12, trans., Harold Chernisis and William C. Helmbold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995 [1957]), 518-23 (Plu._Moralia_.990D-991A).


Garland, _The Eye of the Beholder_, 176.


Because Aristotle was much more familiar with Empedocles’ work than modern scholars, who must rely only on sparse fragments, there is little reason to question Aristotle’s interpretation.

Osborn, _From the Greeks to Darwin_, 37.

Garland, _The Eye of the Beholder_, 175.

Wright, _Empedocles: The Extent Fragments_, 214. Osborn himself recognizes that in Empedocles, “[t]here is no glimmering of slow development through the successive modification of lower into higher forms.” Osborn, _From the Greeks to Darwin_, 40.

Cf. Osborn, _From the Greeks to Darwin_, 40-1.


Osborn defines the material cause as “matter itself,” the formal cause as “the forces of the ‘perfecting principle,’” _i.e._, the form that matter takes, the efficient cause as the “Prime Mover,” and the final cause as the “fitness, adaptation, or purpose, the good of each and all.” Osborn, _From the Greeks to Darwin_, 50-1. For a discussion of Aristotle’s four causes in relation to Empedocles and the idea of evolution, see ibid., 50-52.

For a discussion of the role of accidents in Aristotle’s view of nature, see Collingwood, _The Idea of Nature_, 95-6.

Osborn, _From the Greeks to Darwin_, 51.

Ibid.


See ibid. (Arist._EN_.3.5.15-16).

Although most of Epicurus’ work is no longer extant, Lucretius’ _De Rerum Natura_, written during the first century B.C.E., preserves many Epicurean ideas. Diogenes Laertius’ _Lives of the Eminent Philosophers_ likewise preserves many Epicurean ideas. It even includes three letters that Epicurus purportedly wrote as summaries of his larger works. Although Epicurus does discuss disability in a few occasions in his extant works, he does not discuss congenital deformity in them. Accordingly, book five of _De Rerum Natura_ is our best source for the role of congenital deformity in the Epicurean system. But we may never know the extent to which Epicurus himself agreed with Empedocles’ view of congenital deformity.
Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, vol. 2, trans., R.D. Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958 [1925] 572-3 (D.L.10.43). Ruskin Clay has pointed out that Lucretius’ description of motion is not identical to Epicurus’ own observations in his *Letter to Herodotus*. Ruskin Clay, *Lucretius and Epicurus* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 145-50. As Clay notes, however, both agreed “that atoms are in constant motion. . . .” Ibid., 148-9. And it is the idea that atoms are always in motion that enabled Lucretius’ to find a place for Empedocles in the Epicurean system. The differences between Epicurus and Lucretius, then, are of lesser importance for disability historians interested in Lucretius’ views regarding congenital deformity than they are to classicists such as Clay seeking to explore Epicurus’ impact on Lucretius.


Ibid., 444-5 (Lucr.5.837-54). Lucretius next goes on to apply these proto-evolutionary ideas to the extinction of certain types of animals, who, because of the way in which nature fashioned them, were unable to reproduce in sufficient quantities to propagate their kind. Ibid., 444-7 (Lucr.5.855-877).

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 212-5 (Cic. N.D. 2.93-4).


Ibid., 286-7 (Plu. Moralia.1123B).

See, e.g., ibid., 216-9 (Plu. Moralia.1112A-B).


See *Eis Empedoecla Biblia*, for example, the author notes that Plutarch wrote ten books on Empedocles. Plutarch’s view of tychē, then, is complex enough that Plutarch himself did not even know whom he was quoting. For Lacy’s and Einarson’s commentary on Plutarch’s use of Aristotle, see ibid., 337 & n.h. In a fragment from *Kat’ Ischuos*, preserved by Stobaeus, Plutarch likewise observes that the superior intelligence of human beings has enabled them to thrive despite the physically superior attributes of


112 Ibid. (Plu.*Moria*.98A-B). I have followed Frank Cole Babbitt in translating the verb *peripiptein*, which literally means “to fall around,” as “to stumble against” because of the pervasiveness of the “stumbling” blind person in the history of the West.

113 Ibid. (Plu.*Moria*.98B). Plutarch, however, did not believe that actual blind people were unable to act as our guides. Plutarch was well aware of the famous speech that the blind Appius Claudius gave to the Romans that convinced them to continue the war against Pyrrhus of Epirus. Despite being blind, he convinced his fellow Romans to continue their struggle against the brilliant general. See Plutarch, *Moria*, vol. 10, trans., Harold North Fowler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991 [1936], 134-7 (Plu.*Moria*.794D-F).


116 Ibid. (Plu.*Moria*.98B-C).


118 Ibid. (Plu.*Moria*.98C). In *De Natura Deorum*, by contrast, Cicero’s Cotta suggests that it is foolish to hold that only human beings possess the power of reason. The context, however, is an argument against the Epicurean concept of the gods. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 94-7 (Cic.*N.D*.1.98).

119 Plutarch, *Moria*, vol. 9, trans., Edwin L. Minar, Jr., F.H. Sandbach, and W.C. Helmbold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993 [1961]), 190-1 (Plu.*Moria*.731E). Plutarch did not agree with everything that Diogenianus says in the dialogue, but he certainly would have agreed with the idea that even things produced contrary to nature were components of an ordered system.

120 Diogenianus argues that new diseases do not come into existence, while Plutarch disagrees. See ibid., 186-93, 202-3 (Plu.*Moria*.731B-732B, 734G).


122 Ibid. (Plu.*Moria*.732A). I collated my translation with Minar’s, Sandbach’s, and Helmbold’s translation in the Loeb.


124 Ibid., 40-1 (Pl.Cra. 394a).


127 The author of The Art (*Peri Technē*), who was not a physician himself, suggests that many superstitious people and philosophers likewise attacked the art of medicine as mere quackery. Hippocrates, *The Art*, vol. 2, trans., W.H.S. Jones (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998 [1923]), 190-1 (Hp.*de Arte*.1.1-24). The author makes it clear, as Jones notes in his introduction in the Loeb, that he is not himself a physician when he defends the medical art by pointing both to his own work on medicine and the “demonstrations of those who know the art.” Ibid., 216-7 (Hp.*deArte*.24.6). For Jones’ commentary, see ibid., 186-7.

The author further attributed the “sacred disease” to problems in the brain. Ibid., 138-41 (Hp. Morb. Sacr. 1.10-14). I translated teratōdea as “portentous/monstrous” to convey to English readers that, in Greek, mythical monsters and congenital deformity were inextricably intertwined with the notion of portents.

Ibid., 140-1 (Hp. Morb. Sacr. 2.1-5).

Ibid. (Hp. Morb. Sacr. 2.6-10).


This is not to say that people in the ancient world considered Hippocrates to be solely a physician. Galen, for example, called Hippocrates a physician and philosopher. Galen, On the Natural Faculties, trans., Aurthur John Brock (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991 [1916]), 8-9 (Gal. Nat. Fac. 1.2.5).

Hippocrates, On Ancient Medicine, vol. 1, trans., W.H.S. Jones (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995 [1923]), 52-3 (Hp. Medic. 20.3). As W.H.S. Jones has pointed out, the author used sophistai to mean “philosopher.” It was only after Plato that the word assumed pejorative connotations. W.H.S. Jones, Introduction to On Ancient Medicine in ibid., 5.

Ibid. (Hp. Medic. 20.5-8).

Ibid. (Hp. Medic. 20.9-13). I translated oudamothen allothen, which literally means “from any other place,” as “from any source other” so as to make the passage more intelligible to English readers. I followed W.H.S. Jones in replacing “place” with “source.”


146 Ibid., 156-7 (Hp.Morb.Sacr.9.1-4).


148 Garland has done an admirable job in compiling photographs of statues of disabled people in classical antiquity, including phallic dwarfs. To view a phallic dwarf, see plate 29, between pages 110 and 111, in Garland, *The Eye of the Beholder*.


Indeed, the Romans may have shared these ideas about speech and knowledge. *De Natura Deorum*, however, was a dialogue in which Roman proponents of various Greek philosophical schools debate the existence of the gods. Because Cicero does not expressly state that the Romans agreed with Greek ideas with respect to speech and knowledge, I have not imparted any such claim to Cicero.


165 For a brief discussion of *oida* and its literal meaning, intended for students without an extensive knowledge of Greek, see Anne H. Groton, *From Alpha to Omega: A Beginning Course in Classical Greek*, revised edition (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., 1995), 184.  See also Garland, *Eye of the Beholder*, 34.


167 See ibid., 460-3 (Lucr.5.1056-86).

168 Ibid., 462-3 (Lucr.5.1087-90).

169 Croesus sent his deaf and dumb son to Delphi, where he learned that his son’s first words would be a bad omen for Croesus. Hdt.1.85.

170 Hdt.1.34.

171 Hdt.1.8. Despite her arguments that disabled people did not experience the same levels of stigma and discrimination on account of their disabilities in the ancient world, M. Lynn Rose (née Edwards) has rightly recognized that Croesus’ deaf and dumb son “was worthless to Croesus because he was deaf and mute.” M. Lynn Rose, “Deaf and Dumb in Ancient Greece,” in *The Disability Studies Reader*, 2d ed., ed., Lennard J. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2006), 17.

172 Hdt.1.85. The Pythian priestess told Croesus not to pray for his son to speak because his first words would be a bad omen for Croesus. And sure enough, his son’s first words came as Croesus suffered a complete reversal of fortune and was about to be killed by the Persians. Interestingly, Croesus’ son retained the ability to speak for the rest of his life. Hdt. 1.85.


177 See ibid., 360-3 (Apollod.Bibliotheca.3.6.7).


1996 [1924], 268-9 (Ar.Ec.254). Rogers has pointed out that, according to the scholist, this was a proverb leveled against the short-sighted. See ibid. n. 181


186 Some might point out that very little is known about the real Homer and that he might not even have been blind. But for the purposes of disability discourse, it matters little whether Homer was truly blind, just as it matters little whether Aesop was actually a hunchback and cripple. What is important is that most people in classical antiquity believed that they were disabled.


193 Ibid., 534-43 (Cic.Tusc.5.111-117)

194 Ibid., 543 (Cic.Tusc.5.117).


197 Some of the most well-known hunchbacks in the history and literature of the West, including Thersites, Aesop, Alexander Pope, Quasimodo, and Søren Kierkegaard, were not only hunchbacks but also lame.


Hom. Iliad, 76-7 (Hom.II.2.216).

The vicious attacks that Alexander Pope and Søren Kierkegaard endured because of their hunched backs and lame legs demonstrate that hunchbacks in later periods could not expect their able-bodied adversaries to be as reasonable as Odysseus.


Lessing, An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry, 150.

Ibid., 150

Ibid., 151. Lessing, for example, views Richard, Duke of Gloucester, of Shakespeare’s Richard III as the epitome of evil, proclaiming that, in Richard, “I hear a devil and see a devil, in a shape which only the devil should wear.” Ibid., 152.

Homer. Iliad, 58-9 (Hom.II.1.599-600).


Ibid. (Hom.Od.8.311-12).


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 4-5 (Pl.Ages.2.2).

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 4-5 (Pl.Ages.2.2).

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Xenophon, Hellenica, 216-7 (X.HG.3.3.2).


Ibid. (Pl.Alc.23.7-8).

Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid., 294-5 (Pl.Lys.22.4-5).

Ibid. 294-5 (Pl.Lys.22.4-5).

Ibid. 294-5 (Pl.Lys.22.4-5).

Ibid., 294-5 (Pl.Lys.22.4-5).

231 Plutarch, Lives: Agesilaus, 6-7; Plutarch, Lives: Lysander, 292-3 (Pl.Ages.3.3; Pl.Lys.23.3).

232 Plutarch, Lives: Agesilaus, 6-7 (Pl.Ages.3.3).

233 Plutarch, Lives: Agesilaus, 6-7 (Pl.Ages.3.3).

234 Plutarch: Agesilaus, 6-7 (Pl.Ages.3.3).


236 Plutarch, Lives: Agesilaus, 8-9 (Pl.Ages.3.5). It was Apollo, of course, who purportedly gave the oracle. See Xenophon, Hellenica, 216-7 (X.HG.3.3.3).

237 See Xenophon, Hellenica, 216-7 (X.HG.3.3.3).

238 Plutarch, Lives: Agesilaus, 8-9 (Pl.Ages.3.5).


240 See Pausanias, Description de la Grèce, 10-11(Paus.7.2.1).


243 Ibid. (Plin.Nat.34.12).

244 Ibid.


246 Suetonius, vol. 2, 8-9 (Suet.Cl.3.2).

247 Ibid.

248 Ibid., 6-9 (Suet.Cl.2.2).

249 Ibid., 8-9 (Suet.Cl.2.2).

250 Ibid., 8-9 (Suet.Cl.2.1-2).

251 Ibid. The work is now lost.

252 Ibid., 8-9 (Suet.Cl.3.2).

253 Ibid., 8-11 (Suet.Cl.4.1-2).

254 Ibid., 10-1 (Suet.Cl.4.2). Garland points to a passage elsewhere in Suetonius that appears to suggest that Augustus did indeed show some concern for the feelings of disabled people forced to appear in public. Garland, The Eye of the Beholder, 41n6. According to Suetonius, Augustus “permitted those [knights] who were conspicuous because of old age or some infirmity of the body to send their horses ahead of them in the line [of knights], and to present themselves on foot whenever they were summoned.” Suetonius, vol. 1, trans., K.R. Bradley (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998 [1913]), 208-9 (Suet.Aug.38.3). Garland is on solid ground when arguing that Augustus probably did not want to humiliate his old and disabled knights by forcing them to mount and to ride their horses with considerable difficulty during military reviews. Yet Augustus clearly did not consider it humiliating for these old and disabled soldiers to appear in public; if what was so humiliating about the review was merely appearing as an old or disabled knight in public, then Augustus would have permitted them to forgo the reviews altogether. The problem for Augustus and the imperial family in the case of Claudius, by contrast, was that his mere presence in public was too conspicuous.

255 Suetonius, vol. 2, 10-1 Suet.Cl.4.4

256 Ibid. (Suet.Cl.4.3).

257 Ibid., 12-3 (Suet.Cl.4.7).

258 Ibid. (Suet.Cl.5.1).

259 Ibid.

260 Ibid.

261 Ibid., 14-5 (Suet.Cl.6.1-2).
Ibid. (Suet. Cl. 6.2).
Ibid. (Suet. Cl. 7.1).
Ibid. Claudius was Caligula’s uncle and the brother of beloved Germanicus.
Ibid., 16-7 (Suet. Cl. 8.1).
Ibid. I took some liberties with my translation of this passage. In particular, I omitted et.
It is important to remember the context of this passage. Suetonius offers Claudius’ forced march around the dining-room as an example of the insults that he continued to endure despite his consulships and popularity among the people.
Suetonius, vol. 2, 16-7 (Suet. Cl. 8.1). Because so many jesters in classical antiquity were disabled in some way, it is possible that the jesters that assaulted Claudius were disabled. If that was indeed the case, then other disabled people would have been the instruments of Claudius’ humiliation. Garland has demonstrated that there was a “monster market” for deformed slaves in Rome. Many of these “monsters,” as Garland suggests, may have become jesters. See Garland, The Eye of the Beholder, 46-8. Tiberius, in fact, had at least one dwarf among his jesters. Suetonius, vol. 1, 396-9 (Suet. Tib. 61.6).

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the better translation because it is unlikely that the Spartans would have allowed severely deformed children to survive a significant amount of time after birth.

289 Ibid.

290 Ibid. (Plu. Lyc. 16.1-2). I translated *ameinon*, which is the comparative of *agathos* and thus means "better," simply as "good" to enable English readers to understand the meaning of the passage.


292 Plato, *Theaetetus*, 72-5. (Pl. Th. 160e). Socrates and Theaetus here are discussing the relationship between perception and knowledge in this part of the dialogue rather than infanticide. Socrates’ remarks about infanticide are part of a metaphor with respect to Theaetus’ argument.


294 Plato, *Theaetetus*, 74-5 (Pl. Th. 161a). Boswell has noted that some scholars have been so shocked by Plato’s callous disregard for the humanity of deformed infants, but Boswell rightly contends that this passage “accords well with Plato’s other comments on the subject.” Boswell, *The Kindness of Strangers*, 83.


296 Ibid.

297 See ibid., 39.

298 There were almost certainly disabled beggars within the territory controlled by Athens, but our existing sources make it difficult to determine the extent to which disabled people supplemented their income through begging.


300 Ibid.

301 Jacoby argues against the notion that the Athenian public assistance law was an extension of Solon’s and Peisistratus’ decrees with respect to disabled soldiers. According to Jacoby, it more likely that the law was “one of the social measures which is characteristic of the period of Perikles.” Felix Jacoby, *Die Fragmente Der Griechischen Historiker, b(Supplement) Nos. 323a-334, Volume 1 Text* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954), 563.


303 According to W.R.M. Lamb, the speech “was probably delivered some little time after the restoration of the democracy in 403 B.C.” “Introduction to *On the Refusal of a Pension to the Invalid*” in *Lysias*, 516; see also Jacoby, *Die Fragmente Der Griechischen Historiker*, 562.

304 Lysias, 520-1 (Lys. 24.4) (emphasis added). The disabled man then proceeds to argue that he is neither able-bodied nor able to support himself without his grant.

305 In *The Staff of Oedipus*, Rose cites the *Athenian Constitution* in arguing that, under Athenian law, “[e]ach year, the Boule assess the men who are classed as unable (*andunatos*).” She then argues that those belonging to “this class” are those “who have very little wealth or are physically impaired so as to be unable to work. . . .” Rose, *The Staff of Oedipus*, 96 (emphasis added). I disagree with her translation of this provision, as does H. Rackham, who translated the *Athenian Constitution* for the Loeb Classical Library. I likewise disagree with her translation of Lysias’ description of the law, as does W.R.M. Lamb, who translated *Lysias* for the Loeb Classical Library.

306 Lysias, 522-5 (Lys. 24.10-12).

307 Ibid. (Lys. 24.11-12).


309 Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, vol. 20, trans., H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1996 [1935]), 136-9 (Arist. Ath. 49.4) (emphasis added). I have followed H. Rackham in translating *hoi adunatoi* as “the Incapables.” I added numerals to my translation to make it easier for non-lawyers and those unfamiliar with Greek to determine what exactly the law required of the Council. The Athenian Council also determined which knights were exempt from military service on account of their disabilities. Ibid., 136-7 (Arist. Ath. 49.2).
Jacoby, *Die Fragmente Der Griechischen Historiker*, 562-4 (FGH 328 F 197b).

Lysias, 520-1 (Lys.24.7). I thus disagree with Garland’s conclusion that the disabled man “makes virtually no appeal to pity throughout the entire speech, even though such appeals were a conventional, almost formulaic element of Athenian lawcourt speeches.” Garland, 37. In my view, repeated appeals to pity are an indispensable component of Lysias’ argument. See, e.g., Lys.24.7-8, 10-12, 17-18, 22-26. The disabled man, in fact, asks the Council not to listen to his opponent because people like the disabled man are pitied even by their enemies. See ibid., 520-3 (Lys.24.7).


For the absolute power of the Roman *paterfamilias*, see Boswell, *The Kindness of Strangers*, 58-9.

See Boswell, 62.

Boswell likewise notes that it is impossible to ascertain Roman in with any certainty. Ibid.


Ibid., 392-5 (Sen.Con.3.1). The young man attempted to resist being blinded despite agreeing beforehand to become blinded if he was the unlucky one.

Ibid., 394-5 (Sen.Con.3.1).

Ibid., 392-3 (Sen.Con.3.1).

Seneca here is drawing the classic distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor.

Ibid., 394-5 (Sen.Con.3.1).

Ibid.


Ibid., 424-5 (Sen.Con.10.4.4).


Ibid. (Sen.Con.10.4.4).

Ibid., 422-3 (Sen.Con.10.4.1).

Seneca the Younger, *De Ira*, vol. 1, 144-7 (Sen.Ira.1.15.1-2).

People in classical antiquity, however, did not consider all “weak” people to be inferior. Celsus, for example, observed that “practically all those having passion for letters were “weak” (imbecillis). Celsus, De Medicina, col. 1, 44-5 (Cels.1.2.1). Someone with the intellectual abilities of Celsus, of course, did not consider himself, or people like him, to be inferior to anyone.

Some disability scholars might argue that a particular impairment is “disabling” only because of the ways in which society is socially constructed and that physical impairments thus have little direct impact on the lives of the disabled. While a person with a substantial mobility impairment may have been quite incapacitated in classical antiquity, for example, wheelchairs and laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act have provided severely disabled people in the modern world with exciting new opportunities. But the fact remains that the prejudices of able-bodied people are not the only problems facing the disabled community. While stigma and discrimination are obviously major problems that confront disabled people, our physical impairments themselves are major obstacles to living the type of lives that able-bodied people live. Because people with substantial mobility impairments are not born with wheelchairs attached to their bodies, for example, it makes little sense to pretend that physical impairments have little impact on disabled people. To argue otherwise is to ignore the realities of being disabled.

I am not arguing that able-bodied people are acting malevolently to disabled people by providing them public assistance or private charity. The lives of disabled people in every epoch would have been much more difficult without public assistance or networks of private charity. Still, however, providing necessary aid to the disabled does have some unfortunate consequences.

Garland, The Eye of the Beholder, 37; Rose, The Staff of Oedipus, 97.
Chapter 5: Monsters and Beggars from Late Antiquity to the Mid-Seventeenth Century

Ideas about disability from the late antiquity to the middle of seventeenth century differed from ideas about disability in classical antiquity, in large part, because of the hegemony of Christianity. As Edward Wheatley argues in *Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind*, “[t]here were no clear models of disability in Greece and Rome before the advent of Christianity.”¹ The hegemony of orthodox Christianity during the Middle Ages, then, acted as a relatively uniform system of beliefs that had important implications for the idea that there was something significant about the existence of congenital deformity and the idea that there was a disability problem. Scholars agree that Saint Augustine was the most important early Christian thinker to address the significance of congenital deformity.² Saint Isidore of Seville, building on the ideas of Augustine, offered further observations about monstrosities that would resonate with Christians. Their ideas, in fact, would continue to have a lasting impact on how Christians would view deformity well into the sixteenth century, when Ambroise Paré and Montaigne explored congenital deformity in a manner that often harkened back to those of Augustine and Isidore. Indeed, the ideas of Augustine, Isidore, Paré, and Montaigne, although at times similar to ideas about congenital deformity in classical antiquity, unmistakably reflect the dominant Christian world view. Yet classical ideas about congenital deformity, particularly the ideas of Aristotle, continued to proliferate in medieval Europe. Albertus Magnus’ work on Aristotle, of course, was extremely influential throughout the High and later Middle Ages.³ As Sarah Alison Miller has explained, moreover, Pseudo-Albertus Magnus and a commentator on his text, *De Secretis Mulierum* (“On the Secrets of Women”), which Monica Green has called “‘one of the most influential documents in the history of
medieval scientific attitudes toward women,”” both drew upon Aristotle when discussing women and monstrosity.⁴ Pesudo-Albertus, Miller notes, pointed to Aristotle’s claim in Physics that “there are errors in nature as well as art,” while one commentator drew from Generation of Animals to assert that a “woman is not human [homo], but a monster in nature.”⁵ Other Christian thinkers such as Thomas of Cantimpré, Vincent of Beauvais, and Bartholomaeus Anglicus, despite what Daston and Park call their “Augustinan allegiances,” looked, in part, to the ideas of Galen and Aristotle to understand the natural world.⁶ Thomas Aquinas, the scholastic pupil of Albertus Magnus, meanwhile, accounted for the birth of a six-fingered child by pointing to Aristotle’s notion of accidental births.⁷ The Reformation, meanwhile, added further complexities to conceptions about congenital deformity, as both Catholics and Protestants waged a polemical battle over the significance of monstrous births.⁸ One thing, however, did not change as Christians explored the significance of congenital deformity: able-bodied expressions of contempt for monsters and other types of congenitally deformed people continued to abound in the West.

Christians searched for ways to address the disability problem that would comport with their understanding of disability. According to Andrew Crislip, the disability problem was plainly evident during the life of Basil of Caesarea during the fourth century, when some family networks proved unable or unwilling to care for the disabled “usually owing to the financial burden of unproductive members.”⁹ In Europe, Henri Jacques-Stiker has shown, Christians would deal with their own disability problem by creating a system of charity that relied on almsgiving and institutional care.¹⁰ Crislip, too, notes that the Byzantines would eventually address their disability problem, in part,
through institutional aid, constructing the hospital of St. Paul in Constantinople, which accommodated, among others, the “blind, crippled, aged, and disabled.”¹¹ The intentions of these apparent benefactors, however, may not have been entirely focused on the well-being of disabled people. Wheatley, for example has cautioned scholars not to assume that the Christian system of charity was an entirely benevolent one. According to Wheatley, the religious model of disability that developed during the Middle Ages was as much about social control as charity. Indeed, Wheatley has noted that there was a substantial amount of “control that the church retained over some people with disabilities through charity based on both almsgiving to individuals and institutional foundations for groups.”¹² Wheatley argues, for instance, that “people with disabilities had to make themselves worthy to receive the benevolence of others in order for that benevolence to strengthen the Christian community.”¹³ Wheatley does point out, however, that this system of charity could not have encompassed the entire experience of disability during this period because some disabled people would have been able to survive without assistance.¹⁴

In some respects, western scholars today may feel somewhat familiar with disability and the Christian tradition. For centuries, after all, the Catholic Church was able to dominate religious discussions about disability in Latin Christendom, admonishing the faithful to show compassion to the disabled and creating a system of charity that relied both on begging and institutional care to help the disabled poor during this period.¹⁵ Yet, as Stiker has demonstrated, ideas about disability in the Christian tradition are more complex than one might expect. To address this complexity and thus to understand better the Christian view of disability, he begins *A History of Disability by*
examining the Bible, particularly the Old Testament. Stiker’s approach, as he himself acknowledges, does little to uncover the actual history of Jewish people with disabilities, but it does provide some insights into Jewish ideas about disability. In addition, Biblical ideas about disability are important, Stiker has recognized, because Christians in Europe combined many of those ideas with what remained from classical antiquity to fashion a variety of incongruent views about disability that existed simultaneously in the minds of Europeans for centuries. Accordingly, this chapter adopts Stiker’s approach of examining disability in the Hebrew Bible and Christian New Testament before moving on to address disability and the Christian tradition in later periods.

**Disability and Ambiguity in both the Hebrew Bible and the Christian New Testament**

Both Stiker and Rabbi Judith Z. Abrams have noted the ambiguity with respect to disability in both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. Some negative views about disability have been conspicuous in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Most scholars, including Stiker and Abrams, point to prohibitions in Leviticus against disabled priests officiating in the Temple, based on the idea that certain types of disabled people are physically unfit to act as intermediaries between human beings and God solely on account of their disabilities, as evidence of negative attitudes about disability in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In Leviticus, God instructs Moses to tell Aaron that He will not permit Aaron’s disabled descendants to serve as priests:

No one of your offspring throughout their generations who has a blemish may approach to offer the food of his God. For no one who has a blemish shall draw near, one who is blind or lame, or one who has a mutilated face or a limb too long, or one who has a broken foot or a broken hand, or a hunchback, or a dwarf, or a man with a blemish in his eyes or an itching disease or scabs or crushed testicles. No descendent of Aaron the priest who has a blemish shall come near to offer the Lord’s offerings by fire;
since he has a blemish, he shall not come near to offer the food of his God. He may eat the food of his God...But he shall not come near the curtain or approach the alter, because he has a blemish, that he may not profane my sanctuaries.22

Physical imperfections were so undesirable to the Israelites that Leviticus even requires an animal sacrifice to “be perfect; there shall be no blemish in it. Anything blind, or injured, or maimed, or having a discharge or an itch or scabs—these you shall not offer to the Lord or put any of them on the altar as offerings by fire to the Lord.”23 Rabbinic Judaism later expanded on the Torah’s proscriptions. The Mishnah, Abrams explains, concludes that there “are more [disqualifications] for a person [than these, namely] a wedge-shaped head or a turnip-shaped head or a mallet-shaped head or a sunken head or [the head] flat behind, or a hunchback. Rabbi Yehudah declares [the humpbacked priest] qualified, but the sages disqualify [him].”24 According to Abrams, moreover, “the tannaitic midrash on Leviticus, Sifra,” identifies “several additional visible blemishes and three ‘non-visible’ ones: persons with speaking and hearing disabilities, persons with mental disabilities, and persons who are intoxicated.”25 These three “non-visible” blemishes, Abrams observes, reflect the notion that allowing people with mental deficiencies to officiate in the Temple would “pollute the cult with ritual impurity.”26 The deaf and dumb in Rabbinic Judaism, then, like the deaf and dumb in classical antiquity, were believed to have diminished mental capacities because of their disabilities. Medieval Christians likewise barred disabled people from performing certain clerical functions. The decretals issued by Pope Gregory IX in 1234, Irina Metzler has observed, prohibited disabled people from serving in the higher orders solely on account of their physical deformities, mutilations, and serious blemishes.27
There are other places in the Hebrew Bible where able-bodied people likewise suggest that disabled people are physically unfit to perform certain functions in an able-bodied society. When David marches against the stronghold of the Jebusites, the inhabitants of Jerusalem, for example, they taunt him, saying, “You will not come in here, even the blind and lame will turn you back. . . .” 28 This taunt says as much about the Jebusites’ view of the blind and lame as it does about David. David would prove to be so powerless, the Jebusites gleefully proclaim, that even its weakest inhabitants, those unable to perform the ordinary functions of soldiers, would be able to repel him. David responds by encouraging his followers to “get up the water shaft to attack the lame and the blind, those whom David hates. Therefore it is said, ‘The blind and the lame shall not come into the house.’” 29 David, it seems, reacts to the Jebusites’ intolerable affront to his able-bodied manhood and honor by hating the blind and lame, who themselves appear to have been the targets of the Jebusites’ derision and scorn. Yet David clearly could not have forbidden all blind and lame people from coming into his house because Mephibosheth, who “was lame in both feet,” later eats at David’s table “like one of David’s sons.” 30

Perhaps the most deleterious negative stereotype about disability in the Judeo-Christian tradition, however, is the notion that congenital deformity and even non-congenital disabilities, like other types of affliction, can be the result of divine will, often in the form of divine wrath and punishment. 31 One of the most well-known examples of physical affliction comes from Deuteronomy, which warns that

[the Lord will afflict you with the boils of Egypt, with ulcers, scurvy, and itch, of which you cannot be healed. The Lord will afflict you with madness, blindness, and confusion of mind; you shall grope about at noon as blind people grope in
darkness, but you shall be unable to find your way; and you shall be continually abused and robbed, without anyone to help.\textsuperscript{32}

Another well-known example of physical affliction as divine punishment is the penalty that David must pay, or rather his infant son must pay, for his affair with Bathsheba and its aftermath.\textsuperscript{33} Instead of punishing David for his own sins, God strikes David’s infant son with a grievous illness.\textsuperscript{34} The infant, the true victim of God’s justice some might argue, languishes in agony for seven days until he finally succumbs.\textsuperscript{35}

Although such divine justice might seem extreme to many modern observers, such punishment was acceptable under Jewish law. Jewish scriptures repeatedly stress that God punishes children for the transgressions of their parents, even to the third and fourth generations.\textsuperscript{36} The Hebrew Bible, however, is not always consistent with respect to such punishment. Jeremiah, for example, who was born either in 627 B.C.E. or became a prophet on that date, dying sometime after 587,\textsuperscript{37} upheld the ancient tradition of intergenerational punishment, pointing out that God repays “the guilt of the parents into the laps of their children after them.”\textsuperscript{38} Yet his contemporary Ezekiel, who was a prophet from 593 to roughly 563 B.C.E., proclaims that “[t]he person who sins shall die. A child shall not suffer for the iniquity of a parent, nor a parent suffer for the iniquity of a child; the righteousness of the righteous shall be his own, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be his own.”\textsuperscript{39} The disciples of Jesus later raise the question when they encounter a blind beggar, asking, “Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?” Jesus responds, “Neither this man nor his parents sinned; he was born blind so that God’s works might be revealed in him.”\textsuperscript{41} According to Jesus, then, God was indeed the cause of the man’s blindness, but God did not make him blind so as to punish him.
Despite the omnipotence of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition, believers have not always attributed illnesses and disabilities, directly at any rate, to the will of God. It is Satan rather than God, after all, who afflicts Job with loathsome sores from head to toe. While God does retain ultimate power over Job, telling Satan that he is forbidden to take Job’s life, Job’s illness demonstrates the tremendous power that Satan enjoys over human health. In Luke, moreover, demons and spirits are responsible for some physical disabilities. Shortly after instructing his disciples how to pray, for example, Jesus encounters a person who has become mute after being possessed by a mute demon. When Jesus casts out the demon, the person is able to speak before an amazed crowd. Luke later describes a spirit (pneuma) who had crippled a woman for 18 years. Although the afflicted woman “was bent over and was quite unable to stand up straight,” Jesus heals her by laying his “hands on her.” These examples from Job and Luke had the potential to teach an important lesson to the faithful. Indeed, they demonstrate that although Satan, demons, and spirits can afflict people with illnesses and disabilities, God maintains ultimate control and can heal the afflicted, either personally or through intermediaries, whenever He desires.

Altruistic views about disability and disabled people existed alongside the negative stereotypes. Whereas disability in the Judeo-Christian tradition has sometimes been associated with divine wrath, there has long been a recognition that even righteous people can suffer physical misfortune. The Book of Job develops this theme in detail. At the beginning of Job, the author states that Job was a “blameless and upright” man, “one who feared God and turned away from evil.” God echoes the author’s observation, telling Satan that there “is no one like [Job] on the earth, a blameless and upright man
who fears God and turns away from evil."\(^{48}\) Despite Job’s righteousness, Satan gains God’s permission to strike Job with a terrible affliction.\(^{49}\) The association between wickedness and physical affliction was so strong among Job’s contemporaries, however, that his detractors repeatedly attribute his affliction to his unrighteousness.\(^{50}\) The Book of Job, of course, is not the only book to acknowledge that even righteous people can suffer misfortune. The author of Ecclesiastes, after all, proclaims that “there are righteous people who are treated according to the conduct of the wicked, and there are wicked people who are treated according to the conduct of the righteous.”\(^{51}\) In the Christian scriptures, meanwhile, as we have seen, Jesus informs his disciples that God did not make a beggar blind to punish him but rather “so that God’s works might be revealed in him.”\(^{52}\)

Another altruistic aspect of the Judeo-Christian tradition is the divine exhortation to show kindness and even to provide alms to the disabled. Leviticus, for example, presents the following well-known command to the faithful: “You shall not revile the deaf or put a stumbling block before the blind.”\(^{53}\) Deuteronomy further provides that anyone who misleads a blind person on the road shall be cursed.\(^{54}\) Job, moreover, defends his righteousness by explaining how he helped the poor, orphans, the blind, and the lame.\(^{55}\) These examples suggest that despite the existence of negative stereotypes about disability in Jewish culture, able-bodied people demonstrated considerable compassion for disabled people in need. Christian scriptures likewise exhibit kindness to disabled people, particularly with respect to divine healing. When Bartimaeus of Timaeus, a blind beggar, begs Jesus to make him see again as Jesus and his followers are leaving Jericho, Jesus responds, “Go; your faith has made you well.”\(^{56}\) Even such apparently innocuous
examples of divine healing, however, could have negative connotations for disabled people who were not fortunate enough to receive divine healing. If God does indeed heal the righteous, after all, some people might conclude that those who fail to recover from their afflictions are unrighteous in the eyes of God. One ill psalmist, for instance, recognizing that lingering illnesses are indicative of unrighteousness, prays for healing so that he might vindicate his righteousness.57

Ideas about disability in both the Hebrew Bible and Christian New Testament were thus a synthesis of both negative stereotypes and altruistic compassion that enabled both Jews and Christians to interpret illnesses, congenital deformities, and non-congenital disabilities, in a variety of different ways under a variety of different circumstances. The Qumran, as Stiker and Abrams have noted, appear to have excluded “the disabled of all kinds” from the community.58 According to both Stiker and Abrams, however, it is difficult to determine how other Jewish communities treated people with disabilities.59 The coming of Christian hegemony did little to change the able-bodied view of disability. Christians, like Jews, continued to harbor some negative opinions about the disabled while, at the same time, admonishing the faithful to provide them with alms. What likely mattered to Jews and Christians was not so much how to understand and synthesize all of the theological complexities and contradictions of scriptural examples of disability, if they were even aware of those contradictions, but how to apply them equitably in accordance with their own religious beliefs when the topic of disability was at hand.60

**Congenital Deformity and the Christian Tradition: Monsters with Divine Significance**

From late antiquity to the middle of the seventeenth century, a large number of Europe’s educated elite, influenced not only by the ambiguities in the Judeo-Christian
tradition but also by certain Greco-Roman beliefs about nature, were convinced that the existence of congenital deformity could reveal something about divine will. The most important of these thinkers were Augustine and Isidore of Seville, both of whom described congenital deformity as natural components of the divine order, albeit with important symbolic significance. Augustine was probably the single most important influence on medieval notions of congenital deformity. Augustine’s influence on western intellectuals hardly diminished even as the Renaissance began to reintroduce Europeans to classical texts. When Pierre Boaistuau discussed congenital deformity in the latter half of the sixteenth century in *Histoires prodigieuses*, for example, he directed his readers to Augustine’s *City of God* for an authoritative discussion of monstrosity. In the preface of *Des monsters et prodiges*, moreover, Ambroise Paré, a Renaissance surgeon and perhaps the most important writer on monstrosity during the Renaissance, counted Augustine among his most important sources.

When Adam and Eve sinned against God, Augustine believed, God punished their offspring by transforming the nature of human flesh. What once was perfect and immortal became subject to “the tribulation of this mortal life.” In conjunction with the inception of mortal death, God apparently created monsters as “signs” of divine power and providence. The Latin word *monstra* (“monsters”), Augustine explains in a passage of *City of God* reminiscent of Cicero, comes from the verb *monstrare* (“to show”) “because they show something by a sign.” God created monsters, then, “to show . . . that God will do what he has declared he will do with the bodies of men, and that no difficulty will detain him, no law of nature circumscribe him.” Augustine, moreover, asserts that monsters could not possibly contradict nature because they were integral
components of the natural world in light of God’s response to the Fall. “For how can anything done by the will of God be contrary to nature,” Augustine asks, “when the will of so great a creator constitutes the nature of each created thing?”67 Indeed, all portents, including monsters, only appear to contradict nature because they are “contrary to what is known of nature.”68

Isidore of Seville built on the views of Augustine when discussing portents and monsters that appear to be against nature. Isidore’s description of portents and monsters, like Augustine’s view of monsters, also bear the influence of classical antiquity. Indeed, in the following passage from Isidore, part of which bears a striking resemblance to Cicero’s description of portents and monsters in De Divinatione, Isidore cites Varro in attempting to account for portents and monsters that appear to be against nature:

Portents, according to Varro, are those things that appear to be produced against nature. But they are not against nature, since they happen by the will of God, since nature is the will of the Creator of every created thing. For this reason, pagans sometimes call God nature and sometimes, God. Therefore the portent does not happen against nature, but against that which is known as nature . . . Portents and omens [ostenta], monsters and prodigies are so named because they appear to portend, foretell [ostendere], show [monstrare], and predict future things . . . For God wishes to signify the future through faults in things that are born, as through dreams and oracles, by which he forewarns and signifies to peoples or individuals a misfortune to come.69

This explanation may be “somewhat tortured,” as Daston and Park have noted, but nevertheless “remained standard throughout the medieval period.”70 Isidore elsewhere attempts to account for monstrous births in nature, dividing monsters into two categories. The first, portents (portenta), “are beings of transformed appearance, as, for instance, is said to have happened when in Umbria a woman gave birth to a serpent.”71 According to Isidore, God sometimes creates such monsters to be “indications of future events,” but “those monsters that are produced as omens do not live long – they die as soon as they
are born.” The second, “unnatural beings” (portentuosi), take “the form of a slight mutation, as for instance in the case of someone born with six fingers.” The distinction between Isidore’s two categories, then, was not only whether the monster died shortly after birth but also the degree to which the deformity differed from aesthetic and functional norms. Isidore, for example, lists several types of congenitally deformed people who, according to the severity of their deformities, could fit into either category, including dwarfs (nani), those with misshapen heads or superfluous parts of their limbs, those who are missing some part of their body, those whose fingers “are found joined at birth and fused together,” and hermaphrodites.

Although Daston and Park are no doubt correct that Augustine and Isidore were responsible for the “standard” view of portents and monstrosity in medieval Europe, medieval Europeans also found other ways to explain the existence of monstrosity. Miller likewise has pointed out that medieval Christians attributed monstrosity to a variety of things in addition to the will of God. Some, for example, attributed monstrosity to astrological forces, sexual positions, or problems with the mother’s womb. Others relied on ideas from classical antiquity to account for monstrosity. Pseudo-Albertus, we have seen, agreed with Aristotle’s notion that monstrous births were “errors in nature.” Still others attributed monstrosity to evil forces. According to Stiker, “Augustine would not be supported in all quarters,” and “monstrosity would be associated with Satan and his demons,” even if beliefs about Satan, demons, and monstrosity, “did not prevent Augustine from decisively integrating anomaly into the normal, and difference into the order of things.” Augustine and Isidore, moreover, could not prevent medieval Europeans from viewing monstrosity as something frightening that deviated from the
normal human existence. As Miller has explained, medieval Europeans referred to a
variety of marginalized groups as “monsters,” including “demons, non-Christians, the so-
called monstrous races, freaks of nature, deformed infants, miscarried fetuses, and . . .
women,” all of whom transgressed “the boundaries of the proper human form.”

During the Reformation, both Catholics and Protestants continued to follow
Augustine and Isidore in interpreting instances of monstrous births as expressions of
divine will. Yet as Daston and Park have noted, “the Reformation opened the floodgates
for a deluge of prodigy literature, ranging from simple vernacular broadsides to erudite
Latin treatises, in which monstrous births occupied pride of place.” Catholics, of course,
viewed monstrous births as a condemnation of Protestantism while Protestants believed
that such births signified God’s displeasure with Catholicism. According to Alan Bates,
“the apparent upsurge of interest in monstrous births at the beginning of the sixteenth
century” was not only the result of the Reformation but also the printing press, which, of
course, played an important role in spreading the ideas of reformers such as Luther.
With the printing press, “it was possible to disseminate written accounts quickly enough
and in sufficient numbers that readers could hope to go and see a monster for
themselves.” The events surrounding the birth of a monstrous calf in Saxony in 1522,
for example, demonstrate the role of the printing press in facilitating bitter exchanges
between Catholics and Protestants. While the calf’s legs were deformed, “what
particularly distinguished it was a large fold over the head and shoulders resembling a
monk’s cowl.” An astrologer living in Prague, who purported to be an expert on
monstrosity, proclaimed that the calf represented Luther whom many Catholics would
have viewed as the most dangerous of all monsters. A broadside published less than a
month after the monstrous birth publicized the astrologer’s conclusion in esoteric language to the educated elite. The Rev. John Dobneck, also known as Cochlaeus, quickly published two works, one in Latin and one in German, to popularize the attack on Luther to laypeople. Luther and Melancthon responded by rapidly publishing a pamphlet, which appeared in 1523, interpreting the monstrous calf as well as a monstrous hybrid born in 1496 as an expression of God’s disapproval of the Catholic Church. Melancthon delved into the divine significance of the monstrous hybrid born decades earlier, explaining that the ass’s head represented papal intelligence, the woman’s body signified papal sensuality, and the elephant’s foot was a condemnation of papal tyranny. Luther delved into the meaning of the monstrous calf, proclaiming that it represented the shortcomings of Catholic monasticism.

Subsequent Protestants likewise used instances of monstrous births against their adversaries, whether Catholic or otherwise. In November 1558, when Elizabeth ascended to the English throne, her Protestant supporters contended that “these frequent monsters” were a warning to Catholics. In 1600, a pamphlet from Colwall, England claimed that a woman’s monstrous birth was the result of divine wrath, stemming from her rejection of her husband and “incestuous copulation” with relatives. The Puritans, meanwhile, used monstrosity to attack Anne Hutchinson for her leading role in the Antinomian controversy of 1636-8 after Mary Dyer, her friend and follower, gave birth in 1638 to a stillborn daughter with severe congenital deformities. The deformed infant, in the words of Governor John Winthrop,
and back full of sharp pricks and scales, like a thornback; the navel and all the belly, with the distinction of the sex, were where the back should be, and the back and hips before, where the belly should have been; behind, between the shoulders, it had two mouths, and in each of them a piece of red flesh sticking out; it had arms and legs as other children; but instead of toes, it had on each foot three claws, like a fowl, with sharp talons.  

The Rev. John Cotton advised Hutchinson, Dyer, and the midwife, all of whom had been present during the birth, to conceal it because (1) “he saw a providence of God in it”; (2) “if it had been his own case, he should have desired to have had it concealed”; and (3) he was aware of “other monstrous births, which had been concealed, and that he thought God might intend only the instruction of the parents, and such other to whom it was known. . . .”

The Puritans learned of the monstrous birth “on that very day Mrs. Hutchinson was cast out of the church for her monstrous errors, and notorious falsehoods. . . .” They reacted somewhat predictably by falling into a state of hysteria, exhuming the body of the infant to determine the extent of her monstrous features and accusing the midwife of being a witch. Luckily for Dyer, the Puritans did not execute her because of her allegiance to Hutchinson and her monstrous infant. Her execution would have to wait until 1660, when the Puritans hanged her for being a Quaker. The Puritans, however, were still eager to connect the women of the Antinomian controversy to monstrosity. In 1638, they accused Hutchinson herself of producing monstrous offspring because of her monstrous ideas.

The Puritans, of course, are famous for what the modern world considers their superstitious world view that resulted in the Salem witch trials. The Puritans, however, were not simply witch hunters but rather a complex community with diverse views about divine wrath, witches, and the natural world. The Puritans, for example, apparently did not always view monstrosities as terrifying. Indeed, as the Rev. John Cotton
demonstrated when explaining why he advised Dyer to conceal her monstrous birth, the Puritans could rationalize monstrous births as private affairs between God and the monstrosity’s parents when those parents, unlike Dyer and Hutchinson, had not transcended the acceptable boundaries of Puritan society. Some Puritans, moreover, could espouse both superstitious beliefs about witches and surprisingly modern views about the natural world. Cotton Mather, the grandson of the Rev. John Cotton, after all, stoked fears about devils and witches in the eighteen months between his involvement with the Goodwin children, Goody Glover, and the Salem witch trials. When his first child, Increase, died just three days after his birth due to a deformity of the anus, Mather suspected that witchcraft was to blame. Yet this apparently superstitious man inquired also into the workings of the natural world when addressing the scourge of smallpox, concluding that inoculation was better protection than prayers alone. Mather would have prayed when smallpox struck his community, to be sure, but in proposing to bring Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s inoculation to his community, he demonstrated that his staunch religious beliefs had not rendered him a foe of medicine and science.

Renaissance thinkers, as Surekha Davies has recently demonstrated, likewise continued to view monstrosity in accordance with the ideas of Augustine and Isidore, dividing monstrous births into two categories. The first, derived from both the classical and Judeo-Christian tradition, identified monstrous births as expressions of divine will, either in the form of a sign or warning of divine displeasure. According to Davies, able-bodied society during the Renaissance often viewed monstrosities as “signs that a community was practicing the traditional biblical sins, such as greed, vanity, and adultery, and foretold subsequent punishment through natural catastrophes such as floods
or plagues.” Infants born with severe congenital deformities, then, could expect some people in their communities to recoil in fear and trembling at the thought of their very existence. Such a marginalized existence, of course, would have been psychologically difficult for those unfortunate enough to have been born with severe deformities, at least if their parents and communities had allowed them to survive long enough to contemplate their sorry lot in life. The second category of monstrous births during the Renaissance viewed congenital deformity as a deviation from nature, what the Greeks had referred to as a birth “contrary to nature.” By the late sixteenth century, Renaissance thinkers increasingly explored what monstrosity could reveal about nature and God’s plan for human beings, a trend that would later accelerate during the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment.

These two categories are plainly evident in the works of major Renaissance thinkers who addressed congenital deformity. Ambroise Paré’s *Des monstres et prodiges* (1573), which Janis L. Pallister has called “the book on ‘monsters’” during the sixteenth century, approaches the topic of monstrosity by blending traditional, Judeo-Christian superstitions with a type of reasoning, heavily influenced by classical authors, that would become popular among natural philosophers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The mix between superstition and natural philosophy is so strong in *Des monstres et prodiges*, in fact, that Jurgis Baltrušaitis once called it a combination of “‘the fantastic realism of the image makers’” with “‘the awakening of a realistic mind.’” Yet Paré’s basic understanding of monstrosity did not constitute a rejection of Augustine’s and Isidore of Seville’s views of congenital deformity. Indeed, the first sentence of Paré’s preface to *Des monstres et prodiges* comes close to restating the authoritative conclusion
of Augustine’s *City of God*: “Monsters are things that *appear* outside the course of nature (and most often are signs of some misfortune to come) like an infant born with one arm, another who will have two heads, and other members outside of the ordinary.”

In explaining what types of congenital deformities transformed people into monsters, moreover, Paré did not differ greatly from Isidore of Seville:

> The mutilated are those who are blind, one-eyed, hunchbacks, lame, or [those] having six digits on the hand or on the foot, or less than five, or joints locked together, or arms too short, or a nose that is too deep-set like those having squished noses, or those having thick and overturned lips, or a closure of the genital part of girls because of the hymen, or supernatural flesh, or those who are hermaphrodites or those having some spots, warts, or cysts, or another thing against nature.

Still, however, Paré’s amalgamation of Judeo-Christian superstition with more natural explanations for congenital deformity is apparent in the first chapter of *Des monstres et prodiges*, which enumerates the major causes of monstrosity and provides the basic structure for the work’s subsequent chapters: (1) “the glory of god”; (2) “His ire”; (3) “too much semen”; (4) “too little quantity [of semen]”; (5) “the imagination”; (6) “the narrowness and smallness of the uterus”; (7) “the indecent position of the mother, such as, when pregnant, she has sat too long with her legs crossed or [sat with her legs] pulled up against the stomach”; (8) “by a fall, or a blow given to the stomach of a pregnant woman”; (9) “by hereditary or accidental diseases”; (10) “by rottenness or corruption of the semen”; (11) “by mixture or blending of semen”; (12) “by the trickery of . . . beggars”; and (13) “by demons and devils.”

Montaigne, another prominent humanist of the French Renaissance, examined monstrosity between 1578 and 1580, around the time that new editions of Paré’s *Des monstres et prodiges* were appearing. In “Of a Monstrous Child,” Montaigne claims to
have seen “a child that two men and a nurse, who said they were the father, uncle, and aunt, were leading about to get a penny or so from showing him, because of his strangeness.”

According to Montaigne, below the child’s breast he was fastened and stuck to another child without a head, and with his spinal canal stopped up, the rest of his body being entire. For indeed one arm was shorter, but it had been broken by accident at their birth. They were joined face to face, and as if a smaller child were trying to embrace a bigger one around the neck. The juncture and the space where they held together was only four fingers’ breadth or thereabouts, so that if you turned the imperfect child over and up, you saw the other’s navel below; thus the connection was in between the nipples and the navel. The navel of the imperfect child could not be seen, but all the rest of his belly could. In this way all of this imperfect child that was not attached, as the arms, buttocks, thighs, and legs, remained hanging and dangling on the other and might reach halfway down his legs. The nurse also told us that he urinated from both places. Moreover, the limbs of the other were nourished and living and in the same condition as his own, except that they were smaller and thinner.

Montaigne acknowledges that the boy’s monstrosity was so unique and baffling that “I leave it to the doctors to discuss it.” Yet Montaigne understood that many people during his day were accustomed to viewing congenital deformity as a sign. “This double body and these several limbs, connected with a single head,” Montaigne surmises, “might well furnish a favorable prognostic to the king that he will maintain under the union of his laws these various parts and factions of our state.” Cicero’s skepticism in *De Divinatione*, however, had a profound impact on Montaigne. Indeed, Montaigne twice cites *De Divinatione* in order to warn his readers about the pitfalls of attempting to ascertain, through divination, the divine purpose behind instances of monstrous births. The better approach, Montaigne argues, is to understand that “[w]hat we call monsters are not so to God, who sees in the immensity of his work the infinity of forms that he has comprised in it. . . . We call contrary to nature what happens contrary to custom; nothing
is anything but according to nature, whatever it may be. Let this universal and natural reason drive out of us the error and astonishment that novelty brings us.”¹²¹

Sir Francis Bacon’s recognition in 1620 that monstrosity might reveal some secrets of nature, marks a transition from Renaissance ideas about monstrosity to the understanding of monstrosity that would develop in the latter half of the seventeenth century as well as the eighteenth century. As Daston and Park have pointed out, Bacon observed that “‘a compilation, or particular natural history, must be made of all monsters and prodigious births of nature; of every thing, in short, which is new, rare, and unusual in nature. This should be done with a rigorous selection, so as to be worthy of credit.’”¹²²

As Europe’s educated elite became acquainted with his empiricist views and his observations about monstrous births, it was perhaps only a matter of time before a new type of understanding of monstrosity would emerge in Europe. Over the course of the next two hundred years, natural philosophers would indeed begin to explore monstrosity in a manner that Bacon would deem “worthy of credit.”

If Monataigne’s “Of a Monstrous Child” demonstrates that the crux of Augustine’s view of congenital deformity continued to thrive among elites in the late sixteenth century, Pierre Bayle’s “Antoinette Bourignon,” an article in his renowned Dictionnaire historique et critique, suggests that the killing of congenitally deformed infants, despite the general reluctance of Christians to practice infanticide, continued to find support among some Europeans in the first half of the seventeenth century.

According to Bayle, Antoinette Bourigon, a Catholic born in Lisle in 1616 who would eventually gain notoriety for her mysticism, was “so ugly that her family deliberated for some days if it would not be appropriate to suffocate her as a monster.”¹²³ As time went
on, however, “her deformity diminished, and they decided not to take this course of action.” Bourignon survived, then, because her deformity was mild enough, in the eyes of her family, for her to retain just enough humanity to make her life worthwhile. If Bourignon’s deformity had not diminished or, even worse, had been more serious, her family may well have decided not only that she would be better off dead but also that they would be better off not having to care for her. Diminished labor capacity, then, was not only the consideration when determining whether to kill a congenitally deformed infant.

The precarious early years of Bourignon’s life, then, suggest that people with severe congenital deformities continued to suffer near-unimaginable levels of stigma and discrimination in the first half of the seventeenth century on account of their deformities despite the writings of Augustine, Isidore, Paré, and Montaigne. People with congenital deformities so severe that able-bodied people called them monsters may have fared better in Christian societies than the hermaphrodites of ancient Rome, but they still would have recognized that there was little place for them in normal, able-bodied society. Augustine himself had been well aware that many able-bodied people would continue to view the congenitally deformed as pariahs because their bodies deviated so greatly from the able-bodied norm. He observes in *City of God*, for instance, that a person “who cannot comprehend the whole is offended by the deformity of one of the parts, since he is ignorant as to what it corresponds and how it should be classified.” Augustine believed that such people lacked a proper understanding of God and the natural world that He created. Indeed, Augustine warns Christians not to question whether God demonstrates “rational intelligence” when creating infants with severe congenital deformities,
reminding them that “He whose works no one justly finds fault with knows what He has
done.”

It is difficult, of course, to ascertain the extent to which this warning had any
effect on ordinary people. Augustine’s ideas about monstrosity, after all, may have
remained concealed from the masses because so few of them could understand Latin or
read even their own vernaculars. Indeed, the intellectual and spiritual disconnect between
elites and the masses might explain how western culture during this period could produce
what modern observers would consider reasonable approaches to congenital deformity in
the works of such elites as Augustine, Isidore of Seville, Ambroise Paré, and Montaigne,
while simultaneously creating enough fear and hostility with respect to monstrous births
that the parents of congenitally deformed infants sometimes pondered whether to kill
their own children. To make matters more complex, even members of the educated elite
often attributed certain types of deformity to divine will. This was particularly true in
times of intense crisis, as when Catholics sparred with Luther and Melancthon over the
significance of the monstrous calf and when the third, fourth, and fifth editions of
_Histoires prodigieuses_, which, according to Daston and Park, “appeared between 1575
and 1582, at the height of the French wars of religion,” omitted the natural explanations
for deformity that Boaistuau and Claude Tesserant had included in the first and second
editions, contending, instead, that “all monsters were prodigies sent directly by God to
admonish Christians to ‘repentance and penitence.’”

Stigma and Discrimination Associated with Various Categories of Disabled People

Those with less severe congenital deformities and those with non-congenital
disabilities that occurred early enough that their childhoods resembled the lives of the
congenitally deformed continued to experience a considerable amount of stigma and
discrimination on account of their disabilities from the fourth century to the seventeenth century, albeit not to the same extent as those deemed monstrosities. Didymus, born in Alexandria in the early fourth century C.E., was one such person who could not entirely integrate into able-bodied society despite becoming one of the most important figures in early Christianity. Didymus became blind when he was still a young child but nevertheless managed to excel at “grammar, arithmetic, music, logic, rhetoric, geometry, and astronomy, which,” William Hanks Levy once noted, “were in those days considered to comprehend the whole cycle of human learning.” He was so intelligent and well respected that he became the head of the renowned Catechetical School of Alexandria, where he taught Jerome, Rufinus, Palladius, and Isidore. He may not be as well known as his pupils today, in large part because of his ill-advised embrace of Origen, but he was a major figure in the early history of the Church.

Didymus, however, was still a blind person living in a sighted world that could not fully understand the experience of blindness. His interactions with Anthony, the most important ascetic in the early Church, demonstrate this disconnect between the blind and the sighted. When Anthony reportedly asked Didymus if he suffered emotionally on account of his blindness, Didymus responded truthfully that he did. Anthony, not one to mince words or withhold judgment about experiences that he could not possibly comprehend, rebuked Didymus by essentially questioning his piety. In particular, he castigated Didymus, telling him that such an esteemed Christian should not feel melancholy simply because he had a physical affliction common both to animals and human beings. In particular, he proclaimed, “I marvel that a wise man should mourn his loss of what ants and flies and gnats have, and should not rejoice in his possession of
that which saints and apostles alone have deserved.” In a sense, Anthony’s understanding of disability and the natural world that God created was not so different from Augustine’s later discussion of congenital deformity in the *City of God*. Both Anthony and Augustine believed that physical misfortune was part of the divine order. Yet Anthony’s cavalier attitude in dismissing the real heartache that Didymus acknowledged feeling on account of his blindness makes Anthony a far less sympathetic figure than Augustine. Indeed, we can only imagine how Didymus must have felt at having his piety questioned by a man who sought to prove his own piety by voluntarily removing himself from the world when Didymus’ blindness had, through no choice of his own, deprived him of so many experiences that constitute the normal human experience.

The Christian tradition likewise continued to exclude the congenitally deformed, including hunchbacks, from its fold. In the medieval French fable *Des Tres Boçus* (The Three Hunchbacks), for example, we see the figure of the hunchback, like Homer’s Thersites, as the paragon of ugliness:

A humpback lived there in the town.  
An uglier wretch could not be found.  
His head was almost half his height.  
Nature must have worked all night  
To fashion him exactly wrong,  
For no two parts seemed to belong  
Together all was ugliness.  
His head was big, his scalp a mess;  
His neck was short, his shoulders wide—  
They hugged his ears on either side.  
I’d be a fool to waste the day  
Trying and failing to convey  
His ugliness.

The considerable wealth that the hunchback had amassed through usury and collecting rents, however, suggest that fortune had not been as unkind to him as nature. The
hunchback has become so wealthy, in fact, that he is able to procure a bride so beautiful that he feels it necessary to seclude her from the rest of the world lest she seek love in the arms of another.\textsuperscript{135}

One day, however, three hunchback minstrels come to the hunchback’s residence so as to enjoy a Christmas meal among their own kind:

\begin{verbatim}
... one Christmas afternoon
There came to him to ask a boon
Beneath the landing where he rested
Three hunchback minstrels who requested
That they might share his Christmas meal,
For nowhere else could these three feel
So comfortable; here they might find
Festivity with their own kind,
Because he had a back like theirs.\textsuperscript{136}
\end{verbatim}

Despite the hunchback’s obsessive attempts to prevent anyone from entering his home lest they see his beautiful bride, he cannot refuse entry to his fellow hunchbacks. Instead, he provides them with a lavish meal.\textsuperscript{137}

Before they leave, the hunchback warns them not to return, demonstrating that his feelings of solidarity with the other hunchbacks do not immunize them from his jealous paranoia. The hunchbacks, however, unwisely fail to heed his warning and return to the house to play for his wife at her behest. When her husband returns, as one might expect, she frantically searches for a means of concealing the minstrels. Just as the situation appears hopeless, she notices three chests, one for each minstrel. When her husband enters the room, he sits with his wife for a short time, eventually leaving the house without seeing any sign of the minstrels. Yet when she attempts to let the minstrels out of their chests, she discovers to her horror, that each of them has suffocated.\textsuperscript{138}
She then devises a clever plan in order to dispose of the bodies. She hides two of
the minstrels under her bed, leaving one out in the open, and offers a porter thirty pounds
to throw “this corpse” into the nearby river for her. The porter agrees, takes the body to
the river, and returns to collect his bounty. The wife, meanwhile, pulls one of the other
minstrels from underneath the bed, apparently placing it where the first corpse lay before
the porter threw it into the river. When the man returns for his money, she pretends that
he has not done his job:

Elated now, the man returned:
“Pay me,” he told her, “what I’ve earned.
Your dwarf is carried off and sunk.
—“Sir Dolt,” she said, “you must be drunk.
You can’t pull the wool over my eyes.
The dwarf’s not taken. Here he lies.
You stopped at the street, emptied the sack,
Then brought back both sack and hunchback back.
Look over there if you think I’m lying.

The exasperated man grabs the corpse and throws it into the river. Once again, however,
he returns to find a hunchback corpse. The porter, enraged that the corpse keeps
returning, throws the corpse of the third hunchback minstrel it into the river, this time
warning it to stay submerged:

“Go back to Hell, you wretched stiff!
I’ve carried you so much that if
You venture here again, you’ll rue
The moment I catch sight of you.”

When he returns to collect his money, however, he sees the hunchback husband.
Believing that the corpse, now a living hunchback, has returned once again, the porter
decides to make sure that the corpse never returns:

“What Mr. Hunchback! Back again?
Who would believe it? By St. Nick,
This hunchback takes me for a hick!
Crossing my path again was crazy.
You think I’m recreant or lazy?”
He lifted up the pestle, charged,
Hit the lord’s head, which was too large,
And gave it such a mighty clout,
The blood and brains came pouring out,
There on the step the hunchback died.
The porter put the corpse inside
The sack, securely tied the top,
Then off he ran and didn’t stop
Till he had dumped the fourth hunchback
Off the bridge, still in the sack
Because he feared the corpse might swim
Back to the bank and follow him.

Once the porter returns, she gladly pays him the thirty pounds, reveling in the fact that
her ugly, deformed husband is dead:

Whatever pay the man demanded.
Thirty pounds, no less, she handed
Over to him and still could feel
She had the better of the deal.
And when she paid him, she agreed
He’d done good work, for he had freed
Her from her lord, that ugly dwarf.

There are two important aspects of De Tres Boçus that are especially important
for our understanding of deformity in the Middle Ages. First, it provides evidence that at
least some able-bodied people during the Middle Ages, like their classical counterparts,
viewed hunchbacks as excessively ugly simply because of their deformities. Second, it
suggests that able-bodied people viewed hunchbacks as such aberrations of nature that
Durand, the fable’s author, apparently believed that his audience would find it plausible
that a person could look upon three different hunchback corpses and one living
hunchback and see not four separate people but merely one hump. Indeed, implicit in
Durand’s fable is that there was a tendency among the able-bodied, at least in medieval
France, to notice once thing and one thing alone in their interactions with hunchbacks: their deformities.

Shakespeare likewise expressed negative attitudes about the deformed, linking moral shortcomings with physical deformity. In *The Taming of the Shrew*, for instance, Petruchio informs Kate that he had heard rumors not only that she was “rough, and coy, and sullen” but also physically disabled. The implication of Petruchio’s comments are clear: he expected to find a wretched creature whose bodily imperfections matched her character flaws. When Petruchio learns that Kate is actually a good person, in fact, he feels compelled to address her physical condition:

Why does the world report that Kate doth limp?
O sland’rous world! Kate the hazel-twig
Is straight and slender, and as brown in hue
As hazel nuts, and sweeter than the kernels.
O, let me see thee walk. Thou dost not halt.

Shakespeare is even more explicit in connecting physical deformity to moral failings in *Richard III*. In the beginning of the play, the Earl of Gloucester, the future Richard III, famously attributes his wicked nature to his physical deformities:

But I, that am not shaped for sportive tricks,
Nor made to court an amorous looking-glass;
I, that am rudely stamp’d, and want love’s majesty
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph;
I, that am curtail’d of this fair proportion,
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature,
Deformed, unfinish’d, sent before my time
Into this breathing world, scarce half made up,
And that so lamely and unfashionable
That dogs bark at me as I halt by them;
Why, I, in this weak piping time of peace,
Have no delight to pass away the time,
Unless to spy my shadow in the sun
And descant on mine own deformity:
And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover,
To entertain these fair well-spoken days,
I am determined to prove a villain
And hate the idle pleasures of these days.  

We see here a man so unable to deal with his deformities and the stigma and discrimination that he experiences on account of those deformities that he chooses to reject the able-bodied world and unleash his hate on those who have wronged him. We can only guess, of course, how many people in Shakespeare’s own day attributed the character flaws of actual disabled people to their disabilities.

Kings and queens during this period, like Roman emperors before them, used dwarfs to entertain their courts as royal playthings and to act as servants, thereby upholding the tradition of viewing dwarfs as something less than human. The Bayeux Tapestry, for example, depicts Turold’s groom as a dwarf with two horses. King Louis XII entertained his court with a dwarf named Triboulet, the name that Victor Hugo would later give to the deformed, court fool in Le roi s’amuse. King Henry VIII kept Will Sommers, a dwarf who became famous, in part, for playing jokes on prominent members of the king’s court, including Cardinal Wolsey. Catherine de Medici, one of the more fashionable women of the sixteenth century, amused herself by keeping multiple dwarfs at her court. She even arranged a marriage between two dwarfs in the hope that they would produce dwarf offspring, a feat that the Electress of Brandenburg would likewise attempt a short time later. The efforts of both women, however, proved futile as neither couple proved capable of reproducing. Charles V of Spain kept his own dwarf, Cornelius of Lithuania, at his court. Archibald Armstrong, the dwarf jester of James I of England, became famous for his numerous quarrels with others at court, many of which he instigated.
Christian Solutions to the Disability Problem

Christian Charity not a Complete Rupture with Classical Antiquity

During this period, as in classical antiquity, people addressed the disability problem in a variety of ways. Disabled people themselves, of course, continued to search for cures for their own disabilities. Because medicine still had not advanced enough to offer any realistic methods of curing most disabilities, as Metzler has observed, many disabled people would have viewed miraculous healing as their only real hope of finding a cure. 157 There is little historical evidence, however, to suggest that Christians from the fourth century to the seventeenth century viewed miraculous healing, or prayers to God pleading for miraculous healing, to be a solution to the disability problem at the societal level. Christians appear, instead, to have viewed miraculous healing to be an important aspect of God’s plan for the world that He created. When God healed a person, then, it was not divine recognition that He had erred in creating a world where disabled people lived marginal existences but merely a demonstration of God’s plan to edify, or perhaps to instruct, the faithful, as is evident when Jesus cures the blind man in the Book of John. 158

Able-bodied people did, however, recognize the important role of charity in ameliorating the problem of so many disabled people living in abject poverty. Stiker views the martyrdom of Zotikos, who lived in Constantinople during the reigns of Constantine and his sons, as a rupture between the world of classical antiquity and the Christian system of charity that would develop the Middle Ages. 159 Indeed, Stiker claims that the vitae of Zotikos constitute “the exact antithesis of Greco-Roman practice. . . .” 160 Stiker points to the legend that Zotikos had defied Constantine by constructing a
leprosarium even though the emperor had ordered lepers to be banished or drowned.¹⁶¹ For Stiker, “Constantine shows that he belongs to the world of antiquity and its practice of exposure, the fatal exclusion,” while “Zotikos does the opposite.”¹⁶² Although, according to legend, Constantine did not execute Zotikos for this transgression, Zotikos met his end during the reign of Constantine’s successor, whose daughter had contracted leprosy.¹⁶³ When Zotikos came to her aid, his reward for rebelling against the practices of classical antiquity was martyrdom, which, according to Stiker, represents “the passage from one mental world to another . . . .”¹⁶⁴ There are, however, serious problems with Stiker’s argument. The three vitae of Zotikos, as Timothy Miller and Crislip have recently pointed out, contain numerous fabrications.¹⁶⁵ Constantine never contracted leprosy or ordered the execution of lepers to prevent them from spreading their affliction to healthy people.¹⁶⁶ Nor do any sources, contemporary or otherwise, support the legend that Zotikos suffered martyrdom for attempting to help a leprous woman belonging to the imperial family.¹⁶⁷

For Stiker, however, it matters little whether Constantine and Constantius ever actually dealt with leprosy in their personal lives or whether Constantius executed Zotikos for his refusal to respect the practices of classical antiquity. Indeed, Stiker rightly contends that “[w]hether the person who is celebrated is the historical one or not, and whether the account of his life is completely legendary or not are of no importance in this context.”¹⁶⁸ What matters, he seems to argue, is that the vitae of Zotikos represent a new, more humane way of dealing with the disability problem and that Zotikos’s purported martyrdom is indicative of a very real clash between the classical world views of Constantine and Constantius, which, in Stiker’s view, supported the killing of
congenitally deformed infants to protect the able-bodied community, and the Christian world view of Zotikos, which required the faithful to show compassion to disabled people. The problem for Stiker, here, is that people in classical antiquity, as discussed in the previous chapter, did not address the disability problem solely by killing congenitally deformed infants. Nor were all able-bodied people in classical antiquity opposed to providing meaningful charity to the disabled. Athens, after all, created a system that provided disability pensions to disabled people who were sufficiently poor, while Seneca the Elder expressed what must have been the view of many Romans that it was a moral imperative to give alms to young disabled beggars, even if some Romans would have concluded that such wretched children would be better off dead. Accordingly, even if Zotikos had procured a leprosarium to save lepers from mass execution or, at the very least, later Christians assumed that the vitae of Zotikos were historically accurate, the martyrdom of Zotikos itself would not support Stiker’s claim of a rupture between classical antiquity and the Christian system of charity that would develop from the fourth century through the Middle Ages. The ways in which able-bodied society dealt with the disability problem during classical antiquity and the discourse that accompanied such efforts, notwithstanding Spartan practices and the requirements of the Twelve Tables, were far less draconian than Stiker assumes. It stands to reason, then, that the advent of Christian charity did not mark an absolute rupture with classical antiquity by establishing what Colin Jones has called a “charitable imperative.”

This does not mean, of course, that Christian charity had little impact on the disabled. Stiker is certainly correct that the systematic practice of exposing infants with congenital deformities found little support among Christians. John Boswell, for instance,
notes in *The Kindness of Strangers* that Christian opposition to the killing of congenitally deformed infants, such as Gregory of Tours’ description of a “Frankish mother of a severely deformed child, indicat[ing] that it was inconceivable that mothers should kill even deformed children,” marked a significant departure from classical antiquity, when many able-bodied people viewed infanticide as a viable solution to the disability problem.\(^{171}\) It is simply unfair to the able-bodied people of classical antiquity, however, to attribute to Christianity the invention of the idea that there was a moral imperative to help disabled people, even if Christianity inculcated the importance of providing alms to disabled people to a far greater degree than we ordinarily see in classical antiquity. Indeed, it is perhaps a better approach to view Christianity’s “charitable imperative” with respect to disabled people as an embrace of the moral impetus behind classical antiquity’s more humane solutions to the disability problem and a concomitant rejection of the systematic infanticide of Sparta, unquestionably classical antiquity’s most brutal solution to the disability problem.\(^{172}\)

Yet even if Stiker is too quick to find a rupture between the practices of classical antiquity and Christendom, he rightly asserts that some fourth-century Christians did take steps to help at least some disabled people by establishing charitable institutions in accordance with the tenets of the Christian faith. Basil of Caesarea, who, according to Crislip, “is traditionally regarded as the founder of the first hospital,” envisioned his fourth-century institution, called the Basileias after its founder, as “a place for the nourishment for the poor.”\(^{173}\) Crislip “surmises” that both the elderly and disabled, who would have comprised a class of people “who were physically incapable of providing for themselves,” must have found shelter within the Basileias.\(^{174}\) Most elderly and disabled
people, Crislip argues, would have been unable to survive without receiving some kind of alms, whether through a system of begging or institutional care, if their families were unable or unwilling to care for them, “usually owing to the financial burden of unproductive members.”\textsuperscript{175} Crislip acknowledges, however, that it is not until the later Byzantine period that we see a hospital—the hospital of St. Paul in Constantinople—that included housing expressly set aside for the “blind, crippled, aged, and disabled.”\textsuperscript{176}

We do know that Basil offered direct assistance to lepers, one of the most marginalized groups of disabled people in the history of the West, by establishing a leper colony at his Basileias, where lepers “were housed and fed, indefinitely; their illness was treated, their bodies cared for, although they had no hope of recovery.”\textsuperscript{177} Gregory of Nazianzus praised Basil’s hospital, proclaiming that it surpassed even the “walls of Babylon,” the Pyramids, and the Colossus in grandeur and importance because it was “the most wonderful of all, the short road to salvation, the easiest ascent to heaven.”\textsuperscript{178} Gregory was particularly impressed with Basil’s concern for lepers. Basil’s hospital, Gregory contended, put an end to “‘that terrible and piteous spectacle of men who are living corpses, the greater part of whose limbs have mortified, driven away from their cities and homes and public places and fountains, aye, and from their own dearest ones, recognizable by their names rather than by their features. . . .’”\textsuperscript{179}

\textit{Christian Charity and the Disabled: Almsgiving and Institutional Care}

Christian hegemony in the West resulted in what amounted to Christian solutions to the disability problem from late antiquity well into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to Stiker, the Christian view of charity resulted primarily in almsgiving and institutionalized care.\textsuperscript{180} Although some people today might associate
traditional, Christian almsgiving with wretched beggars looking for largesse in public places, Stiker rightly points out that alms were not merely coins “that one slid into the beggar’s hand” but also large donations to establish “foundations and legacies.”

Hospices “attached to and run by a monastery, bishopric, or a lord,” meanwhile, provided institutionalized care to some types of poor people in Europe, albeit in the form of “accommodation and little else.” These hospices, Stiker assumes, must have housed at least some disabled people. In some ways, then, the institutionalized care of disabled people in Europe after late antiquity at times may have resembled the institutionalized care of the fourth-century Basileias, where the disabled poor may also have lived alongside the able-bodied poor. Yet not all disabled people were always welcome in hospices. Indeed, Stiker points out that hospices always excluded lepers who had their own institutions, sometimes excluded paralytics, and frequently excluded “the lame, one-armed, and blind.” Hospices provided basic custodial services and little else for people expected to recover in time. Their role was not ordinarily to provide long-term institutional care for the incurable disabled population.

Disability studies, of course, had not progressed enough by the 1980s to enable Stiker to answer every question about disability from late antiquity to the seventeenth century. He questions, for instance, whether medieval Europeans distinguished between the disabled poor and the non-disabled poor. As more disability scholars have uncovered pertinent texts and have written their own works on disability history, it has become apparent that Europeans did indeed distinguish, at least to some extent, between the disabled poor and non-disabled poor. Mark P. O’Tool, for instance, has recently observed that medieval French farce distinguished between some groups of the disabled
poor and the non-disabled poor by replicating the “image of quarrelsome and sexually grotesque blind beggars. . . .”

Yet the extent to which European societies treated the disabled poor differently from the non-disabled poor remains difficult to judge. English law, at least by the late fourteenth century, did make such a distinction. In 1388, the English Parliament enacted a statute, called the 12th Richard II, which distinguished between beggars and “beggars impotent to serve,” requiring the latter to “abide in the cities and towns where they be dwelling at the time of the proclamation of this statute” or, in some cases, to return “to the towns where they were born. . . .” In Paris in 1449, meanwhile, two men and a woman stood trial for cruelly kidnapping children “in order to blind and mutilate them and send them into the streets as beggars,” a scheme that would have made the monster in Seneca the Elder’s *Mendici Debilitati* proud. The entire plot, of course, hinged upon the belief of the perpetrators that disabled children would likely receive more alms through begging than able-bodied, adult beggars. In 1553, a committee of twenty-four notable inhabitants of London returned to the idea of the “impotent poor” when it divided the poor into three degrees: (1) the “poor by impotency,” (2) the “poor by casualty,” and (3) the “thriftless poor.” The committee further divided the “poor by impotency” into three subgroups: (a) the “fatherless poor man’s child,” (b) the “aged, blind and lame,” and (c) the “diseased person by leprosy, dropsy, etc.”

Even by the end of the seventeenth century, when some able-bodied societies, as we shall see, were attempting to reduce begging by providing certain disabled people with institutional care, or, as some would say, by thrusting institutional care upon them, we continue to see a distinction between disabled beggars and able-bodied beggars. In
1693, the author of *Proposals for improving able beggars to the best advantage* distinguished between both types of beggars in proposing a draconian law designed to eradicate able-bodied begging. In that text, the author views “able ide People” as extreme dangers to the community, particularly those who choose to become “able beggars,” thereby unjustly taking resources from other able-bodied people industrious enough to labor for their own bread. Because efforts to confine such able beggars to workhouses had failed in the author’s estimation, lawmakers needed to enact a new law that would empower any person “to seize Beggars of whatsoever Sex or Age, wherever they shall find them actually begging” and to treat them virtually as slaves. The underlying assumption of the proposed law, of course, was that it would be unjust to punish disabled beggars, even those disposed to idleness, with what amounted to slavery when their disabilities afforded them far fewer labor opportunities than able-bodied beggars. Indeed, able-bodied beggars had nothing to blame, in the eyes of many Europeans, but their own idleness. Until more disability scholars conduct research into the disabled poor and non-disabled poor before 1388, however, it is difficult to inquire into attitudes about able beggars and disabled beggars in earlier periods.

There is less confusion about Christian institutions specifically designed for particular groups of disabled people. There is admittedly some debate among disability historians about whether the history of lepers and the leprosaria, where lepers received institutional care, are relevant to the field of disability studies. Metzler, for instance, unlike Stiker and Herbert C. Covey, excludes leprosy from her work on disability in the high Middle Ages because “it falls into a category of its own, with its own symbolism, meaning and aetiology.” Metzler is certainly correct, of course, that medieval
Christians represented lepers as something unique even when compared to other types of people with physical disabilities. Yet there are many groups that scholars today include in the study of disability history whom able-bodied people have historically viewed as *sui generis* in at least some respects. Prominent thinkers from classical antiquity to the nineteenth century, after all, compared the deaf to animals because of their inability to speak and to comprehend what people were saying, while rabbinic Judaism compared them to mentally disabled and intoxicated people. Today, moreover, disability scholars such as Lennard Davis debate whether sign language, which deaf people and their associates developed over the millennia to compensate for their inability to hear and to speak, is such a significant aspect of deaf culture that deaf people, as deaf activists often contend, form a group separate from disabled people even as most disability historians recognize that the history of deafness is inextricably intertwined with the history of disability.\(^{194}\) Lepers, in my view, are similar to the deaf in that some aspects of leper culture were so unique that disability historians must not assume that lepers and other disabled people, either during the Middle Ages or later periods, shared identical experiences with respect to the experience of disability.

Yet to decline to study the ways in which able-bodied society treated lepers because their disabilities originated from a contagious disease, albeit one with great cultural and symbolic significance, rather than through congenital deformity, warfare, or accident would raise at least two serious problems. First, it would run the risk of overemphasizing the differences between disability in a general sense and disability caused by disease in the pre-modern mind, a distinction that is probably more indicative of how modern observers familiar with the germ theory of disease conceptualize
disability and disease. Later in her monograph, in fact, Metzler again comes dangerously close to applying modern theories about disability to the Middle Ages when she criticizes the work Ronald Finucane because it “blurs those distinctions, which modern theorists would make, between ‘disability’ and ‘illness’ . . . .”\textsuperscript{195} It is understandable, of course, that a disability scholar such as Metzler would want to examine disability rather than illness or disease in the Middle Ages. Metzler is even on solid ground in asserting that “making distinctions between ‘disability’ and ‘illness’ is one of the cornerstones of disability theories.”\textsuperscript{196} That does not mean, however, that medieval Europeans, as Finucane rightly recognizes, distinguished between disability and illness in accordance with modern, theoretical frameworks. Indeed, medieval historians who tackle the subject of disability, like all disability historians, must remain ever vigilant not to apply modern theories about disability to their historical subjects. With respect to leprosy and other diseases and illnesses that can result in permanent, physical disability in the pre-modern West, this means recognizing that able-bodied observers made far fewer distinctions between the various types of physical affliction that can befall human beings than we ordinarily find in the modern world. Second, the disabilities of Alexander Pope, one of the most important disabled figures in the history of the West, were likely the result of tuberculosis rather than congenital deformity, accident, or warfare.\textsuperscript{197} It would make little sense, then, to exclude discussions of leprosy from works of disability history simply because able-bodied society reacted to leprosy in a manner that differed from its reactions to physical disabilities caused by other types of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. In any event, the decision of Europeans to deal with the problem of leprosy by providing them with institutional care does provide historians with important insights about
Christendom’s attempt to deal with the larger disability problem, even if the only insight is that able-bodied society treated lepers differently from other groups of disabled people, in part, because it socially constructed leprosy in a manner that differed from the ways in which it socially constructed other disabilities.

Whatever consensus disability scholars ultimately fashion with respect to the controversy about whether to include lepers and their leprosaria in discussions of disability in the pre-modern West, there is no debate about whether the blind residents of hospices created specifically for blind people are relevant to the history of the disabled. There are, however, considerable gaps in our knowledge about the precise nature of the earliest of these hospices. As Wheatley has recently observed, William the Conqueror may have founded hospices for the blind in the eleventh century, even if, as Wheatley himself acknowledges, Brigitte Gauthier could find evidence of only two of the four hospices attributed to the famed Norman. For some time, moreover, popular tradition obscured the history of hospices for the blind in France, attributing Louis IX’s founding of the Quinze-Vingts, an institution for the Parisian blind, to his desire to accommodate blinded crusaders. Modern scholarship, however, has demonstrated that that tradition was simply the venerable institution’s colorful, foundation myth. Yet even modern scholars have perpetuated some misconceptions about the Quinze-Vingts. As O’Tool has pointed out, some studies have “left the impression that the residents of the Quinze-Vingts were simply poor blind beggars, rather than working members of the community” when the residents were, in fact, “drawn almost exclusively from the lower and middling levels of the medieval Parisian bourgeoisie.” O’Tool attributes the shortcomings of previous studies to “disability creep,” a discursive phenomenon that reduces the lives of disabled
people “to presumed ideas about disability, denies the agency they had in the process of identity formation, and effaces the importance of other elements of their characters.”

O’Tool convincingly argues that his study demonstrates the “usefulness of setting aside, at least temporarily, our preoccupation with disability when analyzing people with disabilities so that we do not forget that the identities of people with disabilities are multivalent and not solely dependent upon their disabilities.” Indeed, disability historians must always remain mindful not to reduce the lives of the disabled to their experiences with the stigma and discrimination associated with disability, even if such experiences have a profound impact on identity formation in any age.

In any event, the founding of the Quinze-Vingts along with the accommodations and privileges provided to its blind residents reveal important aspects of the medieval view of begging and institutional care. Louis IX founded the hospice in Paris in 1256, just two years before he “expelled beggars from the city, ostensibly because of their perceived dishonesty and unruliness.” According to Wheatley, “[a]nxieties about able-bodied beggars tricking unwitting almsgivers would have contributed to Louis’ motivation to establish the hospice, whose residents wore institutional uniforms identifying them as fully licensed, genuinely disabled members of the royally sanctioned institution.” Pope Clement VI granted them “the privilege of begging at churches both within and outside of Paris” in 1265, a privilege “confirmed by three successive popes and the Council of Trent.” Zina Weygand has pointed out, moreover, that the founding of the Quinze-Vingts was “part of a broad movement that culminated in the thirteenth century, when numerous hospitals, hospices [hotels-Dieu], and monastic hospitals [maisons-Dieu] opened just about everywhere in the cities and countryside.” This
movement produced not only the Quinze-Vingts but also numerous “confraternities of the blind [avuegleries].”²⁰⁷ What we see here, then, is once again the distinction between disabled beggars and able-bodied beggars, this time in the form of the blind beggar worthy of alms contrasted by the able-bodied beggar worthy of exile. What we also see, according to Weygand, is the beginning of the state’s involvement in providing aid to the disabled. According to Weygand, “by supporting the congregation of the blind poor in Paris, Saint Louis demonstrated, for the first time in the history of the French kingdom, the responsibility the institution of the monarchy had for disabled people, and he paved the way for the state to take on a social problem previously abandoned to the Church or to individual generosity.”²⁰⁸

For the next several centuries after the founding of the Quinze-Vingts, able-bodied society would become increasingly concerned about the problems associated with disabled begging. Wheatley, of course, sees the entire medieval system as one that potentially did view disabled beggars as dangerous and in need of social control. We have already have seen how medieval French farce, contributed to the notion that disabled beggars could be dangerous by replicating the “image of quarrelsome and sexually grotesque blind beggars. . . .”²⁰⁹ If the purveyors of Christian alms, as Wheatley argues, conditioned their beneficence to such disabled beggars becoming “worthy,” then Christian charity, at least in some circumstances, may indeed have acted as a powerful form of social control.²¹⁰ By the seventeenth century, at any rate, fears about disabled beggars would contribute to what Foucault famously called “the great confinement,” which, even if it was not as “great” as Foucault imagined, did attempt to reduce disabled begging by increasing the number of institutions that could accommodate or, as Foucault
would argue, confine some groups of disabled people. Indeed, the desire to rid urban areas of disabled beggars, as discussed in the next chapter, played a pivotal role in Louis XIV’s decision to construct the Hôtel des Invalides for his disabled veterans in the seventeenth century.

**Conclusion**

Christian hegemony had a profound impact on both the idea that there was something significant about the existence of congenital deformity and the idea that there was a disability problem, even if Christianity did not mark a rupture with classical antiquity as Stiker has posited. Indeed, various classical ideas about disability continued to proliferate with the advent of Christian hegemony, particularly the idea that there was divine significance to monstrosities and the idea, expressed by both the Athenians and the elder Seneca, that there was a moral imperative to render assistance to the disabled. The various categories for disabled people that had exacerbated the stigma and discrimination experienced by disabled people likewise continued to proliferate in the Christian world from late antiquity to the seventeenth century. Stiker rightly points out, however, that it is difficult to analyze ideas about disability from late antiquity to the middle of the seventeenth century without a firm understanding of how both the Hebrew Bible and the Christian New Testament reflected not only negative stereotypes about disability but also the notion that the devout had an obligation to aid the disabled. Stiker is also on solid ground when contending that Christianity (1) discouraged the killing of children with severe congenital deformities, despite the survival of the practice well into the seventeenth century and (2) created a system that relied on both almsgiving and institutional care to address the disability problem. Many of these Christian ideas would
persist from the middle of the seventeenth century to the French Revolution, of course,
even as westerners constructed a new mechanistic world view and looked for new, more
effective ways of addressing the disability problem.

1 Edward Wheatley, *Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind: Medieval Constructions of a Disability* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2010), 13. Wheatley has concluded that a proper understanding of what he calls the “religious model of disability,” is an essential prerequisite to understanding the complexities of disability discourse in medieval Europe. See ibid., 9-19. He likewise believes that one of the things that separates classical antiquity from the Middle Ages was a “kind of unified discursive system” embodied by “orthodox Christian teaching . . . .” Ibid., 13.


7 Ibid., 126.


11 Crislip, *From Monastery to Hospital,* 116.


13 Ibid., 14.

14 Ibid.


17 See ibid., 23.

18 Ibid., 39.

19 Wheatley has likewise concluded that a proper understanding of what he calls the “religious model of disability,” is an essential prerequisite to understanding the complexities of disability discourse in medieval Europe. See Wheatley, *Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind,* 9-19. He believes that one of the things that separates classical antiquity from the Middle Ages was a “kind of unified discursive system” embodied by “orthodox Christian teaching . . . .” Ibid., 13.


22 Leviticus 21:16-23; see also Leviticus 22:4 (prohibiting Aaron’s offspring who contract leprosy to eat of the sacred donations until they are clean). Abrams points out that deafness, mental illness, and mental disability are not included here “perhaps because they were not considered readily visible defects.” Those disabilities, however, became important under the rabbinic system, which developed after the destruction of the Second Temple. Abrams, *Judaism and Disability,* 9, 23.
Leviticus 22:21-22. According to Abrams, the Mishnah “recognizes the link between the sacrificial animals and the priests, and the role blemishes play in their disqualification from the cult.” Abrams, *Judaism and Disability*, 28.

24 M. Bekorot 7:1, as quoted by Abrams, *Judaism and Disability*, 28. Abrams points out that the Mishnah’s proscriptions were only theoretical because “the cult did not operate during the era of the Mishnah.” Indeed, Abrams explains that “a priest offering a blessing in a synagogue is treated much more leniently.” Abrams, *Judaism and Disability*, 28.


26 Ibid., 29.

27 Metzler, *Disability in Medieval Europe*, 40-1. She likewise surmises that the Apostolic Constitutions, from either the fourth or fifth century, may have discouraged “people who had an impairment prior to applying for the priesthood from doing so,” but may have allowed priests to continue to serve if they “became impaired after they had become” priests. She does point out, however, that individual disabled people may have been able to obtain dispensations to allow them to serve as priests. Ibid., 40.


29 2 Samuel 5:8.

30 2 Samuel 9:11-13. David may simply have hated blind and lame Jebusties rather than all blind and lame people with the notable exception of Mephiboseth.


33 While David was walking on his roof, he saw Bathsheba bathing. Although she was the wife of his faithful soldier, Uriah, David sent messengers to bring Bathsheba to him, and they lay together. Shortly thereafter, she informed David that she was pregnant. David ordered Uriah to lay with Bathsheba so that it would appear that Uriah was the father of the child. Uriah, however, refused, informing David that he would not enjoy the company of his wife while his fellow soldiers were on a military campaign. David then ordered Joab to place Uriah at the vanguard of the hardest fighting. When Uriah met the enemy, David ordered Joab to withdraw his troops, abandoning Uriah to his fate. (2 Samuel 11:1-17). David thus effected the murder of Uriah so as to hide his affair.


36 Exodus 20:5, 34:7; Numbers 14:18; Deuteronomy 5:9.


38 Jeremiah 32:18.


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41 John 9:3.
47 Job 1:1.
48 Job 1:8, 2:3.
49 Job 2:4-7.
50 Job 4:7, 8:4-6, 11:1-11, 15:20-35, 18:1-21, 34:10-12, 36:1-23. Job answers his friends, “I also could talk as you do, if you were in my place; I could join words against you, and shake my head at you.” Job 16:4. “Those at ease have contempt for misfortune.” Job 12:5.
51 Ecclesiastes 8:14.
52 John 9:3.
54 Deuteronomy 27:18.
55 Job 29:11-17.
57 Psalms 43:1. He also desires healing so that he might travel to Jerusalem. Psalms 43:3.
58 Stiker, A History of Disability, 25; see also Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 45-9.
60 For ambiguities in the Jewish tradition, see Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 69.
66 Augustine, City of God, 58-9 (August.C.D..22.8).
67 Ibid. 50-1 (August.C.D..22.8).
68 Ibid. (August.C.D..22.8).
70 Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 50.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Compare the differences between Isidore’s portents and portentuosi (“unnatural beings”) with Paré’s distinction between monsters and portents. For Paré, monsters were “things that appear outside the course of nature (and most often are signs of some misfortune to come) like an infant born with one arm. . . .” He defines portents, by contrast, as “things that occur completely against nature, like woman who gives birth to a serpent, or a dog. . . .” Ambroise Paré, Des monstres et prodiges, 3.
75 Isidore of Seville, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, 244. He goes on to discuss monstrous races in various parts of the world. XI.12-39, p. 244-6. For a brief discussion of Isidore’s classification of monstrosity, see David Williams, Deformed Discourse: The Function of the Monster in Medieval Thought and Literature (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 107.

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77 See Miller, *Medieval Monstrosity and the Female Body*, 86

78 See ibid.


80 Miller, *Medieval Monstrosity and the Female Body*, 1, 2.


83 Ibid.

84 Bates agrees that the printing press facilitated a war for the hearts of Catholic and Protestant believers. See ibid.


87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., 356. Other Catholics likewise spread word of the astrologer’s conclusion to the masses. Smith, 356.

89 Ibid. The monstrous hybrid had the body of a woman, the head of an ass, the foot of an elephant, the fin of a fish, and a dragon’s head as a tail. Ibid. For more on Luther and Melanchthon, see Julie Crawford, *Marvelous Protestantism: Monstrous Births in Post-Reformation England* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 27-34.

89 Smith, “The Mooncalf,” 357.


92 *A special grace*, as quoted by Crawford, *Marvelous Protestantism*, 38.


97 John Winthrop, *A Short Story of the rise, reign, and ruin of the Antinomians, Familists and Libertines*, 44.


100 Ibid., 3-4.


103 Ibid., 123. Mercy Short had earlier warned Mather that devils were out to get him. Ibid., 122-3.

104 See ibid., 336-8, 343-4.

105 Davies identifies three categories of monsters under the following three headings: (1) “monsters as signs of divine pleasure”; (2) “monstrous births and the order of nature”; and (3) “monstrous people at the ends of the earth.” Surekha Davies, “The Un lucky, the Bad and the Ugly: Categories of Monstrosity from the
Renaissance to the Enlightenment,” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous*, ed., Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 52-71. Although monsters thought to inhabit distant regions of the globe, often strange hybrids of beasts and human beings, are outside the scope of this dissertation, Surekha rightly points out that scholars should keep in mind that all three categories are somewhat related. According to Surekha, “[a]lthough a particular text might appear to deal with one type of monster, its author would have been aware of the other types and, in some cases, drew on these traditions, or referred explicitly to their monsters.” Ibid., 51.

106 It is probable that superstitious beliefs, which almost certainly predated classical antiquity and the Hebrew Bible, played an important role in perpetuating the perceived connection between congenital deformity and divine will.

107 Davies, “The Unlucky, the Bad and the Ugly: Categories of Monstrosity from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment,” 52.

108 Ibid., 52-8.


110 Janis L. Pallister, Introduction to Ambroise Paré, *On Monsters and Marvels*, trans. Janis L. Pallister (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), xvi. Pallister argues that *Des monstres et prodiges* is the most important book on monstrosity during the Renaissance because “it, perhaps better than any other, presents a synthesis of views and theories on this and other subjects, while at the same time illuminating one of the richest, albeit roughly-hewn, minds of sixteenth-century Europe.” Ibid., xvi. Paré, however, faced accusations that he borrowed so much from other authors that he essentially plagiarized *Des monstres et prodiges*. See, e.g., Jean Céard, Introduction to Ambroise Paré, *Des monstres et prodiges*, xix. Paré himself includes among his sources Pierre Boistauau’s *Histoires prodigieuses* as well as Claude Tesserant, Saint Paul, Saint Augustine, Esdras the Prophet, Hippocrates, Galen, Empedocles, Aristotle, Pliny, and Lycothennes. *Ambroise Paré, Des monstres et prodiges*, 3.


112 Ibid., 3 (emphasis added).

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid., 4. I collated my translation with Janis L. Pallister’s translation. *See On Monsters and Marvels*, 4. In chapter 20, Paré uses the word “gueux” (beggars) rather than “belistres” (rascals), suggesting that Paré used the words somewhat interchangeably. *See* Paré, *Des monstres et prodiges*, 4, 69. Yet Paré is not condemning ordinary beggars here but rather beggars who pretended to have some type of affliction to increase the effectiveness of their begging. *See, e.g.*, ibid., 69-79. Among the several different types of physical affliction that, according to Paré, beggars would pretend to suffer from are deafness, muteness, and lameness. Ibid., 74.


117 Ibid., 538-9.

118 Ibid., 538.

119 Ibid., 539.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.


124 Ibid.

126 Ibid.
128 William Hanks Levy, Blindness and the blind, or, A treatise on the science of typhology (London: Chapman and Hall, 1872), 185. Levy was the director of the Association for Promoting the General Welfare of the Blind. It is from Rufinus, a pupil of Didymus, that we learn that Didymus became blind before beginning his primary education. Richard A. Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria: Virtue and Narrative in Biblical Scholarship (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 14.
129 Levy, Blindness and the blind, 185.
130 For Didymus and Origen, see ibid., 186. Diderot pointed to Didymus, Eusebius the Asiatic and Nicaise of Mechlin as important Christian thinkers who rose to prominence despite their blindness. Denis Diderot, Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who See, Margaret Jourdain trans. and ed. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1916), 108.
131 See Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria 21; Levy, Blindness and the blind, 185-6.
132 Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria, 21.
134 Ibid., 37 (40-44).
135 Ibid., 36-7 (16-17, 54-58).
136 Ibid., 37 (59-69).
137 Ibid., 37-38 (68-80).
139 Ibid., 39 (132-147).
140 Ibid., 40 (169-176).
141 Ibid. (196-204).
142 Ibid., 41 (220-223).
143 Ibid., 41-2 (251-267).
144 Ibid., 42 (276-282).
145 William Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, 2.1.1093.
146 Ibid., 2.1.1102-1106. Seconds later, Petruchio marvels at her “princely gait.” Ibid., 2.1.1109.
147 William Shakespeare, Richard III, 1.1.
149 Ibid., 81.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 See ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Covey, Social Perceptions of People with Disabilities in History, 81.
156 Ibid.
157 See Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe, 69.
158 John 9:1-17. Metzler has compiled an appendix of medieval miracle narratives that demonstrate the importance of divine healing during the Middle Ages. See Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe, 191-259. These narratives typically evince a desire to glorify God and the saints who purportedly possessed healing powers. They do not suggest that divine healing as a supernatural attempt to address the problem of caring for disabled members of a community.
Stiker, *A History of Disability*, 74. Stiker also views the martyrdom of Zotikos as a rupture between Jewish antiquity and Christianity. Ibid. For Stiker, Zotikos represents a rejection of “the system of Jewish prohibitions” and the embrace of Christ’s view of the poor and disabled. Ibid., 75-6. It is not clear, however, this fictional account of Zotikos represents any such rupture. In any case, the crux of Stiker’s argument with respect to Zotikos is the rejection of the classical worldview in favor of the Christian worldview. And it is that argument that I have decided to address in my own discussion of Christian charity.

The legend is so complicated and rooted in mystery that modern scholars have sometimes been unable to keep track of who is supposed to be who in this legend. Stiker, for example, claims that it was the daughter of Constans who contracted leprosy. Ibid. Miller, by contrast, identifies her as the daughter of Constantius II. Timothy S. Miller, *The Orphans of Byzantium: Child Welfare in the Christian Empire* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University Press of America, 2003), 53. Crislip, for his part, agrees with Miller that it was the daughter of Constantius II who supposedly contracted leprosy, but claims that it was Constantius, not Constantine, who ordered the banishment or killing of all lepers. Crislip, *From Monastery to Hospital*, 193 n.74.

Stiker, *A History of Disability*, 74. Stiker refers to the poor leprous woman, condemned to die by her own father, as the “symbol of the passage from one mental world to another,” but Stiker is really arguing here that Zotikos’s drive to help her regardless of the consequences is what marks such a radical rupture between classical antiquity and Christianity. See ibid.

Miller, *The Orphans of Byzantium*, 53-4. Miller, 53. See also Crislip, *From Monastery to Hospital*, 193 n.74.

See Miller, *The Orphans of Byzantium*, 54.


Disabled people have long recognized the precarious existence of deformed infants in Sparta. William Hay, the hunchback member of Parliament during the eighteenth century, proclaimed in *Deformity: an essay*, that he would have been killed had he been born in Sparta. William Hay, *Deformity: an essay* (London: 1755), 5-6.

Crislip, *From Monastery to Hospital*, 102.

Ibid., 115-6.

Ibid.. 115. Crislip does not actually refer to begging as a possible means of survival for the elderly and disabled. He does, however, identify begging as a survival strategy for lepers. I include begging here because Crislip almost certainly would agree that the elderly and the disabled, like lepers, would have resorted to begging for sustenance in the absence of institutional care.

Ibid., 116.

Ibid., 113-4.

Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or*. 43.63, as quoted by Crislip, *From Monastery to Hospital*, 114.

Ibid., 115.


Stiker contends that it was the incurable nature of disability that resulted in the exclusion of “the lame, one-armed, and blind” from hospices. Ibid.


Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 61. Wheatley does not connect this example of mutilation to Seneca the Elder’s earlier account of such a scheme that I discuss in the previous chapter.


See Proposals for improving able beggars to the best advantage (National Library of Scotland, 1693), 1-3.

Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe, 5-6. Metzler argues that she is contradicting “many medical historians” in claiming that medieval Europeans viewed leprosy as a type of disease rather than as a type of disability. Metzler, 1. For Covey’s view of leprosy, see Covey, Social Perceptions of People with Disabilities in History, 99.

See Lennard Davis, Enforcing Normalcy, xiv-v.

Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe, 126. I omitted the rest of the sentence because that portion of the sentence is somewhat difficult to understand without the rest of the paragraph for context.

Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe, 127.


For a discussion of the legendary founding of the Quinze-Vingts, see Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 42-3, 49-54.


Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 14.
Chapter 6: The Significance of Monsters and the Efficacy of Almsgiving Reexamined in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the evolution of ideas about congenital deformity and the disability problem embarked on a new phase. The developments of this period, however, are not indicative of a linear progression toward a more rational understanding of the natural world. Katharine Daston and Lorraine Park posited such a linear view of progress with respect to congenital deformity in their 1981 article “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France and England.”¹ In that article, they argued that ideas about monstrosity passed through three successive stages during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Shortly after 1500, they claimed, Europeans tended to associate monsters with other natural phenomena such as “earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, celestial apparitions, and rains of blood, stones and other miscellanea.”² Most Europeans, they maintained, viewed such phenomena as “divine prodigies, and popular interest in them was sparked and fuelled by the religious conflicts of the Reformation.”³ According to Daston and Park, however, Europeans increasingly began to cast aside their superstitious beliefs about monstrosities, viewing them “more and more as natural wonders—signs of nature’s fertility rather than God’s wrath.”⁴ By the end of the seventeenth century, they argued, monsters “had been integrated into the medical disciplines of comparative anatomy and embryology.”⁵ Ideas about monstrosity for Daston and Park in 1981, then, had undergone a clear evolution “from monsters as prodigies to monsters as examples of medical pathology...”⁶ Daston and Park even went so far as to contend that although nearly everyone during the Reformation believed that monstrous births were divine prodigies, “only the most popular forms of literature—ballads, broadsides and the occasional
religious pamphlet—treated monsters in this way” by the end of the seventeenth century. Not only the “professional scientist of 1700” but also “the educated layman, full of Baconian enthusiasm,” they asserted, viewed “religious associations with monsters” as “merely another manifestation of popular ignorance and superstition, fostering uncritical wonder rather than sober investigation of natural causes.”

When Daston and Park returned to the issue of monstrosity in their 2001 book, *Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750*, however, they abandoned their notion of “three successive stages,” explaining that they now “see three separate complexes of interpretations of associated emotions—horror, pleasure, and repugnance—which overlapped and coexisted during much of the early modern period.” In that work, they rightly conclude that “[l]ike everything else having to do with wonders, these complexes cannot be detached from the particular audiences, historical circumstances, and cultural meanings that shaped and nourished each of them.” In rejecting the idea of linear progress with respect to the “naturalization” of monstrosity, Daston and Park now hold the much more tenable position that some medieval writers, notably Albertus Magnus, ascertained natural causes for congenital deformity while “examples of monsters read as divine signs or enjoyed *lusus naturae* [as sports of nature] can be found until the late seventeenth century.” The idea that there was some type of supernatural significance to congenital deformity, moreover, did not perish in the seventeenth century, even in highly educated circles. Indeed, Alexander Pope’s eighteenth-century enemies among the educated elite gleefully attributed his deformities to divine wrath.

It is certainly the case that a number of highly influential thinkers, inspired by the ideas of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, began to ponder the
implications of congenital deformity in new ways when fashioning a mechanical understanding of the natural world. Many of them even followed some of the greatest thinkers of classical antiquity in recognizing that it might be possible to uncover some of nature’s most elusive secrets by pondering the existence of congenital deformity. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, did not extirpate supernatural explanations for monstrous births or produce a consensus among philosophers with respect to the significance of such births. Indeed, the conflux of traditional, Christian beliefs with respect to congenital deformity, the remnants of classical ideas about deformity, and the new beliefs and practices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led to remarkably complex ideas about the significance of congenital deformity.

The various categories that had been evolving since classical antiquity to differentiate the congenitally deformed or disabled body from the ideal healthy body, meanwhile, continued to stigmatize congenital deformity and disability. The precise ways in which people utilized these categories during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, often depended on whether they continued to subscribe to the traditional, Christian view of nature and congenital deformity or to the emerging mechanical view. Those thinkers who rejected the notion that monstrous births were divine signs or manifestations of divine wrath as superstitious nonsense may have seen themselves as more humane in their treatment of congenitally deformed people, but they also contributed quite often to the stigma and discrimination accompanying deformity. Indeed, philosophical discussions of congenital deformity, albeit in the context of attempting to understand natural phenomena, reinforced the idea that congenitally deformed people were fundamentally inferior to able-bodied people. Simon Dickie and Roger Lund, in
fact, have suggested that the idea that congenitally deformed people were “sports of nature” may have contributed to the idea that “human deformity constitutes a legitimate object of ridicule. . . .”\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, English jestbooks in the middle of the eighteenth century routinely mocked “cripples, dwarves, and hunchbacks.”\textsuperscript{14}

Just as it would be misleading to attribute to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries an absolute paradigm shift with respect to ideas about congenital deformity, so too would it be problematic to view the new ways of addressing the disability problem that arose during this period as indicative of a linear progression on the path to modernity as religious charity waned and the state increasingly assumed control over assistance to the disabled. Although the state did become increasingly involved in the daily lives of disabled people from the seventeenth century onwards, religious charity did not suddenly disappear as the state grew in power. Indeed, people from a variety of different backgrounds were involved in the creation of new ways to address the disability problem. A growing number social elites, including nobles, the clergy, and philosophers, were beginning to realize that traditional, Christian charity was not adequately addressing the needs of the disabled. Accordingly, both state and private philanthropists began to experiment with new models of helping the disabled, in part, to address the perceived shortcomings of Christianity’s charitable mission. Yet these efforts generally did not constitute a rejection of Christianity or its charitable mission. Some of the most important private philanthropists to address the disability problem, most notably Abbé Charles-Michel de l’Épée, were members of the clergy. Many people who experimented with new ways of helping the disabled and yet were not members of the clergy, moreover, likely would have believed that they were carrying out their duties as righteous Christians. It
would be a mistake, therefore, to assume that Christian responses to the disability problem suddenly disappeared during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nor did these new models extirpate negative stereotypes associated with efforts to provide assistance to the disabled that permeated both classical and traditional, Christian solutions to the disability problem. Indeed, new efforts to provide aid to the disabled often stigmatized disability in the same manner that Greco-Roman and Christian charity had stigmatized it; by constantly proclaiming, however rightly, that large numbers of disabled people needed help in order to thrive, and sometimes even to survive, in an able-bodied world that was often hostile to them, the discourse accompanying those new efforts often reinforced the idea that disabled people were inferior to their able-bodied counterparts.

**Congenital Deformity: The Mechanical World View, the Problem of Theodicy, and the Challenge from Radical Philosophers**

The second major turning point in the development of ideas about nature arose, according to Collingwood, between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as an antithesis to the earlier Greek view. “The central point of this antithesis,” Collingwood argues, “was the denial that the world of nature, the world studied by physical science, is an organism, and the assertion that it is devoid both of intelligence and life. It is therefore incapable of ordering its own movements in a rational manner, and indeed incapable of moving itself at all.” The movements observed in nature, then, “are imposed upon it from without, and their regularity is due to ‘laws of nature’ likewise imposed from without.” Accordingly, the natural world is not an organism but a machine, “a machine in the literal and proper sense of the word, an arrangement of bodily parts designed and put together and set going for a definite purpose by an intelligent mind outside itself.”

The thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thus agreed with the general
Greek view that the order of nature was “an expression of intelligence,” although they rejected the Greek idea that this intelligence was “nature’s own intelligence,” arguing instead that it was the intelligence of “the divine creator and ruler of nature.” According to Collingwood, the development of what he calls the Renaissance view of nature in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rested upon two assumptions. First, “it is based on the Christian idea of a creative and omnipotent God.” Second, “it is based on the human experience of designing and constructing machines.” Indeed, “[e]veryone understood the nature of a machine, and the experience of making and using such things had become part of the general consciousness of European man. It was an easy step to the proposition: as a clockmaker or millwright is to a clock or mill, so is God to Nature.”

Although the mechanistic view of nature, as Collingwood notes, began with Copernicus, Telesio, and Bruno in the sixteenth century, it was during the seventeenth century that congenital deformity would become an important topic of philosophical debate. The previous chapter noted Bacon’s recognition in 1620 that natural philosophers could glean important information about nature from studying monstrosities. Three developments over the course of the next 150 years would demonstrate Bacon’s perspicacity, as inquiries into congenital deformity would provide new insights into the nature of things. First, René Descartes’ inquiry into what a man born blind “sees” to understand the sense of sight and light would have a profound impact on how subsequent philosophers, most notably Diderot, used congenital deformity to explore the natural world. Second, a number of thinkers influenced by the emerging mechanical world view looked to congenital deformity when exploring the problem of theodicy, *i.e.*, why God permits evil to exist if He is both perfectly good and omnipotent.
Third, radical philosophers during the eighteenth century built upon the ideas of Epicurus, Lucretius, Spinoza, and Hobbes to challenge the Christian and Deist understanding of nature and congenital deformity.

*The Mechanical View of Nature and “the Man Born Blind”*

It is well known that René Descartes, as Peter Dear has explained, argued that “the universe is composed of nothing but those things that mathematical magnitudes are suitable for describing, and that causal explanations for all observed phenomena can be provided from *mechanical* principles that fitted such a universe.”

Although Descartes’ “two-substance doctrine of mind and matter” enabled him to assert that “body is one substance and mind is another,” he maintained that each substance “works independently of the other according to its own laws,” even if God unifies them via the pineal gland.

The human body, then, was a divinely created machine like other phenomena of the natural world. This idea would have a profound impact on how subsequent thinkers would view congenital deformity.

It was not only Descartes’ understanding of the human body as a machine, however, that makes him such an important figure for the history of ideas about disability but also his recognition that it was possible to use examples of congenital deformity to test mechanical principles. It was a series of scientific advancements during the early seventeenth century that provided Descartes with the impetus to examine congenital deformity when looking at the natural world. The invention of the telescope and microscope around 1600, as Marjolein Degenaar has explained, raised a number of important questions about optics. Shortly thereafter, Johannes Kepler not only “demonstrated that the eye’s crystalline body is not light-sensitive, but a lens,” but also
“discovered that the images of objects formed on the retina by the way of the lens are reversed and flat, a revelation that confronted him (and scientists after him) with the question of why we see objects the right way up and at a distance.” For Descartes and his contemporaries, then, optics was a major issue of intellectual curiosity. When Descartes decided to explore systematically the complexities of optics, he astutely recognized that one of the best ways to understand the human machine is to examine how it operates when it has defective parts. Such inquires would flourish during the Enlightenment, Degenaar notes, as philosophers recognized that those “lacking one or other of the senses were . . . interesting from the point of view of theories of knowledge because it was thought that they could serve to demonstrate what types of knowledge we possess thanks to the various distinct senses.” Indeed, Enlightenment thinkers went so far as to conclude from their inquiries that “the blind, the deaf and the lame were also . . . curious creatures since—according to some—they were thought to possess not only another capacity for acquiring knowledge but also different beliefs, morals and aesthetics.”

At the beginning of his first discourse on optics, Descartes uses the example of people born blind to gain a better understanding of the sense of sight. Descartes’ method with respect to the blind was not entirely new. Cicero, after all, had proposed using both the blind and the deaf to determine whether divination was a real phenomenon or merely subterfuge, suggesting that one had only to find a blind or deaf person who could see or hear through actual powers of divination to answer once and for all whether divination was possible. The difference between Descartes and Cicero, of course, is that Descartes looked at blindness to explore natural phenomena while Cicero sought to use
blindness and deafness to test supernatural phenomena. In any event, when raising the issue of blindness in his first discourse on optics, Descartes points out that people born blind are so accustomed to perceiving objects with their hands and sticks that “one might almost say that they see with their hands, or that their stick is the organ of some sixth sense given to them in place of sight.”

He then argues that our eyes perceive light, through the medium of air, “in the same manner that the movement or resistance of the bodies that this blind man encounters is transmitted to this hand through the medium of his stick.” For Descartes, then, our perceptions of different colors are no different from the way in which the blind man notes differences between “trees, rocks, water and similar things through the medium of his stick. . . .” A comparison of the eye to the “sixth sense” of the blind was so fruitful for inquiries into how eyesight operates, Descartes believed, that it would finally answer the question of “the origin of the action that causes the sensation of a sight,” a question that had long puzzled philosophers.

“For, just as our blind man can sense the bodies which are around him,” Descartes argues, “not only through the action of these bodies when they move against his stick, but also through that of his hand, when they are only resisting it, so we must affirm that the objects of sight can be felt, not only by means of the action which, being in them, tends toward the eyes, but also by means of that which, being in the eyes, tends toward them.”

In 1688, William Molyneux, an Irish philosopher whose wife became blind during their first year of marriage, went beyond the Cartesian inquiry into blindness in attempting to determine whether a person born blind could possibly comprehend the sense of sight, a question that had puzzled a few notable intellectuals since at least the first century B.C.E. Cicero, for example, came close to providing one potential answer to
the question. In *De Divinatione*, for instance, Cicero notes that his friend Cratippus was accustomed to proclaiming that “if it is not possible for the function or task of sight to exist without the eyes, and although sometimes the eyes are not able to perform their usual function, a person who, even if only once, has used his eyes so as to see things as they really are can henceforth perceive the sense of sight as it really is.” Although Cicero does not indicate that either he or Cratippus ever expressly wondered whether a person born blind could understand what vision is, the implications of Cratippus’ argument are clear: a person born blind likely could not comprehend what it means to see. 

Molyneux, likely influenced by his wife’s blindness as well as his interest in optics, probed much more deeply into the issue, asking in a letter to John Locke whether a “Man Born Blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a Cube and a Sphere” would be able to distinguish those shapes if he could suddenly see. Both Locke and Molyneux, Locke explains in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, concluded that “the Blind Man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say, which was the Globe, which the Cube, whilst he only saw them; though he could unerringly name them by his touch. . . .” The problem has proven to be so captivating, Degenaar has observed, that “those who have attempted to solve it include not only such philosophers as Locke, Berkely, Reid, Leibniz, Voltaire, La Mettrie, Condillac and Diderot but also such psychologists as Johannes Müller, Hermann Helmholtz, and William James.”

*Congenital Deformity and the Problem of Theodicy*

Leibniz and Pope went beyond Descartes, Molyneux, and Locke, discussing congenital deformity not only as a means of exploring how the human body operates, but
also as a way of addressing the existence of evil in light of the emerging mechanistic understanding of the universe. The impetus for Leibniz’s and Pope’s observations about congenital deformity and the natural world was Remark D of Pierre Bayle’s article “Manicheans” in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, published in 1697. In that article, Bayle uses the Manichean belief in both a good and evil principle to examine the problem of theodicy. The problem itself was not the product of the new, mechanical understanding of the universe, but rather one that had perplexed Christians for well over a millennium. Lactantius, for example, had raised the question in chapter thirteen of *Wrath of God* but, as Voltaire noted in his *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, could offer only a weak response, arguing that although God had wished there to be evil, he had “given us wisdom with which to acquire the good.” For the skeptic Bayle, such explanations would not suffice. Indeed, Bayle concludes in “Manicheans” that “reason is too feeble” to reconcile God’s supreme goodness and omnipotence with the existence of both moral and physical evil. Revelation and faith alone, Bayle asserts, support the traditional, Christian understanding of the existence of evil.

In his *Theodicy*, Leibniz decided to prove Bayle wrong by demonstrating that it was possible not only to reconcile reason with faith but also “to place reason at the service of faith” in resolving the problem of theodicy. In that work, famously ridiculed later by Voltaire, Leibniz acknowledges that there is both moral and physical evil in the world, but contends that God had to create such evil to form a perfect world. Leibniz first asserts that God had a variety of worlds from which to choose: “for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally possible . . . the cause of the world must needs have had regard or reference to all these possible worlds in order to
fix upon one of them.” Leibniz next argues that God, in his supreme and infinite wisdom and goodness, “cannot but have chosen the best.” “For as a lesser evil is a kind of good,” Leibniz reasons, “even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a greater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better.” Accordingly, Leibniz posits that since God had an infinite number of worlds from which to choose, and the perfectly good God could not have chosen any world but the best, it follows that this is the best of all possible worlds.

Leibniz recognizes that congenital deformity could pose some problems for his optimistic understanding of physical evil, noting that the problem of physical evil “has difficulties in common with that of the origin of metaphysical evil, examples whereof are furnished by monstrosities and other apparent irregularities of the universe.” Yet as Daston and Park have explained, Leibniz believed that “monsters exemplified the pleasure nature took in variety akin to the pleasure cultivators of tulips and carnations took in unusual colors and shapes.” Indeed, Leibniz’s view of monstrosity resembles Augustine’s claim in De Diversis Quaestibibus that “[a]ll things would never have been, had all things been equal.” Leibniz, however, was a firm believer in mechanical order, contending that “one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities are part of order.” In perhaps the most important passage of the Theodicy to discuss congenital deformity, Leibniz proclaims that “it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better to admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate general rules, as Father Malebranche sometimes argues, but also that these very monstrosities are in the rules, and are in conformity with general acts of will, though we be not capable of discerning this conformity.” Malebranche, of course, was significantly deformed himself.
The challenge to the Christian resolution to the problem of theodicy that lurked beneath the surface of this claim, the challenge that Diderot would raise in his *Letter on the Blind*, was Leibniz’s inability to explain why, in creating a mechanical order, God concluded that it was necessary to create congenital deformity as part of the best of all possible worlds. Indeed, as Voltaire would later quip, such a system “undermines the Christian religion from its foundations, and explains nothing at all.” Augustine, by contrast, had avoided this problem in the *City of God* by contending that although human beings could not ascertain how congenital deformity operates in nature, it is relatively easy to understand at least one reason why God creates monsters. Because human beings sometimes needed portents to understand God’s will, Augustine believed, God had created congenital deformity, at least in part, in order to engage in symbolic communication with His intellectual and spiritual inferiors. Nevertheless, Leibniz apparently believed that his explanation of congenital deformity and other types of physical evil was sufficient. Indeed, Leibniz maintained that the existence of physical evil is “less troublesome to explain” than the existence of moral evil. Yet by the middle of the eighteenth century, as the works of Voltaire, Maupertuis, Diderot, La Mettrie, Hume, and d’Holbach would demonstrate, it was becoming increasingly obvious to some of Europe’s educated elite that congenital deformity did indeed pose serious problems for the Christian view of the natural world.

In the interim, however, Alexander Pope, the hunchbacked and crippled poet, expressed his own optimistic understanding of deformity and the natural world in his anonymous *Essay on Man*, which popularized many of Leibniz’s ideas. In that poem, Pope agrees with Leibniz that a supremely good God could choose only the best:
Of Systems possible, if 'tis confessed
That Wisdom infinite must form the best. 60

Pope further follows Leibniz in concluding that we must live in the best of all possible worlds because God would choose only the best:

All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony, not understood;
All partial evil, universal good.
And, spite of pride, in erring reason’s spite,
One truth is clear, “Whatever is, is right.” 61

Pope even compares deformity to different ranks in the great chain of being, arguing that God could not have produced the perfect, harmonious whole without creating such physical imperfections:

Is the great chain of being, that draws all to agree,
And drawn supports, upheld by God, or thee?
Presumptuous Man! the reason wouldst thou find,
Why form’d so weak, so little, and so blind?
First, if thou canst, the harder reason guess,
Why formed no weaker, blinder, and no less?
Ask of thy mother earth, why oaks are made
Taller or stronger than the weeds they shade?
Or ask of yonder argent fields above,
Why Jove’s Satellites are less than Jove? 62

Yet Pope’s severe deformities, likely resulting from tuberculosis of the bone, or Pott’s disease, which he contracted at age twelve, no doubt enabled him to understand even better than Leibniz the substantial challenge deformity posed for Leibniz’s optimism. 63

The problems that Leibniz had addressed in the abstract in his *Theodicy*, Pope had personally experienced throughout his life. Indeed, like all deformed people who ponder the problem of evil, Pope did not simply have to address why God must afflict some people with physical deformity as part of His divine plan, but rather why God had physically afflicted *him*. 
Pope’s views on theodicy, of course, may have had nothing to do with his deformities. Indeed, it is not simply unfair but also misleading to reduce every belief that Pope ever could have held to his deformities. Plenty of Pope’s able-bodied contemporaries, after all, agreed with the general contours of Leibniz’s view of theodicy. As prominent Pope scholars Maynard Mack and Helen Deutsch have noted, however, Pope’s deformities had such an impact on him that he routinely incorporated his experiences with deformity into his works. In the *First Epistle of the First Book of Horace, Imitated*, Pope expressly refers to his weakness, poor eyesight, and small stature:

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Weak tho’ I am of limb, and short of sight,
Far from a Lynx, and not a Giant quite,
I’ll do what MEAD and CHESELDEN advise,
To keep these limbs, and to preserve these eyes.
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Accordingly, when Pope referred to the “weak,” “little,” and “blind” when discussing the great chain of being in his *Essay on Man* in language that parallels his description of himself in the *First Epistle on the First Book of Horace, Imitated*, Pope was almost certainly drawing on his own experiences with deformity. When addressing disabled people later in the poem, moreover, he may likewise have drawn from his own experiences with deformity as he attempted to “vindicate the ways of God to man.”

Pope, for instance, contends that deformed people should not complain that God has unfairly afflicted them, but rather should submit willingly to His design:

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Cease then, nor order imperfection name:
Our proper bliss depends on what we blame.
Know thy own point: this kind, this due degree
Of blindness, weakness, Heav’n bestows on thee.
Submit. In this or any other sphere,
Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear.
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In the second epistle of his *Essay on Man*, Pope even encourages deformed people to rejoice at their role in God’s plan:

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Whate’er the passion—knowledge, fame, or pelf,
Not one will change his neighbor with himself.
The learn’d is happy nature to explore,
The fool is happy that he knows no more;
The rich is happy in the plenty giv’n,
The poor contents him with the care of heav’n.
See the blind beggar dance, the cripple sing,
The sot a hero, the lunatic a king—
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Pope, of course, is not suggesting, as the aesthetic Anthony did to the blind Didymus in the fourth century B.C.E., that physically deformed people should not feel anguish on account of their deformities. Pope himself suffered terribly because of his own deformities, famously proclaiming in his *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*:

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The Muse but served to ease some friend, not wife,
To help me through this long disease, my life.
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Pope, then, simply believed that physically deformed people should not turn that anguish into anger and resentment against God because, Pope believed, God does only what is necessary to produce the greatest good. The congenitally deformed, then, should understand that their deformities are simply part of God’s grand, benevolent design.

Voltaire, who considered himself one of Pope’s close friends, likewise pondered congenital deformity when attempting to resolve the problem of theodicy. Indeed, congenital deformity seems to have played an important role in his ultimate rejection of the optimism of Leibniz and Pope. Voltaire was not always a foe of optimism, at least with respect to its non-metaphysical aspects. In the twenty-fifth letter of the *Lettres philosophiques*, published the year after Pope’s *Essay on Man*, Voltaire even seemed to espouse a type of optimism. As Richard Brooks explains, he echoed Leibniz and Pope in
contending that “man is but a link in a great chain of being and that the wise man can lead a happy life within the limitations of his nature and function in the grand universe.”

He further believed that “some of the things that Pascal considered unjust and anomalous in man were actually necessary for the continuance and betterment of humanity.” In 1739, a year after Jean Pierre de Crousaz published his *Commentaire sur la traduction en vers de M. Abbé Du Resnel, de l’Essai de M. Pope sur l’homme*, which criticized Pope for suggesting that both physical and moral imperfections were part of one great system, one great chain of being, “so exactly link’d one to another, that no single part can be displaced without leaving the rest unsupported, and endangering the overthrow of the creation,” Voltaire continued to express views similar to Leibniz and Pope. In that year, after discussing Leibniz and Christian Wolff, Leibniz’s protégé, with Frederick the Great, Voltaire published a collected edition of his six *Discours en vers sur l’homme*, which emulates much of Pope’s *Essay on Man*:

> Let us be well content with destiny  
> As short-lived as we, as short-sited are we;  
> Not to search in vain what our master can be  
> What our world could be and ought to be  
> ....  
> Time long enough for all to profit  
> Who works and thinks to hear the limit  
> ....  
> And knowing that here below, pure bliss  
> Human nature never permits.  

Voltaire’s brush with optimism, however, was short-lived. In *Micromégas* (1752), for instance, Voltaire no longer sees Leibniz as “le grand Leibnitz” as he does in the *Discours en vers sur l’homme*, but rather satirizes portions of the *Theodicy*. Because of its skeptical pessimism and harsh treatment of Leibniz, Brooks has gone so far as to contend that *Micromégas* “may be considered as a preface to both the *Poème sur le*
“désastre de Lisbonne and Candide.” Indeed, by 1752, Voltaire had embarked upon a new intellectual period in his life, simply awaiting the proper catalyst to become a champion of pessimism. On November 1, 1755, Voltaire found his catalyst when an earthquake demolished much of Lisbon, perhaps the fourth largest city in Europe at the time. According to one estimate, only 3,000 of Lisbon’s 20,000 homes were still habitable. In addition, an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 people died in Portugal and North Africa.

Late in 1755, Voltaire expressed his growing pessimism by publishing his *Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne, ou examen de cet axiome: Tout est bien*. The first four lines offer a sharp challenge to philosophical optimism:

> Miserable mortals! O deplorable land!
> Of all the curses, dreadful assemblage!
> Of needless pains, eternal discussion . . .
> Mistaken philosophers, who cry, *all is well*—

Towards the end of the poem, moreover, Voltaire makes his rejection of Leibniz and Pope complete, proclaiming his allegiance to Bayle whom Voltaire now refers to as “grand”:

> I abandon Plato, I reject Epicurus;
> Bayle knows more than they in every respect; he I am going to consult:
> The scales by hand, Bayle teaches us to doubt;
> Quite wise, quite grand, to be pure without a system,
> He destroys the whole lot, and struggles with himself.

Voltaire’s assault on optimism, of course, was far from finished. Voltaire thought long and hard about the implications of the earthquake when preparing *Candide*, his *magnum opus* on optimism.

The Lisbon earthquake, however, was not the only type of misfortune that influenced Voltaire’s thinking during this dark period in his life. Indeed, Voltaire’s
correspondence demonstrates that congenital deformity also played an important role in his rejection of optimism. Only a few months after the Lisbon Earthquake, on February 18, 1756, Voltaire wrote a letter to Elie Bertrand, the head priest at the French church of Bern and frequent confidant of Voltaire during this period, using Pope’s hunchback as evidence against optimism. In the letter, Voltaire pretends to converse with the now-dead Pope, asking rhetorically, “But my poor Pope, my poor hunchback, whom I have known, whom I have loved, who told you that God was not able to form you without hunch! You mock the tale of the apple. It is still, speaking humanly, and always setting aside the sacred, it is still more reasonable than the optimism of Leibniz; it provides a reason why you are a hunchback, ill, and a little malicious.”

There was nothing particularly novel in Voltaire’s remarks about the Fall with respect to congenital deformity. Adherents to the Judeo-Christian tradition had long mused over the specific ways in which the Fall had infused human existence with suffering. Voltaire, moreover, was almost certainly familiar with Bayle’s commentary on Antoinette Bourignon, the seventeenth-century mystic with a facial deformity, who had proclaimed that the Fall had destroyed the perfect state of human nature and had given way not only to suffering and imperfections but also to at least one type of monstrosity: the monstrous division of humanity into two separate sexes. In “Adam,” a chapter from his *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, Bayle had reproduced some of the “strange” beliefs of Antoinette Bourignon, including the idea that Adam had exhibited the “‘principles of both sexes’” before the Fall. She criticized men for believing that “‘they were created as they are at present,’” when, in fact, “sin disfigured the work of God in them, and instead of men, who they should be, they have become monsters in nature,
divided into two imperfect sexes, unable to reproduce by themselves, as trees and plants reproduce. . . .’

When Voltaire mentioned Pope’s deformity vis-à-vis the Fall in the letter to Bertrand, then, he was almost certainly applying existing concepts about the Fall, suffering, and deformity to his hunchback friend.

In any event, Voltaire understood that Pope’s life represented a struggle between the notion of the Fall and Leibniz’s optimism. Pope’s enemies, after all, had responded to the irascible Pope’s wit not only by rejecting his arguments but, as Kierkegaard’s enemies would do just over a century later, by mocking his deformities. Unlike Kierkegaard’s attackers, however, Pope’s detractors, as we shall see, proclaimed that God had punished Pope with deformity for his moral shortcomings. As Voltaire recognized, then, Pope had personal reasons for embracing Leibniz’s optimism over more pessimistic understandings of the Fall and divine punishment. Whereas Pope was nothing but a cursed outcast under some interpretations of the Fall, the system of Leibniz made him a necessary component of the best of all possible worlds, one whose lot it was to suffer for the “universal good.” Pope found comfort in believing that there was some benevolent purpose to his deformities. For Voltaire, however, the comfort of Leibniz’s optimism was illusory because it was impossible to accept the notion that God had to afflict some people, including Pope, with deformities in order to create the best of all possible worlds. Upon proper reflection, in fact, Leibniz’s optimism would do more psychological harm than good as the afflicted realized that all was most certainly not for the best. As Voltaire proclaims in his letter to Bertrand immediately after discussing the relationship between Pope’s deformities and his popularization of Leibniz, “We need a God who speaks to mankind. Optimism is despair.”

85
Eighteenth-century radicals, including Maupertuis, Diderot, La Mettrie, d’Holbach, and Hume went far beyond Descartes, Bayle, Leibniz, Pope, and Voltaire in exploring the implications of the mechanical universe. The radicals agreed that congenital deformity presented scientists and philosophers with a means of better understanding nature but they were much more receptive to the ideas of Epicurus, Lucretius, Spinoza, and, especially for Hume, Hobbes. It is often difficult, however, to determine the extent to which those ideas influenced radical beliefs. Radicals had to be extremely careful when espousing materialist and atheistic ideas because doing so could have dire consequences, as the execution of Franciscus van den Eden, Spinoza’s Latin teacher, as well as the imprisonment of Diderot would demonstrate. Accordingly, even when radicals criticized Spinoza, they may have been attempting furtively to popularize his ideas. Maupertuis, for example, famously rebuked Diderot for criticizing Maupertuis’ ideas in his *Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature* (1753), suggesting that Diderot was, in fact, secretly advocating the dangerous ideas that he purported to condemn.  

Before responding to Diderot, Maupertuis quotes Diderot’s purported criticism verbatim: “‘It is here that we are surprised that the author has not perceived the terrible consequences of his hypothesis; or that, if he has perceived the consequences, that he did not abandon the hypothesis.’”  

Maupertuis, knowing full well that nearly every major thinker in France would have been aware that Diderot could never again publish his true thoughts after his infamous imprisonment, sardonically responds, “If one were not certain of the religion of the author, . . ., one might suspect that his design was not to destroy the hypothesis, but to delineate these consequences that he calls terrible.” Yet despite the reluctance of some
radicals to share their most dangerous ideas with a world that would have persecuted
them for those ideas, there is ample historical evidence that some of the most prominent
radicals of the eighteenth century explored congenital deformity not only to understand
the workings of the mechanical universe but also, as we shall see, to build upon the
materialist ideas of Epicurus, Lucretius, Spinoza, and Hobbes so as to construct proto-
evolutionary theories that challenged not only the dominant Christian world view but also
the world view of the Deists and their belief in design.

In Vénus Physique (The Earthly Venus) (1743), Maupertuis discusses congenital
deformity at great length in addressing the reproductive processes of animals, including
human beings. In some ways, he follows the lead of Louis Lemery and Jacques-Bénigne
Winslow, who engaged in a series of debates in the Mémoires de l’Académie des
Sciences concerning the cause of monsters. Maupertuis, however, was not so interested
in the causes of congenital deformity, particularly Lemery’s and Winslow’s theological
arguments, but rather what the study of monsters could reveal about reproduction. In
particular, he uses examples of monstrosity in Vénus Physique to argue against
performationist ovism and animalculism, the two prevailing theories of Maupertuis’ day,
arguing instead that both females and males contribute parts to the fetus. According to
Maupertuis, fluids from each parent, combining far more particles than are necessary for
reproduction, mix together to form the fetus. For Maupertuis, monsters by default,
congenitally deformed people who lacked a particular body part, and monsters by excess,
congenitally deformed people who had a superfluous body part, two types of monsters
that Isidore of Seville had likewise recognized, were the result of a combination of either
too few or too many particles.
Maupertuis likewise explores monstrosity in advancing a proto-evolutionary theory. Maupertuis begins his argument by pointing out that new species can arise either through chance or art. According to Maupertuis, new breeds of dogs, pigeons, and canaries begin as individual freaks or monstrosities. People skilled at perpetuating these anomalies can use their art to perpetuate these anomalies for several generations, thus creating a new species. He next argues that the same principles apply to human beings, pointing out that nature, by chance, produces “the cross-eyed, the lame, the gouty, and the tubercular.” Maupertuis, however, in language that not only echoes Empedocles and Lucretius but also comes close to the theories of evolutionary psychologists today, suggests that the tendency of human beings to consider congenital deformities unattractive creates a barrier to the proliferation of such deformed people. Indeed, Maupertuis proclaims that “wise nature, because of the disgust she has inspired for those defects, has not desired that they be continued. Consequently beauty is more apt to be hereditary. The slim waist and the leg that we admire are the achievements of many generations which have applied themselves to form them.”

Diderot addressed congenital deformity, both blindness and deafness and dumbness, not only to explore how vision and hearing contribute to language and knowledge but also to espouse materialistic and proto-evolutionary ideas. In his *Essai sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient* (Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who See) (1749), Diderot follows the lead of Descartes, Molyneux, and Locke in exploring the relationship between sight and knowledge. Yet by the time Diderot addressed Molyneux’s problem in 1749, he had to address a major development that seemed to have already answered it. In 1728, the English surgeon William Cheselden shocked the West...
when he published an account in the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Society, which explained how he had surgically repaired a thirteen-year-old boy’s cataracts that had made him essentially blind either from birth or an early age. Diderot, then, had to take into account Cheselden’s surgery when attempting to answer Molyneux’s problem.

In 1746, just three years before Diderot published his *Letter on the Blind*, Étienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac, who for a time formed an intellectual and fraternal triumvirate with Diderot and Rousseau, felt it necessary to address Cheselden’s surgery when expressing his disagreement with Molyneux and Locke. In his *Letter on the Origin of Human Knowledge* (1746), Condillac argues that “this blind man has formed some ideas of depth, size, etc. in reflecting on the sensations he experiences when he touches some bodies.” If the man born blind were suddenly to gain the power of his sight, however, he could not immediately enjoy the spectacle of “the admirable mixture of light and color.” Indeed, “through reflection alone” he is able to enjoy this “treasure.” As he reflects on what he sees, Condillac contends, the “man born blind will distinguish the globe from the cube by sight since he will recognize the same ideas that he made for himself by touch.” Condillac does acknowledge, however, that his hypothesis seems untenable in light of Voltaire’s account of Cheselden’s cataract surgery and ensuing observations of the struggles that his patient experienced in attempting to make sense of the images that he was able to see for the first time. To salvage his hypothesis, Condillac adopts an approach similar to La Mettrie in his *Natural History of the Soul* (1745), arguing, first, that the patient’s eyes were likely too weak at first to make out images well enough to reflect upon them and, second, that those who observed the patient were so intent on proving the veracity of Molyneux’s and Locke’s original answer
to Molyneux’s problem that they did not even think of other potential reasons for the patient’s initial struggles. Condillac did substantially revise his views in his *Treatise on the Sensations* (1754), but not before his friend Diderot published his own influential *Letter on the Blind*.

Diderot astutely recognized that if he were to add anything meaningful to the debate over Molyneux’s problem, he would need to discuss the concepts of blindness, sight, and knowledge with an intelligent and educated blind person. Indeed, before offering his own answer to Molyneux’s problem in his *Letter on the Blind*, Diderot explains in great detail how his face-to-face interactions with “the Puisaux man who was born blind” had provided him with important insights into the relationship between vision and knowledge. Diderot introduces his readers to the blind man of Puisaux in language that closely parallels Descartes, explaining that the “blind man’s only knowledge of objects is by touch. He knows by hearing other men say so that they know objects by sight as he knows them by touch; at any rate that is the only idea he can form of the process.” As Diderot continues, however, it becomes clear that his friendship with the unnamed but brilliant blind man has indeed provided him with an understanding of blindness that will enable him to go well beyond not only Descartes but also Molyneux, Locke, and Condillac. The blind man, Diderot explains, “knows that we cannot see our own face though we can touch it. Sight, he therefore concludes, is a kind of touch which extends to distant objects and is not applied to our face. Touch gives him an idea only in relief.” The blind man thus describes mirrors as instruments that place “things in relief at a distance from themselves, when properly placed with regard to it. It is like my hand,
which, to feel an object, I must not put on one side of it.”

“Had Descartes been born blind,” Diderot jokes, “he might, I think, have hugged himself for such a definition.”

When Diderot finally proffers an answer to Molyneux’s problem, it becomes evident how much Diderot has learned from his blind friend. Diderot agrees with Condillac that Cheselden’s cataract operations and subsequent observations had not proven anything because a patient’s eyes would necessarily require some time to adjust in order to function properly after such a surgery. Any experiment designed to solve Molyneux’s problem, then, would need to allocate sufficient time for the connection between the eyes and brain to work properly. Yet even if an experiment took such precautions, it would be of little use if it observed only one blind test subject. Indeed, Diderot astutely recognizes, perhaps through his interactions with his blind friend, that blind people, like sighted people, have different intellectual capabilities that would impact their ability to distinguish objects by touch and by sight. Accordingly, the answer to Molyneux’s problem should not address what would happen to the man born blind if he could suddenly see but rather what would happen to a variety of different congenitally blind people if they were to gain the ability to see.

Diderot examines four different classes of blind people in search of an adequate answer to Molyneux’s problem. If surgeons were to perform cataract operations on the first class of blind people, “dullards without education and knowledge,” images would soon form clearly in their eyes. These patients, however, “being unaccustomed to any kind of reasoning and not knowing anything of sensation or idea, would be unable to compare the sensations they had received by touch with those they now receive by sight.” The second class of blind people, a group that apparently exhibits more intelligence
and education than the class of dullards, “by comparing the forms they see with the bodies that had previously made an impression upon their hands, and mentally applying touch to distant objects, would describe one body as a square, and another as a circle without well knowing why, their comparison of the ideas they have acquired by sight not being sufficiently distinct in their minds to convince their judgment.” The third class of subject, the metaphysician, would be able to “reason as if he had seen these bodies all his life; and after comparing the ideas acquired by sight with those acquired by touch he would declare as confidently as you or I: ‘I am very much inclined to think that this is the body which I have always called a circle, and that again what I named a square, but will not assert it to be really so.’” Indeed, the blind metaphysician would be more concerned with metaphysical questions with respect to tactile “being” versus optical “being.” The final class of test subject, a blind geometrician with the abilities of Cicero’s friend Diodotus or Nicholas Saunderson, the blind mathematician elected to Sir Isaac Newton’s famous Lucasian Chair of Mathematics at Cambridge in 1711 and author of the *Elements of Algebra*, would be able to discern by sight the same geometric properties that he had learned by touch. According to Diderot, the blind geometrician would explain his confidence in distinguishing a square from a circle as follows:

> Those to whom I demonstrated the properties of the circle and the square had not their hands on my abacus, and did not touch the threads which I had stretched to outline my figures, and yet they understood me; they therefore did not see a square when I felt a circle, otherwise we should have been at cross-purposes; I should have been outlining one figure and demonstrating the properties of another . . . but as they all understood me, all men see alike: what they saw as a square, I see as a square; what they saw as a circle, I see as a circle. So this is what I have always called a square and that is what I have always called a circle.

Diderot bolsters his argument by pointing to Saunderson’s prodigious intellect, concluding that “[i]t is certain . . . that Saunderson would have been assured of his not
being mistaken in the judgment he had just given of the circle and the square, and that there are cases when the reasoning and experience of others are of value in elucidating the relation of sight to touch, and in teaching what a thing is to the eye, it is likewise to the touch.”

If Diderot had limited his discussion of blindness to his interactions with the blind man of Puisaux and Molyneux’s problem, then his letter would have been merely another contribution, albeit an important one, to the long-standing discourse regarding blindness that Descartes had initiated. Diderot’s radical, Epicurean and Spinozist proclivities, however, would not permit him to broach the subject of blindness without exploring how it validated his materialist, proto-evolutionary ideas. Indeed, Diderot uses the example of Saunderson in the *Letter on the Blind* to launch an assault not only on religion but on the idea of design. It does seem, at first glance, as if Diderot has introduced Saunderson to delineate further his ideas regarding blindness and knowledge. Diderot, for example, explains how the historical Saunderson was so mathematically gifted that he could lecture on the properties of light, color, and optics to sighted people at the University of Cambridge. Diderot also uses Saunderson to argue that a blind person’s sense of touch can be superior to the sense of sight in some cases, pointing out that Saunderson once detected counterfeit coins that had fooled a sighted connoisseur.

This is not to say, of course, that Diderot’s preliminary discussion lacks the genius that characterizes other parts of the *Letter on the Blind*. In defending the efficacy of the sense of touch, Diderot’s keen intellect is on full display as he comes close to identifying what modern disability scholars such as Lennard Davis view as a distinct relationship between disability and the socially constructed world in which we live.
Indeed, Diderot surmises that a culture comprised wholly of blind people “might have sculptors and put statues to the same use as among us to perpetuate the memory of great deeds, and of great persons dear to them: and in my opinion feeling such statues would give them a keener pleasure than we have in seeing them.” Diderot thus recognizes something ignored by the old axiom that the blear-eyed man would become king in the land of the blind. What the thinking behind the axiom fails to realize is that blind people themselves would have built the kingdom of the blind to meet the needs of the blind, thereby removing many obstacles that blind people encounter vis-à-vis the sighted. Such a kingdom, for example, would teach people to read through characters in relief rather than by sight. The blear-eyed man, then, would have to learn to read in relief if he wanted to read at all. The blind inhabitants of the kingdom, moreover, never would have needed to invent ways of producing artificial light inside of buildings. The blear-eyed man would thus find little benefit to his eyesight when meeting with his blind counterparts indoors because those blind people, merely by socially constructing a society for their own kind, would have shrouded the interiors of their buildings in darkness. The blear-eyed man might ultimately become king in the land of the blind, of course, but a land socially constructed for the blind would not make the task as easy as many sighted people assume.

Diderot, however, suddenly transforms his Cartesian discussion of blindness and epistemology into a materialistic and proto-evolutionary polemic by introducing a fictitious dialogue between a dying Saunderson and a minister named Gervase Holmes, which Diderot represents as an actual conversation that he has translated from English into French. The conversation occurs when Holmes comes to Saunderson’s deathbed, where the two begin to debate the existence of God. Saunderson confounds Holmes by
suggesting that the supposed marvels of the universe are simply chimeras that provide sighted people with a false sense of hope in design, pointing out that such marvels prove nothing to the blind. When Holmes attempts to prove the existence of God by pointing to the “marvels of nature,” Saunderson retorts, “Ah, sir . . . don’t talk to me of this magnificent spectacle, which it has never been my lot to enjoy. I have been condemned to spend my life in darkness, and you cite wonders quite outside of my understanding, and which are only evidence for you and for those who see as you do. If you want to make me believe in God you must make me touch Him.”  

Realizing that his arguments are not persuading Saunderson, Holmes appeals to the authority of great thinkers, pointing out that Newton, Leibniz, and Samuel Clarke believed in both design and God. Yet just as Cicero rejects his brother Quintus’ reliance on Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater to prove both the existence of gods and divination in De Divinatione, Saunderson remains unmoved. Instead of embracing the possibility that there might be a God, Saunderson proposes a counter theory of the origin of the universe—the perspective of a blind materialist. Diderot’s Saunderson, reflecting the impact of Lucretius and Spinoza on Diderot’s thought, rejects design in favor of a type of transformism, a proto-evolutionary theory, which, as Arthur O. Lovejoy pointed out in 1909, predated Darwin by a considerable degree. Matter, Saunderson contends, evolved from chaos to shapeless beings to the higher beings that exist today through a mysterious type of generation in which some beings were able to perpetuate themselves while others, which we call monstrosities, were not. “I may ask you,” Saunderson begins, “who told you that in the first instances of the formation of animals some were not headless and others footless? I might affirm that such an one had no stomach, another
no intestines, that some which seemed to deserve a long duration from their possession of
a stomach, palate, and teeth, came to an end owing to some defect in the heart or
lungs."  
Over the millennia, the monstrosities tended to disappear, as the only beings
able to survive were those “whose mechanism was not defective in any important
particular and who were able to support and perpetuate themselves.”

Directing this proto-evolutionary process was not some divine intellect or rational design but simply
chance. Diderot’s Saunderson, in fact, argues that humans, along with many now-extinct
monstrosities, would have disappeared long ago if “the first man” had had “his larynx
closed, or had lacked suitable food, or had been defective in the organs of generation, or
had failed to find a mate, or had propagated in another species. . . .”

Indeed, what we
call human beings “would have remained perhaps for ever hidden among the number of
mere possibilities.” For Saunderson, then, the apparent order of the universe is an
illusion, which is incompatible with the existence of congenital deformity. “If shapeless
creatures had never existed,” Saunderson proclaims, “you would not fail to assert that
none will ever appear, and that I am throwing myself headlong into chimerical fancies,
but the order is not even now so perfect as to exclude the occasional appearance of
monstrosities.”

Once Diderot’s Saunderson explains his view that human beings came into
existence through chance rather than divine providence or rational design, he concludes
his scathing rebuttal to Holmes by espousing the reflections of a blind materialist on the
question of theodicy. Immediately after explaining his theory regarding transformism,
Saunderson, for dramatic effect, turns to face Holmes and says, “Look at me, Mr.
Holmes, I have no eyes. What have we done, you and I, to God, that one of us has this
organ while the other has not?” The people in the room, when confronted with the “marvels” of God from the perspective of a blind man, begin to understand his painful perspective on the purported order of the universe. “Saunderson uttered these words in such a sincere and heartfelt tone,” Diderot claims, “that the clergyman and the rest of the company could not remain insensible to his suffering, and began to weep bitterly.” The French authorities, of course, unlike Holmes and the imaginary group assembled at Saunderson’s deathbed, found no redeeming qualities to Diderot’s tale, and Diderot found himself imprisoned because of the impious nature of the Letter on the Blind.

In his Letter on the Deaf and Dumb for the Use of Those Who Hear and Speak (1751), the now-free Diderot returned to his inquiries into the relationship between sensory disabilities and epistemology, examining people born deaf and mute to test his theories regarding the construction of language. The central figure in the Letter on the Deaf and Dumb is Diderot’s intelligent, deaf-mute friend who, according to Diderot, was able to communicate through “expressive gestures.” Diderot uses the example of his friend, the deaf-mute equivalent to the blind man of Puisaux in the Letter on the Blind, to examine the deaf-mute perspective on both language and the hearing world that often excludes the deaf and dumb.

At points in the Essai sur les sourds et muets à l’usage de ceux qui entendent et qui parlent (Letter on the Deaf and Dumb for the Use of Those Who Hear and Speak), which Diderot calls an “imitation” of the Letter on the Blind, Diderot approaches the brilliance of his prior letter in three ways. First, whereas the blind man of Puisaux had once explained to Diderot the fascinating blind perspective on mirrors, Diderot notes that his deaf-mute friend exhibited similarly interesting reactions to a machine that, according
to its inventor, could perform sonatas by representing them visually in color. According to Diderot, his deaf-mute friend thought that the machine’s inventor was also deaf and dumb and that the colors represented letters of the alphabet. He further believed that musical instruments must be a means of conveying words to the hearing because he had seen instruments have the same effect on people as words. Upon seeing the sonata machine, then, the deaf man believed that he could finally understand what music was and why it had an emotional impact on people. Second, Diderot understands that deaf-mutes must experience difficulties in attempting to understand spoken language, arguing that it is nearly impossible to describe to a person born deaf-mute “indefinite portions of quantity, number, space, or time, or to make him grasp any abstract idea. One can never be sure that he realises the difference in tense between I made, I have made, I was making, and I should have made.” Third, Diderot recognizes that deaf-mute perspectives on language may provide insights into not only how early humans originally constructed language but also why inversions have “crept into language.” Diderot, however, wisely avoids any temptation to add to the intellectual gravitas of the Letter on the Deaf and Dumb by expanding on the radical ideas expressed in the Letter on the Blind. If Diderot had created a deaf-mute equivalent to Saunderson to challenge further both the Christian and Deist world views, after all, there is no telling how the French authorities would have reacted or what would have become of Diderot’s and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, which began to appear in 1751, the same year that Diderot published the Letter on the Deaf and Dumb.

La Mettrie, a contemporary of Diderot’s and a fellow materialist, likewise believed that natural philosophers could begin to unlock the secrets of nature by inquiring
into various aspects of congenital deformity. In the final chapter of *Histoire naturelle de l’ame* (Natural History of the Soul) (1745), for example, La Mettrie uses examples of congenital deformity to support his argument that ideas come from the senses. His account of Cheselden’s cataract surgery and ruminations on Molyneux’s problem, as we have seen, are similar to Condillac’s later discussion of the topic in his *Letter on the Origin of Human Knowledge* (1746). La Mettrie, realizing that other types of disabilities could offer additional insights into the relationship between the senses and knowledge, also discusses, as he would do later in *L’Homme machine* (Man a Machine) (1748), an excerpt from Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle’s *Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences*, which describes the curious case of a boy born deaf and dumb from Chartres who, after living many years as a deaf-mute, “‘suddenly began to speak to the great astonishment of everyone in the town.’”145 According to Fontenelle, the former deaf-mute understood so little of the world around him that he led a “‘purely animalistic life, completely occupied by objects both sensible and present, and the few ideas that he had received from his eyes.’”146 Fontenelle did recognize, however, that it was not his disability that had left the former deaf-mute in an animalistic state but rather his social isolation. Indeed, Fontenelle concluded that “‘[t]his was not the mental state with which he was naturally born, but rather the mind of a man deprived of interaction with others . . . ’”147 La Mettrie cites Fontenelle’s account to support his notion that ideas come from the senses, arguing that the former deaf-mute “had only those ideas that he received from the eyes; for it follows that if he had been blind, he would have been without ideas.”148

In 1750, just a short time after Diderot published his *Letter on the Blind*, La Mettrie published his *Système d’Épicure*, which followed Lucretius and Diderot in
exploring the existence of congenital deformity in an attempt to understand matter, motion, and chance. In that work, La Mettrie surmises that “the first generations” of living organisms “must have been extremely imperfect. Here, the esophagus would have been missing; there, the stomach, the vulva, the intestines etc. It is evident that the only animals that would have been able to live, to survive, and to perpetuate their species would have been those who were . . . provided with all of the parts necessary for generation. . . .” Meanwhile, “those who had been deprived of some part of an absolute necessity died, either shortly after birth or at least without reproducing.” La Mettrie illustrates how such a deformity would prevent reproduction according to the Epicurean system by discussing the plight of a congenitally deformed woman who lacked all of her female organs. The unfortunate woman who, according to Mary Efrosini Gregory, was “just as tragic as Diderot’s Saunderson,” held out hope that doctors could help her. According to La Mettrie, however, doctors had to abandon their plan to create a vulva for her. In the end, the deformity that had already deprived her of the ability to procreate resulted in the annulment of her marriage of ten years.

David Hume was not as interested in exploring what the existence of congenital deformity could reveal about the natural world as Maupertuis, Diderot, and La Mettrie, but he did use monstrosity to attack religious modes of thought. In the first section of his *Natural History of Religion* (1757), Hume criticizes superstitious interpretations of monstrous births. “A monstrous birth,” Hume points out, “excites [a person’s] curiosity, and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty; and immediately sets him a trembling, and sacrificing, and praying.” Yet “an animal compleat in all its limbs and organs, is to him an ordinary spectacle, and produces no religious opinion or
affection.” For Hume, fear and trembling in the face of monstrous births, like all superstitious anxieties with respect to the body, arise from the inability of the “ignorant multitude” to understand “unknown causes,” which result in the human condition of “perpetual suspense betwixt life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want.” If the multitude, however, could “anatomize nature, according to the most probable, at least the most intelligible philosophy, they would find, that these causes are nothing but the particular fabric and structure of the minute parts of their own bodies and of external objects; and that, by a regular and constant machinery, all the events are produced, about which so many are concerned.”

In 1770, Paul Henri Thiry, baron d’Holbach anonymously published his Système de la nature, ou Des loix du monde physique et du monde moral, a radical work that not only proffered a mechanistic understanding of nature steeped in materialism but also defended atheism. As one might expect from a radical materialist, D’Holbach begins his work by castigating the superstitious for failing to realize that “nature, devoid of both kindness and malice, follows only necessary and immutable laws in producing and destroying various beings. . . .” Among the most important of these laws for D’Holbach was the notion that “[t]he universe, that vast collection of all that exists, offers us only matter and motion. . . .” Because D’Holbach, along with other materialists, rejected the idea that intelligence or design governed matter in motion, he attributes congenital deformity to various combinations of matter in accordance with nature’s necessary and immutable laws. “There can be neither monsters nor prodigies, neither marvels nor miracles, in nature,” D’Holbach asserts. “Those that we call monsters are combinations with which our eyes are not at all familiarized, but which are not any less
the necessary effects [of natural causes]. Those that we name prodigies, marvels, and supernatural effects are natural phenomena of which, because of our ignorance, we understand neither their principles nor their way of working. . . .”

D’Holbach, never one to hold back his attacks on superstition, further contends that human beings have not allowed their ignorance to get in the way of attempting to find some deeper meaning behind such natural phenomena. Lacking any knowledge about the “true causes” of natural phenomena, D’Holbach proclaims, “we foolishly attributed them to fictitious causes, which, along with the idea of order, exist only in ourselves [i.e., in our own minds].”

The Persistence of Religious and Superstitious Beliefs about Congenital Deformity

When looking at what philosophers from Descartes to D’Holbach wrote about congenital deformity, it is sometimes tempting, as Daston and Park have noted, to discern an incremental triumph of reason and science over superstition in the West beginning in the seventeenth century and continuing during the Enlightenment. There is a tendency to view the mechanistic world view of Descartes, Pope, Leibniz, and Voltaire as merely the first step in laying the groundwork for the eventual triumph of the modern scientific world view. The materialistic ideas of eighteenth-century radicals, according to such an interpretation of disability history, would constitute yet another important step in the inevitable triumph of modern science because nineteenth- and twentieth-century science seemingly validated so many of the radicals’ claims about matter, motion, and chance. The vast majority of people during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, would have perceived no such triumph of materialism over either the traditional,
Christian world view or the Deist world view, the latter of which served as a sort of middle position between Christianity and materialism.

Even the radicals, who wanted more than anyone for the Enlightenment to spread throughout the West, recognized that it was impossible to eradicate superstitious ideas from the masses. In his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, for instance, Hume observes that “civilized people” are less likely than “ignorant and barbarous” people to believe in prodigies and other supernatural explanations of the natural world because “as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvelous. . . .”162 He points out, however, that although the inclination to believe in such superstition “may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.”163 Even today, the persistence of superstitious beliefs about the causes of congenital deformity, despite the clear connection between genetics and congenital deformity, demonstrates that Hume’s claim has considerable merit even for the modern world.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the modern scientific world view scarcely seemed imaginable, superstitious beliefs were almost certainly more prevalent. Indeed, most ordinary people during this period were almost certainly unaware of the philosophical debates about matter, motion, chance, and design, and many of them no doubt continued to believe in various prodigies, including portentous monsters. After a comet appeared on November 14, 1680, and then again on December 24 of the same year, widespread panic famously gripped Europe. It was not only the common people who were terrified, but also members of the educated elite. Thomas Bartholini, for
example, a Danish doctor who died in early December, 1680, held that comets caused congenital deformity, a notion that Maupertuis later declared shameful to find in the mind of a learned doctor. Bayle, perplexed by the extent of the panic, wrote his famous *Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet* as a response. In that work, Bayle criticizes not only superstitious beliefs regarding comets but also irrational fears that congenital deformity could be a portent of some impending disaster. In arguing that no one should be distressed when the wicked prosper, for example, Bayle alludes to the still extant “superstitious man,” who, “judging falsely that a monster presages something fatal, proceeds from his error to a criminal sacrifice.”

In his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, published in 1690, John Locke, as Lund has recently explained, likewise suggested that some of his contemporaries continued to kill monstrous births because of their imperfect shape, albeit he was quick to point out that to do so would likely constitute murder because it is impossible to tell if a monstrous birth has a rational soul shortly after birth. It is impossible to know for certain if the superstitious masses of this period killed their congenitally deformed infants as did the superstitious masses of earlier epochs. All that is certain is that Europe’s educated elite perceived that such superstition continued to result in infanticide among the unenlightened segments of the European population.

Even if there were no triumph of materialism over Christianity and Deism with respect to congenital deformity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a consensus about congenital deformity and the natural world was beginning to emerge among both moderate and radical philosophers. Radicals such as Maupertuis, Diderot, La Mettrie, Hume, and D’Holbach agreed with moderates such as Descartes, Leibniz, Pope,
and Voltaire that the natural world was governed by mechanistic laws and that the study of congenital deformity could play an important role in uncovering the secrets of those laws. Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, for instance, recognized that he could test some of his theories by pondering some aspects of congenital deformity. When Buffon returned to the idea of the fixity of species in his article “De la dégénération des animaux” in 1766, he acknowledged that at least some monstrosities were naturally recurring phenomena caused by certain peculiarities of the natural world. According to Buffon, the “mule, which is always regarded as a contaminated production, as a monster composed of two natures, and which, for this reason, is judged incapable of reproducing itself or of producing descendants . . . is not really infertile, and its sterility depends only on certain external and peculiar circumstances.”¹⁶⁸ This is obviously a far cry from the radical ideas of Maupertuis, Diderot, La Mettrie, Hume, and D’Holbach, but Buffon’s observations portended that even mainstream philosophers and scientists would continue to ponder what secrets of nature lurked behind the existence of congenital deformity.

This does not mean, however, that the new ideas about congenital deformity that began to emerge during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries marked a complete rejection of earlier ideas about deformity. Instead, people with congenital deformities continued to endure the same types of stigma and discrimination as their classical, medieval, Renaissance, and Reformation counterparts. We have little evidence about how the “superstitious” masses treated people with congenital deformities other than anecdotal or overly generalized accounts of congenital deformity and infanticide, written by members of the educated elite about the masses that they abhorred. Bayle, for example, says a great deal in Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet about the
“superstitious man” who kills congenitally deformed infants, but we hear nothing from the superstitious man himself about his own beliefs.  

There is ample evidence, however, of the tendency even among the educated elite of this period to play on traditional fears and animosities about deformity to inflict emotional pain on deformed adversaries. Pope’s enemies, for instance, repeatedly suggested that his deformities were the result of divine wrath. In 1716, John Dennis launched a brutal attack on Pope in *A True Character of Mr. Pope* in the *Flying Post*. In that work, Dennis claims that Pope was “one, whom God and Nature have mark’d for want of Common Honesty, and his own Contemptible Rhimes for want of Common Sense.” Elsewhere in *The True Character*, Dennis is even more explicit in connecting Pope to the Judeo-Christian notion that impairment is a curse or divine punishment: “‘Tis the mark of God and Nature upon him, as a Creature not of our Original, nor our Species. And they who have refus’d to take this Warning which God and Nature have given them, and have in spight of it, by a senseless presumption, ventur’d to be familiar with him, have severely suffered for it, by his Perfidiousness.” Dennis goes on to say that while he had heard rumors that Pope had claimed that human beings are the descendants neither of Adam nor the Devil, “‘tis certain at least, that his Original is not from *Adam*, but from the *Devil* By his constant and malicious Lying, and by that Angel Face and Form of his, ‘tis plain that he wants nothing but Horns and Tail, to be the exact Resemblance, both in Shape and Mind, of his Infernal Father.” In 1733, Pope’s former intimate friend, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, along with Lord John Hervey, published *Verses Address’d to the Imitator of the First Satire of the Second Book of Horace. By a Lady*, a scathing rebuttal against Pope for his own vicious attacks against her in his *First satire on the second book*
of Horace, Imitated. Lady Mary follows Dennis’ lead in attributing Pope’s deformities to God, proclaiming,

   It was the Equity of righteous Heav’n,
   That such a Soul to such a Form was giv’n;
   And shews the Uniformity of Fate,
   That one so odious, shou’d be born to hate.
   When God created Thee, one would believe,
   He said the same as to the Snake to Eve;
   To human Race Antipathy declare,
   ’Twixt them and Thee be everlasting War. 174

Lady Mary concludes by comparing Pope’s hunchback to the mark of Cain:

   But as thou hate’st, be hated by Mankind,
   And with the Emblem of thy crooked Mind,
   Mark’d on thy back, like Cain, by God’s own hand;
   Wander like him, accursed through the Land. 175

Stigma and Discrimination Associated with Categories of Disabled People

Not all abuse directed at disabled people during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of course, relied on superstitious connections between deformity and God but rather on categories used to group disabled people together. As Mack has observed, “by the time [Pope] began to be known as a successful poet he was already established in his own mind and in the minds of others as a dwarf and a cripple.”176 Pope’s enemies callously utilized these categories to ridicule Pope. In 1729, the anonymous Pope Alexander’s Supremacy and Infallibility Examin’d; and the Errors and Infallibility examin’d; And the Errors of Scriblerus and his Man William Detected. With the Effigies of his Holiness and his Prime Minister contained a poem, the “Martiniad,” which compares Pope to a weak and harmless insect:

   Meagre and wan, and Steeple-crown’d,
   His Visage long, and Shoulders round.
   His crippled Corps, two Spindle Pegs
   Support, instead of Human Legs;
His Shrivel’d Skin, dusky Grain,
A Cricket’s Voice, and Monkey’s Brain.177

The authors make it clear in footnotes that they have compared the weak and little Pope to a cricket because “[t]his is an Animal famous for the Smallness of his Voice and Legs.”178 Another of Pope’s enemies, as Mack has noted, once called him “a little Aesopic sort of animal in his own cropt Hair, and Dress agreeable to the Forest he came from.”179 John Dennis, Pope’s nemesis, repeatedly used the word “little” to mock Pope. In his True Character of Mr. Pope, he calls Pope a “little Monster.”180 In the preface to Remarks on Mr. Pope’s Rape of the lock. In several letters to a friend. With a preface, occasion’d by the late Treatise on the profound, and the Dunciad and Remarks upon several passages in the preliminaries to the Dunciad, Dennis mockingly refers to Pope as a “little Gentleman” multiple times.181 In one instance, Dennis proclaims that he had published his “Remarks on the Translation of Homer, on Windsor Forest, and on the Temple of Fame . . . to hold a Glass to this little Gentleman, and to cure him of his vain and wretched Conceitedness, by giving him a View of his Ignorance, his Folly, and his natural Impotence, the undoubted Causes of so many Errors and so many Imperfections.”182

Pope attempted to make light of these attacks by writing two epistles for The Guardian, purportedly explaining the foundation of a “Club of Little Men,” a fictional club that would enable little men to find solace among one another by shunning the ordinary, tall world. In the first epistle, Pope alludes to the prejudice and discrimination that little people experience when discussing the reasons for forming a “Club of Little Men”: 

250
I remember a Saying of yours concerning Persons in low Circumstances of Stature, that their Littleness would hardly be taken Notice of, if they did not manifest a Consciousness of it themselves in all their Behaviour. Indeed, the Observation that no Man is Ridiculous for being what he is, but only in the Affectation of being something more, is equally true in regard to the Mind and Body.

I question not but it will be pleasing to you to hear, that a Sett of us have formed a Society, who are sworn to Dare to be Short, and boldly bear out the Dignity of Littleness under the Noses of those Enormous Engrossers of Manhood, those Hyperbolical Monsters of the Species, the tall Fellows that overlook us.  

In the second epistle, Pope discusses the club’s president, Dick Distick, a thinly disguised rendition of Pope himself, describing Distick in language reminiscent of the taunts that the real Pope endured throughout his life. According to Pope, the club has elected Dick Distick

not only as he is the shortest of us all, but because he has entertain’d so just a Sense of the Stature, as to go generally in Black that he may appear Less. Nay, to that Perfection is he arrived, that he stoops as he walks. The Figure of the Man is odd enough; he is a lively little Creature, with long Arms and Legs: A spider is no ill Emblem of him. He has been taken at a Distance for a small Windmill. But indeed what principally moved us in his Favour was his Talent in Poetry, for he hath promised to undertake a long Work in short Verse to celebrate the Heroes of our Size. He has entertained so great a Respect for our Statius, on the Score of that Line, Major in exiguo regnabat corpore virtus [Great virtue reigned in the little body], that he once designed to translate the whole Thebaid for the sake of little Tydeus.

Despite the playful tone of these two epistles, Pope agonized over the abuse that he endured on account of his deformities. In a letter to John Caryll, written on January 25, 1710/11, for example, Pope demonstrates the profound pain that he had experienced throughout his life when ridiculed by able-bodied people, writing, that he appeared in his own mind’s eye not as “the great Alexander Mr Caryll is so civil to, but the little Alexander the women laugh at.” In a letter to Lady Mary before they became bitter enemies, Pope further demonstrates his belief that an able-bodied woman in Europe could
never accept him as a lover on account of his deformities, dreaming of a trip to India
where he might finally find acceptance:

I tremble for you the more because (whether you’ll believe it or not) I am capable
myself of following one I lov’d, not only to Constantinople, but to those parts of
India, where they tell us the Women like the Ugliest fellows, as the most
admirable productions of nature, and look upon Deformities as the Signatures of
divine Favour.\textsuperscript{185}

For Pope, India represented a place, unlike England, where socially constructed ideas
about deformity would apotheosize deformed people rather than denigrate and ostracize
them. In the European world in which he lived, by contrast, Pope knew that a romantic
relationship with Lady Mary would amount to an amorous relationship between “the fair
Princess and her Dwarf.”\textsuperscript{186} Pope understood, moreover, that women with deformities, at
least in the West, likewise suffered from the able-bodied notion that their deformities
made them sexually unappealing. Indeed, according to Lund, Pope edited, “or at least
reviewed.” William Wycherley’s \textit{Miscellany Poems}, in which Wycherley, in language
reminiscent of Lucretius, contends that a woman’s hunchback is a blessing because it will
ensure that she forever remains a virgin:

\begin{quote}
Because your Crooked Back does lie so high,
That to your Belly, there’s no coming nigh,
Which, as your Back’s more low, more high does lie;
You then all Breast, all Shoulders, and all Head,
To be Love’s Term or Limit may be said,
By which our Love-Proceedings are forbidden;
You, because Saddled, never will be Ridden.\textsuperscript{187}
\end{quote}

Pope understood well, then, that many able-bodied people viewed his deformed body as
well as the deformed bodies of his fellow hunchbacks as too unattractive, if not
disgusting, for them to even consider them sexual beings.
Pope may even have internalized some of the negative stereotypes about hunchbacks being wicked and devious, envisioning himself as a type of villain. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing relies on such stereotypes in *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry*, arguing that Shakespeare’s Richard III is a far more disgusting and horrifying villain than Shakespeare’s King Lear because Shakespeare depicts Richard III as a hunchback. According to Lessing, when King Lear speaks, “I hear a devil speaking, but in the form of an angel of light,” whereas when Richard III speaks, “I hear a devil and see a devil, in a shape which only the devil should wear.”

In a letter to Henry Cromwell, Pope, no doubt familiar with such characterizations of hunchbacks, compares his own deformed body to the Devil when discussing his encounter with a “Sick Woman” on a stagecoach:

I ventur’d to prescribe her some Fruit (which I happen’d to have in the Coach) which being forbidden by Her damn’d Doctors, she had the more Inclination to. In short, I tempted, and she Eat; nor was I more like the Devil, than she like Eve. Having the good Success of the foresaid Gentleman before my eyes, I put on the Gallantry of the old Serpent, & in spite of my Evil Forme, accosted her with all the Gayety I was master of; which had so good Effect, that in less than an hour she grew pleasant, her Colour return’d, & she was pleas’d to say, my Prescription had wrought an Immediate Cure. In a Word, I had the pleasantest Journey imaginable, so that now, as once of yore, by means of the forbidden Fruit, the Devil got into Paradise...

Despite this braggadocio in response to such repugnant views about hunchbacks, Pope is once again simply trying to make the best of a terrible situation. Indeed, in a more serious letter, Pope laments that he could never marry a beautiful, able-bodied woman because only a devil could perform such a deed:

Here, at my Lord Harcourt’s, I see a Creature nearer an Angel than a Woman, (tho a Woman be very near as good as an Angel) I think you have formerly heard me mention Mrs Jennings as a Credit to the Maker of Angels. She is a relation of his Lordships, and he gravely proposed her to me for a Wife, being tender of her interests & knowing (what is a Shame to Providence) that she is less indebted to
Fortune than I. I told him his Lordship could never have thought of such a thing but for his misfortune of being blind, and that I never cou’d till I was so: But that, as matters now were, I did not care to force so fine a woman to give the finishing stroke to all my deformities, by the last mark of a Beast, horns.  

We can never know for certain whether Pope truly believed that it would be a wicked deed for him to use his fame to find a beautiful, able-bodied bride. Yet the fact that he would even question whether it would be wrong for a hunchback to marry an able-bodied woman demonstrates the extent to which negative stereotypes about hunchbacks troubled him.

Diderot’s letters on the blind and deaf-mutes likewise demonstrate the extent to which negative stereotypes permeated discussions of blindness and deafness during this period. In those letters, Diderot expresses various negative stereotypes about the blind and deaf-mutes, some he attributes to others and some he attributes to his own shortsighted prejudices. In his Letter on the Blind, for example, he explains how the blind man of Puisaux once expressed his profound isolation from the sighted world to a magistrate. After getting into some trouble, including an altercation with his brother, the blind man found himself before the magistrate, who threatened to throw him “in the bottom of a deep hole.”  

Undaunted, the blind man responded, “Ahh, sir . . . I have lived in such a place for twenty-five years.” Diderot interrupts the narrative at this point to inject his own interpretation of the blind man’s recrimination: “We [the sighted] leave life as an enchanted spectacle; the blind leave it as a dungeon (un cachot): if we have to live with more pleasure than he, admit that he has considerably less regret in dying.” Diderot here uses cachot as a double entendre. The darkness of a dungeon corresponds to the blind man’s lack of sight, while the isolation of a prison cell corresponds to the ways in which the sighted world excludes the blind. Diderot explains,
for instance, that the blind man, now a husband and father, wakes up around four in the afternoon “because, as you know, the day begins for him when it finishes for us.” This is not, as one might expect, because sunlight has no impact on the ability of blind people to move about in the world, thus enabling them to sleep whenever they choose. Indeed, both the blind man’s wife and son sleep at normal hours, which would force him to adopt the sleeping patterns of the sighted world if he wanted to spend time with his family. Yet Diderot tells us that the blind man chooses to live apart from his wife and son because “at midnight, nothing disturbs him, and he is not inconvenient to anyone.” The blind man has grown so weary of being treated as a burden by the sighted world that he has absconded even from his own family in order to avoid the discomfort of having to be reminded constantly of what an inconvenience he is to others.

In one of the more astonishing examples of negative stereotypes expressed in the *Letter on the Blind*, Diderot himself claims that the blind can feel little pity for the sufferings of others because they cannot see those who suffer. In his *Additions to the Letter on the Blind*, however, Diderot expresses regret for having made such a ridiculous observation, explaining how Mélanie de Salignac, the niece Sophie Volland, Diderot’s longtime mistress, taught him the folly of being so presumptuous about the moral shortcomings of the blind. De Salignac, Diderot remembers, scolded him for his attack on the blind, informing him that while she could not see the sufferings of others, she could hear cries of anguish far more intensely than Diderot and other sighted people.

When, according to Diderot, he attempted to defend himself by pointing out that “some suffer in silence,” she responded, “I believe . . . that I would soon perceive them and that I would sympathize with them more.” Diderot concedes defeat, thus acknowledging
the unfortunate propensity of sighted people, including Diderot himself, one of the most
well-respected *philosophes* of his own day, to allow prejudices to distort their views
about the blind.

Although Diderot does not delve as deeply into the effects of negative stereotypes
on deaf-mutes in his *Essai sur les sourds et muets à l’usage de ceux qui entendent et qui
parlent* as he does with respect to the blind in *Essai sur les aveugles*, he does suggest that
one of the biggest obstacles facing deaf-mutes is the tendency of hearing and speaking
people to dismiss their language and intelligence as primitive. Fontenelle supported this
negative view of the blind when ascribing animal-like intelligence to the deaf-mute from
Chartres who purportedly gained the ability to hear and speak later in life.\textsuperscript{199} Although
Fontenelle recognized that it was society who had deprived him of the opportunity to
develop his mental faculties, it did not change the fact that social isolation, at least
according to Fontenelle, had left him a mere shell of a man. According to La Mettrie,
moreover, the social isolation had damaged the mind of the deaf-mute from Chartres to
such an extent that he was intellectually on par with a mentally disabled man who lacked
the capacity to understand “moral ideas.” Indeed, although La Mettrie claims in the
*Natural History of the Soul* that there was nothing “deaf” about the man without “moral
ideas” except for his “mind,” he concludes that the story about the mentally disabled man
was a “duplicate” of the tale of the deaf-mute from Chartres.\textsuperscript{200} Diderot was intimately
aware that this type of prejudice and discrimination haunted the deaf-mute community.
His friend Condillac, after all, had initially concluded that *language d’action* (language of
action) was a primitive protolanguage. It was not until the 1770s, likely because of his
association with Epée, that Condillac changed his view.\textsuperscript{201}
Diderot thus seeks to demonstrate the true intellectual capability of deaf-mutes in his *Letter on the Deaf and Dumb*, proclaiming, for example, that his deaf-mute friend “is not lacking in mental ability and has expressive gestures.” Diderot even provides an interesting anecdote to demonstrate his friend’s intelligence. Diderot remembers one occasion when he was playing chess in front of a group of spectators, including his deaf-mute friend. When it appeared that Diderot could not win, the deaf man, “thinking that the game was lost, . . . closed his eyes, bowed his head, and let his arms fall, signs by which he announced that he held me as checkmated or dead.” After the spectators saw the deaf man’s gestures, they began to talk about Diderot’s situation, and devised a way for him to prevail. When Diderot attempted to gloat, the deaf man rebuked him, “pointing his finger at all of the spectators, one after another, while, at the same time, making a small movement of his arms that came and went in the direction of the door and tables, responding to me that it had been little to my merit to have escaped the predicament. . . .” Diderot and the spectators learned from this encounter not to underestimate the intelligence of deaf-mutes.

Epée’s attempts to provide deaf-mutes with meaningful educational opportunities were likely more effective than Diderot’s philosophical arguments at dispelling negative stereotypes about deaf-mutes and their intellectual capabilities. When, for example, the playwright Jean-Nicolas Bouilly wrote *L’Abbé L’Épée, comedie historique, en cinq actes et en prose* (*The Abbé L’Épée, a Historic Comedy, in Five Acts and in Prose*) in 1799, he portrayed the deaf-mute Jules, one of the primary characters of the play as an intelligent person despite his disability. Jules, like Diderot’s friend in the *Letter on the Deaf and Dumb*, communicated with the other actors on stage through various gestures.
For instance, when Bouilly introduces Jules, whom everyone mistakes for a person named Theodore, Jules “uses rapid signs to announce that he recognizes the house of his parents” in an attempt to explain his true identity. As the title of the play suggests, it is unlikely that such a play could have been imaginable without Epée’s groundbreaking efforts to educate the deaf and dumb and popularize their intellectual capabilities.

Dwarfs continued to be sports both of nature and kings and queens during this period. In Laurence Sterne’s *A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy*, for instance, Yorick refers to wretched dwarfs as sports of nature. Although the popularity of dwarfs as court jesters diminished in some areas during the first half of the seventeenth century, notably in France where the last court dwarf, Balthazar Simon, died in 1662, many monarchs continued to bring dwarfs to their courts throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 1710, Peter the Great held a grand wedding for his favorite dwarf, Valakof, to the dwarf of Princess Prescovie Theodorovna, in which 72 dwarfs of both sexes served in the bridal party.

Joseph Boruwlaski, a dwarf born to a poor Polish family in 1739, eventually traveled throughout Europe visiting various courts. In Vienna in 1754, Marie-Theresa was amazed at his short stature, while Prince Kauntiz, who met Boruwlaski in Munich, offered him a pension for life. The Comte de Treffan took notes for his article “Nain” in the *Encyclopédie* when Boruwlaski met with the Stanislaus while the latter was exiled in Lunéville. When Boruwlaski later fell in love with Isalina Borboutin and asked the Polish king for a pension to support her, he received both a pension and a title, demonstrating that some court dwarfs, despite being the victims of able-bodied exploitation and sometimes derision, could become far wealthier on account of their
congenital deformities than most commoners during this period. Yet Boruwlaski never lost sight of the fact that able-bodied society did not ordinarily consider dwarfs to be equal to people of normal stature. “It is so uncommon,” he begins his memoirs, “to find reason and sentiment, with noble and delicate affections, in a man whom nature, as it were, could not make up, and who in size has the appearance of a child, that, persuaded nobody would even take the trouble to cast an eye upon these Memoirs, I began to commit to paper some of the principal events of my life . . . for my own use. . . .” In the end, he decided that his life was interesting enough to leave a written record of it, even if only to entertain those who were interested in nature’s shortcomings. Indeed, Boruwlaski proclaims that his memoirs could “be interesting only to those who delight in following nature through all her different ways, who are wont to look upon beings of my stature as upon abortive half-grown individuals, kept far beneath other men, both in body and mind. . . .”

It was perhaps in matters of love that Boruwlaski felt the most rejected by able-bodied society. When he professed his love for Isalina, for example, “she only found the scene ridiculous. Indeed, Joujou, said she, you are a child, and I cannot but laugh at your extravagance.” When he tried to explain to her that he “did not love her as a child, and would not be loved like a child,” Isalina “burst into laughter, told me I knew not what I said, and left the apartment.” Isalina’s initial response to Boruwlaski, then, was similar to Lady Mary’s response to Pope when he professed his love for her, albeit Isalina ultimately agreed to become Boruwlaski’s wife, while Pope and Lady Mary became bitter enemies. In the meantime, Boruwlaski, like Pope, fell into a deep depression as he lamented his sorry lot in life: “O! that Nature had doomed me, by my stature, never to
pass the narrow circle of childhood!"²¹⁸ In particular, Boruwlaski wondered why nature
did not keep his mind in a childlike state so that he might be spared the agony of having
the thoughts and passions of a man in the body of a child.²¹⁹ He even questioned whether
nature had deliberately given him an adult mind so as to torture him: “By liberally
bestowing on me what she allows to others as a gift of Heaven, had she in view my
torment and misery?—She is not a step-mother; she cannot be so cruel only to me.”²²⁰

The State and Private Philanthropists Offer New Solutions to the Disability Problem

As in ancient Athens, whose disability pensions for disabled veterans likely
evolved into a system that provided pensions to all sufficiently poor disabled Athenians,
the problem of supporting disabled veterans played a pivotal role in the advent of new
ways of dealing with the seventeenth-century disability problem. Before the mid-
seventeenth century, some disabled veterans who could no longer serve on active duty,
flooded into towns and cities to beg for sustenance while others sought refuge in
monasteries. Yet not all disabled veterans were helpless beggars who lived entirely at the
mercy of others. Many disabled veterans were perfectly capable of banding together to
terrorize the countryside if they felt that able-bodied society was no longer meeting their
needs. With the massive increase in the size of standing armies and the alarming number
of casualties associated with them in conflicts such as the Thirty Years’ War, disabled
veterans were becoming so numerous that able-bodied people felt under constant siege
from throngs of begging veterans or, even worse as in France, marauding bands of
disabled veterans who sought to enrich themselves at the expense of defenseless, able-
bodied civilians. To deal with this perceived menace, the French sought to house disabled
veterans in the Hôtel des Invalides, where they could peacefully live out the remainder of
their days without bothering the able-bodied community. The English later emulated the French and created their own military hospitals for disabled veterans. It is highly unlikely that these efforts, which constitute part of what Foucault called the “great confinement,” would have confined enough disabled veterans to eradicate completely the problem of begging and marauding veterans because European states did not yet have the resources to build enough hospitals to accommodate every veteran.

In seventeenth-century France, there were two distinct categories of disabled veterans: the invalides (the truly disabled) and the estropiés encore valides (battle-scarred but viable soldiers). Invalides generally had only two options available to them. First, they could seek accommodations at certain monasteries obliged to care for the laity under le droit d’oblat (the law of the oblate). Veterans, however, likely bristled under monastic discipline to which they were unaccustomed. Likewise, the monasteries were probably discomfited by caring for the moines laies, or lay monks, whom many monks would have viewed as alien and perhaps even blasphemous. Second, they could attempt to survive by begging and petty theft. Initially, the estropiés encore valides experienced the same bleak opportunities as the invalides. The estropiés encore valides, however, were still technically fit-for-service, even if the military abandoned them to the wretched existence of church ward or beggar. In 1644, the government decided both to palliate the begging problem in the cities and to find, in theory at least, some military use for the estropiés encore valides by sending them to garrison the frontiers. In practice, however, the estropiés encore valides lived sedentary existences in the frontiers and thus served little military purpose. Their
expulsion and deployment, then, amounted merely to the removal of an undesirable element from city slums.\textsuperscript{228}

The frontier deployment may have ameliorated the begging problem in the cities, but it unleashed on the countryside dangerous throngs of army veterans, who, of course, could not be controlled as easily as they had been in the cities.\textsuperscript{229} The government obviously needed to find a way to withdraw the army veterans from the countryside without thrusting them back into the city slums. After signing the Treaty of Pyrenees in 1659, which ended the conflict between France and Spain that had begun during the Thirty Years’ War, Louis XIV began to muse intently over building an institution to provide both medical care and housing for seriously wounded—both the \textit{invalides} and \textit{estropiés encore valides}—and aging veterans.\textsuperscript{230}

The impetus for what would become the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris, then, was twofold. First, Louis and his advisors hoped to control disabled veterans, an undesirable and potentially dangerous element of society, by placing them in a grand institution, just as they established, by decree, the Hôpital Général of Paris (1656) and other general hospitals throughout France (1662) to confine other groups of people perceived to be dangerous, including the destitute and disabled non-veterans.\textsuperscript{231} Indeed, Louis desired to confine the dangerous \textit{estropiés encore valides} in one Parisian location so that they could no longer burden the countryside. Concomitantly, the Hôtel des Invalides served also to confine the \textit{invalides} who, although not as dangerous as the \textit{estropiés encore valides}, certainly would not have been a welcomed sight in the city slums. Louis’ intention of controlling both the \textit{estropiés encore valides} and the \textit{invalides}, may explain, at least in part, why the former head of the military police, served as the first director of the Hôtel
des Invalides. Scholars must be careful, however, not to overstate the intention to control the _estropiés encore valides_. In 1690, after all, in response to overcrowding at the Hôtel des Invalides, the government encouraged the least disabled and infirm (_le plus valides_) to join new detached companies, _compagnies détachées d'invalides_, which functioned, once again, as sedentary guard units in forts, chateaus, and garrisons.

The second reason behind the creation of the Hôtel des Invalides, one often forgotten by today’s disability scholarship because of its embrace of Foucault and his concept of the great confinement, was a sincere attempt to provide necessary care for aging and disabled veterans. Louis’ vast expenditures on the Hôtel des Invalides’ construction, as well as his enormous level of emotional investment in the project, demonstrate that Louis’ claims of wanting to help his disabled veterans were not, as some Foucauldian scholars might conclude, merely attempts to conceal his true intentions but rather indicative of a genuine attempt to provide not only adequate, but exceptional, care for his veterans. For Louis, aging and disabled veterans were unquestionably among the most deserving of what has come to be known as the “deserving poor.”

The idea for a hospital for aging and disabled veterans was not new. There were plans to construct such a hospital in the reigns of Henry III, Henry IV, and Louis XIII, all of which amounted to nothing. Unlike his predecessors, however, Louis XIV had both the resources and the resolve to see the project through to its completion. On February 24, 1670, Louis issued an ordinance providing that half of the funds coming from religious and lay pensions would be used for the construction of a hospital that would accommodate disabled veterans. Several additional ordinances followed until Louis finally realized his dream, which he called “the greatest idea of his reign.”

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1674, Louis personally welcomed the first lodgers to the still-under-construction hospital.\textsuperscript{239}

Evidence of Louis’ genuine care for the Invalides’ veterans is plentiful. When the Invalides’ governor asked him for a portrait, Louis promised “that he [would] always take a lively interest in the conservation of such a precious institution.”\textsuperscript{240} His actions during and after his visit, moreover, suggest that it was not an empty promise. While at the Invalides, Louis distributed largess to any veteran whom he encountered.\textsuperscript{241} He further ordered that the “poor widows” of the diseased veterans receive 30,000 livres from the Invalides’ coffers.\textsuperscript{242} Louis even gave the Invalides’ governor 6,000 livres from his own funds “for distribution to the soldiers” and ordered a doubling of the veterans’ pocket-money for the month of June.\textsuperscript{243} Marie Antoinette, for her part, later emulated Louis’ generosity to veterans and their families, distributing largess and expressing particular concern about the “poor daughters of the invalides.”\textsuperscript{244}

Disabled veterans in England, like disabled veterans in France, traditionally resided in monasteries.\textsuperscript{245} According to Captain C.G.T. Dean, who lived in the Royal Hospital Chelsea as Captain of the Invalids for twenty years and served as Adjutant for ten years before authoring the definitive history of the hospital in 1950, when King Henry VIII suppressed monasteries, he disfurnished “‘the realm of places to send maimed soldiers to.”\textsuperscript{246} Queen Mary I attempted to help the plight of these veterans, ordering in her will the construction of “a convenient howse within nye the Suburbs of the Citie of London…for the reliefe and helpe of pore and old soldiers.”\textsuperscript{247} Her proposed hostel, overseen by three priests, would have housed between twenty and thirty pensioners.\textsuperscript{248} Queen Elizabeth I, however, did not heed her sister’s wishes.\textsuperscript{249}
The primary solution to the disabled veteran problem in England appears to have been to facilitate their capacity to beg. Although vagrancy laws prohibited most ordinary people from begging on city streets, disabled veterans received “begging passeportes,” which permitted them to eek out an existence. Some English notables did attempt to use the resources of the state and private philanthropy to alleviate the suffering of disabled veterans. In 1593, individual Peers and Members of Parliament donated money for their care. Later that year, Parliament enacted the Statute for Maimed Soldiers to aid veterans who had “adventured their lives or lost their limbs in the service of Her Majesty and the State.” To receive relief, veterans had to apply to county treasurers in which they were born or had resided for at least three years. The maximum pension was £10 per year for ordinary soldiers and £20 for officers. The legislation, however, proved ineffective in providing meaningful support for disabled veterans. Unlike the Poor Law or anti-vagrancy legislation, the statute divested veterans of their pensions if authorities caught them begging like “common rogues.” It was no surprise, then, that “stypenders,” frequently supplicated the Queen for help or that the Commons, in 1601, once again had to donate money to disabled soldiers in London. The situation was so bleak that Francis Quarles, in the reign of King James I, composed the following epigram highlighting the misery of disabled veterans:

Our God and soldiers we alike adore,
When at the brink of ruin, not before,
After deliverance both alike requited,
Our God forgotten and our soldiers slighted.

For the next sixty years, English notables searched in vain for a way to deal adequately with the disabled veteran problem. John Evelyn, one of four commissioners appointed at the outbreak of the Dutch War in 1664 to oversee the sick, wounded, and
prisoners of war, ultimately concluded that England required a new military hospital. He took as a model for his new hospital the Soldaatenhuis at Amsterdam, a hospital founded in 1587 for 51 “lame and decrepit soldiers,” which had greatly impressed him as a young man. After converting a barn at Gravesend into a hospital with thirty beds, Evelyn drew up plans for an infirmary for 400 to 500 men. Samuel Pepys, Clerk of the Acts to the Navy Board, brought the plan to the attention of Charles II. Evelyn’s diary records his proposal to Charles:

I had another gracious reception by his Majesty, who call’d me into his bedchamber, to lay before and describe to him my project for an Infirmarie, which I read to him who, with great approbation, recommended it to his R. Highness [the Duke of York, Lord High Admiral].

Evelyn subsequently secured the Duke of York’s approval, selected a site at Chatham, and made preliminary estimates. Unfortunately, however, the Navy was in financial distress and was thus unable to finance the project. According to Dean, Charles himself declined to contribute to Evelyn’s hospital possibly because Charles had already spent £34,000 on the sick, wounded, and prisoners of war.

Charles did realize, however, that wounded soldiers were not receiving adequate care and, during the last year of the war, asked bishops to provide details of the statutes, government, property, revenue, and number of lodgers and various hospitals and almshouses within their dioceses. He further ordered that maimed soldiers were to receive priority for vacancies in existing institutions, an order that he repeated four years later. Not surprisingly, these measures did little to end the veteran crisis. In June 1666, for example, when the military was seeking recruits, an anonymous writer complained to the King: “[I]f your Majesty did but hear the slits and scofes that is mad; for saie the
people, be a soldier, noe, we have presedents daily in the streets, we will fight no more, for when the wars is over we are slited like dogs.”

When France began to construct the Hôtel des Invalides in 1670, Charles was no doubt under considerable pressure to establish a similar institution for English veterans. His eldest illegitimate son, the Duke of Monmouth, visited the Invalides in 1672 and again in 1677 when he was Captain-General. Three months after this second visit, he wrote to the Marquis de Louvois, the Minister of War, who was primarily responsible for the undertaking: “It pleases you well that I beg you once more to make available to me the plan for the Hôtel des Invalides drawn on the model with all of its faces, because the King will be pleased to see it.” Relations between England and France soon became strained, however, and Monmouth seems not to have received the plans.

Nevertheless, Charles never forgot the stories that his son had told him about the Invalides and desired to build a similar institution in London. According to Dan Cruickshank, an English equivalent of the Invalides offered an intriguing solution. If Charles were to construct a similar institution in London, he would not only solve the pressing problem of providing adequate care and housing for old and disabled veterans but also create a majestic architectural ornament to his reign. Such a glorious institution, moreover, would, in Dan Cruickshank’s words, serve as “a conspicuous act of benevolence” that “would encourage enlistment in his army and promote loyalty to the King among his soldiers.”

By 1675, Charles must have felt even more pressure to build a hospital in London when the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, Duke of Ormonde, proposed to build a military hospital at Kilmainham, just outside of Dublin. When construction for the hospital at
Kilmainham began in 1680, the pressure seemingly intensified. In early September 1681, the Earl of Longford, who had laid the foundation stone at Kilmainham in 1680 and was a member of its Standing Committee, arrived in England and had three long audiences with the King. As Cruickshank has observed, how to apply the lessons of Kilmainham to a similar establishment in London must have been the topic of their meetings. Indeed, after the last meeting on September 6, 1681, Charles referred Longford to the Treasury to discuss the mechanics of the proposal. Less than two weeks later, the project became tangible when the King apparently instructed Stephen Fox to oversee the effort to build a military hospital in London. Indeed, on September 14, Evelyn, who had long been a proponent of building hospitals for veterans, recorded in his diary how he

Din’d with Sir Stephen Fox who propos’d to me the purchasing of Chelsey College, which his Majesty had some time since given to our Society, and would now purchase it againe to build an Hospital or Infirmary for Souldiers there, in which he desired my assistance as one of the Council of the R. Society.

In Evelyn, Fox found a kindred spirit with respect to finding a solution to the suffering of England’s veterans. At Fox’s funeral, Rev. Richard Eyre, Canon of Sarum explained that Fox desperately wanted to find a way to help disabled veterans so that they could live out their days without having to resort to begging. Fox, Eyre explained,

was the first projector of the noble design of Chelsea Hospital, and contributed to the expense of it above £13,000; and his Motive to it I know from his own Words, he said, “he could not bear to see the Common Soldiers who had spent their Strength in our Service to beg at our Doors,” and therefore did what he could to remove such a Scandal to the Kingdom.

Preparations were soon underway for the hospital, and on December 7, 1681, a royal warrant appointed the Paymaster-General, Fox’s nephew Nicholas Johnson, as Treasurer for a hospital “for the reliefe of such souldiers as are or shall be old, lame, or
On January 11, 1682, Sir Christopher Wren, the eventual architect of both the Royal Hospital Chelsea and the Royal Hospital for Seamen at Greenwich, reported to the Council of the Royal Society that, subject to ratification, Fox had agreed to purchase the Chelsea property for £1,300, £200 below the Council’s asking price. In February 1692, the Royal Hospital Chelsea welcomed its first pensioners.

The Royal Hospital Chelsea, like the Hôtel des Invalides, housed only veterans of the land army. England’s navy, however, was much more important to England than the French navy was to France, and England thus needed a naval equivalent to the Royal Hospital Chelsea. Otherwise, England would have had to acknowledge that while it provided adequate care for its army veterans, it was content to allow its navy veterans to languish in misery even though they were no less important for safeguarding the realm. In 1687, James II took the first step in establishing a hospital for seamen by donating his house at Greenwich “to be fitted for the service of impotent sea commanders and others.”

It was Queen Mary II, however, who would become the primary force behind the effort to construct the Greenwich hospital. In 1691, she “signified her pleasure to the Treasury Lords that the house at Greenwich shall be converted and employed as a hospital for seamen.” The Queen’s exhortations went largely unheeded until the English sustained heavy casualties in the naval victory over the French at La Hogue in May 1692. In October of that year, the Commissioners of the Treasury learned that Queen Mary and King William III had granted “the ‘house’ at Greenwich to be a hospital
for seamen,” to house the sick and wounded until a permanent institution was in place.

In December 1694, Queen Mary died in a smallpox epidemic, but her desire to build a hospital for seamen lived on. Indeed, King William, respecting his wife’s wishes, issued a Royal Warrant in both of their names, backdating it to October 25, the last quarter-day of the legal year. The warrant expressed the Queen’s intent to grant the land on which to build a hospital for the reliefe and support of Seamen serving on board the Shipps or Vessells belonging to the Navy Royall who by reason of Age, Wounds or other disabilities shall be uncapable of further Service at Sea and be unable to maintain themselves. And for the sustentation of the Widows and the Maintenance and Education of the Children of Seamen happening to be slain or disabled in such service and also for the further reliefe and Encouragement of Seamen and Improvement of Navigation.

Sir Christopher Wren’s eventual design for the Royal Hospital for Seamen at Greenwich was far more magnificent than his design for the Royal Hospital Chelsea, thus coming closer to displaying the grandeur of the Hôtel des Invalides. The hospital’s magnificence, in part, was the result of the peculiar juxtaposition of the hospital and the Queen’s House, which required Wren to design twin domes to the left and the right of the Queen’s House.

In 1748, Frederick the Great likewise decided to build a military hospital, the Invalidenhaus in Berlin, for Prussian soldiers based on the model of the Hôtel des Invalides. Frederick the Great emulated King Louis XIV in professing philanthropic motives for building the military hospital, proclaiming that “[i]ngratitude is an ugly vice in private life; when princes or states lack thankfulness it is abominable.” At Frederick the Great’s behest, those disabled veterans lucky enough to find lodging at the
Invalidenhaus received free housing, medical care, coal, and uniforms in return for wearing military uniforms in public and participating in Sunday church parades.\textsuperscript{296} It remained an important institution in Germany until 1938, when most of the lodgers were removed to separate houses despite their protests.\textsuperscript{297} In 1944, the allies destroyed Frederick the Great’s Invalidenhaus during the bombing of Berlin, and the Berlin Wall eventually stretched across the Invalidenhaus’ old graveyard.\textsuperscript{298}

The disability problem during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of course, extended beyond the question of what to do with disabled veterans. Cheselden’s report of his successful cataract surgery in 1728, which played such a prominent role in the philosophical debates of the eighteenth century, offered a revolutionary new solution to the disability problem: the ability of doctors and surgeons to use their medical expertise to \textit{cure} certain disabilities.\textsuperscript{299} Surgical cures remained extremely rare during this period, of course, but Cheselden’s surgery demonstrated the potential capacity of medicine not only to make the individual lives of disabled people better but to ameliorate the disability problem by reducing the number of disabled people. Yet because Cheselden’s surgical procedure could cure only a tiny portion of the blind population, and obviously offered no help whatsoever to the deaf and dumb, the disability problem with respect to people with sensory disabilities remained nearly as strong as ever.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, an increasing number of elites, including philosophers, members of the clergy, and private philanthropists, began to recognize the very real plight of the blind and the deaf and dumb, who continued to live in abject poverty and misery despite the Christian tradition of almsgiving. They searched for a new model of dealing with the disability problem that would do more than simply feed and
house them. The most effective method of helping people with sensory disabilities, these
able-bodied would-be benefactors believed, would be to provide them with enough
education that they could fend for themselves. Although most people today remember
Diderot’s *Letter on the Blind* because of its attack on religion and promulgation of a
proto-evolutionary theory influenced heavily by Lucretius, both the *Letter on the Blind*
and its follow-up, *Additions to the Letter on the Blind* (1782 or 1783), discuss the
importance of educating the blind in great detail as a way of counteracting the systematic
exclusion of blind people from the sighted world. In the *Letter on the Blind*, Diderot first
extols the virtues of educating the blind when discussing the blind man of Puisaux, who
received a stellar education, apparently because he was the son of an “acclaimed
professor of philosophy at the University of Paris.” Diderot’s blind friend, moreover,
enjoyed the fruits of his father’s wealth and notoriety, which permitted him to interact
with the educated elite. According to Diderot, he “is a man who is not lacking in good
sense; whom a lot of people know; who knows a little chemistry, and who has followed
with some success the botany lessons at the Jardin du Roi.” In addition, the blind man
apparently evinced at least some degree of literacy. Indeed, Diderot recalls one occasion
when he went to visit his friend one evening and found him “busy teaching his son to
read with characters in relief.”

The blind man’s education, Diderot further informs us, enabled him to see himself
as the intellectual equal of sighted people. When, for example, the blind man had to go
before a magistrate on one occasion, he did not present himself as an inferior creature but
“as a fellow human being.” In some regards, the blind man even believed that his life
experiences gave him distinct advantages over his sighted friends. The blind man,
Diderot notes, “would find himself very much someone to pity, having been deprived of the same advantages that we have, and that he would have been tempted to regard us as having superior intelligence, if he had not felt a hundred times how much we yielded to him in other respects.” Diderot recalls how he and his friends were shocked that the blind man valued “himself as much or perhaps more than we who see.” After discussing the issue for a moment, however, they understood the blind man’s point of view, acknowledging that “we [sighted people] have a fierce tendency to overrate our qualities and to overlook our defects. . . .”

Diderot uses the remarkable life of Saunderson to inculcate further to his fellow intellectuals the importance of educating the blind. Diderot explains in great detail the numerical system that Saunderson developed and the device with which Saunderson performed mathematical equations and depicted geometric shapes, even if John Gascoigne has recently pointed out that Diderot’s description of Saunderson’s device was “somewhat inaccurate.” In essence, Saunderson created a numerical precursor to braille, which Louis Braille later invented to depict letters, numbers, and musical notes. The device enabled Saunderson to arrange the numbers in such a way that there was “no arithmetic operation that he was not able to execute.” Just as Diderot uses Saunderson to provide an Epicurean interpretation of the natural world elsewhere in the Letter on the Blind, Diderot utilizes Saunderson at this point in the letter to make a strong case for providing formal education to the blind, proclaiming, “What advantage would it have been for Saunderson to have found a tangible arithmetical system completely prepared when he was five years old, rather than having to have devised one at the age of twenty-five!” When he finally does launch his attack on superstitious ideas, which, for
Diderot, included the belief in design, Diderot alludes to the education of the blind when expressing one of his more well-known arguments. Near the beginning of the deathbed conversation between Saunderson and Holmes, Saunderson remembers what a spectacle he had been during his life, explaining that people from all over England visited him because they simply “could not conceive how I could work at geometry. . . .”

Saunderson accounts for their amazement by pointing to the human tendency, when we “think a certain phenomenon beyond human power,” to “cry out at once: ‘‘Tis the handiwork of a god’; our vanity will stick at nothing less.” After finishing his rebuke of the sighted for assuming something divine in his academic achievements, Saunderson shifts to a general rebuke of humanity for attributing natural phenomena to supernatural forces, driving the point home by referring to the fable of the elephant and tortoise popularized originally by Locke and Shaftesbury and more recently by Stephen Hawking, who, like Saunderson, became the Lucasian Chair of Mathematics at Cambridge despite his severe disabilities:

Why can we not season our talk with a little less pride and a little more philosophy? If nature offers us a knotty problem, let us leave it for what it is, without calling in to cut it the hand of a being who immediately becomes a fresh knot and harder to untie than the first. Ask an Indian how the earth hangs suspended in mid-air, and he will tell you that it is carried on the back of an elephant; and what carries the elephant? A tortoise. And the tortoise? You pity the Indian, and one might say to yourself as to him: “My good friend M. Holmes, confess your ignorance and drop the elephant and the tortoise.”

Diderot believed so strongly that socially constructed biases had negatively impacted people with sensory disabilities that he firmly believed that it was possible to educate a person who was not only blind but also deaf and dumb. Indeed, he suggests in the Letter on the Blind, over forty years before the birth of Victorine Morriseau, a Parisian girl who became the first deaf and blind person to receive a formal education,
that it would be possible to educate even a deaf, blind, and mute person and that it is only our misguided prejudices regarding the abilities of such people that cause them to languish in almost total isolation. In Diderot’s view, it is able-bodied society that has isolated them not the darkness, silence, and muteness associated with their physical disabilities. In particular, Diderot points out that the sighted and hearing world has created means of communicating both through sight and sound but has refused to do so with respect to touch, even though “the sense of touch has its own manner of speaking and of obtaining responses.”315 Diderot thus suggests that if people who were deaf, blind, and mute were taught from childhood a means of speaking through touch that was “fixed, constant, and uniform,” they might be able to “acquire ideas.”316

In *Additions to the Letter on the Blind*, Diderot returns once again to the importance of educating the blind when discussing his interactions with de Salignac, the niece of Diderot’s longtime mistress.317 According to Diderot, de Salignac received an extraordinary education and demonstrated a brilliant mind before dying at the age of twenty-two. De Salignac, Diderot explains, “had learned to read with cut-out characters,”318 had read a book that Perault had created specifically for her,319 and was able to write by using a pin to prick holes in sheets of paper.320 In addition, she had learned “music through characters in relief,” as well as “the elements of astronomy, algebra, and geometry.”321 She had even learned geography by studying maps that Diderot described as having “parallels and meridians made out of brass, boundaries of kingdoms and provinces distinguished by embroidery, in yarn, silk and wool of bigger and smaller sizes, rivers, both big and small, and mountains by heads of pins of greater and lesser thickness, and cities of various sizes by unequal drops of wax.”322
De Salignac’s education and perspicacious nature enabled her to make several observations that impressed Diderot. On one occasion, Diderot says that he asked her a question related to the properties of a prism, which Saunderson had answered by imagining a series of adjoined pyramids. Diderot asked her to imagine a point in the center of a cube. Next, he told her to draw a straight line to the corners. He then asked her how she would divide the cube. Despite her young age, de Salignac responded immediately, “in six equal pyramids . . . each having the same sides, the base of the cube and half of its height.”

When Diderot asked her how she could know this, she responded that she saw it in her head, “the same as you.” Elsewhere in the letter, Diderot further testifies to de Salignac’s intelligence by furtively suggesting that de Salignac, like Saunderson, had rejected the religion of the sighted world. Diderot says, in a manner calculated to avoid the enmity of the authorities, “What were her religious opinions? I ignored them; it was a secret that she guarded out of respect for her pious mother.” In light of such displays of intelligence, it is hardly surprising that Diderot closes the letter by lamenting de Salignac’s death at such an early age: “With an immense memory and insight equal to her memory, what a path she would have made in the sciences, if a longer life had been accorded to her!”

In 1783, just after Diderot published his *Additions to the Letter on the Blind*, the Société Philanthropique of Paris founded the Institution des Jeunes Aveugles. The next year, Valentin Haüy formulated a program for educating the blind in Paris, hoping that the Société would support his efforts. Haüy recruited a blind student of unusual ability, François Lesueur, to demonstrate the effectiveness of his methods. The Société was so impressed it they decided to back Haüy, who opened his school in 1785.
Although, as Gordon Phillips has pointed out, there is no direct connection between Diderot and Haüy’s school for the blind,³²⁹ it is likely that Diderot’s *Letter on the Blind* would have had at least some impact on a philanthropist such as Haüy who devoted his entire life to educating the blind.³³⁰ Diderot’s *Letter on the Blind*, after all, was no obscure document. The letter was such a sensation in Paris that Voltaire almost immediately wrote to Diderot asking to make his acquaintance, while its attack on religion contributed to Diderot’s infamous arrest and imprisonment along with other perceived “atheists, Jansenists, pornographers or abusers of the King.”³³¹ Haüy, at any rate, shares many of Diderot’s concerns regarding the blind and even discusses the isolation of blind people in language similar to Diderot’s. While Diderot compares the existence of a blind person to life in a “dungeon” (*cachot*) in the *Letter on the Blind*, Haüy laments the plight of the blind beggars whose begging simply prolongs “the obscurity of a dungeon (*cachot*), their unfortunate existence” in his *Letter on the Education of the Blind*.³³²

In any event, Haüy, like Diderot, learned a great deal about educating the blind by looking at the famous life of Saunderson and by interacting with blind elites who managed to become educated despite the lack of formal educational opportunities for the blind. Haüy, for instance, modeled much of his curriculum not only Saunderson but also on Hermann Weissenberg and Maria Theresa von Paradis. Haüy was especially indebted to Maria Theresa von Paradis, the blind singer, pianist, and composer from Austria for whom Mozart may have composed his K. 456 piano concerto.³³³ Haüy studied with von Paradis in 1785 while she was in Paris to give a series of concerts. During their time together, he learned that von Paradis “used a tangible print of perforations made by pins;
and also operated a small portable press enabling her to write letters.334 Von Paradis, then, like Lesueur, helped Haüy create many of the techniques that he used to educate blind students in his school.

Despite Haüy’s interest in the education of blind elites, he also desired to provide ordinary blind people with educational opportunities. In his Letter on the Education of the Blind, Haüy discusses the anomalous nature of blind geniuses, such as Saunderson, Lesueur, and von Paradis, pointing out that “some [blind people], full of insight, have enriched their memory of the productions of the human mind, and have partaken in the charms of a conversation or of a lecture at which they were present, of knowledge that was impossible for them to gather for themselves, in the precious warehouses where they had been enclosed.”335 Other blind people are extraordinary, in Haüy’s view, not because of their intellects but because of prodigious technical skills that enable them to excel as artists or skilled artisans.336 For Haüy, these remarkable blind people are merely “prodigies, who are the product of a tenacious industriousness, and seem reserved only for a small number of those so privileged among them.”337 Haüy thus believed that educators of the blind must find a place in their educational curriculum for ordinary blind people. It is ordinary blind people, after all, the “brothers” of the blind geniuses, who are “abandoned to an idleness from which, they believe, they will never be able to escape, dead to society the very moment they are born to it; and the majority of them, victims at all times of the deprivation of sight and of fortune, have only a share of the difficult and sad recourse of begging. . . .”338

Haüy sought to develop a curriculum that could accommodate both blind prodigies and ordinary blind people, giving both the necessary skills that would enable
them to abandon their “dungeons” once and for all. As Haüy explains in his *Letter on the Education of the Blind*, the purpose of his school was to develop “principles and tools” that would facilitate the education of those who “were performing only with effort, and others who appear [entirely] unable to perform.” What Haüy achieved for blind people likely surprised even him. From its inception in 1785, his school would play an important role in transforming the lives of blind people throughout the West.

Although most people today point to Epée’s Parisian school for the deaf as the birthplace of deaf education in France, there were earlier figures interested in educating the deaf. Indeed, if there was any “founder” of deaf education in France during the eighteenth century, it was Etienne de Fay, born deaf in 1669 to noble parents and sent to the Abbey of Saint-Jean d’Amiens at the age of five. According to the eighteenth-century Jesuit Father André, it was at the abbey that de Fay learned not only to read and write but also “arithmetic, Euclidean geometry, mechanics, drawing, architecture, holy and profane history, especially of France.” In addition, de Fay taught deaf children a system of signs at the abbey. In the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the center of deaf education shifted to Paris. In 1746, when de Fay was in his seventies, the parents of Azy d’Etavigny, de Fay’s most famous pupil who studied at the abbey for seven years, decided that their son could receive a better education by studying under Jacob Rodrigues Periere in Paris. Periere was a Portuguese Jew whose deaf sister inspired him to become a leading figure in deaf education. His family had fled Portugal during the Portuguese Inquisition and eventually settled in Paris, where he began his work on educating the deaf. In 1749, just three years after d’Etavigny arrived in Paris to study Periere’s techniques and the same year that Diderot published his *Letter on the Blind*,

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Periere argued before the French Academy of Science in Paris that it was possible to teach deaf people to speak.344

As Periere perfected his methods of educating the deaf in Paris, Diderot returned to his work on the senses and knowledge after his three-month imprisonment, publishing his Letter on the Deaf and Dumb in 1751. Although, once again, there is no direct connection between Diderot and Epée’s school for the deaf, Anne Quartararo has noted that the ideas of both Diderot and his close friend Condillac “helped to shape certain images of deaf people that later informed the literate, hearing public.”345 Epée’s school, then, existed in an intellectual and cultural climate that Diderot and Condillac helped to create. Both Diderot and Condillac continued to remain interested in sensory disabilities long after the 1740s and 1750s. Indeed, Diderot published his Additions to the Letter on the Blind in the 1780s, and Condillac, as Quartararo explains, likely reconsidered his initial dismissal of the language d’action (language of action) as a primitive protolanguage, in part, because of his association with Epée during the 1770s.346 After attending a number of Epée’s demonstrations with deaf students, during which he “saw first-hand how gestural language functioned in relationship to written language,” Condillac concluded that the language d’action was far more intricate and expressive than he had originally thought.347

In any event, Epée began to educate the deaf in 1755, just four years after the publication of Diderot’s Letter on the Deaf and Dumb. Epée, like Häüy with respect to the blind, was concerned not only with deaf people with extraordinary capabilities but also ordinary deaf people. As Quartararo explains, Epée was determined to prove that “deaf people could lead productive lives and earn their daily bread, if only they had
access to schooling.” He also attempted to demonstrate to French elites that it was the prejudices of the hearing and speaking world that oppressed deaf people, not their physical disabilities. In *The True Method of Educating the Deaf and Mute, Confirmed by Long Experience* (1784), for example, Epée echoes Fontenelle’s report of the deaf man from Chartres who suddenly gained the power to speak one day, arguing that deaf people, “though similar to ourselves, are reduced, as it were, to the condition of animals so long as no attempts are made to rescue them from the darkness.” He further argues that it is “an absolute obligation to make every effort to bring about their release from these shadows.” To promote these educational aspirations, Epée held frequent demonstrations at his Parisian home on the rue des Moulins, where, Quartararo explains, he “made the case for the ‘improvement of humanity’ with a European elite that was encouraged to believe that even the most unfortunate of human beings could be lifted from their misery and isolation.”

**Conclusion**

During the latter half of the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century, a period that encompasses much of the Scientific Revolution as well as the Enlightenment, a new view of nature developed, one that conceptualized nature as a machine created by an intelligent being rather than a living, rational being itself. Many of the most important figures of the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment looked to congenital deformity when attempting to unlock the secrets of the emerging mechanistic world view. The majority position, as in classical antiquity, was that the mechanistic universe was the creation of a divine being, even if such knowledge still left questions about the problem of theodicy. The minority position of the Epicureans, however, would reemerge during
the eighteenth century to challenge the Christian and Deist faith in design, surmising that
the diversity of the natural world was the product of chance. These debates would
continue after the French Revolution, of course, but Charles Darwin’s theory of natural
selection would finally give scientific credibility to the longstanding beliefs of
materialists with Epicurean proclivities. The ancient categories for disabled people,
meanwhile, continued to heap stigma and discrimination on disabled people and
influence debates about the emerging mechanistic world view, particularly with respect to
the idea that disabled people were inferior to their able-bodied counterparts.

Some people, moreover, began to realize that traditional, Christian solutions to the
disability problem, namely Church-directed almsgiving and institutional care, were not
adequately addressing the needs of the disabled. Indeed, both state and private
philanthropists began to offer new types of aid to the disabled. Louis XIV created the
Hôtel des Invalides to provide institutional care for disabled veterans, while
simultaneously preventing his veterans from bothering the able-bodied community.
Others, including the English and the Prussians, would ultimately emulate Louis’
achievement, constructing their own military hospitals. Epée and Haüy, meanwhile,
revolutionized assistance to the deaf and dumb and blind by setting up schools to educate
them. After the French Revolution, the West would develop new solutions to the
disability problem to address the rapidly changing world of the long nineteenth century.

1 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Ibid., 24.
9 Ibid.
11 Ibid. For Daston’s and Park’s observations about Albertus Magnus, see Daston and Park, “Unnatural Conceptions,” 23.
14 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 8.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 9.
22 For more on how the mechanistic world view developed during both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see ibid., 94-5.
24 Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, 6. Descartes believed that it was God who united the two substances. Ibid., 6-7.
26 Ibid.
27 As Degenaar has explained, “the notion that our world undergoes far-reaching changes when we lack one or more of our senses, a suggestion found widely in the scientific and popular literature of the Enlightenment.” Ibid., 13.
28 Ibid., 13-4.
29 Ibid., 14.
33 Ibid. Descartes begins by discussing people born blind, but thereafter refers to a man born blind.
34 Ibid., 67-8.
35 Ibid., 68.
36 Ibid. Elsewhere in his discourses on optics, Descartes returned to the man born blind to make certain observations. In the fourth discourse, rejecting the idea that our minds are “stimulated by little pictures which form in our head to conceive of . . . objects” by discussing a blind person’s understanding of objects. Ibid., 89. In the sixth discourse, Descartes even provided an illustration of a blind man holding two sticks to make a point about how our minds perceive objects. Ibid., 104-5.
37 Cicero, *De Divinatione*, 300-3 (Cic.Div.1.71).
38 Cratippus was not exploring the sense of sight per se, but rather using blindness and the ability to see only once as an analogy to prove that some forms of divination were real, even if people with the power of divination sometimes erred in their prophecies. Ibid. (Cic.Div.1.71). His analogy, however, did touch on the
issue of what a blind person could perceive with limited experience with eyesight. And that issue would later fascinate a number of influential thinkers, including William Molyneux, John Locke, Étienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac, and Diderot.


47 Ibid., 127.

48 Ibid., 128.

49 Ibid.

50 As Henry Allison has explained, critics in Leibniz’ own lifetime criticized him for arguing that God could not have chosen anything but the best of all possible worlds. This claim, they argued, curtailed “divine freedom, subjecting God to an overriding necessity or fate.” Henry E. Allison, “Kant on freedom of the will,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 382. Leibniz conceded that it was not “absolutely necessary for God to create the best of all possible worlds.” He argued, however, that “there is a sense in which he must choose the best, since anything else would constitute a violation of the principle of sufficient reason.” Ibid.

51 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, 276. Leibniz was not alone in recognizing that monstrosities could reveal some of nature’s secrets. During the eighteenth century, as Annie Ibrahim has pointed out, there was “a remarkable effort to think about the anomalies of order (l’Ordre), monstrosities, [and] the deformed.” Annie Ibrahim, “La notion de moule intérieur dans les théories de la génération au XVIIIe siècle,” *Archives de Philosophie* 50 (1987): 556.


54 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, 276. Leibniz further describes his mechanical understanding of congenital deformity by comparing it to irregularities in mathematics. Ibid., 277.

55 Ibid., 276 (emphasis added).


57 Voltaire, *Les oeuvres completes de Voltaire*, vol. 35, 426. Voltaire is actually referring here to Bolinbroke, Shaftesbury, and Pope, but he would have applied the same criticism to Leibniz.


moreover, noted the particular importance of Bolingbrooke and Shaftesbury for Pope’s understanding of theodicy. See Voltaire, Les oeuvres completes de Voltaire, vol. 35, 426.

60 Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle 1:43-44.
61 Ibid., Epistle 1:298-94.
62 Ibid., Epistle 1:33-42.
67 Ibid., Epistle 1:281-6.
68 Ibid., Epistle 2:261-8.
69 Alexander Pope, Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, 131-2.
70 As Brooks has pointed out, Voltaire was always critical of Leibniz’ metaphysics. See Brooks, Voltaire and Leibniz, 68-9.
71 Ibid., 67.
72 Ibid., 68.
73 Ibid., 73, quoting (M., IX, 419, 420).
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 89.
79 Voltaire, Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne, ou examan de cet axiome: Tout est bien (London 1756), 37 (1-4)
80 Ibid., 44 (166-70).
82 Voltaire, Correspondence 101: XVII, 1756-1757: D6738. Voltaire seems to treat Pope as if his humped back was the result of a congenital deformity.
84 Ibid.
85 Voltaire, Correspondence, D6738.
Among the most “dangerous” of Spinoza’s claims were (1) that God and nature are interchangeable (Deus sive Natura); (2) that motion is inherent in matter; and (3) that everything in nature is necessary rather than contingent, from which Spinoza concluded that no divine intelligence ever intervenes, via miracles, to change the general laws of the universe. These ideas, of course, relied heavily on Epicurean philosophy. For a good discussion of Spinoza, see Israel, *The Radical Enlightenment*, 160-174.


100 *Ibid.*


104 I have concluded to omit a discussion of Condillac’s changing views and the prior observations of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, important as they were, so as not to stray too far from my discussion of Diderot.

See ibid. Diderot does not expressly compare his theoretical blind geometrician to the historical example of Diodotus, but Diderot almost certainly would have known about Diodotus from reading Cicero.

Sir Isaac Newton was actually the second Lucasian Chair of Mathematics, but is the most famous person to hold the prestigious person. Subsequent professors have added to its prestige. Charles Babbage, regarded as the father of the computer, was Lucasian chair from 1828 to 1839, and Paul Dirac, a legendary pioneer in quantum mechanics and special relativity, held the position from 1932 to 1969. Stephen Hawking, who was Lucasian chair from 1979 to 2009, added to the position’s prominence in recent years by popularizing inquiries into “the origin and the fate of the universe.” See Kevin C. Knox and Richard Noakes, “Introduction: ‘Mind Almost Divine,’” in Kevin C. Knox, ed., From Newton to Hawking: A History of Cambridge University’s Lucasian Professors of Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. Interestingly, two of the eighteen Lucasian chairs, Nicholas Saunderson and Stephen Hawking, overcame serious physical disabilities to hold the professorship.


Ibid., 138-9.

Ibid., 101-2.

Ibid., 106.

Ibid.

Ibid., 109.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Cicero, De Divinatione, 316-7 (Cic.Div.1.84).


Ibid., 112.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 112-3.


Ibid., 169.

Ibid.

Ibid., 158.

Ibid., 170-2.

Ibid., 170-1.

Ibid., 171-2.

See ibid.

Ibid., 177.

Ibid., 178.


Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences (1703), 19, as quoted by La Mettrie, Histoire naturelle de l’ame, 297. In L’Homme machine, La Mettrie explains that the deaf-mute gained the ability to speak at forty years of age. Julien Offray de la Mettrie, Man a Machine, trans., Gertrude C. Bussey and Mary Whiton Calkins (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1912), 33, 104.
This work contains both the original French and an English translation. The first page number is from the French, while the second page number is from the English. For more on La Mettrie’s use of Fontenelle’s *Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Science*, see Riskin, *Science in the Age of Sensibility*, 43.


147 Ibid.

148 La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 300.

149 La Mettrie, *Système d’Épicure in Oeuvres Philosphiques* (Londres, 1751), 335.


151 La Mettrie, *Système d’Épicure*, 336.


153 Ibid. Hume then states, “Ask him, whence that animal arose; he will tell you, from the copulation of its parents. And these, whence? From the copulation of theirs. A few removes satisfy his curiosity, and set the objects at such a distance, that he entirely loses sight of them.” Ibid. Hume’s Cleanthes makes a similar argument in *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, in *The Natural History of Religion and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, eds., A. Wayne Colver and John Valdimir Price (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976), 178.

154 Hume *The Natural History of Religion*, 33.

155 Ibid. In *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Hume’s Cleanthes likewise expresses a mechanistic worldview: “Look around the World: Contemplate the Whole and every Part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great Machine, subdivided into an infinite Number of lesser Machines, which again admit of Subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human Senses and Faculties can trace and explain.” Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, 28.


157 Ibid., 10.

158 For D’Holbach’s views about design and chance, see ibid, 63-76.

159 Ibid., 65-6.

160 Ibid., 66.


163 Ibid.

164 Maupertuis, *The Earthly Venus*, 47 & n.27.


170 Edward N. Hooker, “Pope and Dennis,” *ELH* 7, no. 3 (Sep. 1940): 189. Pope attributed *A True Character* both to Dennis and Charles Gildon. The weight of the evidence, however, supports George Shurburn’s well-known observation that *A True Character* “is done Dennisissime!” George Shurburn, *The Early Career of Alexander Pope* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 178. Dennis himself, in fact, asserted that he did not write *A True Character* in concert with Gildon: “I here solemnly declare, upon the Word and Honour of a Gentleman, that I never wrote so much as one Line, that was afterwards printed, in Concert
with any one Man whatsoever." Remarks upon several passages in the preliminaries to the Dunciad, 50. In addition, he included two letters from Gildon in order to show that they did not write it together. Ibid., 50-51. In the second letter, Gildon specifically refers to A True Character as "your excellent Pamphlet." Ibid., 50-51. Gildon, of course, was "infinitely satisfy'd and pleas'd with it." Ibid., 51.

John Dennis, A True Character of Mr. Pope (London 1717), 1.

Ibid., 3-4.

Ibid., 5.


Ibid., 8.


The Martiniad, 2 (5-10), in Pope Alexander's Supremacy and Infallibility Examin'd; And the Errors of Scriblerus and his Man William Detected. With the Effigies of his Holiness and his Prime Minister (London, 1729).

The Martiniad, 2.

Mack, Alexander Pope: A Life, 148. Pope was "Aesopic," of course, because both Pope and Aesop were hunchbacks.

Dennis, A True Character of Mr. Pope, 3.

Remarks on Mr. Pope's Rape of the lock. In several letters to a friend. With a preface, occasion'd by the late Treatise on the profound, and the Dunciad (London: J. Roberts, 1728), iii-iv, vi-vii; Remarks upon several passages in the preliminaries to the Dunciad (London: H. Whitridge, 1729), 3, 29, 32.

Preface to Remarks on Mr. Pope's Rape of the Lock, iii-iv.


Ibid., 364-5.

Ibid., 365. Pope compares Mary to a fair princess and himself to a dwarf by saying that he would surely meet her in Lombardy, "the Scene of those celebrated Amours between the fair Princess and her Dwarf."


The Correspondence of Alexander Pope, vol. 1, 67.

Ibid., 430-31.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 140.

Ibid. (emphasis added).

Diderot, Letter on the Blind, 81-2.

See Furbank, Diderot: A Critical Biography, 323 n.5. Sophie’s given name was Louise-Henriette. Ibid., 186. Diderot compared Sophie’s intellect to a man’s, saying, “my Sophie is man and woman, as she chooses.” Ibid., 186. This view of women, of course, was common in the eighteenth century. In Voltaire’s introduction to his mistress Emile du Châtelet’s translation of Newton’s Principia, he famously proclaimed that she was “a great man whose only fault was being a woman.” See Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (Bremen: Outlook Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 2012 [1926]), 229.


Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.


La Mettrie, *Histoire naturelle de l’ame*, 299.

Ibid., 301.
Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans., Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 38-64. In 1656, King Louis XIV, by decree, established the *l’hôpital général de Paris*, as soon as he “was no longer occupied by the affairs of a long and dangerous war.” *L’Establishissement de L’Hôpital Général*, 1656 (Decree), in Michel Mollat and Jean Imbert, *Histoire des hôpitaux en France* (Toulouse: Privat, 1982), 169. The decree noted that Paris had found itself inundated by an infinite number of vagabonds and beggars, who led licentious lives with impunity. Ibid. The decree further proclaimed that “in order to prevent their libertinism and, at the same time, in order to remedy their needs, the King . . . orders the construction of five different buildings under the name of *d’Hospital general*. It orders that the poor of all ages and either sex will be confined; that the disabled and elderly there will receive all sorts of assistance; that those there who are able to work will be employed in various jobs; and that all there will be instructed in the duties of piety.” Ibid. According to Jean-Pierre Gutton, the success of the *l’hôpital general de Paris* ensured that the government, afraid that beggars would flow back into the province, at least in times of crisis, would inevitably attempt to confine an even larger number of undesirables. Jean-Pierre Gutton, “L’enfermement à l’âge classique,” in Mollat, *Histoire des hôpitaux en France*, 170. Thus, a 1662 decree ordered every old and major burg that had not yet established a *hôpital général* to do so soon in order to house, confine, and feed the poor, beggars, and invalids who were native to the region. Ibid.

Brockliss and Jones, *The Medical World of Early Modern France*, 255.

Woloch, *The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration*, 5. By the end of the Seven Years War, there were 150 such companies with a potential of absorbing up to 15,000 slightly disabled veterans. Ibid.


Woloch points out that the military in the old regime found it unseemly that veterans should be considered in the breath as the “deserving poor.” Nevertheless, Woloch concludes, veterans were functionally simply one more group of dependent, “deserving poor.” Woloch, *The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration*, xvi-xvii.


Ibid., 15.

Ibid., 14.


Ibid., 44.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 16.

Ibid., 44.

Ibid., 16.


Dean, *The Royal Hospital Chelsea*, 16; Cruickshank, *The Royal Hospital Chelsea*, 19.

Dean, *The Royal Hospital Chelsea*, 16.


Dean, *The Royal Hospital Chelsea*, 16.

Ibid., 16-17.
250 Ibid., 19.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
253 Ibid.
254 Diary of John Evelyn, as quoted in ibid.
256 Ibid. General Sir Clive G. Lidel, Governor of the Royal Hospital Chelsea when Dean wrote his book in 1949, describes Dean’s connection to the hospital in the forward to Dean’s book. Ibid., vii.
257 Ibid., 19.
258 Ibid., 19-20.
259 Ibid., 23.
260 Ibid. The French reads, “Vous voulez bien que je prie encore de me faire avo ir le plan de l’hostel des Invalides tire sur le modèl avec toutes les faces, car le Roy sera bien aise de le voir.”
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
266 See Cruickshank, *The Royal Hospital Chelsea*, 22.
268 Cruickshank, *The Royal Hospital Chelsea*, 22.
269 Ibid.
270 Dean, *The Royal Hospital Chelsea*, 29.
271 Ibid., 27-28.
274 Cruickshank, *The Royal Hospital Chelsea*, 62.
275 For a discussion of veterans of the French navy, see Brockliss and Jones, *The Medical World of Early Modern France*, 696.
277 Ibid.
278 Calendar of Treasury Books, 1689-92, 1226, as quoted in ibid.
279 Ibid.
280 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1691-92, as quoted in ibid.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid., citing P. Newell *Greenwich Hospital: A Royal Foundation 1692-1983* (Greenwich 1984), 8.
284 See ibid., 104.
285 See ibid., 103-104.
287 Ibid., 173.
288 Ibid., 186.
289 Ibid.
Diderot may have envisioned different types of education for different types of blind people. Diderot, after all, argued that a blind person’s level of education would determine how he or she answered Molyneux’s problem. Diderot, *Letter on the Blind*, 134-5. In the *Letter on the Blind*, however, Diderot does not specifically address whether dullards should receive a formal education or something more akin to vocational training.

Diderot, *Essai sur les aveugles*, 140.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 145.

Ibid., 144.

Ibid.

Ibid., 144-5.


Ibid., 152.


Ibid., 110.


Ibid.

See Furbank, *Diderot*, 323 n.5.


Ibid., 194.

Ibid.

Ibid., 193.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 195.

Ibid., 196.


Ibid.

Ibid., 35.

As I discuss below, Quaratararo points out that the observations of Diderot and Condillac “helped to shape certain images of deaf people that later informed the literate, hearing public.” Quaratararo, *Deaf Identity and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century France*, 10. This is most certainly true with respect to the deaf and perhaps even more true with respect to Diderot’s *Essai sur les aveugles*, which has always
been regarded as more influential, both during the eighteenth century and today, than his *Essai sur les sourds et muets*.

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331 Furbank, *Diderot*, 48-49. Rousseau visited Diderot frequently during his imprisonment, writing later that he feared that Diderot would perish in prison.

332 Valentin Haüy, *Essai sur l’éducation des aveugles*. At the very least, even if Diderot did not directly influence Haüy’s views on educating the blind, the identical language demonstrates that the two intellectuals were participants in the same Parisian discourse regarding the blind.


335 Haüy, *Essai sur l’éducation des aveugles*.

336 Ibid.

337 Ibid.

338 Ibid.

339 Ibid.


341 Ibid., 15.

342 See ibid., 15, 18.


346 Ibid.

347 Ibid.

348 Ibid., 11.


Chapter 7: New Ideas about Monstrosity and the Search for Modern Solutions to the Disability Problem in the Long Nineteenth Century

The period from the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789 to the aftermath of World War I mark yet another important transition in the evolution of ideas about disability. Naturalists and scientists continued to ponder the existence of congenital deformity in order to understand the secrets of the natural world, culminating in Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which identified monstrosities as mutations indicative of progressive processes that facilitated the evolution of species through natural selection. Yet as naturalists and scientists increasingly embraced Darwin’s views of natural selection, they became less interested in determining what the existence of congenital deformity could reveal about nature and more interested in fashioning experiments to uncover hereditary laws, which, coupled with environmental factors, were responsible for producing those living beings long considered monsters in the western tradition.

A number of important developments, meanwhile, including the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the growth of capitalism, the increasing power of the medical profession, the rise of the modern nation-state, and the unprecedented industrial carnage of World War I, added new dimensions to the disability problem. The trend was toward increasing state intervention to address the many problems associated with disability. Yet religious and private philanthropy remained an integral part of western efforts to provide meaningful and assistance to the disabled. Indeed, the West addressed its disability problem during this period essentially by adopting a hybrid system—comprised of state, religious, and private actors—to dole out aid to the disabled, whether it was in the form of education, public assistance, or medical care. These efforts,
however, often amounted to new forms of social control. The most ironic new approach to the disability problem was the birth of the eugenics movement, which, in part, combined Darwin’s ideas about mutations and the evolution of species with concepts prevalent in animal husbandry and horticulture in an attempt to decrease the number of burdensome people with congenital deformities. For millennia, the bodies of congenitally deformed people had provided westerners with tantalizing clues about the secrets of nature. Now that naturalists and scientists were on the brink of finally unlocking many of those secrets, the congenitally deformed became victims of a scientific discourse that sought to eradicate their aberrant bodies, which, in the view of eugenicists, placed an undue burden on able-bodied society.

The Enigma of Congenital Deformity Finally Solved?

According to Collingwood, the third view of nature, the modern view, which followed both the Greek view of nature and the mechanical view of nature, first began “to find expression towards the end of the eighteenth century, and ever since then has been gathering weight and establishing itself more securely down to the present day.”¹ That view “is based on the analogy between the processes of the natural world as studied by natural scientists and the vicissitudes of human affairs as studied by historians.”² According to Collingwood, this modern view of nature “could only have arisen from a widespread familiarity with historical studies, and in particular with historical studies of the kind which placed the conception of process, change, development in the centre of their picture and recognized it as the fundamental category of historical thought.”³ This understanding of history, which first appeared about the middle of the eighteenth century, became important for natural science over the next “half-century,” as “the idea of
progress became (as in Erasmus Darwin, *Zoonomia*, 1794-8 and Lamarck, *Philosophie zoologigique*, 1809) the idea which in another half-century was to become as famous as that of evolution."⁴

Collingwood understood, of course, that it is sometimes difficult to view the evolution of the idea of nature in a perfectly linear manner. He notes, for example that the “Democritean atomism which we know from Epicurus and Lucretius,” became “a fossilized relic of ancient Greek physics, anachronistically surviving in an alien environment, the evolutionary science of the nineteenth century.”⁵ So, too, did the Empedoclean and Epicurean understanding of matter, motion, chance, and monstrosity. Indeed, it was the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus as well as the Empedoclean and Epicurean understanding of monstrosity that would combine with late-eighteenth-century notions of progress to create a new view of monstrosity.

It was Charles Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*, published in 1859, that would ultimately change how the educated elite viewed monstrosity. Yet there were a number of thinkers who likewise played a pivotal role in the new, scientific view of monstrosity that would emerge in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The study of monstrosity had become so popular by the nineteenth century that Darwin referred to it as the “doctrine of monsters.”⁶ There was thus a large contingent of naturalists and scientists ready to apply Darwin’s theories to their own work on monstrosity. Darwin, moreover, had finally provided materialists with a viable alternative to the notion that monstrosity was a necessary component of God’s design. Indeed, as Collingwood has observed, “materialism was from first to last an aspiration rather than an achievement. Its God was
always a miracle-working God whose mysterious ways were past our finding out.”

Materialists had always hoped that “with the advance of science we should find them out some day; so the scientific credit of materialism was maintained by drawing very large cheques in its own favour on assets not yet to hand.” For materialists, then, Darwin’s theory of natural selection served as a long-awaited confirmation of the idea that matter, motion, and chance rather than design were responsible for the existence of congenital deformity.

The existence of monstrosities had provided Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles Darwin, with intriguing clues about the mysteries of the evolution of species. In *Zoonomia*, Darwin argues that “when we enumerate the great changes produced in the species of animals before their nativity; these are such as resemble the form or colour of their parents, which have been altered by . . . cultivation or accidents . . ., and are thus continued to their posterity.” Some evolutionary change, Darwin surmises, likely occurs through “changes produced probably by the exuberance of nourishment supplied to the fetus, as in monstrous births with additional limbs; many of these enormities of shape are propagated, and continued as a variety at least, if not as a new species of animal.”

Darwin then discusses specific examples of monstrosities that both he and Buffon had personally observed as well as other monstrosities that were well known during the late eighteenth century:

I have seen a breed of cats with an additional claw on every foot; of poultry also with an additional claw, and with wings to their feet; and of others without rumps. Mr. Buffon mentions a breed of dogs without tails, which are common at Rome and Naples, which he supposed to have been produced by a custom long established by cutting their tails close off. There are many kinds of pigeons, admired for their peculiarities, which are monsters thus produced and propagated.
By pondering the existence monstrosities, along with other natural phenomena, Darwin was able to fashion a theory of evolution which likely influenced his grandson’s thinking about monstrosities, mutation, and the origin of species in at least some respects. “From . . . meditating on the great similarity of the structure of the warm-bloodied animals,” Darwin begins, and at the same time of the great changes they undergo both before and after their nativity; and by considering in how minute a portion of time many of the changes of animals above described have been produced; would it be too bold to imagine, that in the great length of time, since the earth began to exist, perhaps millions of ages before the commencement of the history of mankind, would it be too bold to imagine, that all warm-bloodied animals have arisen from one living filament, which THE GREAT FIRST CAUSE endued with animality, with the power of acquiring new parts, attended with new propensities, directed by irritations, sensations, volitions, and associations; and thus possessing the faculty of continuing to improve by its own inherent activity, and of delivering down those improvements by generation to its posterity, world without end! In France, meanwhile, naturalists such as Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, appointed to study vertebrates at the Jardin des Plantes while his associate Jean-Baptiste Lamarck was in charge of studying invertebrates, and his son, Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, examined monstrosity to understand the natural world. In Principes de philosophie zoologique (1830), for instance, Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire concluded that “monsters, which have long been regarded as strange whims of nature, are only beings in which the regular development of certain [body] parts has been stopped. . . .” For Saint-Hilaire, then, “man considered in his embryonic state, in the bosom of his mother, passes successively through all of the degrees of evolution of inferior animal species: his organization, in his successive phases, comes closer to the organization of the worm, of the fish, and of the bird.” Saint-Hilaire’s understanding of congenital deformity, of course, would have done little to erase the stigma and discrimination
associated with monstrosity. Saint-Hilaire, after all, was asserting that people with severe congenital deformities were, by definition, inferior to able-bodied people because they exhibited characteristics of inferior animals. Yet Saint-Hilaire’s ideas about congenital deformity, and the ease with which the educated elite of Europe were able to gain access to his work, demonstrated that the assault on superstitious beliefs about the connection between congenital deformity and the divine, which had featured so prominently in the disputes between Alexander Pope and his adversaries, was far from finished.\textsuperscript{17} In addition, even though few people ultimately agreed with the specifics of his hypothesis with respect to congenital deformity and human development, his conclusion that those with severe congenital deformities were inferior to the able-bodied norm was, for a medical and scientific establishment intent on curing those with physical ailments, as close as possible to axiomatic.

Charles Darwin likewise explored the implications of congenital deformity when fashioning his theory of evolution by means of natural selection. Darwin proclaimed in his shorthand notebook from the first half of 1838, over twenty years before the publication of his \textit{On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life} (1859), that “[t]he doctrine of monsters is preeminently worthy of study on the idea of those parts most easily monstrified, which last produced —insane men in civilized countries—this is well worthy of investigation.”\textsuperscript{18} Darwin’s understanding of the “doctrine of monsters” was remarkably similar to the earlier observations of Isidore of Seville and Maupertuis in its division of monstrosity into four categories: “(1) From praeternatural situation of parts (2) addition of parts, (3) deficiency of parts (4) combined addition & deficiency of parts,
As one might expect, Darwin did not explore monstrosity or categorize the various types of monstrosity for the sake of his own curiosity but rather to explore the extent to which monstrosities were indicative of biological processes that made the evolution of species possible. In one of his notebooks, for instance, he noted the relationship between congenital deformity and other inherited, physical characteristics, pondering “[t]he case of all blue eyed cats . . . being deaf curious case of correlation of imperfect structure.”

Monstrosity was so important to Darwin’s understanding of natural selection that it featured prominently in the first chapter of *On the Origin of Species*. Indeed, monstrosity was Darwin’s starting point for explaining how species could change over time. Darwin notes in the second paragraph of his most monumental work, for example, that “Geoffroy St. Hilaire’s experiments show that unnatural treatment of the embryo causes monstrosities; and monstrosities cannot be separated by any clear line of distinction from mere variations.” Darwin likewise discusses monstrosity when attempting to understand the “laws governing inheritance,” which in 1859 remained “quite unknown.” He observes that breeders had long-manipulated monstrosities to create new breeds, suggesting that breeders had facilitated the development of cats with blue eyes that were “invariably deaf” by attempting to create blue-eyed cats. The cats’ deafness, Darwin concludes, was the result of the “mysterious laws of the correlation of growth,” which make it impossible to promote the perpetuation of a primary monstrosity without promoting the perpetuation of a secondary monstrosity.

By the end of his career, Darwin had concluded that it was no longer appropriate to use the term “monstrosity,” preferring instead to use the term “mutation.” In *The Life
of Erasmus Darwin,” Darwin explains his view of his grandfather’s observations about monstrosity and the evolution of species: “So changes in form do occur in nature. [Erasmus] Darwin notes the crucial point that monstrosities—or mutations as we should say—may be inherited. . . .”24 Here we see monstrosity transformed; monstrosities are no longer curious byproducts of the mysterious laws of nature but rather examples, albeit extreme ones, of mutations that play a role in the evolution of species through natural selection. Yet despite Charles Darwin’s interest in congenital deformity, he did not believe that species evolve through substantial mutations that he had previously called monstrosities. Instead, Darwin contended that the evolution of species occurs in nature primarily through gradual variations, which, in the words of Elof Axel Carlson, provided “the raw material on which natural selection acted.”25 For Darwin, then, monstrosities were merely extraordinary anomalies that deviated from the ordinary nature of things to such an extent that they usually could not play a significant role in evolution.26 In On the Origin of Species, for example, Darwin concludes that “sporting plants,” monstrous plants with “a single bud or offset, which suddenly assumes a new and sometimes very different character from that of the rest of the plant,” are “extremely rare under nature.”27

As increasing numbers of the educated elite embraced the major premises of Darwinism, naturalists and scientists continued with their efforts to understand the precise processes by which the evolution of species occurs. In Materials for the Study of Variation (1894), the geneticist William Bateson rejected Darwin’s claim that evolution occurs primarily through gradual, continuous variation. Bateson argued, instead, that discontinuous variation—a variation caused by a sudden and abrupt mutation that significantly alters an organism—was primarily responsible for the evolution of species.28
Bateson, as one might expect, relied heavily on examples of monstrosity in delineating his views of discontinuous variation. In chapter 24 of *Materials for the Study of Variation*, titled “Double Monsters,” Bateson uses examples of “double and triple ‘monstrosity,’” which could be “found in any work on general teratology,” to explain his conception of meristic variations, congenital deformities characterized by superfluous body parts or missing body part such as an infant born with too many or too few digits.29

The rediscovery of Gregor Johann Mendel’s work on heredity by Jugo de Vries, Carl Correns, and Erich von Tschemark at the end of the nineteenth century not only offered critical support to Bateson’s challenge to the Darwinian concept of gradual, continuous variation but also marked the beginning of modern genetics. The rediscovery of Mendel was so important to naturalists that it resulted in the development of two opposing groups. The first, led by Bateson, de Vries, and their pro-Mendelian supporters, argued that the evolution of species was the result of discontinuous rather than gradual, continuous variations. The second, called the “biometric school” and led by Sir Francis Galton, Darwin’s half-cousin, Karl Peterson, and W.F.R. Weldon, continued to argue in favor of evolution through more gradual, continuous variations even though they rejected many of Darwin’s own ideas.30 Because Bateson, de Vries, and their supporters attributed the evolution of species primarily to discontinuous variation, they were more likely to view monstrosity as having evolutionary significance. Yet this does not mean that the biometric school ignored the importance of monstrosity. Indeed, the biometric school viewed congenital deformities as anomalies indicative of the biological processes behind evolutionary change rather than the means by which that change occurs.
As the supporters of Mendelian genetics and the biometric school waged a polemical war about the role of mutation and natural selection in the evolution of species, scientists were learning that it was becoming difficult to delve further into the secrets of nature’s laws simply by pondering the existence of congenital deformity. Most scientists, whether they supported Bateson and de Vries or the biometric school, agreed that congenital deformity was indicative of hereditary laws, even if those laws remained only partially understood. What was becoming increasingly important to scientists in the early decades of the twentieth century was to uncover those hereditary laws through experimentation. Thomas Hunt Morgan, for instance, famously experimented with fruit flies to discover the role of mutation in heredity. Although he initially believed that he had found a “mutating period,” he recognized through further experimentation that Edmund Beecher Wilson had been correct in proposing that the X chromosome results in sex-limited inheritance.\(^{31}\) Subsequent scientists, some of whom had been Morgan’s students, embraced the laboratory as the proper place for studying the precise ways in which mutations occur and replicate. Even experiments that focused more on observing and thinking about the peculiarities of monstrosity rather on learning about the relationship between genes and congenital deformity were becoming less popular among some scientists. As the pediatrician and geneticist Barton Childs once explained, there were two ways to study infants “with congenital deformities. One was teratology,” the study of monstrosities, “which consisted in taking something out of every bottle on the shelf and giving it to some poor pregnant rat and then observing what happened to her fetuses. That seemed to me about as gross as hitting someone over the head with a sledgehammer and devoid altogether of scientific elegance.”\(^{32}\) Childs preferred a second
approach, looking “at family aggregations of cases [to] see whether one could learn
something about genes and what they might be doing in these disorders.” Debates about
the precise ways in which evolutionary change occurs, of course, would continue
throughout the twentieth century. Yet in the age of experimentation, the laboratory, and
genetics, the mere act of pondering congenital deformity so as to uncover the secrets of
nature was fast becoming a relic of a bygone era. Revolutionary Solutions to the Disability Problem

From the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, a number of
important developments, including the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the
growth of capitalism, the rise of the modern nation-state, the increasing power of the
medical profession, World War I, and the advent of the eugenics movement, impacted
how able-bodied society viewed the disability problem. The five most important
developments for disabled people, in my view, were (1) debates about whether
republicanism required new ways of addressing the disability problem; (2) efforts to
provide public assistance to disabled people to address a wide range of problems
associated with the Industrial Revolution and the growth of capitalism; (3) the
medicalization of disability; (4) total war; and (5) the rise of the eugenics movement.

The French Revolution and Disabled Veterans

It is tempting to look to World War I as the crucial event that forced able-bodied
society to think about what to do about the problem of reintegrating disabled veterans
back into its fold. Yet the political landscape of the French Revolution, as Isser Woloch
has demonstrated in The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration, likewise
presented an opportunity for France to reexamine its treatment of disabled veterans.
Disability scholars, however, should not assume that the French Revolution was wholly an able-bodied affair, which ultimately resulted in important, albeit unilateral, changes for disabled veterans. Indeed, disabled veterans themselves would play an important role in the overthrow of the old regime.

Although it has become commonplace in the modern world to view the storming of the Bastille by armed Parisians on the afternoon of July 14, 1789 as a symbolic “triumph over despotism,” few today are aware of the important role that the disabled veterans of the Hôtel des Invalides played in the events of that fateful day. Even fewer are aware of how the Invalides’ lodgers as well as a company of invalides detachés indirectly facilitated the storming of the Bastille. Their French contemporaries, however, were certainly aware of their actions. As Paris edged ever-closer to armed insurrection, Baron de Basenval, commander of the troops quartered at the Champ de Mars to suppress Parisian mobs, and Governor Sombreuil became concerned that the cache of approximately 30,000 rifles at the Invalides might fall into dangerous hands. On July 13, Sombreuil “thought that he would have the firing mechanisms removed from the rifles; but in six hours the twenty invalides who were set to that task had only disarmed twenty rifles.” Besenval considered this a calculated act of resistance, noting that there was “a seditious spirit that reigned in that institution.” According to Basenval, for example, “a one-legged man who was not distrusted was discovered introducing packets of licentious and mutinous chansons into the Hôtel.” Basenval, in fact, recalled that “one could not count on the invalides; and if the cannoneers were given the order to load their pieces, they would have turned them against the governor’s apartment.”
On the morning of July 14, an enormous Parisian crowd gathered around the Invalides, demanding rifles. The invalides detachés manning the cannons on the Invalides’ ramparts, encouraged by other invalides, indicated their unwillingness to fire on the crowd by extinguishing their matches. Sombreuil thus had no choice but to capitulate and hand the rifles over to the crowd. According to Basenval and other witnesses, “the generals agreed thenceforth that it was impossible to bring Paris to heel.” Jacques Godechot has thus concluded that “after the invasion of the Invalides and the clear proof that the troops could not act, the victory of the Parisian insurrection was assured, and the capture of the Bastille might well be considered as a symbolic episode which made little difference to the situation.”

As the French Revolution progressed, France had to determine how it could best take care of disabled veterans not only within the Hôtel des Invalides but also disabled pensioners who resided elsewhere. The Republic had to determine whether the Invalides, once a crowning achievement of King Louis XIV, the paragon of royal absolutism, was still an effective way of dealing with the problem of providing adequate assistance to disabled veterans now that royal authority was dissolving. Politicians likewise had to determine whether the existing disability pension system would sufficiently compensate disabled veterans for their sacrifices for the nascent Republic. In February 1791, a majority of the National Assembly’s military committee, headed by Dubois-Crancé, issued a report that recommended abolishing the Invalides. A fierce debate thus began as abolitionists desperately tried to persuade the Assembly that invalides would be better off without the venerable institution while supporters of the Invalides vigorously came to its defense.
Dubois-Crancé’s report mentioned the administration’s abuses, of course, but as Woloch has ably demonstrated, the proffered reasons went well beyond administrative abuses. Indeed, Dubois-Crancé and his supporters proffered two main arguments for abolition. First, they argued that the finances saved by abolishing the Hôtel des Invalides would, in the end, actually benefit the invalides. Dubois-Crancé, however, somehow had to distinguish his plan from Saint-Germain’s prior expulsion of over 1,000 invalides, a tremendously unpopular act. Dubois-Crancé’s proposal, in fact, had the potential of being even more popular because it would have expelled all of the invalides. He attempted to distinguish his plan from Saint-Germain’s infamous expulsion by pointing out that pensions under Saint-Germain were meager whereas Dubois-Crancé’s proposed pensions were exorbitant. In addition, in a facet of his plan that was likewise reminiscent of Saint-Germain, Dubois-Crancé further proposed the establishment of one small veterans hospice in each of the nation’s thirty-six gouvernements to provide lodging for the totally disabled or caducs.

The Invalides’ supporters were quick to react to this first argument in favor of abolition. The two principal defenders—the moderate Clermont-Tonnerre and the reactionary Abbé Maury—argued that the government should reform the abuses in the Invalides’ organization, give the invalides a choice whether to stay or leave, and raise pensions to the high levels proposed by Dubois-Crancé. They provided a litany of reasons for their proposals. Clermont-Tonnerre reminded his colleagues of the debt that France owed to its invalides and contended that Dubois-Crancé’s plan could not hope to repay it: “What do we owe the invalides? We owe them honor, comfort, special attentions, a family. None of that is provided by the modest sum of 227 livres.”
Clermont-Tonnerre, moreover, noted that the Invalides, surrounded by “national treasures” in the nation’s capital, was a “temple whose ornaments continually recall [for the invalide] his past exploits.” That temple, Cleremont-Tonnerre argued, could foster a sense of camaraderie among the invalides that no pension could possibly replicate. The defenders further warned that pensions had been unreliable in the past whereas the Invalides would remain a bulwark against the suffering of invalides even in times of crisis. Abbé Maury proclaimed, “Public institutions which have a clear useful purpose will develop and improve continually, while assistance which is given individually and in obscurity will diminish and gradually dry up.” The defenders likewise raised alarms about the proposed hospices. According to one deputy, expressing the typical French abhorrence of hospices, Dubois-Crancé’s hospice plan “would mean relegating the invalides to refuges of contagion.”

The defenders of the Invalides, however, were far from optimistic about the character of the invalides for whom they lobbied. Indeed, demonstrating appalling levels of paternalism, the defenders further argued that the Hôtel des Invalides was necessary to protect the invalides from themselves and, concomitantly, to protect France from begging invalides. Clermont-Tonnerre proclaimed that the invalides’ “past deeds have earned them a subsistence which their future imprudence must not be permitted to jeopardize.” If a pensioner ran through his pension too quickly, the defenders feared, he would “go begging for the rest of the time since he can’t be expected to enter a department hospice while still in good health.” The defenders, then, feared a return to the deplorable situation that had initially led King Louis XIV to garrison the estropiés encore valides in the frontiers in the first place, which, of course, ended in a perceived disaster.
The second way in which the abolitionists attempted to win support for their plan was to appeal to republican sympathies by equating abolition with antiroyalism. Even if the Hôtel des Invalides helped its invalides, Beaharnais proclaimed, a free people must “establish public institutions on solid foundations different from those of despotism . . . . Our institution must be completely different.”58 Dubois-Crancé, moreover, long before the advent of social control theory, argued that in establishing the Invalides, the monarchy forced the invalides into “absolute dependence in a military regime that is so harsh for old age.”59 The Invalides, according to Dubois-Crancé, was not the benevolent institution that its defenders made it out to be but rather “nothing more than a prison.”60 Menou even argued that any institution in the capital would be deleterious to the moral and physical well-being of the invalides. Indeed, if the invalides remained in Paris, they would be unable to avoid “dissipat[ing] in its excesses,” for that was one of the “inevitable disadvantages of large cities.”61

As the National Assembly prepared to vote on the fate of the institution, Emmery, a moderate on the military committee, joined the defenders of the Hôtel des Invalides.62 Realizing that the abolitionists could not hope to win without Emmery’s support, Dubois-Crancé suggested that the Assembly take a poll of the invalides to ascertain their position before voting on the matter. The Assembly, however, voted down his motion and, on March 24, 1791, adopted Emmery’s proposal that gave the invalides the choice whether to remain at the Invalides or to leave. In addition, the defenders of the Invalides enacted the committee’s recommended larger pensions that were supposed to be compensation for the Invalides’ abolition. The vote, then, represented a total victory for those invalides.
who wanted the freedom to choose what lifestyle fit them best. The inaugural volume of
the *Feuille Villageoise* reported on the monumental vote:

The National Assembly has decreed that the Hôtel des Invalides—that respectable
monument—will continue to receive disabled or wounded soldiers who wish to
retire there. An adequate stipend will be accorded to those who prefer to live
among their families.…

All the galleries of the Assembly were filled with invalides who silently
followed a debate so important to them and who, at the end of the session,
signified their respectful approbation. That venerable cortege, that attentive
silence, that unanimous submission of old soldiers constituted an imposing
spectacle.

The radical republicans were disappointed that they had not prevailed and hoped
that a mass exodus of invalides, particularly republican invalides, would prove that their
position had been correct. Their hopes, however, were dashed when the exodus proved
to be much smaller than they had hoped. Of the 2,900 invalides living at the Hôtel des
Invalides in June 1791, just over 1,600 left the institution and accepted pensions.

Perhaps most disappointing to the republicans was the fact that the decision to leave did
not necessarily reflect partisan views. The well-known radical Jacobin Jean-Baptiste
Cordier, for example, chose to stay.

Now that the Assembly had provided meaningful assistance to the invalides
detachés, it turned to the more difficult question of the invalides retirés dans les
departments, who had once been eligible for the Hôtel des Invalides but who, for a
variety of reasons, had been forced to accept “modest stipends” and to retire to the
provinces instead. This group of invalides, in fact, had been the intended beneficiaries
of Dubois-Crancé’s plan to abolish the Invalides in the first place. When the invalides
retires heard that the military committee was proposing legislation that would
marginalize their status as invalides, they made impassioned pleas to the committee to
The committee conceded and even proposed to increase their pensions significantly. The invalides retires, moreover, received highest priority for lodging at the Hôtel des Invalides and its special pensions. The invalides retires had proven quite capable of navigating through the representative process to protect their own interests. Politicians, moreover, had shown a true commitment to providing meaningful assistance to the invalides retires.

The French Revolution and the Schools for the Deaf and Blind

Just as the French Revolution raised questions about how a republic could best tend to the needs of its disabled veterans, the Revolution likewise presented the French with an opportunity to reassess the extent to which the state should assist, if not replace, churches and private philanthropists as providers of aid to some groups of disabled people. When Abbé Charles-Michel de l’Epée died on December 23, 1789, just months after the French Revolution, the revolutionary authorities had to determine how best to provide for their care in the absence of their famous benefactor. Jérôme-Marie Champion de Cicé, the Keeper of the Seals, who had headed a delegation from the National Assembly to be present in Epée’s final hours, made a solemn promise to Epée: “Die in peace; the Nation now adopts your children.” A few days later, deputies of the Commune of Paris expressed before the National Assembly a desire to establish an institute “for the needy orphans that the death of Abbé de l’Epée has left without support.” Between January and March 1790, candidates vied to succeed Epée. On April 6, 1790, Abbé Roch-Ambroise Cucurron Sicard, a grammarian who had learned a great deal about educating the deaf from Epée, became director of the Institute for the Deaf and Dumb in Paris. As he and other advocates for the deaf waited to see how the French
Revolution would impact efforts to educate the deaf, he attempted to convince revolutionary authorities to support his methods over Epée’s because they were more compatible with written French. Before the National Assembly could act on Jérôme-Marie Champion de Cicé’s promise to the recently deceased Epée, however, it had to determine whether it should also provide state funds for the education of the blind.

The connection between Epée’s deaf students and Haüy’s blind students was obvious to some French observers after Epée’s death, when Haüy’s blind students performed at a funeral ceremony at Saint-Etienne-du-Mont, a church in Paris, on February 23, 1790. Three days later, the Journal de la Municipalité et des Districts noted that the audience “was moved by an emotional double scene: to one side the deaf and mute. . ., to the other, the blind children who expressed the public’s grief with lugubrious, moving music.” The journal, moreover, praised Haüy for his efforts to do for the blind what Epée had done for deaf-mutes. What was not so apparent at this time, Zina Weygand has explained, was that the National Assembly would soon make the connection between the deaf-mutes and the blind more concrete by consolidating, at least for a short time, efforts to educate deaf-mutes with efforts to educate the blind in Paris.

On March 25, 1790, three days after Haüy, his blind students, and several members of the Philanthropic Society, marched to the Church of Saint-Jacques-l’Hôpital, Haüy’s blind students performed before deputies of the National Assembly and representatives of the Paris Commune at the Hôtel de Ville. Jean-Denis Avisse, an accomplished blind student, presented a petition on behalf of his fellow students, which called for the nationalization of the Institute for Blind Youth. Meanwhile, Armand-Joseph de Béthune-Charost, president of the Philanthropic Society, which financially
supported the Institute for Blind Youth, alerted La Rouchefoucauld-Liancourt and the Committee on Mendicancy of the society’s financial troubles after its subscriptions had plummeted in the wake of the French Revolution. According to Weygand, he likely alerted them to the Institute for Blind Youth at this time, which was putting a significant strain on the society’s budget. For French philanthropists and advocates of the blind, the Committee on Mendicancy had the power and resources to offer meaningful assistance to the blind, whereas Edmund Burke denigrated the committee as evidence not only that the French Revolution had created an economic catastrophe in France but also that the National Assembly was taking unprecedented, foolish steps to help the French poor. On August 24, 1790, Sicard likewise appeared with a delegation of his deaf students before the National Assembly. Jean Massieu, one of Sicard’s talented students, emulated Jean-Denis Avisse in presenting a petition to nationalize Epée’s former school.

The Committee on Mendicancy produced reports on establishing institutes for deaf-mutes and the blind the next year. On July 21, 1791, Pierre-Louis Prieur, one of the four members of the committee, presented a “Report on the Establishment of the Institute for the Congenitally Deaf” as well as a proposed decree for the project. On September 28, 1791, Jean-Baptiste Massieu, another member of the Committee on Mendicancy, presented a “Report on the Establishment of the Blind on its Unification with that of the Deaf and Dumb” along with a proposed decree. The unification of efforts to educate both deaf-mutes and the blind reflected the French Revolution’s belief in the importance of fraternité. The deaf-mutes and the blind would prove that there was no obstacle too great for republican fraternité to overcome. Massieu noted in his report that “nature has raised a barrier between the faculties of the deaf-mute and those of the congenitally blind
that at first seems insurmountable.” He argued, however, that “if the blind person can express [his idea] before the deaf-mute’s eyes, and if the deaf-mute can, for his part, trace or express palpable signs that represent the idea that the former inspired, then it is true that the deaf-mute can understand the blind person and the blind person the deaf-mute.”

The eventual establishment of a joint institute at the Celestines, a convent appropriated by the Republic, as Weygand has suggested, may have been a utopian fantasy destined to fail. Article 5 of Massieu’s decree forced Haüy, the “principal teacher” of the blind, to consult with Sicard, the “principal teacher” of the deaf-mutes, before appointing personnel to teach and oversee blind students, while Sicard did not have to consult Haüy when making appointments with respect to his deaf-mutes. In addition, article 6 of Massieu’s decree made the existing bursar overseeing deaf-mutes the bursar over both the deaf-mutes and the blind, which again placed Haüy and other advocates for the blind in an inferior position vis-à-vis Sicard and his supporters. By 1792, Weygand has demonstrated, “the cohabitation became truly poisoned by the dissension between Haüy and Sicard. . . .” By April 1794, the attempt to educate deaf-mutes and the blind in a combined institute had failed, as the deaf-mutes left for what had been the seminary of Saint-Magloir.

The goals and methodology of the new combined institute may have altered the lives of deaf-mute and blind students even more drastically than the merger of the institutes for deaf-mutes and the blind. The National Assembly, Weygand explains, hoped that the combined institute would one day be able to “provide for itself” by teaching students various trades. Yet the new combined institute would constitute a Foucauldian nightmare, where hearing and sighted instructors would subject their deaf-
mute and blind students to constant surveillance and discipline so as to forge them into worthwhile citizens and workers. In Weygand’s estimation, the new institute pursued “a process of social control where students from the laboring classes were invited to become honest workers, subject to the laws of their superiors and capable of one day fending for themselves.”

Article 6 of Massieu’s decree specified that “[t]he bursar will never allow a student to remain idle. He will inform the headmaster of student carelessness if he has reason to be dissatisfied or of reasons he may have to praise them, so as to bring some around and give others a sign of his satisfaction.” Article 7, moreover, stipulated that “[t]he bursar will be the one to directly inspect all work. He will not only oversee the students in employed in the workshops but even the inspectors or foremen. They will answer to him, each day. . . , and the bursar will answer to the headmaster of each institute, who will answer to the administration.”

The regulations that implemented the decrees of July 21 and September 28 likewise contributed to the surveillance of the deaf-mutes and the blind. Title 3, article 13, required all dormitories to “be lit at night. The tutor-supervisors’ beds will be placed at either end of the boys’ dormitory, and the mistress-governesses will also sleep in the girl’s dormitory. The shop foremen and mistress-governesses will abide by this same article in the dormitories of the blind.”

Title 2, article 3, moreover, provided that “[t]he tutor-supervisors of the boys, and the mistress-governesses of the girls (in the case of the deaf) will never leave the students alone, neither day nor night. . . . The inspectors or shop foremen and the mistress-governesses will do the same with the blind.” The authors of the regulations establishing the joint institute, Weygand has rightly concluded, thus “realized the ideal of panopticism without having had to spend money on a particular architectural layout.”
The Industrial Revolution and Capitalism

If the French Revolution provided the French with the opportunity to discuss what able-bodied society should do about some aspects of the disability problem, the Industrial Revolution demonstrated the weaknesses of the traditional system of providing aid to the disabled. As the Industrial Revolution transformed the western economies, some states determined that they could best deal with the disability problem by expanding charitable functions traditionally carried out by the Church and private philanthropists. Large numbers of disabled people, after all, had remained in desperate need of help under the traditional system. With the advent of capitalism and the rise of the modern nation-state, there was the distinct possibility that the problem could escalate if governments did not step in to provide assistance directly to disabled people. This does not mean, however, that every government intended to provide this assistance in lieu of aid from churches and private philanthropists. Instead, the welfare systems that would develop in the West would generally rely on government assistance as well as any aid that churches or private philanthropists could offer.

Although it is difficult to generalize about western forms of state assistance for disabled people because, as disability scholar Robert Drake has noted, there were substantial differences between state welfare programs in countries or regions such as Scandinavia, Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia, there were some similarities among the various welfare systems. In the West, there has long been a tradition of the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor. The deserving poor, including widows, orphans, and the disabled, have been considered poor through no fault of their own while the undeserving poor are supposedly able-bodied vagabonds too lazy to work
like everyone else. As discussed in the second chapter, Christians always had considered it part of their mission to provide aid to various types of the deserving poor, including the disabled. When governments began to perform some of the charitable functions traditionally exercised by the Church, they often incorporated the traditional distinction between deserving and undeserving poor into their own welfare systems. Indeed, governments attempted to ensure that able-bodied people did not wrongly appropriate aid intended for the disabled. The two safeguards commonly used to prevent this type of fraud are the same type of safeguards employed by the ancient Athenians: a requirement that the claimant be sufficiently poor and a requirement that the claimant be sufficiently disabled. The intent of the first type of provision is to prevent wealthy people who happen to be disabled from taking precious resources needed by disabled people who are not financially secure, while the second type of provision seeks to prevent able-bodied people from pretending to be disabled in order to defraud the state out of payments.

A comparison between the two safeguards of the Athenian disability pension and the two modern safeguards for modern welfare programs for disabled people reveals how the modern world was impacting the growth of state assistance to disabled people. It was relatively easy for the Athenians to enforce the first safeguard. In Lysias’ speech in defense of the lame man’s pension, for example, the pensioner suggests that the Council is personally aware of his finances because so many of its members know him personally. In the nineteenth century, government bureaucrats would not have been as familiar with each individual claimant because modern governments were not confined to one relatively small city. Yet bureaucrats obviously could access financial records and even interview local members of the community to determine if a claimant was hiding
money somewhere. As Garland has noted, the Athenians would have encountered far more difficulty in enforcing the second safeguard. Indeed, it was no easy task in classical antiquity to determine whether a prospective disability pensioner was truly disabled because medicine in antiquity did not provide physicians with enough expertise to make such determinations.\textsuperscript{108} Still, however, Athens was small enough that some members of the Council, at least in some cases, may have been personally aware of a person’s disability. Eventually, of course, the medical profession would advance to such an extent that doctors could conduct medical examinations on behalf of the state and be reasonably certain that they would be able to detect those who intended to defraud the state out of payments intended for disabled people. Indeed, as doctors perfected their art throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were on their way to becoming important gatekeepers of welfare programs for disabled people in the West.\textsuperscript{109}

\textit{The Medicalization of Disability}

The medical profession during the nineteenth century, as Henri-Jacques Stiker has observed, became increasingly able to offer treatments for various disabilities.\textsuperscript{110} The public understandably grew ever more trusting of medicine, especially as scientists and doctors began to unlock many of the secrets of health and disease.\textsuperscript{111} As the prestige of the medical profession increased, doctors were able to convince large portions of the public that medicine was an effective means of addressing some problems associated with large numbers of disabled people living in able-bodied societies. In the process, doctors medicalized disability by combining both able-bodied norms and able-bodied prejudices about disabled people with their specialized medical knowledge. “The nineteenth century,” Stiker argues, “was a great era for orthopedics. Straightening out
physically and straightening up behaviorally are put in the same semantic field, a normative one. Educate and rehabilitate, mind and body: draw upward, toward correctness. *Correct* is another keyword that forges a link between medicine and pedagogy. ¹¹² Drake agrees, contending that “[t]he project of medicine has been to treat, ameliorate, or ‘normalize’ disabled people according to prevailing understandings of physiological and cognitive norms.”¹¹³ In the latter half of the twentieth century, of course, disabled people would begin to challenge the medical model of disability by employing counter-discursive strategies, through which disabled activists attempted to regain some measure of independence from their medical overlords by creating a new definition of “disability.” Before that social awakening, however, disabled people were limited in their responses to domineering doctors who claimed to know everything that disabled people *should* have been doing with their bodies and their lives.

*Disability and Total War*

Developments associated with the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the growing power of the medical profession in the West would ultimately have a profound impact on disabled veterans and how able-bodied society attempted to reintegrate them into its fold. Perhaps the most significant development was the use of new military technology, particularly gunpowder, which not only increased the destructive capabilities of European armies and navies, but also made it easier for the emerging nation-states of Europe to create massive standing armies. During the seventeenth century, the ease with which musketeers could be trained, compared to archers and cavalry, enabled monarchs to create armies that dwarfed medieval armies. While the armies involved in the Hundred Years’ War were extremely small by modern
By the end of the century, a century marred by the devastation wrought by the Thirty Years’ War, the French army contained 400,000 soldiers. This increase in the size of armies, and the alacrity with which monarchs sent them to battle, resulted in significantly more disabled veterans than wars in previous epochs. Improvements in the medical profession, moreover, exacerbated the problem by ensuring that an increasing number of soldiers would survive the horrific wounds inflicted upon them by the instruments of modern warfare. The increase in disabled veterans, as one might expect, overburdened military hospitals and disability pension systems.

In the early twentieth century, the ever-increasing destructive capacity of military technology, one of the most important legacies of the Industrial Revolution, combined with the power of mass politics and nationalism, two of the most important legacies of the French Revolution, to create a new type of warfare—total war—that would rock the foundations of Western Civilization. Convinced that modern warfare would be decided by quick, decisive campaigns as in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1), Europeans entered into a system of alliances and prepared for the next decisive war. War would eventually erupt in the summer of 1914 after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, but it would not be the war that most anticipated. Europeans were so unaware of the dangers of modern warfare that they merrily marched off to face their foes, confident that the fighting would be over by Christmas. What was actually in store for them, however, was a nightmare of a war that would forever change the lives of Europeans, especially disabled veterans.
While it is true, as James M. Diehl has pointed out, that problems associated with veterans after major wars are “universal and of universal significance,” and “include compensation for war-related disabilities, reentry into the labor market, pensions for professional soldiers, and the reintegration into society of late-returning prisoners of war,” the carnage of World War I was far greater than previous wars, leaving 9.5 million soldiers dead and another 8 million permanently disabled. In Britain alone, there were over 750,000 permanently disabled veterans, while there were 1.5 million in Germany. The nations that found themselves embroiled on the battlefields of World War I, then, had to confront unprecedented problems in attempting to provide adequate medical care for their disabled veterans. Each postwar nation had to find a way to provide enough hospital beds to accommodate the staggering number of veterans who returned home disabled. In the minds of many disabled veterans, the doctors who saved their lives and treated them in hospitals, could nevertheless compound their miseries. “Doctors,” Robert Weldon Whalen has observed, “dominated the lives of war victims. They not only prescribed the disabled soldiers’ treatment; they also decided whether an injury was war-related, which, of course, determined whether a man could get a pension.” Accordingly, the relationship between doctors and disabled veterans, characterized by a staggering sense of lost autonomy in the minds of the latter, mirrored the relationship between doctors and other types of disabled people. To make matters worse, disabled veterans not only were in the beginning stages of coming to grips with the horrors of industrialized warfare from their hospital beds, but also had to face the fear of attempting to reintegrate into an able-bodied society that often held disabled people in contempt.
Disabled veterans had good reason to fear the daunting task of attempting to reintegrate into able-bodied society. The sheer number of disabled veterans returning home from the war put an enormous strain on the reintegration efforts of postwar governments. Each nation had to devise its own methods of achieving reintegration in accordance with its own cultural norms. In Britain, for example, as Deborah Cohen has demonstrated, “civil servants in the new ministry charged with their care sought to limit the state’s obligations toward disabled veterans.”

Indeed, just as the construction of the Royal Hospital Chelsea relied heavily on donations from private philanthropists, the reintegration of disabled veterans in Britain in the wake of World War I “proceeded primarily through voluntary and philanthropic efforts,” including “most initiatives for the long-term treatment or rehabilitation of wounded servicemen, from the country’s largest artificial limb-fitting center at Roehampton to the comprehensive program for war blinded administered through St. Dunstan’s Hostel.”

Voluntary efforts and philanthropy likewise played an important role in money raised to construct the Star and Garter Home for Disabled Sailors and Soldiers, the Roehampton Hospital, the War Seal Mansions, [and] Lord Roberts Memorial Workshops,” even though these efforts, according to Cohen, were “insufficient to care for the majority of disabled men. . . .”

Postwar British governments, both Labour and Conservative, were quick to rely on the goodwill of private actors. The Ministry of Pensions and the Exchequer, for example, proved eager to shift responsibility for finding employment for disabled veterans to the private sector. Sir Robert Horne, chancellor of the Exchequer under Lloyd George, defended the refusal to provide more aid to disabled veterans on the ground that “‘so far as the grievance of these men is that they cannot find employment, their case is not
different at the present time from that of an unprecedented number of other men and women, who do not draw pensions from the State." For Horne, it did not matter that these British soldiers had become disabled fighting for Britain; their service simply did not entitle them to preferential treatment in the labor market.

Postwar Germany, by contrast, ultimately attempted to use the resources of the state to achieve reintegration. During the war itself, as Diehl has demonstrated, Germany had “no comprehensive system for the war-disabled.” When Germany attempted to rely on existing “nineteenth-century institutions” to provide aid to disabled veterans, it found itself overwhelmed by the number of people who needed assistance. Accordingly, disabled veterans in Germany had to rely on “semiofficial and voluntary organizations” for assistance until the state could create a more effective system. By the time of the Weimar Republic, the state had established such a system, with “state officials embrac[ing] the rehabilitation of the disabled as, in the words of the Republic’s first president, Weimar’s ‘foremost duty.’”

Germans still had to decide, however, whether some nineteenth-century institutions, particularly the Invalidenhaus, could continue to thrive in the new Germany. In some ways, this process mirrored the introspection of the French, who wondered after the French Revolution whether the Hôtel des Invalides was compatible with republicanism. Yet the French engaged in this process of introspection voluntarily, with politicians on both the Left and Right engaging in the debate about what to do with les Invalides. For the Germans, the inquiry was not voluntary but rather a condition of the hated Treaty of Versailles, which removed the Invalidenhaus from the control of the army more than 170 years after its creation and placed it under the control of the Labor
Although General von Seeckt, as Cohen has pointed out, questioned whether a republican institution could care adequately for officers, the Labor Ministry retained control over the Invalidenhaus after it gained the support of the Minister of Finance. The army ultimately agreed to relinquish control of the venerable hospital, urging the civilian authorities not to change the institution.

The Labor Ministry, however, decided to transform Frederick the Great’s military hospital into “a proud symbol of republican war victims’ care.” It forcibly retired the eighty-year-old General Lieutenant von Gergemann as commandant and replaced him with a civilian, who promptly evicted twenty widows and adult children who had no legal justification for living at the hospital. The Labor Ministry also abolished preferential treatment for officers and other well-connected veterans, declaring that apartments would be available only to veterans who had sustained severe disabilities during the Great War and also had a wife or other female family member who could provide them with daily care. The governing principle behind the new Invalidenhaus was independence and the notion that even severely disabled veterans could lead productive lives rather than the militarism of the imperial Invalidenhaus, which had required disabled veterans to dress in military uniforms and participate in parades. The Invalidenhaus was now more of a place where severely disabled men could find housing for themselves and their families while they endeavored to return to the workforce.

In addition to settling the issue of the Invalidenhaus, at least for the time being, the Weimar Republic attempted to reintegrate disabled veterans throughout Germany by helping them to find and to retain meaningful employment. This help, in part, came in the form of government programs intended to give disabled veterans the ability to lead
productive lives despite their disabilities.\textsuperscript{137} The Law of the Severely Disabled of 1920, meanwhile, offered some protection to disabled veterans against layoffs and unemployment.\textsuperscript{138} For those disabled veterans who had sustained such serious wounds that they were unable to work, of course, the state provided pensions adequate enough to permit them to live at home with their families. Some disabled veterans, moreover, eked out an existence by begging on the streets, just as disabled people have done throughout the history of the West.\textsuperscript{139} Yet these were exceptions to the Weimar Republic’s position that disabled veterans should be encouraged to return to work so that they could live as independently as possible, just as disabled veterans continue to beg in modern nations despite social welfare programs for their well-being.

\textit{The Eugenics Movement and the Will to Eradicate the Congenitally Deformed}

The rise of the eugenics movement was perhaps the most ironic development in the history of the evolution of ideas about disability. Because of scientific advances during the nineteenth century, thinking about nature vis-à-vis congenital deformity gave way to using knowledge about genetics and congenital deformity to address the disability problem. During the first half of the nineteenth century, as we have seen, naturalists continued to explore congenital deformity so as to learn more about the natural world, just as Empedocles had done over two millennia earlier. Yet as large numbers of Westerners accepted either the Darwinian notion of evolution by means of natural selection or Lamarckism—with its erroneous belief in the heritability of acquired characteristics—scientific discourse about congenital deformity experienced a radical change.\textsuperscript{140} Some scientists in the latter half of the nineteenth century began to argue that they could use genetics, combined with techniques perfected in animal husbandry and
horticulture, to improve both the physical and mental health of human beings. People with congenital deformities, who for millennia had inspired thinkers, including Charles Darwin himself, to challenge the idea that the natural world was the product of rationality or design would thus become victims of the scientific discourse of the eugenics movement that viewed congenitally deformed people as degenerates and threats to healthy, able-bodied society.

The study of eugenics originated with Sir Francis Galton, Charles Darwin’s half-cousin, who feared that society “appears likely to be drugged into degeneracy by demands that exceeds its powers.” In particular, Galton argued that several factors place “a steady check in an old civilization upon the fertility of the abler classes,” while “the improvident and unambitious are those who chiefly keep up the breed.” Although his own sister had a curvature of the spine that limited her daily activities, Galton viewed people with congenital deformities as particularly dangerous to society, arguing that in the “best form of civilization . . . the weak could find a welcome and a refuge in celibate monasteries or sisterhoods. . . .” These monasteries and convents had to be celibate, the historian of science Daniel Kevles has noted, in order to ensure that the genetically unworthy “would be unable to propagate their kind.” From its inception, then, the eugenics movement reinforced efforts to institutionalize disabled people as a means of dealing with the disability problem. The drive to institutionalize disabled people might have continued to gain momentum in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century without the advent of eugenics, but there is no question that eugenic ideas influenced many able-bodied people who viewed institutionalization, along with
eugenic practices associated with institutionalization, as a sort of panacea for the disability problem.  

By the 1920s and 1930s, support for eugenic policies had increased throughout the West, leading to compulsory sterilization laws both in the United States and Europe. In 1927, the United States Supreme Court famously upheld the compulsory sterilization of Carrie Buck, “a feeble minded woman” committed to a Virginia institution who, in turn, was “the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child.” In 1924, Virginia had passed legislation, which provided that “the health of the patient and the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives. . . .” The idea behind the law was that unsterilized “mental defectives,” if released, “would become a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and to society. . . .” The famed Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for the Court, concluded that “[i]t is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute the degenerate offspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.” Holmes supported his reasoning with one of the most chilling proclamations in the history of disability discourse: “Three generations of imbeciles is enough.” The legacy of *Buck v. Bell*, as one might expect, was a nightmare for those whom able-bodied society deemed feebleminded. According to Philip Reilly, the decision ushered in a “triumphant period for those who embraced hereditarian hopes
for social progress,” as more states passed sterilization laws and more disabled people found themselves sterilized against their will.\textsuperscript{152}

In 1933, Germany went even further than the eugenicists in American state legislatures, enacting a compulsory sterilization law “with respect to all people, institutionalized or not, who suffered from allegedly hereditary disabilities, including feeblemindedness, schizophrenia, epilepsy, blindness, severe drug or alcohol addiction, and physical deformities that seriously interfered with locomotion or were grossly offensive.”\textsuperscript{153} The Germans sterilized roughly 225,000 people over the next three years, half of whom they classified as feebleminded.\textsuperscript{154} The Nazis later justified the murder of thousands of disabled Germans in the Nazi T-4 medical killing program, an important precursor to the Holocaust, by appealing, in part, to the eugenic benefits of ridding the fatherland of so many degenerates.\textsuperscript{155}

The T-4 program, as Robert J. Lifton has noted, was not simply the product of the Nazi desire to protect the regime and the German people from the perpetuation of imperfect genes and the allocation of precious resources to people with serious mental and physical defects.\textsuperscript{156} Before the rise of the Nazis, to be sure, the most influential German works promoting the medical killing of certain types of people justified such draconian practices by pointing the benefits of ridding the state of burdensome people. In 1895, for example, Adolf Jost published \textit{The Right to Die}, in which he argued that the state must have the ability to kill certain types of people in order to keep it strong.\textsuperscript{157} Warfare, he argued, amounted to the sacrifice of thousands of people for the benefit of the state.\textsuperscript{158} He also supported medical killing, however, by claiming that it was compassionate to kill the incurably ill.\textsuperscript{159} When the jurist Karl Binding and the
psychiatrist Alfred Hoche published *The Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Life* (*Die Freigabe der Vernichtung Lebensunwerter Lebens*) in 1920, they likewise argued that disabled people were dangerous to the state.\(^{160}\) Before Germany’s defeat, Hoche had opposed medical killing, rejecting it in a 1917 article. Shortly thereafter, however, his son died in the war, and, according to Lifton, “was said to have been deeply affected by both his personal loss and the German defeat.”\(^{161}\) Indeed, Lifton explains that Hoche, “[l]ike many Germans[,] . . . felt himself experiencing the darkest of times, and the book was an expression of personal mission and a call to national revitalization.”\(^{162}\) Yet Binding and Hoche also justified medical killing by proclaiming that it was “purely a healing treatment” and a “healing work.”\(^{163}\) In his section of the book, Hoche claimed that “such a policy of killing was compassionate and consistent with medical ethics,” pointing “to situations in which doctors were obliged to destroy life. . . .”\(^{164}\) Hoche even went beyond contending that mentally disabled and physically deformed people were better off dead, arguing that such people were, in fact, “already dead.”\(^{165}\)

Binding and Hoche, Lifton observes, “reflected the general German mood during the period following the First World War.”\(^{166}\) They later became such an important influence on Nazi eugenics that Lifton has called them “the prophets of direct medical killing.”\(^{167}\) Indeed, as the Nazi regime progressed, “there was an increasing discussion of the possibility of mercy killings, of the Hoche concept of the ‘mentally dead,’ and of the enormous economic drain on German society caused by the large number of . . . impaired people.”\(^{168}\) One mathematics text, for example, asked students to determine how many loans the state could provide for newly married couples with the money it spends on “‘the crippled, the criminal, and the insane.’”\(^{169}\) The Nazis, however, apparently realized that
they might not find sufficient support for the medical killing of such people simply on the
grounds that it was economically beneficial to the state. Indeed, in the 1941 Nazi
propaganda film, *I Accuse (Ich klage an)*, which grew out of Karl Brandt’s suggestion
that there needed to be a film that would increase German support for a “euthanasia”
program, a woman with multiple sclerosis begs her physician husband to kill her so that
she will not have to suffer a horrible death. The film advocated for such mercy killings
only with the consent of the patient. The true message of the highly influential film,
however, is, as Lifton notes, “more or less subliminal—a reference, in the midst of
ostensibly thoughtful discussion, that an exception to that voluntary principle should be
made for the mentally ill, where the ‘state *must* take over the responsibility.”*170 The T-4
program itself, of course, was not a voluntary “euthanasia” program but the systematic
murder of defective people against their will.171

**Conclusion**

After the French Revolution, the study of monstrosity continued to be an
important aspect of scientific inquiry into the nature of things. Charles Darwin’s theory of
natural selection, however, would fundamentally alter how the educated elite viewed
monstrosity. Indeed, Darwin demonstrated that what people once called monstrosities
were better conceptualized as mutations indicative of progressive processes that have
resulted in the evolution of species through natural selection. Subsequent scientists would
gradually turn away from merely pondering the existence of congenital deformity when
attempting to unlock nature’s secrets, preferring, instead, to conduct experiments to
explore the precise ways in which hereditary laws and environmental factors result in
mutations.
A number of important developments, including the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the growth of capitalism, the increasing power of the medical profession, the rise of the modern nation-state, and the unprecedented industrial devastation of World War I, and the rise of the eugenics movement caused the West to reconsider how to address its disability problem. The birth of republicanism resulted in debates about whether institutions such as the Hôtel des Invalides and separate schools for deaf-mutes and the blind were compatible with a republic. The Hôtel des Invalides, to the chagrin of radical republicans, survived the republican challenge, while the grand mission of the combined school for deaf-mutes and the blind—to demonstrate how republican fraternité could overcome communication barriers that had once rendered such joint schooling impossible—resulted in abject failure. The continuing plight of disabled people with the advent of industrialization and capitalism, moreover, required states to consider providing public assistance to those disabled people in need. The medicalization of disability during the nineteenth century would alter the experience of disability by placing disabled people under the guidance of all-knowing doctors. The unprecedented number of disabled veterans who returned home from World War I, meanwhile, resulted in efforts to find meaningful ways to assist them. The eugenics movement, perhaps the most ironic development in the history of disability, would combine Darwin’s ideas about mutation and natural selection to address the disability problem by combining scientific and medical expertise with techniques perfected in animal husbandry and horticulture to eradicate the unfit from the gene pool. These developments, however, did not result in a rejection of religious and private aid to the disabled. Indeed, the long nineteenth century, notwithstanding the efforts of eugenicists,
resulted in a hybrid system, where state, religious, and private actors all sought to offer various types of assistance to disabled people, all the while creating new forms of social control with which to keep the disability problem in check.

2 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 18.
8 Ibid.
9 Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia, or, the laws of organic life, vol. 1, 2d ed., corrected (London: Printed for J. Johnson, 1796), XXXIX.4
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. Darwin added to these different types of monsters “the changes produced by the imagination of the male parents. . . .” Ibid.
12 It is difficult to determine the extent to which Erasmus Darwin influenced Charles Darwin. Indeed, Charles Darwin himself even had difficulty in determining whether his grandfather’s work influenced On the Origin of Species. In his autobiography, Charles Darwin claimed that neither his reading of Erasmus Darwin’s Zoonomia nor a discussion that he had with his grandfather about Lamarck and evolution had produced “any effect on me.” Yet Darwin acknowledged that “it is probable that the hearing rather early in life such views maintained and praised may have favoured my upholding them under a different form in my Origin of Species. At this time I admired greatly the Zoonomia; but on reading it a second time after an interval of ten or fifteen years, I was much disappointed; the proportion of speculation being so large to the facts given.” Charles Darwin, Charles Darwin’s Autobiography, ed., Sir Francis Darwin, ed. (New York: Henry Schuman, 1950), 21.
13 Darwin, Zoonomia, or, the laws of organic life, vol 1, XXXIX.4.
14 For the relationship between Hilaire and Lamarck, see Henry Fairfield Osborn, From the Greeks to Darwin: An Outline of the Development of the Evolution Idea (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1913), 157. I have not included a discussion of Lamarck’s ideas because Darwin repeatedly criticized them. In a letter to J.D. Hooker, dated January 11, 1844, Darwin proclaimed, “Heaven forfend me from Lamarck nonsense of a ‘tendency to progression,’ ‘adaptations from the slow willing of animals,’ &c! But the conclusions I am led to are not widely different from his; though the means of change are wholly so.” Charles Darwin, Charles Darwin’s Autobiography, ed., Francis Darwin (New York: Henry Schuman, 139). This does not mean, however, that Lamarck’s ideas were irrelevant during the nineteenth century. On the contrary, Lamarck’s understanding of evolution was a popular alternative to Darwin’s views for much of the nineteenth century. Yet by the first half of the twentieth century, his ideas had become so discredited that Osborn called his notion of the heritability of acquired characteristics “[t]he greatest gap in his reasoning,” which had “become obvious since [Lamarck’s] time.” Osborn, 180.
As David Kohn has explained, Charles Darwin indicated in his notebook between 1837 and 1838 that he was developing his own ideas, in part, by reading Saint-Hilaire’s comments on congenital deformity. See Charles Darwin, *Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836-1844: Geology, Transmutation of Species, Metaphysical Enquiries*, 197, B112-1.

Ibid., 311, C226e.

Ibid., 384, D161.

Ibid., 334, D11e.


Ibid., 12-3.

Ibid., 11-13.


For a recent discussion about Darwin’s views with respect to monstrosity, see Carlson, *Mutation*, 14.


For a brief discussion of the “biometric school,” its leaders, and disagreements with Darwin, see Carlson, *Mutation*, 27-31; 275-6.

See ibid., 41-3

Interview with Barton Childs, as quoted by Daniel J. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 232.

Interview with Barton Childs, as quoted by Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 232.

Kevles has come to a similar conclusion. See Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 250.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. It is difficult to determine whether Basenval had such fears before the siege of the Invalides, or whether the invalides’ actions during the siege colored his recollections.

Ibid.

Ibid., 47.


Ibid.

Ibid., 51.


Ibid.

Ibid., 52.
Ibid., 53.

Ibid.

See ibid., 53.

Ibid., 54.

Ibid., 52. Dubois-Crancé naturally responded by pointing out that an epidemic had recently stricken the Invalides and claimed, incorrectly, that over 800 invalides had died in its wake. Ibid., 54.

Ibid., 52.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Some invalides, of course, favored abolition. Chevalier, for example, wrote a pamphlet castigating the royalists within the Invalides and calling for an end to the institution. Ibid., 55.

La Feuille villageoise, No. 27, 31 mars 1791 (p. 500), as quoted in Woloch, The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration, 57.

See Woloch, The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration, 57-58. The partisan newspaper Révolutions de Paris exhorted the invalides to “flee the despotic blare of the bugle; come and instruct our future soldiers; tell them about the revolution of 1789. Teach them to serve the nation as free men.” Révolutions de Paris, No. 91, Avril 1791 (pp. 651-54), as quoted in Woloch, The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration 57-58.

Woloch, The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration, 58.

Ibid. I discuss Cordier in detail below.

Ibid., 65.

Ibid.

Ibid., 66-67.

The increases were as follows: Officers, whose average salary was 243 livres, would receive 600 livres; NCOs, whose average salary was 71 livres, would receive 200 livres; privates, whose average salary was 54 livres, would receive 150 livres. Ibid., 67.

Ibid.


Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 125.

Anne T. Quatataro, Deaf Identity and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century France (Gallaudet University Press, 2002), 14-5.

Journal de la Municipalité, as quoted by Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 123.

Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 123.

See ibid., 123.

Ibid., 124.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 124.
Ibid., 125-6.
87 Ibid., 126-8.
88 See ibid., 128.
90 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 129.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 130.
95 Ibid., 133.
96 Ibid., 130.
97 Ibid., 132.
99 Ibid., title 2, article 7, as quoted by Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 129-30.
100 Ibid., title 2, article 13, as quoted by Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 131.
101 Ibid., title 2, article 3, as quoted by Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 131.
102 Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 132.
104 Ibid., 415-6. According to Drake, Sweden and Scandinavia produced extensive welfare programs. Another group, including Britain, produced “piecemeal and rather uncoordinated services.” The United States, Canada, and Australia relied on “civil rights mechanisms” as much as “social services.” Ibid., 416.
105 For a discussion of the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor in the context of the rise of welfare for disabled people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see ibid., 415.
106 Ibid., 417.
111 For a brief discussion of the rise of the medical profession in the context of disability, see Whalen, Bitter Wounds, 60.
112 Stiker, A History of Disability, 115.
115 Ibid.
See Pearton, *Diplomacy, War and Technology Since 1830*, 155.

James M. Diehl, *The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 2. Some historians might criticize Diehl for being too quick to claim that postwar societies experience universal problems because the magnitude of specific problems can change from society to society or epoch to epoch. A postwar society from the fifteenth century, after all, almost certainly would have had different postwar problems from Germany after World War I. Medicine had advanced to such an extent by the outbreak of World War I that doctors were able to save a significant number of wounded soldiers who would have succumbed to their wounds in previous centuries. Diehl would likely respond, however, that while the magnitude of a particular problem can change from society to society, all postwar societies experience these problems to a lesser or greater extent. For a discussion of casualties in World War I in a monograph that looks specifically at disabled veterans and World War I, see Deborah Cohen, *The War Come Home* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1.

Ibid., 4.


Ibid. Philanthropy and voluntary efforts likewise played a role in money raised to construct the Star and Garter Home for Disabled Sailors and Soldiers, the Roehampton Hospital, the War Seal Mansions, [and] Lord Roberts Memorial Workshops,” even though these efforts, according to Cohen, were “insufficient to care for the majority of disabled men. . . .” Ibid., 17.

Ibid.

Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer [Horne], June 3, 1921, as quoted in Cohen, *The War Come Home*, 17.


Diehl claims that the number of casualties placed “an unbearable strain on nineteenth-century institutions for the collection and distribution of funds for the war-disabled and next of kin of those killed.” Ibid.

See ibid. For more about the need for the state to step in to help disabled veterans to deal with the carnage of World War I, see ibid, 10-11.


Ibid., 173.

Ibid.

Ibid., 173-4.

Ibid., 174.

Ibid. The civil servant was Richard Stern, the Labor Ministry’s senior civil servant. Ibid., 174.

Ibid.

Ibid., 175.

Ibid. According to Cohen, many severely disabled veterans, particularly the old lodgers of the Invalidenhaus, did not thank the Ministry of Labor for these efforts but rather became bitter foes of the Ministry in large part because of their demands for “more autonomy and special privileges.” Ibid., 176.

Ibid., 151.

Ibid.

For more on disabled veterans who resorted to begging, see ibid. According to Cohen, Germans appear to have been relatively generous in giving to such beggars. See ibid.


Ibid., 362.

Ibid (emphasis added). For a brief discussion of Galton’s early life, including his relationship with his sister, see Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 5-8.

Philip Reilly, for example, has discussed the impact of eugenics on the justification for institutionalization in the United States, which became a pioneer in the implementation of eugenics policies. According to Reilly, the first American institutions for “the feeble-minded” appeared in Massachusetts in 1848. State legislatures in New York (1851), Pennsylvania (1853), Connecticut (1855), and Ohio (1857) likewise attempted to provide more institutional care for mentally disabled people. “At first,” Reilly explains, “most arguments in favor of state-sponsored institutions were largely altruistic. But during the 1870s the superintendents of these institutions enhanced their appeals for legislative support by arguing that money spent on the so-called schools was a wise investment that would reduce the social burden of crime, prostitution, and illegitimacy that would be incurred by failing to isolate the feeble-minded.” Philip Reilly, *The Surgical Solution: A History of Involuntary Sterilization in the United States* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 12.

Reilly has rightly cautioned against assuming that doctors would not sterilize feeble-minded people in the absence of laws permitting such sterilization. Indeed, a group of physicians from Elwyn, Pennsylvania conducted a study to follow up on 270 patients sterilized at Elwyn since the 1890s. The problem, Reilly explains, is that “Pennsylvania had never enacted a law permitting sterilizations. . . .” Philip Reilly, *The Surgical Solution*, 90.


*Id.*

*Id.*, at 205-6.

*Id.* at 207.

*Id.*


Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 116.

Ibid., 117.


After World War II, the zeal with which the Nazis had pursued eugenic policies helped to discredit eugenics for many Westerners. See Marouf Arif Hasian, Jr., *The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1996), 1-2.

For the importance of protecting the genes of the fatherland, see Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors*, 46-7

Ibid., 46.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 47.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See ibid., 46.

Ibid., 47.

See ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 48.

Ibid.


Chapter 8: The Emergence of a New Type of Disability Discourse in the Long Nineteenth Century

The long nineteenth century marked the genesis of a new type of disability discourse, which Lennard Davis sees as so important for the modern experience of disability. Yet this discourse was not simply the product of modernity. The old categories of monsters, hunchbacks, cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs continued to heap stigma and discrimination on the disabled, while the emerging disability discourse of the long nineteenth century increasingly juxtaposed those categories with observations about the rapidly changing world, including how to deal with the disability problem. The result was a hybrid disability discourse that utilized both pre-modern and modern ideas about disability in categorizing the disabled. This hybrid disability discourse is evident in many of the literary depictions of disabled people during the long nineteenth century as well as in the histories and personal narratives of some disabled people.

Monsters in the Age of Science

Lord Byron, who had some type of congenital deformity similar to club foot and was thus personally acquainted with how able-bodied society treated the disabled in the first half of the nineteenth century, understood that congenitally deformed people still had to endure comparisons to monsters in his lifetime.¹ *The Deformed Transformed*, an unfinished play on which Byron was still working when he died, begins with a callous mother calling her hunchback son Arnold, in language that has long plagued people with congenital deformities, a “monstrous sport of nature.”²

A much more famous example of the use of “monster” in reference to congenital deformity came in 1831, just seven years after Byron’s death, when Victor Hugo published *Notre-Dame de Paris: 1482*, translated into English as *The Hunchback of*
Notre Dame, in which Hugo repeatedly depicts Quasimodo as a monster. Hugo, in fact, calls Quasimodo a monster in explaining how he came to Notre-Dame. Jehanne, one of the four old women staring at the abandoned Quasimodo in shock and horror, says, “The foundling, as they call it, is a regular monster of abomination.” Agnès la Herme, likewise views Quasimodo as a monster and expresses pity for the wet nurses who would have to suckle him: “Oh good gracious . . . I pity those poor nurses in the Foundling Hospital at the end of the lane, as you go down to the river, just next door to his lordship the bishop, if this little monster [monstre] is given to them to suckle. I’d rather nurse a vampire.” At this point in the novel, Hugo interjects as the narrator with his observation that there was no other way to describe Quasimodo:

In fact, “this little monster [monstre]” (for we ourselves should find it hard to describe him otherwise) was no new-born baby. He was a very bony and very uneasy little bundle, tied up in a linen bag marked with the monogram of M. Guillaume Chartier, then Bishop of Paris, with a head protruding from one end. This head was a most misshapen thing; there was nothing to see of it but a shock of red hair, an eye, a mouth, and teeth. The eye wept, the mouth shrieked, and the teeth seemed only waiting for a chance to bite.

Later in the novel, Hugo reinforces Quasimodo’s monstrous nature when describing the symbiosis between Quasimodo and his beloved bell by calling it both “monstrueuse” and a “monstre”:

All at once the frenzy of the bell seized him; his look became strange; he waited for the passing of the bell as a spider lies in wait for a fly, and flung himself headlong upon it. Then, suspended above the gulf, launched upon the tremendous vibration of the bell, he grasped the brazen monster [monstre] by its ears, clasped it with his knees, spurred it with his heels, doubling the fury of the peal with the whole force and weight of his body. As the tower shook, he shouted and gnashed his teeth, his red hair stood erect, his chest labored like a blacksmith’s bellows, his eye flashed fire, the monstrous [monstrueuse] steed neighed and planted under him; and then the big bell of Notre-Dame and Quasimodo ceased to exist . . . .
Quasimodo and his bell become “a dream, a whirlwind, a tempest; a vertigo astride of uproar, a spirit clinging to a winged crupper; a strange centaur, half man, half bell; a sort of horrid Astolpho, borne aloft by a prodigious hippogriff of living bronze.”

Quasimodo’s symbiosis with his monstrous bell ultimately reinforces his own monstrous nature, as the creature that results from the union of Quasimodo and bell is more monstrous than either of its constituent parts; Quasimodo is now monstrous in both body and spirit:

Sometimes the terrified spectator saw an odd dwarf [un nain bizarre] on the extreme pinnacle of one of the towers, climbing, creeping writhing, crawling on all fours, descending head-first into the abyss, leaping from one projection to another, and diving deep into the maw of some sculptured gorgon: it was Quasimodo hunting for crows’ nests. Sometimes a visitor stumbled over a sort of living nightmare, crouching and scowling in a dark corner of the church; it was Quasimodo absorbed in thought. Sometimes an enormous head and bundle of ill-adjusted limbs might be seen swaying frantically to and fro from a rope’s end under a belfry: it was Quasimodo ringing the Vespers or the Angelus. Often by night a hideous form was seen wandering along the frail, delicately wrought railing which crowns the towers and runs around the top of the chancel: it was still the hunchback of Notre-Dame.

Quasimodo’s monstrosity has increased through his symbiosis with the bell to such an extent that Parisians living in the vicinity of Notre-Dame begin to view the cathedral itself as a type of monster:

Then, so the neighbors said, the whole church took on a fantastic, supernatural, horrible air, —eyes and mouths opened wide here and there; the dogs and dragons and griffins of stone which watch day and night, with outstretched necks and gaping jaws, around the monstrous [monstrueuse] cathedral, barked loudly. And if it were a Christmas night, while the big bell, which seemed uttering its death-rattle, called the faithful to attend the solemn midnight mass, the gloomy façade assumed such an aspect that it seemed as if the great door was devouring the crowd while the rose-window looked on. And all this was due to Quasimodo. Egypt would have taken him for the god of the temple; the Middle Ages held him to be its demon: he was its soul.
In light of this passage, the English title of the novel, *The Hunchback of Notre Dame*, might be more appropriate than Hugo’s original title in French, *Notre-Dame de Paris: 1482*. To refer to Notre Dame in the title without reference to its hunchback was, in the context of Hugo’s novel, to identify the monstrous body—the fifteenth-century cathedral—but not its monstrous soul.

Hugo’s fictional account of the “monster” Quasimodo would soon find a real life counterpart in the person of Joseph Merrick, more commonly known as either the Elephant Man, whose “monstrous” nature was as legendary in his own lifetime as today.\(^{10}\) Merrick’s contemporaries, however, did not simply consider him to be a hideous monster. Instead, the life of Merrick demonstrates how modern disability discourse could perpetuate the old categories for particular groups of disabled people while, at the same time, exploring new solutions to the disability problem. Indeed, Merrick was not only the Elephant Man, a freak “exhibited as a grotesque monster at circuses, fairs, and wherever else a penny might be turned,” but also one of London’s most famous hospital patients.\(^{11}\)

Sir Frederick Treves, the London surgeon who rescued Joseph Merrick from hopeless indigence in 1886 after the authorities in both England and Brussels forbade his “performances,”\(^{12}\) repeatedly refers to Merrick’s monstrous nature in his memoirs, written several years after Merrick’s death. This dehumanization, in fact, may help to explain how Treves, after spending several years in close contact with Joseph Merrick, could have misremembered his name as John.\(^{13}\) Early in his memoirs, Treves indirectly compares Merrick to a monster when reminiscing about Merrick’s arrival at the hospital by pointing out that Merrick’s only possessions, save his clothes and some books, were his “*monstrous* cap and cloak,”\(^{14}\) monstrous, of course, because of the disgusting creature
that they concealed.\textsuperscript{15} Treves, moreover, observes that Merrick could never realize his dream of becoming a dandy because, in part, the deformity of Merrick’s mouth “rendered an ordinary toothbrush to no avail, and as his monstrous lips could not hold a cigarette the cigarette-case was a mockery.”\textsuperscript{16} Treves also refers to Merrick as monstrous when explaining how he and hospital staff managed to sneak Merrick into a box at the Drury Lane Theatre so that he could enjoy a popular pantomime: “All went well, and no one saw a figure, more monstrous than any on the stage, mount the staircase or cross the corridor.”\textsuperscript{17} Treves further writes that he had desperately wanted Merrick “to become a human being” by making acquaintances with men and, especially, women “who would treat him as a normal and intelligent young man and not as a monster of deformity.”\textsuperscript{18}

Treves’ particular emphasis on introducing Merrick to women may have stemmed from Merrick’s early interaction with his nurses, especially a “regrettable incident” that occurred upon Merrick’s arrival at the hospital. A nurse, having been instructed to bring Merrick some food but not informed about his appearance, entered Merrick’s room and “saw on the bed, propped up by white pillows, a monstrous figure as hideous as an Indian idol.”\textsuperscript{19} Demonstrating an appalling lack of restraint and callous disregard for Merrick’s feelings, she promptly dropped her tray and fled in terror, shrieking as she exited the door.\textsuperscript{20} Subsequent nurses did not flee from Merrick at least, but they did tend to him perfunctorily, “acting rather as automata than women.”\textsuperscript{21} Because Merrick could perceive that “their service was purely official,” they “did not help him to feel that he was one of their kind.”\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, their behavior, although they did not realize it, “made him aware that the gulf of separation was immeasurable.”\textsuperscript{23} Treves thus asked Leila Maturin, a “young and pretty widow,” to enter Merrick’s room, smile at him, and shake his hand.\textsuperscript{24}
After she had done so, Merrick broke down in near-uncontrollable sobs. Later, Merrick explained to Treves that he had broken down because this was the first time that a woman had ever smiled at him and shook his hand.25

Luckily for Merrick, as his fame spread throughout London because of newspaper coverage, he had the opportunity to interact with many other women. As Treves remembers, Merrick “must have been visited by almost every lady of note in the social world. They were all good enough to welcome him with a smile and to shake hands with him.”26 Merrick was now acquainted with “duchesses and countesses and other ladies of high degree,” who “brought him presents, made his room bright with ornaments and pictures, and, what pleased him more than all, supplied him with books.”27 Even Alexandra, Princess of Wales, the Queen, and the Queen Mother, visited him at the hospital, entering his room with a smile and shaking “him warmly by the hand.”28 According to Treves, none of Alexandra’s deeds “ever caused such happiness as she brought to Merrick’s room when she sat by his chair and talked to him as to a person she was glad to see.”29 After their initial meeting, Alexandra visited Merrick many times and sent him a Christmas card each year in her own handwriting.30 On one occasion, she sent him a signed photograph of herself, which Merrick regarded as a “sacred object,” hardly allowing Treves to touch it. Not surprisingly, other eminent women emulated Alexandra by sending their own photographs “to this delighted creature who had been all his life despised and rejected of men.”31 It was so common for kind-hearted women to send gifts to Merrick, in fact, that his “mantelpiece and table became so covered with photographs of handsome ladies, with dainty knick-knacks and pretty trifles that they may almost have befitted the apartment of an Adonis-like actor or of a famous tenor.”32
Few women, however, were able to interact with Merrick with cordiality. Shortly before Merrick’s death, Lady Knightley “offered Merrick a holiday home in a cottage on her estate,” which led to a lamentable encounter with a woman as timorous as the nurse who dropped her tray when she had seen Merrick. Upon entering the holiday cottage, the housewife, who, like the nurse, “had not been made clearly aware of the unfortunate man’s appearance,” threw “her apron over her head” and “fled, gasping, to the fields.” She later explained that “such a guest was beyond her powers of endurance for, when she saw him, she was ‘that took’ as to be in danger of being permanently ‘all of a tremble.’”33

Merrick’s life, then, did not differ in some respects from people with serious congenital deformities in previous epochs. Able-bodied people considered Merrick, as able-bodied people had long considered monstrosities before him, as less than human. There were, of course, some kind people who took pity on him, just as some people in the pre-modern world had attempted to provide assistance to the congenitally deformed in earlier times. Yet Merrick’s life also reveals tremendous changes in how able-bodied people treated such monstrosities. For millennia, some congenitally deformed people supported themselves financially by being freaks and entertainers. In the end, however, Merrick died in a hospital as a patient rather than as a circus freak, even if Merrick might have wondered whether, under the prying eyes of inquisitive doctors, he had become simply another type of spectacle for a more educated audience. Yet one wonders, despite Foucauldian notions of the modern power imbalances between doctors and disabled patients, whether Merrick, toward the end of his life, would have believed that Treves, his famous doctor, had exacerbated or ameliorated the isolation that he had long expressed in a poem based on Isaac Watts’ “False Greatness”: 345
‘Tis true my form is something odd,
But blaming me is blaming God;
Could I create myself anew
I would not fail in pleasing you.

If I could reach from pole to pole
Or grasp the ocean with a span,
I would be measured by the soul;
The mind’s standard of the man.\(^{34}\)

**Hunchbacks: “Martyrdom in the Age of Reason”?**

Hunchbacks, when they were not identified as monsters, cripples, or dwarfs, likewise continued to comprise a distinct category in the nineteenth century. Arnold, the hunchback in Byron’s *The Deformed Transformed*, represents Byron’s views— influenced by his own struggle to live as a deformed person in an able-bodied world— about the stigma and discrimination that hunchbacks experienced in their interactions with able-bodied society. In the beginning of the play, Arnold begs his mother to look past his deformity, and his mother responds by comparing him to several inhuman creatures before informing him that she does not even consider such a deformed creature her son:

*Bertha*: Out, hunchback!
*Arnold*: I was born so, Mother!

*Betha*: Out,
Thou incubus! Thou nightmare! Of seven sons,
The sole abortion!

*Arnold*: Would that I had been so,
And never seen the light!

*Betha*: I would so, too!
But as though *hast*—hence, hence—and do thy best!
That back of thine may bear its burthen; ‘tis
More high, if not so broad as that of others.

*Arnold*: It *bears* its burthen; —but, my heart! Will it
Sustain that which you lay upon it, Mother?
I love, or, at the least, I loved you: nothing
Save You, in nature, can love aught like me.
You nursed me—do not kill me!

_Bertha:_ Yes—I nursed thee,
Because thou wert my first born, and I knew not
If there would be another unlike thee. . . .

It is at this point that Arnold’s mother calls him a “monstrous sport of Nature,” after
which she commands him to “gather wood.” Before he goes to fetch the wood, the
exchange between the two demonstrates that his mother will never love him as she does
her other children.

_Arnold:_ Speak to me kindly. Though my brothers are
So beautiful and lusty, and as free
As the free chase they follow, do not spurn me:
Our milk has been the same.

_Bertha:_ As is the hedgehog’s
Which sucks at midnight from the wholesome dam
Of the young bull, until the milkmaid finds
The nipple next day sore and udder dry.
Call not thy brothers brethren! Call me not
Mother; for if I brought thee forth, it was
As foolish hens at times hatch vipers, by
Sitting upon strange eggs. Out, urchin, out.  

When his mother leaves, Arnold begins to cut the wood for her until he cuts his hand. As
he stares at his own blood, he begins to brood over the degree to which the able-bodied
people reject him on account of his deformity:

My labour for the day is over now.
Accursed be this blood that flows so fast;
For double curses will be my meed now
At home.—What home? I have no home, no kin,
No kind—not made like other creatures, or
To share their sports or pleasures.
Arnold is so upset with the able-bodied world that he comes close to echoing Richard, Duke of Gloucester, in Shakespeare’s *Richard III* when he wishes that he could somehow get even with them:

Oh that each drop which falls to earth
Would rise a snake to sting them, as they have stung me!
Or that the devil, to whom they liken me,
Would aid his likeness! If must partake
His form, why not his power?  

Arnold makes it clear, moreover, that he is angry at able-bodied people not because he is deformed and they are not but because of how they, particularly his mother, treat him. Indeed, he says that his wrath would dissipate if only his mother would treat him more kindly:

For one kind word
From her who bore me would still reconcile me
Even to this hateful aspect.

As Arnold agonizes over his treatment at the hands of a cruel world, he walks over to a spring, sees his ugly reflection, and decides to end his life:

They are right; and Nature’s mirror shows me
What she hath made me. I will not look on it
Again, and scarce dare think on’t. Hideous wretch
That I am! The very waters mock me with
My horrid shadow—like a demon placed
Deep in the fountain to scare back the cattle
From drinking therein.  

And should I live on,
A burden to the earth, myself, and shame
Unto what brought me unto life? Thou blood,
Which flowest so freely from a scratch, let me
Try if thou will not in a fuller stream
Pour forth my woes for ever with thyself
On earth, to which I will restore at once
This hateful compound of her atoms, and
Resolve back to her elements, and take
The shape of any vile reptile save myself,
And make a world for myriads of new worms!
This knife! now let me prove if it will sever
This wither’d slip of nature’s nightshade—my
Vile form—from the creation, as it hath
The green bough from the forest.  

As Arnold sets the knife on the ground with the knife pointing upwards, he offers one last
lament over his unfortunate existence:

Now ‘t is set,
And I can fall upon it. Yet one glance
On the fair day, which sees no foul thing like
Myself, and the sweet sun, which warm’d me, but
In vain. The birds—how joyously they sing!
So let them, for I would not be lamented:
But let their merriest notes be Arnold’s knell;
The fallen leaves my monument; the murmur
Of the near fountain my sole elegy.
Now, knife, stand firmly, as I fain would fall!

Just before Arnold kills himself, however, “a tall black” stranger materializes out of the
spring. When Arnold says that the stranger’s approach resembles that of “the demon,”
the man responds that it is not he but Arnold, who, on account of his deformity,
resembles the devil:

Unless you keep company
With him (and you seem scarce used to such high
Society) you can’t tell how he approaches;
And for his aspect, look upon the fountain,
And then on me, and judge which of us twain
Look likest what the boors believe to be
Their cloven-footed terror.

The stranger offers to transform Arnold into an able-bodied man in return for his soul.

When Arnold agrees to the deal, thus becoming a sort of deformed incarnation of Faust,
the stranger conjures up several phantoms representing various conquerors, generals, and
philosophers of antiquity, instructing Arnold to choose one as his new form. After
rejecting the forms of Julius Caesar, Alcibiades, Socrates, Marc Antony, and Demetrius
Poliocetes, Arnold ultimately settles on the form of Achilles. The stranger, however, informs Arnold that just as he has assumed the form of Achilles someone else must assume his former hunchback form. When Arnold decides that the stranger should assume the form, the stranger responds that he will forever be at Arnold’s side as a haunting reminder of what he once was:

_ Stranger_: In a few moments
   I will be as you were, and you shall see
   Yourself for ever by you, as your shadow.

_ Arnold_: I would be spared this.

_ Stranger_: But it cannot be.
   What! Shrink already, being what you are,
   From seeing what you were?  

Unfortunately, Byron did not live long enough to finish his play, and thus we can rely only on second-hand information about how Byron would have concluded it. Nevertheless, _The Deformed Transformed_, even in its unfinished state, offers a remarkable look at the psyche of a deformed poet who always felt a sense of exclusion from the able-bodied world because of his disability. _The Deformed Transformed_, after all, parallels Byron’s own life in at least one crucial respect. As Byron’s associate Thomas Moore once explained, Bertha’s harsh treatment of Arnold in _The Deformed Transformed_ was an autobiographical indictment of Byron’s own mother. When Arnold laments the cold words of his mother, then, we get a glimpse of how Byron viewed his own mother and his own struggles with the stigma accompanying deformity.  

James Sheridan Knowles’ most well-known work, _The Hunchback_ (1832), begins with a group of disrespectful able-bodied people mocking Walter, a hunchback. After the Earl of Rochdale dies, Walter, his elderly agent, comes to find to the presumptive heir.
When Walter, the true heir, arrives, he tells the group to pay their respects to the dead before celebrating the presumptive heir’s good fortune. A man named Gaylove promptly responds by calling Walter a knave and mocking his deformity. Walter responds to the hateful words by challenging him to a duel:

Walter: Reflect’st thou on my shape?
Thou art a villain!

Gaylove: Ha!

Walter: A coward, too!
Draw! *(Drawing his sword)*

Gaylove: Only mark him! how he struts about!
How laughs his straight sword at his noble back.*46

Sir Thomas Clifford, finding little humor in Gaylove’s behavior, intervenes. Walter, however, is angry about Clifford’s attempt to save him and complains bitterly about his treatment by able-bodied people:

Walter: How know you me for Master Walter? By My hunchback, Eh!—my stilts of legs and arms, The fashion more of ape’s, than man’s? Aha! So you have heard them too—their savage gibes As I pass on,—“There goes my Lord!” aha! God made me, Sir, as well as them and you. 'Sdeath! I demand you, unhand me, Sir.'*47

Clifford remains calm, however, and saves Walter’s life by convincing him that the group is “not worth your wrath.”*48 Yet even after the danger has passed, Walter demonstrates how self-conscious he is about his deformity by asking Clifford in a more subdued manner whether knew his name because of his deformity:

Walter: I pray you, now,
How did you learn my name? Guess’d I not right?
Was’t not my comely hunch that taught it you?

Clifford: I own it.*49
Much to Walter’s delight, however, Clifford tells Walter that his good character has obscured his deformity:

But when I heard it said
That Master Walter was a worthy man,
Whose word would pass on ’change, soon as his bond;
A liberal man—for schemes of public good
That sets down tens, where others units write;
A charitable man—the good he does,
That’s told of, not the half: I never more
Could see the hunch of Master Walter’s back.  

Walter is so pleased with both Clifford’s words and deeds that he decides to repay Clifford’s kindness by helping him procure a wife, saying, “You’ll bless the day you serv’d the Hunchback, Sir!” Walter introduces Clifford to Julia, and the two become engaged. 

The life of Søren Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher and first existentialist, reveals that the stigmatization and discrimination of hunchbacks that permeates Byron’s *The Deformed Transformed* and Knowles’ *The Hunchback* were not mere literary inventions. His life also reveals, however, how print capitalism was creating new media through which able-bodied people could mock the disabled. Kierkegaard was a hunchback and cripple who had extremely thin and weak legs. Kierkegaard’s physical disabilities may have been congenital birth defects, which could have manifested as late as puberty. When Kierkegaard was born, after all, his father was fifty-six and his mother was forty-five, which would have significantly increased the chances of congenital birth defects. In addition, some have suggested that the Kierkegaard family may have had a genetic predisposition to congenital birth defects. Kierkegaard’s second cousin, Hans Peter Kierkegaard, was born with severe congenital defects. In the words
of Hans Brøcher, Hans Peter was “wholly handicapped, wholly paralyzed on the one side, and a complete cripple.” Some of Kierkegaard’s associates, however, may have attributed his disabilities to an accident. Henriette Lund, Kierkegaard’s niece, speculated that Kierkegaard’s hunchback could have resulted from a childhood back injury that he sustained after falling from a tree while vacationing in Buddinge Mark, a village north of Copenhagen. In any case, whatever the cause of Kierkegaard’s hunchback and thin legs, Kierkegaard’s journals suggest that his disabilities were prevalent, at least in inchoate form, by childhood or early adolescence. As Kierkegaard lamented in one journal entry, “[t]o be a strong and healthy person who could take part in everything, who had physical strength and a carefree spirit—oh how often in earlier years I have wished that for myself. In my youth my agony was frightful.”

Kierkegaard’s journals demonstrate the profound pain and humiliation that he experienced on account of his disabilities. Yet Kierkegaard’s journals cannot be taken as an absolute, authoritative source for Kierkegaard’s feelings on any subject, let alone how he coped with being Copenhagen’s eccentric hunchback. It is quite possible that the real Kierkegaard, the person that Kierkegaard tried to obscure from the readers of his journal entries, suffered even more intensely in private. Indeed, in one of his more famous journal entries, Kierkegaard wrote, “After my death, this is my consolation: No one will be able to find in my papers one single bit of information about what has really filled my life; they will not find the inscription deep within me which explains everything, which often makes what the world would call bagatelles into events of enormous importance to me, but which I, too, view as insignificant when I remove the secret note that explains everything.” Nevertheless, Kierkegaard’s journals unquestionably give us a great deal
of insight into the life experiences of a nineteenth-century hunchback who, like Alexander Pope 100 years earlier, participated in the able-bodied public sphere and paid a heavy emotional price for doing so.

Although Kierkegaard struggled his entire life to fit into able-bodied society, his suffering took a disastrous turn in 1846 when the Danish tabloid *The Corsair* began to lampoon his disabilities. Kierkegaard’s enemies, as Pope’s enemies had likewise done to him, ushered in a new period in Kierkegaard’s already difficult life by transforming his private anguish into public spectacle. Print capitalism, however, had transformed the medium through which Kierkegaard’s detractors could attack him. Whereas Pope’s enemies had to publish works intended for a highly sophisticated audience to attack the famous poet’s character, *The Corsair* mocked Kierkegaard through a series of jejune caricatures that even the most uneducated members of society could understand and enjoy. One caricature depicts Kierkegaard as a “bent-over little fellow spraddled across a young woman’s shoulders.” 62 Another features Kierkegaard on horseback, “where he sat as crooked as the Devil, wearing a top hat, looking totally out of balance.” 63 In another, Kierkegaard is making his way through the doorway to *The Corsair’s* offices, and then back out, “impotent and bedraggled, with all his deformities.” 64

It is no exaggeration to say that in *The Corsair’s* caricatures, Kierkegaard’s lopsided body was laid bare for all of Denmark to contemn and ridicule. Indeed, as a result of these attacks, Kierkegaard was scarcely able to embark on his beloved peregrinations around Copenhagen without being assaulted by throngs of jeering miscreants. Kierkegaard bitterly complained that he was “deprived of ordinary human rights, was abused with indignities every day,” and considered himself a “wretched
plaything for the amusement even of schoolchildren.” But it was not only schoolchildren that scorned him. Kierkegaard complained that “[e]very butcher boy believes that he is almost entitled to insult me on orders issued by *The Corsair*; the young university students grin and giggle and are happy that a prominent person is trampled down; the professors are envious and secretly sympathize with the attacks, repeating them, though of course they add that it is a shame.” The abuse was so bad that even Kierkegaard’s nephew, Troels Frederick Lund, avoided him. One day, Troels remembered, he saw Kierkegaard on the street and ran to say hello when he “heard some passerby say something mocking about him and saw a couple of people on the other side of the street stop, turn around to look at him, and laugh. His one trouser leg really was shorter than the other,” a common joke about Kierkegaard that proliferated because of *The Corsair*’s caricatures, “and I could now see for myself that he was odd-looking. I instinctively stopped, was embarrassed, and suddenly remembered that I had to go down another street.”

As Joakim Garff, Kierkegaard’s authoritative biographer has noted, Kierkegaard “again and again attempted to escape from his humiliation by making light of the matter,” once again demonstrating the affinities between the life experiences of Pope and Kierkegaard. In one entry, for example, Kierkegaard writes, “I am accustomed to terrors other than the childish one of being drawn with . . . alarmingly thin legs of a less-than-obscure philosopher.” In another, Kierkegaard proclaims, “I commit myself to writing a much different sort of witty articles about myself and my legs than [Aron] Goldschmidt [editor of *The Corsair*] is capable of.” In yet another entry, one that Kierkegaard repeatedly rewrote, Kierkegaard points out that
Petrarch believed he would be immortalized by his Latin writings, and it was his erotic poetry that did it. Fate treats me even more ironically. Despite all my diligence and my efforts, I have not been able to fathom what it was the times required—and yet it was so close at hand. It is inconceivable that I did not discover it by myself, that someone else had to say it: It was my trousers. . . . Were they red with a green stripe or green with a red stripe?\textsuperscript{71}

Other journal entries demonstrate the extraordinary suffering Kierkegaard endured because of his disabilities, particularly after \textit{The Corsair}'s sustained attack against him. Shortly before his death, Kierkegaard writes in one entry, “They have all laughed at me, some good-naturedly, some maliciously—in brief in the most various of ways, but all have laughed.”\textsuperscript{72} In another journal entry, Kierkegaard lashes out at Goldschmidt, \textit{The Corsair}'s Jewish editor, in an embittered anti-Semitic diatribe. “\textit{The Corsair},” Kierkegaard proclaims,

is of course a Jewish rebellion against the Christians (the opposite of a pogrom) and against other Jews if they will not accept \textit{The Corsair}'s notion of respect. . . . Because, look over there in the cellar entrance, there he sits, the idea of \textit{The Corsair}, the dominator, he himself the enforcer, the bookkeeper, the cellarman, the vagabond prince, the userer Jew or whatever you want to call him…. So let us get these talents out into the open and see what they can do. Let them write on the same terms on which other authors write; one on one, using their real names without hiding in the cellar—then I will fritter away even more hours on a polemic of this sort.\textsuperscript{73}

In many respects, this “polemic” is not unlike the sophomoric caricatures in which \textit{The Corsair} had lampooned Kierkegaard’s deformities; indeed, just as \textit{The Corsair} had attempted, and largely succeeded, in publicly humiliating Kierkegaard by appealing to the public’s proclivity to ridicule the disabled, so too did Kierkegaard intend to appeal to the public’s anti-Semitism to discredit and humiliate \textit{The Corsair}'s editor. Goldschmidt, after all, was well known in Denmark for struggling to live as a Jew in a Christian society. At a Danish nationalist gathering in 1844, after being provoked by a converted Jew, he shouted from the podium, “I am a Jew. What am I doing among you?”\textsuperscript{74} A year

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later, he wrote *A Jew*, under the pseudonym Adolf Meyer, which was fairly successful, even appearing in an English translation. In *A Jew*, which Kierkegaard read soon after its publication, the main character encounters a great deal of discrimination from Christian society and ultimately becomes a usurer. *The Corsair*, then, was not the only combatant in the *Corsair* affair that could exploit its enemy’s insecurities in order to win an argument, albeit Kierkegaard, unlike *The Corsair*, ultimately decided not to publish his acrimonious attacks.

The unpublished attacks against Goldschmidt did not end there. In a journal entry entitled “The Squint-Eyed Hunchback,” Kierkegaard constructs an elaborate tale, which, as Garff has noted, first appears to be about Kierkegaard because it contains so many autobiographical parallels but soon dissolves into another attack on Goldschmidt. The opening paragraph of “The Squint-Eyed Hunchback,” offers an unmistakable glimpse into Kierkegaard’s feelings about struggling to live as a disabled person in an able-bodied world and, in particular, the pain and humiliation that resulted from the *Corsair* affair.

“There are at least three observations about the squint-eyed hunchback that seem, to some extent, to have been autobiographical. First, *The Corsair*’s malicious attacks had isolated Kierkegaard greatly from Copenhagen society, albeit not to
the extent of the squint-eyed hunchback’s isolation. Although Kierkegaard continued to associate with many friends and acquaintances after the Corsair affair, he clearly felt that something had changed. “The least thing I do, even if I merely pay a visit to someone,” Kierkegaard complained, “is mendaciously distorted and repeated everywhere. If The Corsair learns of it, it prints it, and it is read by the entire population.” According to Kierkegaard, any man he visited would find himself in such an embarrassing situation that he “almost becomes angry with me.” Kierkegaard concluded that he would ultimately “have to withdraw and associate only with people I don’t like, for it’s almost a sin to associate with the others.” Second, even before The Corsair’s attacks, Kierkegaard had experienced excruciating depression over his disabilities. Accordingly, while Kierkegaard may not have agreed with the squint-eyed hunchback that the only truly unhappy people are squint-eyed and hunchbacked people, Kierkegaard certainly would have agreed that hunchbacks experience far more melancholy than the average, able-bodied person. Third, like the squint-eyed hunchback, Kierkegaard’s exhibited considerable sympathy for disabled people through his relationship with his severely deformed second cousin, Hans Peter Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard, who was well known for keeping visitors “a flight of stairs away,” gave Hans Peter special permission to visit him at any hour of the day. When asked what the two disabled cousins discussed, Hans Peter responded, “Mostly . . . things pertaining to the Kingdom of God. He is so unspeakably loving and understands me so well. . . .” In a letter to Hans, Kierkegaard demonstrated that love and understanding. “Above all,” he instructs his cousin, never forget the duty of loving yourself. Do not let the fact that you have in a way been set apart from life, that you have been hindered from taking an active part in it, and that in the eyes of the dim-witted and busy world, you are superfluous—above all, do not let this deprive you of your notion of yourself, as
if, in the eyes of all-knowing Governance, your life, if it is lived in inwardness, did not have just as much significance and worth as every other person’s.  

Kierkegaard even attempted to provide as much physical assistance as possible to significantly deformed Hans, who recognized that Kierkegaard’s own disabilities made the task exceedingly difficult: “I am really afraid to make use of [Kierkegaard’s] arm when he offers it to me to help me into my carriage.”

It is impossible to determine whether the final sentence of the “Squint-Eyed Hunchback’s” introductory paragraph, which tells of a broken engagement, is likewise autobiographical. Kierkegaard was engaged to Regine Olsen and did break off the engagement after one year. But there is no evidence whatsoever either from Kierkegaard or his acquaintances that his disabilities played any role in the break-up. Nor did Regine herself discuss Kierkegaard’s impairments in connection with the broken engagement. Nevertheless, it remains an intriguing question whether the taunts that accompanied Kierkegaard’s disabilities may have factored into Kierkegaard’s decision to leave Regine. It is unimaginable that the observant Kierkegaard would not have perceived at least some taunts regarding his engagement with Regine. One wonders, however, whether Kierkegaard would have ended his engagement with Regine simply because his relationship offended the sensibilities of “the dim-witted and busy world.” Yet because neither Kierkegaard nor Regine ever attributed the broken engagement to Kierkegaard’s disabilities, there is simply no way of ascertaining whether there was any connection. We are left only to ponder Peter Munthe Brun’s claim that Regine once told him that “[f]rom what she said it was very clear that her understanding of the matter was that it had been a genuinely profound and personal matter for S.K. [Kierkegaard], and that he had suffered greatly in breaking off the engagement.”
Kierkegaard’s struggle to find acceptance in able-bodied society caused Kierkegaard to search for some type of divine purpose behind his disabilities, just as Voltaire had believed that Pope had searched for a reason for his own deformities. Even without his disability, Kierkegaard may have felt a strong connection to Jesus Christ. The Kierkegaard family believed that Kierkegaard’s father had done something to bring about a curse upon the family by transgressing God in his youth. The family further believed that none of the seven Kierkegaard children would live past the age of thirty-three, the age of Jesus at his crucifixion, and that their father would outlive them all.\(^88\) For a time, the children did indeed seem destined to die in accordance with the “curse.” Five of the seven children died before their father, all before their thirty-fourth birthdays.\(^89\) It is not surprising, therefore, that the “curse” was for Kierkegaard a sword of Damocles that seemed to draw closer and closer to his neck with each passing year and each tragic death until Kierkegaard’s father suddenly died and both Kierkegaard’s older brother and Kierkegaard himself subsequently reached the age of thirty-four. A journal entry on Kierkegaard’s thirty-fourth birthday, dated May 5, 1847, demonstrates Kierkegaard’s fear and trembling regarding the “curse”: “How strange that I have turned thirty-four. It is utterly inconceivable to me. I was so sure that I would die before or on this birthday that I could actually be tempted to suppose that the date of my birth has been erroneously recorded and that I will still die on my thirty-fourth.”\(^90\)

Kierkegaard’s disability, however, clearly heightened his perceived connection with Jesus. At times, Kierkegaard pondered whether God had granted him his genius in order to compensate for his less-than-human existence. Kierkegaard wrote in one journal entry, ”Slight, thin, and weak, denied in almost every respect the physical basis for being
reckoned as a whole person, comparable with others; melancholic, sick at heart, in many ways profoundly and internally devastated. I was granted one thing: brilliant intelligence, presumably so that I would not be completely defenseless.”  

At other times, Kierkegaard claimed that God had afflicted him with deformities in order to make him a brilliant philosopher and champion of Christianity. According to Kierkegaard, if “Christ now [returned] to the world he would perhaps not be put to death, but would be ridiculed. This is martyrdom in the age of reason. In the age of feeling and passion, people were put to death . . . . A martyrdom of ridicule is what I have really suffered.”  

For Kierkegaard, just as Jesus had suffered martyrdom to save mankind, God had foreordained Kierkegaard’s martyrdom so that people might know the true meaning of Christianity: “Thus I believed myself to have been sacrificed because I understood that my sufferings and my torments made me resourceful in exploring the truth, which in turn could be beneficial to other people.”  

Kierkegaard thus sincerely believed that he “would never have succeeded in illuminating Christianity in the way that has been granted me, had all this not happened to me.”  

As Kierkegaard explained, suffering “has not made me unproductive,” but rather “has indeed developed my literary productivity, and yet it has permitted me to experience the sort of isolation without which one does not discover Christianity. . . . No, no, one must in fact be acquainted with it from the ground up, one must be educated in the school of abuse.”  

**Cripples: New Forms of Stigma and Discrimination**  

As the *Corsair* affair demonstrated with the hunchback and cripple Kierkegaard, cripples continued to comprise a category ripe with stigma and discrimination during the nineteenth century. Some of the literary depictions of cripples, moreover, demonstrate
that the growing power of doctors and scientists was beginning to affect the way in which able-bodied society viewed and treated cripples. In *Madame Bovary*, for example, Gustave Flaubert explores the growing intrusion of nineteenth-century doctors into the lives of disabled people. In that novel, Homais, an apothecary and friend of Charles Bovary, learns about an experimental surgery to correct club foot and convinces Charles to perform the operation on Hippolyte, a local stable-boy with club foot. 

Hippolyte, however, is understandably reluctant to submit his body to an experimental surgery and resists. Hippolyte does not even feel that his club foot warrants a surgery because, like Lord Byron, he has learned to compensate physically for his deformity. Indeed, Flaubert explains that Hippolyte “was constantly to be seen . . . jumping round the carts, thrusting his limping foot forwards. He seemed even stronger on that leg than the other. By dint of hard service it had acquired, as it were, moral quality of patience and energy; and when he was given some heavy work, he stood on it in preference to its fellow.”

Homais, desperate to convince Hippolyte to agree to the surgery, attempts to use his deformity to shame him. Homais proclaims that the surgery is for Hippolyte’s benefit, explaining that whether Charles cures him “doesn’t concern me. It’s for your sake, for pure humanity! I should like to see you, my friend, rid of your hideous caudication, together with that waddling of the lumbar regions which whatever you say, must considerably interfere with you in the exercise of your calling.” Homais then tries to convince Hippolyte that being able-bodied will make him “more likely to please women,” a claim that makes Hippolyte “smile heavily.” Homais even challenges Hippolyte’s manhood, asking, “Aren’t you a man? Hang it! What would you have done if you had to go to the army, to go and fight beneath the standard?” Hippolyte continues to resist until several prominent members
of the town intervene and convince him to have the experimental surgery. “The poor fellow gave way,” Flaubert explains, “for it was like a conspiracy. Binet, who never interfered with people’s business, Madame Lefrançois, Artémise, the neighbors, even the mayor, Monsieur Tuvache—every one persuaded him, lectured him, shamed him; but what finally decided him was that it would cost him nothing.”

Flaubert uses the aftermath of the surgery to criticize doctors for being too cavalier with the lives of the disabled. At first, everything seems normal as Homais and Charles contemplate how the surgery could make them famous. Homais, in fact, issues a press release in which he proclaims that “[t]he novelty of the attempt, and the interest incident to the subject, had attracted such a concourse of persons that there was a veritable abstraction on the threshold of the establishment [where Charles performed the operation]. . . .” Homais also expresses the medical spirit of the age in the press release, asking, “Is it not time to cry that the blind shall see, the deaf hear, and the lame walk?” With this unbridled optimism in the power of medicine to cure the disabled, Homais informs the public that he will keep it “informed as to the successive phases of this remarkable cure.” Soon, however, things begin to go horribly wrong as Hippolyte’s leg becomes infected. Canivet of Neufchâtel, a renowned surgeon, comes to the town to save Hippolyte’s life and learns what Charles and Homais have done to his patient. After concluding that he will have to amputate Hippolyte’s leg, Canivet goes to Homais’ shop “to rail at the asses who could have reduced such a poor man to such a state.” When he arrives at the shop, Canivet “shakes Monsieur Homais by the button of his coat,” berating him for his appalling disregard for Hippolyte’s well-being: “These are the inventions of Paris! These are the ideas of those gentry of the capital! It is like
strabismus, chloroform, lithotrity, a heap of monstrosities that the Government ought to prohibit. But they want to do the clever, and they cram you with remedies without troubling about the consequences. We are not so clever, not we!”

Doctors and surgeons, Canivet asserts, are “practitioners; we cure people, and we should not dream of operating on any one who is in perfect health. Straighten club-feet! As if one could straighten club-feet! It is as if one wished, for example, to make a hunchback straight!”

In the end, Canivet amputates Hippolyte’s leg, and Hippolyte must learn how to walk with a wooden prosthesis.

Émile Zola’s *L’Assommoir*, which appeared just over 20 years after Flaubert’s *Madame Bovary*, likewise shows how the stigma and discrimination associated with cripples were beginning to assume slightly different forms in the mid to late nineteenth century. The protagonist, Gervaise, is a cripple who “limped with the right leg,” particularly when she was tired. Nothing occurs in Gervaise’s face-to-face interactions with able-bodied people that could not have occurred in earlier epochs in the history of the West, which demonstrates the longevity and continuity of the various categories of disabled people. In the beginning of the novel, for example, when Gervaise’s lover, Lantier, does not come home one night, she confronts a woman who has seemingly been aware of Lantier’s amorous indiscretions. Gervaise accuses the woman of having seen Lantier the night before, calling him her husband even though they were not yet married. The woman responds by mocking the idea that a disabled woman such as Gervaise could find a husband: “Her husband! Oh that’s rich, that is! Madame’s husband! As if she could catch a husband with a bandy leg like hers!” As the novel progresses, Gervaise demonstrates that she has internalized such mockery, concluding that her disability has
indeed made her sexually undesirable. When Coupeau makes advances on Gervaise, he recognizes that her disability has affected her self-esteem. He tries to reassure her that her disability does not matter to him, telling her that “it’s hardly anything, it doesn’t show at all.” Gervaise, however, remains somewhat exasperated that an able-bodied man could be attracted to her: “She shook her head; she knew well it showed; she’d be bent double by the time she was forty. Then with a little laugh she added gently: ‘You’ve funny tastes, to fancy a girl who limps.’”

Gervaise’s interactions with Coupeau’s sister, Lorilleux, suggest that there was a good reason for Gervaise to fear what able-bodied people thought of her sexuality in light of her disability. Lorilleux and most of Lorilleux’s friends repeatedly mock Gervaise’s disability throughout the novel. On one occasion, Lorilleux and her friends are in the midst of a conversation when they pause to look at Gervaise and call her Banban, a pejorative term for a person with a limp: “She broke off to point at Gervaise, who was limping badly because of the sloping pavement. ‘Just look at her! I ask you! Banban! The nickname Banban ran through the group like wildfire. Laughing meanly, Lorilleux said that was what she should be called.” Madame Lerat, “never at a loss for a suggestive remark, calls Gervaise’s leg a ‘love pin,’ adding that lots of men liked such things, though she refused to explain further.” For Lerat, then, Gervaise could not be sexually attractive because she was a pretty young woman who happened to have a limp but rather because some men viewed her disability as a sexual fetish.

Yet *L’Assommoir* also demonstrates how the rapidly changing world of the nineteenth century was in the process of transforming some aspects of disability discourse in at least three ways. First, Zola discusses Gervaise’s congenital deformity in a
manner that would become commonplace among eugenicists. Zola attributes Gervaise’s deformity to her father’s propensity to make love to her mother in a violent, drunken stupor: “And even her bit of a limp came from the poor woman, whom Père Macquart was forever beating half to death. Time and again her mother had told her about the nights when Macquart came home blind drunk and made love so brutally that he almost broke her bones, and certainly she, Gervaise, with her gammy leg, must have been started on one of those nights.”¹¹⁵ The naturalist Zola, of course, is not suggesting that the moral depravity of Macquart’s act has resulted in a divinely caused physical affliction, as Christians during the Middle Ages might have surmised, but rather that hereditary laws suggested by Lamarck had resulted in her deformity, just as other eugenic failings had contributed to the decline of other members of the Rougon-Macquart family.¹¹⁶

Gervaise’s limp, then, represents a new, scientific way of viewing congenital deformity that was gaining momentum throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, albeit Lamarckism itself would soon become obsolete. Indeed, Gervaise’s disability is a mark of biological and behavioral shame, proof that she and her family are trapped in an ongoing descent into degeneracy.

The second way in which L’Assommoir alludes to changes in disability discourse is the recognition among Zola’s characters that doctors and surgeons were providing new opportunities to solve the disability problem by surgically “curing” disabled people. When Gervaise and Coupeau rent a shop, Gervaise runs “back and forth between the Rue Neuve and the Rue de la Goutte-d’Or” throughout the day so quickly that she no longer appears disabled. Those who know her are so amazed by her gait that they assume that she must have been surgically cured of her deformity: “Watching her racing nimbly
along, so elated that she no longer limped, people in the neighbourhood said that she must have had an operation.”\textsuperscript{117} Such assumptions almost certainly would not have prevailed in earlier centuries, when doctors and surgeons still knew relatively little about the human body. As we saw in chapter 3, however, after William Cheselden developed a surgical cure for cataracts in the eighteenth century, people gradually began to gain faith in the corrective powers of doctors and surgeons. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the medical profession had garnered so much power and prestige that Zola felt it perfectly reasonable for his characters to assume that Gervaise must have benefitted from surgical intervention.

The final way in which \textit{L’assommoir} addresses the new aspects of disability discourse in the nineteenth century is by discussing the need for the government to intervene to help disabled workers. At one point in the novel, Père Bru complains that he can no longer work because of the wear and tear of hard labor on his body. He attributes his sorry lot in life to the fact that he is not yet dead: “Yes, it’s my own fault. When you can’t work no more you should just lie down and die.”\textsuperscript{118} Lorilleux chimes in to support Bru, wondering “why the government doesn’t do something to help disabled workmen. I was reading about it in a newspaper the other day. . . .”\textsuperscript{119} Poisson, however, interjects to “stand up for the government,” pointing out that “[w]orkmen aren’t soldiers. . . . The Invalides is for soldiers . . . There’s no point asking the impossible.”\textsuperscript{120}

Friedrich Engels had previously expressed similar concerns for disabled workers in the industrial age, attacking the capitalist mode of production in \textit{The Condition of the Working Class in England} by blaming factories and mills for the sorry sight of cripples on the streets of England. “I have seldom walked through Manchester,” Engels asserts,
“without seeing three or four cripples whose deformities of the spine and legs were exactly the same as those described by Mr. Sharp of Leeds.”

Engels had no doubt that it was capitalism that was causing such disabilities, arguing that “[i]t is easy to identify such cripples at a glance, because their deformities are all exactly the same. They are knock-kneed and deformed and the spinal column is bent either forwards or sideways.”

Engels supported his claims by pointing both to a cripple whom he knew personally and accounts from “relatives of all these cripples,” who had “unanimously declared that these deformities were due to excessive work in the factories.” Implicit in Engels critique of capitalism’s cripples, of course, is the notion that workers could be free from this type of exploitation only if they came together to hasten the demise of the capitalist mode of production. It is easy to see, then, how Otto von Bismarck’s plan to provide workers with social welfare programs, including disability insurance, deprived socialists and Marxists of some of their most effective rhetoric against what they perceived to be the evils of capitalism. Indeed, both Lorilleux’s call for increased government intervention to protect disabled workers and Engels attack on capitalism suggest that the disability problem in the industrial age was fast becoming too great for governments to ignore.

If Poisson was correct that disabled veterans could expect assistance from their governments while disabled workers could not, the unprecedented industrial carnage of World War I would demonstrate that providing meaningful assistance to disabled veterans in the age of modern warfare would be no easy undertaking. After the war, the West attempted, often in vain, to come to grips with the horrors of trench warfare and a world populated by war-cripples in various ways. In the process of trying to make sense of the unprecedented carnage, literary figures often depicted the disabled as wretched
souls no longer fit for the lives they once knew. Mary Louise Roberts, for instance, has recently pointed to the fictional Olivier Mauret, a soldier who returns from the war after having lost an arm and an eye in Jean Dufort’s *Sur la route de lumiére*, to examine changing gender roles after World War I. Her discussion, however, demonstrates that World War I and its aftermath was as important for disability discourse as it was for gender discourse. Mauret’s fiancée, Roberts explains, “in whom he has placed all hope of happiness, is repulsed by his mutilated body. Throughout the course of the novel, she increasingly withdraws and finally rejects him totally.”

Mauret learns, then, that disabled veterans, despite their sacrifices for their particular nation, have become anathemas to many people, including even some of their loved ones, on account of their mangled bodies.

In *Disabled*, Wilfred Owen, a soldier-poet from World War I who died in combat shortly before the armistice and catapulted to fame posthumously for *Dulce et Decorum Est*, describes the wretched life of a veteran with multiple amputations to convey the true cost of modern warfare for those who have to wage it on the front lines. The poem begins by explaining the severity of the veteran’s injuries and how they have confined him to a hospital; he now wastes away the remainder of his meaningless days while listening to sounds of life from the world outside that no longer has a place for him:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{He sat in a wheeled chair, waiting for dark,} \\
\text{And shivered in his ghastly suit of grey,} \\
\text{Legless, sewn short at elbow. Through the park} \\
\text{Voices of boys rang saddening like a hymn,} \\
\text{Voices of play and pleasure after day,} \\
\text{Till gathering sleep had mothered them from him.}
\end{align*}
\]

As the boys depart, he pines for the days when he was able to enjoy the company of a woman, recognizing that he will never again have the opportunity to do so:
About this time Town used to swing so gay
When glow-lamps budded in the light blue trees,
And girls glanced lovlier as the air grew dim,—
In the old times, before he threw away his knees.
Now he will never feel again how slim
Girls’ waists are, or how warm their subtle hands;
All of them touch him like some queer disease.\textsuperscript{128}

\textit{Disabled} ends by illuminating the bleakness of the veteran’s existence as he waits helplessly for someone to come and put an end to his miserable evening:

Now, he will spend a few sick years in institutes,
And do what things the rules consider wise,
And take whatever pity they may dole.
To-night he noticed how the women’s eyes
Passed from him to the strong men that were whole.
How cold and late it is! Why don’t they come
And put him into bed? Why don’t they come?\textsuperscript{129}

Embedded in Owen’s observations about the veteran’s now-wretched life is Owen’s epiphany that war-cripples have lost far more than their limbs to modern warfare and modern medicine; in many ways, they have lost their freedom to a medical establishment that claims to have specialized knowledge about how war-cripples should live. The veteran, who enlisted to fight the Germans not because the state coerced him into doing so but because he chose to do go of his own free will, has become a patient who must do “what things the rules consider wise, / And take whatever pity they may dole.” No longer are the disabled controlled by the clergy who dole out alms in exchange for obedience to God but a by a medical apparatus that doles out treatment and kindness so long as patients do what doctors and nurses conclude is necessary to preserve not only their own bodily and psychological health but also the health and morale of society.

Elsewhere in the poem, as Owen seemingly ponders the difference between nationalistic propaganda promising soldiers that the home front is behind them with every
fiber of its being and the reality of a homecoming with little fanfare and recognition for
the limbs left behind on the battlefield, he directly addresses the status of the traditional
relationship between Christian charity and the disabled in the modern age. Despite how
eagerly the disabled veteran marched off to the war that would destroy his life, he
received anything but a hero’s welcome home:

Some cheered him home, but not as crowds cheer Goal.

Only a solemn man who brought him fruits

Thanked him; and then inquired about his soul.  130

Although Owen says nothing else about the “solemn man,” possibly a Christian minister,
who came to offer fruits to the veteran, the encounter demonstrates that the rise of the
modern nation-state did not entirely sever the old ties between Christian charity and the
disabled. Indeed, there was still desperate need for Christian charity in the aftermath of
World War I, even as the war lay bare the human costs associated with the unbridled
nationalism of modern nation-states and the new medical apparatus that was taking
shape, in part, to care for its victims.

Erich Maria Remarque, also a veteran of World War I, likewise used the fear of
amputation and hospitals in All Quiet on the Western Front to explore the physical and
emotional carnage of trench warfare. After Paul Braümer carries his friend Albert Kropp
to safety, Braümer witnesses a number of terrifying sights in the hospital, including
“spine cases, head wounds and double amputations.”  131 Braümer is horrified to see that
many of the wounded soldiers “have their shattered limbs hanging free in the air from a
gallows; underneath the wound a basin is placed into which drops the puss.”  132 The
surgeon’s clerk even shows Braümer “X-ray photographs of completely smashed
hipbones, knees and shoulders.”  133 The wounds are so severe that it is easy to forget “that
above such shattered bodies there are still human faces in which life goes its daily round.” To make matters worse, Braümer recognizes that “this is only one hospital, one single station; there are hundreds of thousands in Germany, hundreds of thousands in France, hundreds of thousands in Russia.”

For Remarque, military hospitals are the greatest testament to the madness that drove Western Civilization to the brink of collapse. Indeed, so many tragedies play out in military hospitals that soldiers who have been hospitalized can no longer make sense of the world. “How senseless,” Braümer wonders, “is everything that can ever be written, done, or thought, when such things are possible. It must be all lies and of no account when the culture of a thousand years could not prevent this stream of blood being poured out, these torture-chambers in their hundreds of thousands.” Braümer’s stay in the hospital has such a tremendous impact on him that he ultimately concludes that “[a] hospital alone shows what war is.”

For Remarque and his characters, returning home from the hospital as a wretched cripple is among the most terrifying consequences of modern warfare, particularly since they understand that surgeons often perform operations to make their jobs easier rather than to provide medically necessary treatment for their patients. Once Braümer and Kropp arrive at the dressing station, for instance, they fear that the surgeons will needlessly amputate their wounded legs. According to Braümer, “everyone knows that the surgeons in the dressing stations amputate on the slightest provocation” because it is “much simpler than complicated patching.” As Braümer decides to resist any attempt by the surgeons to chloroform him, he thinks about his friend Kemmerich, who died shortly after having his leg amputated. Kropp has even more reason to fear amputation.
because his wound is slightly above his knee and is not responding well to treatment. On one occasion, a few moments after Braümer mentions returning home, Kropp responds, “I’ve made up my mind . . . if they take off my leg, I’ll put an end to it. I won’t go through life as a cripple.”⁴⁰ Braümer, of course, could say something to Kropp to let him know that life is still meaningful even as a cripple, but he says nothing. Instead, the two friends merely “lie there with [their] thoughts and wait.”⁴¹ Both Kropp and Braümer recognize the difficulties that await them at home if they become cripples; there is no reason for Braümer to pretend otherwise. Many soldiers recovering from such wounds in hospitals throughout Europe no doubt shared their concerns and wondered whether the life of a disabled veteran, a life marred by difficulties in finding both meaningful work and a loving wife, would be worth living or whether war-cripples truly would be better off dead.⁴²

When the surgeons eventually do take Kropp’s leg, he continues to contemplate suicide. As Braümer and Kropp convalesce in the same room, Braümer contemplates Kropp’s declining mental state. “It is going badly with Albert,” Braümer observes. “They have taken him and amputated the leg. The whole leg has been taken off from the thigh. Now he will hardly speak any more. Once he says he will shoot himself the first time he can get hold of his revolver again.”⁴³ Over time, Kropp’s physical health improves and Braümer thinks about what the future will hold for his friend. “Albert’s stump heals well. The wound is almost closed,” Braümer notes. Yet Braümer worries that Kropp “continues not to talk much, and is much more solemn than formerly. He often breaks off in his speech and stares in front of him. If he were not here with us he would have shot himself long ago.”⁴⁴ Braümer does recognize that Kropp’s initial shock at having become an
amputee might subside over time. Indeed, he sees that Kropp “is over the worst of it,” and even “often looks on while we play skat.” Ultimately, it is in “an institute for artificial limbs,” where Kropp will likely go “in a few weeks,” that Kropp will learn whether he can salvage some kind of meaningful life despite his disability.

Braümer soon learns, however, that the battlefield is not a soldier’s only means of becoming a cripple. Instead, he comes to realize the extent to which some surgeons, confident in their surgical abilities and eager to perform experiments on soldiers who are powerless to stop them, will put their own interests over the health of their patients. When two wounded soldiers arrive at the hospital, the chief surgeon learns, to his great delight, that they are flat-footed. He tells the two soldiers, as Homais and Charles tell Hippolyte in *Madame Bovary*, that “we will just do a small operation, and then you will have perfectly sound feet.” When the surgeon leaves, another patient warns them to resist the surgery at all costs: “Don’t you let him operate on you! That is a special scientific stunt of the old boy’s. He goes absolutely crazy whenever he can get ahold of anyone to do it on.” The patient tells them that the surgery will cure them of their flat feet but will give them “club feet instead,” requiring them “to walk the rest of your life on sticks.” The patient reminds them that their flat feet give them no trouble in the field and that there is simply no reason to operate on them. “At present you can still walk,” he admonishes them, “but if once the old boy gets you under the knife you’ll be cripples. What he wants is little dogs to experiment with, so the war is a glorious time for him, as it is for all the surgeons.” Although one decides to agree to the surgery because there is “no telling what you’ll get if you go back out there again” and, in his opinion, it is “[b]etter to have a club foot than be dead,” the other decides against it. Yet the next
day, “the old man has the two hauled up and lectures and jaws at them so long that in the end they consent. What else could they do?—They are mere privates, and he is a big bug.”

Indeed, the soldier who initially refused to consent to the surgery ultimately proves as unable to resist the growing power of the medical establishment as Flaubert’s Hippolyte.

**Deaf-Mutes and the Blind: Both Stigma and Innovation**

Deaf-mutes and the blind continued to be distinct categories of disability ripe with stigma and discrimination, despite the efforts of Epée, Haüy, and likeminded philanthropists. Sicard, Epée’s successor, employed negative stereotypes about the deaf that had circulated in the West since classical antiquity in order to gain support for his educational mission. In particular, Sicard harkened back to classical antiquity in arguing that education for the deaf was critical because they lacked the capacity for rational thought in their “natural state.”

He contended that “a congenital deaf-mute . . . before some kind of education has begun . . . is a perfectly worthless being, a living automaton . . .” He even argued that a deaf-mute in his or her natural state “is but an ambulant machine whose organization is inferior to that of animals,” proclaiming that the deaf-mute “does not even possess that sound instinct that leads animals.” He likewise belittled the capacity of the deaf to empathize with others, just as Diderot had done with respect to the blind in his *Letter on the Blind*, proclaiming that “no affection for anything outside himself ever enters the deaf [person’s] mind” and that, for deaf children, “virtues, like vices, are without reality.”

Sicard contended, therefore, that his method of educating the deaf would “pacify this beast, humanize this savage,” and inculcate to deaf children the “rights and duties” of citizens. Sicard, of course, was not alone in his harsh
judgments about the intellectual capacity of deaf mutes. In *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development*, the eugenicist Galton concluded that deaf-mutes even lacked the capacity to understand the concept of religion, writing that religious rituals in churches “touched no chord in their untaught natures. . . .”

As Epée’s successor, however, Sicard was a person who exercised tremendous control over efforts to educate deaf-mutes in France, particularly in Paris, and was thus a person whose judgments about the deaf held particular sway with the hearing community.

In any event, Sicard’s observations about the deaf are so harsh to modern observers that some scholars in recent years, most notably Anne Quartararo, have rightly pointed out that Sicard seemingly disdained the very people whom he purported to help. Yet Sicard’s view of savagery, education, language, and civilization were part of a greater movement in Europe during the nineteenth century. As Eugen Weber famously demonstrated in *Peasants into Frenchmen*, much of Europe’s educated elite likewise viewed the uneducated peasantry as savages, sometimes even comparing them to animals. Many people belonging to the educated classes, moreover, believed that education was one of the best means of teaching peasants how to be civilized. Accordingly, when Sicard attempted to raise deaf-mutes out of their “natural state” of inferiority by providing them with access to the language of hearing society, he was simply doing, albeit in an egregiously patronizing manner, what others in his class felt was best for other uneducated classes. This is not to argue, of course, that Sicard made no contributions to negative stereotypes about the deaf; to argue that a whole class of people lack the power of reason in their natural state is to view them as animals. Disability scholars, however, should recognize that Sicard did not create a wholly *sui generis*
educational model for deaf students but rather combined methods designed to educate deaf-mutes with an emerging model of educating other groups of internal “savages.”

Blind people likewise had to endure the prying eyes and patronizing judgments of sighted people held in high regard in educated circles. In *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development*, for instance, in an inquiry somewhat reminiscent of Descartes, Molyneux, Locke, and Diderot, Galton examined whether blind people truly do have some kind of “compensation for the loss of their eyesight” in the form of “increased acuteness of other senses.” It was not his conclusion that blind people do not have such an advantage that was indicative both of negative stereotypes about the blind but and a fundamental misunderstanding of the experience of blindness, but rather the way in which he supported that conclusion. Galton, like Diderot over a century earlier, relied on anecdotal evidence of his personal interactions with blind people to inform his judgments about the mental capacities of the blind. According to Galton, he had met two blind people who claimed that blindness had heightened the sensitivity of their other senses. Galton was frustrated to learn that those two blind people did not want to participate in his sensory experiments, complaining, “I used all the persuasion I could to induce each of these persons to allow me to put their assertions to the test; but it was of no use. The one made excuses, the other positively refused.” Later, he wrote that they both likely had “the same tendency that others would have who happened to be defective in any faculty that their comrades possessed, to fight bravely against their disadvantage, and at the same time to be betrayed into some overvaunting of their capacities in other directions.” These two blind people “would be a little conscious of this,” he concluded, “and would therefore shrink from being tested.” It apparently never occurred to Galton that his
proposed test subjects may not have wanted to be the guinea pigs of a sighted scientist who was skeptical of their purported abilities.

Perhaps the worst stereotype that plagued blind people during the long nineteenth century, however, was the notion that their disability made them helpless. Weygand, for example, describes the life of Thérèse-Jacqueline Parent, a congenitally blind woman, who found herself without family members to care for her. In the margins of a letter to the Minister of the Interior seeking her admission to the Quinze-Vingts, a municipal official emphasized her helplessness apparently in an attempt to bolster the request’s chance of success: “Since her grandmother’s death, she no longer has close relatives who can feed and take care of her. Let us note that it would be dangerous to leave this young person with no means of support to the mercy of events, especially in a city filled with soldiers, sailors, and an infinite number of foreigners.” Wealth, of course, could make a blind person’s existence far less precarious because wealth could afford them some measure of security. While poor blind people could find themselves destitute if they did not have family members to care for them, the wealthy could afford “enough domestics to provide the necessary help to ensure a well-run household. . . .” Yet the notion of helplessness remained even in these circumstances; wealth brought blind people security primarily because it enabled them to hire sighted servants to do what they could not do themselves on account of their blindness. The stereotype of the helpless blind person remained so strong after the French Revolution that Weygand has suggested that Sicard may have prevailed over Haüy in their battle for control over the combined institute for deaf-mutes and the blind because of prejudices about the helplessness of the blind.
Negative stereotypes about the blind continued to abound in the aftermath of World War I. In *All Quiet on the Western Front*, as Braümer and Kropp convalesce, they encounter two blind veterans, one of whom decides that suicide is preferable to blindness. When the two blind soldiers arrive in their room, one actively seeks to kill himself by any means necessary. He is so eager to put an end to his misery, in fact, that “[t]he sisters never have a knife with them when they feed him; he has already snatched one from a sister.”

On one occasion, “while he is being fed, the sister is called away, and leaves the plate with the fork on his table. He gropes for the fork, seizes it and drives it with all his force against his heart, then he snatches up a shoe and strikes with it against the handle as hard as he can.” He manages to drive the “blunt prongs” deep into his flesh and, by morning, suffers from lock-jaw. Now, the blind veteran, once a musician, can neither see nor speak. For Remarque, this is the miserable existence that awaits the soldier-victims of modern warfare. For blind people, however, the use of blindness to express the true horrors of war in the industrial age may seem to be a yet another example of sighted people assuming the worst about the experience of blindness.

Although negative stereotypes about deaf-mutes and the blind could be bad enough during this period, most people in the hearing and sighted community would have considered the deaf-blind to be wretched and helpless creatures wholly unequipped for life. Some philanthropists, however, agreed with Diderot that educators simply needed to adapt their methods in order to provide such people with the advantages that an education could bring. Just as Sicard had depicted the deaf as “savages” in their “natural state,” public discussions of the two most famous deaf-blind people of the nineteenth century, Laura Bridgman and Helen Keller, often assumed that they were animal-like “savages”
who underwent a “miraculous” transformation by receiving an education. The overseers of Bridgman’s and Keller’s instruction, of course, reinforced this belief by disseminating information about the amazing intellectual growth of their famous pupils before an inquiring public.

To some observers, Bridgman’s and Keller’s publicity might have appeared to be something akin to freak shows, where hearing and sighted philanthropists exploited Bridgman and Keller by thrusting them into the public eye, knowing that negative stereotypes would bolster their claims of “miraculous” intervention. Yet the people in charge of Boston’s Perkins Institution for the Blind when Bridgman and Keller received their educations there, despite the power imbalances between them and their students, may well have felt as trapped by the negative discourse surrounding the mental capabilities of the deaf and blind as Bridgman, Keller, and other students with significant hearing or vision problems, concluding that making Bridgman and Keller famous was the only way to convince an ignorant hearing and sighted community that it should not condemn the deaf-blind people to solitary existences. In any case, the educators associated with Bridgman and Keller pragmatically followed the precedents of Epée, Haiiy, and Sicard, all of whom had successfully demonstrated the abilities of their students in order to gain public support for their philanthropic efforts. The demonstrations of the eighteenth century, after all, had increased public awareness of the intellectual capabilities of deaf-mutes and the blind. Accordingly, they may rightfully have concluded that it was a necessary evil to thrust Bridgman and Keller into the public spotlight in order to take the first steps toward enabling the deaf-blind to take their rightful place at the table of humanity.
In 1837, more than forty years before the birth of Helen Keller, the parents of Laura Bridgman, who had lost her hearing, sight, sense of smell, and sense of taste after contracting scarlet fever as a toddler, placed their daughter in the care of Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe, director of Perkins Institution for the Blind in an attempt to give her the ability to communicate better with the world. Howe had been publicly displaying the blind since 1832 and eagerly embraced the opportunity to share Bridgman’s accomplishments with the world. Charles Dickens, who toured the Perkins Institution in 1842 was so impressed with Bridgman that he devoted most of his chapter on Boston in his *American Notes* to Howe’s work and Bridgman’s abilities. Not surprisingly, Dickens’ writings on Bridgman helped to make her famous throughout Europe and the United States.

Few people today remember the remarkable life of Laura Bridgman. Helen Keller has long since supplanted her in the minds of Westerners as the person who demonstrated to the hearing and sighted public the intellectual capacities of deaf-blind people, so long as educational systems were willing to accommodate their unique needs. Keller’s contemporaries, however, were well aware of her connection to Bridgman. In 1888, the Perkins Institution published its fifty-sixth annual report, *Helen Keller: A Second Laura Bridgman*, written by its director, Michael Anagnos, who observed that “[i]n many respects, such as intellectual alertness, keenness of observation, and vivacity of temperament [Keller] is unquestionably the equal to Laura Bridgman.” In some ways, however, Keller outperformed Bridgman. In other ways, such as “quickness of perception, grasp of ideas, breadth of comprehension, insatiate thirst for solid knowledge, self-reliance and sweetness of disposition,” Aganos claimed, “she clearly excels her
 prototype [Bridgman]. . . .” It is little surprise, then, that when Keller’s teacher, Anne Sullivan, came to Keller’s house the year before the Perkins Institution published Anagnos’ report, she brought a doll from the institution’s blind children that Keller later learned had been dressed by Bridgman. The doll, in retrospect, represented a symbolic passing of the torch from Bridgman to Keller, with the former dying just two years later.

Once Sullivan began to teach Keller, of course, her famous pupil’s life began to parallel Bridgman’s earlier experiences in significant ways. Advocates for improving the education of both the blind and the deaf believed that Keller, like Bridgman, could help their respective causes. Anagnos used Keller’s fame to promote the agenda of the Perkins Institution just as Dr. Howe had relied on Bridgman’s notoriety to gain public support for Perkins Institution fifty years earlier. Alexander Graham Bell, the inventor of the telephone, similarly recognized that the public’s infatuation with Keller could increase support for efforts to provide the deaf with better educations. In 1888, he gave a New York newspaper Keller’s picture along with a letter that she had written to him. In 1891, he wrote that the public, “through her, may perhaps be led to take an interest in the more general subject of the Education of the Deaf.” Whereas Laura Bridgman counted Charles Dickens among her greatest admirers, moreover, Mark Twain claimed that the two most interesting people of the nineteenth century were Napoleon and Helen Keller. As Dorothy Herrmann has recently explained, the American and European public apparently agreed, enthusiastically following her exploits, including pictures of her in newspapers reading Shakespeare. Indeed, Keller was so famous and articulate that she was able to provide the hearing and sighted world with glimpses into the complexities of her existence by publishing her own works.
The experiences that Keller shared with an inquisitive public, however, did reinforce some negative stereotypes about deaf-blind people. In explaining her own bleak existence before Anne Sullivan began to teach her, for example, Keller corroborated the common sentiment during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the life of a deaf-blind person would necessarily be lonely, perhaps even animal-like, without an education.183 “Have you ever been at sea in a dense fog,” asked Keller in *The Story of My Life*,

when it seemed as if a tangible white darkness shut you in, and the great ship, tense and anxious, groped her way toward the shore with plummet and sounding-line, and you waited with beating heart for something to happen? I was like that ship before my education began, only I was without compass or sounding line, and had no way of knowing how near the harbour was.184

At the same time, the deaf-blind prodigy demonstrated that people like her were every bit as capable of rational thought as hearing and sighted people, so long as society would provide them with an education. Keller, and to a lesser extent Bridgman, demonstrated that Diderot had been correct all along in arguing that the prejudices of the hearing and sighted world, particularly the refusal to refine methods to educate the deaf-blind, were responsible for their “animal-like” lives rather than some inherent, intellectual deficiency caused by their particular type of disability.

**Dwarfs: The Waning of Dwarfism as Entertainment?**

Dwarfs, like the other categories of disability, continued to encounter a great deal of stigma and discrimination during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although the court dwarfs, such as Joseph Boruswlaski who died in 1837, were fast disappearing, many dwarfs continued to find employment in freak shows and circuses through the first half of the twentieth century.185 The little person Charles S. Stratton, born just a year after
Boruswlaski’s death, found considerable fame and wealth under the stage name General Tom Thumb in P.T. Barnum’s traveling circus.\textsuperscript{186} He was so famous that he came out of retirement to help Barnum when he found himself in financial difficulty because of bad investments.\textsuperscript{187} Yet the question of whether able-bodied society should continue to gawk at deformed freaks, many of whom were little people, remained. Buffon and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire had previously argued that even court dwarfs were wretched, degraded people.\textsuperscript{188} The same, of course, could be said of performers like Stratton and, especially, dwarfs in smaller freak shows who could never hope to attain the same levels of wealth and fame of Boruswlaski and Stratton. Freak shows gradually became an anathema to “civilized” society, as an increasing number of the middle class began to conclude that it was inhumane to allow deformed freaks to humiliate themselves for the pleasure of able-bodied gawkers.\textsuperscript{189}

It was this turn of events that left Joseph Merrick, the Elephant Man, without any place to go before Treves rescued him and brought him to his hospital. By the time that Tod Browning, director of \textit{Dracula} (1931), which starred Bela Lugosi, directed \textit{Freaks} (1932), a failure at the box office, it was obvious that freak shows were losing some of their appeal. The dwarfs and other disabled people who once performed at circuses and freak shows almost certainly found themselves less economically secure after they could no longer perform. Twentieth-century observers, however, were slowly coming to the conclusion that they could no longer tolerate such inhumane treatment in the guise of entertainment. As disability scholars such as Lennard Davis have demonstrated, however, the “kindness” that replaced the inhumane treatment of freak shows in the twentieth century “ended up segregating and ostracizing” them, along with other disabled people,
“through the discursivity of disability.” Davis and others with Foucauldian proclivities, however, should not conclude that the modern discursivity of disability created negative stereotypes about dwarfs, the quintessential “sports of nature.” Indeed, their marginalized existence as entertainers and court jesters throughout much of the history of the West was every bit as demeaning as the able-bodied “kindness” of the modern age, even if some dwarf entertainers managed to amass considerable wealth.

In recent years, the resurgence of freakshows, particularly on television, YouTube, and other forms of multimedia, may ultimately signify a rejection of twentieth-century values about dwarfs and freakshows. The television program *Freakshow*, which features dwarfs and other “freaks,” was so popular that AMC renewed it for a second season. Now that able-bodied people can gawk at freaks from the security of their own homes, without having to encounter the disapproving glances from those who disagree with such forms of entertainment, it appears that many able-bodied people seem eager to return to a time when freaks entertained them. Freakshow performers themselves, however, would likely point out that able-bodied audiences are not exploiting them but rather learning about a subculture that has always been associated with disability.

**Conclusion**

The long nineteenth century witnessed the creation of a new type of disability discourse, one that combined the ancient categories for disabled people—monsters, hunchbacks, cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs—with observations about the rapidly changing world, including ideas about congenital deformity and the disability problem. Indeed, the emerging disability discourse of the nineteenth century was not, as some might assume, the product solely of modernity but rather a combination of pre-
modern and modern ideas about disability, practices with respect to disability, and
categories that had long exacerbated the stigma and discrimination that disabled people
have had to endure throughout the recorded history of the West.

According to Peter Quennell, Lord Byron had an ambulatory impairment, possibly club-foot, but it is
“difficult to gauge the extent of his lameness; its origin and precise character have not yet been diagnosed.”
Peter Quennell, *Byron: The Years of Fame: Byron in Italy* (London: Collins, 1974), 47-48. During Byron’s
lifetime, his impairment was so famous that it was the subject of an article by H. Cameron, “The Mystery
of Lord Byron’s Lameness,” in *The Lancet*, March 31, 1923. Visual depictions have not shed any light on
his impairment. Joseph-Denis Odevaere’s 1826 painting, *Lord Byron on his Death-bed*, for example, has a sheet
covering Byron’s deformed right foot.

Letters, Journals, Etc.* (Hartford: Silus Andrus & Son, 1847), 345.

monstre d’abomination que ce soi-disant enfant trouvé.” Victor Hugo, *Notre-Dame de Paris: 1482 in
Gallimard (Gallimard, 1975), 140. I have provided the original French for Quasimodo’s abandonment so as
to give French readers a sense of *monstre* in a French context.

Hugo, *The Hunchback of Notre Dame*, 145-46. Ah mon Dieu! s’écriait Agnès, ces pauvres nourrices qui
sont là dans le logis des enfants trouvés qui sont là ruelle en descendant la rivière, tout à côté de
monseigneur l’évêque, si on allait leur apporter ce petit *monstre* à allaiter! J’aimerais mieux donner à téter à

Hugo, *The Hunchback of Notre Dame*, 146. “En effet, ce n’était pas un nouveau-né que <<ce petit
monstre>>. (Nousserions fort empêché nous-même de le qualifier autrement.) C’était une petite fort
anguleuse et fort remuante, emprisonnée dans un sac de toile imprimé au chiffre de messier Guillaume
Chartier, pour lors évêque de Paris, avec une tête qui sortait. Cette tête était chose assez difforme. On n’y
voyait qu’une forêt de cheveux roux, un oeil, un bouche et des dents. Le oeil pleurait, la bouche criait, et


Ibid., 159.

Ibid., 160. It is interesting that Hugo calls Quasimodo un nain bizarre here after Henrietta la Gaultière
refers to him as an énormité.

Ibid., 160-61.

Stanley Kauffmann, in a review of Bernard Pomerance’s play, *The Elephant Man*, clearly saw a
connection between Quasimodo and Joseph Merrick. Indeed, Kauffmann approved of Pomerance’s
decision not to use make-up for the actor portraying Merrick because it “would make Quasimodo look like
Puck.” Peter W. Graham and Fritz H. Oehlschlaeger, *Articulating the Elephant Man: Joseph Merrick and
His Interpreters* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 86.


1980), 11-12. For a discussion of similar problems phénomènes experienced in France during the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see Diana Snigurowicz, “The Phénomène’s Dilemma: Teratology
and the Policing of Human Anomalies Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth-Century Paris,” in *Foucault and the

based on Treves’ memoir despite other memoirs that correctly remembered Joseph Merrick’s name. In his
memoir, Treves explains, “I learnt nothing about the Elephant Man, except that he was English, that his
name was John Merrick and that he was twenty-one years of age.” Treves, *The Elephant Man and Other
Reminiscences*, 9. For a discussion of how Joseph Merrick became John Merrick for over 70 years based
on this mistake, see Michael Howell and Peter Ford, *The True History of the Elephant Man* (London: Allison & Busby, 1980), 25-6. Howell and Ford also dispelled the notion that Merrick was merely fantasizing about his mother, Mary Jane Merrick, when he spoke fondly about his childhood with her. According to Treves, she had “basely deserted him when he was very small,” proving what a “[w]orthless and inhuman” mother she was. Treves, *The Elephant Man and Other Reminiscences*, 15. Merrick, Treves maintained, had merely constructed idealized memories of her in order to deal with the pain of abandonment: “Mothers figured in the tales he had read and he wanted his mother to be one of those comfortable lullaby-singing persons who are so lovable.” Ibid., 15. Accordingly, Treves believed that Merrick was merely dreaming when he observed that his deformities were unexpected in light of his mother’s beauty: “‘It is very strange, for, you see, mother was so beautiful.’” Ibid. Howell and Ford, however, demonstrated that although Merrick was seriously deformed, he was, in fact, capable of remembering the nearly eleven years he spent with his loving mother until she died of bronchopneumonia. Howell and Ford, 71. Interestingly, Merrick’s mother, Mary Jane Merrick, “was herself a cripple.” Howell and Ford, *The True History of the Elephant Man*, 55.

14 Treves, *The Elephant Man and Other Reminiscences*, 17
15 Treves repeatedly calls Merrick a “creature.” See, e.g., ibid., 7, 8, 16, 20, 21. He also refers to him as disgusting. See ibid, 8.
16 Ibid., 22.
17 Ibid., 24.
18 Ibid., 18.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. According to Treves, the hospital subsequently sought out “volunteer nurses whose ministrations were somewhat formal and constrained.” Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 19.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 20.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 21.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 345-6.
40 Ibid., 346.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 347-48.
43 Ibid., 349.
44 See Quennell, *Byron: The Years of Fame*, 50.


Ibid., 6-7.

Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 7.

Ibid., 8

Ibid., 12.

The two break off their engagement, but Walter reveals his identity toward the end of the play to ensure that the two lovers wind up married. Ibid., 116-18.


Garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, 298.

Ibid., 429.

Ibid.

Ibid., 100-101.

Ibid., 400.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 414.

Ibid., 415.

Ibid., 417-8.

For Garff’s observations about Kierkegaard, see ibid., 407.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 408.

Ibid., 417.

Ibid., 408.

Ibid., 384-5.

Ibid., 385.

Ibid., 409.

Ibid.

Ibid., 414.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 297.

Ibid.

Ibid., 298.

Ibid., 297.

Ibid., 185-90.

Kierkegaard even claimed that Regine Olsen’s sister, Cornelia, was in love with him, further complicating the matter. See ibid., 189.

Encounters with Kierkegaard, 43.
Kierkegaard, in fact, had always felt that he was in some way connected to Jesus. The Kierkegaard family believed that Kierkegaard’s father had done something to bring about a curse upon the family by transgressing God in his youth. The family believed that none of the seven Kierkegaard children would live past the age of thirty-three, the age of Jesus when he was crucified, and that their father would outlive them all. Ibid., 136-37. For a time, the children did indeed seem destined to die in accordance with the “curse.” Five of the seven children did indeed die before their father, all before their thirty-fourth birthdays. Ibid., 346. It is not surprising, therefore, that the “curse” was for Kierkegaard a sword of Damocles that seemed to draw closer and closer to his neck with each passing year and each tragic death until Kierkegaard’s father suddenly died and both Kierkegaard’s older brother and Kierkegaard himself subsequently reached the age of thirty-four. A journal entry on Kierkegaard’s thirty-fourth birthday, dated May 5, 1847, demonstrates Kierkegaard’s fear and trembling regarding the “curse”: “How strange that I have turned thirty-four. It is utterly inconceivable to me. I was so sure that I would die before or on this birthday that I could actually be tempted to suppose that the date of my birth has been erroneously recorded and that I will still die on my thirty-fourth.” Ibid., 137.


118 Ibid., 219.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., 219-20.
122 Ibid., 173.
123 Ibid.
125 I consider Mauret a war-cripple even though he lost an arm rather than a leg because such disabled veterans, as the fictional account of Mauret’s life suggests, could experience the same types of stigma and discrimination as disabled veterans who lost their arms.
128 Ibid., 77 (7-13).
129 Ibid., 78 (40-46).
130 Ibid. (37-39).
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., 263.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., 242.
139 Ibid., 242-3.
140 Ibid., 242.
141 Ibid.
142 Remarque does recognize that some disabilities are more serious than others.
143 Ibid., 260-1.
144 Ibid., 268.
145 Ibid.
146 See ibid.
147 Ibid., 259.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid., 260.
151 Ibid.
154 Ibid.


156 Ibid.
160 Ibid., 5.
162 Galton also came to a similar conclusion about the mental abilities of the blind. Diderot had argued that it was impossible to answer Molyneux’s question in regard to all blind people because blind people, like able-bodied people, display varying degrees of intellectual ability. Galton likewise suggested that it was impossible to access the difficulty of teaching blind people to read “by touch” because of those variations in ability. He pointed Lord Hathery, a former Lord Chancellor of England, who was able to learn to read “by touch vary rapidly” as evidence “of the sensitivity of able men.” Ibid., 31.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
168 See ibid., 134.
169 Remarque, *All Quiet on the Western Front*, 261.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 For more on how the education of these girls could depict a transformation from savage to citizen, see Ernest Freeberg, *The Education of Laura Bridgman: First Deaf and Blind Person to Learn Language* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 1-2, 14
175 Ibid., 52.
176 Ibid.
178 Ibid., 63-4.
179 Ibid., 34-5.
180 Herrmann, *Helen Keller: A Life*, 64.
182 Herrmann, *Helen Keller: A Life*, 64.
183 Even scholars today refer to the “animal-like existence” of deaf-blind children in the nineteenth century. Herrmann, for example, has observed that the deaf-blind Tommy Stringer lived a “animal-like existence” before being “rescued.” See ibid., 67.
187 Ibid.

See Bogdan, *Freak Show*, ix-xi.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Disability has a history and, in many respects, it is a familiar history. The history of disability is inextricably intertwined with the development of Western Civilization because of the importance of western ideas about disability. Two ideas about disability have been of particular importance in the western tradition: (1) the idea that there was some type of significance, whether supernatural or natural, to the existence of congenital deformity and (2) the idea that the existence of disabled people has resulted in a disability problem due to their diminished labor capacity. Yet the importance of these ideas has been hidden from us by the able-bodied purveyors of the metanarrative. In some ways, of course, it is understandable that the history of disability and disabled people have been cast into the penumbras of history. The various categories for disabled people—monsters, dwarfs, hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the deaf and dumb—have reinforced negative stereotypes about disabled people from the beginning of the recorded history of the West, influencing not only the idea that there was something significant about congenital deformity and the idea that there was a disability problem, but also contemporary attitudes about disability. When the only experience so many able-bodied people today have had with disability is the constant, linguistic bombardment of these various categories, whether in a literal or metaphorical sense, it should come as little surprise that many able-bodied scholars have assumed that disability and disabled people could not possibly have played an important role in the history of the West. How could such a wretched and marginalized people, they might ask themselves, have had a history that was important to anyone other than the disabled themselves?
Yet a reexamination of the metanarrative with disability in mind reveals entirely new dimensions to the familiar story of the development of Western Civilization. When classical philosophers attempted to understand the natural world, they looked to congenital deformity to test their ideas. The minority view of Empedocles and the Epicureans with respect to congenital deformity, that chance rather than design governed the development of living beings, were particularly important, ultimately triumphing over supernatural explanations for congenital deformity, at least among the educated elite of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Athenian disability pension system, meanwhile, was one of the earliest examples of public assistance in the West. The elder Seneca’s observations about the problem of fraud when attempting to provide public assistance to the disabled would, of course, find parallels in modern debates about public assistance and fraud. Augustine, one of the most influential of all Christian thinkers, and subsequent Christians looked to congenital deformity when vindicating “the ways of God to Man.”¹ During the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, philosophers were virtually obsessed with what congenital deformity and disability might reveal about the natural world and the nature of human beings. Indeed, if congenital deformity and disability had never existed, the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment simply could not have been the same. Congenital deformity and disability likewise played an important role in facilitating the rapid changes that wracked the West from the French Revolution through World War I. Charles Darwin, after all, studied monstrosity, what he later called mutation, when fashioning his theory of natural selection. The massive undertaking to provide medical care for disabled veterans and to rehabilitate them after World War I, meanwhile, almost certainly played a role in the expansion of state-sponsored aid to other
groups, both disabled and non-disabled alike, even if some war-time governments preferred to rely more on private and religious charity than direct public assistance.

It is unfortunate that disabled scholars themselves, whether because of Marxist or post-structuralist proclivities, have bought into the idea that disability has no pre-modern history. In attempting to understand disability in the modern world, while simultaneously fighting for the civil rights of disabled people, they have unwittingly supported the traditional, able-bodied metanarrative that disability has no history, at least before the eighteenth century. Disability scholars, most notably Lennard Davis, who see a profound transformation in the social construction of disability with the advent of capitalism or the rise of the modern nation state, are not entirely incorrect. Both capitalism and the emergence of nation-states undoubtedly altered the relationship between disabled people and their able-bodied counterparts. Disability discourse during the long nineteenth century, in fact, differed from earlier discourse by incorporating many of the rapid changes that accompanied the advent of modernity. Yet these developments did not mark a sudden epiphany, either among the disabled or the able-bodied, that people with disabilities differed from the able-bodied norm. Nor did those developments mark the beginning of efforts to categorize and control disabled people. Indeed, many of the same criticisms that Foucauldian disability scholars level at nineteenth- and twentieth-century attempts to provide public assistance to disabled people apply also to the Athenian public assistance system as described by Lysias, *The Constitution of Athens*, and Philochorus. Christian hegemony and its emphasis on almsgiving and institutional care for certain types of disabled people, meanwhile, not only reinforced the notion that disabled people were helpless but also likely provided able-bodied Christians with some measure of
control over the disabled. In conditioning aid to disabled people on their willingness to embrace Christian practices, the Church, as Edward Wheatley has argued, may indeed have been motivated, in part, by the desire to assert social control over the disabled, demonstrating that the able-bodied community, to some extent, separated the disabled from its fold not only before the rise of capitalism and the nation-state but even before Foucault’s “great confinement” of the seventeenth century.²

The ridicule that Søren Kierkegaard experienced during the Corsair affair of the nineteenth century, then, may have been slightly different from the ridicule that disabled people such as Alexander Pope had experienced a century earlier, but there are unmistakable parallels between the public lives of Pope and Kierkegaard, suggesting that there is far more continuity in the history of disability than many disability scholars today assume. Indeed, disability scholars should abandon attempts to determine precisely when able-bodied people in the West discovered that there was something unsavory about congenital deformity and disability and should focus, instead, on exploring how able-bodied people have allowed negative stereotypes about disability to impact their views of the disabled throughout the recorded history of the West. Accordingly, disability scholars should not seek to ascertain the age in which disabled people first lost their autonomy or experienced stigma but rather to determine the extent to which disabled people have lost autonomy and experienced stigma in every age.³

1 Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle 1:16.
3 Disabled people lacked autonomy throughout much of the recorded history of the West. In Sparta and Rome, people with serious congenital deformities, in theory at least, could be killed before they even reached the age of maturity. The Athenian Council, with its power to grant or withhold disability pensions, likewise possessed a great deal of control over the lives of disabled people who relied on their pensions to
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