Narrating Public Policy and Identity: The Case of SB 1070

by

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ABSTRACT

The stories that we tell matter. Public storytelling influences how we think about ourselves and how we treat others. This project explores how Arizona’s Support our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB 1070) affected the development of social identities such as citizen, immigrant (documented and undocumented), and public administrator through public storytelling. The question of how a public policy shapes identity development is relatively under-explored in the literature. Critical aspects of feminist and political theory demonstrate that identity is affected by discourses, such as performatives and accounts of oneself. A public policy authorizes public administrators to issue or demand discourses, such as performatives and accounts of oneself, from the individuals they encounter. Moreover, the text of a public policy resembles an account of oneself, delivered on behalf of a fabricated subject. In this project, the structural elements and storytelling techniques of SB 1070 are drawn out through tools derived from the field of narratology. When applied to the text of SB 1070, narratological tools reveal four major organizing principles or plots, all of which center on the identification and punishment of four types of individuals or organizations: (a) employers of undocumented immigrants; (b) transporters/shielders of undocumented immigrants; (c) undocumented immigrants; (d) state and local government agencies or officials that do not fully implement federal immigration law. An analysis of 321 news stories published after SB 1070’s passage reveals that some plots resonated more than others with storytellers. The storytelling about SB 1070 also makes visible the policy’s power as a discourse to unsettle the identities of citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and public administrators. It also raises concerns about who bears the responsibility for the
impact of policies like SB 1070, which have been passed but not implemented, and yet have a tangible impact on the lives of citizens and other residents. These findings suggest that not only can public policy unsettle social identities, but proposes complicated questions about who is responsible for the harm inflicted on others when a public policy is passed.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents without whom none of this would be possible.

Words cannot express the depth of my gratitude for your unwavering love and support.

You have been my port in every storm. I love you both very much.
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A dissertation is a labor of love, but sometimes, it is just a labor. Without the support of the following people (and many more who I am sure to miss), this project would not have been possible. I have dedicated this dissertation to my parents Dr. Retha Warnicke and Ronald Warnicke because they have provided never-ending emotional, intellectual, and financial support throughout my life and this specific project. My mother has set a standard for academic excellence that always inspires and motivates me in my own intellectual efforts. My father’s enthusiasm and desire to understand my sometimes arcane investigations has helped keep me focused and find new ways to explain my work and its implications.

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In an article published on May 22, 2010, almost one month after the passage of Arizona’s controversial new immigration policy -- the Support our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act ("Sb 1070," 2010a; "Sb 1070," 2010b) -- a reporter described the debate about the law as fiercely divided:

From one perspective, Arizona's immigration debate is about stopping a wave of criminal invaders who threaten our economy and safety.

On the other side, the state's new enforcement law will cost a fortune and create a police state reminiscent of Nazi Germany. (Groff, 2010c)

The reporter continues, noting that some “warn the debate has spun out of control” (Groff, 2010c). Indeed, it would be difficult to over emphasize the polarization of the public discourse surrounding SB 1070 in the 6 weeks after its initial passage. The early flurry of conversation about the policy eventually resulted in the passage of several substantive modifications that Governor Jan Brewer signed into law on April 30th, exactly one week after she had approved the original version of the bill. Throughout the debate, supporters and opponents of the policy repeatedly turned to arguments about crime, fiscal and personal security, racial profiling and racism to build their case for why the policy was necessary or unnecessary. They related stories about SB 1070 that addressed important questions such as what the policy was, what ends it would accomplish, who would enforce its various provisions and who it would harm (intentionally or unintentionally) in the implementation process. At the heart of these narratives, storytellers reveal their assumptions about who they think citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented) and public administrators are, how they should be treated under the law, and whether SB 1070 causes necessary or unnecessary harm to
them. Through these narratives, the discursive power of SB 1070 to influence identity development also becomes visible.

In this project, I explore how a policy such as SB 1070 influences the development of the identities of citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and public administrators. While many studies evaluate whether public policy accomplishes the tasks that government hopes to achieve (e.g., delivering rewards or punishments, inducing people to behave differently), the question of how public policy as a discourse can shape identity development is relatively under-explored. In the first half of this project, I weave together several strands of feminist and political theory to make the argument that not only can public policy be considered a narrative, but since it can take narrative form, a public policy has an unusual ability to have an impact on identity development. There are several reasons for this. First, every time a public policy is created, the People are invoked. As Catlaw (2007) argues, the People is both an exclusionary and fictional idea. The People do not exist, but to create the illusion of the People, a legislative body has to mark a group as excluded from that construct. For example, in the case of immigration policy, citizens are always the in group and undocumented immigrants are always kept-out and thus marginalized as a population. Secondly, public policy authorizes its agents to issue performatives and demand that an individual deliver an account of who he or she is and whether he or she is responsible for the harm caused to others (Butler, 1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005). Performatives are oral statements delivered by authorized government agents such as a judge that transform an individual’s identity (i.e., from an alleged criminal into a convicted criminal), and the
demand for an account of oneself is always a violent and difficult experience. Finally, a public policy also resembles an account of oneself, a statement delivered by the fictional People in narrative form that accounts for the harm caused by the People. As an official account, the propagation and repetition of this narrative promotes the exclusions established by the fabrication of the People and has an impact on the identities of those harmed by the policy as well as those who benefit from the policy.

This project also furthers our understanding of the constructed nature of the identities of citizen, immigrant (documented and undocumented), and public administrator. The comparison of the constituent elements of SB 1070 to the news stories reveals that the public fixated most on one aspect of the policy, which also reflects the academic work about SB 1070. Although SB 1070 targets employers of undocumented immigrants, transporters/shielders of undocumented immigrants, undocumented immigrants, and state and local government officials or agencies that do not fully enforce federal immigration law, the chief focus of the storytelling about the policy is the targeting of undocumented immigrants. Supporters of the policy emphasize that undocumented immigrants deserve punishment for the harms they have caused to Arizona while opponents highlight that to accomplish the goals of the policy, many law enforcement officers may resort to racial profiling. As the predominant racial or ethnic identity of undocumented immigrants in Arizona is Hispanic, the most frequently expressed concern by opponents of the policy is for how Hispanic citizens and undocumented immigrants may be harmed by the repeated demands for an account of oneself by law enforcement officers. Supporters of SB 1070 deny that such problems will
occur, but that even if they do, it is police officer’s fault since the revised version of the law stipulates that race or ethnicity cannot be considered a factor. Opponents disagree and place the responsibility for what happens next on the government agents, both elective and administrative, that make the policy and its enforcement possible. In the meantime, the storytelling about the policy also reveals that even before its implementation, members of the identities under review here -- citizen, immigrant (documented and undocumented), and public administrator -- reported feeling as if the context in which they performed their identity had changed even though no performatives had been issued nor accounts of oneself demanded.

Another contribution this study makes to furthering our understanding of how public policy has an impact on identity development is through the application of the tools of narratology to the text of the public policy itself. Although several scholars have advanced the notion that public policy can be considered a narrative, no one has evaluated the underlying structure of the narrative or broken it down into its critical pieces. The methodology employed in this project is called narratology and was initially developed by literary theorists for the purpose of analyzing novels. Narratology has evolved over time and developed a sensitivity to the concerns of post-structuralists who contend that the context of the narrative and the reader are just as important as the narrative’s structural elements when trying to build an understanding of the meaning of the narrative. For this reason, news stories from a diverse array of media outlets in Arizona that answer key questions such as -- what SB 1070 is, what it will do, who will enforce it, and who will be harmed by it -- were also collected. Incorporating these two
kinds of narrative (policy and the storytelling about the policy) provides a broader perspective on the question of what the policy states, how those statements are interpreted by the public, and what influence those interpretations ultimately have on the development of the identities of citizen, immigrant (documented and undocumented), and public administrator.

**Organization of the Project**

This project weaves together several strands of theory to relate a story about the relationship between public policy, storytelling, and social identity development. As such, it begins by establishing the importance of narrative in public administration and public policy, the procedures for an application of narratology to these fields, and then a demonstration of how feminist and political theory lay important groundwork for why investigating the relationship between a public policy and identity development is necessary. The first half of this project, then, fleshes out the theoretical and methodological groundwork for the data analysis that takes places in later chapters.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of what public administration and public policy scholars have said about narrative analysis, and why analyzing a public policy as a narrative is an important gap in the literature. The third chapter explains why narratology, the literary analysis of narratives, provides important methodological tools for public administration and public policy. Chapter 4 elaborates the final pieces of the theoretical and methodological framework for this project by pulling together ideas from feminist and political theory to make the case that public policy can be treated as a narrative and that due to its specific characteristics as a form of discourse, it has a significant influence.
not only on the interactions of public administrators with citizens and immigrants (documented and undocumented), but also on the development of their identities.

The fifth chapter begins the second part of this study, which instantiates the theoretical models established in the first portion. This chapter defines the specific policy and context that will be examined, reviews what scholars have said about the policy, and establishes the two types of data and their collection procedures, which includes the text of the two versions of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) and over 320 articles published in Arizona media outlets. Chapter 6 provides a narratological analysis of both versions of SB 1070 that reveals four major plots that guide how citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and public administrators should interact in the state of Arizona. Chapter 7 examines the extent to which the news stories collected for this project include the four plots present in SB 1070 and how supporters and opponents emphasize different aspects of these plots. In Chapter 8, I return to the question of whether the news stories provide insight into how SB 1070 works to influence the identities of citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and public administrators. In Chapter 9, I summarize the major findings of this study, including the limitations of this research and avenues for future exploration.
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

Over the last several decades, scholars in the fields of public administration and public policy have increasingly turned to analyzing narratives and methods of storytelling to shed light on administrative and policy-related topics. This chapter investigates how these scholars have defined and made use of narratives in the literature of public administration and public policy. In particular there are four main issues of importance to the larger study of narrative, policy, and identity. Scholars in the fields of public administration and public policy have employed the term narrative (and its associated synonyms such as story or tale) in a variety of manners. The first section examines how scholars have portrayed narratives and narrative analysis as valuable to public administration and public policy research.

In terms of the kind of analysis performed by scholars, for some, research and scholarly theory constitutes narrative. More commonly in the field of public administration, scholars have focused on the storytelling of practitioners and their value-laden “stories of the field.” Other scholars define narratives as the ideologies or stories that are common within political discourse, which they either hope to isolate and analyze or destabilize by developing counter-narratives. In the subsequent sections, Czarniawska’s (1998) model provides a structure for classifying narrative research in organizational studies and clarifying how scholars have defined and analyzed narrative in public administration and public policy scholarship.

The next issue explored here is how and to what extent scholars in the fields of public administration and public policy have incorporated the work of narratologists.
While most scholars have accepted the work of cognitive psychologist Bruner (1986, 1990, 1991) who claims that narrative “operates as an instrument of mind in the construction of reality” (1991, pp. 5-6), only a few scholars have mined the field of narratology for insight and those who have often turn to different narratological traditions. Yet these scholars have revealed valuable insights into the deeper structures of public narratives.

The final issue discussed in this chapter is how scholars have connected the study of narrative to the analysis of identity. In general, the fields of public administration and public policy have paid too little attention to issues of gender, race, class, sexuality, and disability. While Ospina and Dodge (2005a) argue for the importance of narrative in building a greater understanding of identity, the discussions of narrative and identity in public administration and public policy, are fractured and do not build on one another. In my conclusion, I pull together these four main strands and begin fleshing out the framework for how social identities can be examined through a narratological analysis of public policy and public narratives.

The Value of Narrative Analysis

In this section, I explore why narratives are perceived as valuable in public administration and public policy. According to scholars, narratives offer access to a vast amount of information that is necessary to building a better understanding of the world. As Roe explains (1994), “In fact, few practicing policy analysts and academics in the policy profession would disagree that stories in the bureaucracy can convey a great deal of information and fairly efficiently at that” (p. 9). Narratives and narrative analysis also
provide insights that quantitative methods and data cannot, specifically about questions of identity, morals, and values. Scholars even describe narratives as capable of rendering more of the world’s complexity than quantitative analysis can.

Narrative analysis became increasingly fashionable in the fields of public administration and public policy in the 1990s and scholars justify their excursions into narrative analysis in a variety of ways. Roe (1994), one of the most influential scholars in the subfield of narrative policy analysis, describes the importance of narrative, “I do not know how the role of power and politics in such circumstances could be analyzed without the kind of analysis of policy narratives that is developed in the following chapters” (p. 14). While Roe focuses on the critical role narratives play in illuminating how processes and structures work in public institutions and policy making, Schram and Neisser (1997), in the introduction to their edited collection of essays about narrative in politics and public policy in the United States, make an analogy between the everyday storytelling of individuals in society and the storytelling of those who govern, “just as narrative is central to people in their everyday private lives, so it is to the public affairs of the state. … Both elites and masses rely on unsubstantiated stories for making sense of what they do” (p. 1). According to this logic, storytelling exists in all parts of society and the narratives relayed by those who govern ought to be studied because “stories … are critical constitutive forces in politics and public policymaking” (p. 5).

Later scholars concur with this perspective, arguing that narratives reveal much about how people understand the political world and their roles within that realm. For example, Feldman, Sköldberg, Brown, & Horner (2004), in their study on how city plans
for organizational change are translated into the daily work life of employees, emphasize the important and ritualized role of storytelling, “Through telling their stories, people distill and reflect a particular understanding of social and political relations. Stories are a common, habitual method people use to communicate their ideas” (p. 148).

Czarniawska’s (1998) work on the development of organizational identity in government agencies in Sweden also discusses the daily storytelling of individuals in organizations and its role in enhancing communication: “Almost certainly, the greater part of organizational learning happens through the circulation of stories” (p. 8). Narratives, then, offer much for scholars to consider when evaluating political leadership, policy-making, administrative processes, the nature of public organizations, and the daily lives of those who work in those agencies.

Not only do scholars claim that narrative is critical to understanding these issues, but also that it provides a source of knowledge that cannot otherwise be accessed. Both scholars of public organizations and public policy agree on this. Czarniawska (1998) states, “it is clear that narrative offers an alternative mode of knowing” (p. 5) and Wagenaar (2011) affirms, “That is the central claim of narrative, that it is a distinct mode of knowing” (p. 209). Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2006), in an essay on the value of stories collected through fieldwork, suggest that this knowledge is missing from most quantitative research and that narratives counteract the reductionist nature of statistical analysis: “One great advantage of narrative field research is that its rich, variegated,

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1 Barbara Czarniawska (also known as Barbara Czarniawksa-Joerges) has authored a number of works in the field of organizational studies and narrative. While her first book focused on Swedish government agencies, her later work has included the private sector. However, she has continued building on the ideas first developed in her discussion of Swedish government throughout her career. Her discussion of narrative theory, organizational identity, and narratology offers much to any discussion of narrative in public life.
nuanced, and often conflicting textual information … simultaneously presents challenges
to preconceived ideas and grist for insight. Narratives retain more of the social world’s
complexity than do quantitative renderings of social life” (p. 319). Bevir (2006)
emphasizes that narratives explain actions differently than statistical analysis. Where
quantitative research hones in on causal explanations that seek to identify one single
cause for an outcome, narratives explanations focus on two kinds of connections.
Conditional connections follow how an actor’s beliefs affects the choices the actor makes
whereas volitional connections trace the actor’s desires. Bevir contends, “To explain an
action, we cannot just correlate it with a single isolated attitude; we must interpret it in
relation to a whole set of beliefs and desires” (p. 284). The alternative way of knowing
that narratives offer include details and complexities, but also connections that are often
masked in quantitative methods of creating knowledge. As Dodge, Ospina and Foldy
(2005) argue, “narratives convey meanings, narrative inquiry is concerned with
understanding intentions, beliefs, values, and emotions that reflect social reality rather
than an ‘objective reality’” (p. 290).

Dodge, Ospina and Foldy (2005) identify another unique factor of narratives and
how scholars have understood them to work, “narratives are constitutive, meaning they
are shaped by individuals for their own purposes, but at the same time, they are forces
that shape human beings and help give meaning to the social worlds they inhabit (Gergen
1985)” (p. 291). Individuals craft narratives, but the narrative creation process and the
(re)telling has an impact on the storyteller and the audience. Schram and Neisser (1997)
emphasize this dual aspect to narrative by noting that “is an important way in which
people, coalitions, and groups let others know who they are, what their interests are, and how those interests can be served” (p. 7). They also maintain, “stories are said to ‘inscribe,’ or ‘reinscribe,’ realities upon the individual body or even the collective body politic” (p. 5). Several scholars focus on how narratives that guide public policy formulation and administrative practice shape individual identity and have material ramifications for citizens, both individually and collectively. Cruikshank (1997, 1999) suggests that the story of welfare queens, however fictive, have been sustained by the policies and practices of the state: “The welfare queen is not only an ideological scapegoat and fictive character, a racial formation, but a strategic one” (1999, p. 110). Similarly, Yanow (1999, 2003) classifies public policy as a form of collective storytelling which invokes “three kinds of stories: national identity stories, group identity stories, and national origin stories. These storytelling practices are narrated and enacted through administrative apparatuses such as the census” (2003, p. xi). Narratives, whether produced by individuals or government, have a tangible impact on how we think about ourselves, reflecting the pervasive social norms in a particular group, organization, or society.

Indeed, scholar after scholar affirms the important role that stories play in communicating specific information about values and beliefs. Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) describe the value that stories have researchers as “cultural artifacts that hold, in compact form, the norms, beliefs, and decision rules that guide actions and choices. Though not immutable, they resist change, thereby making them even more useful to the social scientist looking for patterns” (p. 30). They further suggest that a
story that has been told repetitiously perhaps reflects more clearly the values of the person telling the story than the “facts” of the situation as it occurred, which is a recurrent theme throughout the interviews they gathered. Abma (1999a), the editor of a collection of essays that focuses on the role of narratives in policy evaluation, perceives narrative analysis as particularly valuable for policy evaluators because “Narratives illuminate … the value and meaning of a program or policy and indicate which actions need to be taken to improve it or how failures can be prevented in the future” (p. 4). In terms of how public policy is implemented, Wagenaar (1995) describes narratives as critical to moral decision-making in spite of the fact that scholars and practitioners of public policy and public administration have adopted a value-neutral language. He maintains, “values are never understood by the worker in a pure, abstract, sense, disconnected from the welter of detail that make up a case. Instead, ‘facts’ and ‘values’ merge in the process of organizing detail into a coherent and meaningful whole” (pp. 101-102). Thus, the process of creating a story is critical to making sense of a situation. Hummel (1991) takes this point a step further, suggesting that storytelling is not simply a factor in decision-making, but critical to how managers communicate with each other: “In sum, managers first and foremost communicate through stories that constitute or construct their world. How could it be otherwise?” (p. 39).

It is in this sense that stories (re)create the worlds of the storyteller for the audience. As Stone (2012/1988) indicates, we use narratives to describe the world, which shapes our expectations of what will happen next: “Stories provide explanations of how the world works. These explanations are often unspoken, widely shared, and so much
taken for granted that we aren’t even aware of them” (p. 158). More than just providing descriptions of a world that a passive audience receives, scholars assert that narratives engage the person reading or hearing it. Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2006) describe this process, “On hearing a story we enter, if only for a moment, this created world and interact with its invented characters. Storytellers recreate their world as they see it and as they want to present it to others” (p. 320). Not only do we envision the world described by the storyteller, Hummel (1991) contends that we participate in developing an understanding of the story, “Engagement in this context means participating with others—the story-teller as well as those about whom the story is told—in the construction of the reality that the story opens up” (p. 36). He further explains that this kind of engagement is unique to storytelling because “as we hear the story, the events are not meaningful for us until we have read ourselves into the story” (p. 36). Feldman and Sköldberg (2002) also identify the audience as critical to the story, an issue that became evident to them through their evaluation of narrative analysis and its surrounding literature (p. 275). Storytelling, then, requires an audience and that audience engages with the storyteller and the story, participating in the construction of the storyworld.

Despite the fact that narrative analysis differs from traditional quantitative methodologies in these important ways, scholars are stalwart in defense of the validity and value of narrative research. Ospina and Dodge (2005a) argue that narrative inquiry improves the quality of public administration research and identify three reasons why it is an important methodology. It is “an internally consistent research approach when asking questions that relate to meaning and interpretation” that can “capture complex
interpretations of experience” and allows one to “tap into the unique kind of knowledge
that is communicated through stories and narratives” (p. 149). Narrative analysis, in their
view, is an interpretive approach that provides a pluralistic perspective on the problem
and allows researchers access to valuable knowledge. Czarniawska (1999) also describes
three critical qualities of narrative analysis that make it valuable to social science
research. First, she explains that the research is “able to produce generalizations and deep
insights without claiming universal status” (p. 16). Second, readers can learn from the
examples presented in the stories, and finally, the results of an analysis of narratives can
be translated into future studies that utilize other analytical toolsets, including
quantitative methods. Hummel (1991) focuses in particular on the question of validity of
narratives as a source of data about the world, arguing that stories can be considered valid
when they remind us of or make us familiar with situations that we have perhaps never
experienced: “The fundamental criterion of validity for a story is therefore the ability of
the listener to literally ‘re-cognize’—in the original sense of knowing again—the familiar
even in an unfamiliar story” (p. 38). A valid story successfully communicates to the
listener by way of shared social norms and storytelling practices.

Narratives, then, communicate a type of knowledge not easily accessible through
quantitative research by reconstructing the world through stories. These storyworlds
reflect the norms of the storyteller, but also require the participation and interpretive
skills of the reader. Even though the knowledge produced through narrative analysis
differs from that produced by quantitative methods, scholars contend that it is valid and
necessary to advancing our understanding of critical issues in the fields of public
administration and public policy. In the following sections, I will explore how scholars have undertaken their analyses of narrative.

**Research as Narrative**

As narrative analysis has become an increasingly popular in public administration and public policy research, the understanding and use of the term narrative has varied. In particular, Wagenaar (2011) offers a sharp critique of how scholars have utilized the term narrative: “Stories have been oversold in the social sciences in general and policy analysis in particular. In the policy literature the concept of narrative has been inflated beyond recognition . . . everything is narrative now” (p. 209). While it is important to note that not everyone agrees with Wagenaar’s assessment (See Ospina & Dodge, 2005a), a model for organizing the disparate kinds of research on narrative in public administration and public policy proves helpful given this diversity in the scholarship. Czarniawska (1998) identifies four forms that narrative research takes in the field of organizational studies, which provides helpful guidance for thinking about narrative analysis in the fields of public administration and public policy. The four types include: 1) research that is written in narrative form; 2) research that includes stories collected through fieldwork which relate essential knowledge about how administrative processes or public policy function; 3) research that defines the activities of individuals and organizations as “story making” and positions the researcher as the primary reader or interpreter of that story; 4) and research that is “a disciplinary reflection that takes the form of literary critique” (p. 14). Czarniawska classifies her work in this fourth category
because she borrows from narratological theory. In this and subsequent sections, I will examine each kind of scholarship, starting with research as narrative.²

According to some scholars of public administration and public policy, narrative is the most common form for communicating knowledge generated in research. Most often, this discussion of narrative emerges from concerns that researchers have become too focused on quantitative research methods and have downplayed the value of qualitative methods. As a consequence, White (1999) suggests that the narrative form of communication underlies all public administration research, classifying all types of knowledge production in public administration and public policy as narrative: “The knowledge that we develop and use in public administration, as well as in related fields like policy analysis, law, and literary criticism, can be usefully understood as a story presented in narrative form” (p. xi). White further explains that a story includes statements such as hypotheses or generalizations and communicates information about both the facts and values associated with the research (p. 52). In their article on welfare policy, Schram, Nitz, and Kruger (1997) echo White’s discussion: they identify narrative as a form and then suggest that it is often used to communicate statistical research: “As stories, policy-tales take a narrative form. As policy-tales, these stories often are narrated in the statistical register of quantitative research that is so preferred by policy makers (Stone, 1997)” (p. 139). Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) also recognize the reliance of researchers on narrative mechanisms: “Even quantitative data and formal models are meaningless unless until put in some narrative structure; quantitative

² Case studies are often presented as the prime example of research presented in narrative form. Case studies will not be discussed in more depth here. As the study that follows will rely on narratives as a source of data, the discussion of narrative analysis will focus on those studies that collect or find stories.
researchers, just like their qualitative colleagues, must attach a narrative to the findings to discover and communicate meaning” (p. 27).

Bevir’s (2006) work identifies narrative as a form of communication, but limits the scope to interpretive approaches. He emphasizes the role of beliefs and values, “Interpretive approaches instantiate a narrative form of explanation in which actions are explained by pointing to conditional and volitional connections between beliefs and in which beliefs are explained in terms of traditions and dilemmas” (p. 289). While neither White nor Schram et al. specify what constitutes narrative form or differentiate it from a story, Bevir at least provides an analogy: “interpretivism deploys the same type of narrative structures found in works of fiction” (p. 289). It should also be noted that just because a scholar refers to research as a narrative, that does not mean that the scholar envisions a single definition of the word. Bevir and Rhodes (2006) explain their two distinct understandings of narratives: “First, … we offer a narrative. Second, the actors in our narrative have their own interpretations of their actions and practices, and these accounts also include narrative explanations. We deliberately use narrative to describe both what we offer and what we study” (p. 20).³

Scholars who emphasize the communicative aspect of narrative also highlight the role that researchers play as storytellers. Bevir and Rhodes (2006) describe their narrative as an interpretation of the narratives that others have relayed (p. 20). In an article that reported the results of a series of case studies about organizational change in Swedish

³ Bevir and Rhodes (2006) and Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, 2006) each self-consciously employs the term narrative in multiple ways. Bevir and Rhodes discuss research as narrative and then narratives as ideology. Maynard-Moody and Musheno define research as narrative, narrative as tales from the field, and finally narrative as ideology. As each pair of authors is clear about what narrative means when they use it, their works will be discussed throughout.
government agencies, Sköldberg (1994) offers a similar perspective: “The present article summarizes the author’s interpretation of these events. As a ‘story about stories,’ its value depends mainly on whether it will be successful in opening up a new way of seeing things” (p. 222). Elliot G. Mishler (1995) pushes the discussion even further. He identifies three purposes that social science scholars have pursued when producing narratives. Scholars rely on them to relate chronological representations of events, to study their construction and textual qualities, and to emphasize the “work” stories accomplish, including the effects of their production. Mishler concludes, “we do not find stories; we make stories. We retell our respondents’ accounts through our concepts and methods—our research strategies, data samples, transcription procedures, specifications of narrative units and structures, and interpretive perspectives—we construct the story and its meaning” (pp. 117-118). Abma (1999b) reiterates Mishler’s sentiment, arguing that policy evaluators select their material, populate the material with specific characters, and then speak for those characters through their narrative voice (pp. 245-246).

Organizational theorists Czarniawska and Gagliardi (2003) suggest that the researcher is actually the narrator, the one who organizes the data gathered, “this raw and fragmented material with the help of such devices as plot and characters. Simultaneously, organizing makes narration possible, because it orders people, things and events in time and place” (p. vii). Thus, researchers rely on narrative as a method for communicating the results of their investigations, but researchers also actively construct narratives with the data they have generated through a variety of qualitative and even a few quantitative techniques.
Tales from the Field

In general, in the fields of public administration and public policy, narrative analysis has developed as a qualitative research approach. In this section, I will examine those studies that consider narrative a source of data that is collected through fieldwork. The most common methods utilized for collecting narratives in these studies are conducting interviews, performing participant-observations, and analyzing documents obtained through on-site fieldwork. In their discussion of data collection, scholars who have gathered narratives in these manners illustrate their shared assumptions about what narratives and stories are. While the terms narrative and story are often used interchangeably, most authors differentiate them and establish a hierarchy in which “Narrative is the broader category; all stories are narratives, but not all narratives are stories” (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003, p. 26). In the description of their fieldwork, Feldman et al. (2004) explain the difference between narratives and stories in their data, “Interviews and documents both readily provide narrative data. The narrative materials from which we draw our stories are interviews about organizational change” (p. 150). Similarly, Hummel (1991) differentiates between two kinds of stories, or anecdotes, that break up the larger narrative of an interview, “The engaging anecdote directly invites the listener to practice reality construction by taking an active part in the story. … the biographical anecdote—a ‘recalled experience’ — serves the function of making a new situation part of the listener’s previously experienced world” (p. 36). Narratives, then, are

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4 Feldman and Sköldberg (2002) and Feldman et al. (2004) explore the role of the rhetorical trope entymeme. As this concept draws from rhetorical theory rather than narratology, I review their work here.
generated through fieldwork and are a form of communication in which scholars find the stories they analyze.

The methods employed by scholars to collect these narratives vary from project to project. For example, Dodge et al. (2005) “designed in-depth group conversations of each organization and their communities. The purpose was to evoke stories about aspects of the work that are central to the pursuit of their missions” (p. 288). Many studies had data collection procedures that occurred over extended time periods and involved the analysis of different kinds of sources. Sköldberg (1994) performed over 83 interviews, plus analyzed other data made possible or available by Swedish government agencies, including second-hand interviews, participant-observations, and documentation. Other research projects were more limited in scope. Gold and Hamblett (1999) focused on the activities and experiences of an HR manager “who faced a particularly intractable problem at work and who was prepared to tell the tale” (p. 131). For their evaluation of an employment program, Widdershoven and Sohl (1999) interviewed six individuals who completed the program as well family members and work colleagues of the six individuals. However, their article only discusses the experiences of one of those six individuals. While Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2006) contend that more stories are better when it comes to creating valid and reliable interpretations, the scholarship suggests that researchers employ data collection techniques that vary based on the nature of their research question and the realities of their fieldwork site.

While many scholars lump disparate data collection efforts together without providing information about their specific collection procedures, others explain in detail
how they collected stories, especially in the context of interviews. Some interviews include questions designed to elicit storytelling. Sköldberg (1994) describes this kind of interview, “We asked the respondents to describe the history of the reorganizations from their own personal experiences and perspectives” (p. 220). Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s (2003) work about the stories of street-level workers eschews this more traditional interview approach for a tightly focused effort on story collecting. Three weeks prior to a story collection appointment, workers were given notebooks in which they were instructed to outline two to three stories so that they had a map to jog their memories during story collection. After the stories were transcribed, interviewees were asked to review the story and ensure its accuracy (pp. 169-170). This approach allows the stories to emerge directly from the interviewees rather than having the researcher “find” the stories in the interviews or other documentation, which would insert the researcher directly into the role of determining what merits consideration as a story or even weaving together the story herself. Notably, Maynard-Moody and Musheno did guide interviewees as to what constituted a story for their purposes. Stories, according to the instructions provided to their interviewees:

(1) have a plot or storyline with a beginning, middle, and end; (2) tell us who characters are; (3) explain the relationships among the characters; (4) describe the feelings of the characters toward each other and the events; (5) include a description of the setting and circumstances in which the event(s) occurred. (2003, p. 170)

Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s description of essential story elements resonates with the work of other scholars. However, since most scholars do not collect stories in the directed manner that Maynard-Moody and Musheno did; their descriptions of these
elements usually are tied to explanations of how they recognized stories in the data or re-
constituted stories through interpretation. The elements scholars highlight as most
recognizable include plots, characters, settings, and two or more connected events that
can be ordered chronologically. Dodge and Foldy (2005) confirm the nature of this
process as they describe how they wrote memos after transcribing their interviews and
group conservations. Out of those memos, in which they began interpreting their data,
stories emerged that would later became the case studies they discuss in their articles.
These stories met specific criteria that embody the points made by other scholars about
the uniqueness of narratives and stories. These criteria included having a sense of
chronology by which the events could be organized and plots (pp. 289-290). Kaminsky
(1999) emphasizes the importance of these characteristics, suggesting that the presence of
these elements is critical to the sense-making function of narratives: “We know that
narratives indicate how people make sense of experience. We know that narratives are
comprised of people, settings, plots, and valued endings” (p. 162).

Scholars who analyze narratives and stories generated through fieldwork typically
focus on advocating the value of narratives as a source of data and emphasizing the role
of narrative as a method by which individuals make sense of the world. Narratives reveal
information about norms and identity, as well as the success or impact of a specific
policy, program, or agenda. As a consequence, the literature is more filled with arguments
supporting the need for narrative research as a whole, rather than advancing or honing
any one particular method for analyzing the material generated through fieldwork.
However, these scholars often display an acute recognition of the role they play in
interpreting the stories they have collected. Karen Malone and Rob Walker (1999) explain the central role of the researcher in reconstituting the stories gathered through their interviews about a school in crisis:

> When they told me their ‘story’ and I wrote their ‘story’ I was asking them to relive experiences and generate their personal interpretation of past events. In the task of storytelling and writing, we (the participants and I) were drawing on images of the past through the lens of time, filtered by lived experience and personal history. (p. 208)

In their tales of the field, scholars demonstrate an awareness of their role in the identification and interpretation of narratives, which resonates with the points made by scholars who define all research as a form of narrative.

**Narratives “Found”: Visible and Invisible Discourses**

In this section, I turn to those scholars who have “found” narratives in political discourse. Czarniawska (1998) describes these conceptions of narrative in organizational studies as “organizational life as story making and organization theory as story reading” (p. 14) or “research as sensemaking” (p. 16), which, in public administration and public policy, translates into public life or public policy as story-making. Although this may not seem distinct than the work of scholars in the prior section, there are critical differences. While all of these scholars rely on interpretive techniques for their analysis of narratives, scholars who generate narrative data through fieldwork may illuminate larger ideas or they may not. Many retain a particularistic focus on one program or policy. In contrast, the scholars I discuss here, with few exceptions\(^5\), do not prompt the creation of narratives nor do they share a consistent vision of what a narrative is. A review of the

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\(^5\) Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, 2006) are an exception. Through their analysis of the stories collected from the field, they identify an “unwritten” narrative and a counter-narrative.
literature reveals two types of narrative that researchers “find” in political discourse:

Some scholars evaluate discrete stories excerpted from public speeches, interviews, legal documentation, or even public policy. Other scholars examine narratives that are “‘unwritten’ or invisible” (Ospina & Dodge, 2005a, p. 145), where narrative is used as a synonym for ideology or theory.

**Narratives in Political Discourse**

The studies that analyze narratives found in the archives often focus on the discourses of politicians and other political leaders. This kind of research hones in on texts produced by one or two individuals to highlight how storytelling has been employed. For example, White (1997) explores how two U.S. Presidents relied on storytelling, noting that an “important function of the office is the incumbent’s ability to ‘tell the tales of the state’” (p. 54). White’s work is not a structured evaluation of the stories, but a thought piece that reviews stories told in speeches made during key moments in the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. Similarly, Vaughan (1997) examines the storytelling in the confirmation hearings for Clarence Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme Court. Vaughan describes Thomas’ testimony as peppered with stories that were designed to dissuade listeners from believing the accusations of sexual harassment made against him by Anita Hill: “Through the artful use of American folk narratives, Thomas wrote a script that discredited Hill, effectively silencing her or, as some would say, rendering her functionally white with his use of the ‘high-tech lynching’ metaphor” (p. 77). Goldberg-Hiller (1997) turns to written legal briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court about a challenge to the second amendment. Goldberg-Hiller reveals
how stories told in these briefs demonstrate how “purification politics are materialized through narratives of ‘disidentification’ (Patton, 1993) and how they respond to a changing political economy” (p. 90). All of these scholars emphasize the role of storytelling and what those stories reveal in their specific political contexts, but none of them differentiate stories from narratives nor do they define narrative. They find their narrative data in political discourse, but they do not explain what features cued these discoveries.

Stone (1989, 2012/1988) adopts a broader perspective and explores the role of storytelling in political discourse as a whole. In her influential discussion of causal storytelling, she links stories to public problem identification and public policy formation. In a 1989 article, Stone develops her model, contending that political actors “compose stories that describe harms and difficulties, attribute them to actions of other individuals or organizations, and thereby claim the right to invoke government power to stop the harm” (p. 282). By identifying the problem, the individual, group or organization that caused it, and the location where the problem should be solved, causal stories can forge new bonds among individuals or political groups (p. 295). Unlike the other scholars discussed so far who have analyzed narratives found in political discourse, Stone (2012/1988) provides a definition:

*narrative stories* are the principal means for defining and contesting policy problems. . . . Problem definitions are stories with a beginning, a middle, and an end, involving some change or transformation. They have heroes and villains and innocent victims, and they pit the forces of evil against the forces of good. (p. 158)
Like the scholars who research stories derived from fieldwork, Stone presumes a hierarchical relationship between narrative and story. Narrative is a form in which stories are written. Stories have three parts, settings, and characters. Additionally, the storyworld at the end differs from the world at the beginning due to a transformative event.

In Stone’s (2012/1988, pp. 157-182) book, she further elaborates her model for causal storytelling and develops a helpful typology of the kinds of storytelling that occur in political discourse. There are two main genres of stories told in political arenas, stories of change or stories of power. Both types of stories can be positive or negative: a story of change can be one of decline or one of rising, and, a story of power can be one of helplessness or control. Stories of change, and in particular stories of decline, can follow several trajectories. A simple story of decline laments the loss of some period in the past when everything was going well, which contrasts with the contemporary period where everything is going wrong and an inevitable doom is predicted. Variations of this story include the “stymied progress story” and the “change-is-only-an-illusion story.” Stories of power link helplessness and control, establishing them as dichotomous aspects of power relationships. The plain version of the power story follows this model, “The situation is bad. We have always believed that the situation was out of our control, something we had to accept but could not influence. Now, however, let me show you that in fact we can control things” (pp. 165-166). There are two versions of this story – one is the “conspiracy” in which we believe that we control our lives, but a select group of individuals actually manages us. The second iteration of this spin off of the power story is called the “blame-the-victim story,” which suggests that victims of the problem initiated
the sequence of events that has led to their suffering. Stone summarizes the relationship between stories of change and stories of power: “Stories of control offer hope, just as stories of decline foster anxiety and despair. The two stories are often woven together, with the story of decline serving as the stage set and the impetus for the story of control” (p. 168). There is one final type of storytelling that Stone highlights, which she calls “the horror story.” According to this trope, a political actor isolates an “egregious or outlandish incident to represent the universe of cases, then use that example to build support for changing a policy addressed to the larger universe” (p. 169).

In marked contrast to these approaches, Shenhav (2004) establishes a step-by-step method for “narrative conceptualization analysis” which is an “instrument for studying the narrativity in the usage of concepts” (p. 83). Shenhav applies this instrument to speeches made by Israeli Likud Party leaders. In this approach, he considers narrative to be the larger form of communication from which the researcher must extract embedded stories. The steps are: (1) choose a concept (such as nation); (2) select the texts to be analyzed; (3) ascertain what key words represent the concept; (4) find the key words in the text(s); (5) note what events are associated with those key words; (6) order those events chronologically. The seventh and final step is analysis, which Shenhav describes as “the most fragile and subject to the preferences of the researcher. As a result of the previous step, the researcher faces a story, or stories, of a specific concept, and should decide how to analyze it” (p. 84). At no point in this article does Shenhav define narrative. However, this article is only Shenhav’s first foray into narrative analysis. In his later work (Sheafer, Shenhav, & Goldstein, 2011; Shenhav, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2009),
he turns to narratology for a definition of narrative and also to develop different kinds of analytical tools. This first article reveals Shenhav’s interest in structuralism and his determination to find the hidden meanings buried in narratives by fracturing political discourse, which eventually led him to narratology.

Narrative policy analysis has become increasingly popular. While many scholars continue to approach narratives from an interpretive perspective influenced by Roe (1994)\(^6\), Michael Jones and Mark K. McBeth (2010) have argued for its usefulness in quantitative analysis. These scholars name their approach NPF (Narrative Policy Framework), which is “a quantitative, structuralist, and positivistic approach to the study and theory building of policy narratives” (p. 339). The authors define narrative as having: a setting; a plot that temporally orders important events and establishes relationships between actors; characters that can be classified as heroes, villains, or victims; and ultimately, a clear moral at the end. Narratives are used in policy contexts to convince the public of a particular vision of a policy problem or influence policy outcomes. They develop seven hypotheses to be tested based on their understanding of what a narrative is and how it works in political discourse. McBeth and Shanahan (2011) further explore this framework, demonstrating a conviction that narratives are not only easily identifiable in political discourse, but that their influence on the public can be measured.

The final kind of “found” narrative is more direct and accessible, but not as well explored – public policy. While Stone (2012/1988) does not argue that public policy is narrative, she does suggest that there is strong reason to consider it to be: “We don’t

\(^6\) As Roe’s (1994) work incorporates narratology, his model will be discussed in a later section of this paper.
usually think of policy as literature, but most definitions of policy problems have a narrative structure, however subtle” (p. 158). Schram and Neisser (1997) are more straightforward, asking readers “what are public policies but stories narrating our relations (between citizens, between the citizen and the state, between states, etc.) in politically selective ways?” (p. 2). In their research, two scholars instantiate the idea that public policy is a kind of narrative, but in a limited fashion. Yanow (1999, 2003) connects public policy on racial categories in the U.S. census to narrative: “I wish to explore this expressive, storied dimension of public policies here with respect to contemporary U.S. discourse on race-ethnicity” (1999, p. 31). However, Yanow is not analyzing the policy alone to uncover this narrative; she includes much more in her analysis such as “public displays or enactments: public policies, the practices of administering those policies, discussions in public fora, and the headlines and articles reporting on them” (pp. 30-31). In this sense, public policy is the basis for the narrative, but Yanow considers the policy insufficient for exploring collectively constructed concepts such as identity on its own. Similarly, Swidorski (1997) discusses the Constitution and the stories surrounding it, but also the Constitution as a story: “The dominant story of the Constitution serves an important educational and thus ideological function in U.S. politics. The Constitution is a way of knowing, of making sense out of the world” (p. 29). The Constitution, then, is a story that defines who citizens of the U.S. are, how they should treat one another, and what role government will have in their lives. Despite these initial efforts to conceive of public policy as narrative, more work remains to be done.
“Unwritten” Narratives

Unwritten narratives, according to Ospina and Dodge (2005a), are “ideologies or theories in use” (p. 145). Unlike tales from the field or the stories drawn from public discourse, these narratives are not directly uttered by anyone nor found in any one specific document or location. In this kind of research, narrative is not data to be analyzed. A narrative is found through careful analysis and interpretation of evidence, whatever that may be for the project at hand. While researchers evaluate documents or discourses, none of those documents is itself a narrative nor does a narrative have an identifiable author. Narratives are more ephemeral and emerge from the social context.

This kind of narrative research rarely shares a common definition of narrative as evidenced by the synonyms that researchers employ. For example, Bevir and Rhodes (2006) describe at length the kind of narratives that interest them, ones that explain by connecting facts and provide insight into the construction of these facts. The value of a narrative can only be determined through comparison, “we must compare bundles of narratives, or, if you prefer, theories, in terms of their success in relating various facts to one another by highlighting pertinent similarities and differences, continuities and disjunctions” (p. 28). Kurth-Schai and Green (1997) shift from discussing narratives to stories to tales and finally to myths: “The politics of schooling requires new tales and reinterpreted myths” (p. 195). Culverson (1997) substitutes the concepts of stereotype and myth for narrative in his concluding remarks: “This chapter has suggested that stereotypes and myths reflect policy-maker perceptions of other societies” (p. 210). Rosenthal and Schram (1997) discuss the American Dream as a narrative about which
stories are told and ultimate conclude it “can be understood as both ideology and discourse” (p. 49). Thee synonyms – theory, myth, stereotype, and ideology – all suggest that narrative is not a form of communication, but to a certain extent, a representation of an entire belief system that is present, although not tangible, in social discourse. However, Cruikshank (1999) notes that narratives, particularly government or state narratives, have materials ramifications when combined with statistical analysis. She maintains that the welfare queen’s “race and gender embodiment is the product of fictional narratives and rhetorical ploys, but the fact that she has a body is an effect of numbers” (p. 110).

Narratives are often treated as a foil by researchers who want to unseat common assumptions or proffer a different perspective on an issue. For some scholars, narrative refers to the grand narratives that postmodernism has challenged. White (1999) describes, “They told people what to believe, how to act, and what to hope for in life. Norms and rules communicated through narratives established social bonds, as well as social, political, and economic practices for those who chose to believe the narrative” (p. 155). Yet, narratives can be modified as Kling (1997) articulates, “Those who shift a society’s narrative direction must pay close attention to the ways its members construct social belief out of the everyday terrain they experience themselves to be living and moving through” (p. 162).

In their work, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, 2006) describe two recurrent narratives – the citizen-agent narrative and the state-agent narrative – which are essentially paradigms for how government workers should behave and treat citizens. The
authors conclude that narratives are adaptable, but also representative of a moment in
time: “Narratives are not passive artifacts reflecting organizational culture but active
elements in forming and reforming organizational culture. When captured in a specific
rendition or text, as in this research, narratives become a form of cultural history” (2003,
p. 158). Several scholars translate this changeability of a narrative into the goal of their
study. Lynch (2006), in her article on interwar peace movements, details a plan of action
for those who want to challenge the status quo. First, one must identify the dominant
assumptions, figure out how the data has been manipulated to fit those assumptions, and
then tease out how power relations are woven into those assumptions. To create an
alternate narrative, one must “document, describe, and analyze the self-understandings of
actors and their relevant conditions of action, always cross-checking the evidence against
the interpretations and evidence provided by others” (p. 298). Shapiro (1997), in his
discussion of national culture, expresses that his goal was to “disrupt national imaginaries
and, at the same time, to offer an alternative language and thus an alternative vision” (p.
26). Nevertheless, no scholar provides a clear outline that details how exactly one shifts
these narratives.

Like those scholars who collect tales from the field, scholars who “find” stories in
the discourse of public actors or in public policy conceive of narratives or stories as
discrete units, although few provide a definition of narrative. Meanwhile, those who
discuss invisible narratives generally equate narratives with belief systems such as
theories or ideologies, but also avoid specific explanations of what narratives are.
Narratological Analysis

Many of the scholars discussed to this point have evaluated narrative employing traditional interpretive techniques. When analyzing narratives as forms of data, scholars make interpretations based on conceptual lenses such as organizational change, leadership or policy sub-fields such as education and welfare. So far, I have examined how scholars have considered narrative from three general perspectives: narrative as form of communication in which research is communicated to others; narrative as a form of communication in which stories in the field are related, gathered, and analyzed; and narrative as stories or unwritten theories or ideologies that can be found in public discourse. Czarniawska (1998) argues that works employing narratological analysis constitute a fourth approach to narrative, but my review of the literature of public administration and public policy suggests that is not exactly the case. Instead, works that incorporate narratological theory typically adopt one of these three perspectives of narrative. Then, the scholar applies a narratological lens, on top of the conceptual lens, to the analysis. A conceptual lens addresses the content while the narratological lens focuses on the structures of the discourse. Borins (2011) describes the application of this kind of approach, “Throughout this book, we’ve moved back and forth between considerations of the managerial content of the narratives we’ve analyzed and formal, narratological issues, always keeping in view the relationship between the two” (pp. 239-240). In this section, I review the work of scholars in the fields of public administration and public policy who have applied narratological tools in their research.
Two scholars considered here approach narrative as a form of communication in which policy evaluation reports are written. Abma (1999b) examines three articles published by policy evaluators. Rather than focusing on these reports as tales from the field that communicate valuable information, she turns her attention to the underlying narrative structures of the research itself. Abma is influenced by narratology, but does not adhere to any one tradition in particular for her analysis nor does she apply the model of any one narratological scholar. However, she does discuss concepts such as events and actions, character, and narrative stance or voice, citing Bal’s (2009/1985) work for guidance on this last concept. Abma explains that her focus is on the world building capacities of narratives, “The question central in this chapter is what kind of reality evaluators create in the story they tell” (1999b, p. 245). Barone (1999) also centers his work on policy evaluation and the form in which a policy evaluator can communicate results through narrative. Barone considers forms of storytelling in light of the theoretical work of M. M. Bakhtin (1981) and his distinction between epics and novelness. Where epics lead readers to one final and correct solution, stories that are characterized by novelness are more centered on dialogue that continually reminds readers of otherness. Barone argues that novelness is better suited to evaluation reports on education. He wants readers to “experience … a polyvocal text that invites a critical examination (and even a negation) of the educational values which underlie prevailing notions of failure and success in an educational program” (p. 233). Thus, both scholars explore the role that narrative structure plays in the communication of a policy evaluation and what potential impact those structures have for readers of the text.
Czarniawska’s work on the changes to the Swedish public sector in the late 1980s and early 1990s, reflects the same characteristics discussed in the earlier section about stories generated in the field. Czarniawska (1997) conducted extensive fieldwork, “I collected various narratives: the self-reports of my interlocutors, various documents, my own field notes, and the like” (p. 78). Based on the work of narraologist Greimas’ (1982) definition of narrative, she considers stories to be sub-units of narratives that have a plot with a clear beginning, middle, and end (1998, p. 2). Although narratological theory informs her understanding of narrative, her analysis and theory is less narratologically-based. She discusses terms such as characters and plot as she builds her argument that organizational studies literature should be considered a genre, but she is not invested in any one narratological model for this analysis.

In contrast, in his study of a Canadian municipality and its efforts to engage with citizens, Robichaud (2003) embraces narratological theory, “I would like to illustrate some of the results of examining organizing processes through the perspective of a narrative framework; rather, there are a number of narrative perspectives and narratologies that can shed light on organizations” (p. 37). Robichaud’s extensive project included observations, interviews, and documentation collected over an 11-month period. Robichaud also relies on the work of Greimas to evaluate the data. However, Robichaud’s definition of narrative differs from that of other scholars who collected tales from the field; he defines narrative broadly to include non-text based information that he gathered. He explains, “The word ‘narrative’ will refer not to written or spoken texts, but rather it will capture the general form of the organization of text, a form we can extrapolate to the
enactment of organizational processes. In other words, I will treat actions of organizational actors as if they were texts” (p. 39). Like Czarniawska, he is interested in questions of organizational identity, but he considers the institutions that constitute an organization, such as consulting, to be narratives. Since Robichaud’s defines narrative as inclusive of action and practices, his work more closely resembles that of the scholars who discussed unwritten narratives even though he generated narrative data in the field.

Only one scholar in this paper has really established what can be called a tradition for narrative analysis. While Kaplan (1986, 1993) first explored and discussed narrative policy analysis, Roe’s (1994) work has proven to be the most influential. Like so many other scholars, Roe considers stories to be a form of narrative. He also defines nonstories, counterstories, and metanarratives as sub-types of narrative. Although Roe’s discussion of literary theory itself is fairly light, he credits conversations with several narratologists as influential. According to Roe’s methodology, the analyst “starts with the conventional definition of stories and identifies those policy narratives in issues of high uncertainty and complexity that conform to this definition” (p. 3). After collecting the stories, the analyst determines which is the dominant narrative and sorts the rest, which confirm or disavow this narrative. Then, the analyst compares the stories to develop a metanarrative, which “is the candidate for a new policy narrative that underwrites and stabilizes the assumptions for decision making on an issue whose current policy narratives are so conflicting as to paralyze decision making” (p. 4). In the final step, the analyst evaluates the metanarrative to see if it reshapes our understanding of the problem that the policy is meant to address, hopefully making it more possible for policymakers to resolve or
reduce the impact of the problem. Like Czarniawska, Roe’s definition of narrative is clearly drawn from narratological literature and he elaborates on that definition to develop concepts that better suit policy analysis, but his methodology is less obviously influenced by narratology. Still, Roe’s model has been applied to a vast array of policy problems in the public policy literature (Bridgman & Barry, 2002; Garvin & Eyles, 1997; Gerstl-Pepin, 2006; Ginger, 2006; Hampton, 2005, 2009; Kensen & Bogason, 1999; Price, 2003, 2011; van Eeten, 1999).

Shenhav (2005a), who developed the method for analyzing concepts in narratives discussed earlier, builds on the work of narratologists Rimmon-Kenan (1983), Genette (1980, 1988), and Prince (1982) to define narrative and develop two kinds of narrative analysis: thin and thick. Shehav contends that narratives include two or more events, real or imaginary, and a narrated discussion of that sequence. A thin narrative analysis focuses on the time dimension of the story while a thick analysis hones in on the narration, characterization, and focalization. In a contemporaneously published article, Shenhav (2005b) connects his structural analysis of “found” narratives to unwritten, ideological narratives through the creation of a specific kind of narrative developed for analyzing political discourse – the concise narrative. Concise narratives “are segments (a few paragraphs) of a political text (e.g. a speech, an interview, a political discussion) that contain its entire chronological range” (p. 315). Assemblages of these concise narratives “can facilitate our structural and thematic understanding of how references to day-to-day politics are framed by historical perspectives in a way that creates ideological political narratives” (p. 315). In subsequent papers (Sheafer et al., 2011; Shenhav, 2009), he and
his co-authors pursue developing quantitative techniques for analyzing the structural elements in narratives. They argue that a narrative’s ability to create connections between current events and prior periods of a nation’s history allows political leaders to make convincing arguments that sway public opinion as evident in voting patterns. While Shenhav is not considering narratological discussions of characters or plot lines, his focus on narratological discussions of time and narrativity adapts literary analytical tools for use in political discourse in meaningful ways.

In the field of public administration, Borins (2011) explains his turn to narratology as based on his dissatisfaction with prior scholarship and through a desire to help practitioners tell better stories by building “narrative competence.” He describes prior narrative inquiry, “There is a general lack of any rigorous, or even systematic, selection criteria to justify the choice of narratives analyzed. And … an equal lack of a clearly defined analytic methodology capable of addressing issues of narrative form as well as content” (p. 3). Borins decides to rely on Bal’s (2009/1985) work because she clearly establishes structural tools, but also includes non-textual narratives as possible data for analysis. There are two pieces to Bal’s work that Borins imports into his analytical tool set: her conceptualization of the fabula and the narrative; and narrative polyphony. The fabula, or fable as Borins renames it, refers to the events, characters, and settings that are the essential building blocks for any story, which he renames narrative. Thus, Borins considers the story-narrative distinction less important than the fable-narrative distinction. Regarding narrative polyphony, where Bal highlights the multiplicity of voices within a narrative as reflected in embedded points of view and
shifting focalization, Borins elects to “encompass internarrative polyphony as well; that is, the interplay between multiple narratives (re)telling a single fable” (p. 7). Borins also incorporates genre analysis from the work of Vladimir Propp (1968/1928) to help structure his discussion of fables and counter-fables and how they “parody, invert, distort, or subvert the familiar formal structures of a given archetype” (p. 8). Borins evaluates fictional and nonfictional narratives, including text-based as well as video-based narratives such as television shows and movies.

Thus, narratological analysis has been incorporated into the fields of public administration and public policy in limited ways. In general, scholars who have turned to narratological methods share the three common conceptions of narrative identified in the rest of the literature. Their use of narratology ranges from a shallow application that incorporates key definitions to more in-depth adaptations of narratological tools to the analysis of political discourse or to purposes specific to the fields of public administration and public policy. This analysis of the work of these scholars suggests that narratology provides an array of tools that are useful for evaluating the deeper structures of narratives and the worlds constructed in them.

Narrative Analysis and Identity

Throughout this exploration of the literature of narrative inquiry in the fields of public administration and public policy, scholars have repeatedly made note of the connections between narratives and identity. Schram and Neisser (1997), for example, describe how narratives translate into an emotional and physical self through the denaturalization of the body, which “can be seen not as a preexisting natural phenomenon
but a textual representation that people, individually and collectively, embody. And when we embody a narrative practice, we help to reinscribe it in our individual and collective selves” (p. 5). Shenhav (2005a) also asserts that political discourse is ripe for narrative analysis due to its connection to the development of collective political identities: “The study of political narratives, whether produced in day-to-day contexts or during special events, can be an effective lens through which to understand the construction and presentation of collective identities” (p. 95). Yet in-depth explorations of the process of how identity is shaped through narrative practices are few and far between in the literature. Czarniawska (1997) recasts the legitimacy crisis in public administration as a crisis of organizational identity, “it would be more appropriate to speak of an identity crisis. Thus, what is currently required is the creation of new identities that clearly demonstrate the break with the past (that is, the tradition of powerful public authorities with a supervisory function)” (p. 142). While she acknowledges the connections between the identity of the organization and the identity of individuals, she remains focused on “An (institutionalized) metaphor of organization as person” (p. 142).

Other scholars explore how both written and unwritten narratives impact our understanding of social identities such as race or class, focusing on the agency that individuals have in either accepting or deploying certain narratives in political discourse. Ferguson (1997) claims that social science research has implicitly accepted a racial determinism, propagating stereotypes that assign blame for urban issues such as crime to certain racial groups, while Kling (1997) suggests that the adoption of such ideologies is a complicated and mystifying process: “Policy-tales are often efforts to redraw and
thereby offer new maps to people. Yet we do not fully understand the dynamics by which
social groups come to follow one set of these maps as opposed to another” (p. 162). Kling
then asserts that individual agency is pivotal to understanding how and why such
narratives are accepted. Neisser (1997) also points to the importance of individual agency
when examining identity and narrative: “We construct identities under various constraints
and partly by means of stories, and it is as such constructed selves that we conclude that
this or that is in our interest” (p. 225). Similarly, Goldberg-Hiller (1997) suggests that
LGBT advocacy groups selectively emphasize certain narratives that shape how others
conceive their political identity to secure equality. Daniels (1997) also underscores the
importance of individual and collective agency in discussions of narrative and identity. In
his work on the identities produced by policy discourse about cyberspace, he emphasizes
that individual agency over identity is increased by direct engagement with these
discourses: "If one is able to engage in discursive practices that can in some measure
rewrite the ways that one is identified as a citizen" (p. 111).

In contrast to this focus on individual agency in personal identity, Maynard-
Moody and Musheno and Yanow offer insights into what role government plays in the
structuring of individual identity by limiting the range of available discourses, or by
determining for individuals what their identity is. Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003),
through their analysis of narratives provided by public servants, uncover the pivotal role
that these government workers have in determining the identity of members of the public:
“These stories make clear that street-level work is as much a process of forming and
enforcing identities—of both citizen-clients and street-level workers—as of delivering
services and implementing policy” (p. 153). While the authors acknowledge that members of the public also influence their identities and shape how those identities are perceived, they assert that the power of the state, as channeled through public workers, mitigates that influence: “The identity-making process is, therefore, mutual in the sense that it involves and affects both workers and citizen-clients. Identity fixing is, however, not mutual in the sense that both sides are equal partners” (p. 153). Yanow’s (2003) work, in contrast, emphasizes the power of the state, not just through the actions of individual workers, but through state-sanctioned discourses. She argues, “Identities are asserted by naming them. Each category scheme and the name it encompasses are a condensed articulation of an identity story” (p. 7). Yanow’s concluding comments demonstrate her conviction that state policies limit the possible identities (specifically racial and ethnic categories). For this reason, she believes:

we must stop giving accounts of ourselves in terms of the five gross, lump race-ethnic categories: they create, impose, and maintain identities that are, by and large, not embracing of individuals’ lived experiences and, because of the baggage of meaning that they carry, detrimental to human dignity. (p. 226)

Yanow’s points – that state power is pervasive and that the racial and ethnic categories employed by the state are reductionist – are convincing. Yet her assertion that our understanding of race and ethnicity can be changed by simply altering the racial and ethnic categories that U.S. government employs is somewhat contradicted by the work of Maynard-Moody and Musheno. She also simplifies the complicated nature of identity formation and the interaction of state-produced discourses with social norms. While state workers do enforce the laws and policies of the state, Maynard-Moody and Musheno assert, “stories that tell of sustained interactions with clients, citizens, and kids tend to
offer thick accounts of who people are and describe how street-level workers imbue citizen-clients with complex identities” (2003, p. 84). Even when presented with simplistic racial or ethnic categories in bureaucratic paperwork and forms, street-level workers demonstrate their understanding and respect for the complicated nature of these identities.

Conclusions

Narrative analysis and the discussion of narrative in the fields of public administration and public policy is generally fragmented. Scholars work with disparate definitions of narrative and are not always clear about what constitutes narrative in their work. My perusal of the scholarship has revealed that there are three common ways that scholars define narrative: as a form of communication that all research follows; as a source of data collected via fieldwork from individuals working in the field or who have benefited from public programs; and as “findable” units of text or as ideologies in political discourse. A small population of scholars have adopted narratological approaches, which are often idiosyncratic and based on their unique research agenda and data. The kinds of narratives studied by scholars include narratives as research, narratives generated through fieldwork, and those “found” as specific units in political discourse. Understandably, given the structural basis of these tools, narratives that are unwritten have typically not been studied directly with these methods.

In particular, the discussion of “found” narratives in political discourse has revealed several important insights for my study. First, political discourse is purposeful and these authors argue that storytelling is a technique employed by political actors to
accomplish a variety of goals, including communicating to the public or accruing political power. Second, political actors may relay these stories directly, or they may be buried in deeper structures of the political discourse, conveying meanings through normative associations. Finally, Stone’s work on the genres of political storytelling suggest that political narratives rely on familiar tropes that relay specific messages to their audiences. Comparing these genres of political storytelling to the narratives under consideration will help flesh out the historical and political context as well as illuminate some of the intended interpretations of the policy or political problems.

This review of the literature has also revealed a kind of narrative that is ripe for analysis, one that has been identified as a form of narrative by several scholars, but that has rarely been evaluated as such: public policy. If the policy is a narrative, then it relates to the norms of the social context as well as other discourses. One cannot read a policy on its own. One cannot even read it according to one’s own social values. To understand more about the policy as it was created or what it was designed for, then there is definite value in reading the policy according to narratological methods. However, other stories from that period should also be analyzed in order to: (a) flesh out the norms and values that made the policy meaningful; (b) identify clearly the intended (and perhaps unintended) targets and enforcers of the policy; (c) and understand better how the policy was formulated to solve a particular public problem. Again, this information helps better establish the storyworld of the policy and the world that policymakers hope will exist after the policy’s passage and implementation.
Few scholars have explored narratives in terms of personal identity development, and those who have typically do not build on each other’s work. Although full-length investigations into the development of personal identity in political narratives are few and far between in the fields of public administration and public policy, this review of the literature has established important groundwork. First, scholars generally agree that narratives are rich in the norms and values of the context in which they were produced and that they reveal much about identity, both individual and collective. Additionally, there is tension between the deployment of personal identities by individuals, the role that the government plays in structuring identities through state-produced discourses, and how those who work for government select or apply identities to members of the public, with or without their consent. As these topics are only touched on briefly in the literature, they require further exploration, especially in the context of the specific identities of citizen, public administrator, and immigrant (documented and undocumented). In a later chapter, I examine the insights that scholars from various disciplines, including feminist theory, can provide to my analysis.

From the works of those who applied narratological theory to the study of narrative in public administration and public policy, several major points have emerged. Those who apply narratology have designed studies to explore more deeply the structures of narratives, yet much of their work has only incorporated the definition of narrative or tools related to plots. Both Shenhav and Borins offer valuable examples and guidance for how to apply narratology to the kinds of resources and concepts found in the fields public administration and public policy. As political discourse is varied in purpose, format, and
length, Shenhav’s (2005a, 2005b) stripped down definition of narrative makes the most sense for the purposes of analyzing public narratives. This definition focuses on narratives that include two or more events. While numerous scholars make the case for why narratives or stories must have a beginning, middle, and an end, that seems to imply that all stories are resolved or resolvable, which is not always the case in the fields of public administration and public policy given the complexity of modern public problems. For these reasons, Shenhav’s concept of the “concise narrative” is also valuable. According to Shenhav, a narrative may consist of only two to three paragraphs that are embedded in a type of political discourse that is not itself a narrative, such as a speech or an interview. Borins’ work establishes several other important methodological points for narratological analysis in the fields of public administration and public policy, in particular, his application of Bal’s (2009/1985) narratological method. This also suggests a more thorough evaluation of the field of narratology is necessary in order to unearth additional tools related to character development, point of view, and narration that might illuminate important aspects of identity. Thus, in the next chapter, I turn to the field of narratology.
CHAPTER 3: NARRATOLOGY AS METHODOLOGY

Literary theorists describe the past three decades as “the narrative turn” (Herman, D., Jahn, & Ryan, 2005, "Introduction"), which was initiated by a group French of structuralists that included Barthes (1977b) and Genette (1980, 1988). While the conversation about narrative began with linguistics and structuralism, scholars from other fields and specialties have broadened this conversation. Despite the diversity of scholars contributing to the work on narrative, the primary participants in discussions of narrative theory have been literary critics, who focus on analyzing fictional text-based narratives, most typically novels. The study of this particular form of discourse gained new life in 20th century with the work of Russian formalists such as Propp (1968/1928), who studied Russian folktales and identified 31 possible plots. Since the publication of Propp’s work, narrative theory can be divided along two lines as Ryan (2005) describes, “The first, aiming at a description, asks: what does narrative do for human beings; the second, aiming at a definition, tries to capture the distinctive features of narrative” (p. 345). Essentially, this is the divide between the classical and post-classical approaches to narratology, where classical approaches focus almost exclusively on form and post-classical approaches place more emphasis on the content and the context (although structural analysis remains critical to their analysis).

In this chapter, I review classical and postclassical narratology in order to establish what a union of these perspectives would entail for a larger scale research project. The purpose of this chapter is to establish the methodological groundwork for my investigation into the connections between a public policy, the storytelling about that
policy, and the development of identities of citizen, immigrant (documented and undocumented), and public administrator.

Classical Narratology

In this section, I examine classical narratology in more depth. First, I discuss the main architects of narratological theory and their definitions of narrative, including its underlying form. Then, I explore the elements that classical narratologists believe to be critical to a narrative and their different approaches to studying those elements. In particular, Bal’s (2009/1985) establishes a narratological method of analysis that scholars from a variety of fields have employed.

Classical Narratological Definitions of Narrative

Scholars who hone in on the distinctive textual features of narrative and treat them as objects are often called “narratologists,” a term that Todorov introduced in 1969 to describe the work of the French structuralists Barthes and Genette (Herman, L. & Vervaeck, 2005, p. 41). Barthes (1977b) pushed scholars to consider narrative in a much broader fashion than Propp had in his work, “Narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor has been a people without a narrative” (p. 80). After this call to consider the prominence of narrative throughout the world, Barthes proposes that structuralists apply Saussure’s langue system to narrative texts to reveal the hierarchical structures within those texts that convey their deep meaning. Barthes justifies the application of linguistic theory,

there can be no doubt that narrative is a hierarchy of instances. To understand a narrative is not merely to follow the unfolding of the story, it is also to recognize
Barthes then discusses the several levels and elements that he considers crucial for a text to be considered narrative, including specific kinds of syntax, action(s), a narrator, a narrative setting, narrative time, and an effort to represent reality. Barthes’ initial investigation opened a new realm of scholarly work and had a dramatic impact on narratological scholars such as Genette.

One of the most influential classical narratologists, Genette (1980, 1988) defines narrative as a three-part hierarchy – story, narrative, and narrating. He describes the difference between these three concepts, indicating that he will use these words very carefully: “the word story for the signified or narrative content (even if this content turns out, in a given case, to be low in dramatic intensity or fullness of incident), … the word narrative for the signifier, statement, discourse or narrative text itself, and … the word narrating for the producing narrative action and, by extension, the whole of the real or fictional situation in which that action takes place” (1980, p. 27). For Genette, the purpose of studying narrative is to understand the relationship between these three levels. A narrative is a closed system that can be evaluated and its elements compared to one another: “Analysis of narrative discourse will thus be for me, essentially, a study of the relationships between narrative and story, between narrative and narrating, and (to the extent that they are inscribed in the narrative discourse) between story and narrating” (1980, p. 29). Genette builds his methodology through an analysis of Proustian
narratives, making clear that while Proust’s work cannot be considered representative of
literature as a whole, such an analysis can generate generalizable theory (1980, p. 23).

Classical narratological definitions in the tradition of Genette continue this
differentiation between the content of the narrative and the form (or text) of the narrative,
although the names and number of divisions vary. Chatman (1978, 1990), a notable
classical narratologist, reduces Gerard’s divisions to two: the story and the discourse.⁷
Chatman (1978) explains that the story includes the events and actions of the narrative, as
well as elements such as characters and location while the discourse is method by which
that information is relayed to the reader and thus includes the narrator: “In simple terms,
the story is the what in a narrative that is depicted, discourse the how” (p. 19). In a later
work, Chatman (1990) contrasts narrative with other kinds of texts, specifically argument
and description. A point that he believes differentiates narrative is, “Narrative entails
movement through time not only ‘externally’ (the duration of the presentation of the
novel, film, play) but also ‘internally’ (the duration of the sequence of events that
constitute the plot)” (p. 9). Narrative, then, is a kind of text-based discourse that conveys
a story of events that occur over a period of time.

Classical and post-classical narratological scholars generally have adopted the
two levels described in Chatman’s work, but some have added more qualifications to the
definition. Prince (2003/1987)⁸, for example, accepts the precept that narrative is

⁷ Genette (1988) disapproved of the reduction of his three-part division because he believed that it
diminished the role of the narrator and conflated the mood of the narrative with the voice of the narrator
who recounted the narrative (pp. 13-14).

⁸ Prince’s (1982, 1992, 2003/1987) definition of narrative was influential on the development of narrative
policy analysis as he reviewed and provided feedback to Emory Roe (1994) on early versions of his book
Narrative Policy Analysis. Prince’s A Dictionary of Narratology (2003/1987) is now in its 3rd edition and
continues to be a popular resource.
constituted of story and discourse, but argues that those distinctions alone are not
sufficient for a text to be identified as a narrative. Instead, a text must relate multiple
events, include an obviously identifiable narrator, and address a clear audience (or
narratee). Narrative is: “The representation (as product and process, object and act,
structure and structuration) of one or more real or fictive EVENTS communicated by
one, two, or several (more or less overt) NARRATORS to one, two, or several (more or
less overt) NARRATEES” (p. 58). Prince’s requirement of the presence of at least one
narrator and at least one narratee lines up with the level of narrative that Genette calls
narrating, although Prince does not consider these elements of the narrative to be a third
layer. According to Prince, narrative is comprised of a story that is conveyed through
text-based discourse to someone by someone else, which makes narrative “not only a
product but also a process, not merely an object but also an act which occurs in a certain
situation because of certain factors and with a view of fulfilling certain functions
(informing, diverting attention, entertaining, persuading, etc.)” (pp. 59-60). Thus, Prince
adds another prerequisite to the definition of narrative: a narrative text includes a story
that is related by one person to another and that story has a point (or plot).

Bal (2009/1985), one of the few classical scholars who continues to employ a
three-layered model, defined the levels differently than Genette. For Bal, the act of
narrating is an aspect that can be evaluated best in terms of the story of the text. The three
parts of a narrative that Bal identifies are narrative text, story, and fabula. The narrative
text “is a text in which an agent or subject conveys to an addressee (‘tells’ the reader) a
story in a particular medium, such as language, imagery, sound, buildings, or a
combination thereof” (p. 5). The story is the content related by the narrative text, basically the essential events and actions of the characters (and narrator). The fabula is an underlying structure, “the series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors” (p. 5). Bal clarifies that an event “is the transition from one state to another state” and that actors “are agents that perform actions” (p. 6). The fabula is not present in the narrative, but can be deduced by placing the events of the story in chronological order.9

Elements of Narrative

Much as the general classical perspective of what constitutes a narrative reflects the influence of Genette (1980, 1988) so do the most commonly analyzed structures in narratives. Genette’s work specifies five components of a narrative that connect its three layers: order, duration, frequency, mood, and voice. Genette explains that order, duration, and frequency allow one to study time in a narrative: the amount of time that passes in a narrative and the amount of time spent reading the narrative. Order, then refers both to the “connections between the temporal order of succession of events in the story and the pseudo-temporal order of their arrangement in the narrative” (1980, p. 35). Duration includes the length of time recounted in the story and the amount of text required to relay the story; frequency explores the role of repetition in the story and the text. The category mood refers to the way that the narrative conveys information through the characters and the narrator: “one can tell more or tell less what one tells, and one can tell it according to one point of view or another” (1980, p. 162). Voice most directly covers the aspects of

9 In the case of narratives that have multiple versions, such as Cinderella, a more detailed fabula may be created. Each version of the story is unique, but references the same sequence of events and actors.
narration, including “time of narrating, narrative level, and ‘person’” (1980, p. 215).

Notably, all considerations of plot and character are excluded from Genette’s (1988) methodology. He justifies these exclusions and his focus on semiotics and grammar, “there are no ‘narrative contents.’ There are chains of actions or events amenable to any mode of representation” (1988, p. 16). Narrative is a form of discourse with unique modes of communicating information; Genette contends that the story of Oedipus can be conveyed through a variety of types of discourse. What interests Genette is not the story of Oedipus or the character, but the mechanisms employed to relay that story in narrative form.

Chatman (1978) shares Genette’s preference for analyzing the structures rather than the substance of narrative texts, but classifies the elements of a narrative differently. Chatman maintains that events and existents (i.e. characters or actors) pertain to the story while the narrator, narratee, author, implied author, reader and implied reader are aspects of the discourse. Where Genette avoids discussing the individuals present in the narrative, Chatman justifies their inclusion in his analysis: “one cannot account for events without recognizing the existence of things causing or being affected by those events. At the level of discourse, no statement of an event can be made, in any medium, that does not include a subject” (p. 34). Both Chatman and Genette employ unique and specific terminology to describe the structural elements of narrative. Some of these terms are still utilized by theorists, some have been discarded, and still others have prompted decades-long debates about their meaning, validity, and helpfulness as concepts.
Indeed, both Keen (2003) and Bal (2009/1985) agree that the jargon of narratology has proven alienating and divisive. Keen notes, “Jargon presents a serious challenge to the student of narrative form” and “advanced students take a risk if they adopt a vocabulary that may be perceived, even by other literature professionals, as arcane, elitist, or deliberately obscure” (p. xv). Bal’s work reflects the influence of both Chatman and Genette, while promoting her own version of critical concepts (2009/1985, p. xix). Unlike other narratology texts that are designed for literary theorists (Abbott, 2008/2002; Fludernik, 2009; Herman, L. & Vervaeck, 2005; Keen, 2003), Bal has designed her work to guide researchers from other disciplines. She notes in the Preface to the 3rd edition that despite the growing interest the study of narrative, few scholars from other disciplines have made use of narratological principles because of “its positivistic claims, formalist limitations, and inaccessible, idiosyncratic jargon” (p. xviii). Since I intend to incorporate both classical and post-classical approaches, Bal’s work proves a valuable resource and model for the development of a methodology for a social science such as public administration and public policy. Bal demonstrates a sensitivity to the critiques of post-classical narratology while still maintaining a classical focus on form. For these reasons, her text will serve as the primary source for the remainder of my discussion of classical narratology.

Bal’s Narratological Methodology

Bal’s (2009/1985) definition of narrative has three components: a narrative text in which a narrator relays a story to a narratee; a story of events involving actors; and the fabula, which is the series of related events involving actors that is often organized
chronologically. Bal structures her discussion of each of the main elements of narrative according to this layered structure, and also acknowledges that this division is “a theoretical supposition based on a process of reasoning” and that “Only the text layer, embodied in the sign system of language, visual images, or any other, is more or less directly accessible” (p. 7). Bal provides a clear overview of the components and relationships between the three layers, including how they relate to one another and how a narrative is produced. The fabula consists of elements -- “events, actors, time and location” (p. 8) – that are arranged into a story. She calls the various factors that affect how story is ordered “aspects” and these include: the sequencing of the events; the amount of time allocated for the elements; the transformation of actors into characters with unique and identifiable traits; the transformation of the locations of the fabula into specific and recognizable settings; the establishment of higher level relationships between actors, events, location and time that exceed the information of the elements as described in the fabula; and the selection of a “point of view” that results in a focalization which is “the relation between ‘who perceives’ and what is perceived, ‘colours’ the story with subjectivity” (p. 8). The story is then translated into signs, which are conveyed by a narrator to the readers or audience.

The defining feature of the first layer, the narrative text (Bal, 2009/1985, Chapter 1), is the narrator, who is not an actual person nor the author of the narrative. As Bal explains, the narrator is a function, an expression of language. However, the narrator may also be a character in the text. If the narrator is not a character in the story, then narrator is called an external narrator. If the narrator is a character in the story and an agent in the
fabula, then the narrator is called a character-bound narrator. Character-bound narrators have limited knowledge, only aware of the events that they have experienced, whereas an external narrator may have access to all information available in the fabula. Personal statements in the first person and with verbs conjugated in the present indicate that the narrator has a personal connection to the narrative, whereas impersonal statements in the past tense reflect a more distant relationship. Moreover, a text may have multiple narratives embedded in it. *Arabian Nights* is the most commonly discussed example that illustrates the complexity of embedded narratives. In this narrative, a narrator relates a story about Scheherazade and Scheherazade then narrates a series of stories to her husband and then sometimes characters within Scheherazade’s tales narrate stories and so on. When analyzing a text, it is critical to determine the kind of narrator and the level at which the narration takes place to understand fully the trustworthiness and reliability of the narrator, but also the logic of the story’s structure.

Narrators may also make several kinds of statements: narrative, argumentative, and description. Narrative statements relay information about the events of the fabula and move the story forward. Argumentative statements have nothing to do with the story or fabula; Bal (2009/1985) describes them as “any statement that refers to something of general knowledge outside the fabula” (p. 33) and may convey purely ideological statements. A descriptive statement by the narrator is “a textual fragment in which features are attributed to objects” (p. 36), which offers additional information about the events and actors of the fabula and makes the world of the text come to life for the reader. Bal suggests that although argumentative statements often relay information that is
ideological or cultural, narrative and descriptive statements can do this also, albeit in a
different fashion: “It is, however, quite possible that such explicit statements
[argumentative] are treated ironically in other parts of the text, or are contradicted by
descriptive or narrative parts of the text to such an extent that the reader must distance
herself from them” (p. 33). Bal further concludes that the relationships between these
types of statements can best be found through a structural, narratological analysis: “all
approaches that isolate ideology from structure, or reject structural analysis because it is
not political, are missing an important point of narrative theory” (p. 35).

In Bal’s (2009/1985) middle layer of the narrative – the story – the events and
actors of the fabula are organized and fleshed out. The first aspect of this, the ordering
and timing of events, builds directly on Genette’s work. Bal indicates that in the story, the
events from the fabula are placed into a sequence, which may or may not be
chronological. The analysis of this aspect of the story, how and when events are
discussed, requires that the researcher construct as complete of a fabula as possible in
order to determine: in which direction the events have been ordered, either
chronologically or by anachrony (a flashback or flash-forward); the distance each event
takes place from the present; and the span of time in the anachrony. Analysis of these
aspects, according to Bal, may reveal “the basis of the laws of everyday logic which
govern common reality” (p. 79), which is a critical connection to the goal of identifying
the social norms cited in a narrative text. Bal indicates that rhythm of the narrative is an
aspect of the story that “is as striking as it is elusive” (p. 98). The rhythm of a narrative is
unique and involves the comparison of how much time in a story is dedicated to each
element. Essentially, the researcher must account for all time in the fabula and then evaluate how each of those elements is addressed in the story. Some elements may be skipped while others may be quickly summarized; some elements may be conveyed through a description of a scene, while others may receive exhaustive attention that slows down or even pauses the narrative.

Another element that affects the presentation of aspects of the fabula in the story is frequency, which is how often events from the fabula are repeated in the story. As Bal (2009/1985) explains, “When I refer here to a repetition, I mean different events or alternative presentations of events, which show similarities” (p. 110). There are several ways that repetition may appear: an event that takes place once in the fabula is presented once in the story; an event that happens multiple times in the fabula is presented the exact same number of times in the story; an event may occur once in the fabula and be presented multiple times in the fabula; an event that happens numerous times in the fabula may be presented once in the story (with a mention of the numerous identical occurrences). As Butler’s theory of performativity indicates that social identities are subject to ritualized repetition, the treatment of repetitious behaviors in a narrative may prove enlightening.

The next aspect of story that Bal (2009/1985) addresses is also critical to any discussion of social identity: characters. As she explains, “we respond to those paper people” who are “anthropomorphic figures provided with specifying features the narrator tells us about” (p. 112). Indeed, Bal is explicit that characters are not people, they have human characteristics but “no real psyche, personality, ideology, or competence to act,
but it does possess characteristics that make readers assume it does, and makes psychological and ideological descriptions possible” (p. 113). She further suggests that readers construct characters based on the kinds of information provided in the narrative and it is important to identify these pieces of information. First, throughout the narrative, as a character’s attributes are revealed, one can more or less predict how a character will behave: “The fact that profession, sex, external factors, or quirks of personality are mentioned creates an expectation. The story may fulfil it, but may just as easily frustrate it. Either way, character features activate the reader” (p. 125). The narrator may emphasize certain traits by mentioning them repeatedly, or a character may be fleshed out simply by the amount of details revealed about its actions and relationships. Yet even though characters may be fairly predictable, transformation is still possible and chief factor in character development. In the end, characters and their presentation reflect social expectations and include normative judgments. Bal affirms, “the description of a character is always strongly coloured by the ideology of critics, who are often unaware of their own ideological hang-ups. Consequently, what is presented as description is an implicit value judgment” (p. 119).

Characters inhabit specific spaces, which is the next aspect of story that Bal (2009/1985) explores. Space is at once both a self-evident and under-explored concept in narrative theory. Space is linked to characters through perception, specifically “sight, hearing, and touch. All three participate in the presentation of a space in the story” (p. 136). Spaces serve as the frame in which the action of the story takes place, but also can have emotions associated with them (i.e. safety, insecurity, fear). Much like characters,
Bal argues that spaces are subject to “determination, repetition, accumulation, transformation, and the relation between various spaces” (p. 139). Reader have determinative expectations about what a space or setting is like, but the space can also be “an acting place rather than the place of action” (p. 139). Spaces, then, are often associated with specific emotions or moods of the characters.

The final aspect of the story is focalization. Genette (1980, 1988) introduced this concept to the narrative theory and it continues to be a challenging and contested aspect. Bal (2009/1985) defines focalization as the way that the elements from the fabula are seen or perceived. Where point of view addresses the issue of who is speaking, focalization is the issue of who is seeing the events described in the story. As Bal explains, “Character-bound focalization (CF) can vary, can shift from one character to another, even if the narrator remains constant” (p. 151). The person who sees the action is the focalizor and the object seen is the focalized object. There are three questions that Bal identifies as critical for any researcher to answer when considering the issue of focalization: “1 What does the character focalize: what is aimed at? 2 How does it do this: with what attitude does it view things? 3 Who focalizes it: whose focalized object is it?” (p. 155). There may be multiple levels of focalization as narrative progresses as different characters focalize. Bal concludes her discussion, noting “focalization, is in my view, the most important, most penetrating, and most subtle means of manipulation. Analyses of newspaper reports which aim at revealing the hidden ideology embedded in such reports should involve focalization in their investigation” (p. 176). Regarding questions of social identity, a question that should also be considered (which Bal does not
discuss) is the issue of which characters act as focalizors and which do not. Is everyone’s perspective considered throughout the narrative? Or are certain focalizations of the events in the story ignored?

The third layer, the fabula, consists of elements, which are static, and processes, which are dynamic. Bal (2009/1985) explains that the researcher constructs the fabula of a narrative, and thus there is no one fabula, but many possible fabulas. As a result, her discussion of the elements of the fabula also includes advice for determining which elements to include. The first of these elements, events, Bal describes as “the transition from one state to another state, caused or experienced by actors” (p. 6). She emphasizes that when constructing a fabula, certain events are more important to include in the chronological list than others. The most critical events prompt actors to make choices, unveil the consequences of a choice, or involve a confrontation between multiple actors. Both the choices and their repercussions have clear connections to the norms espoused by a society, which makes events a valuable point of analysis for any investigation of social identity in narrative. Additionally, events relate to other events in the fabula in four ways: “First the events can be grouped on the basis of the identity of the actors involved” (p. 200); events are classifiable based on the kind of interaction that takes place; events are related to each other chronologically and thus can be ordered; and finally, “the locations at which events occur can also lead to the formation of a structure” (p. 201).

Actors are the next element and are closely linked to events. Actors who do not take part in critical events can be excluded from the fabula. The factors that should be considered when evaluating actors include: the psychological relationships between
actors; the ideological relationships or oppositions as “actors must always deal with the ideological oppositions of the world in which they move” (Bal, 2009/1985, p. 213); and finally any other oppositions that are not psychological or ideological. Not all actors are created equal. While most actors have a goal, only the goal of the main subject-actor of the narrative connects most of the actors to one another. Actors that are important to the fabula and the attainment of the subject-actor’s goal are either the object of the subject, a power that resists/assists the subject in the attainment of the goal, or helpers or opponents who perform supplemental tasks that either assist or oppose the subject’s goal.

Another element of the fabula that Bal (2009/1985) considers is time. Every fabula has a duration or time span over which the constitutive elements occur, but there are also often gaps in time due to incomplete information in the narrative. Still, the researcher can usually uncover a logical sequence of events because “On the basis of the information offered in the text, it is possible to find the chronology of the fabula even if the order is not sequential” (p. 219). Bal believes that it can be very useful for the reader to identify the differences in chronology and the gaps between the fabula and the story.

The final element is location. Sometimes locations are explicitly stated and in other cases one can make an inference about where an event took place. According to Bal (2009/1985), the relationship between the location and other elements of the fabula can be enlightening. Deciphering the interconnections between these elements is critical: “When several places, ordered in groups, can be related to psychological, ideological, and moral oppositions, location may function as an important principle of structure” (p. 221).
Classical narratology, then, clearly defines narrative as a form of discourse with unique aspects that differentiate it from other kinds of discourse. In a narrative, a narrator relates a story and that story includes events that occur during a specific period of time. Classical narratologists emphasize the importance of form, rather than content. For the purposes of developing a methodology to evaluate the presence of norms that govern social identities, classical narratology offers a variety of valuable analytical tools. Bal’s (2009/1985) work establishes a three-part division of narrative – narrative text, story, and fabula – which lays out the structural elements of narratives where social norms may be cited. Yet there are other aspects of narrative that should also be evaluated, which is where post-classical narratologists pick up the pace.

Post-Classical Narratology

In this section, I discuss post-classical theories of narratology. While Bal’s (2009/1985) classical narratological analysis focuses on the structure of the narrative and issues that are internal to the narrative, postclassical scholars push beyond the narrative and investigate how narratives convey information that readers interpret according to their personal understanding of the world. In particular, this fits well with the second aspect of narrative that Ryan (2005) identifies—what narratives accomplish for humans—and requires looking beyond the structure of the discourse. As Herman and Verbaeken (2005) explain, “The reader and the context—literary as well as ideological—perhaps constitute the most important new ingredients of contemporary narrative theory” (p. 9). I examine their definitions of narrative, but also recent trends in the scholarship that have stretched the boundaries of narratology as a field. These new modes of analysis consider
narratives produced in alternative media in addition to text-based forms. Post-classical narratologists also elevate the importance of the context(s) in which a narrative was created and/or read. Scholars of this tradition value the role of the reader in creating and imagining the worlds of the story (otherwise known as storyworlds). Those storyworlds are always incomplete and the reader fills in the gaps based on his or her knowledge and beliefs. Unlike most classical narratologists, who only envisioned their methods being applied to literary works, post-classical scholars embrace the application of narratology to other fields, which they acknowledge to having important ramifications for the interpretation of a narrative.

Definitions of Narrative

While post-classical discussions of narrative often incorporate the work of classical narratologists, their definitions of narrative reflect the influence of Bruner (1986, 1990, 1991, 1998, 2004). Central to Bruner’s analysis of narrative is his critique of the classical narratological assertion that the most important aspect of narratives can be found by identifying the deeper structures of the discourse. Bruner envisions a different purpose for narrative; he argues that the act of constructing narratives plays just as an important role in shaping our perceptions of reality as do the forms that narratives employ to represent reality: “Eventually, it becomes a vain enterprise to say which is the more basic—the mental process or the discourse form that expresses it—for, just as our experience of the natural world tends to imitate categories of familiar science, so our experience of human affairs comes to take the form of the narratives we use in telling about them” (1991, p. 5). Accordingly, Bruner describes the focus of his work as “not how narrative text is
constructed, but rather how it operates as an instrument of mind in the construction of reality” (1991, pp. 5-6). The stories that are relayed in a narrative form represent our efforts to describe, understand, and process the events that occur in our lives. Narratives provide a valuable window into culture and society because “Stories must necessarily, then, relate to what is morally valued, morally appropriate, or morally uncertain” (1990, p. 50). We construct narratives about our experiences, which cite the norms and values of our societies. The construction of these narratives helps us develop an understanding of our experiences and to share them with others, but constructing these narratives also affects how we perceive the world, including how we interpret the identities of others and ourselves.

Bruner indicates that narratives do more than just reflect the nature of reality as we have perceived or processed it. In stories, we explore the limits of societal rules and regulations: “Stories, carried to completion, are explorations in the limits of legitimacy” (1990, p. 50). Stories establish the normal state of the world, describe the events that disrupt that stasis, and then portray the emergence of a new state of normalcy: “One view has it that lifelike narratives start with a canonical or ‘legitimate’ steady state, which is breached, resulting in a crisis, which is terminated by a redress, with recurrence of the cycle an open possibility” (1986, p. 15). Moreover, Bruner (1990) suggests that in narratives, we not only reference what is normal but also provide explanations for which deviations are recognizable and why they happen: “when you encounter an exception to the ordinary, and ask somebody what is happening, the person you ask will virtually always tell a story that contains reasons (or some other specification of an intentional
Where classical narratological tools offer insights into where norms might be found in narrative discourse, Bruner’s mental models pave the way for building a better understanding of how those norms may be cited, what purposes their citation might have in the narrative, and what role narratives play in helping us understand, share, and construct the social world.

Postclassical scholars, then, consider factors outside the content or form of the narrative and by removing constraints related to the number of actors, causality, and narrative medium. Ryan’s (2005) lengthy definition of narrative in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory* epitomizes this new direction. Ryan argues that the classical narratological distinction between narrative and story, while important, is not what makes narrative unique. Rather, the narrative is unique in “it is its ability to evoke stories in the mind that distinguishes narrative discourse from other text-types” (p. 348). In a later work, Ryan (2007) describes “narrative texts as a fuzzy set allowing variable degrees of membership, but centered on prototypical cases that everybody recognizes as stories” (p. 28). This fuzzy set is comprised of four dimensions: spatial, temporal, mental, and formal/pragmatic. Each of these dimensions includes conditions that essentially allows individuals to construct their own definition of narrative based on personal preference.

Fludernik’s (2009) definition of narrative incorporates many of the same elements Ryan describes, but Fludernik does not support a choose-your-own-adventure model. She states that a narrative is “a representation of a possible world in a linguistic and/or visual medium, at whose centre there are one or several protagonists of an anthropomorphic
nature who are existentially anchored in a temporal and spatial sense and who (mostly) perform goal-directed actions (action and plot structure)” (p. 6). Fludernik’s definition is brief, but valuable for the construction of a methodology for analyzing narratives because it emphasizes several crucial elements missing from classical narratological definitions, while providing a bit more structure than Ryan’s definition does (2007, pp. 28-30). What differentiates Fludernik’s definition from prior definitions is: her broadening of the field of possible narrative mediums beyond text to include film, theater, and graphic novels; her usage of the phrase “possible world” which refers to theory imported from the field of philosophy; her acknowledgement that post-modern stories may or may not be relayed through a narrator (who may or may not be human); and her inclusion of plot.

Herman’s (1999, 2002, 2007, 2009) work highlights several additional critiques of classical narratology that also merit attention. Herman suggests that all narratives have the following elements: a context in which they must be interpreted as an act of communication (situatedness); a series of events that occur within a specific timeframe that prompt consumers of the narrative to make interpretations; a disruption of the storyworld and its human (or anthropomorphic) inhabitants; and also “the experience of this storyworld-in-flux, highlighting the pressure of events on real or imagined consciousness affected by the occurrences at issue” (2009, p. xvi). According to Herman, the first element, situatedness, is only partially addressed by classical narratologists. While these narratologists consider who communicates in a narrative and the distinctive roles of narrator, author, and reader, their concern is the nature and structure of a written text, so they do not consider the communicative context in which a narrative is relayed.
(which can be interactive). Herman also notes that classical narratologists “failed to come to terms with the referential or world-creating properties of narratives, partly because of the exclusion of the referent in favor of signifier and signified in the Sausserean language theory that informed structuralists’ approach” (2009, p. 105). Context and world construction are two additional elements, then, that post-classical narratological theorists consider critical.

One point of contrast does emerge from a comparison of the work of Herman (1999, 2002, 2007, 2009) and Fludernik (1996, 2009; 2010b). It involves the question of fictionality and whether it is appropriate to apply narratological methods to historical (nonfictional) narratives. Fludernik asserts, “fictional narrative, whether in fairy tale, novel or television film, differs radically from historical writing” (2009, p. 3) and thus require different analytical methods. Her point of view lines up with the classical narratological perspective that their tools should be applied only to fictional text-based narratives. Herman (2002), however, offers a different perspective. He acknowledges that fictional and historical narratives require different considerations during analysis since historical texts reference events that have happened, but the term he uses, storyworld, “applies both to fictional and nonfictional narratives. All narratives have world-creating power, even though, depending on the kind of narrative involved, interpreters bring to bear on those storyworlds different evaluative criteria” (p. 16). Thus, consumers of narratives have different expectations for nonfictional narratives, but they are still engulfed in the storyworld of the narrative. In next few subsections, I explore the four elements that have emerged from this discussion of post-classical theory: alternative
narrative media; context and character; possible (story)worlds; and the question of fictionality.

**Transmedial Approaches to Narratology**

Although some classical narratologists include visual media as a possible form of narrative storytelling (Bal, 2009/1985; Chatman, 1978), most scholars privilege the linguistic roots of narratology and focus on text-based sources. In her early work, Fludernik (1996) pushes the boundaries of classical narratology by suggesting that structural tools of narratology could also be used to evaluate conversational storytelling: “What the present model therefore attempts to do is to rescue diachronic considerations for the study of narrative and to make possible a discussion of narrativity and narrative structure that spans the entire range of available narrative discourses” (p. 51). A narrative, then, is a cognitive model in written or oral form, which is deployed by the author and interpreted by the reader/listener to build an understanding of the world described in the narrative. Ryan (1991, 2001, 2004, 2006) has lobbied throughout her career for a transmedial approach to narratology that includes not only texts but also all kinds of media. She further differentiates the interdisciplinary study of narrative from a transmedial approach:

one project directs us to the importance of narrative in mostly language-based practices, the other focuses on the embodiment, that is to say, the particular semiotic substance and the technological transmission of narrative. Its categories are language, image, sound, gesture, and, further, spoken language, writing, cinema, radio, television, and computers rather than law, medicine, science, literature, and history. (2004, p. 1)

In addition to the types she lists, some of the newer digital types of narrative include hypertext narratives, which allow readers to jump around within the text as they please by
clicking on links within a section of the passage. Readers can skip to “supplemental narrative discourse, alternate continuations of the story, fragments of still other narratives—but links can also consist of footnote material, definitions, pictures, poems, music, and so on” (Abbott, 2008/2002, p. 33). While Ryan (2005) advocates the application of narratological tools to these other media, she recommends that scholars: carefully evaluate the literary tools and make any necessary adjustments; build a strong understanding of the storytelling capabilities of the medium; be clear about what makes that story a narrative (particularly if there is no narrator); identify the differences between the storytelling devices of this medium compared to others; and determine whether the features of this mode are beneficial or deleterious.

Ryan differentiates interdisciplinary narrative analysis from a transmedial analysis, but it is critical to note that the narratives typically used in social sciences differ from those analyzed by literary theorists. As discussed in an earlier chapter, scholars in academic disciplines such as public administration and public policy often gather narratives from participants in research studies or from publicly available political dialogue. These narratives are generally less formal and more likely to be incomplete; they may be written in response to survey questions, they may be delivered orally in response to interview questions, or the researcher may compile the meta-narrative based on the resources. Narratives gathered in these contexts are not usually constructed with the same care for construction as a novel: their stories may not have a clear beginning, middle, and end, or, the causal chain between the events related may not yet be fully developed or understood. As Herman suggests, “narratives do different things, and
assume different forms, in different communicative environments” (pp. 33-34). Mildorf (2010) argues in her article “Narratology and the Social Sciences” that enormous opportunity remains for the application of narratological theory in social science research. Mildorf explains that researchers in the social sciences have developed their own techniques for evaluating narratives, but “it is my impression that much narrative research in the social sciences is still limited to an investigation into what is told, while the how (that is, the process of constructing and conveying what is told) is discussed in fairly general terms” (p. 234). Mildorf further argues, “Despite their focus on narrative, many social scientists seem to be largely unaware of (and perhaps not interested in?) what (literary) narratology has to offer” (p. 234). The narratological tools developed for evaluating fictional written or spoken narratives, then, raise possibilities for drawing new insights that social scientists ought to consider when evaluating narratives.

**Context and Identity**

Some of the most vocal critics of classical narratology’s restrictive focus on the text while ignoring the larger context have emerged from feminist studies. Early influential proponents of a “feminist narratology” include Knutson (1989) argued that “Gender/power relations are encoded in narrative form, and at the three levels of fabula, story, and text, feminist narratology can break the code” (p. 12). Lanser (1992, 1995, 1997/1986), one of the more prolific feminist narratologists, initiated her efforts by questioning whether narratologists ought to consider the gender of the author of the narrative and what impact gender has on the type of characters and plots developed by authors: “The tendency to pure semiosis is both cause and effect of a more general tendency in
narratology to isolate texts from the context of their production and reception and hence from what ‘political’ critics think of as literature’s ground of being—the ‘real world’” (1997/1986, p. 677). Thus, context in this sense focuses on the site of the narrative’s production and the author.

However, over time, as feminism and feminist narratologists increasingly were influenced by poststructural theory and its decentering of the subject, other contextual issues came to prominence (Mezei, 1996). Ruth E. Page (1999, 2003, 2006, 2007), one of the most visible contemporary feminist narratologists, describes the changing focus of feminist narratology. First, scholars set about “(1) finding examples of narrative written by women that posed challenges to the categories of classical narratology, and referring to historical context to account for (the significance of) the gendered differences they observed” (1999, p. 342). Next, scholars would read a text closely, “applying the analytic categories narratology made available to scrutinize texts very closely and arrive at gender-conscious interpretations of narratives (1999, p. 343). Page’s (2007) more recent work cites the influence of Judith Butler as pushing feminists to consider gender fluid and performative rather than binary and oppositional, but also to investigate how gender identity intersects with other social identities such as class, race, and sexuality. For this reason, she and others (Fludernik & Alber, 2010a) consider feminist narratology a critical avenue that has extended narratological analysis to examine issues raised by queer theorists and postcolonial scholars about what identities and values are privileged in narratives.
Indeed, interest in the question of what norms drive the creation of narratives and the portrayals of its actors and events has spread beyond those who consider themselves feminist narratologists. Herman & Vervaeck (2005, 2007) have demonstrated a persistent interest in the role of ideology in narrative, arguing that “The naturalization of ideology is an effect on the reader, but early structuralist narratology has little to say about how this reader contributes to the whole process. It seems as if the text does all the work and imposes its ideology on the audience. More recent narratologies have a more active view of the reader” (2007, p. 218). Postclassical narratologists, then, have raised important questions about the norms that imbue the structure, characters, and events of narratives. While this may seem like it returns the author to hierarchical prominence, postclassical narratologists maintain that readers play a more critical role in developing the meaning of narratives through interpretation, which will be explored next.

Readers and Possible (Story)Worlds

Classical narratological theorists originally suggested that narrative texts included information that the reader absorbed directly, but post-classical narratologists have questioned this in part due to: the rise of poststructuralist theory in which both Barthes (1977a) and Foucault (1984) critique the author as overly hierarchical, Barthes concluded, “we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author” (p. 148); Bruner’s discussions of mental models, which prioritize the actions of the reader over those of the author; and the work of Iser (1978, 1989). Iser developed a theory of reading that has
proven to be very influential throughout literary theory and narratology. Iser (1978) describes the process by which readers respond to the messages in a literary text:

Any successful transfer however—though initiated by the text—depends on the extent to which this text can activate the individual reader’s faculties of perceiving and processing. Although the text may well incorporate the social norms and values of its possible readers, its function is not merely to present such data, but, in fact, to use them in order to secure its uptake. (p. 107)

Influenced by Iser’s theory, Bruner (1991) suggests that readers interpret texts based on their personal experience: “We inevitably take the teller’s intentions into account and do so in terms of our background knowledge (and, indeed, in the light of our presuppositions about the teller’s background knowledge)” (p. 17). Thus, whether reading fictional or nonfictional narratives, readers employ their knowledge of their lives to develop an understanding of the world presented in the narrative.

Yet postclassical scholars such as Pavel (1986), Ryan (1991, 2001, 2006), Ronen (1994), Doležel (1998, 2010), and Herman (2002, 2009) each have made major contributions to expanding the narratology’s valuation of the role of the reader by introducing a theory from the field of philosophy. Possible worlds theory, “a formal model developed by logicians for the purpose of defining the semantics of modal operators” (Ryan, 1991, p. 3) suggests that texts can project worlds through semantic operations and that those worlds can be broken down into objects, states and events. In terms of what this means for narrative, Ryan concludes that “being narrative means” bringing a universe to life, and conveying to the reader the sense that at the center of this universe resides an actual world where individuals exist and where events take place” (1991, p. 259). Doležel (1998, 2010) builds on Ryan’s approach, suggesting that
fictional worlds can be characterized in the following ways: fictional worlds are not real places; there are no limits on the number of possible fictional worlds that can be created; one accesses a fictional world through texts; fictional worlds can never be complete; fictional worlds can vary from one another in significant manners; and fictional worlds are produced by the creative activity of humans (1998, pp. 16-28). Ronen (1994) positions her work as a clarification of the work of Ryan and Doležel, suggesting that while literary theory had incorporated possible worlds theory, it had not sufficiently paid attention to the differences between “possible worlds” and “fictional worlds.” Where a “possible world” is not ontologically distinct from reality, “the fictional world is constructed as a world presenting a self-sufficient system of structures and relations. Possible worlds however, despite being distinguishable worlds, do not share this ontological autonomy” (p. 8). Thus, while fictional worlds are not complete, they have a system of values that may differ from reality.

The concept of fictional worlds (or storyworlds as Herman (2002, 2009) calls them) expands the role of the reader; fictional worlds are necessarily incomplete, which means that there are gaps that the reader must fill in based on knowledge and preferences. Readers, then, play an active role; they build mental models based on the cues provided in the story and while interpreting the narrative, they “imaginatively (emotionally, viscerally) inhabit a world in which, besides happening and existing, things matter, agitate, exalt, repulse, provide grounds for laughter and grief, and so on — both for narrative agents and for interpreters working to make sense of their circumstances and (inter)actions” (2009, p. 118). Ryan (2001) concurs with Herman’s assessment of the
contributions that readers make when consuming a narrative. She notes, “Whether textual worlds function as imaginary counterparts or as models of the real world, they are mentally constructed by the reader as environments that stretch in space, exist in time, and serve as habitat for a population of animate agents” (p. 15). Storyworlds, then, require the participation of the text and the reader: the text lays the foundations for the storyworld, establishing characters, events, and rules for behavior; readers then take those foundations and generate interpretations of that raw material, envisioning and filling in the gaps. While a storyworld has its own social norms that govern the behavior of characters (which may or may not mimic those of the world the reader lives in), the prevalent norms of the social context of the reader also has an impact. Thus, when evaluating narratives, it is critical to examine the context of the reader.

**Fiction vs. Nonfiction**

In their discussion of fictional worlds, Ryan (1991, 2001, 2006), Ronen (1994), Doležel (1998, 2010), and Herman (2002, 2009) generally agree that while historical narratives are in some ways similar to fictional narratives, a structural analysis of a historical narrative requires different tools. Doležel (2010) summarizes what makes them distinctive, “Historical text is not performative; it does not create a world that did not exist before the act of representation. Rather, it is constantive, a description of a world that preexisted the act of representation” (p. 42). Indeed, many proclaim that the underlying factual basis of historical narratives makes them different; even Bruner (1986) notes, “The fact that the historian’s ‘empirical’ account and the novelist’s imaginative story share the narrative form is, on reflection, rather startling” (p. 45). Historical
narratives are also written by different kinds of individuals (professional historians vs. literary authors). The question of the role of fact and fiction in the construction of narrative has been a heated point of discussion among a variety of theorists, both in the fields of history and in narratology.

While narratologists have emphasized that historians must use reliable and verifiable proof to justify the construction of their narrative, critical theorists wrestling with this issue have arrived at different determinations. White (1973, 1978b, 1987a) argues that the distinction between history and fiction is murkier than one might suppose. The historian constructs the story, not only imagining or inferring the meaning of the story, but establishing the central plot of the narrative, which “is always an embarrassment and has to be presented as ‘found’ in the events rather than put there by narrative techniques” (1987b, p. 21). White (1978a) acknowledges that histories purportedly convey information about “real” events, but maintains that there are always imaginary aspects inherent to the narrative simply because the historian has divided the past into discrete events and then fashioned them into a larger story, filling in gaps in the historical record with interpretation. Ricoeur (1984, 1985, 1988) also admits that historians rely on methods similar to those employed fictional authors, but he perceives the difference to be one of professional ethics, arguing “If history is a construction, historians, by instinct, would like this construction to be a reconstruction” (1988, p. 152).

Cohn (1999), a narratologist, offers valuable insights from the narratological perspective on why historical narratives require a different analytical base for a structural analysis. Cohn advocates a three-part division to the narrative text, similar to Genette’s
(1980) and Bal’s (2009/1985). While the first two layers – story and discourse – remain identical to the narratological standard, the third level would be distinct and called the reference level, which encompasses the known historical events, actors, and locations that populate the story. Cohn (1999) notes, “the idea that history is committed to verifiable documentation and that this commitment is suspended in fiction has survived even the most radical dismantling of the history/fiction distinction” (pp. 112-113). Cohn further identifies three issues that a “historiographic narratologist” must address: 1) Historical narratives tend to focus more on collective actions than individuals; 2) The narrative relies more on summary than on scene; 3) The author/narrator distinction collapses (pp. 121-129). It is certainly up for debate whether these three issues are relevant to every historical narrative; however, without question, her substitution of a reference level in the three layers of the narrative is noteworthy. In essence, Cohn reimagines Bal’s fabula; instead of the researcher compiling a fabula from the fictional narrative (or multiple versions of it), the researcher compiles the reference layer based on historical events, both those recounted in the narrative and those that are excluded.

Post-classical theories of narratology, then, have added several crucial considerations to the mix. First, that narratives may be communicated through a variety of mediums, not just text. Second, the context of the narrative – in terms of the author and the reader – is essential to developing interpretations of the narrative that reflect societal attitudes about identity. Third, whether a narrative is fictional or nonfictional, the narrative evokes a storyworld with rules, values, and environments that are inhabited by characters. Those storyworlds are always incomplete and the reader fills in the gaps based
on his or her knowledge and beliefs. Readers have amount of agency in interpreting the messages included in the narrative, but that agency is limited based on the norms of the reader’s social context. Finally, when working with nonfictional narratives, it is critical to recognize that the events are historical and to construct a fabula/reference layer that includes real world events as well as those that occur within the narrative.

**Conclusions**

Bruner (1986) identifies two dominant perspectives of narrative that have emerged during the “narrative turn” in academic scholarship: top-down and bottom-up. An individual who approaches narratives from the top-down perspective is typically a social scientist who will “take off from a theory about story, about mind, about writers, about readers” and then “swoops down on this text and that, searching for instances (and less often counter-instances) of what he hopes will be a right ‘explanation’” (p. 9). An individual who approaches a narrative from a bottom-up perspective is usually a literary theorist who focuses in on one work and explores its possible meanings through deconstruction (p. 10). While Bruner characterizes this first method as powerful, he also cautions, “it instills habits of work that always risk producing results that are insensitive to the contexts in which they were dug up” (p. 9). What I propose is a mixture of these two perspectives: from the top-down perspective, I want to search for evidence of norms in narratives to develop a better understanding of how storytelling affects social identity, but to do this, I will also need to carefully (re)construct the storyworld of the narratives.

As the classical narratologists demonstrate, narrative is a unique form of discourse with recognizable structural forms. Bal’s (2009/1985) narratological method, which
involves evaluating the narrator and his/her narration closely; breaking the story down into main aspects, including the methods conveying the passage of time in the narrative (frequency, repetition, and chronology), characters, and settings; constructing a fabula with the critical constitutive elements (events, actors, time and location). Post-classical narratologists have made a clear case for the presence of social norms in narratives. They argue that in addition to analyzing structural forms, it is critical to generate a vision of the storyworld projected within the narrative, which means becoming familiar: with the medium the narrative is communicated in and with what purpose; with its historical context, specifically the norms that make intelligible the social identities under examination at the time of the narrative’s production and the relevant events that chronologically precede the actions of the narrative.

Both classical and post-classical narratological approaches, then, highlight critical issues to consider when searching for the presence social norms in discourse and suggest how a reader might respond to these citations in terms of accepting, contesting, or expressing ambivalence about the norms. Despite this expressed interest in norms and identity, the narratological literature offers little clarity about the role of narratives in the construction and development of social identities. As the post-classical narratology scholars contend, readers interpret the narratives and the meaning of the narrative may vary significantly from reader to reader. In the next chapter, I explore in more depth a theory of how identity develops, including questions of agency, the role that government can play in the structuring of identity through discourses such as public policies, and a closer examination of how public administrators enforce or assign identities to members
of the public. In subsequent chapters, I will connect this theory of identity to the study of narratives, including SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) and the storytelling about the policy.
Feminist theory provides a useful base for examining the development of social identities through the interaction of narratives with their readers or listeners. Drawing from this theory offers a better understanding of the potential role of narrative in identity development, but also specifically for a discourse such as a public policy. The work of Judith Butler (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005) and her theory of performativity in which she argues that neither gender, sex, nor sexuality is a natural identity -- all are social constructions -- offers such insight. Butler posits that social norms and discourses interact in such a way to make possible (or impossible) the emergence of identities such as gender or sex. She argues that identity is ritualized and performed rather than something that is natural or inherent to an individual. In this chapter, I first examine several of Butler’s writings on identity to reveal how she envisions societal norms as forces that shape the contexts in which identities such as gender and sexuality emerge. Then, I explore how her theory of performativity characterizes the interaction between norms, individuals, and two specific kinds of discourse: performatives and the self-narrative, which Butler (2005) calls “giving an account of oneself.” I discuss both forms of discourse, including what they are, how they are created, and what role they play in individual identity development.

Next, I explore whether a public policy, such as SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) can be considered an account of oneself and what that may mean for a study of identity. I contend that public policy can be considered a narrative based on the definitions considered so far from the fields of public administration and public policy, narratology,
and Butler (2005). Then, I examine whose narrative public policy is and what the ramifications of its content may be in light of Butler’s work. Here, I argue that while public policy shares many qualities with an account of oneself, it is not such an account. The key reasons emerge through a discussion of Thomas J. Catlaw’s (2005, 2006, 2007) work on the fabrication of the collective subject the People, and the impact of this empty subject on modern governance, including the fields of public administration and public policy. Finally, I connect these threads to the more specific questions of identity considered in this project for citizens, public administrators, and immigrants (documented and undocumented). Given the constructed nature of these identities, I contend that incorporating Butler’s work is appropriate. As an available discourse that resembles an account of oneself given on behalf of the People, public policy has the potential to strongly influence individual identity development, the public storytelling about a policy, and ultimately the construction of the identities of citizens, public administrators, and immigrants (documented and undocumented).

**Performativity and the Development of Identity**

Over the last several decades, Judith Butler (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005) has developed an influential and complex theory of how the identities of gender, sex, and sexuality form. Butler postulates that none of these identities are natural or essential to an individual. Rather, from birth onwards, we are normalized by our social context through the discourses and individuals with whom we interact. No one is born embodying the identities of male, female, transgender, homosexual, bisexual, transsexual, or heterosexual; these identities develop in accordance with the dominant norms and
discourses, which impact not only our personal and emotional perception of identity, but also its physical materialization. The following discussion focuses first on the role of norms and then on how norms and discourses interact as demonstrated through two kinds of discourse: the performative and an account of oneself.

**Performativity and Social Norms**

Central to Butler’s argument about the constructed nature of gender are two points: 1) gender is not an identity that is present in individuals at birth; and 2) gender is a performed identity. By performance, Butler means “a kind of a doing, an incessant activity performed, in part, without one’s knowing and without one’s willing” (2004, p. 1). Thus, gender is not something that we elect to perform, nor is performed by rote: “On the contrary, it is a practice of improvisation within a scene of constraint” (2004, p. 1). The social context provides cues and guidelines for how gender should be performed, which leaves individuals a small margin of agency in their performances. The final critical piece to her definition of identity performance is its relationality. She argues, “one does not ‘do’ one’s gender alone. One is always ‘doing’ with or for another, even if the other is only imaginary” (2004, p. 1). Even when alone, we are conscious of the social constraints that define what gender should and should not be, which means that we continue to perform our gender even if no one apart from ourselves is watching. This performance, what Butler calls performativity, is not subject to change on an act-by-act or moment-by-moment basis. Rather, it is a regularized repetition of the activities.

Social norms, then, set the scene for the development of our gender identity and our sense of personhood. One’s gender options are only those made possible within the
framework of these norms: “One only determines ‘one’s own’ sense of gender to the extent that social norms exist that support and enable that act of claiming gender for oneself” (2004, p. 7). Individual agency, then, is limited but still possible within that framework. Additionally, these norms impact individuals in a material fashion as well as an emotional one. Butler explains, “The effect of gender is produced through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self” (1990/2006, p. 191). Despite the often-noted physicality of gender identity, Butler firmly maintains that there is no “gender” that pre-exists these material productions. Gender is performed in accordance with the dominant norms and despite the fact that our physical acts and appearance provide concrete evidence of the existence of these norms, the norms may not be easily identifiable in practice: “Norms may or may not be explicit, and when they operate as the normalizing principle in social practice, they usually remain implicit, difficult to read, discernible most clearly and dramatically in the effects that they produce” (2004, p. 41). Thus, one might not be able to define what the norms governing gender performance are, but the evidence of their existence is apparent in the gender performance of every individual in that society.

For example, in contemporary U.S. society, a gender performance of female includes wearing feminine clothing, spotlighting or enhancing one’s feminine physical features, and living a socially acceptable lifestyle for a woman. A socially compelled performance typically means that a woman wears clothing that has been designed in a feminine style; while this most often includes skirts, blouses, and dresses, pants, shorts,
and shirts that look feminine are also acceptable. A woman wears makeup and spotlights the physical features that are commonly considered to be the most feminine such as hairstyle, breasts, hips, and shaved legs. Women also traditionally marry men, bear children through pregnancy, and manage the domestic duties of the household. Not every woman performs her gender in the same way, but women are recognized based on their general adherence to these expectations, which includes physical appearance but also the repetitive actions of daily life. If a woman does not shave her legs one morning that does mean that she is not performing the gender of woman. It simply indicates that her performance is not completely in line with the dominant gender norms and discourses, which could place her recognizability as a woman at risk if she persists in not shaving her legs. If she resists the gender norm, she will most likely be subject to pressure (and possibly punishment) until she resumes the activity: “Femininity is thus not the product of a choice, but the forcible citation of a norm, one whose complex historicity is indissociable from relations of discipline, regulation, punishment” (1993, p. 232). As there are women who do not shave their legs in our society, this indicates that a social norm also exists that is less powerful than the one that compels women to shave their legs, but by virtue of its existence, still permits others to recognize a woman with unshaved legs as performing the gender identity of “woman.”

Butler considers “feminine” a construction. According to her theory, there is nothing naturally “feminine” about the body or about any of the above-described activities. These activities are considered feminine and associated with the identity of woman because of the social norms and discourses that have developed. In the 19th-
century U.S., a gender performance of woman did not include shaved legs, so there is nothing inherently feminine about having shaved legs. In Butler’s estimation, “woman itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end. As an ongoing discursive practice, it is open to intervention and resignification” (1990/2006, p. 45). Yet the gender norm ought not to be conflated with the performance of that norm. Rather, the norm makes certain actions such as shaving one’s legs intelligible: we recognize that a woman who shaves her legs is acting feminine and since current social norms indicate that feminine behavior is indicative of womanhood, that individual is recognizable as a woman. Butler describes the relationship between gender norms and gender performance:

the norm only persists as a norm to the extent that it is acted out in social practice and reidealized and reinstated in and through the daily social rituals of bodily life . . . it is itself (re)produced through its embodiment, through the acts that strive to approximate it, through the idealizations reproduced in and by those acts. (2004, p. 48)

One’s gender performance, then, is intelligible and recognizable by other members of society as long as it remains consistent with the existing social norms that those other members of society are also performing.

Oppression, according to Butler (2004), is not the same as unintelligibility. Rather, one must be recognizable to be oppressed by society; someone who is unrecognizable cannot be described in the current discourse because the norms simply do not exist. Subjects do not pre-exist the norm; the norms create subjects and we are forced to identify ourselves with these pre-existing norms. Butler explains that the self exceeds the
subject made intelligible by the norms. Thus, who we feel we are may not always conform to our recognized identity:

The fact that I am other to myself precisely at the place where I expect to be myself follows from the fact that the sociality of norms exceeds my inception and my demise, sustaining a temporal and spatial field of operation that exceeds my self-understanding. (2004, p. 15)

Using the example of gender identity, there is no “man” or “woman” that exists prior to the norms. The identity of man or woman is imposed on us from birth through our interactions with others and that identity will never fit comfortably in every instantiation. The norm that governs gender identity gains authority through reiteration with the continual creation of subjects who are identified as either male or female. Butler explains, “performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and constrained repetition of norms. And this repetition is not performed by a subject; this repetition is what enables a subject and constitutes the temporal condition for the subject” (1993, p. 95). Butler further argues that even genitalia are not gendered prior to the social norms. Rather, the norms determine how we perceive bodies. Certain bodies are made intelligible by gender norms, while others are not. For example, in the U.S., hermaphrodites or intersexed individuals create a great deal of consternation and are often compelled to physically modify their genitalia to be clearly recognizable as male or female: “To the extent that gender is an assignment, it is an assignment which is never quite carried out according to expectation, whose addressee never quite inhabits the ideal s/he is compelled to approximate” (1993, p. 231).
Performativity, Discourse, and the Performative

Although it might sound as if norms act as rules or laws, Butler differentiates them by classifying rules and laws as discourses. Rather than prohibiting or demanding a performance like a law might, a norm regulates a performance by normalizing certain behaviors since “the ‘coherence’ and ‘continuity’ of ‘the person’ are not logical or analytic features of personhood, but rather, socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility” (1990/2006, p. 23). If one somehow manages to defy the compulsion to perform gender in accordance with the norms, then one risks being identified as less than human (2004, p. 2). Social norms establish the context for identity and pre-exist discourse. Discourses are created that cite those norms to establish rules, regulations, and punishment for those who do not perform their identity correctly. As Butler explains, “Indeed, to understand identity as a practice, and as a signifying practice, is to understand culturally intelligible subjects as the resulting effects of a rule-bound discourse that inserts itself in the pervasive and mundane signifying acts of linguistic life” (1990/2006, p. 198). However, the relationship between discourse (such as laws) and social norms is not unidirectional. Discourses cite norms, providing the compulsory push for certain performances of gender or sexuality, but each repeated citation of social norms in discourse increases the regulatory authority of the norms: “the norm of sex takes hold to the extent that it is ‘cited’ as such a norm, but it also derives its power through the citations that it compels” (1993, p. 13).

While the repeated citation of the norm augments its authority, it also opens the possibility for the norm to change because the repeated interpretation of discourses by
individuals can result in diverging interpretations becoming popular: “To the extent that
gender norms are reproduced, they are invoked and cited by bodily practices that also
have the capacity to alter norms in the course of their citation” (2004, p. 52). Norms may
change, but that change is slow-paced. Individuals perform identities based on
interpretations of discourse. Although individuals are compelled to conform to the norm,
the repeated interpretation of discourses by different individuals can result in
reinterpretations that stray from the original meaning. An interpretation of an
interpretation, much like in a game of telephone, leads to subjects whose identities relate
to the existent social norms, but stretch the boundaries, ultimately provoking change in
the norms and then producing new interpretations of existing discourse, new discourses,
new citations, and new subjects: “The productions swerve from their original purposes
and inadvertently mobilize possibilities of ‘subjects’ that do not merely exceed the
bounds of cultural intelligibility, but effectively expand the boundaries of what is, in fact,

For example, in the United States in the 1950s, the prevailing gender norms as
cited in discourses indicated that men had short hair and women had long hair. Anyone
who deviated from these norms provoked discomfort and had his or her gender identity
called into question. As time passed, the discourses and norms were slowly reinterpreted
and it became acceptable for women’s hair to be shorter and men’s hair to be longer.
Eventually, men and women could perform their gender identity differently from the
original ideal established by the norms of the 1950s and could now be recognized as
performing a gender identity of male or female, regardless of hair length. Indeed, Butler
explains that we must think of “gender as a constituted social temporality” and that even “the appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief” (1990/2006, pp. 191-192). Thus, people in the 1950s firmly believed and performed their identities in accordance with the norm that women had long hair and men had short hair. Over time, those same individuals came to believe in a different version of that norm that did not require a specific performance of hair length for a gender identity to be interpretable.

Discourses cite social norms, but discourses can also be cited by other discourses. The most powerful citation of discourse that Butler describes is the performative. Performatives are oral utterances that transform an individual’s identity. Those who issue performatives usually have been invested with significant authority by a state or a religious institution, and thus channel juridical power in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault, 1978). Judges regularly cite legal discourse in performatives when transforming a defendant into a criminal or a married couple into two divorced individuals. The judge cites the law when she vocalizes the performative and channels the power of the state to alter materially the identities of individual citizens: “The judge is thus installed in the midst of a signifying chain, receiving and reciting the law and, in the reciting, echoing forth the authority of the law” (Butler, 1993, p. 107). Moreover, the discourse then produces the subject that it claims to govern. The discourse is there to govern criminals, but the criminals do not exist until the judge cites the law in a performative and creates the criminal. Similarly, divorced individuals do not exist until the judge issues the
performative that effects the dissolution of the marriage, eliminating the couple in question and bringing into existence two divorcés: “When the law functions as ordinance or sanction, it operates as an imperative that brings into being that which it legally enjoins and protects” (1993, p. 107). However, Butler emphasizes that to create new kinds of subjects, the performative must be regularly repeated. A single instance is not sufficient as “No ‘act’ apart from a regularized and sanctioned practice can wield the power to produce that which it declares” (1993, p. 107).

Since performatives require repetition for authority to transmit effectively, once produced, performatives are subject to errors of replication: repetition makes them vulnerable to reinterpretation or application to different contexts, which can modify the nature and meaning of the performative. Butler concludes that performatives develop new meanings through reiteration, regardless of the intention of their initiator: “[performatives] cannot be controlled by the one who utters or writes . . . They continue to signify in spite of their authors, and sometimes against their authors’ most precious intentions” (1993, p. 241). For example, in the case of the performative that creates divorcés from married couples, this performative once had a different meaning than it does today. Until the late 20th century in the U.S., being a divorcé(e) was considered shameful and resulted in social isolation, usually of women more than men. As time went on and more judges reiterated the performative, the social norms evolved. Now, the performative that creates two divorcés from a married couple no longer carries with it a sentence of social shame. In modern society, divorce is much more commonplace, so the intent of the performative has changed even as the performative itself is still
transformative. The role of the performative in the construction of an individual’s identity is direct and powerful. An agent of a state or a religious institution cites a law or policy that cites social norms. The agent does not simply tell the individual “who” he or she is when issuing a performative; the agent transforms the individual, regardless of that individual’s will or nature, into a new subject.

**An Account of Oneself**

Apart from performatives, there is only one other kind of discourse that Butler explores in any depth: an account of oneself. In *Giving and Account of Oneself* (2005), Butler links her theory of performativity to a different kind of discourse, one that is not dependent on juridical power or a representative of the state. In this work, Butler explores how the creation of a self-narrative affects identity. Butler situates her discussion of the role of this kind of discourse in the work of Hannah Arendt (1998, pp. 176-194) and Adriana Cavarero (1997) who both suggest that every individual has a unique identity at the moment of birth and that this uniqueness can only be captured in a narrative delivered by a third party. This identity does not reflect “something internal, the deep and intimate identity of the self,” rather, “Identity expresses nothing other than ‘itself and what is shown or exhibited’” (Cavarero, 1997, p. 23). Thus, Arendt and Cavarero place great emphasis on the role of action in revealing who someone is. Butler builds on the work of these two theorists despite her different perspective about what performance reveals about an individual and his or her identity.

In the Arendtian (1998, pp. 176-194) perspective, identity is firmly linked to action and narrative. Arendt maintains, “In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal
actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world” (p. 179). For Arendt, one’s physical appearance or characteristics are not critical to understanding who one is, rather the “‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is — his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide — is implicit in everything somebody says and does” (p. 179). As a result, the meaning of one’s life and one’s identity can only be revealed in retrospect when a narrator relates the sequence of events. The narrator, who is neither protagonist nor participant in the events narrated, relays the story of the protagonist’s actions and this story reveals the “who” of the protagonist. According to Arendt, narratives are not composed by the protagonist or the narrator. Instead, Arendt suggests that there is no author of an individual’s life narrative (p. 184); only fictional narratives have authors. An individual takes action and the narrator merely recounts what has happened after the fact.

Cavarero’s (1997) work shares much with the Arendtian perspective, but differs on a few points that Butler (2005) incorporates. Unlike Arendt, Cavarero concludes that action is impermanent. What preserves the memory and the meaning of someone’s life is not the action of the self, but the narrator: “As the true greatness of man, as a measure of his being-human, acting is indeed fragile. It appears, and consumes itself in the very moment of its appearing. Only the poet and the historian can save it from oblivion” (p. 25). Cavarero instead argues that humans suffer from an overwhelming compulsion to feel that we have made an impact on the world, which causes us to narrate our lives from memory to try to show the world that we are narratable and thus worth remembering: “Every human being, without even wanting to know it, is aware of being a narratable self
— immersed in the spontaneous auto-narration of memory” (p. 33). Although Arendt contends that we can never see our unique identity without a narrator, Cavarero maintains that we are constantly searching for it in the stories that we tell about ourselves and that others relate about us. This desire drives us: “To put it simply, everyone looks for the unity of their own identity in the story (narrated by others or by herself), which, far from having a substantial reality, belongs only to desire” (p. 41).

Butler’s (2005) discussion of self-narratives builds on the Arendtian idea that the self emerges through the perception of an other and Cavarero’s emphasis on the compulsion we have to recount our life story to another person. However, Butler focuses on a specific type of communication, which she calls an “account of oneself.” An account of oneself is always a narrative and has several temporal, tonal, and directional characteristics: “Giving an account thus takes a narrative form, which not only depends upon the ability to relay a set of sequential events with plausible transitions but also draws upon narrative voice and authority” (p. 12). In order to give an account of oneself, one must be capable of creating a narrative, which means that one must also be capable of being responsible for one’s actions. An account of oneself is more in-depth than a simple story about one’s life; giving an account requires one to admit that she may have caused another’s pain and suffering. Moreover, Butler characterizes the act of giving an account of oneself as requiring the presence of another individual: “Let us remember that one gives an account of oneself to another” (2005, p. 50), whether that other person is physically present or imaginary. In order for the “I” to be intelligible, the self-narrative must be delivered in accordance with social norms, which is how this form of self-
narrative connects to Butler’s theory of performativity and the role that norms play in making certain identities intelligible. Butler describes the process of forcing oneself into a pre-existing identity defined by social norms as violent because the self always exceeds whatever identity it assumes in a narrative (2005, p. 64).

The self-narrative as a form of discourse, then, if analyzed, can help scholars build a greater understanding of the development of social identities. The production of the self-narrative requires the presence of norms that delimit the possibilities for how one describes oneself in discourse. One is compelled to narrate one’s life to make oneself recognizable to others; one cannot give an account of oneself that is unintelligible – the words do not exist. When describing oneself with discourse, one is forced to reduce oneself to a recognizable identity. Any identity that is evident in an account of oneself is predefined by social norms and reflects more about society than it does the individual self, who never quite fits into the cookie cutter identities proffered in that society. While the individual assumes more authority as the creator of the account than the individual who is the recipient of a performative, Butler indicates that the process of creating an account of oneself may still be very painful and violent as the individual cannot control when the account must be created. Both performatives and accounts, then, cite norms and play pivotal roles in social identity formation.

Although Butler does not discuss storytelling or narratives, her theory lines up well with what scholars of public administration and public policy have highlighted about narratives: the presence of social norms is obvious and identities are often at play in them. What Butler’s work adds to the discussion is a greater recognition of the impact of
the social context itself and how it affects the individual and the state. While the state clearly exercises juridical power through its agents, state power over identity is based on and limited by the dominant norms and discourses, which are rich, diverse, and complex. As Butler’s discussion of the account of oneself suggests, individuals regularly force themselves into identities that do not fit at the insistence of others, whether those others are state agents, strangers, family members, or friends. While Butler’s discussion has been critiqued for its limited acknowledgement of agency in the determination of identity, her emphasis on the process by which discourses cite social norms that make identities intelligible offers much to the discussion of identity in the fields of public administration and public policy, which have solely focused on the state’s imposition of identity or individual deployment of identity. In the next section, I connect Butler’s work on account giving and performativity to the analysis of public policies as narratives.

**Public Policy as Narratives and Accounts**

To understand how public policy works in the development of collective and individual identities as detailed in Butler’s work, several issues must be addressed: 1) How does the text of a public policy constitute a narrative? 2) Is the text of a public policy an account of oneself? 3) And if it is, who is the subject of the account? First, I tackle the question of whether public policy should be considered narrative. Although several scholars have suggested that public policy has narrative qualities or should be considered a narrative (Schram & Neisser, 1997; Stone, 1989, 2012/1988; Yanow, 1999, 2003), no one has established a method or basic criteria by which one can verify this. Next, I take on the questions of whether a public policy can be considered an account of
oneself and whose account it is. In this part, I turn for guidance to the work of Catlaw
(2005, 2006, 2007), a political theorist, who has described the fabrication of the
collective subject the People and examined what the repetitious (re)creation of this
subject means for modern governance.

**Public Policy as Narrative**

As I emphasize in Chapter 2, those scholars who suggest that policy should be
considered narrative make different kinds of connections between these concepts. Stone
(1989, 2012/1988) refers to policy problems as stories, arguing that the political discourse
surrounding whatever policy has been proposed takes on narrative elements. Schram and
Neisser (1997) echo this approach, indicating that the public policy has narrative element.
These scholars, then, focus on the political discourse that emerges about the policy but
not the policy itself. In contrast, Yanow (1999, 2003) perceives the public policy as a
narrative that is ripe for analysis, but her data include much more than just the text of the
policy. She also examines public performances, the policy implementation procedures,
public discussions, and publications in the news media (1999, pp. 30-31). In the work of
these authors, public policies provide critical information about a larger story, but the
policy itself is not evaluated as a narrative or evaluated for its narrativity. Unquestionably,
the larger social context is critical to understanding any text or any historical event.
Postclassical narratologists concur and support this contention, but still perceive value in
a deep, structural analysis of a narrative, which leads back to the question of whether a
policy can be considered a narrative. The requirements for a narrative, based on my
review of the literature are that a narrative ought to include “two real or fictive events, or
a narration of a succession of events” (Shenhav, 2005a, p. 87), and events involve at a minimum two actors and some kind of interaction between them, usually a change, choice, or confrontation (Bal, 2009/1985, pp. 189-201).

The question of the content of a policy is addressed most directly by Anne L. Schneider and Helen Ingram (1997) in their work on policy designs, which “refers to the content or substance of public policy--the blueprints, architecture, discourses, and aesthetics of policy in both its instrumental and symbolic forms” (1997, p. 2). The authors maintain that policy design is connected to a number of policy failures and governance problems in the U.S., including the “disconnection of citizens from politics” (p. 189). Schneider and Ingram analyze the content of public policies to reveal the six constituent elements that are present in most policies: target populations, goals, agents, rules, rationales, and assumptions. Of these elements, the presence of target populations, agents, and rules are most important for establishing that policies can be treated as narratives. Target populations are those groups who receive the burdens or benefits of a policy. Agents are typically those governmental agencies or officials tasked with delivering the burdens or benefits of the policy to the target population. The rules are those procedures by which agents and target populations interact. Schneider and Ingram (1997) indicate that these “core empirical elements” are “found in virtually all examples of policy” (p. 82). Thus, every policy has the potential to be a narrative because there are always at least two actors (the target population and the agent) and some kind of interaction between these actors that is described in the rules of the policy. Each policy
must be read carefully to discover if two events take place, but there is a strong possibility that this will be the case for many public policies.

**Public Policy as Account Giving**

Butler (2005) focuses on the importance of the individual self and how giving an account of oneself both forms and limits an individual’s identity. Even though public policy-making speaks for a collective, I argue that there are strong resemblances between an individual’s account and a public policy. Here, I explore the connections between public policy and an account of oneself by identifying the similarities and differences between them. In doing this, I turn to Catlaw’s (2005, 2006, 2007) work about the fabricated subject the People, and what role the People has played in modern governance. In particular, I am interested in how the fabrication of the People creates a fictional collective subject that claims ethical responsibility for the actions taken by a representative government through the discourse of public policy.

An account of oneself, according to Butler (2005), is always limited by the presently available norms and discourses, is given at the behest of another and results in the exposure of the subject to that other, and requires that the individual be capable of assuming responsibility for his or her actions, perhaps even causing another’s pain. Additionally, an account of oneself takes narrative form by relating sequentially ordered events with narrative voice and authority. If a public policy includes at least two events that depict the relationships between a target population and an agent, then it can be considered a narrative, which leaves two questions to be answered: Who narrates a public policy with narrative voice and narrative authority? And, if there is no individual who can
speak, for whom does the narrator speak? These questions are deeply connected. Yet theoretically grounded discussions of public policy generally focus on the process used to create the policy (Adam & Kriesi, 2007; Blomquist, 2007; Ingram, Schneider, & DeLeon, 2007; Kingdon, 2003; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Ostrom, 2007; Sabatier, 2007a, 2007b; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Schlager, 2007; True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007; Zahariadis, 2007), rather than on the style or structural elements of a policy. Mining through policy textbooks, a more general definition of public policy emerges: “the term public policy refers to a set of actions by the government that includes, but is not limited to, making laws and is defined in terms of a common goal or purpose” (Cochran, Mayer, Carr, & Cayer, 2009, p. 1). Government, then, is the key actor. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) expand on this, indicating that there are three dimensions to public policy: government is the primary agent; government elects what do or not do about a problem; and “public policy is a conscious choice of a government. This is, government actions and decisions often yield unintended consequences” (p. 5). Government, or more specifically, the legislative body that produces the policy is the voice behind the narrative and accepts the responsibility for whatever action a policy produces, deliberate or accidental.

Yet, in a representative democracy such as the U.S., a legislative body does not purport to speak on its own behalf. Instead, its speaks on behalf of the People who elected it and delegated to it the act of governing. Catlaw (2007) defines the People as a subject designed to represent a collective, but that is constructed based on exclusions. Law, or public policy, is a political technology that produces the People. As Catlaw explains “the
People, rather than being a universal category or unity, in fact, is characterized by a logic of exclusion: it creates unity through exclusion. These exclusions are necessary because the term *the People* is actually empty or devoid of content” (p. 13). Exclusions established by law break down into three categories: the kept-out, those who are not allowed entry into the geographic area belonging to the People such as undocumented immigrants; the written-out, such as Native Americans who were defined as not being taxable and thus excluded from the People; and the included-out, or those who are defined as not having the characteristics necessary for full engagement in the political world, like children (pp. 109-113). Even though the concept of the People lacks content, the act of excluding and dividing has practical consequences for the daily lives of those subject to the People’s law. The production of the People “is an intervention in the processes of biological life and subject constitution. It is an intervention into the material practices and discourses that structure, delimit, and produce the coherence of those very same processes. (2007, p. 114). The People, then, is an imaginary subject that is (re)produced through law and that creates a fictive unity by way of exclusionary practices.

A legislative body evokes the fictional subject the People when crafting legislation and this subject is divided based on these legal exclusions, but also due to geopolitical boundaries. So, for example, the Arizona State Legislature evokes the subject the People of Arizona when crafting legislation. This evocation has ramifications for those within the physical parameters of the state, but also for those outside of Arizona who are by definition excluded from this collective subject. In fact, each time the legislature in
Arizona creates law, it fabricates the People of Arizona and those who are excluded. Despite the continual (re)creation of this fictive subject, the sense of social order is treated as if it were the natural order of all things:

The People purports to express not simply an order, but the order, the natural order (though restricted as a member of the system of nation-states and Peoples), and on this basis justifies the command to reproduce and represent, and to decide on the state of the exception. (Catlaw, 2007, pp. 113-114)

Whereas once, Americans accepted this fabrication as reflective of reality, in modern society, we accept that there may be multiple versions of the people. Catlaw notes, “Today, the proper attitude toward the People is to assert, ‘That’s not the People! Here is the real People!’” (p. 187). Of course, there is no real People that supersedes any one fabrication.

So what does this mean in terms of giving an account of oneself? There is no “I” that exists that can claim ethical responsibility for the acts of government that are taken through the creation of public policy. The legislative body fabricates a We instead of an I -- the People -- and then speaks on their behalf. The separation of the subject from the narrator means that the narrator can have full knowledge of the subject’s origin; something which, according to Butler (2005), a subject can never have when giving an account; an I is always alienated from the events of its origin and can never take responsibility for the events of its origin (p. 37). A public policy, then, lacks several of the requisite criteria to be considered an account of oneself: the subject the People does not exist and cannot be exposed to another person through conversation; and, for this reason, the People are not delivering the account, instead it is narrated by a legislative body. Yet, there are important consequences to the creation and propagation of a public policy that
merit exploration, in particular for their effects on the accounts given by individuals who are subject to the public policy.

Each policy is a discourse in narrative form that accepts, on behalf of the People, responsibility for the benefits or punishments handed out to others. These discourses become part of the social framework. Moreover, anyone considered to be part of the People have now had an account delivered on their behalf that accepts responsibility for the harm that may be caused to others. With or without foreknowledge or willingness to do so, the individual has accepted ethical responsibility for the harm that the People may have caused. Now, when faced with the question “Was it you?” that individual must force himself or herself within the new boundaries of available social norms and discourses. The individual who is part of the fabricated People must answer the questions: “Why did you and the People do this? Why did you and the People cause this harm?” According to Butler (2005), giving an account of oneself is always violent because one is forced to expose oneself to another, but it seems to add another level of violence to this experience when one is asked to account for actions taken by a collective on your behalf.

In responding to a public policy that is controversial, then, one might expect to see various levels of frustration, rejection, joy, and acceptance. For those who are part of the People and who agree with the course of action, account giving for the actions taken by the People is not difficult. For those who disagree with the actions taken by the People, then one might expect open disagreement that these actions were not acceptable. Or, as Butler (2005) suggests, there might even be silence:

it is always possible to remain silent in the face of such a question, where the silence articulates a resistance to the question: ‘You have no right to ask such a
question,’ or ‘I will not dignify this allegation with a response,’ or ‘Even if it was me, this is not for you to know.’ (Butler, 2005, p. 12).

Similarly, nonverbal expressions may indicate agreement: “one might simply ‘nod’ or make use of another expressive gesture to acknowledge that one is indeed the one who authored the deed in question” (Butler, 2005, p. 13) An acceptance or rejection of the policy becomes an acceptance or rejection of the ethical responsibility for the harm caused to others. These stances are entrenched unless a new reading of a discourse or norm intervenes and causes one to change one’s position.

Stone’s (2012/1988) work on political narratives and common storylines present in them also sheds light on the kinds of responses one should expect to see towards a controversial public policy. The two most common political storylines, according to Stone, are stories of change and stories of power. Stories of change either describe how the world is getting better -- a story of rising -- or how it is getting worse -- a story of decline. Stories of power also have two sides -- helplessness and control. In stories of control, there is hope because we can make choices to influence our environment and secure social change. Stories of helplessness, in contrast, “are always threatening” (Stone, 2012/1988, p. 166) because there is no choice to be made that will provide a solution to the problem at hand. Stone indicates that stories of decline are often connected to stories of control “with the story of decline serving as the stage set and the impetus for the story of control” (p. 168). If one accepts responsibility for causing harm to others, then relating a story of decline that blames a particular group for causing the public problem at hand is very easily connectable to a story of control; the group or individual deserves the harm caused by the policy. In contrast, if an individual disagrees with the action taken by the
policy, one could expect to see two different narratives. If the individual is also a target, he or she might relate a story of helplessness and loss of control. If the individual is not a target, he or she might reject responsibility for causing the harm and convey a story of control that involves taking political action to change the disliked policy.

According to my analysis, then, a public policy meets the basic criteria to be a narrative if there are two actors who have two interactions with one another. While a public policy that is a narrative shares many characteristics with an account of oneself -- it takes narrative form, has narrative voice and authority, and is delivered to an other -- the self cannot convey the narrative as it is fabricated and the narrator is a third-party. The presence of public policies in the available norms and discourses have important implications for identity development. Certain subjects are always excluded from the People and thus the law. Those who are included have had an accounting for the harm inflicted on others delivered on their behalf and must now incorporate this account into their personal accounts of themselves. Stone’s (2012/1988) work provides valuable guidance for thinking about how people traditionally frame political storytelling. Public policy establishes the rules for how government agents interact with the populace, whether as target populations (Schneider & Ingram, 1997) or as the kept-out, written-out, or included-out (Catlaw, 2007). In the next section I discuss in more depth who these might be in SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b).

Public Policy, Narratives, and Identity

In the literature of public administration and public policy that discusses narrative analysis, identity is addressed in three ways: as deployed by the individual using agency
(Daniels, 1997; Ferguson, 1997; Goldberg-Hiller, 1997; Kling, 1997; Neisser, 1997); as structured by the discourses of government (Yanow, 1999, 2003); and as assigned by agents of the government through interpretation (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003, 2006). While issues of agency are critical and important, the tools that I use in the project are best suited to examining how the structures of government, whether through published discourses such as public policy or through the actions of government agents, influence identity development. My primary focus is on how individuals respond to the deeper structures of narrative and the governmental mechanisms those narratives create.

In this section, I draw together the final theoretical strands necessary for this project. Scholars from a vast array of disciplines from public policy to literary theory agree that narratives and the development of identity are connected, both through their delivery and formation. Additionally, many public policies have the necessary ingredients to be considered narratives, and also to assume ethical responsibility for the harms caused by the People on behalf of the members of that society. SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), in particular, has fomented public conversations about citizenship, immigration and identity, which is at the heart of the question of who belongs to the People and who is excluded. In this section, I discuss those memberships in more depth, including the role of public administrators in making those determinations.

First, it is important to note that Butler’s (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005) work exclusively examines the development of the identities of sex, gender and sexuality. However, her theory that norms and discourses limit and structure how we think about ourselves seems applicable to other identities that are also socially constructed such as
race, class, and disability. In the Preface to the second edition of *Gender Trouble*, now in its third edition, Butler challenges scholars who want to simply map her theory to other identities such as race and suggests that scholars should not ask “whether the theory of performativity is transposable onto race, but what happens to the theory when it tries to come to grips with race” (1990/2006, p. xvi). Thus, in this project, I am also investigating what happens to performativity when it is applied to another set of interrelated constructed identities present in the storytelling about SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b): citizen, public administrator, and immigrant (documented and undocumented). Citizen and immigrant are one of the critical divisions in public policy and one of the first exclusions invoked by the fabrication of the People (Catlaw, 2007). Public policy also defines who public administrators are and how they should interact with those who belong to the People and those who are excluded from it. Despite the critical role of public policy in constructing the categories of citizen, immigrant, and public administrator, the social identities most commonly discussed in the public administration and public policy literature are gender, race, class, sexuality, and disability. In general, the identity of citizen has been treated as relatively fixed and discussions of citizenship often focus on how to encourage individuals to become more active and engaged members of society. Less discussion abounds about what it means to be or not be a citizen, although some scholars raise very important questions about what it means to be a “good” citizen (Lucio, 2009; Rawlings, 2012; Rawlings & Catlaw, 2011).

Scholars in fields such as political science, history, and sociocultural anthropology, in contrast, highlight the constructed nature of the identity of citizen and immigrant
Cruikshank (1999) asserts “Citizens are not born; they are made” (p. 3). Susan B. Coutin (2000) argues that while “terms such as nation, citizen, and immigrant presume a certain coherence . . . this coherence is belied by the social realities—nations can be interspersed, boundaries can be relocated, membership can be partial, ‘citizenship can be multiple’” (pp. 4-5). While Coutin highlights the fluidity of identity in a globalizing world, Mae M. Ngai (2004), an historian, explains the historical roots of the socially constructed identities of immigrant (documented and undocumented): “Immigration restriction produced the illegal alien as a new legal and political subject, whose inclusion within the nation was simultaneously a social reality and legal impossibility—a subject barred from citizenship and without rights” (p. 4). As noted earlier, one of the first exclusions necessary to the evocation of the People is the non-citizen. Ngai describes the constructed exclusion, the undocumented immigrant, as “an ‘impossible subject,’ a person who cannot be and a problem that cannot be solved. (p. 5). Bonnie Honig (2001), a political scientist, examines how tales of foreign founders “make sense of the felt alienness of the law and of the ongoing mutual opacity of a people that is supposed to develop (but rarely does) a sense of kinship and commonality in the joint enterprise of self-government” (p. 107). Stories of foreignness help make sense of the fact that individuals never feel fully connected to the collective People that purportedly unites them. The creation of the nation-state and the design of immigration policy, then, have constructed the identities of citizen, immigrant, and undocumented immigrant. Citizens belong; documented immigrants are permitted, but written-out of
having full rights; and undocumented immigrants are kept-out and also written-out, a subject that should not exist, yet does.

As Butler’s (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005) theory of performativity suggests, the application of these constructions onto individuals is not unidirectional based on policy discourse alone. The actions and normative context of government officials also shape identity. Several scholars have detailed how public administrators have an important function in the official state-based assignment and interpretation of gender, race, sexuality, and disability-based identities of citizens as well as of immigrants (Canaday, 2009; Gardner, 2005; Luibhéid, 2002; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Schweik, 2009). Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s work, in particular, highlights how storytelling opens up scholarly vantages into how public policy may or may not guide interactions between government agents and individuals. Through Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s analysis of the stories related to them by public administrators, two narratives emerged: the state-agent narrative and the citizen-agent narrative. In the state-agent narrative, “law and predictable procedures . . . insure that like cases will be treated alike. . . . deviations from law are allowable only if workers adapt law to the circumstances of cases in a manner consistent with policy and hierarchical authority” (p. 4). Maynard-Moody and Musheno also note that scholars and the media alike regularly punch holes in this narrative, citing evidence that rules do not always ensure equal treatment because individual discretion is rarely consistently applied. In particular, they hone in on the racial and ethnic profiling committed by some police officers, despite the presence of laws that make such actions illegal.
In contrast, in the citizen-agent narrative, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) indicate, “street-level workers describe themselves as citizen agents enforcing moral standards and norms” (p. 157). Through their interactions with individuals, public administrators determine who deserves “unauthorized but extraordinary and life-enhancing help” and those who “receive what the rules and procedures allow--no more but no less” (p. 5). The tension-fraught coexistence of the state-agent and citizen-agent narratives recurred throughout the stories, which suggests “worker’s beliefs and values are formed in a rough-and-tumble interaction with peers and citizen-clients, not in regulated formal interaction with supervisors” (p. 157). Moreover, as agents of the government, street-level workers such as cops exercise enormous power, including the ability to determine the identities of those individuals with whom they interact, which can have major ramifications for how someone is treated by government institutions.

Conclusions

Butler’s (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005) work highlights how norms and discourses interact and influence the socially constructed identities such as a gender, sex, and sexuality. Although many like to think of these identities as natural and based on physical characteristics, Butler argues that there is nothing natural about these identities. They develop and evolve based on interpretations of existing norms and discourses. Identities are always performed for others, and never quite encompass one’s conscious self comfortably. She also highlights two powerful discourses that influence one’s social identity. The first, the performative, occurs when a government official with juridically-based authority transforms an individual’s identity. The second, an account of oneself, is
when one is forced to account for one’s actions and the possibility that one has inflicted harm on another. Only the account of oneself is delivered in narrative form, which Butler describes as sequencing events together and using narrative voice or authority.

Although Butler highlights on an account of oneself as a type of discourse that one individual delivers to another individual, there are similarities between an account of oneself and a public policy. Public policies may be considered narratives if they sequence two events and involve one or more actors, which many do. Public policies typically instruct government employees on how to interact with certain target populations; these instructions may involve the delivery of benefits or the imposition of punishments, depending on the nature of the public problem and the political decision-making process. A public policy, then, accounts for the potential harms caused to others, is narrated by the legislative body that creates it, and confers the responsibility for any actions taken to the People. The People is a fabricated subject, according to Catlaw (2007), and fictional subjects can never be fully exposed to an other or assume responsibility for the harm caused to others. Yet the existence of a publicly available discourse that assumes responsibility on behalf of the People may influence the individual accounts given by those who are considered part of that collective identity, especially if others are harmed by the public policy. While some may relate stories of power that emphasize their control and acceptance of responsibility, some may express helplessness, and still others may reject responsibility for any harm caused and seek new ways to assert control over the disliked political processes. As the People is based on creating an excluded group, it is
likely that some group is harmed whenever it is fabricated by a legislative body to create a new policy.

In addition to influencing the accounts that individuals give for themselves, public policy also directs those working for government to determine who the individuals are and either transform their identities through a performative, or distribute benefits or punishments. The scholarly discussions about the identities of citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented) and public administrators indicate the following. First, while public policy constructs who citizens, public administrators, and immigrants (documented and undocumented) are, these constructions are not equal in the benefits, punishments, or authority conferred. Although policy alone does not define who we are, identities are often influenced by the repeated interactions that we have with one another.

Without question, public policy as a discourse is significant as it defines how and when public administrators will interact with citizens and immigrants (documented and undocumented). These interactions may result in public administrators making a determination of who someone is based and then awarding some kind of treatment based on the identity conferred. For these reasons, it is critical to evaluate both the text of the policy and the public storytelling surrounding the policy. The examination of both kinds of discourse offers an important opportunity to evaluate the social norms that influence and construct these four identities -- citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), citizens, and public administrators -- but also should reveal important insights into how individuals believe the policy will work and how it affects the performance of their identities. In the next chapter, I begin my application of these points.

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to the analysis of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), and in subsequent chapters, I analyze the storytelling about the policy.
CHAPTER 5: THE CONTEXT OF SB 1070 AND DATA COLLECTION

In prior chapters, I have established the theoretical basis for this project by highlighting how the fields of public administration and public policy have employed and analyzed narratives, by examining the contributions that narratology may make to the analysis of narrative in these fields, and exploring how public policy, which can be considered a narrative, impacts individual identity through performatives and account giving. This chapter begins the process of applying these theoretical tools to the empirical analysis of the immigration policy SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) and the stories that individuals in Arizona conveyed to one another about the policy. This chapter first provides an overview of the two versions of SB 1070 and then examines what other scholars have written about SB 1070. The remaining sections of this chapter focus on the research questions and the second source of data collected for this project, the 321 news stories written about SB 1070 in Arizona media sources between April 23rd and June 7th, 2010.

SB 1070: A Tale of Two Versions and 14 Sections

On January 13, 2010, a group of Arizona State Senators led by Senator Russell Pearce, introduced SB 1070 to the Arizona State Senate. During the next three months, the Arizona Senate and House of Representatives debated the policy and made a number of amendments to the existing text, including adding four new sections. Various versions of the policy existed between January and April 2010. For the purposes of this project, there are two versions of SB 1070 that will be considered. The first version of SB 1070 (2010a) was passed by the Arizona House of Representatives on April 13th and the
Arizona State Senate on April 19th. Governor Brewer signed this version into law on April 23rd. During the ensuing week, members of the public debated and protested the policy. This activity ultimately resulted in the state legislature making several revisions that altered the meaning of certain sections of the policy while leaving its format and structure mostly intact. Both legislative bodies passed the revisions to SB 1070 (2010b) by April 29th and the governor signed the revised bill into law on April 30th.

In this section, I summarize the points covered in each section of SB 1070 and that section’s relationship to the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.). There is no one location in the A.R.S. where SB 1070 can be found. The provisions of SB 1070 impact four different parts of the A.R.S. by adding new sections or amending existing sections, which include: Title 11, Chapter 7; Title 13, Chapter 15; Title 13, Chapter 29; and Title 41, Chapter 12. The Arizona legislature made available electronic copies of SB 1070 in its entirety for the public to review. A clean version of the first draft of the SB 1070 (2010a) still exists and is 18 pages. No clean copy of the revised version of the policy is available; instead, the posted draft is a copy of the first version with the insertions, deletions, and modifications that were made.

Certain sections of SB 1070 insert new sections or subsections into the A.R.S., others make minor modifications to existing sections of the A.R.S., and other sections relate only to SB 1070 itself. There are 14 sections of SB 1070. Sections 2, 3, 5, and 11 add new sections to existing A.R.S. statutes, while Sections 4 and 6 through 10 make minor modifications to existing statutes. Only Sections 1, 12, 13, and 14 are standalone provisions and relevant only to SB 1070. Section 1, titled “Intent,” establishes the goal
and overall plan for the subsequent sections (2010a, p.1; 2010b, p. 1). Section 12, called “Severability, implementation and construction,” indicates that each of the prior sections are severable from one another, so that if one section is found invalid, the entire policy is not invalidated (2010a, p. 16; 2010b, p. 19). Section 13 names the policy the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” (2010a, p. 16; 2010b, p. 19).

Section 14, “Immigration, legislation challenges,” provides instructions for the Attorney General and Governor in case they should need to defend the policy in court (2010b, p. 19). Sections 1, 12, and 13 appear in both versions of SB 1070. Section 14 exists only in the second version of the policy and was added after the public response to the policy made it clear that lawsuits would be filed immediately.

There are three sections of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) that the legislature altered in the second version of the policy and that were also new in their entirety to the A.R.S. The first of these, Section 2, adds the most substantive new text and is called “Cooperation and assistance in enforcement of immigration laws; indemnification.” The provisions of this section: mandate the enforcement of federal immigration law; stipulate when law enforcement officers can require an individual to prove citizenship or immigration status; provide instructions for transferring undocumented immigrants to federal custody; describe information state and local agencies must share with one another about immigrants; create mechanisms for legal residents to file lawsuits against government agencies that violate federal immigration law; indemnify individual law enforcement officers if such lawsuits are filed; and mandate that the enforcement of this section be consistent with federal law (2010a, pp. 1-2; 2010b, pp. 1-3).
Section 3, another new section, is called the “Willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document: assessment: exception: authenticated records: classification.” This section makes it illegal for an immigrant not to carry proper paperwork in the state of Arizona and explains the identification procedures as well as what the punishments are, which include fees, jail time, and the repayment of all jail costs (2010a, pp. 3-4; 2010b, pp. 3-5).

Section 5 has two parts -- 13-2928 or “Unlawful stopping to hire and pick up passengers for work: unlawful application, solicitation or employment: classification: definition” and 13-2929 or “Unlawful transporting, moving, concealing, harboring or shielding of unlawful aliens: vehicle impoundment: exception: classification.” The first part makes it illegal: to hire workers from a vehicle stopped on a public road or highway if the vehicle blocks traffic; to seek work by standing on a public roadway if the vehicle picking you up blocks traffic; and for undocumented immigrants to apply for work (2010a, pp. 5-6; 2010b, p. 6). The second part makes it illegal for anyone to transport or hide undocumented aliens in Arizona, and indicates that any vehicles used for this purpose will be impounded unless the driver is conducting government business (2010a, p.6; 2010b, pp. 6-7).

The remaining sections of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) are identical in both versions of the policy, and make only minor modifications to existing law by adding clauses that target undocumented immigrants. Section 4, “Smuggling, classification: definitions,” defines human smuggling as the transportation of undocumented immigrants. A “peace officer” can now stop any individual that is suspected of violating any civil traffic law
(2010a, pp. 4-5; 2010b, pp. 5-6). Section 6 makes minor changes to the existing A.R.S. statute “Arrest by officer without warrant” by adding a new probable cause that a law enforcement officer can use to justify an arrest. Under this revision, sufficient probable cause exists if the officer believes that an individual has committed an act that makes can cause his or her removal from the United States (2010a, pp. 6-7; 2010b, pp. 7-8).

Sections 7 and 8 (2010a, pp. 7-15; 2010b, pp. 8-16) refer to A.R.S. 23-212 and 23-212.01 pertain to the employment of undocumented immigrants. These statutes were originally passed in 2007 (with minor modifications in 2008) as the Legal Arizona Workers Act, more commonly known as the Employer Sanctions Law. These two sections are identical except for one word in Part A. 23-212 makes it illegal for an employer to knowingly hire an undocumented immigrant, and 23-212.01 makes it illegal to intentionally hire an undocumented immigrant (2010a, pp. 7, 11; 2010b, pp. 8, 12). They establish a complaint system for legal residents to inform the Attorney General’s office about employers who have hired undocumented immigrants, and then specify investigation and judicial procedures. SB 1070 adds two clauses to these sections that explain what is necessary to prove that law enforcement officers have entrapped the employer into violating the law (2010a, pp. 10-11, 14-15; 2010b, pp. 12, 16). Section 9 also modifies the portion of the Employer Sanctions Law that mandates that all employers use the e-verify program, a federal program that employers must use to check on employee eligibility to work in the U.S. ("E-verify," n.d.). The new clause indicates that employers must maintain records for at least three years, or the entire span of the employee’s tenure (2010a, p. 15; 2010b, pp. 16-17).
Section 10, or the “Removal and immobilization or impoundment of vehicle,” lays out the conditions under which a law enforcement officer can impound a vehicle. A law enforcement officer can now impound a vehicle if the driver is transporting undocumented immigrants, or if the driver is concealing, harboring, or shielding undocumented immigrants (2010a, pp. 15-17; 2010b, pp. 17-18).

Finally, Section 11 establishes the Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission Fund where the fees imposed in Section 2 will be deposited. It indicates that the legislature will decide how these funds shall be spent, but that the intended use is to reimburse county jails for the costs associated with holding undocumented immigrants (2010a, p. 17; 2010b, pp. 18-19).

**Literature Review of SB 1070**

The scholarly discussion about SB 1070 includes specific references to the text and the two versions of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), but also reveals important considerations for a narratological analysis of the policy and the storytelling about it. Only one article about the policy sources from a major public administration or public policy journal (Pope & Garrett, 2013). Many of the articles published about SB 1070 appear in journals dedicated to the fields of Chicano Studies, Psychology, Sociology, Criminology, or Law. The articles reveal that almost immediately after the passage of SB 1070, scholars began wrestling with important questions related to how the policy would be enforced, what that might mean for intergovernmental relations, who would be harmed and who would benefit from the policy. These scholars employ a variety of resources to support their discussion of the conflict among levels of government (i.e., federal, state,
and local) that SB 1070 causes, and the diverse implications of SB 1070. In particular, scholars focus on who supports the policy, how and whether it makes racial profiling legal, how law enforcement officers would implement the law, and what kind of harm the policy inflicts on undocumented immigrants, but also on Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants. Several scholars raise questions about how issues of national identity influenced the rise of SB 1070 and what impact SB 1070 might have on this shared sense of identity.

As a relatively recent policy, there are five kinds of resources that scholars mine for specific information about how SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) works and what people think about it. Most scholars reference the text of the policy itself, although no one takes on a provision by provision analysis of what each aspect of the text means. Scholars also turn to the publicly available words of the politicians who designed and supported the law, such as Governor Jan Brewer and Senator Russell Pearce. Legal scholars review case precedent and other similar laws to make comparisons and establish contextual connections. Another popular source of information about the law are news outlets and the stories that discuss SB 1070. Scholars reliant on news stories generally perform content analysis and support their assertions with statistical evidence. And finally, some scholars perform interviews with or issue surveys to those who have opinions about or have been affected by the law. Although both the text of the policy and the news stories about it have been evaluated by scholars, no one applies narratological techniques to either of these two types of data.
For legal scholars, the text of policy offers a critical source of data from which they raise a number of questions about how SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) would impact the relationships between and coordinated actions of the different levels of government. Harris (2011) suggests that SB 1070 threatens national security by forcing state and local law enforcement officers to inquire about immigration status, which will damage intelligence-gathering efforts in Hispanic communities. Similarly, Kraehenbuehl (2011) maintains that SB 1070 infringes on the federal government’s constitutional right to design, fund, and implement immigration policy. Reich and Barth (2012) reveal this intrusion by a state into the federal arena of immigration policy design and enforcement as an increasingly common trend through their comparative case study of Arizona, Texas, Florida, and North Carolina. While Chin, Hessick, and Miller (2012) describe SB 1070 as an act of a state government frustrated with the poor border security provided by the federal government, McDowell and Provine (2013) disagree with this “frustration hypothesis” and maintain that the “‘frustration’ framing is loaded with assumptions, some of which are clearly wrong. The frustration hypothesis assumes, for example, that the federal government has been inactive in recent years in seeking to curb illegal immigration and root out violators. This is untrue” (p. 55). Although most legal scholars focus on the relationship between the federal government and the state of Arizona, at least one article emphasizes the challenges that a state-wide policy like SB 1070 creates for local governments: “But if Arizona’s new law does not radically alter the federal-state balance of immigration enforcement, it threatens to drastically alter the state-local
relationship . . . and eliminate local discretion with respect to immigration enforcement” (Su et al., 2010, p. 77).

Other scholars integrate political theory into their discussion of SB 1070 to demonstrate how the policy excludes certain classes from full access to citizenship and negatively impacts democratic institutions. Pope and Garrett (2013) portray SB 1070 as part of “the ongoing phenomenon of lawmakers becoming more aggressive in designing policies ostensibly for increased national security” (p. 170), but that actually “imperil some of its citizens’ rights by expanding the state of exception to people of color under a predetermined category used for discrimination” (p. 181). The authors employ Agamben’s *State of Exception* and *homo sacer* to demonstrate how the concerns of politicians who want to maintain a hierarchically racialized division of political power leads to policies such as SB 1070, which not only punish a marginalized class like undocumented immigrants, but also Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants. Murphy Erfani (2013) also expresses concern about the motivations of Arizona’s politicians and employs Hannah Arendt’s work to illustrate that Arizona’s “public officials employed false, inflammatory, and racist rhetoric against undocumented Mexican immigrants in order to win or remain in public office” (p. 209). Magaña (2013) suggests that Arizona’s politicians popularized negative constructions of undocumented immigrants, which fits perfectly the model of Schneider and Ingram’s (2007) social construction theory. The criminalization and negative construction of undocumented immigrants, a politically powerless class, resulted in the passage of “a series of initiatives that target and scapegoat unauthorized immigrants” (p. 159). Jiménez (2012)
takes this analysis a step further. Not only does she indict Arizona’s politicians for mischaracterizing a marginalized class, she investigates how “Critical Race Theory can therefore be employed to reveal how a ‘colorblind’ law can represent and reproduce a racial hierarchy . . . by exploring the legislation's race-coded language, and argues that the impetus for the legislation is anti-Latino animus” (p. 281). While the law may appear facially neutral and colorblind, it includes code words that target more than just undocumented immigrants, but Hispanics as a whole.

Thus, scholars generally agree that SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) has deleterious effects for Hispanics, but several focus more specifically on how this harm is delivered through the practice of racial profiling. Campbell (2011) explores the verbiage of the law and suggests it is “designed to purge the State of Arizona not only of undocumented persons, but of all persons who are or appear to be of Latino heritage, through racial profiling by state and local law enforcement” (p. 2). While Campbell contends that racial profiling is clearly permissible, some scholars dispute this notion. Selden, Pace, and Nunn-Gilman (2011) differentiate between the two versions of SB 1070. They insist that the first version of the law passed on April 23rd, 2010 included language that unquestionably encouraged and “expressly authorized racial profiling, contrary to the Governor's assertion that it did the opposite” (p. 524). The Governor and the legislature quickly realized the problems with the law and issued a revision, which these scholars believe eliminated all legal support for racial profiling. Other scholars such as Erwin (2012) contend, “Even as amended, however, the law allows the use of race ‘to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona Constitution’” (p. 195). Erwin then
demonstrates that in the case of immigration policy, court rulings have allowed racial profiling under the U.S. Constitution to a certain degree. She further notes that even though racial profiling can be used legally, there are high political and moral costs to such actions.

Despite these anticipated costs, scholars generally expect that racial profiling by law enforcement officers will occur. Fisher, Deason, Borgida, and Oyamot (2011) note, “SB 1070 compels local police officers to determine who might be an immigrant and to verify this status, yet grants officers considerable discretion in the criteria that they use to make this judgment” (p. 292). While the law seems to presume that police officers will act from a sense of neutrality and objectivity, the research has demonstrated that police officers bring their personal biases and expectations into every interaction. Fisher et al. conclude that in the prevalent political climate, negative perceptions of immigrants abound among law enforcement and will influence the behaviors of officers in situations where they expect to encounter immigrants, regardless of whether documented or undocumented. Epstein and Goff (2011) examine the costs of racial profiling incurred by law enforcement officers who have been cross-deputized to enforce federal immigration law by policies such as SB 1070. According to Epstein and Goff, “the speed demanded by policing could lead to an increase in stereotyping and heuristic processing. This is not necessarily due to any racial bias on the part of the officers, but simply to the heuristics that they use to cope” (p. 318). If community members perceive themselves to be racially profiled, then they will grow to distrust the police and “when a policy is enacted that officers believe their community will disrespect them for enforcing, this jeopardizes the
officers’ moral authority” (p. 322). A loss of moral authority leads to a loss of legitimacy and ultimately the decline of public safety. Taking this a step further, Nier, Gaertner, Nier and Dovidio (2011) argue that racial profiling is inevitable and that those who believe themselves to be profiled will have little legal recourse as “the current structure of antidiscrimination law will make it extraordinarily difficult for those targeted on the basis of race to legally establish that racial bias actually played a role in their treatment by law-enforcement officers” (pp. 16-17).

Scholars also contend that the communities targeted by SB 1070, which include Hispanic immigrants and citizens, will be severely damaged. Nill (2013), a legal scholar, describes SB 1070 as fostering, "a toxic atmosphere for immigrants and Latinos in general. It has driven the American public closer to putting civil immigration laws above civil rights” and that “this prioritization scheme has in turn endangered both the legal and social standing of Latinos as equal, law-abiding citizens” (p. 36). Nill further suggests that many in Arizona believe that discrimination against Latinos increased simply with the passage of the law, regardless of whether it was implemented. One community-embedded research (Quiroga, 2013) affirms these contentions, noting the fact that Latinos, whether immigrants or citizens, report increasing anxiety and “feeling vulnerable to police surveillance and discrimination, and experiencing the weakening of social networks through self-imposed isolation” (p. 582). SB 1070’s passage generated an immediate sense of change in Arizona’s Latino communities, sparking fear that caused some residents to reduce their visible presence in order to avoid “being asked for documentation, disparaging comments and discriminatory incidents” (p. 583). Several
researchers also highlight the psychological damage that isolation and fear causes. Levers and Hyatt-Burkhart (2011) emphasize the human element and the reality that migration is itself a stressful process that may cause trauma, which is compounded by “the possibility of further distress from new legislation enacted under the guise of national security and protection of the American way of life” (p. 68). Santos, Menjívar, and Godfrey (2013) explore how Hispanic adolescents, whether citizens or immigrants, report being affected by the passage of SB 1070. Their results indicate that “awareness of SB 1070 had a small but significant negative association with a youth’s sense of being American, and that this weakened sense of American identity resulted in a small but meaningful reduction in psychological wellbeing (i.e., lower levels of self-esteem)” (p. 88).

Several scholars focus exclusively on questions about the relationship a policy like SB 1070 has to this shared sense of national identity. Fryberg et al. (2012) frame policies like SB 1070 as setting up an opposition between identities: “the anti-immigration bill places national identities (“I am American”) in opposition to racial-ethnic identities (“I am Mexican American”)” (p. 106). They argue that establishing this contrast privileges the general safety of the public over the civil rights of citizens who are not White. This logic induces many to support the bill because “good” citizens support enhancing the safety of the nation, no matter the cost. Mukherjee, Molina and Adams (2011) contend that the racialized construction of undocumented immigrants as criminal and Hispanic deflects our focus away from the “many law-breaking American citizens who illegally employ or exploit these undocumented immigrants” (p. 30). Nationalism, then, fosters support for punishing law-breaking non-citizen intruders, and looking the
other way when citizens exploit that group, which results in the “awarding of undue privilege to American citizens, especially those who occupy positions of racial dominance” (p. 30). Plascencia (2013) takes this a step further and describes the purpose of SB 1070, attrition through enforcement, as a “political sacrifice that has constructed a sacrificial subject—the Mexican ‘illegal/undocumented’ migrant . . . to re-assert a state and national identity” (p. 122). Smith (2011) echoes these statements, emphasizing the violent effect on identity that policies like SB 1070 may have: “both Americans, such as those Arizonans who feel burdened by nationally-imposed immigration policies, and Mexicans and Mexican-Americans who wish to have practical and perhaps official dual nationality, have had their identities, values, and interests shaped by coercively enforced U.S. policies” (p. 546).

This review of scholars’ work on SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) reveals several important points for a narratological analysis of SB 1070 and the storytelling about the policy. While many scholars have turned to the text of the policy and the news stories about it, none have performed the kind of analysis that I offer in subsequent chapters. The major themes that emerge from the articles and essays written about SB 1070 suggest that scholars believe the policy effects intergovernmental relationships, increases the probability that Hispanics will be subject to racial profiling, allows sufficient discretion to police officers that their inherent biases towards undocumented immigrants and Hispanics will be difficult to disrupt, caused psychological harm to Hispanic immigrants and citizens immediately upon its passage, and forcibly privileges a sense of national identity that marginalizes Hispanic citizens. Thus, white citizens who exploit
undocumented immigrants or police officers who engage in racial profiling will face few, if any, repercussions for their actions while Hispanic communities felt threatened immediately upon the law’s passage. While scholars focus extensively on the Hispanic immigrants and citizens, few discuss the other provisions of the law, including the modifications made to the employer sanctions law, the targeting of citizens who harbor or transport undocumented immigrants, or those government officials who fail to fully enforce federal immigration law. Scholars generally discuss the implications of Sections 2 and 3 of SB 1070, which include the provisions that instruct law enforcement officers about when to ask for proof of status and that make it a state crime not carry documentation. In the next section, I lay out the data collection procedures for this project.

**Research Questions**

The field of public policy has not yet dedicated much attention to analyzing public policy as a narrative, or to employing narratological tools of analysis. The question of the relationship between identity development and public policy is also under-explored. This project integrates the narratological methodology established in Chapter 3 with the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 4 to investigate how a public policy might impact identity. Moreover, due to the contextual concerns expressed by post-classical narratologists, it is important to analyze a policy about which there has been much public discussion. This aids in understanding the goals of the policy, but also in revealing how people expect the policy to be implemented and who they expect to be harmed. The review of the scholarly literature about SB 1070 has demonstrated that some scholars
have explored the relationship between SB 1070 and the identities of citizen, immigrant (documented and undocumented), and public administrator, yet none have adopted the narratological or post-structural approach that I have developed. Their work suggests that SB 1070 succeeds at targeting undocumented immigrants and has spurious effects that result in the marginalization of Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants. Moreover, the expectation that undocumented immigrants will appear Hispanic leads many researchers to conclude that police officers cannot avoid engaging in racial profiling. Scholars point to impact that SB 1070 will have once implemented, but also to the effect that it had upon its passage.

The research questions for this project have been developed to further our understanding of how a policy impacts identity by evoking the People, which creates an initial division between those who belong and those who are excluded, and how that narrative then influences how people think about themselves and others. The following are the research questions that guide the rest of this project.

1. Does the narrative structure of SB 1070 influence the storytelling about the policy?

   A. Which of the plots and actors described in SB 1070 are repeated in the storytelling about the policy?

   B. Which of the plots and actors described in SB 1070 are not repeated in the storytelling about the policy?

   C. Which repeated elements in the storytelling about SB 1070 are not present in the text of the policy?
2. To what extent does the storytelling about SB 1070 make visible its power as a discourse to unsettle the identity performances of citizen, immigrant (documented and undocumented), and public administrator?

A. What do the storytellers indicate has or has not changed in terms of the performance of their identity since the passage of SB 1070?

B. What harm do the storytellers suggest that SB 1070 redresses, has caused or will cause?

C. How do individuals account for the harm (intended and unintended) caused by SB 1070?

**Methods of Data Collection**

Narratological analysis has been developed primarily to analyze text-based discourse. While some scholars advocate for pushing these limits by analyzing video, pictorial, or other unique forms of media (Abbott, 2008/2002-16; Bal, 2009/1985; Ryan, 1991, 2001, 2004, 2006), for the purposes of this study, I remain focused on written narratives. The first reason is to ensure consistency in the application of this approach across multiple kinds of text. In the next chapter, I will apply narratological tools to SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) itself, treating it as a narrative. Then, I turn to the storytelling about the policy as related in Arizona-based newspapers to discover what these shorter narratives do or do not share in common with the narrative elements of the policy. By focusing on text-based narratives, this reduces the differences that might emerge from applying narratological methods to media where the mode of storytelling differs.
considerably. In the following sections, I establish my data collection procedures, describe the type of data collected, and lay out an overview of the different modes of data analysis in this project.

**Narratives about SB 1070 in Arizona Media Outlets**

The most relevant storytelling about SB 1070 appears in the period between April 23rd, 2010, when Governor Brewer signed the first version of the bill into law, and June 7th, 2010, the day before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated in an interview that the Department of Justice planned to file a lawsuit regarding the constitutionality of the law (Myers, 2010). The public discussion of SB 1070 prior to its passage by the Arizona State House of Representatives on April 13th was fairly limited. Between its introduction to the Senate in January and its passage by the House on April 13th, only 20 articles that could be considered narratives were published. After the bill’s passage by the House, however, the Arizona media began paying significantly more attention to the bill as many Arizonans questioned whether or not Governor Brewer would sign the bill or veto it. For the purposes of this study, I am most interested in the period after Governor Brewer signed SB 1070 into law, evoking for both supporters and detractors of the bill a reality (or storyworld) in which the bill would take effect on July 29th, 2010. The storytelling evaluated in this project derives from the period after SB 1070 became a law on April 23rd, making it an official action taken by the legislature on behalf of the People of Arizona, and just before agents of the federal government jumped into the political debate using their juridical power to express official disapproval of the measure on June 8th.
Between April 23rd and June 7th, 2010 individuals wrestled with what the policy would mean for themselves, for Arizona, and for the nation as a whole.

During this tumultuous 6-week-period, conversations about the policy grew heated: political protests took place in Arizona and throughout the nation both for and against SB 1070; and many Americans who objected to SB 1070 engaged in an economic boycott of Arizona. Some individuals who lived in or planned to visit Arizona struggled with the question of what the policy would mean, who was responsible, and what would be an appropriate response to these events. Once Secretary of State Clinton stated that the Department of Justice planned to file a lawsuit, the voice of the federal government became increasingly prominent. For many who opposed the law, the federal government became an official mouthpiece for their concerns, regardless of whether the federal lawsuit was based on their personal objections to the policy. Similarly, for those who supported the policy, the federal government because the chief opponent and they adjusted their counter-arguments to the federal government’s specific complaints, which insisted that a state did not have the right to create immigration policy according to the U.S. Constitution. Thus, the storytelling between April 14th and June 7th best reflects how individuals struggled to vocalize their response to the policy in their own words and to accept or reject responsibility for any harm that the policy might cause to others.

As SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) was instituted by the state legislature in Arizona on behalf of Arizonans, I focused my data collection efforts on Arizona-based media sources. Scholars have noted not only the important role that the media plays in shaping public perception through the framing of arguments about SB 1070, but also the
differences in the framing of the issue by local and national media outlets (Fryberg et al., 2012). While all of the articles in the sample were published in Arizona media outlets, a few of the articles were authored by organizations such as the Associated Press. The purpose of this study is not to exclusively analyze Arizona authored articles, but to evaluate the articles that related stories about SB 1070 to Arizonans.

I collected news articles through two key methods: 1) I searched the research database NewsBank Access World News for keywords relating to SB 1070 during the time period in question; 2) I visited the website of the individual media provider when that provider was not available through NewsBank (i.e. a Spanish language outlet such as La Voz). Articles were collected from newspapers from all over the state of Arizona, and included editorial opinion pieces, blogs posts, news articles, and letters to the editor. Each article was analyzed and treated as a whole when considering these questions, although the responses to each of the questions may have been delivered multiple times through different mechanisms within one article. For example, in an article discussing the signing of the bill into law, the text might include a summary of the law provided by the reporter, and then multiple interpretations of the law presented as quotations provided by different individuals or groups. In this sense, each narrative may consist of multiple “concise narratives” (Shenhav, 2005b), or a narrative of only two to three paragraphs (or less) that appear in a type of political discourse that is not itself a narrative, such as a speech or an interview. This means that one narrative may include a multiplicity of voices relating stories about SB 1070, whereas another narrative might include only one opinion as expressed in a letter to the editor. Following the guidance of narratologists such as Bruner
(1986, 1990, 1991, 1998, 2004) and Iser (1978, 1989), I focus on the possible meanings of a text rather than on the status or intent of the author. In general, greater attention is paid to individuals quoted in articles by reporters or to individuals who express their opinion in editorials or letters to the editor.

To qualify for inclusion in this study, each narrative had to meet the following criteria in terms of its discussion of SB 1070: 1) Explain what SB 1070 is; 2) Interpret or explain what SB 1070 does or will do; 3) Identify an individual or group either involved in implementing the policy (an agent) or harmed by the policy (the intended or unintended target). Exactly 321 narratives from 24 different Arizona newspapers met the criteria for this study. Those newspapers that yielded the greatest quantity of qualified articles represent a variety of geographic areas of the state, including its major urban centers such as the metropolitan Phoenix area (which includes Phoenix, Mesa, Chandler, Glendale, Scottsdale, Gilbert, Tempe, Peoria, and Surprise), Tucson, Yuma, Flagstaff, and Nogales. Those newspapers representing the greater Phoenix area include: The Arizona Republic/AZCentral.com (n = 79); East Valley Tribune (n = 38); Phoenix New Times (n = 25); Phoenix Examiner (n = 16); La Voz (n = 16); Peoria Independent (n = 1); Surprise Independent (n = 1); Glendale Examiner (n = 1); Arizona Capital Times (n = 1); North Scottsdale Independent (n = 1); and Sun City West Independent (n = 1). Media outlets from Tucson include: Arizona Daily Star (n = 58); Tucson Examiner (n = 20); and The Explorer (n = 2). The Yuma Sun (n = 20) represents Yuma. Flagstaff’s main newspaper the The Daily Sun (n = 7) also provided articles for the sample. The area south of Tucson and north of the border with Mexico was represented by: Nogales Bulletin-International
(n = 20); *Sierra Vista Herald* (n = 8); *Douglas Dispatch* (n = 4); *Green Valley News and Sun* (n = 3); and *San Pedro Valley News* (n = 1). Northwestern Arizona was not heavily represented in the sample with only one article qualifying: *Mohave Valley Daily News* (n = 1). One article from the *Navajo Times* (n = 1) also appeared in the sample.

**Data Analysis**

Two kinds of narratives have been collected and analyzed for this study: SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) and the news articles that relate the story of SB 1070, including its agents and targets. These narratives were imported into the qualitative analysis software application Atlas ti ([http://www.atlasti.com/index.html](http://www.atlasti.com/index.html)), which has been designed to facilitate storing, coding, and analyzing data such as narratives.

All narratives were coded, but the procedures for coding SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) differed from the news articles. I evaluated SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) thoroughly according to narratological methods. I analyzed its three layers -- narrative text, fabula, and story -- in order to establish its major organizing principles, or plots by coding its actors, events, and locations. For the narratives about SB 1070, I coded for the presence of each of the four organizing principles, any descriptions of SB 1070 as well as the targets and the enforcers of the policy.

**Conclusion**

Scholars who have published their work on SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) have made use of a variety of kinds of data, including the text of the policy, publicly available records, and news stories about the policy. They have also surfaced a number of important themes that illustrate the broad-ranging impact of SB 1070 on public thought.
and public life. According to their work, SB 1070 causes friction between the state and federal government, but also between state and local governments. SB 1070 increases the likelihood that Hispanics will be subject to racial profiling by increasing police discretion to act in accordance with their stereotypes of what an undocumented immigrant looks like. Additionally, they highlight how the policy supports a sense of national identity that privileges concerns for public safety over civil rights and results in a decreased concern for law-breaking when those who suffer the effects of the criminal behavior are a marginalized class such as undocumented immigrants. Even though SB 1070 governs the behavior of more types of individuals (i.e., employers, transporters/shielders, and government agencies or officials), scholars focus most on the harm caused to certain members of the American public who they fear will be targeted because of race or ethnicity.

Words, such as those included in the text of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), matter. A study such as this one that investigates the text of SB 1070 and the storytelling about the policy builds on the work of these scholars, but also offers a new lens through which these themes can be explored. The data collected for this project, then, is not novel, but the procedures of analysis are. In the following chapters, I employ narratological methods to examine what narrative elements exist in SB 1070, describe which appear most in the storytelling about the policy, and then discuss the ramifications of this storytelling for identity and how we account for the harm caused by a policy such as SB 1070.
CHAPTER 6: APPLYING NARRATOLOGY TO SB 1070

In this chapter, I explore in more depth the text of SB 1070 -- the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act ("Sb 1070," 2010a; "Sb 1070," 2010b). My review of the literature of public administration and public policy has revealed that while several scholars suggest that the text of a public policy can be treated as a narrative, few, if any, scholars have done so (Schram & Neisser, 1997; Stone, 2012/1988; Swidorski, 1997; Yanow, 1999, 2003). The discussion of narratology demonstrated that narratological analysis reveals important underlying structures in narratives that reveal the presence of norms that influence identity. In this section, I work to fill the gap in the literature of public administration and public policy by evaluating SB 1070 as a narrative using narratological methods to unearth the structures in the text. SB 1070 is a discourse, which resembles an account of oneself because it is in narrative form and assumes responsibility for the harms that may be imposed on others. SB 1070 is not an account of oneself because the fabricated People cannot deliver such an account, but as the work of Butler and postclassical narratologists suggests, the text of the policy is still foundational because it is part of the discursive context that influences the identity development of its readers.

Narratological tools can also provide valuable insight into the differences and similarities between the two versions of SB 1070. In this chapter, guided by the work of Bal (2009/1985), I apply the tools of narratology to SB 1070. I award due consideration to the fact that SB 1070 was designed in accordance with the format and guidelines of the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.), which means that not all narratological tools will
contribute meaningfully to analysis of the policy. As I flesh out the layers of the policy, narrative text, fabula, and story, I surface the similarities and differences between the two storyworlds of SB 1070 and the citizens, public administrators, and immigrants (documented and undocumented) that populate them.

**Narrative Text and SB 1070**

The narrative text layer is where “a narrative agent tells a story” (Bal, 2009/1985, p. 15). This includes who narrates, whether there are embedded levels of narration, or if there is extensive description or non-narrative commentary that conveys ideological sentiments. Only a few of these concepts pertain to SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), which reveals much about the nature of the policy. Regarding the question of narration and if there are multiple narrators, there is really only one subject that speaks in SB 1070 as evidenced in the preamble of the policy, “Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona” (2010a, p. 1; 2010b, p. 1). Before every line of every section in the policy one could insert the phrase “The legislature says.” This repetition not only reflects the formal and hierarchical method of communicating that is common to the A.R.S., but also, it reinforces the power behind the voice of the legislature. Since the legislature is also an actor in the narrative, the legislature fills the role of a character narrator.\(^\text{10}\) According to Bal, character narrators recount narratives that not only pertain to their perspective, but are their life stories. A character narrator’s presentation of the events of his or her life incorporates an aura of truthfulness, regardless of whether the events are fantastical or realistic. What a reader may infer from this narrative tone is that the legislature considers

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\(^{10}\) Although the legislature fills this role in the narrative, the legislature is never fully translated into a character in SB 1070. This question of actors vs. characters will be explored in more depth later in this chapter.
the events of the policy important and that the legislature is affected by what transpires in the text. Moreover, the legislature is conveying the truth it perceives about the world though the text of the policy.

SB 1070 differs from literary narratives in that it does not include many descriptive statements or non-narrative comments (Bal, pp. 31-48). Every line of SB 1070 is directed toward accomplishing its principle aim: “to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States” (2010a, p. 1; 2010b, p. 1). The policy is instructional, establishing the behaviors and processes that the legislature expects its agents to employ to cooperatively enforce federal immigration law. This unflinching focus means that the policy is forward-looking rather than autobiographical. Yet, the events of the past can be inferred from the provisions of the policy. For example, Section 5 does not describe an event where an undocumented immigrant stood on the side of the road and waited until someone offered to hire him or her. However, the legislature clearly believes this to have happened due to the following prohibition:

IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON TO ENTER A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS STOPPED ON A STREET, ROADWAY OR HIGHWAY IN ORDER TO BE HIRED BY AN OCCUPANT OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE AND TO BE TRANSPORTED TO WORK AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION IF THE MOTOR VEHICLE BLOCKS OR IMPedes THE NORMAL MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC. (2010a, p. 5; 2010b, p. 6)

The narrator does not describe an historical event or the characters who participated in it; instead the narrator indicates that all future examples of this behavior will be considered illegal. Thus, SB 1070 is narrated by the Arizona State Legislature, which is also an actor in the narrative. The narration is conveyed through a heavy-handed tone with an aura of
truthfulness and power. While the policy mandates behavior for the future, inferences can be made about the past from its prohibitions. In the next section, I examine in more depth the structures that underly this narration and the elements that constitute it.

The Elements of SB 1070’s Fabula

Bal (2009/1985) explains that a fabula is constructed according to a “logic of events” that the reader identifies and extrapolates from the narrative “in accordance with some form of understanding of the world” (p. 184). There are several approaches for constructing a fabula. A structure may be centered around any of the following aspects: 1) time - the duration and sequence of events; 2) locations - the places where the actors interact with one another and where the events occur; 3) actors - those elements (which are not always people) in the narrative that have goals; 4) events - the processes in a narrative that result in actors causing change, making choices, or confronting one another. There is no one “correct” fabula that can be identified for a narrative. Rather, the organizing principle that appears most helpful for structuring the fabula depends on the perspective of the researcher (Bal, 2009/1985, p. 199).

Time

In describing the role of time in a fabula, Bal (2009/1985) highlights three factors that should be analyzed: the duration, or the timespan covered in the narrative; the chronology, or a time-based sequencing of the events in the narrative; and the logical sequence, an ordering of the events based on underlying causal connections that may have nothing to do with chronology. Evaluating these three aspects of time reveals several important insights about the construction of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) and its
purpose. First, there is no specific timespan of the policy within its text (i.e. 1978-1990, May through June, 10 years), so there is no duration to the policy. Yet, as Bal notes, every fabula begins in the same place with a defined state of deficiency, “in which one or more actors want to introduce change ... the process of change involves an improvement or deterioration with regard to the initial situation.” (Bal, 2009/1985, p. 199). Indeed, the first section of SB 1070, which is identical in both versions of the policy, establishes the state of deficiency as the fact that undocumented immigrants are living in Arizona and participating in its economy (2010a, p. 1; 2010b, p. 1). SB 1070 has been designed to eliminate this problem. What makes SB 1070 unusual, according to Bal’s description of traditional narratives, is that the critical period during which this state of deficiency will be relieved is after all the provisions of the policy have been implemented. Time, in this sense, does not pass during the events of the fabula. The question of whether the state of improvement is achieved is not answered in the policy. In this sense, SB 1070 reads like an unfinished narrative. The actors persist in a state of deficiency with instructions for how to act, but no actor or element in the narrative ever moves beyond the moment described in Section 1. Chronology plays no part in this narrative.

Although duration and time sequence are missing from the storyworlds of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), logical order does have a central role in the unfolding of events. Events depicted in one provision of the policy prompt subsequent events. For example, in Section 2, the policy indicates what a law enforcement agency should do if an individual in its custody is determined to be an undocumented immigrant:

A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY MAY SECURELY TRANSPORT AN ALIEN WHO THE AGENCY HAS RECEIVED VERIFICATION IS
The possibility that the federal facility may be out of state then triggers another instruction: the law enforcement agency must receive permission from a judge before moving the undocumented immigrant out of the state.

In the revised version of SB 1070 (2010b), one final instruction is inserted after this passage: only individuals who work for the federal government, or who have been authorized by the federal government, may verify an immigrant’s status as documented or undocumented. This step is mentioned last and out of sequence (for reasons that relate more to the policy’s revision process). The logical sequence of these events in the two versions of the policy are:

1. A federal agent or federally authorized agent identifies the individual as an undocumented immigrant (Only 2010b).

2. The law enforcement agency then must determine where the federal facility or transfer point to which the undocumented immigrant should be taken is.
   
   2.1. If the facility or transfer point is out of state, the law enforcement agency must file the appropriate paperwork with a judge.

3. The law enforcement agency can then transport the undocumented immigrant to that location. (2010a, p. 2; 2010b, p. 2)

The strong presence of logical sequencing and the lack of chronology suggests that the policy is designed to provide instructions for how actors can resolve the state of
deficiency and achieve the goal of reducing the number of undocumented immigrants in Arizona through the enforcement of federal immigration policy. The focus of the policy is on what the individuals who are subject to its instructions will do rather than on describing past events. As an organizing principle for a fabula of SB 1070, time is not very helpful. If chronological sequences or duration were more crucial to the structure of events, then the policy could be discussed within those parameters. The strong presence of logical sequencing, however, is important to understanding the relationships between the actors and the importance of certain actors in carrying out the events of the narrative.

**Location**

Like time, location is important to developing an understanding of the policy, but not as helpful as an organizing principle for the fabula of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). Bal recommends deducing where events take place based on cues included in the narrative and then making note of whether certain kinds of events recur in that location. As not all locations in SB 1070 are mentioned, inference is a necessary step. Two locations where all events can be inferred to take place are Arizona and the United States simply because, as Section 1 indicates, the Arizona legislature designed the policy to make sure that state and local government agencies enforce federal immigration policy. Other locations are more vaguely outlined. Section 2, for example, states:

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FOR ANY LAWFUL CONTACT MADE BY A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL OR A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OF THIS STATE OR A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL OR A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OF A COUNTY, CITY, TOWN OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS
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STATE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANY OTHER LAW OR ORDINANCE OF A COUNTY, CITY OR TOWN OF THIS STATE. (2010b, p. 1)\textsuperscript{11}

No identifiable location is mentioned in this passage, which may have been deliberate.

There are numerous kinds of law enforcement officers in the state of Arizona with varying duties, which can include patrolling highways, streets, other public properties or responding to calls for assistance on private property or inside a private residence. If a location had been specified, that would have severely limited the applicability of the policy. As written, the events of this section can take place anywhere in Arizona where a law enforcement officer has contact with an individual.

In other cases, the possible locations of events are narrowed down, but only slightly. In SB 1070, the punishments to be imposed for violations of the law are detailed several times, but specific locations are rarely mentioned. Often the court is identified as the actor imposing a sentence, which implies that sentencing takes place where the court does its work -- in a courtroom in Arizona. However, rarely is a type of court is mentioned (i.e, Superior, County, City), nor is a specific courtroom in one of those jurisdictions ever described.

Despite this vagueness, the locations mentioned in the policy reveal much about where the events are expected to take place. Many events occur in federal, state, or local government facilities, whether those be offices, prisons, jails, detention facilities, or courtrooms. Public roadways and any kind of motor vehicle operated in a public place are also discussed. Although rarely described, two kinds of privately owned locations are

\textsuperscript{11} This quotation was significantly revised in the second version of the policy by replacing “LAWFUL CONTACT” with “LAWFUL STOP, DETENTION, OR ARREST,” but the alterations did not impact the location.
Section 4 lists a drop house or any other building that might be used to help undocumented immigrants enter the state. A drop house is defined in the policy as any property in the state that temporarily houses undocumented immigrants. The second kind of private property is inferable from Sections 7, 8, and 9 (2010a, pp. 7-15; 2010b, pp. 8-17), which focus on employers and stipulate what they are expected to do to ensure that none of their workers are undocumented immigrants. The locations evident in these three sections include places of employment, government offices, and courtrooms. While Bal (2009/1985) advocates setting up oppositions between the locations where events take place, what this analysis reveals is that there is very little specific information with which to work. Most events take place in public spaces where government officials work or where law enforcement officers patrol. In the cases where privately owned properties are mentioned, such as places of employment, motor vehicles, or drop houses, the rules are laid out for why and how government agents can lawfully enter. No matter whether inside or outside, government officials are assigned the duty of ensuring that any opponents to the legislature’s goal are identified, detained, punished, and transferred to government facilities.

**Actors**

For the purposes of a project about issues of identity, the question of who acts within a narrative and what role that actor plays is critical. Narratives are generally populated with a number of actors, but not every actor has a pivotal role in the fabula. As Butler’s (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005) work on performativity establishes, identities are...
performed for someone or with an audience in mind, which suggests the importance of
the interactions between actors and their relationships both to the overall narrative and
with each other. As the following analysis demonstrates, the roles of the actors in the
narrative are not sufficient as an organizing principle for the elements of the fabula of SB
1070 (2010a; 2010b). While understanding the kinds of roles actors may play is vital, it is
also necessary to understand the relationships and interactions between those actors -- the
events prescribed by the policy -- because that is where identity performances are most
clearly depicted. Unravelling the events of this narrative provides valuable insights into
the intended interactions and storyworld of the policy. Before turning to these events,
however, I will discuss the three paired types of actors that Bal (2009/1985) describes as
critical to the structure of any narrative.

Actors may be people, but they may also be mental states, social forces, groups,
organizations; even conditions may be classified as actors in a narrative. Actants are
delineates three kinds of actants that exist in opposition to each other: subject-actants and
object actants; power and receiver; helpers and opponents. Subjects-actants have a goal
and that goal is usually represented by an object-actant. Section 1 of SB 1070 lays out the
intention of the policy, but also establishes the principle subject-actant as “the
legislature” (which is also the narrator). The legislature is the only entity identified as
having a goal for the policy. The main aim of the legislature is to “discourage and deter
the unlawful entry and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United
States” (2010a, p. 1; 2010b, p. 1). In this case, the actant object is a condition -- Arizona
with a reduced presence and economic engagement of undocumented immigrants -- or, a
state without undocumented immigrants. Thus, the functional relationship between the
actant-subject and the actant object in SB 1070 can be restated as:

The Arizona legislature (actant-subject)

wants to achieve (function)

a state without undocumented immigrants (actant object).

In narratological terms, this relationship between the actors is the main process or event
-- the underlying organizational principle of the fabula.

One unusual aspect to the actant-subject’s role in SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) is that
much of its participation in the events of the fabula is implied or demonstrated through
declarative statements. As already noted, the legislature narrates the policy, so the voice
of the legislature is audible in each of the sections as it orders the various actions to take
place. However, the legislature never takes direct action to advance the events of the
narrative by interacting with other actors. At times, it declares certain actions illegal and
describes the kind of crime those actions are. For example in Section 5, the narrator
announces that “IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON WHO IS UNLAWFULLY
PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND WHO IS AN UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN
TO KNOWINGLY APPLY FOR WORK” (2010a, p. 5; 2010b, p. 6) and that this kind of
behavior “IS A CLASS 1 MISDEMEANOR” (2010a, p. 6; 2010b, p. 6). Despite this
audible voice of the object-actant, the events of the narrative push forward primarily
through the interaction of powers, helpers, and opponents rather than through declarative
statements. The only direct mention of the legislature emerges in Section 11, which
establishes the Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission Fund. In this passage, the legislature takes no action. Rather, the legislature reserves a power for itself: “MONIES IN THE FUND ARE SUBJECT TO LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATION AND SHALL BE USED FOR GANG AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND FOR COUNTY JAIL REIMBURSEMENT COSTS RELATING TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION” (2010a, p. 17; 2010b, p. 19). Otherwise, the legislature is a relatively inactive actant-subject that depends on other actors to take action and develop relationships with one another.

Bal (2009/1985) notes that many narratives have a vast array of actors and that one actor may even be represented by two classifications of actants, which is often the case in discussions of the actants power and receiver. The receiver is generally the subject-actant who receives the actant object, the goal towards which the subject-actant has been working. In the case of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), the legislature is both the actant-subject and the receiver. Power, on the other hand, consists of those actors that either permit the actant-subject to obtain the actant object or prohibit its attainment; they work negatively or positively in the subject-actant’s pursuit of the object actant. Power generally influences the ultimate outcome of the narrative, is abstract, rarely comes to the foreground, and is usually singular (Bal, pp. 204-207).

There are three “powers” that assist or interfere with the achievement of the legislature’s goal to achieve a state without undocumented immigrants. The first actant that works as a power in the policy is a positive power -- federal immigration law.

Section 1 establishes federal immigration law as a critical actant: “The legislature finds
that there is a compelling interest in the cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout all of Arizona” (2010a, p. 1; 2010b, p.1). Federal immigration law is referred to repeatedly throughout the policy, usually indirectly. The following clause, which indicates who can verify the status of an immigrant, was inserted four times in the revised version of SB 1070:12

1. A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO IS AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO VERIFY OR ASCERTAIN AN ALIEN'S IMMIGRATION STATUS.
2. THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OR THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PURSUANT TO 8 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1373(c). (2010b, p.2)

In the four sections that include this provision, the actant-subject provides directions to state and local government officials and agencies about who can provide the proper assistance for interpreting federal law and determining whether an individual is an undocumented immigrant. Identifying undocumented immigrants is a necessary step to removing them from the state of Arizona. Federal immigration law serves as an important power, and its relationship with the actant-subject/receiver can be represented as:

Federal immigration law (power)

makes a state without undocumented immigrants possible for (function)

the legislature (actant-subject and receiver).

Federal immigration law is a less visible, although still present, positive power in the first version of SB 1070.

12 Three subsequent repetitions of this text are identical with this example except for the third word of the first sentence, which instead reads “IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS SECTION” (2010b, pp. 3, 6, 7).
There are two negative powers in SB 1070 that actively work to make the achievement of the legislature’s goal impossible. These powers are described in Section 1 as the *entry and presence of undocumented immigrants*, and the *economic activity of undocumented immigrants*. Wherever either of these powers appears in the policy, they interfere with the state legislature’s goal and are targeted by the helpers assisting the legislature. Section 3, for example, describes punishments for the *presence of undocumented immigrants*. In both versions of SB 1070, this section makes it a state crime not to carry proof of immigration status and includes instructions for how state and local government officials are to act against this power. The scope of these punishments differs significantly in the two versions. In the first version, a first-time violation is a Class 1 Misdemeanor, but if a case meets certain criteria, it can become a Class 3 or Class 4 Felony (2010a, p. 4). Penalties include a substantive fee of be $500 or more, depending on what the judge deems appropriate, and jail costs. In the second version of SB 1070, the violation can never be more than a Class 1 Misdemeanor and the maximum fine is $100, plus jail costs (2010b, pp. 4-5). Both versions of SB 1070, then, seek to counter and punish the adversarial power that prevents the legislature from achieving its goal, although the punishments are significantly reduced in the second version.

There is one final class of actants that participates in the narrative: helpers or opponents. In contrast to powers, which are abstract and represented by only a few influential actants, helpers and opponents appear in abundance, but no one helper or opponent controls the outcome of the narrative. Instead, they relate to the function that connects the actant-subject and actant object, or power and receiver, rather than relating...
directly to these other actants. Helpers and opponents are often numerous, which is true for SB 1070. One of the principle helpers is the class of actants referred to as state and local officials or agencies. Sometimes a narrower class of this helper is identified: law enforcement officials or agencies, the court, the Superior Court, the Attorney General, the County Attorney, or the Governor. For example, the helpers involved in determining whether an individual is an undocumented immigrant in Section 2, 3, and 5 are “A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO IS AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” and “THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OR THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION” (2010a, p. 3; 2010b, pp. 2, 3, 6-7). Other helpers, then, include federal agencies as well as employers, legal residents, and state or local laws/ordinances.

As depicted in SB 1070, the opponents who repeatedly interfere with the legislature’s goal of achieving a state without undocumented immigrants are undocumented immigrants, employers of undocumented immigrants, and those who transport or shield undocumented immigrants. In Section 7, employers of undocumented immigrants and undocumented immigrants are clearly identified as opponents. An “employer shall not knowingly employ an unauthorized alien” and neither can an employer use “a contract, subcontract or other independent contractor agreement to obtain the labor of an alien in this state” (2010a, p. 7; 2010b, p. 8). In this section, the negative power being countered is the economic activity of undocumented immigrants and the legislature uses its juridical power to declare the actions of the opponents -- the
employers -- illegal. Thus, those who are found to have hired undocumented immigrants are transformed into violators of the law.

Whereas power and receiver have a stable relationship to the actant-subject/receiver and actant object throughout a narrative, a helper in one part of a narrative may transform into an opponent in another part of the narrative, or vice versa (Bal, 2009/1985, p. 211). This occurs with one class of actants in SB 1070, state and local officials or agencies. Generally, state and local officials or agencies are given instructions and perform as helpers throughout the policy; however, in Section 2, they are singled out for acting in ways that could interfere with the legislature’s goal:

NO OFFICIAL OR AGENCY OF THIS STATE OR A COUNTY, CITY, TOWN OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE MAY LIMIT OR RESTRICT THE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS TO LESS THAN THE FULL EXTENT PERMITTED BY FEDERAL LAW. (2010a, p. 1; 2010b, p. 1)

In subsequent parts of Section 2, mechanisms are created for legal residents to file a lawsuit if they witness state and local government officials or agents with a “POLICY OR PRACTICE” (2010a, p. 2), or, in the first version of SB 1070, a “POLICY” (2010b, p. 3) that inhibits the implementation of federal immigration law (a positive power).

While time and location are underdeveloped elements in SB 1070, actants are numerous. The legislature, which is both actant subject and receiver, hopes to achieve its goal of a state without undocumented immigrants (the actant-object). Most of the actants in the story are powers, helpers, or opponents; actants that assist or resist the accomplishment of that goal. The presence of the positive power -- federal immigration law -- is more visible in the second version of SB 1070 than in the first version, but the
two negative powers are equally present in both versions of the policy. Throughout the policy, an opponent is singled out by a helper for punishment. Opponents, even with the assistance of the two negative powers -- the presence and economic activity of undocumented immigrants -- are always identified and always punished.

**Events**

The final element of the fabula is an event, which, according to Bal (2009/1985), “is a process, an alteration” (p. 189). One of the first tasks for a narratologist is to evaluate each of the sentences in a fabula and determine which are events. There are three criteria to consider: change, an event should involve a change in status or condition of an actant or actor; choice, an actant or actor generally makes a decision that has ramifications for the fabula; and confrontation, an actant or actor should engage in some fashion with another actor or actant in the fabula. Most sentences in SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) meet these standards, which makes the policy very dense. As a result, events serve as a helpful organizing principle for the fabula because they provide the most consistent model for arranging the interactions among the actors and actants. While Bal (2009/1985) suggests evaluating whether each event is a physical, verbal, or mental confrontation and ordering them accordingly (p. 200), a close reading of the events in the SB 1070 reveals that not all interactions can be classified as a single confrontation type. For example, an arrest of an individual involves physical and verbal interactions between at least one law enforcement officer and the individual suspected of having committed a crime.
Instead, I focus on two important types of interactions between helpers and opponents that recur throughout the policy and advance the goal of the legislature: 1) Identification of Opponents; and 2) Punishment of Opponents. The legislature, as narrator and actant subject, establishes a variety of methods for finding possible opponents and verifying their identities so that undocumented immigrants can be removed from the state and their economic activity ceased. There are four major opponents described in the policy: undocumented immigrants, transporters/shielders of undocumented immigrants, employers of undocumented immigrants, and state and local officials or agencies. Each of the major events, which involve change, choice, or confrontation among the actors, either indicates how helpers can identify one of these opponents, or establishes the punishment that each opponent will receive. The identification and punishment of each of these opponents is the roadmap for how the actant-subject (the legislature) plans to achieve its goal and resolve the state of deficiency (the presence and economic activity of undocumented immigrants). It is in how these actors engage one another, regardless of time and location, that the work to accomplish the goal of the policy happens. The identification and punishment of each of the four opponents, then, constitute the main organizing principles for the fabula of SB 1070 and deserve more attention.

The Organizing Principles of SB 1070

If the overarching goal of the policy is to achieve a state devoid of undocumented immigrants through the enforcement of federal immigration law, then the identification and punishment of those who oppose that goal constitute significant organizing principles

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13 One final opponent, individuals who file false complaints against employers, are mentioned only in Sections 7 and 8 and are not as difficult for the legislature’s helpers to identify because the falseness of their claims will be determined through an investigation of the employers.
for the fabula. This also demonstrates that SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) meets the
requirements to be considered a narrative as established in Chapter 4: SB 1070 includes
more than two events that depict the interactions between the target and the enforcer of
the policy: undocumented immigrants and government employees. While chronology is
often the organizing principle used for a fabula, in the case of SB 1070, the recurrent
interactions between helpers and opponents makes more obvious the differences between
the two versions of the policy and ultimately what that means for storyworlds they
construct. In this section, I elaborate the logical sequence of events for the identification
and punishment of each opponent -- undocumented immigrants, transporters/shielders of
undocumented immigrants, employers of undocumented immigrants, and state and local
officials or agencies. I account for the differences between the two versions of SB 1070,
which are most visible in the processes established for the identification and punishment
of undocumented immigrants and state and local officials or agencies. Throughout,
helpers emerge to advance the goals of the legislature by filling the role of identifier or
punisher.

**Undocumented Immigrants**

Undocumented immigrants are the most critical opponent in SB 1070. Their
presence in the state of Arizona prevents the legislature from achieving its goal of a state
without undocumented immigrants. Many of the events in both versions of the policy
provide instructions for how helpers, usually law enforcement officers, can find
undocumented immigrants and verify their immigration status. Two key differences
between the two policies emerge from Section 2 in which law enforcement officers are
instructed that they can request proof of immigration status if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is an undocumented immigrant. The first relates to why an individual may be requested to show proof of status and the second to when an officer might request such proof. Regarding why an officer may request proof of status, the officer must have “REASONABLE SUSPICION” (2010a, p. 2; 2010b, p. 2) that the individual is an undocumented immigrant. What constitutes reasonable suspicion differs between the two drafts of the policy. According to the first version of SB 1070 (2010a):

A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL OR AGENCY OF THIS STATE OR A COUNTY, CITY, TOWN OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE MAY NOT SOLELY CONSIDER RACE, COLOR OR NATIONAL ORIGIN IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS SECTION EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ARIZONA CONSTITUTION. (p. 2)

This implies that while race, color, or national origin cannot exclusively be used as a reason to inquire about someone’s immigration status, any combination of the three may be. In the revised version of the policy (2010b, p. 2), the word “solely” has been deleted, which changes the meaning of the sentence entirely. Now, neither race, color, nor national origin (or any combination of thereof) can provoke reasonable suspicion.

Regarding when a request for proof of status may be initiated, in the first version of the policy, these conditions are described as “LAWFUL CONTACT” (2010a, p. 2) whereas in the second version of the policy this has been revised to “LAWFUL STOP, DETENTION, OR ARREST” (2010b, p. 2). Lawful contact potentially refers to a broader range of activities than those described in the revised verbiage, which limits the activities to those that a law enforcement officer initiates because the officer believes that an individual has violated the law. Lawful contact, on the other hand, could include when
an individual stops an officer to ask for directions or to request assistance because the individual has been victimized by another person.

Whereas in the initial version of the policy, those suspected of being undocumented immigrants were not always engaged in some other criminal activity, in the second version they are. This change to this one line makes it very unlikely in the storyworld of the policy that law enforcement agents and undocumented immigrants will encounter one another without the undocumented immigrant first having committed a civil or criminal violation, apart from the crime of not carrying documentation as laid out in Section 3 (2010a, pp. 3-4; 2010b, pp. 3-5). The only exception to this is the event that makes it unlawful for anyone to transport an undocumented immigrant. If a driver of a motor vehicle is stopped for any reason, anyone in the vehicle can be asked for proof of immigration status. Since the transporter’s guilt is contingent on the passenger’s ability to provide appropriate documentation (2010a, p. 6; 2010b, pp. 6-7), the undocumented immigrant may simply be a passenger acting in a lawful manner. So, if an undocumented immigrant is not engaged in an activity that the officer finds suspicious or if the undocumented immigrant has not committed a crime in the officer’s presence, then the undocumented immigrant is present while someone else is suspected or witnessed to have committed a crime. Ironically, that criminal activity may be the very presence of the undocumented immigrant. Thus, the storyworld of the first version of SB 1070 (2010a) allows for law enforcement officers to request proof of documentation from those suspected of being undocumented immigrants in a range of situations that may not involve the commission of an illegal activity. In contrast, the storyworld of the second
version of SB 1070 (2010b) closes that door and only discusses events in which the undocumented immigrant is suspected or witnessed to have committed a crime, or is a companion to someone else who has.

These crimes may even include finding a job as SB 1070 makes it illegal for an undocumented immigrant to work as an employee for anyone in the state of Arizona, to seek work in a public place, or to seek work in a public roadway where the potential employer would have to stop the vehicle and interfere with the flow of traffic (2010a, pp. 5-6; 2010b, p. 6). If an employer is investigated for hiring undocumented immigrants, the proof of the employer’s guilt is to be found in the presence of undocumented immigrants working there, which means that all employees are subject to proving their immigration status (2010a, pp. 7-8, 11-12; 2010b, pp. 8-9, 12-13). Other sections are more general, such as Section 6, which stipulates that a law enforcement officer may arrest anyone who the officer suspects of committing a public offense that could result in his or her removal from the U.S., which generally only immigrants, regardless of status, are (2010a, pp. 6-7; 2010b, pp. 7-8).

In both versions of SB 1070, there are four kinds of valid documentation that individuals may offer as proof that they are lawfully present: an Arizona driver’s license; an Arizona identification license; a document proving tribal identification; or any document issued by a state, local, or federal agency that requires “PROOF OF LEGAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE ISSUANCE” (2010a, p. 2; 2010b, p. 2). Yet, the two versions of SB 1070 differ significantly on the issue of who can interpret and determine an individual’s immigration status. The revised version of the policy
makes more visible the helper the federal government by inserting a clause three times that indicates that only a law enforcement officer authorized by the federal government, the United State Immigration and Custom Enforcement Agency, or United States Customs and Border Protection Agency can officially determine an individual to be an undocumented immigrant (2010b, pp. 2, 3, 6-7). The first version of SB 1070 includes this clause only in Section 3 (2010a, p. 3), which is a marked contrast with the revised version that includes this clause four times. These repetitions provide louder and clearer marching orders for state and local law enforcement officers: let the appropriate federal agencies or authorized representatives determine an individual’s status.

While the main helpers involved in identifying and detaining undocumented immigrants are law enforcement officers and agents of the federal government, punishment is almost exclusively instituted by the court system. According to both versions of Section 3 of SB 1070, those proven guilty of being in the country unlawfully are subject to paying fees, serving jail time, and then repaying the costs incurred for their time in jail, but the revised version scales back the nature of these punishments significantly. In the first version of the policy, those found guilty will be fined at least $500 (and twice that if they have been convicted of this crime before), be required to pay jail costs, and will be convicted of a Class 1 Misdemeanor, unless one of the following is in their possession, in which case they have committed a Class 3 Felony: a “dangerous drug,” precursor chemicals for methamphetamine manufacturing; a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; or property that could be used to commit an act of terrorism (2010a, p. 4). If the person has been previously convicted of violating this section or were
removed from the United States within the last 5 years, then they have committed a Class 4 Felony. None of these sub-clauses exist in the second version; violators of this section will only be considered to have committed a Class 1 Misdemeanor and they will not have to pay any fines, but will still be held responsible for jail costs (2010b, pp. 3-4). While the scale and scope of the punishments differ dramatically between the two versions, the ramifications of these events to the identity of undocumented immigrant are not markedly different: those determined to be undocumented immigrants are transformed into criminals who are “NOT ELIGIBLE FOR SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE, PROBATION, PARDON, COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE, OR RELEASE FROM CONFINEMENT” (2010a, p. 3; 2010b, p. 4).

This process concludes when state and local officials or agencies contact federal officials to arrange for the transportation of an undocumented immigrant to federal custody. Two events govern this process. The first concerns the notification of the federal government once the punishment of an undocumented immigrant is complete: “ON DISCHARGE FROM IMPRISONMENT OR ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ANY MONETARY OBLIGATION THAT IS IMPOSED, THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OR THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED” (2010a, p. 2; 2010b, p. 2). The second event provides instructions for the logical sequence of events that law enforcement agencies must follow. The law enforcement agency finds the federal facility or transfer point to which the undocumented
immigrant should be transferred, files the appropriate paperwork with a judge, and then completes the transfer (2010a, p. 2; 2010b, p. 2).

Thus, each event in this sequence includes: identification through a combined effort by law enforcement officers and federal agents, punishment by the court system, and transfer to federal facilities by law enforcement officers. The differences between the two versions of the policies also become very visible here. First, in the fabula for the first version of the policy, law enforcement officers can request proof of identity based upon characteristics that reflect race, ethnicity, or national origin. In the second version, none of these may be used. In the initial version of SB 1070, an officer may request documentation after any lawful interaction, not just because the officer suspects a crime has been committed, which is what the revised text of the second policy requires. This revision to SB 1070 (2010b) means that all interactions between law enforcement officers and undocumented immigrants involve the suspicion that a crime has been committed, the witnessing of the commission of a crime, or the presence of the undocumented immigrant during the commission of a crime.

A second difference that emerges between the two versions is that the federal government is more visible in the revised text as a helper, one that interacts with law enforcement agencies or officials regularly in the determination of whether an individual is an undocumented immigrant. Third, law enforcement officials in the revised policy are directed more forcefully to not rely on race, ethnicity, or national origin as the basis for asking for documentation or seeking proof of the commission of a crime. A fourth difference between the two policies emerges from the dramatic reduction to the
punishments for those found to be undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants are still transformed into criminals, but the crime they have committed is more minor as are the penalties.

**Transporters/Shielders of Undocumented Immigrants**

Those who transport or shield undocumented immigrants are discussed by several sections of SB 1070. For the most part, these sections are identical in the two versions of SB 1070, law enforcement officers fill the role of helpers and are instructed to find those who transport undocumented immigrants in motorized vehicles. Section 4, for example, expands the statute that makes human smuggling illegal by indicating the officers can pull a vehicle over to search for human smuggling based on the suspicion that minor traffic infractions have been committed. Human smuggling is a felony in Arizona and is defined as:

> the transportation, procurement of transportation or use of property or real property by a person or an entity that knows or has reason to know that the person or persons being transported or to be transported are not United States citizens, permanent resident aliens or persons otherwise lawfully in this state” (2010a, p. 5; 2010b, p. 6).

Based on this text, it is possible that those opponents who transport or shield undocumented immigrants may also be undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants are transformed into criminals by Section 3 (2010a, pp. 3-4; 2010b, pp. 3-5), so undocumented immigrants who transport or shield other undocumented immigrants are targeted by the text “IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON WHO IS IN VIOLATION

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14 The insertions to the revised policy in these sections relates to determining whether the transporters/shielder is also an undocumented immigrant. Those include the mandate that only federally authorized agents or federal employees may determine whether an individual is an undocumented immigrant, and that race, ethnicity or national origin may not be used in the enforcement of those provisions (2010b, pp. 6-7).
OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE” (2010a, p. 6; 2010b, p. 7) to assist or move an undocumented immigrant, shield or harbor an undocumented immigrant, or encourage an undocumented immigrant to enter the state. Sections 4 and 5 offer the most specific list of locations where law enforcement officers might find these opponents: drop houses, other buildings, and forms of transportation.

Unlike in the punishment procedures for undocumented immigrants, law enforcement officers may participate in the distribution of punishments to those who transport or shield undocumented immigrants. Law enforcement officers are authorized to order a vehicle to be impounded if the operator is suspected of human smuggling or transporting undocumented immigrants (2010a, pp. 6, 16; 2010b, pp. 7, 17). However, the court also participates in the distribution of punishments. Individuals who have engaged in human smuggling become felons if they transport 10 or more undocumented immigrants and are subject to a fine of $1,000 per undocumented immigrant. Otherwise, “A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS SECTION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS 1 MISDEMEANOR AND IS SUBJECT TO A FINE OF AT LEAST ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS” (2010a, p. 6; 2010b, p. 7). According to these passages of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), law enforcement officers find those who are transporting or shielding undocumented immigrants either in motorized vehicles or private residences. If the transporter is suspected to be an undocumented immigrant, then all the procedures follow those laid out for the opponent undocumented immigrant. The punishment of those who transport or shield undocumented immigrants may begin with the impoundment of the
vehicle by the law enforcement officer, but is concluded by the court system. The more undocumented immigrants found being transported, the more severe the punishment.

Employers of Undocumented Immigrants

While finding undocumented immigrants and those who transport or shield them is accomplished by local law enforcement agents (who surface potentially undocumented immigrants) and federal or federally authorized agents (who do the actual identifying), employers who hire undocumented immigrants are discovered through very different mechanisms. No modifications were made to these processes in the revised version of SB 1070. Employers who hire undocumented immigrants are generally found in two locations in the text of SB 1070: in their cars driving down public roadways, occasionally blocking or impeding traffic as they attempt to hire undocumented immigrants (2010a, pp. 5-6; 2010b, p. 6) or at their site of business where the undocumented immigrants are already employed (2010a, pp. 7-15; 2010b, pp. 8-16). In the first scenario, a law enforcement officer spots the (potential) employer of undocumented immigrants in a car that is impeding the flow of traffic, either trying to hire an undocumented immigrant or having just hired one (or more), which strongly resembles the other sequences of events that involve undocumented immigrants or those who transport or shield them. The (potential) employer of undocumented immigrants has just violated the law and the law enforcement officer has witnessed that violation.

In the second scenario, a variety of helpers are integrated into the policy to assist with the identification and investigation of employers who are suspected of hiring undocumented workers in a traditional workplace. First, an individual reports the
employer to the Attorney General’s office through the complaint system established in these sections of the policy. Then, the Attorney General and the relevant County Attorney investigate. The new pieces of these sections make it clear that law enforcement officers, who finally get involved at this point, are not allowed to entrap employers. Entrapment is proven if: “THE IDEA OF COMMITTING THE VIOLATION STARED WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS RATHER THAN WITH THE EMPLOYER” (2010a, pp. 10, 14; 2010b, pp. 12, 16). When necessary, the federal government is asked to verify the identity of workers as documented or undocumented. Once the federal government confirms the presence of undocumented workers, the punishment phase begins.

The punishment phase for employers differs dramatically based on how they are identified. Employers who are found guilty of having “STOPPED ON A STREET, ROADWAY OR HIGHWAY TO ATTEMPT TO HIRE OR HIRE AND PICK UP PASSENGERS FOR WORK AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION IF THE MOTOR VEHICLE BLOCKS OR IMPEDES THE NORMAL MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC” (2010a, p. 5; 2010b, p. 6), have committed a Class 1 Misdemeanor, which may or may not result in jail time and fees. Yet, the employer is now a criminal. In contrast, employers discovered by the Attorney General’s office are not. They must terminate the employment of all undocumented workers, file regular reports on their new hires, and file sworn affidavits to indicate that they have complied with the law. Their business licenses may be temporarily suspended, or even permanently suspended, if violations persist. Punishments are administered by the Attorney General or County
Attorney and impact the place of business, but not the individual employer (2010a, pp. 7-15; 2010b, pp. 8-16).\textsuperscript{15} Thus, the kind of employers who hire undocumented workers are differentiated by their identification process and their punishment, but they are both treated identically in the two versions of SB 1070.

**State and Local Officials or Agencies**

State and local officials or agencies is a rather nebulous opponent as it encompasses many other helpers including law enforcement officers, the Attorney General, county attorneys, and many other types of government employees not specifically mentioned in SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). Understandably, the identification process differs for this actant. Throughout the text of the two versions of SB 1070, state and local officials or agencies are repeatedly ordered to obey federal immigration law to its fullest extent and told that they: “MAY NOT BE PROHIBITED OR IN ANY WAY BE RESTRICTED FROM SENDING, RECEIVING OR MAINTAINING INFORMATION RELATING TO THE IMMIGRATION STATUS, LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL, OF ANY INDIVIDUAL” (2010a, p. 2; 2010b, p. 2). Violations of the law are identifiable through behaviors such as restricting the flow of information about known undocumented immigrants. In Section 2 of the policy, legal residents are empowered to file lawsuits in Superior Court if they witness an official or agency disregarding federal immigration law. Once the complaint is filed, a judge determines whether the law has been broken or not and the opponent state and local official or agency is then punished. The only exception is a law enforcement officer who “IS INDEMNIFIED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT

\textsuperscript{15} It is important to remember that other chapters of the A.R.S. may in fact do this. Here, I am only considering the narrative presented in SB 1070 itself.
OFFICER’S AGENCY AGAINST REASONABLE COSTS AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES” (2010a, p. 3; 2010b, p. 3).

This section of the policy was revised in the second version of SB 1070. Initially, legal residents could file lawsuits based on a “POLICY OR PRACTICE” (2010a, p. 2), but the second version limited this to a “POLICY” (2010b, p. 3). This modification has significant ramifications for the storyworld of each version. A policy generally means an official action of a public agency, one that leadership has deliberately decided to take, where a practice may be a more informal action followed by custom rather than decisive direction. The first version of the policy allows legal residents to police both the informal and formal rules that public agencies follow, but the second version restricts that enforcement to the formal rules.

In terms of punishment, those officials or agencies who the court determines have violated federal immigration law must pay financial penalties. In the first version of SB 1070, these penalties were between $1,000 and $5,000. The second version of the policy reduced the potential penalty to between $500 and $5,000 “FOR EACH DAY THAT THE POLICY HAS REMAINED IN EFFECT AFTER THE FILING OF AN ACTION PURSUANT TO THIS SUBSECTION” (2010a, p. 2; 2010b, p.3). Additionally, the judge might also order the state and local official or agency to pay the court costs and attorney fees of the individual who filed the lawsuit.

Like the opponents undocumented immigrants, there were alterations to the identification process and punishments for those working in government who elect not to enforce fully federal immigration law. However, the modifications are more significant
for the identification process than for the punishment phase. Legal residents are given
greater latitude to file lawsuits based on the kinds of actions they see government
agencies take in the first version of the policy than in the revised version. The revised
version also makes a $500 reduction in the minimum fee per day that a public agency
might face for violating this aspect of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). These changes together
reduce the number of lawsuits that might be filed and the penalties that might be imposed
if guilt is proven. The identification and punishments for transporters/shielders of
undocumented immigrants and for employers of undocumented immigrants remain
identical in both versions of SB 1070.

**Story and SB 1070**

In this section, I tease out the concepts connected with Bal’s (2009/1985) story
layer, which she describes as the relationship between the elements of the fabula and the
narrative text. The already mentioned lack of description and chronology in SB 1070
(2010a; 2010b) reduces what can be analyzed using these tools. For example, rhythm,
frequency, slow down, and anachrony require that there be an underlying chronological
order to events. Without this ability to sequence events in a timeline, there is no sensible
way to analyze the speed at which the events are unfolding or even if they are revealed
out of order in the text of the narrative. Similarly, locations are not translated into specific
spaces because they are not described with any detail. There are, however, two ideas in
the story layer that bear further discussion as they have implications for the storyworlds
of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b): characterization, or the anthropomorphizing of the actors in
the fabula; and focalization, or who sees in the narrative.
Bal (2009/1985) indicates that an actor becomes a character through four principles: repetition, accumulation of characteristics, relationships to others, and transformations (pp. 112-113). Very little evidence of any of these four principles exists in SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). Within the boundaries of the narrative, no one transforms because time never passes. While new crimes and punishments are established for opponents, no one actor in the narrative is ascribed with a human-like personality or appearance. In fact, none of the actors in the narrative are described with sufficient detail that one can really call anyone a character. The only actors to have any physical characteristics attributed to them are undocumented immigrants, but we do not really know what those attributes look like. There is a repeated event that bans law enforcement officers from using race, ethnicity, or national origins as a reason to ask someone for their proof of identification (2010a, p. 3; 2010b, pp. 2, 4, 6-7), but those shared characteristics are never described (i.e., skin color, hairstyle, mode of dress). Bal states, “characters are only reducible to actors in a process of abstraction” (p. 113), but all potential characters in SB 1070 are too abstract to be called anything but an actor or actant class. There are no names, no physical characteristics, no emotions, no verbal ticks, nothing with which the reader can emotionally connect. A narratological analysis of the text reveals a clear lack of personification of the characters in both versions of SB 1070.

The final concept of the story layer that merits attention is focalization. Narration and focalization are often confused, but in Bal’s (2009/1985) method they are distinct: where the narrator speaks, the focalizer sees (p. 149). So, in a narrative, a narrator may relate the story about what one character is seeing. If the narrator is character-bound, then
the narrator may also be the focalizer. In SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), the narrator is clearly the Arizona State Legislature, but the question of the focalizer is a bit more murky. None of the events have happened; no character actually “sees” anything in the present. Instead, the legislature provides instructions for what its helpers should do if they see certain events. Although some of the events can be inferred to have happened in the past, such as those related to hiring an individual from the side of the road. The specifics of those past events are not recounted, we do not know what the individuals involved looked like, what they said, or how they acted. The implication that the events have taken place is clear, but no detailed depiction of what happened during that encounter is provided.

For example, in Section 2, law enforcement officers are instructed to make an attempt to determine the immigration status of an individual “WHERE REASONABLE SUSPICION EXISTS THAT THE PERSON IS AN ALIEN AND IS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES” (2010b, p. 1). However, there are no instructions provided to these helpers about what circumstances prompt that reasonable suspicion, except that race, ethnicity, or national origin cannot be used as an excuse (2010a, p. 3; 2010b, pp. 2, 4, 6-7). While there clearly characteristics related to race, ethnicity, and national origin that will be visible to law enforcement officers, the text does not specify what those are. No one perceives describable characteristics in either version of the policy. Without descriptive text and without time passing, there is nothing in SB 1070 for a reader to see through a character’s perspective.

16 There is a minor distinction between the two versions of SB 1070 in this line. The first version states, “WHERE REASONABLE SUSPICION EXISTS THAT THE PERSON IS AN ALIEN WHO [emphasis added] IS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES” (2010a, p. 1).
World-Building and SB 1070

The main principle of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) is that the legislature, which is narrator, actant-object, and receiver, wants to arrive at a point where there are no undocumented immigrants in the state of Arizona. The state of deficiency that opens the narrative, then, is that there are many undocumented immigrants present in Arizona and they are engaged in economic activity. Just as Stone (1989, 2012/1988) suggests about the purposefulness of storytelling in political discourse, SB 1070 defines the public problem in a specific way (the presence and economic activity of undocumented immigrants) that creates heroes, villains, and victims. Although the actors do not fully develop into the characters that Stone describes, all events in the narrative connect to four major sequences in which helpers determine if the individuals they encounter are opponents and then impose punishments on those who are opponents. In SB 1070, there are four opponents: undocumented immigrants, shielders/transporters of undocumented immigrants, employers of undocumented immigrants, and state and local officials or agents (who also act as helpers in parts of the policy). Despite these underlying structures to the narrative, time never passes and few locations are described with any detail. In general, SB 1070 lacks the descriptive text that connects the elements of the fabula to the narrative text layer and to the story layer. Moreover, by the end of the narrative, the state of deficiency remains unresolved. The policy provides instructions for how government workers can redress the state of deficiency, but no action to achieve that aim is taken within the text.
Despite the lack of direct action, the legislature’s assertion that the state of deficiency exists is convincing because of the power of its voice, which emerges from two factors. First, the legislature speaks from a place of power due its role as the governing body that creates and passes laws for the imagined collective subject -- the People of Arizona. The legislature speaks for this subject and acts on its behalf, which has ethical implications that will be discussed in a later chapter. Nevertheless, the context of who the author of this narrative is, which has been a contentious issue throughout narratological scholarship, cannot be ignored in this case. SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) was created by a specific entity to accomplish a purpose. As postclassical narratologists affirm, the medium of the storytelling is a critical consideration because public policies are designed with a purpose: to communicate the will of the People. Yet, the strength of the legislature’s voice also derives from its role in the narrative. As a character-narrator, the legislature speaks the truth about its experience, which in this scenario means that the legislature speaks the truth about what it hopes future events will be in the state of Arizona. The narrator of SB 1070 can organize the necessary resources to make the events depicted in the policy come to pass, and thus, make the storyworlds evoked by the two versions of the policy into reality.

The differences between the two versions of SB 1070 have an impact on the nature of their storyworlds, in particular for the identification and punishment of undocumented immigrants. In the undocumented immigrant sequence, law enforcement officers repeatedly interact with undocumented immigrants in different types of scenarios. In the revised version of SB 1070 (2010b), all of these encounters are
prompted by the law enforcement officer suspecting or witnessing criminal activity either by the undocumented immigrant or a companion. These interactions result in the law enforcement officer requesting proof of identity and immigration status. Also recurrent in the revised version of the policy is the greater presence of federal agencies or federally authorized agents, which are the only actors that may verify the immigration status of an individual. Law enforcement officers are admonished to never use race, ethnicity, and national origin as a basis for investigating whether a law has been broken (which differs substantively from the first version), and, the punishments for undocumented immigrants are also reduced. Yet the association between undocumented immigrant and criminal activity is obvious in both versions of the policy, even though the first version does not require an actual or suspected crime for police to request proof of identity. Thus, the world of the revised policy reflects a greater involvement by the federal government, a concern that visible racial, ethnic and national origin characteristics are not used by law enforcement officers as a basis for initiating contact, and that although undocumented immigrants are criminals, they merit less punishment than allowed for in the first version of SB 1070.

Public administrators are very visible in both versions of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) as helpers and opponents. In many ways, the storyworlds of SB 1070 are their worlds. In the policy, the legislature provides its agents with marching orders for how to erase the state of deficiency and bring about an improved world order by identifying and punishing opponents. This reflects the characteristics of the state-agent narrative that Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) describe: rules and regulations ensure a properly ordered
world where all individuals are treated fairly and as equals. It also provides the necessary discourses that its agents may cite to issue performatives. In particular, judges now have the authority to transform an individual from an alleged undocumented immigrant into a criminal. Law enforcement officers are also authorized to demand proof of status from those they suspect might be undocumented immigrants. Demanding to see identification documents strongly resembles the act of demanding an account of oneself. The officer asks the questions: Who are you? Do you accept responsibility for harming Arizona by crossing the border illegally? The individual may: provide proof of citizenship or immigration status; respond with silence and let other government agents research his or her status; or admit culpability and acknowledge his or her status as an undocumented immigrant. Regardless of the response, the account giving and issuance of performatives take place in a public world of government offices, courtrooms, jails, streets, cars, and places of business, but not homes or other private residences.

The storyworlds are populated with government officials of all stripes including, politicians, federal officials, law enforcement officers, CPS workers, judges, and all other state and local government officials and agencies. As helpers, law enforcement officials are the most active in identifying and punishing opponents and they are also the most protected; they are the only workers indemnified by their agencies if a legal resident files a lawsuit against them. State and local officials or agencies, as a general actant class, are transformed into opponents at various places in the narrative, which raises the question: Are they friends or foes of the legislature’s objective? The first version of SB 1070 (2010a) indicates that formal policies or informal behaviors that violate federal
immigration law may prompt policing activity by legal residents, but in the revised version of SB 1070 (2010b), only formal policies may do so. In the revised version of SB 1070, the minimum punishment is also somewhat reduced. Regardless, these provisions portray public administrators as potentially untrustworthy and possibly meriting punishment for acting in opposition to the goal of the legislature. This reflects the citizen-agent narrative in which public administrators make judgments in their work that may not necessarily coincide with the desires of the legislature.

In contrast, documented immigrants and citizens are practically invisible in a narratological analysis of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). Both actors exist in the narrative, but they do not play an active role in helping or opposing the legislature’s achievement of a state with undocumented immigrants; they do not change, make choices or confront other actors. Often, these actors are subsumed in other actant classes such as legal residents or persons. In SB 1070, documented immigrants and citizens carry proper identification and present it to the authorities when requested to do so; no exceptions to this rule are described. Both versions of SB 1070 stay tightly focused on those who commit crimes or associate with undocumented immigrants. As long as a documented immigrant or citizen does not attempt to transport/shield or hire an undocumented immigrant, no punishments await. Neither documented immigrants nor citizens develop into actors critical to the structure of the policy, and most certainly, they do not become characters. In a structural analysis of SB 1070, citizens and documented immigrants are barely visible.

Without descriptive text, time, or characters, the storyworlds constructed by the two versions of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) are incomplete, which is not surprising. All
storyworlds, whether fictional or nonfictional, are incomplete. The sections of SB 1070 proffer guidance for how state and local officials should behave and advance the goals of the legislature. In essence, the readers of this text are meant to write their own stories around SB 1070 based on how their work intersects with these new rules. Scholars across the disciplines have generally agreed that readers insert themselves into the narratives, bringing their own values and experiences to bear (Bruner, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1998, 2004; Butler, 2005; Cavarero, 1997; Dodge et al., 2005; Herman, D., 2002, 2009; Hummel, 1991; Iser, 1978, 1989; Ospina & Dodge, 2005a, 2005b; Ryan, 2001). In the next two chapters, I will explore how the storytelling about the policy fills the gaps in these storyworlds.
CHAPTER 7: STORYTELLING AND CHANGING SB 1070

In the prior chapter, I employed narratological tools to examine the elements of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) and described the storyworlds constructed by the two versions of the policy. Here, the public storytelling about SB 1070 takes center stage as I present the results of my analysis of the over 321 articles published in Arizona news media outlets. These stories were published between when Governor Brewer signed the bill into law on April 23rd, 2010 and when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in an interview that the Department of Justice intended to file a lawsuit against the state of Arizona on June 7th, 2010. The narratives that have been collected for this project include answers to three questions: What is SB 1070? What will the policy do? Who are the agents/enforcers and the targets of the policy?

In this chapter, the responses to these questions are structured around the four organizing principles, or plots, that surfaced in the narratological analysis of SB 1070 -- the identification and punishment of: employers of undocumented immigrants, transporters/shielders of undocumented immigrants, undocumented immigrants and state and local government agencies or officials that do not fully enforce federal immigration law. Each section examines the extent to which these narratives include these organizing principles and translate elements of SB 1070’s (2010a; 2010b) fabula into a story that imagines how the policy will work. In their analysis of national identification and ethnocentric enforcement laws like SB 1070, Mukherjee, Molina and Adams (2011) argue that there is an “ethnocentric enforcement bias implicit in popular discourse, which focuses almost entirely on punishment of law-breaking immigrants rather than law-
breaking Americans who illegally employ them” (p. 23). The analysis developed in this section will provide insight into whether this bias is evident in the narratives collected for this project. In particular, the discussion focuses on how the narratives describe the characters who enforce the policy, the characters who are targets of the policy, and the space where the events take place. As SB 1070 is a primary actor in these narratives, the articles also offer insight into the two main perspectives that developed around the policy: critics and supporters. While SB 1070 can never become a character because “a character resembles a human being” (Bal, 2009/1985, p. 112), much can be learned about how the policy affects individuals through an analysis of how it is described and what worth the storytellers ascribe to it.

The conclusions provide a description of the two storyworlds that appear most prominently in the storytelling about SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). While numerous unique perspectives about the policy emerge from these news articles, as Butler (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005) argues, the repetitious elements reveal valuable insights into how social identities develop and evolve through their recurrence in norms and discourses. Describing the aspects of the two most prevalent storyworlds evoked by policy helps build a better understanding of how the storytellers believe SB 1070 will impact citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and public administrators.

**Employers of Undocumented Immigrants**

Employers of undocumented immigrants are a highly visible opponent in SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) because they are targeted in four different sections of the policy. Yet very few of the news articles mention the provisions that identify and punish employers of
undocumented immigrants, which supports Mukherjee, Molina and Adam’s (2011) contention that public discourse dedicates little time to the question of citizens acting illegally. SB 1070 targets two kinds of employers: those attempting to hire individuals while driving a motor vehicle and possibly blocking traffic; and those who already employ undocumented immigrants. Section 5 (2010a, pp. 5-6; 2010b, p. 6), which makes it a crime to hire an individual from the roadside, is an all new statute. In contrast, all but a few lines of Sections 7, 8, and 9 (2010a, pp. 7-15; 2010b, pp. 8-16), which target individuals who already employ undocumented immigrants, draw their origin in the 2007 Employer Sanctions law. Nevertheless, this organizing principle sparked little public discussion, with only 6 narratives included in this sample even mentioning it. While several individuals, including Senator Pearce, lambasted the employers who hired undocumented workers in their commentary (Pearce, 2010), only one article discusses these specific provisions in its summary of SB 1070 (Nowicki, 2010).

The issue of hiring of individuals from a motor vehicle also had a minimal presence in the storytelling about SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). This plot only appears in three narratives, and the storytellers generally focus on the criminalization of the act and not the punishments. They also do not embellish much on the elements from SB 1070’s fabula. For example, one narrative explains that SB 1070 “Makes it a crime to pick up a day laborer for work if the vehicle impedes traffic and makes a day laborer subject to criminal charges if he or she is picked up and the vehicle involved impedes traffic” (Nowicki, 2010). This statement very closely resembles the verbiage in SB 1070 with no additional descriptive text added to the actors or location. Only one article from
the sample offers even a basic scenario that imagines how the process of identifying employers might work. The storyteller critiques the verbiage of the law, noting that the identification process for this section will be challenging: “This is an attempt to make it a state crime to hire day laborers, but the way it's written it may be hard to prove without getting a confession . . . it seems to only make it illegal to block traffic in the street” (McCombs, 2010).

Neither the identification or punishment of employers appears with much frequency in the storytelling about SB 1070, nor are the actors and locations of this organizing principle transformed from elements of the fabula into characters or space of a story. As a result, few assessments of the effectiveness of SB 1070 are associated with this organizing principle, which contrasts markedly with the other three.

**Transporters/Shielders of Undocumented Immigrants**

Those who transport or shield undocumented immigrants are targeted by Sections 4 and 10 of SB 1070 (2010a, pp. 4-5, pp. 15-17; 2010b, pp. 5-6, pp. 17-19), which modified pre-existing sections of the A.R.S. about human smuggling and vehicle impoundment. Human smugglers, according to these sections, transport undocumented immigrants into the state, which results in punishments including vehicle impoundment, jail time, and fees. Several of the narratives include descriptions of these two sections of SB 1070 in their explanations of what the policy is, but their level of completeness varies. Some merely note that transporting an undocumented immigrant is now a crime (Grimes, 2010; Portillo Jr., 2010a), others highlight that an individual must also know or “recklessly disregard” an individual’s immigration status (Fischer, 2010a, 2010d;
Franchise, 2010a; Nowicki, 2010), and two mention that public service workers are exempted from these provisions while carrying out government business (McCombs, 2010; Nowicki, 2010). What these descriptions share in common is a focus on the activity that is now criminalized. None of the narratives in this sample emphasize how transporters or shielders of undocumented immigrants will be identified, nor are punishments much discussed. Only one narrative details the exact repercussions that an individual found guilty of violating these sections faces: “as much as six months in the county jail and as much as $2,500 in fines” (Knost, 2010a).

Scenarios of Transporters

Several narratives from the sample include stories that transform the elements of SB 1070’s fabula -- opponents, helpers, and locations -- into stories with interpretations of how and where the storyteller thinks that law enforcement officers will identify transporters or shielders of undocumented immigrants. Mukherjee, Molina, and Adams (2011) predicted that there would be less of an emphasis on the wrongdoing of citizens or legal residents, and this once again is the case. There are two kinds of stories present in the sample: those that support the policy by describing individuals who transport or shield undocumented immigrants and who deserve punishment for their actions; and those that critique the policy by describing individuals who transport or shield undocumented immigrants and who do not deserve to be punished for their actions.

In the one supportive narrative, the co-author of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), Kris Kobach indicates that the only individuals harmed by the policy are those “who know or recklessly disregard the fact that the person is an illegal immigrant” (Kobach in
McCombs, 2010). Although not offered as a scenario specific to the organizing principle of transporters or shielders of undocumented immigrants, Kobach describes a scene that demonstrates how he thinks SB 1070 will be applied to transporters. He states that the policy will be implemented most frequently during traffic stops such as when “A police officer pulls a minivan over for speeding. A dozen passengers are crammed in. None has identification. The highway is a known alien-smuggling corridor. The driver is acting evasively” (Kobach in McCombs, 2010). The principle elements of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) that pertain to this organizing principle -- actors and location from the fabula -- have been transformed into characters and setting. The motor vehicle on a public roadway is an overly filled van on a highway that is often used for the purposes of human smuggling, a space where criminal activity is likely to occur. The opponent, the transporter or shieder, is a law-breaker who has violated the speed limit and is acting suspiciously. Little is known about the appearances of the driver or the passengers. The character focalizer, the police officer, suspects that the driver has possibly broken two laws -- exceeding the speed limit and violating SB 1070 by transporting undocumented immigrants. Readers see the actions of the narrative through the eyes of the police officer, but no specific description of the officer is provided, although it is indicated that he or she is fulfilling the requirements of the position by stopping a law breaker and making observations about the driver and the passengers.

Three scenarios that critique SB 1070 offer a very different perspective on this organizing principle, which is demonstrated most clearly by their characterizations of the opponents or targets of the policy and the character focalizers. There are three targets of
the policy identified in these renderings: citizens with children who are friends with undocumented immigrant children; citizens with family members who are undocumented immigrants, and citizen church leaders whose parishioners include undocumented immigrants.

In the case of citizens who are parents, their main characteristic is fearfulness: “Aguirre said she fears that the law . . . could put her daughter and family members at risk. ‘She has a lot of friends who are undocumented’” (Smokey, 2010). While the process of how transporters are identified is not emphasized, the storyteller expresses anxiety not only about being transformed into a criminal, but also having to enforce the law herself: “‘Am I supposed to ask these kids, ‘Who has papers? Only kids with papers can get in my car.’ You get criminalized if you have an undocumented person in your vehicle.’” (Smokey, 2010). The location referenced in the fabula of SB 1070 (2010a, pp. 4-5, pp. 15-17; 2010b, pp. 5-6, pp. 17-19), a motor vehicle, is her car in this story, a space to which she feels personally connected. The character focalizer in this narrative is a female citizen; she is a mother who fears that she will have to figure out whether her child’s friends are undocumented immigrants. Although the text of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) indicates that only federally authorized law enforcement officers can determine whether an individual is an undocumented immigrant and that to be considered a violator of this section, one must already know that an individual is an undocumented immigrant, Aguirre’s commentary suggests that some citizens feel forced to take a more active role in the identification process. In particular, Aguirre fears that claiming ignorance of another person’s status might not be enough to avoid punishment or criminalization.
Interestingly, law enforcement officers are invisible in this scenario; the citizen-mother fills the role of target and enforcer of the policy.

Another scenario that focuses on family members emphasizes how even an individual who is attempting to aid a family member by providing transportation can be identified and punished under these provisions of SB 1070. In the first example, an adult seeks medical attention for his mother: “If an 18-year-old citizen drives his undocumented immigrant mother to the hospital and gets pulled over for speeding on his way there, he can receive six months in jail and his car will be impounded. His mother can receive six months in jail for ‘trespassing’” (Knost, 2010a). The driver is a male adult citizen who breaks two laws: he exceeds the speed limit and he transports his undocumented immigrant mother to a hospital in order to seek medical attention. Although never directly mentioned, one can infer the presence of a police officer in the narrative. The officer pulls the young man over and then determines that he or his mother are potentially undocumented immigrants. In this story, the space is the citizen’s car, but there is also no character focalizer. Only the targets of SB 1070 are described in terms of their relationship to one another, which includes mention of their gender and the adult child’s age, as well as their immigration and citizenship status.

The final scenario that pertains to transporters focuses on how churches might be affected by SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). This example is relayed in the first person and concerns a pastor whose congregation has just been joined by several undocumented immigrants who do not have a car. The pastor offers transportation because “it's your
religious duty to help people pray at the church of their choice” (Safier, 2010). The scenario continues,

If you're pulled over for, say, a faulty rear brake light, the officer will take one look at your passengers, have a “reasonable suspicion” about their immigration status and be bound by law to check their papers. They're likely to be arrested and deported. And because you knew they were undocumented when you let them in your car, you're also in violation of SB 1070. Bye-bye car. Hello $1,000 fine. (Safier, 2010)

The transporter and target of SB 1070 in this scenario is a pastor who has “religious principles” (Safier, 2010), but who has also potentially broken two laws by driving with a broken brake light and transporting undocumented immigrants. The undocumented immigrants are characterized as individuals seeking a religious community. Again, no physical description of any of these characters is provided, the only details included concern their relationship to one another and their status as citizens or immigrants. The police officer is mentioned, but only to indicate that the officer follows the law by asking to check the papers of the passenger. The focalizer in this story is a second-person narrator, which seems designed to make the reader imagine himself or herself as the transporter.

All four scenarios share the main elements of this organizing principle of SB 1070. As a statute, SB 1070 makes it possible for a law enforcement officer to discover that an individual is transporting others who might be undocumented immigrants, which sets into motion efforts to verify identities and issue punishments. While the supportive scenario focuses on the identification process, the critical scenarios highlight both identification and punishment. As there is only one supportive scenario present in the sample, it is difficult to draw too many conclusions. However, the storytellers who
critique the policy make clear attempts to humanize the targets of SB 1070 (the transporters and undocumented immigrants) primarily through characterization by highlighting the good intentions of the criminalized individual or the complicated personal relationships (i.e., the relationship between mother and friends of her child, son and ill mother, or pastor and parishioner) that result in citizens making the decision to violate the law. In the critical scenarios, whenever an individual is identified as a citizen, he or she is portrayed positively. In contrast, none of the individuals in the supportive story are developed as characters at all; the only descriptor of the suspected undocumented immigrants is that they are “crammed in a van.” Police officers are inconsistently visible in the scenarios, but whenever present, they work efficaciously even if the storyteller disagrees with their actions.

**SB 1070, Human Smuggling, Drug Trafficking and Border Violence**

Although the title of the section of SB 1070 describes the identification process of transporters or shielders of undocumented immigrants as “Smuggling; classification; definitions” (2010a, p. 4; 2010b, p. 5), neither the definitions of these provisions of the policy nor the scenarios built from its elements use the term “human smuggling.” In spite of this omission, SB 1070 is discussed in 37 narratives in terms of its effectiveness at addressing the problem of human smuggling. In particular, assessments of how it will impact this crime appear in conjunction with discussions of how and whether it will influence other crimes such as drug trafficking and violence at the border with Mexico.

Again, two viewpoints about SB 1070 and human smuggling emerge from the narratives:
those that support the policy and believe that it will help reduce the problem, and those
that oppose the policy and believe that it will not address the problem.

Discussions of human smuggling by those who support SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b)
often connect this crime to drug trafficking and border violence. These narratives focus
on the problem at hand, rather than how the policy will be implemented or who it will
target. One letter to the editor suggests that Arizonans support SB 1070 because
undocumented immigrants are costly to maintain and they commit awful crimes, the
“increase in illegal immigrants has made the impact on Arizonans of educating, medically
treating and providing law enforcement regarding illegal immigrants intolerable. The
safety of citizens is being jeopardized by the horrific criminal acts of illegal drug
smugglers and human traffickers” (Hance, 2010). Undocumented immigrants, then, drain
Arizona’s resources and drug smugglers and human traffickers endanger citizens. One
letter to the editor further describes the dangers that citizens living near the border face
due to the criminal actions of undocumented immigrants, and ascribes blame for this
problem to the federal government:
I live near the border and in the last five years my dwellings have been burglarized at
least 20 times by illegal immigrants, many of whom are armed and dangerous drug
smugglers.

My neighbor Rob Krentz was killed in March. It is dangerous here and the feds
must seal the border.

But they refuse to act. Don't blame Arizona for trying to protect its citizens
because of federal inaction. At least they are trying to protect us. (Winkler, 2010)
In these narratives, undocumented immigration is conflated with drug smuggling, human trafficking, and violent crime. Specific provisions of SB 1070 are not discussed, and no undocumented immigrants or citizens are described. However, the distrust and dislike of undocumented immigrants is made clear, as is the perceived ineffectiveness of the federal government.

Two arguments emerge from the narratives in which individuals have suggested that SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) will not work effectively on the public problem of human smuggling. First, some contend that SB 1070 does not include the proper provisions to target human smugglers and targets individuals who are not trying to harm others or break other U.S. laws. State Representative Lynne Pancrazi, D-Yuma reports that she voted against the bill because it did not “go after the real criminals, the narco traffickers and human traffickers” (Pancrazi in Knaub, 2010). Even though SB 1070 includes provisions targeting human smuggling, Pancrazi doubts that these individuals will be caught through the enforcement of the policy. Another editorial asks, “Is an illegal immigration bill that targets landscapers, maids and cooks — not the drug cartels and smugglers responsible for most of the violent crime — really worth all that?” ("Damage already done," 2010). According to these arguments, SB 1070 targets low-income undocumented immigrant workers and not the individuals committing violent or drug-related crimes. Others suggest that SB 1070 will foster fear and distrust of police officers in immigrant communities rather than fixing the problem of human smuggling:

it will cause people who are otherwise law abiding to become ever more fearful of the police in their communities. Regardless of any precautions the authorities
might take to avoid it, no undocumented immigrant who witnesses a crime will ever have enough confidence to come forward. No undocumented immigrant who is the victim of a crime will come forward. Indeed, no family members of undocumented immigrants will ever come forward. (Knost, 2010a)

Like the critical scenarios about the transporters or shielders of undocumented immigrants, these narratives focus most on characterizing undocumented immigrants as undeserving of being targeted by this law. Additionally, they point to the damage that SB 1070 may cause to undocumented immigrants, their families, and the larger community. There is no mention of the details of SB 1070’s provisions that counter human trafficking, nor are characterizations of citizens and police officers provided. Human traffickers are merely described as “real” criminals and the rest is left to the imagination of the reader.

Critics of the policy focus on the harm SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) will cause in the future, whereas those who support the policy emphasize the pain that citizens currently experience. Time, then, is an undercurrent in these narratives, but the question of time is rather one of setting, an element of the space in which the storytelling happens that is connected to the question of who is suffering and who the policy will help. Critics express a concern for the future suffering that SB 1070 will cause whereas supporters lament the present-day suffering that SB 1070 will ameliorate. While the imagined scenarios depict citizens as the targets of the human smuggling provisions of SB 1070, in the more general discussions of human smuggling and SB 1070, neither supporters nor opponents of the policy describe citizens as potential targets of the policy because those engaged in human smuggling (both smugglers and those who are smuggled) are presumed to be undocumented immigrants. Mukherjee, Molina, and Adams (2011)
suggested that there would be less of a focus on the misdeeds of citizens or documented immigrants who break the law, and that has again proven true. Transporters/shielders of undocumented immigrants receive only a modicum of attention compared to the *real criminals* -- undocumented immigrants. Both supporters and opponents describe criminals, who may also be undocumented immigrants, as the primary targets of the policy and both also agree that human smuggling is an important problem that Arizona faces.

**Undocumented Immigrants**

Undocumented immigrants are the main opponent in SB 1070: all actions directed at employers, transporters/shielders, and government officials are ultimately designed to impact negatively the lives of undocumented immigrants and encourage “attrition through enforcement” (2010a, p. 1; 2010b, p. 1). SB 1070 targets undocumented immigrants in their places of employment, in the company of state and local government agencies or officials, and in public places. SB 1070 makes it a state crime for an immigrant not to carry official documentation at all times, for undocumented immigrants to seek work, and imposes a variety of punishments for those who are caught engaging in these activities. The principle revisions in the second version of SB 1070 (2010b) affected not only the identification process for undocumented immigrants, but also the kinds of punishment that could be inflicted. This section examines the definitions of SB 1070 to reveal the prominence of these provisions, the impact of the revisions of the policy to the storytelling, and then explores the two major positions recurrent in the storytelling that developed in over 200 of the narratives based on these provisions:
critiques of the policy that suggest it will encourage racial profiling and marginalize Hispanic residents; and supportive narratives that emphasize the criminal nature of undocumented immigrants and the financial burden they impose on communities.

**Defining SB 1070**

The sections of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) that provide directions for how law enforcement officials should seek undocumented immigrants and then punish them received the most attention in the narratives about the policy. In fact, most definitions of SB 1070 focus exclusively on the pieces of Section 2 (2010a, pp. 1-3; 2010b, pp. 1-3) and Section 3 (2010a, pp. 3-4; 2010b, pp. 3-5) that target undocumented immigrants as opponents. Section 2 establishes the conditions under which a law enforcement officer may confront an individual (i.e., when there is “REASONABLE SUSPICION” (2010a, p. 2; 2010b, p. 2) that the individual is an undocumented immigrant) and request proof of citizenship or immigration status. Section 3 requires that all immigrants carry “AN ALIEN REGISTRATION DOCUMENT” (2010a, p. 3; 2010b, p. 3) with them at all times and details the punishments for violations of this new criminal provision.

The definitions of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) present in the narratives often include elements from both Sections 2 and 3, but generally place more emphasis on the steps associated with identification rather than the punishment process. For example, “It [SB 1070] would make it a state crime to be in the country illegally and requires local law enforcement to determine an individual's legal status if there is reasonable suspicion that he or she is in the U.S. illegally” (Wong, 2010). The helpers from Section 2 who
determine the identity of individuals suspected of being undocumented immigrants merit inclusion in the narratives, but not those who deliver the punishments established in Section 3. The phrase “make it a state crime to be in the country illegally” reduces the events in Section 3 to a question of legality that is devoid of actors with neither enforcer nor target specified. The rare variants of this definition that do include people generally describe the targets, but not the enforcers, and maintain their focus on the illegal nature of the actions taken by undocumented immigrants: “makes it a state crime for illegal immigrants to be in Arizona” (Groff, 2010b) and “convierte en delito la presencia de indocumentados” ("Negocios," 2010). While several narratives discuss other aspects of Section 3, including what its exact verbiage may mean in legal interpretations ("How would scenario," 2010; Kobach, 2010) and what punishments it describes (Sakal, 2010; "Una coalición ", 2010), these are infrequent.

SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) has other provisions that target both the presence and economic activity of undocumented immigrants, but the storytelling about the policy practically ignores them. One provision of Section 5 makes it a crime for undocumented immigrants to seek work and another outlaws one of the prime methods by which day laborers connect with prospective employers on city streets. However, even statements made by representatives of the National Day Laborer Organizing Network did not mention them. In general, the critiques from members of this organization reflect the recurrent themes espoused by all opponents of the policy. Representatives describe SB 1070 as "the most anti-immigrant legislation" ("Arizona immigration law: History," 2010), “hateful and motivated by racism,” (Ringle, 2010), and unconstitutional (Groff,
Moreover, they call on President Obama to halt its implementation (Alvarado, 2010; "Opposing sides," 2010). One article notes the gravity and economic impact of the provision that prohibits undocumented immigrants from seeking employment of any kind, “This is the most clearly written part of the statute and what should be the headline of any story about the new law” (McCombs, 2010). However, just as provisions targeting employers of undocumented immigrants receive little attention in the narratives, so do the portions addressing the employment of undocumented immigrants even though some narratives characterize undocumented immigrants as workers seeking better opportunities for their families through employment in the United States.

Revising SB 1070: Unique storyworlds?

The processes that SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) establishes for police officers to use when determining if an individual is an undocumented immigrant cause the most controversy in the storytelling about the policy. Although passages of Sections 2, 3, 5, and 6 were altered in the revised version of SB 1070, the narratives pay exclusive attention to the events in Section 2 that were modified: why a police officer may request proof of status and when that request may be delivered. In the first version of SB 1070 (2010a, p. 2), a police officer could request proof of status during any lawful contact when the officer had reasonable suspicion that the person was an undocumented immigrant. Reasonable suspicion could be met by considering the individual’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, but not solely these characteristics. The revised version of the policy limited officers to being able to request proof of status during a stop, detention or arrest and indicated that neither race, ethnicity, nor national origin could be considered
reasonably suspicious (2010b, p. 2). Governor Brewer explained that she requested that
the legislature make these changes in order to allay public concern about SB 1070 and
racial profiling: “These changes specifically answer legal questions raised by some who
expressed fears that the original law would somehow allow or lead to racial
profiling” (Brewer in Newton & Rough, 2010, p. para. 1).

In spite of the Governor’s intention, the revisions had little impact on the tenor of
the conversation about SB 1070 (2010b) or the storyworlds evoked in the narratives.
Even an editorial that found these alterations valuable explained that although the
revisions “should ease fears that police will stop people for no reason at all to ask for
proof they are here legally. They are positive steps. But, really, the public relations
damage has already been done” ("Damage already done," 2010). Not only had the
damage been done, some people felt that the changes to SB 1070 were either cosmetic
and ineffective, or possibly made the policy worse. Another individual notes, “But no nip
and tuck can make this grotesque law any more presentable” (Navarrette, 2010). He then
continues his critique:

they also put in new language that extends the requirement to ask for papers to
those instances where police respond to violations of minor city ordinances. That
could include loud music, raucous parties, barking dogs, cars on blocks in front of
a house, overcrowded apartments, etc. (Navarrette, 2010)

The criminal infractions that will result in a request for proof of status are minor and
domestic. While some express satisfaction with the changes, for many critics, the
storyworld already existed and nothing could make SB 1070 more palatable.
Racial Profiling in Nazi-zona: A Fearful Space

For critics of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), the question of what constitutes “reasonable suspicion” that someone is an undocumented immigrant troubles them. In the narratives, police officers are the enforcers of the policy who target individuals based on a specific racial profile. The spaces described are often private locations (i.e., private residences). The narrative is focalized through the eyes of the enforcer, the police officer, to imagine what the officer sees that makes the person targeted seem reasonably suspicious. Many fear that the policy will encourage racial profiling, specifically of Hispanics. Several storytellers suggest that although SB 1070 states that race cannot be considered, the question of who an undocumented immigrant is cannot be divorced from race: “given the known fact that most of the ‘illegals’ in Arizona are Hispanic, the statement of intent can properly be construed to mean that the intent of the law is to get rid of ‘illegal’ Hispanics” (Overgaard, 2010). Indeed, the conflation of the target of the policy -- undocumented immigrants -- with all Hispanics, regardless of citizenship status -- is described repeatedly. One narrative, for example, suggests that even police officers who try to act with empathy and compassion will inadvertently target members of the community who look Hispanic:

People with Spanish accents, Hispanic surnames, and Latino physical features will certainly suffer from “reasonable suspicion” that they are a) from somewhere in Latin America, and b) here in the U.S. without permission. Many of the people who will be subject to being misidentified as undocumented immigrants will in fact be people who are legal residents or U.S. citizens. (Knost, 2010b)

This storyteller highlights his belief that the law is and will be enforced in a manner that impacts a much broader spectrum of people than just undocumented immigrants. In
particular, the target is an individual who looks or has features that can be identified as Hispanic. The enforcers, police officers, are carefully characterized as not evil; there are broader societal issues at play that impact the space of the story, which shape the behavior of law enforcement officers and influence how they treat others.

For some storytellers, the combination of the police officer’s decision-making process and the act of requesting someone’s papers too closely resembles the actions of Germany’s Nazi Regime in the 1930s and 1940s. Several storytellers report the usage of the term “Nazi-zona” (See Martinez, 2010) to refer to the new police state they believe has been created in Arizona. This narrative teases out with more depth the storyworld of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) and how it will “create a Nazi style police state” in which:

Any law enforcement officer, for any reason (they call it “reasonable suspicion”), can stop any individual and make the ominous demand: “Are your papers in order?” Have we learned nothing from the horrors of the 20th Century? Are we doomed to repeat these abominations? Will one day a certain class of individuals be required to wear a yellow patch on their clothing for easy identification? Don’t laugh, it happened in Europe, and it can happen here. We are seeing the beginnings of it with SB 1070. (Knost, 2010a)

While this narrative does not describe the group of individuals that will be targeted by SB 1070, except to liken them to groups targeted by the Nazis, others storytellers do. A Hispanic Vietnam War veteran explains that “It reminds me so much of what happened during the early part of WWII when you had the criminalization of Jews because they are Jews ... Now you have the criminalization of Hispanics because they are Hispanics” (Pisano in Ringle, 2010). These descriptions of the narrative space evoked by the storyworld of SB 1070 emphasize the hostile atmosphere that will be cultivated towards individuals based on their appearance or other identifying characteristics.
Arizona, then, is a space of fear that will cause harm to citizens and immigrants, regardless of documentation status, if they appear Hispanic.

Other narratives provide provocative examples of a group that will not be targeted by police officers enforcing SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b): white or Caucasian males who might be undocumented immigrants from Canada. One storyteller, who identifies himself as a white Caucasian male, jokingly suggests that police officers might consider him to be an undocumented immigrant based on his physical characteristics and behavior:

In public, I wear nothing but hockey jerseys. I never leave the house without putting my trusty tuque over my head. My car sports a “Yukon do it!” bumper sticker, and I drive around blaring nothing but “O Canada” through my iPod. I fear that I may be deemed to be “reasonably suspiciously Canadian” and forced to show my papers at a whim. (Wheelock, 2010)

Through humor, this storyteller argues that while there is another easy stereotype available that could be used to identify undocumented immigrants, it will not be employed by police officers. In addition to the race and gender specified in the narrative, another important identifying feature in this description is class. The possessions he mentions -- hockey jerseys, a car, an iPod -- are not inexpensive items and imply that the individual has a fair amount of disposable income, perhaps more than those who are poor or working class. Individuals who will not be targeted by law enforcement, then, are white males with financial means.

Some narratives take this analogy a step further and offer conclusions about why white males will not be targeted under SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). One storyteller notes, “laws are easy to support when they do not affect you” and argues that “few folks who address a cop at a traffic stop with the a phrase that ends in "eh," such as "Was I speeding,
eh?” (a common part of some Canadians phrasing) will be asked to prove their citizenship” (Vicich, 2010). Further, the storyteller asserts that SB 1070 will create a divisive atmosphere between those who look Caucasian and those who look Hispanic: “It is about creating a "us" against "them" culture. One that can walk freely and one that always feels the eyes of the law upon them, just because of the color of their skin” (Vicich, 2010). Like the narratives that make an analogy between Arizona and Nazi Germany, narratives of this kind evoke the future and describe a storyworld in which Arizona, the space in the narrative, is inherently hostile to those who look Hispanic, regardless of whether citizen, documented immigrant, or undocumented immigrant.

**Rule of Law and Criminalization: Criminals before or after?**

Narratives that support SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) and its targeting of undocumented immigrants do not reference the text of the policy as directly as those that critique it in terms of this organizing principle. The storytellers in these narratives often provide counter-arguments to those offered by opponents of the policy, explaining why SB 1070 is not racist and why undocumented immigrants should be targeted for removal from the state due to concerns about criminality and public resource depletion. For example, four attendees of a march explain that “neither they nor the Arizona law is racist. ‘Nowhere in the bill does it say (police can stop or question people about their immigration status) because of race. It just says illegal immigrants’ ("Civil disobedience", 2010). In this case, the storytellers reference the revised text of SB 1070 (2010b) and its stipulation that the enforcers of the policy, law enforcement officers, cannot use race as a cause for questioning an individual about his or her immigration status. Another
storyteller also emphasizes that SB 1070 does not target groups based on race or
nationality:

This law is meant to protect the citizens of Arizona, not the illegals in this country or the ones coming across the border. This is not about race or just Mexicans. However, the opponents of the bill are making it so. It is about the laws and people abiding by the laws governing them in the United States. (Hayes, 2010)

Again, the contrast between supporters and opponents of SB 1070 is firmly established:

SB 1070 targets only those who break U.S. laws by entering the country without proper documentation. SB 1070 does not encourage the profiling of either Hispanics or Mexicans nor those who appear Hispanic or Mexican, regardless of what critics of the policy suggest. The policy is meant to evoke a space of safety and security for its citizens, regardless of race, according to these narratives.

In fact, the storytellers who support SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) consistently deemphasize the physical appearance of an undocumented immigrant. Only one narrative describes clothing or other behaviors that might heighten reasonable suspicion.

Representative John Kavanagh, R-Fountain Hills indicates “There is no illegal look,” but then, when reporters press him on this point, he retorts: “Short of running away from a federal detention center in an orange jump suit, there is nothing about a person’s appearance that would lead anybody to suspect, much less know, that you’re illegal” (Kavanagh in Fischer, 2010c). As with narratives that critique the policy for fostering an environment where racial profiling will become normal, the focalizer of this narrative is the police officer. However, the target of the policy in this scenario is evidently a criminal, as suggested by the description of the space, which is near a federal detention center, and the jailhouse clothing worn by the undocumented immigrant. This
perception echoes the retort from Senator Russell Pearce to opponents of SB 1070 that appeared repeatedly in the narratives: “Illegal is not a race, it's a crime” (Hernandez, 2010). As several storytellers note, entering the United States without documentation is a criminal act according to federal law. Ann Hardy explains, “It's just, they think they can walk right in, and it's not right. We have laws right now on the books, don't we, that we should be able to enforce?” (Associated Press, 2010)

Indeed, the criminalization of undocumented immigrants is an evident theme throughout the narratives of those who support the policy. This is often accomplished by including descriptions of the negative impact that undocumented immigrants have on the present as justification for why an intervention such as SB 1070 is needed. One storyteller emphasizes several themes that reappear frequently in these narratives, including drug smuggling, human trafficking, various types of violent and non-violent criminal acts, and the utilization of public services:

When did racial profiling get its start? With the drug "mules" bringing their cargo across the border? With the "coyotes" bringing their human cargo across and abandoning them somewhere? With the vehicle bearing Mexican license plates damaging another vehicle in a parking lot and hastily leaving the scene?

With the driver having an Arizona license who can't speak, read or write English? With the trails of trash in our Sonoran desert? With Arizonans being accosted on our streets? With large groups of illegals being caught in "safe" houses? With the slaughtering of range cattle? With the woman who has her baby in a U.S. hospital and then sneaks back across the border, leaving the infant to become a ward of the state? With the rise of a tougher strain of tuberculosis? (Wullenweber, 2010)

As this excerpt contends, it is not just the criminal acts that ignite support for SB 1070, but the fact that undocumented immigrants do not make sufficient efforts to integrate into American society by learning English. As another storyteller notes, “Illegals arrive here
expecting us to bend over backwards and assimilate their way of living, expect handouts, don’t learn our language and don’t respect us as Americans” (Carol Drew in "Immigration letters," 2010). While appearance is de-emphasized, traits such as the ability to speak English or “act” American come to the forefront in these narratives.

One final theme that supporters of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) employ in their storytelling relates to the usage of services provided by public agencies such as schools and hospitals, which they feel should be accessible only to citizens or documented immigrants who have entered the country the “correct” way. Additionally, there is also a concern for the economic health of the state and the fear that undocumented immigrants hold jobs that should belong to citizens, “our jobs are still siphoned by illegal workers. Directly in the pathway of the constant border flow . . . And as our unemployed neighbors seek help, stressed state and private social services understandably continue to aid illegal families” (Turley-Hansen, 2010). According to this viewpoint, SB 1070 will relieve a number of public problems caused by the presence of undocumented immigrants and, as Representative Kavanagh (2010) stresses, “‘crack down’ on illegal immigration and all the harm it causes Arizona in crime and backbreaking public expenses to incarcerate, educate, medically treat and provide other services to illegal immigrants and their children.” Present-day Arizona is a space where citizens are routinely harmed by the activities and presence of undocumented immigrants.

The narratives that highlight the provisions of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) which target undocumented immigrants vary depending on whether the storytellers support the policy or oppose it. Narratives that present the perspectives of opponents of the policy
generally direct their critiques to Section 2 of SB 1070 and its instructions for how enforcers -- police officers -- should find the targets -- undocumented immigrants. Opponents adopt the stance that even though modifications to SB 1070 prohibit the use of racial profiling, Hispanics and those who look Hispanic, regardless of citizenship status, are much more likely to be targeted by the enforcers of the policy. Additionally, some allude to Nazi Germany as an example of what future Arizona might look like. In this storyworld, SB 1070 will transform Arizona into a hostile space once it is implemented. In contrast, those who support the policy link their arguments much less directly to the text of SB 1070 and only do so when countering charges of racism. Most storytellers that support the policy instead describe the space of their storyworld(s) as existent in the present and argue that undocumented immigrants cause many already existing public problems. In these narratives, undocumented immigrants deserve to be targeted because they have broken federal law by entering the country without going through the proper channels, and incur harm to Arizona either by using public services, engaging in other criminal activities, or stealing jobs from citizens.

State and Local Government Officials or Agencies

Section 2 of SB 1070 (2010a, pp. 1-3; 2010b, pp. 1-3) includes the major components of the organizing principle that targets state and local government officials or agencies for identification and punishment. Two parts in particular figure prominently in the definitions of SB 1070: all state and local government officials or agencies are tasked with enforcing federal immigration law, and if a legal resident discovers that an official or agency has a policy or practice (2010a) or a policy only (2010b) that violates federal
immigration law, then the resident may file a lawsuit. These items appear in the about 50 of the narratives, and they generally mirror the language of the policy. For example, one narrative indicates that SB 1070 “puts the state in the business of enforcing federal immigration laws” (Fischer, 2010b). Another tackles a discussion of the elements together, describing “the requirement that state law enforcement agencies enforce federal immigration laws, with a provision allowing the public to sue any cities or police departments they believe are not doing so” (Neyoy, 2010d). Again, the identification process is discussed more than the punishments and the revisions to both aspects of this organizing principle, while substantive, are rarely mentioned in the narratives. As the individuals targeted are government employees, and thus citizens, this also fits with Mukherjee, Molina, and Adams’ (2011) thesis that the criminal violations of citizens will receive less attention. A deeper analysis of the narratives suggests that two kinds of stories are told about this organizing principle: supporters of SB 1070 focus on the requirement to enforce federal immigration law, while opponents fret about the consequences of allowing citizen lawsuits. Both types of storytelling reveal underlying assumptions about citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and public administrators.

Supporters of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) emphasize that the policy is not new, but as State Senator Sylvia Allen explains, “Federal law is very clear if you are here on a visa you must have your papers on you at all times. That is the law. . . . So nothing new has been added to this law” (Kovach, 2010). Embedded in these discussions is also an evident frustration with the federal government. Although the federal government is a principle
helper in SB 1070, in the narratives, the federal government is portrayed negatively: “It is not a new immigration law, nor does it discriminate. It has been a federal law for more than 40 years; the only difference is the federal government does not enforce it” (Helmers, 2010). According to supporters of SB 1070, the policy should not be perceived as scary or new, it simply requires state and local governments to do the work that the federal government will not. SB 1070 applies this instruction to all state and local agencies, but most storytellers describe the enforcers as law enforcement officers. In a letter to the editor, Helen Moulton (2010) describes the implementation of the policy: “The law basically gives to local law enforcement the means to enforce immigration laws the federal government fails to enforce.” Scenarios in these narratives are minimalist without a focalizer or even a target. They present the enforcer of the policy in a positive light and indicate that law enforcement officers have been granted more power by SB 1070. In this sense, the target of the organizing principle is not being singled out for punishment, but to receive a reward. These narratives expect that police officers will welcome this section of the policy.

Critics of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) focus their storytelling more on the identification process defined in the policy for opponent state and local government agencies or officials and raise questions about how these sections will be implemented. Just as with the storytelling about other organizing principles, opponents express concern that individuals may be mis-identified and suggest that the application of the identification processes is a form of punishment. Many storytellers indicate that they believe police officers will face the brunt of these provisions because no matter what
action officers take, lawsuits are likely. As the attorney for one police officer explains, “the new immigration law puts him between a ‘rock and a hard place,’ . . . ‘If officers enforce the act, they'll be sued. If they don't enforce the act, they'll be sued’” (Rau & Rough, 2010). While some narratives such as this one focalize the events through the enforcer police officer, other narratives focalize the events through the perspective of the police department. Sahuarita Police Chief John Harris emphasizes the financial cost to departments such as his: “‘We’ve got the far left crying racial profiling and discrimination and the far right (potentially) suing us under SB 1070 saying we’re not doing enough,’ he said. ‘This will cost cities and towns lots of money” defending itself in lawsuits’” (Franchise, 2010b). In this case, the target that Chief Harris discusses is the intended target of the organizing principle. Only a few of the narratives provide additional description of the citizens, but one evokes images of Nazi Germany to emphasize the hostility of the space that will be created by SB 1070: “This type of "turn in your neighbor" law is reminiscent of many World War II movies and books. That is, it reminds me of Nazis” (Fernandez, 2010).

The narratives that discuss this organizing principle, then, rely on similar storytelling techniques to the narratives about the other organizing principles. Critics highlight the hostility of the space in their storyworld of SB 1070 and argue that police officers will be harmed if the policy is implemented. Meanwhile, supporters dedicate their storytelling to reassuring readers that the policy will not provoke large-scale change and that only those agencies or officials that deserve punishment will be targeted by the policy. Unlike the other organizing principles, narratives about state or local government
agencies and officials link their discussion directly to the text of the policy. These scenarios are also often present less fully developed characters and rarely mention undocumented immigrants. Citizens and police officers are neither saints nor villains, but for those who support SB 1070, the federal government is a clear opponent and for those who oppose it, the main villain is SB 1070 itself.

Conclusions

The four organizing principles of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), then, are visible in the storytelling about the policy, but to varying degrees. Mukherjee, Molina, and Adams (2011) made the case that the public discourse would pay less attention to the provisions dedicated to law-breaking citizens or documented immigrants than to undocumented immigrants, and this analysis supports that contention. The process of identifying and punishing employers of undocumented immigrants appears infrequently in the narratives and did not inspire interpretations of how its tenets would be applied. Transporters/shielders of undocumented immigrants sparked more conversation and even some very detailed scenarios, which illustrated the contrasting storytelling techniques employed by supporters and critics of the policy. Although SB 1070 included measures directed to prevent human smuggling, the assessments of its effectiveness were not directly linked to the text of the policy and reflected the diminished concern that the public has for the citizen or documented immigrant lawbreakers.

While each narrative evokes its own storyworld, it is possible to describe two overarching storyworlds evoked by SB 1070: one that becomes visible in the storytelling of those who support the policy and the other that appears in the narratives of those who
oppose SB 1070. There are many commonalities between these two worlds, but their differences provide important insights into underlying beliefs that form the foundation not only for what caused the policy to be written, but how people think it will be implemented. Critics of the policy often focalize their story from the perspective of the person targeted by the policy and portray that target in a sympathetic manner. In the narratives about human trafficking, the targets are citizens who make the decision to break the law in order to support a sick family member, or encourage undocumented immigrants to attend church. The critical storytelling about the provisions aimed at undocumented immigrants focuses on the citizens who will be harmed by the policy -- Hispanics -- and those who will not be -- white, Caucasian males. They also describe the space that SB 1070 will create as hostile and similar to the politically hateful atmosphere experienced by those living Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s. In their discussions of the organizing principle state and local government agencies or officials, critics emphasize the harm that will be caused to police officers who will face lawsuits from citizens no matter what action they take.

In contrast, supporters of the policy focus on the harms caused to citizens in the present and focalize the narratives through the eyes of the police officers. A transporter of undocumented immigrants, in the one narrative identified in the sample, is someone acting suspiciously who has already broken another law. The storytelling about undocumented immigrants and their targeting by the policy furthers this theme by emphasizing their criminality and their inability to fit into U.S. society. Undocumented are criminals who broke U.S. law and stand out, either by not speaking English or
appearing to be criminal. In these narratives, undocumented immigrants are a burden to local governments by causing crime and taking advantage of public services that they do not deserve. Finally, the discussion of the organizing principle state and local governments agencies or officials, reveals that supporters of the policy repeatedly draw connections between existing federal law and SB 1070. While the policy is designed to cause change, supporters describe it as mirroring federal law and merely offering police officers one more tool by allowing them to enforce federal immigration law. In these narratives, the federal government is depicted as a villain, which contrasts to its presentation in SB 1070 as a helper.

One of the most discernible differences between these storyworlds is visible in their portrayals of space. The scenarios of those who critique the bill are almost always rooted in the future once the policy takes place, whereas the scenarios evoked most frequently by supporters of the policy are rooted in the present and the problems that need addressing. The question of who is punished and who benefits from the policy is also substantively different. Supporters indicate that undocumented immigrants are targeted because citizens are currently being harmed and police officers are limited in their ability to fight this problem. Critics of the policy steep their opposition in the fact that police officers and Hispanic citizens will be targeted by the policy, not just undocumented immigrants. In the next chapter, I will examine the narratives about SB 1070 to investigate further who is harmed by the policy, what the harms caused are, when the impact of the policy will be felt, and what ethical implications this presents.
CHAPTER 8: THE DISCURSIVE IMPACT OF SB 1070

In the prior chapter, I described the two major storyworlds that emerge from the analysis of how the specific provisions of SB 1070 are cited in the narratives. This chapter explores in more depth the question of how SB 1070 works as a discourse to influence the identities of citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and public administrators, not only through those citations, but through the more generalized storytelling about the policy. I also examine how the People account for the harm caused to others, both intentionally and unintentionally, by SB 1070. The storytelling incorporated here is from a broader selection of narratives; some cite the part of the policy they support or object to, but others do not. This greater inclusiveness allows for the emergence of an additional storyworld that provides a perspective that was under-represented in the prior chapter: undocumented immigrants. This storyworld is generally less visible in the sample than the other two storyworlds, but it provides an important vantage point into the impact that the storytellers perceived SB 1070 would have on individuals and their identities.

If a policy such as SB 1070 mimics an account of oneself in style and content, then the narratives that cite the policy should indicate who is harmed, how those individuals are harmed, and who will assume responsibility for the infliction of that harm. I first explore how Stone’s (2012/1988) discussion of the most prevalent story lines in political narratives -- stories of change and stories of power -- helps reveal the important assumptions that storytellers make about the identities of those targeted and how individuals may be harmed by SB 1070. It is through this analysis that the third
storyworld becomes most visible. Next, I delve further into the question of how SB 1070 influences identity development by evaluating how the storytellers describe the performed identity of the enforcer of the policy -- the individual who inflicts harm on another. Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s (2003) work on the citizen-agent and state-agent narratives provides essential insight for this analysis. Finally, I turn back to the issue of how SB 1070 works as a discourse on citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and public administrators. I consider how the policy influences these identities and how the storytellers account for the harm caused to others by the People of Arizona.

A Story of Decline: Fostering a Climate of Fear

Stone’s (2012/1988) discussion of political narratives helps make sense of the underlying plots of the stories told about SB 1070 by its supporters and opponents. While many narratives repeat elements from SB 1070, the narratives included in this sample do not simply mimic the plots of the policy. Rather, the storytellers build arguments about what SB 1070 would or should do and make political statements about the value of the policy, which often rely on well-rehearsed structures typical to political discourse. In particular, Stone’s delineation of stories of change and stories of power structures this analysis. The negative version of the story of change -- the story of decline -- is critical for understanding the storytelling about SB 1070. A story of decline, according to Stone, follows the following plot: “In the beginning, things were pretty good. But they got worse. In fact, right now, they are nearly intolerable. Something must be done” (p. 160). Stories of decline also connect to stories of power, which either focus on the strength of a
group to control its destiny, or on its inherent weakness and inability to initiate social
change. As forms of public discourse, through these plot lines, the narratives cite norms
that shape identity performance and our public lives, which fills in some of the details left
out of the storyworlds depicted in the policy. Butler (2004) explains that these norms
influence socially constructed identities such as gender and sex, but even more basic
identities such as human:

These norms have far-reaching consequences for how we understand the model of
the human entitled to rights or included in the participatory sphere of political
deliberation. The human is understood differentially depending on its race, the
legibility of that race, its morphology, the recognizability of that morphology, its
sex, the perceptual verifiability of that sex, its ethnicity, the categorical
understanding of that ethnicity (p. 2).

This question of who counts as human is depicted in the narratives as the storytellers fill
in the blanks and describe who citizens and immigrants (documented and undocumented)
are. In this section, I discuss the presence of story lines of decline and power in the
narratives about SB 1070 to illuminate further the perspectives of the two main
storyworlds and how they characterize the targets of SB 1070. I also highlight the ways in
which the storytellers describe the model of the human and cite pre-existing norms that
influence their interpretations of the identities of citizen and immigrant (documented and
undocumented) in the aftermath of SB 1070’s passage.

**Supporting SB 1070 for all Humans**

Both supporters and opponents of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) relate stories of
decline and the sequence of events that precedes their explanation for why they support
or oppose SB 1070 is very similar. The storytellers generally accept the notion that the
situation in Arizona is declining due to the effects of unchecked undocumented
immigration and both agree that the federal government should have already taken action. The editors of the *Arizona Republic* describe these views, “Those who rail about damage to the state from illegal immigration and those who rage against a damaging new state law are really angry at the same thing: Congress shirked the duty to enact and enforce reasonable federal immigration laws” (“Seek consensus,” 2010). Indeed, this assertion is supported by the storytelling in other narratives. One supporter of SB 1070 explains, “I'am [sic] proud of Arizona, our Legislature, and our Gov. Jan Brewer, for having the courage to enact a law designed to help stem the flow of illegal drugs and horrendous crimes being perpetrated by criminals coming across our border” (Chatham, 2010). Similarly, the editors of the Tucson-based *Arizona Daily Star* establish their opposition to the policy in a framework of decline, “SB 1070 should be seen for what it is - a flawed attempt to do the federal government's job by addressing the symptoms of illegal immigration, not the true causes. It should be struck down” (“Law creates fear,” 2010).

Although the arguments of many supporters and opponents start in the same place, they diverge when it comes to the passage of SB 1070 and whether it represents a positive choice that leads to a greater ability to combat the problems caused by undocumented immigration. Supporters argue that SB 1070 will combat human trafficking, drug smuggling, and border violence, which are the primary symptoms of the lack of action by the federal government to control undocumented immigration. In a letter to the editor, one storyteller opens by stating “The people of Arizona owe Gov. Brewer a debt of gratitude for signing SB 1070” and then describes the current situation: “Mexican
drug cartel violence, drug smuggling, drug distribution, human trafficking and kidnapping have placed Phoenix in the number one spot for kidnapping in the world, next to Mexico City” (Highland, 2010). Thus, supporters of SB 1070 emphasize how this problem has worsened and blame undocumented immigrants (and those from Mexico in particular) for creating a situation that requires SB 1070. Stone (2012/1988) describes this as a blame-the-victim story, which is an offshoot of the story of control. According to this variant, undocumented immigrants have brought their punishment, by way of SB 1070, onto themselves by making the choice to enter the U.S. illegally. Moreover, some storytellers emphasize the differences between those here illegally now versus in the past as further justification for why SB 1070 is immediately necessary: “The current crop of illegals is very different from the ones I grew up with and do not want to work and earn the right to be a U.S. citizen” (Jerry V. Jack in Bennett, 2010). In a letter to the editor, Wullenweber (2010) explains why the U.S. should return to the 1964 immigration system with quotas,

All here illegally should go home and get in line with the rest. While they’re waiting for their numbers to come up, learn English, a good, marketable skill and how to assimilate American customs, morals and rules of law, not how to undermine or subvert them or allow others to do it for them.

So, according to this line of thinking, if undocumented immigrants made better choices about how to enter the United States and how to behave after their entry, they would merit better treatment. Individuals who want and deserve to become citizens speak English, work hard, and follow the necessary processes for becoming a citizen. They also support the social values of the U.S. rather than maintaining their foreignness through daily repetitious behaviors.
Supporters of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), then, insist that undocumented immigrants control their own fate and must be prepared for the ramifications of their decisions if they do not obey U.S. and Arizona laws. Yet the storytelling of supporters of the bill also recognize that since the first version of SB 1070 (2010a) allowed race, ethnicity, or national origin to be considered a factor for reasonable suspicion, a law enforcement officer might request proof of immigration status based on physical appearance alone. Some supporters of the policy even openly acknowledge that they think race should play a role in the officer’s decision-making. One storyteller describes Senator Pearce’s explanation of the bill he championed: “He said it recognizes that 90 percent of those who come to this country illegally are from Mexico or points south. ‘You can't just say it's not ever a factor,’ he said. ‘It may be’” (Fischer, 2010a). Other supporters reiterate the point that the target of the policy is an intersectional identity -- one that includes race or nationality as well as immigration status: “Face it, race has to come into the picture, because the ones entering this state are Mexicans! Hello?” (Walker, 2010). According to the storytellers who support the policy, undocumented immigrants who deserve punishment not only act foreign, but they look Hispanic and most likely are from Mexico.

After the legislature revised SB 1070 (2010a), Senator Pearce altered his focus from appearance back to specific behaviors and several narratives repeat his assertion, “Illegal is not a race, it's a crime” (Pearce in Hernandez, 2010). Despite this switch, some supporters of SB 1070 continued to repeat his original language about physical appearance. In a letter to the editor of The Explorer, a Tucson-based paper, one storyteller
notes, “If 99 percent of the illegal aliens in the state are Hispanic, who is Arizona supposed to pull over… the three Norwegians living here?” (Schwartz, 2010). As discussed in Chapter 7, the alteration to the language of the policy did not substantively reduce fears of racial profiling or change how opponents positioned their objections to the law. Scholars (Campbell, 2011; Erwin, 2012; Jiménez, 2012; Levers & Hyatt-Burkhart, 2011; Nill, 2011; Quiroga, 2013; Santos et al., 2013; Selden et al., 2011; Williams, 2011) and storytellers alike agree that Hispanics would be the most likely population to be targeted. Yet Senator Pearce’s redirection of his description of the target population as one that could be identified by criminal behavior did eventually have an impact on the storytelling of supporters of the policy. Many of the narratives published after the revision to SB 1070 focus on the criminality of undocumented immigrants and how they pose a threat to the safety and financial security of citizens. John Fernandez, a resident of Yuma, explains, “If you come across the border illegally, you are breaking the law, and you are a criminal . . . All these illegals that are here chose to do it the wrong way” (McDaniel, 2010).

More than just disapproving of the criminal actions taken by undocumented immigrants, some storytellers insist that allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the country threatens their rights and fosters discrimination against citizens.

I have to follow the law, you have to follow the law. I have to pay taxes, you have to pay taxes. I am no one special, you are no one special . . . I am discriminated against because I am not illegal. I cannot break laws and I don’t think that’s fair or right. (Hernandez in Kelly, 2010)

In a letter to the editor, another storyteller depicts undocumented immigrants as receiving benefits such as not having to pay for resources or face the consequences of their crimes:
“It's high time we get a handle on illegal aliens (aliens, not immigrants, because they're not) coming into our state, using our resources, committing every crime imaginable and not having to be responsible for their actions” (Walker, 2010). U.S. Senator John McCain positions his support of SB 1070 as one of advocating for the rights of citizens, specifically those living near the border who experience the brunt of the problems associated with undocumented immigration: “The people of southern Arizona have had their human rights violated . . . Their rights are being violated -- their rights as American citizens to live in a safe and secure environment” (Lemons, 2010c). Interestingly, Senator McCain employs the phrase human rights, clearly identifying Arizona’s citizens as human. Not only is the right to security of citizens threatened, but so are their rights as human beings.

Other storytellers take this logic a step further and address the question of whether undocumented immigrants are entitled to be treated as human beings. One narrative describes protestors carrying signs with supportive messages about SB 1070, including “Be human in your country. You're an illegal immigrant in my country” ("Civil disobedience ", 2010). Signs like this one make a clear statement that an undocumented immigrant should be treated as less than human, but also clarifies that full recognition as a human is one of the benefits of citizenship. Supporters of SB 1070 repeatedly explain that only those who have committed the crime of crossing the border illegally have anything to fear from the policy. Again, the blame-the-victim storyline comes through clearly:

You know if you don’t run a red light you don’t have to worry about those cameras at those intersections. If you don’t speed you don’t have to worry about a
policeman giving you a ticket for speeding. And if you don’t try to get into the
country illegally you don’t have to worry about being arrested by a policeman. If
you have proper ID, you’re fine. ("On your mind," 2010, "April 30")

One supporter of the policy even labels the proper documentation that an individual
needs to prove citizenship or immigration status human registration: “if you are in
Arizona after crossing the border without paperwork, i.e. no passport, no birth certificate,
no ‘human registration’, then it is fair that you get a “ticket,” pay a fine and return to your
country” (Butters, 2010).

Supporters contend that SB 1070 will fix the problems associated with poor
border security and allow citizens to accomplish the sorely needed social change that will
improve their daily lives. Throughout their narratives, they adopt a blame-the-victim plot
line, which suggests that the target of SB 1070 -- undocumented immigrants -- deserve to
be identified and punished. Several important insights also emerge relating to their
assessment of who undocumented immigrants are. According to supporters,
undocumented immigrants are generally Mexican and appear Hispanic, but they also act
foreign and do not exhibit the values or behaviors that American citizens, or those who
want to become American citizens, perform repetitiously. They are also criminals because
they have crossed the border without proper documentation and may even commit
additional crimes once in Arizona. Due to this criminal activity, their identity
performance does not reflect that of a citizen, and because they can be defined as not
belonging to the People of Arizona, their presence poses a serious threat to the safety and
to the rights of citizens. Supporters of SB 1070 reaffirm the exclusionary action taken by
the legislature and the punishments it imposes.

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Opponents: Citizens as Targets

Like supporters of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b), many opponents of the policy believe that undocumented immigration is a problem, but they do not support SB 1070 as the proper solution. Opponents believe that the passage of SB 1070 will lead to a greater sense of control and successful political action, but not due to the implementation of the policy. Rather, narratives of those who oppose the policy often cite the effectiveness of the collective action that citizens can take by engaging in a boycott, holding demonstrations, or voting against those who supported the bill. These kinds of political or economic action, according to the narratives, will lead to control rather than helplessness in the face of SB 1070’s passage. One storyteller notes the probability of continued public discord and its eventual outcome, “People are angry, and they should be. Pearce's bill was passed with the help of a pack of prevarications, half-truths, and twisted stats. Now racial profiling has become law in Arizona. Civil unrest may be a natural, and unfortunate, result” (Lemons, 2010a). Indeed, in the weeks that followed the passage of SB 1070, public protests occurred throughout Arizona. An editorial in *The Arizona Republic* encourages those opposing the law to stay focused and get active in the political arena:

> Arizona's primal scream about illegal immigration got the nation's attention. Now, Arizonans need to make sure the awful mistake does not define our state. So, don't be quiet now. Those who disagree with the immigration bill that Gov. Jan Brewer signed into law Friday need to let their feelings motivate them to stay engaged in the political process. ("Don't like this," 2010)

Several narratives include quotations from U.S. Representative Raul Grijalva who called for an economic boycott of Arizona: “‘I am asking national organizations across this country,’ he told the crowd, ‘civic, religious, of color, unions, women's organizations, not
to have their conferences and conventions in this state, until we rectify this law’” (Raul Grijalva in Lemons, 2010b). As tourism and conferences were an important part of the state’s revenue, calls for this kind of action eventually proved very unpopular. Other organizations such as the Border Action Network, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund advocated legal action: “MALDEF and others will be pursuing all legal avenues to challenge this law. We have every expectation, based upon judicial precedent and unquestioned constitutional values, that SB 1070 will be enjoined before it can ever take effect” (Thomas A. Saenz in "Reactions," 2010). Citizens, then, can take many different kind of actions to counter the problem that SB 1070 is for Arizona.

In contrast, another storyworld emerges from the narratives. While it is considerably more muted in the sample, it is visible and it is pessimistic. Several narratives relate the impact of SB 1070 on immigrant families and communities that include undocumented immigrants. In these narratives, fear limits the choices of mixed status families to one: leave Arizona. The storyline in these opponents of the policy is not one of control, but one of helplessness. One narrative recounts the experience of two Hispanic sixth-graders -- Noemi and Francisco -- who would not be returning to their schools in the fall because their parents either planned to move to another state or return to Mexico. Noemi and Francisco are citizens, both born in Arizona, and their parents are undocumented immigrants. Francisco’s mother explains their decision to return to Mexico in June, “We came together as a family and talked. And my sons told me they would not want to see me arrested” (Faherty, 2010). Another narrative presents the stark
impact that SB 1070 had on an Hispanic community of parents, who once regularly walked their children to school together. The group “began to dwindle in January after the migration bill was introduced. By spring, no one was showing up. . . . Those parents were too fearful to walk the streets, parents and school officials say. Some were busy packing for a move” (Kossan, 2010). The presence of fear and its immediate influence on the identity performances of families reflects what scholars reported in their community-based research during and after the period represented in this sample (Levers & Hyatt-Burkhart, 2011; Quiroga, 2013; Santos et al., 2013; Valdez, Lewis Valentine, & Padilla, 2013).

One narrative suggests that the effect of this fear was somewhat uneven, depending on the specific circumstances of an undocumented immigrant’s life. One storyteller interviewed several repeated border crossers who were awaiting deportation while staying at a shelter in San Luis Rio Colorado, Arizona and concludes, “SB 1070 . . . may not stop the flow of illegal immigration, as illegal immigrants say they will try to find some other way to cross” (Neyoy, 2010e). One undocumented immigrant there offers a more direct assessment, “You know when I’m going to stop trying to cross? When I die. I’m going to try to cross again tomorrow or the day after” (Juan Cervantes in Neyoy, 2010e). As the storytelling demonstrates, some undocumented immigrants, generally those whose families accompanied them to the United States, found the palpable fear paralyzing. In contrast, those who were crossing to send money to their families who were still at home were determined to push beyond this fear, even at a horrible price. Still, the border crossers who indicate their determination to continue entering Arizona
never argue that they can control or change how the People of Arizona treat them. In both scenarios, the underlying plot is one of helplessness and frustration.

The difference in these storyworlds is especially visible in the few narratives where storytellers who are citizens or documented immigrants challenge the notion that undocumented immigrants deserve to be punished. Those opponents who speak on behalf of undocumented immigrants express a desire to regain control of the political process and take action. One narrative recounts the efforts of the ten members of the Cuauhtemoc Human Rights Group who blocked the port of entry at San Luis, Arizona for two hours one Saturday in protest of SB 1070. Esteban Sanchez, the group’s leader, states, “We want reform that dignifies Mexicans” (Neyoy, 2010c). In another narrative, Maria Eugenia Carrasco, a naturalized citizen originally from Mexico, describes the fear that SB 1070 provoked among legal residents and citizens, but also the active response of members of the immigrant community: “I believe people are being pushed into participating with community organizations” (Portillo Jr., 2010b). Others attended vigils to protest how the law would treat their undocumented relatives: “Mesa resident Susan Islas said she has undocumented relatives she fears will be hurt by the law. ‘We just have to have faith that everything is going to pass by,’ she said. ‘We're holding vigils every day’” ("U.S. Immigration rallies," 2010). Again, citizens and legal immigrants demonstrate optimism and a conviction that they can act in ways to control their fate, which contrasts sharply with the helplessness and fear visible in the storyworld of undocumented immigrants.
The passage of SB 1070 presents an opportunity for political action for those who oppose the legislation, and their opposition emerges from the contention that SB 1070 conflates Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants with undocumented immigrants. As discussed in Chapter 7, many opponents fear racial profiling and that certain citizens and documented immigrants will be treated differently based on their physical appearance or national origin. The reduction of all Hispanics to (possibly) undocumented immigrants unsettles not only the identities of Hispanic citizen and Hispanic documented immigrant, but also their ability to be recognized as human. Supporters of SB 1070 raised several questions about the right of undocumented immigrants to be treated as human, and the question of humanity and human rights also permeates the narratives that oppose SB 1070. In particular, several challenge the notion that undocumented immigrants are not human. One narrative describes several students who ditched classes to attend a protest of SB 1070 and who carried signs such as: “Stop SB 1070, we are human” (Neyoy, 2010a). In a letter to the editor, one storyteller rejects the argument that, as criminals, undocumented immigrants deserve lesser treatment, “Please remember that we are talking about human beings seeking honest work, not criminals” (Whitson, 2010). Others emphasize that the question of human rights should not be bound up with racial identities, citizenship or immigration status. Jennifer Allen of the Border Action Network asserts that, “Regardless of our legal status, regardless of the language we speak and regardless of the color of our skin, we all have fundamental human rights that this law works to undermine” (Shacat, 2010).
Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants also express fear that they will be dehumanized due to their misidentification as undocumented immigrants. One storyteller concludes, “SB 1070 increases fear, humiliates Mexican-Americans on account of the way they look and the language they speak, and is a direct affront to human dignity” (Ocheltree, 2010). An editorial from *The Arizona Republic* describes in more detail the problem:

Most Latinos in Arizona have nothing to hide from police officers who will be newly empowered to ask for proof of immigration status. There is something else going on here. There is a resentment that comes from knowing that people who look like you have been denigrated and systematically dehumanized as the problem of illegal immigration became more about scoring political points than finding solutions. ("State must find," 2010)

This concern translates directly into a fear of what the dehumanization of undocumented immigrants will mean for citizens and documented residents who also look Hispanic. In one narrative, a mother expresses concern for her child whose father is Hispanic: “I'm afraid he’s [her son] going to be targeted . . . We’re all human. We all bleed the same color. We’re here to have the same rights as Whites” ("U.S. Immigration rallies," 2010).

The presence of these two contrasting plots in the storyworlds of the narratives -- control and helplessness -- provides a valuable vantage point into an important division among opponents of SB 1070. The bulk of the storytellers who oppose the policy express concern over the fact that Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants will be misidentified under the law and subject to racial profiling, but very rarely do they contest the notion that the main target of the policy -- undocumented immigrants -- should be
found and punished. In contrast, those who are undocumented immigrants or who live in communities or families that include undocumented immigrants express fear and a sense of helplessness with no way to counteract the law. While both of these storyworlds include a strong sense of fear, one storyworld focuses on the fear of misidentification under the law while the other focuses on the inevitable punishments. Most opponents of SB 1070 do not describe undocumented immigrants, but the fact that so many assume that racial profiling and misidentification will be a problem demonstrates that they also believe that undocumented immigrants look Hispanic and may offer few other physical cues that would differentiate them from citizens or legal residents in their identity performances.

Unlike the supporters of the policy who dwell on the misery of the present and the happiness that will come with the implementation of the policy or opponents who reject the policy for the harm that it causes and who suggest that control over their environment can be found through political or economic action, the storyworld of the undocumented immigrants conveys a sense of hopelessness because few choices remain and harm has already been inflicted. In all cases, fear plays an enormous role in the storytelling. Supporters of the policy insist that SB 1070 will relieve their current anxieties once it is implemented, which makes their story of decline connect to a heartening story of change. Opponents, on the other hand, relate stories situated in the present that highlight the fear provoked by the mere passage of SB 1070 and connect the story of decline to a story of helplessness for undocumented immigrants or to a story of rising for citizens and legal immigrants. Through their employment of these political story lines, supporters and
opponents of the policy reveal much about how SB 1070 has influenced their lives and their identity. Supporters contend that SB 1070 will redress the harms caused to them by the presence of undocumented immigrants who are criminals and act foreign. Moreover, the law appropriately targets Hispanics because most undocumented immigrants are Hispanic and likely Mexican. Opponents on the other hand contest the notion that all Hispanics should be considered undocumented immigrants. Through their narratives, Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants express a sense that their political identities have been unsettled since the passage of SB 1070 and that their identification as human has also been called into question. While some opponents argue that not even undocumented immigrants should be treated in such a manner, others quietly leave that point uncontested. In the following section, I turn to what the narratives reveal about the public administrator who enforces the policy and the implicit assumptions about this identity.

Regulators of Identity: Law Enforcement

The narratives analyzed in this project provide valuable insights into how SB 1070 works to regulate the identities of citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented) and public administrators. Maynard-Moody and Musheno argue that in the stories they collected, public administrators assign identities to citizens in their daily work and that their decision-making process is guided more by moral judgments rather than rules or procedures. My narratological analysis of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) in Chapter 6 confirms that the policy repeatedly establishes rules to guide the behavior of law enforcement officers and other government officials for determining the identity of
those individuals they come across in specific circumstances. The narratives examined here reveal a clear division of opinion about how people expect police officers to carry out this work, even among law enforcement officers and their agencies. Supporters of SB 1070 argue that police officers will follow the rules and only question people about their identity when permitted. However, opponents question the specificity of these rules and whether the rules permit racial profiling, which are concerns that scholars also have shared (Campbell, 2011; Erwin, 2012; Jiménez, 2012; Selden et al., 2011).

Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) report irresolvable tensions between the state-agent narrative and the citizen-agent narrative in the storytelling of public administrators. Adherents of the state-agent narrative expect public administrators to follow the rule of the law and strictly enforce the rules of their agencies. In contrast, in the citizen-agent narrative, workers regularly make decisions based on their personal value systems, which may conflict with the policies of their government or their agency. These two narratives are also visible in the storytelling about SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). Supporters of the policy argue that the rules established in SB 1070 are clear and that law enforcement officers will not use racial profiling. Opponents of the policy incorporate both narratives. While some criticize the policy for making racial profiling legal, others argue that the law allows sufficient discretion that racial profiling will happen because officers cannot avoid stereotyping the individuals they encounter based on physical characteristics. Although the language of the revised version of Section 2 of SB 1070 (2010b) indicates that race cannot be considered a factor for requesting proof of status, many of the narratives debate this question of whether or not law enforcement officers
will follow the rules laid out in this provision, or whether they will make use of their discretion to take action based on normative assumptions about who undocumented immigrants are. In their narratives, storytellers cite the discourse SB 1070 (2010b), and fill in the normative blanks of the text to explain what they policy means and whose identities it regulates.

Supporters of SB 1070 indicate clearly in their storytelling that racial profiling is illegal and that police officers will follow the rule of law when implementing the policy. In one narrative, Governor Brewer states, “I will not tolerate racial discrimination or racial profiling in Arizona” (Bunk, 2010). In a later narrative, she expands on this viewpoint urging readers, “‘We have to trust our law enforcement,’ Brewer said. ‘Police officers are going to be respectful,’ the governor continued. ‘They know what their jobs are, they've taken an oath. And racial profiling is illegal’” (Fischer, 2010a). Some representatives of law enforcement agencies direct attention to the fact that they already have similar procedures in place. For example, Major Leon Wilmot of the Yuma County Sheriff's Office explains, “SB 1070 merely formalizes the department's long-lasting coordination with the Border Patrol and other agencies that enforce immigration laws” (Neyoy, 2010b). Deputy Yuma Police Chief John Lekan reiterates this perspective noting, “When you read the law, and you see what we've been doing, it's almost a mirror image” (Neyoy, 2010b). According to this viewpoint, then, SB 1070 cites an existing informal discourse, transforms it into a formal legal discourse, and then applies it to all state and local law enforcement agencies, some of whom already practice these procedures. For its supporters, SB 1070 did not materialize out of thin air and does
nothing to disrupt pre-existing legislation that makes racial profiling illegal. The fact that some agencies have already practiced SB 1070’s rules and regulations serves as proof that the law can be implemented in a legal manner.

In response to critics who charge that SB 1070 mandates racial profiling, supporters of the policy contend that police officers are being mischaracterized. Instead of falsely constructing the enforcers of the policy in a negative light, supporters recommend that critics look at the criminal behavior of the intended target. As one storyteller explains,

> What opponents are really saying is that they cannot trust our law-enforcement personnel to act "lawfully," and avoid profiling. They are saying Latinos' civil rights are violated if they are detained for having committed a civil or criminal offense and aren't able to produce a valid driver's license or some other form of citizenship. (Weaver, 2010)

This presentation of police officers is fully in line with the state-agent narrative. Police officers employ their authority to carry out the laws of the state exactly as they have been written. Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu describes his frustration with those who question the state-agent narrative: “Some of these people refer to law enforcement being jack-booted thugs. This is outrageous. We're the police who are charged as protectors to safeguard our families and our communities. We take that oath very seriously” ("Sb 1070 is misunderstood," 2010).

Yet proponents of the law do acknowledge that some officers may misuse their authority to act in manners that do not fit with their oath office, but as one storyteller notes, striking down a law because of a few misbehaving officers is not the solution: “The opposition’s argument implies that the majority of police officers are crooked. The
position that we should eliminate 1070 because a handful of officers could abuse the law and racially profile is ignorant and irresponsible” (Weinstein, 2010). Supporters of the policy repeatedly resist efforts to redirect the conversation to one about police officers misusing their authority. One supporter insists that the discussion must stay focused on the harm caused by undocumented immigration and not on the reality that some police officers may abuse their power, which she perceives as a separate public problem: “Yes, there are bad cops. They can pull the same illegals over right now and harass them and even check on their documentation by calling Immigration and Customs Enforcement. But this discussion isn't about bad cops; it's about SB 1070, a law” (Fleishans, 2010).

Opponents of the law offer several critiques of SB 1070. First, they argue that the law is poorly written and although race is precluded as a factor for reasonable suspicion, the new rules are clearly designed to regulate a specific class of individuals: Hispanics, whether citizens, legal residents, or undocumented immigrants. In particular, the first version of SB 1070 provoked ire. The President of the American Civil Liberties Union in Arizona describes the first version of SB 1070: “She [Governor Brewer] has just given every police agency in Arizona a mandate to harass anyone who looks or sounds foreign, while doing nothing to address the real problems we’re facing” (Alessandra Soler Meetze in Bunk, 2010). Immediately after the Governor signed the first version of the bill into law, Coconino County Sheriff Bill Pribil states, “I believe that it's bad legislation ... I have a concern about putting my officers in a position to have them profile people based on the color of their skin and the language they speak” ("Locals sound off ", 2010). Even as the legislature worked to revise the policy, two police officers, one from Phoenix and
another from Tucson, objected so strongly to the legislation that they filed lawsuits against it. Martin Escobar, a Tucson police officer, “said there’s no racially neutral criteria that can be used by police to determine someone’s immigration status” (Fischer, 2010b). David Salgado, a police officer from Phoenix, “says that to enforce the law, he would violate the rights of Hispanics and be forced to expend his own time and resources to familiarize himself with the law's requirements” (Madrid, 2010). Even after the revisions to SB 1070, both officers continued with their lawsuits and shared with the public their interpretations of how the policy would affect their work. Another storyteller emphasizes the importance of authority and following the rule of law in accordance with the state-agent narrative, but also explains why race could become a factor if an officer is allowed too much discretion:

    no single law enforcement official should be left to his or her own discretion when it comes to determining what is “reasonable suspicion.” Because the majority of undocumented immigrants in Arizona are Hispanic, it is practical to fear that certain law enforcement officials will abuse and misuse the law unjustly to target those of a certain ethnicity or even skin tone. (Scott, 2010)

    Indeed, many opponents express fear that the citizen-agent narrative will prevail simply because the policy’s text is imprecisely worded. One storyteller explains that no matter what supporters of the bill state about the law only targeting undocumented immigrants, ‘wording in the law, such as ‘reasonable suspicion,’ is so vague that seemingly countless scenarios can lead police to question legal status and demand papers” (Hernandez, 2010). Another storyteller rejects the assertion of supporters of the policy that police officers are trustworthy and will only apply SB 1070 when another law has been broken:
It's very easy for the police to find a reason to stop a car, and any stop police make gives them the opportunity to have the driver and passengers “show me your papers.” Good cops will not abuse this, but there are some who will. (Baker, 2010)

Other critics point to the fact that since undocumented immigrants are primarily Hispanic in origin, there is no way to avoid racial profiling. Per these storytellers, even good police officers, no matter how much training they have had, will succumb to racial profiling because it is impossible to act otherwise under SB 1070:

despite honest efforts of well-trained, well-intentioned law enforcement personnel to enforce the law in a compassionate way. People with Spanish accents, Hispanic surnames, and Latino physical features will certainly suffer from “reasonable suspicion” that they are a) from somewhere in Latin America, and b) here in the U.S. without permission. (Knost, 2010b)

Even though the revised version of the policy indicates that race cannot be used as a determinative factor, opponents expect that racial profiling will become normal under the policy regardless of what the text says. Police officers are able to employ their own discretion, as the citizens-agent narrative describes, and they will consider race a factor when asking individuals for proof of status. As one skeptic explains,

We tell police, “No matter what, don't think about race, color or national origin” - ensuring, through the power of suggestion, that this is exactly what they'll think about. In the real world of policing, it's impossible for law enforcement officers to make judgments about one's legal status while being colorblind. To believe otherwise is naive. (Navarrette, 2010)

Both supporters and opponents of the policy, then, would prefer a version of reality that is lines up with the state-agent narrative. While supporters expect this to be the case and even argue that SB 1070 will not have an impact on the behavior of police officers, opponents disagree. Their major complaint about SB 1070 is that it insufficiently regulates the behavior of police officers by allowing them too much discretion. Moreover,
opponents of the policy believe that even the best-trained and well-intentioned police officer will rely on racial traits when deciding whether or not to ask someone for proof of status. Both sides agree that the appearance and behavior of the individuals targeted by police officers play a pivotal role in this interaction, but they disagree about who and what those behaviors are. Supporters of the policy insist that SB 1070 targets only those who have violated a law or ordinance, while opponents argue that Hispanics as a whole will be targeted. The storytellers, then, have filled in a number of the normative blanks from the storyworlds of the policy. In the following section, I explore how SB 1070 works as discourse to influence and unsettle identity performances.

**SB 1070: Unsettling Identities and Accounting for Harm**

As a policy passed and signed into law by the state of Arizona’s government, SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) provides the necessary discourse that its enforcers need to channel the juridical power of the state to issue performatives that transform the identities of alleged undocumented immigrants into criminals. SB 1070 also instructs its enforcers to request proof of status, which is an abbreviated form of an account oneself in which an individual explains who he or she is and accepts or rejects responsibility for causing harm to Arizonans by entering the country improperly. Butler (2005) describes any interaction where one individual demands an account from another as violent (p. 64). Supporters of SB 1070 downplay the threat of misidentification and the violence of such encounters, but the fear and anxiety of opponents is palpable in their storytelling. SB 1070’s connection to the performative and an account of oneself is not solely limited to the actions of it authorizes for its enforcers. Throughout the narratives, opponents of the
policy explain how the world feels different to them since SB 1070 was passed. In this section, I first examine how SB 1070 as a written discourse works to unsettle identity performances even before its enforcers can legally issue performatives. Next, I build on the argument I laid out in Chapter 4. If SB 1070 resembles an account of oneself that is delivered on behalf of a fabricated subject -- the People of Arizona, to what extent do the arguments of supporters and opponents of SB 1070 claim or reject ethical responsibility for the harms caused by the policy to its intended and unintended targets -- undocumented immigrants and Hispanic citizens and legal residents?

**SB 1070 and the Scene of Constraint**

Butler (1993) describes a performative as a verbal statement issued by an individual with juridical power that transforms an individual and that transformation is binding (pp. 225-226). In the case of SB 1070, a judge would cite the policy when issuing a performative that changes an individual from an alleged undocumented immigrant into a criminal and eventual deportee. However, the narratives in this sample suggest that the targets of SB 1070, both intended and unintended, felt their identities become unsettled at the moment of the policy’s signing into law. Here I evaluate the narratives for examples of how the citation of a new discourse might influence these identity performances.

According to Butler’s theory of performativity (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005), identity is always performed for another person, whether another person is physically present or not. After the passage of SB 1070, several storytellers relate sequences of events that illustrate how other people experienced their identities differently. One storyteller recounts how he went out to dinner with his wife on April 23rd, the day the
first version of the bill was signed into law. He challenges supporters of the law who argue that SB 1070 only harms undocumented immigrants:

Senate Bill 1070 won't impact law-abiding citizens? My wife and I went out to dinner Friday night, ironically, at a Mexican restaurant. Linda, who is a Mexican-American from a family that has been in Arizona 100 years longer than most Arizonans, felt like everyone in the restaurant was looking at her, wondering if she was an illegal. She felt bad about her ethnicity, that somehow people saw her as inferior. (Humbert, 2010)

In this narrative, Linda reports to the storyteller that her identity felt different. Linda had not changed, but the “scene of constraint” (Butler, 2004, p. 1) had. The pre-existing norms of racial and ethnic intolerance influenced interpretations of SB 1070 and created an environment inhospitable to undocumented immigrants and those who might be misidentified as them. Whether those in the restaurant had a different opinion of Linda is irrelevant. Linda felt fear that she might be categorized by others as a target of SB 1070, an undocumented immigrant, based on her physical appearance. Linda’s husband concludes that this is unacceptable for a citizen, “No American should have to feel like an outsider in her own country” (Humbert, 2010).

Butler (1993) emphasizes that an identity has not changed unless there is also an impact on one’s everyday, repetitive actions. Evidence of the impact of SB 1070 on the routinized patterns of everyday life is also visible in the narratives. One storyteller asserts that her fear of SB 1070 led her to make changes even before the legislature had finished debating and modifying the bill: “Long before the bill was law, I prepared for the worst. I have my attorney on speed-dial on my cellphone, and I'm carrying my Social Security card with me at all times” (Torres Marquez, 2010). One of the police officers who filed a lawsuit against SB 1070 discusses the impact on the Hispanic communities that is already
visible to him. Before SB 1070, Hispanic residents related to him differently than they
did after its passage.

“They fear we're going to take action on their status,” Salgado said. “It's a large
concern as an officer because you built a trust that went down the drain.”
Salgado has already seen a change.
“I was driving around (in the patrol car) the Sunday after she signed it, and
nobody would wave to me,” Salgado said. “They used to wave.” (Madrid, 2010)

This reluctance to wave echoes the fear from the example discussed earlier of the group
of Hispanic parents who used to walk their children to school together, but stopped doing
so after the bill started moving through the state legislature (Kossan, 2010). Even after
the law was modified on April 30th, people’s behavior and expectations of what the law
would mean reflected the same fear and sense of marginalization. Maribel Castro, the
Director of Refugio de Colores which is a shelter for victims of domestic violence,
discusses how undocumented immigrants who are victims of domestic violence have
called her shelter and expressed concern that if they report their abusers, the police
officers will ask for the victims’ identification and deport everyone. Castro explains that
few understand that the law has not gone into effect yet and have opted to stay with
abusers because they are afraid to call the police.

they don’t know that the law is not even implemented yet and they believe that if
they report the abuse, they could be deported, this could be a problem because the
women who are afraid of contacting the police report their case will stay in the
abusive situation, perpetuating it (translated from Bernal, 2010)

In this case, undocumented immigrants, the intended targets of the law, believed that their
access to police protection had already been abrogated even though the law was not yet
being enforced.
So, how do the evolutions described by the storytellers occur? No judges have issued repeated rulings transforming undocumented immigrants into criminals and deportees. Police officers have not started misidentifying Hispanic citizens or documented immigrants as undocumented immigrants and demanding that they deliver accounts of themselves. SB 1070 cited pre-existing social norms, but without government agents interpreting and applying the policy, individuals should not have felt as if their performances of Hispanic citizen or undocumented immigrant had shifted in any way. Several narratives provide insight into how SB 1070 could more immediately influence identity performances. First, Director Castro of the Refugio de Colores indicates, most people do not understand how the legislative process works (Bernal, 2010). Thus, for some people, there is no distinction between a policy being passed and a policy being implemented. Second, the storytelling by people to one another (e.g., in conversations, in news stories and editorials, in letters to the editor) performs some of the work without the involvement of government agents. Through their repeated interactions with one another (whether through spoken or written words), individual interpretations of the policy changed the scene of constraint, and, for some people, how it felt to perform their identity (even if no other person were present).

Additional examples from the narratives provide further evidence of the change in people’s interactions with one another in the aftermath of SB 1070’s passage. One storyteller reports that anyone entering the local coffee shop, which had a primarily Hispanic clientele, was asked to provide proof of documentation as a joke about how they expected to be treated under SB 1070: “Was having coffee in Rio Rico (which is about 10
miles north of the border) Saturday and every new arrival was asked to ‘Show me your papers!’” (Holub, 2010). In this case, playacting reflects how Hispanic citizens believed they would be treated under the new law. Through the repetitious greeting of “Show me your papers!,” those expecting to be misidentified under the law indicate that they believe they will receive numerous indiscriminate demands for an account of oneself. Another storyteller, a white male citizen, recounts his conversations with his Hispanic girlfriend: “I tell my girlfriend, who is a naturalized citizen, to carry her passport to avoid harassment based on her ‘looking Mexican’” (Ocheltree, 2010). Although his recommendation that she carry proof of status with her is relayed out of concern for her well-being, it reifies the notion that Hispanic individuals, no matter their citizenship status, should anticipate being treated differently under SB 1070. Another narratives emphasizes the role of media attention in accomplishing the sense of transformation:

The constant drumbeat from the mainstream media ever since Governor Brewer signed SB1070 on Friday is that Arizona is going to become a place where people of Hispanic origin are going to hear a regular German-accented refrain of “Show us your papers.” The media seems to indicate that that is going to be a change in some way. (Dailey, 2010)

Thus, even without government agents issuing performatives or demanding that an account of oneself be delivered, the discursive production of the identity of citizen evolved. Through their interactions with one another and the storytelling in the media, the public interpreted and reinterpreted what SB 1070 might mean for the identities of citizen and immigrant (documented and undocumented). These successive repetitions, as reported in the narratives, caused at least some Hispanic citizens, legal residents and
undocumented immigrants to feel unsettled, as if the scene of constraint in which they had been performing their identity had suddenly changed.

**Accounting for Harm**

My discussion of Catlaw’s (2007) work in Chapter 5 revealed that whenever the People of Arizona is invoked, someone is always excluded. As the analysis of the narratives in this chapter has revealed so far, supporters and opponents of SB 1070 both acknowledge that undocumented immigrants should be kept-out and are the intended excluded group. However, opponents of the policy also suggest that more than just undocumented immigrants are harmed and excluded. Hispanic citizens and legal residents report feeling fearful in the new climate established by the policy and the public storytelling. Even without government agents taking action, some individuals felt a shift in how the pre-existing norms that influenced the identities of citizen and immigrant (documented and undocumented) were cited and even altered their daily behavior as a result. Here, I examine whether individuals accept or reject the harm caused by SB 1070 and what this means for public administrators, those who enforce the law and cause much of the direct harm to its targets.

Supporters of SB 1070 generally agree that its purpose is to identify and punish those who have entered the country illegally. Yet there is some disagreement about the question of the unintentional harm that many supporters and opponents of SB 1070 suggest will be caused to Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants This storyteller explains the purpose of the law and why critics who make analogies between SB 1070 and the Holocaust are off-base:
Arizona's new law does not attempt to persecute nor annihilate Mexicans. It merely tries to identify people who are in this state illegally.

There is nothing wrong with that. While this may appear racist to some or result in some undesirable profiling, the benefits far outweigh the risk of doing nothing. Our economy and the safety of our citizens are at risk. (Wolitzky, 2010)

This narrative emphasizes several of the common themes recurrent in the narratives of supporters. The storyteller connects SB 1070 to a story of decline in which the presence of undocumented immigrants threatens the physical and financial security of citizens. For this reason, undocumented immigrants deserve the harm that they receive. Moreover, any accidental harm caused to citizens because they share the stereotypical physical appearance of undocumented immigrants (Mexican) is worth it. This storyteller evokes a storyworld that justifies the intentional and unintentional harm caused by the policy and accepts full ethical responsibility.

Other supporters of the policy are more selective in what kind of harm they accept ethical responsibility for causing. Governor Brewer, for example, accepts full responsibility for any harm caused to undocumented immigrants, but rejects the notion that either version of SB 1070 will cause harm to Hispanic citizens or documented immigrants. After signing the first version into law, one storyteller recounts how Governor Brewer disavows the idea that SB 1070 will lead to racial profiling and the misidentification of citizens and legal residents as undocumented immigrants:

But she conceded that it does permit either to be used as one factor for an officer's consideration. And she defended the language. “We have to trust our law enforcement,” Brewer said. “Police officers are going to be respectful,” the governor continued. “They know what their jobs are, they've taken an oath. And racial profiling is illegal.” (Fischer, 2010a)
In a statement made in a later narrative about the revised bill, Governor Brewer states that the revisions will “make it crystal clear and undeniable that racial profiling is illegal” (Newton & Rough, 2010). Both her statements shift the responsibility for any harm caused to citizens and legal residents to law enforcement officers. Since racial profiling is illegal and since she is providing training programs to instruct officers on how to implement the law without resorting to racial profiling, any officer who profiles someone by their race is committing a crime and is the one responsible for any harm caused, not the Governor or any other politician who participated in the passage of the legislation on behalf of the People. The People are not responsible, but public administrators are. This act of delegating the ethical responsibility to the police officers means that the political leaders can argue that they are not responsible for the any harm caused to citizens, and it also means they can assert that opponents of SB 1070 who suggest that racial profiling will happen are insulting the integrity of police officers. As one supporter of SB 1070 explains, “The opposition’s argument implies that the majority of police officers are crooked” (Weinstein, 2010).

The most visible objection to the law, as noted in Chapter 7 and throughout this chapter is that SB 1070 will cause harm to Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants. While opponents of the law in these narratives for the most part accept ethical responsibility for the harm caused to undocumented immigrants, most flatly reject the idea that racial profiling and misidentifying citizens and documented immigrants is acceptable. An editorial in The Arizona Republic summarizes this perspective: “Of all the damage made possible by Gov. Jan Brewer's signature on Friday to Senate Bill 1070 . . .

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The worst effect is its grave potential for causing harm to innocent, taxpaying American citizens who no longer can feel certain of the law's blindness” ("Arizona politics," 2010). This paper’s editorial staff were not the only ones to rail against Governor Brewer and assign her responsibility for any harm caused to citizens. Another storyteller suggest that Brewers actions are in conflict with participatory governance in a democratic state:

If her actions aren't racism, what is it called? Brewer doesn't speak for me! Why does Brewer have this power and authority to speak for me anyway? What was the rush in passing the immigration law without the vote of the people of Arizona? What happened to the meaning of democracy? (Bennett, 2010)

The storyteller’s outrage is tangible, and further illustrates the inherent fiction that is the People of Arizona. Senator Pearce also receives the ire of a number of storytellers. One frustrated blogger refers to SB 1070 as Senator Pearce’s “bigot bill” (Lemons, 2010a) or “racial profiling law” (Lemons, 2010c).

Although many opponents fault the legislature and the Governor for passing SB 1070, some narratives do acknowledge that a certain amount of the harm caused by the law will be the ethical responsibility of law enforcement officers. In one narrative, for example, the word “they” references both the politicians who passed the bill and the cops who will enforce it, “Anecdotal Hispanic response from down here…. ‘If they pull over as many Anglos as Hispanics and demand proof of citizenship, then maybe they can claim this isn’t racist.’ Laughter at the prospect of this actually happening” (Holub, 2010). One narrative notes that Martin Escobar, the police officer from Tucson who filed a lawsuit against SB 1070 rejects Governor Brewer’s argument that racial profiling will not happen: “While the vast majority of officers are good, he said, "there's that 1 percent who will abuse the law." (Portillo Jr., 2010c). And while this perspective is generally
muted in the storytelling, at least one narrative describes the enormous harm caused to immigrant communities, which often include citizens and documented and undocumented immigrants.

But one terrible reality is that this is going to make it easier for criminals to prey on otherwise law-abiding people whose only crime is that they don't have a green card. And because of the possibility of undue harassment, it will make a lot more people, especially Latinos, hesitate even more than in the past before they report a crime that's been committed against them. (Jordan, 2010)

In general, then, opponents reject personal ethical responsibility for the harm that SB 1070 causes or will cause.

When asked to account for the harm SB 1070 causes, opponents push back and indicate that government officials, both politicians and public administrators, are responsible. Supporters of the policy delegate their responsibility to the public administrators. At the heart of all of this then, is the law enforcement officer who is hired by the government to enforce the laws that the Arizona State Legislature passes on behalf of the fabricated People of Arizona.

Conclusions: Identity and SB 1070

In this chapter, I have analyzed the narratives in this sample to show how supporters and opponents form their interpretations about SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) into different political story lines (Stone, 2012/1988). Both sides presume that undocumented immigration is a problem. Where supporters believe that SB 1070 is the proper solution and suggest that it will lead to a better world order by punishing those who violate the law, opponents either feel helpless (if they are the targets) or like they need to engage in political action to keep the law from being implemented. The storytelling by both
supporters and opponents of SB 1070 suggests that the question of who is targeted by the
draw and who counts as human is linked not only to visible identities such as race,
ethnicity and nationality, but also to the repetitive performed behaviors (such as speaking
English and paying taxes) of citizenship.

For some, the presence of impossible subjects (Ngai, 2004) calls into question the
value of their citizenship. According to this argument, undocumented immigrants should
not receive the benefits of citizenship if they do not also have to assume the costs by
adopting certain behaviors such as speaking English, paying taxes, and obeying the law.
The presence of undocumented immigrants who maintain their foreignness, for some
supporters of the policy, devalues their own identities as U.S. citizens or legal residents.
Some supporters not only reject the idea that undocumented immigrants should receive
the services that citizens do, but suggest that undocumented immigrants should not be
considered full human beings. As undocumented immigrants in Arizona are primarily
Hispanic, both supporters and opponents of the policy demonstrate an awareness of the
fact that enforcers of the law will have to target those who look Hispanic. If the
recognition of certain individuals as less than human is based on visible, racial
characteristics, then citizens and documented immigrants that share that appearance are at
risk of being misidentified and treated as less than human, which is at the heart of much
of the opposition to the law in the narratives. To combat the possibility of this
mischaracterization, both sides generally agree that law enforcement officers ought to
ascribe to the state-agent narrative in which officers follow the rule of law and have few
opportunities to use their discretion. While supporters believe that most officers follow

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this narrative and thus will not engage in racial profiling, opponents suggest that reality differs from the ideal world and that officers often rely on their own discretion, which could lead even officers of great integrity to employ racial profiling.

Butler’s theory about two specific kinds of discourse -- performatives and an account of oneself -- provides valuable insights into how the storytellers perceive the impact of SB 1070. For some storytellers, the impact of SB 1070 was immediate. Although not a performative itself, SB 1070 as a discourse was cited repeatedly in public conversations about the policy, both in the media and elsewhere. Through the repeated citations, some individuals began to feel insecure in their identity and how it might be received. Although no judge ever issued an order that transformed someone into a criminal, several Hispanic citizens report to the media and to their loved ones that they felt differently about themselves. Supporters of the policy reject the notion that SB 1070 will cause any harm to Hispanic citizens once implemented. While supporters accept ethical responsibility for harming undocumented immigrants, they delegate responsibility for any harm caused to citizens or legal residents to police officers and claim that any racial profiling that happens is a crime and a misapplication of the law. Opponents push responsibility for the harm caused by the policy back to all government workers, both elective and administrative. Yet, the storytelling in these narratives suggests that harm had already been caused to Hispanic citizens and immigrants (documented and undocumented), which begs the question of who is ethically responsible for the harm already caused to Hispanic citizens, documented immigrants and undocumented immigrants if, during the time period under consideration here, the law has not yet been
implemented? The narratives themselves provide few clues. I will explore this issue in more depth in the conclusions to this project.
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this project has been to examine the extent to which the identities of citizen, immigrant, (documented and undocumented), and public administrator are influenced by a policy such as SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b). To accomplish this end, I first established that a public policy could be analyzed as a narrative. The field of narratology was reviewed to establish the kinds of tools that can be employed to break a narrative down into its structural elements and storytelling techniques. I demonstrated how feminist and political theory illustrate that identity is affected by discourses, specifically by performatives and accounts of oneself. A public policy authorizes its agents to issue performatives and demand accounts from those who they encounter, when appropriate. Moreover, a policy resembles an account of oneself, delivered on behalf of a fabricated subject that is exclusionary in the moment of its evocation. I then applied these narratological tools and theoretical lenses to SB 1070 and a number of news stories about the policy. In this chapter, I discuss the findings of this project by reviewing the research questions. Finally, I consider the value and limitations of this research, and conclude by identifying areas that merit further investigation in future projects.

Answering the Research Questions

The main question driving this study is how and whether a public policy such as SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) can influence the development of the identities of citizen, immigrant, (documented and undocumented), and public administrator. The analysis so far has provided answers to each of the major research questions, which I will review in turn.
First, it is evident that narrative structures of SB 1070 did influence the storytelling that developed after its passage. The narratological analysis of the policy revealed four major organizing principles or plots: (a) the identification and punishment of employers of undocumented immigrants; (b) the identification and punishment of transporters/shielders of undocumented immigrants; (c) the identification and punishment of undocumented immigrants; (d) the identification and punishment of state and local government agencies or officials that do not fully implement federal immigration law. In these plots, the undocumented immigrant is always an opponent and the law enforcement officer is for the most part a helper. In contrast, citizens and state and local government agencies or officials can switch between these two roles depending on the plot.

Transporters/shielders of undocumented immigrants, employers of undocumented immigrants, and state and local government officials can also be citizens. A citizen or legal resident can also become a helper by filing a lawsuit when he or she discovers a government agency or official with a policy that interferes with the full implementation of federal immigration law. While all four plots and all actors are mentioned in the storytelling about the policy, most narratives focus on the question of identifying undocumented immigrants rather than on the misbehavior of citizens or legal residents and punishments are only occasionally mentioned.

Supporters of SB 1070 emphasized the criminal nature of undocumented immigrants and how they hurt Arizona by draining resources and threatening public safety. In contrast, opponents highlighted the fact that the term undocumented immigrant suggests a specific race, ethnicity, and national origin: Hispanic and Mexican. As many
citizens and legal residents in Arizona are also Hispanic and of Mexican origin, opponents raised concerns about the potential for citizens and legal residents to be misidentified by law enforcement officers. Although race, ethnicity, and national origin are mentioned in the text of SB 1070, the storytelling about the policy brought new light to how those portions of the policy could be interpreted in their implementation. Additionally, even though a substantive revision to Section 2 of SB 1070 made it less likely to support an interpretation that would allow a law enforcement officer to engage in racial profiling, the storytellers were not appeased. Thus, SB 1070 had a visible impact on the storytelling, but just as the narratological scholars and Butler (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005) suggested would be the case, each storyteller incorporated their own experiences and understanding of the social norms and discourses cited in the policy into their interpretations of what SB 1070 would do. The structural elements of SB 1070 had an impact on the public conversation, but so did other factors.

The storytelling about SB 1070 also makes visible its power as a discourse to unsettle the identity performances of citizen, immigrant (documented and undocumented), and public administrator. This becomes apparent through the storylines of change and power (Stone, 2012/1988) that the storytellers employ to explain what they think SB 1070 will do. While many supporters and opponents agree that undocumented immigration is a public problem that needs addressing, supporters assert that undocumented immigrants are criminals and deserve to be punished by the enforcement of SB 1070. In contrast, opponents protest that SB 1070 will cause unnecessary harm to Hispanic citizens and legal residents who may be misidentified as undocumented
immigrants by law enforcement officers. Supporters of the policy discount this notion and argue that little will change for citizens or documented immigrants after SB 1070 is enforced. Opponents of the policy contend that SB 1070 will not only cause harm in the future, but has caused harm in the present. This is visible in the stories related by undocumented immigrants, documented immigrants, citizens, and law enforcement officers who cite examples of how their lives have changed, or express fear that the changes will come soon. Regarding how individuals account for the harm that SB 1070 assumes on behalf of the People of Arizona, supporters accept the harm that will come once the policy is implemented because they believe that causing harm to undocumented immigrants is necessary to improving public safety and securing the economy. Opponents blame government officials and reject responsibility for the harm the policy will cause. Neither opponents nor supporters accept responsibility for the harm already caused.

**Contributions**

One of the primary ways that this project contributes to the advancement of research in the fields of public administration and public policy is through its inquiry into how a public policy such as SB 1070 influences the identities of citizen, immigrant (documented and undocumented), and public administrator. While many scholars have investigated how policy design is related to its effectiveness or whether a policy accomplishes the goals drawn out for it by the legislative body or administrative agency, this project suggests that there is much more happening than just the act of policy creation, although the development of a policy does establish important contextual elements. As Catlaw’s (2007) work establishes, the act of creating policy is exclusionary.
By invoking the People as their source of legitimacy, legislative and administrative bodies immediately create a division between those who are considered part of the People and those who are not. The analysis presented in this project has endeavored to further this research by demonstrating how the translation of the will of the People into a text with the characteristics of a narrative advances those exclusions. Although the revised text of SB 1070 (2010b) explicitly discourages racial profiling (unlike the first version (2010a)), the narratives revealed much about how the storytellers expected the policy to be implemented. Those who supported the policy and felt that there were included in the People of Arizona rejected the notion that the text of the policy cited norms or other discourses that would lead to the marginalization of Hispanic citizens and legal residents.

Interestingly, some opponents of the policy understood why it had been enacted on the People of Arizona’s behalf; they agreed that undocumented immigration was a public problem that needed addressing. Their point of difference rested in their assessment of the identity of police officers and how they expected these public administrators to behave. Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) found that although the state-agent narrative dominates scholarly and media-based presentations, it’s depiction of “a democratic state as an edifice built on law and predictable procedures that insure that like cases will be treated alike” (p. 4) is not accurate, based on their own analysis of the stories of street-level workers. Instead, the citizen-agent narrative provides a better description of how some street-level public administrators use their discretion to give some citizens “unauthorized but extraordinary and life-enhancing help” while others deliver “what the rules and procedures allow--no more, no less” (p. 5). The stories related
by supporters of SB 1070 suggest that they believe that the state-agent narrative accurately describes how public administrators such as police officers behave. Opponents of SB 1070 demonstrate a greater acceptance of the existence of the citizen-agent narrative as a number assert that it is the fact that police officers have considerable discretion that will cause racial profiling to occur under the policy. The prevalence of the concerns expressed about the citizen-agent narrative among the storytellers who object to SB 1070 highlights one of the key ways in which the policy influences the identity of police officers. Even though the law was not implemented, at least one police officer indicated that he felt like members of some Hispanic communities were treating him differently than they had before its passage. SB 1070 altered the scene of constraint, which unsettled the performances of both the police officer and the members of the community by interfering with what had been their routine and repetitive daily interactions with one another.

Another contribution of this work is the discovery that storytellers cited only certain aspects of the storyworlds evoked by the policy. While employers of undocumented immigrants, transporters/shielders of undocumented immigrants, state and local government agencies or officials, and undocumented immigrants were targeted for identification and punishment, the storytellers were primarily concerned with how police officers would carry out the process for identifying undocumented immigrants and considerably less interested in the identification of anyone else or any of the punishments. “Papers, please,” which was a recurring phrase attached to SB 1070, reflects these fears about enforcement, identification, and the demand that one account for who one is to
police officers. In this regard, the work of Butler (1990/2006, 1993, 2004, 2005) provided an important theoretical and structural base. In response to Butler’s challenge to see what happens to the theory of performativity when applied to identities other than gender, sex, and sexuality, I offer the following assessment. Public policy describes how government agents will carry out the will of the People. SB 1070 provided numerous instructions for how and when a police officer could demand that citizens or immigrants account for who they are. Judges also receive instructions for how to impose sentences and issue performatives, which will transform an individual into a criminal. In the storytelling about SB 1070, some individuals reported that they felt as if their identities were already shifting, even though the law was not in effect and no performative had been delivered. This suggests that for much discussed policies, the public conversation about what it means and who will be affected can kick-start the process of the repetitious citing of norms and discourses that is necessary to begin changing the identity performances of some individuals, whether their identities are specifically governed by the policy or not. This also highlights the falseness of claims that “facially-neutral” policies such as SB 1070 are harmless. People interpret the policy, no matter how neutrally worded, in light of existing norms and discourses, and through their discussions of the policy with each other reify its potential meanings and applications. This process of repetition and reification can influence identity development and alter the scene of constraint.

This project also raises concerns about the question of harm and who bears the responsibility for the impact of policies like SB 1070. The storytelling about SB 1070 reveals that those who believe that they are included in the People of Arizona accept
responsibility for the harm that the policy directs to undocumented immigrants. Yet, they reject responsibility for the harm that might be caused to Hispanic citizens or documented immigrants who might be misidentified by law enforcement officers and requested to deliver an account of themselves. Supporters of SB 1070 generally reject the notion that accounting for oneself inflicts any kind of harm on an individual, an assertion that both Butler’s (2005) work and the stories related by opponents of the policy suggest is untrue. Opponents of the policy, in the meantime, accept that harm may need to be caused to undocumented immigrants, but reject responsibility for the harm that will be caused by SB 1070 and push it back to the government officials, elective and administrative, who design and implement the policy. Elected officials insist that no harm will be caused and that if any officer engages in racial profiling, that officer, on his or her own, has acted unethically and illegally; all responsibility for unintended harm, then, falls to individual police officers.

One interesting question that emerges from this analysis was posed at the end of the last chapter. Who is responsible for the harm caused by a policy that has not yet been implemented? There is no clear answer. Harm has been caused, but who will account for it? Additionally, how can the harm be stopped if supporters deny it is happening and the most vocal opponents blame the political system and wash their hands of responsibility? The discursive production of the People of Arizona seems particularly insidious as it allows those who object to the policy to deny that they are part of the People, and it permits those who consider themselves to be part of the People to declare themselves free of guilt for the impact of the policy (either because it has not been implemented yet, or
because responsibility has been delegated to public administrators). At no point does anyone offer an account of himself or herself that accepts full responsibility for the actions of the People of Arizona, which provides insights into the some of the flaws of governance in modern representative democracies, but also into how members of a society that espouses ideals of equality and justice can still knowingly permit the mistreatment or marginalization of other humans without feeling any guilt. Moreover, this raises even more troubling questions about the rise of meta-governance and the popularity of the contracting and outsourcing of what has been traditionally government labor through public-private partnerships. What does it mean if the ethical responsibility for the treatment of inmates (who are often marginalized members of society due to their racial and/or class-based identities) in private prisons has now been delegated to private sector employees who take no oath of public service? Who is ethically responsible for the harm that private sector militias cause in foreign countries to citizens of the U.S. or other nations?

A final contribution of this project derives from the methodology and theoretical framework that it has established. Although several scholars indicate that public policy can be considered a narrative (Schram & Neisser, 1997; Stone, 2012/1988; Yanow, 1999, 2003), my analysis has demonstrated not only that most public policies have the necessary elements to be analyzed as a narrative, but there is value in carrying out such an analysis. In applying narratological tools to the study of a public policy, I was able to establish the actors, events, locations, and focalizors described in the policy. After identifying the major plots prevalent in the policy, I was able to compare that to the
public storytelling to determine the extent to which those elements were also visible in the storytelling. The evaluation of which elements persisted, in particular the actors and the events associated with the identification of undocumented immigrants by law enforcement officers, as well as those that did not, reveals much about the prevailing assumptions of what policy would do and who it would affect. In this particular project, the most outrage emerged over the concern that citizens might be misidentified as undocumented immigrants and treated as less than human. Although some individuals struggled with the repercussions that undocumented immigrants would face upon the policy’s passage, the majority of both the supporters and opponents of the policy turned their attention to what the policy would mean for citizens and documented immigrants. This methodology is sufficiently flexible that it could also be applied to other public policies that are much discussed and heavily contested.

**Limitations of the Study**

The limitations that this work faces are typical for most research projects that employ qualitative procedures. First, this work is interpretive, and thus influenced by the perspective of the researcher. As the literature review of narratology makes clear, readers, authors, and context have an impact on the interpretations of texts. No text can be interpreted in one and only one way. As a researcher, I have done my best to read each text closely and carefully in light of the various threads of theory that supported this project.

Second, my findings are not generalizable to other immigration policies nor to the entire time period during which SB 1070 has been debated. This investigation has
revealed important insights about a specific window of time between April 23rd and June 7th, 2010. Although the insights provided by this study may prove beneficial when designing other projects with similar topics, methodologies or methods, one cannot assume that the conclusions from this analysis will prove true in different contexts.

Efforts were made to secure a sample of narratives that reflects the geographic and cultural diversity of Arizona. However, all items included in this sample are text-based narratives. As narratologists have indicated, stories can be told through a variety of media (e.g., videos, discussion boards) that were not included here, and these alternative media may allow for a different kind of storytelling that would reflect a different relationship to the text of SB 1070. Additionally, although narratives were collected from non-English text-based media, the results were not as representative as I had hoped. It is very possible that if more Spanish media sources had been available, the voices of undocumented immigrants would have come through more prominently. One final limitation of relying on text-based narratives is that many people do not subscribe to newspapers or visit online news sites, so these forms of storytelling may not be typical of what most of the residents of Arizona read during the period under review here.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

The story of SB 1070 (2010a; 2010b) is still ongoing. On June 8th, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mentioned in an interview that the U.S. Justice Department was planning to file a lawsuit against Arizona and SB 1070. On July 29th, one day before SB 1070 would enter into effect, U.S. District Judge Susan Bolton enjoined several of its key provisions, including the most controversial provisions in
Section 2. Eventually, on June 25th, 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 3, Section 5(C) and Section 6 violated federal law. Section 2, the most controversial and debated aspect of the law, was allowed to enter into effect. The first, and most obvious, avenue of future research would be to collect more news stories during the period leading up to and including the Supreme Court’s ruling to evaluate whether the basic plots of the storytelling changed over time. Another excellent possibility emerges from the limitations mentioned earlier, which would be to investigate other kinds of media and incorporate more Spanish-language resources.

Beyond just expanding the nature of the data considered in this project, there are opportunities to continue investigating this question of how a public policy works on identities such as citizens, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and public administrator. The primary identities under consideration here were related to citizenship and immigration status and how they overlapped with race, ethnicity, and national origin. Without question, issues of gender and class also played important roles in these stories and merit further investigation, both from the standpoint of the individual who related the story as well as who the storytelling included as characters. Conducting another analysis employing the same methodology would allow for further testing of the different ways that public policy may have an impact on storytelling and identity. Additionally, employing an alternative theory of identity that is more sensitive to questions of agency (an issue for which the theory of performativity has been criticized) may help build a fuller perspective into the type of reactions that individuals had to the policy, including how and why they accepted or resisted the unsettling effects of SB 1070 on their
identities. The final opportunity for future research that should be explored is to apply
this methodology to another much-discussed policy in another controversial area such as
drug, abortion, or social welfare policies.
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