THE PROMISE OF A NAME: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN

MACEDONIA

by

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A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Approved April 2014 by the
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May 2014
ABSTRACT

Naming and naming practices take place at various sites associated with international politics. These sites include border crossings, migrations, diasporas, town halls, and offices of political parties representing minorities. This project is an investigation of these and other sites. It takes seriously questions of names and naming practices and particularly asks how people participate in these practices, often doing so with states and state authorities. It not only looks at and discusses how people proceed in these practices but also assesses the implications for people regarding how and when they can be at home as well as how and where they can move. Through an ethnography of Aegean Macedonians involving interviews, participant observation, and archival research, I find that naming practices occur well beyond the sites where they are expected. Names themselves are the result of negotiation and are controlled neither by their bearers nor those who would name. Similarity of demonyms with toponyms, do not ensure that bearers of such demonyms will be at home in the place that shares there name. Changes in names significance of names occur rapidly and these names turn home into abroad and hosts into guests.
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my wife Anjeanette who, without hesitation or thought for her own wellbeing, encouraged the pursuit of my passion. When this pursuit took me to a far away land she, with considerable grace, helped me to uproot our small family and accompanied me there. Thank you for your belief. I also dedicate it to Aidan and Eliana, our much loved children.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Much debt is owed to each of my committee members: Roxanne Doty, Richard Ashley, and Leif Jonsson. They read and gave useful comments on various drafts of the chapters of this dissertation. Not only did they provide critical feedback and encouragement during the writing of the dissertation but they all provided graduate courses that made it possible to even think of my topic in the sort of context in which I treat it here.

Without the help of Georgi Donevski, my fieldwork would not have been remotely as rich and rewarding as it was. He introduced me to his lifelong friends and allies in the movement of refugees from the Aegean part of Macedonia. His kindness and generosity made this work possible. While his demise happened long before this work took the shape that it has, his insistence that I finish it provided inspiration and encouragement during the labor required to complete it.

Special thanks is also due to Jessica Auchter who regularly read and provided comments on my work. Also thanks to Eyal Bar and participants and discussants at the “Fanaticism and the Abolition-Democracy: Critical Theory in the Spirit of Joel Olson” conference that took place in January 2013, and the ISA North East Conference in Providence in 2013. These forums were critical to the development of this dissertation.

My fieldwork in Macedonia was facilitated by a research grant from the US Fulbright program. The Critical Languages Institute at Arizona State University’s Melikian Center provided the excellent Macedonian language instructors Marija Kusevska, Ljupka Bocevska, and Amanda Greber.
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Figure 1: Macedonia/Macedonias in the Balkans

Figure 2: Dolnenei and the Pelagonia
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Aerodrom is a municipality full of modern blocks of flats with retail space on the first and basement floors and residential units on the higher ones. It is located just to the East of the city center, known as Centar Municipality, on the southern, predominantly ethnically Macedonian, side of the Vardar river. While sitting on the terrace of a café on a boulevard named after a Macedonian partisan shot dead by Bulgarian occupiers towards the end of World War II, journalist and former philosophy professor Dimitar Chulev recounts an episode from his life.

He was born in Romania to ethnic Macedonian refugees of the Greek civil war. After moving back to Macedonia and becoming a journalist, Dimitar was sent on assignment to the region of Romania he had lived as a child. Returning to his native village, to his old neighborhood, he met a familiar old lady. In her younger years, she had lived in the apartment below his. Recognizing her, he went and introduced himself as little Dimitar. What followed next was an intense negotiation. The old woman insisted he could not be Dimitar because Dimitar was a little boy and he protested that he was indeed that same Dimitar whom she had watched play football from her window. Dimitar told me that it was then that he realized that there was no way to prove that the name really belonged to him. There is no biological test, no ultimate sovereignty that can finally say, and convince an old lady, once and for all that a name, be it Dimitar, Danish, or Dominican Republic, really represents the object that stands before you whether it is in the form of a man or whether it is a formless nationality or nation-state.
THE PROMISE OF THE NAME

Names promise a lot. Through a claim to represent that to which they are linked, they offer a sense of permanence and continuity in a world of change and decay. While I may not be the same person I was as a boy, my name remains the same. Governments change, populations are entirely replaced over time, and institutions dissolve themselves. Yet, the name that pretends to represent that government, that population, and those institutions can continue unchanged and can persuade us to speak as though the stuff it claims to stand in place of remains intact. At least, it grants an air of equivalence in the face of much difference. Thus France, the kingdom of Louis quatorze, the Republic of Napoleon Bonaparte, and the current member of the European Union can be represented as a single entity continuing through time. When we think of England, we can imagine Elizabeth I sending out her sea vessels to discover the world. Just as easily, we can imagine Margaret Thatcher sending hers to the Falkland Islands. The author of both of these events can be referred to by the name England. Even where it is considered that a particular state has ceased to be, the name can still be recalled and offers a continuity after death so to speak\(^1\). Although the referent of the name Soviet Union is considered to no longer exist, through the name, we can still refer to it. Its history continues to be written.

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\(^1\) Jean-François Lyotard and Georges Van Den Abbeele, “The Différend, the Referent, and the Proper Name,” *Diacritics*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Special Issue on the Work of Jean-Francois Lyotard (Autumn, 1984), 3-14, 10
In addition to the colors on a political map of the world, it is the names that would divide the Earth. Names “at tempt to order and structure the chaos and flux of existence.” While the bounded hues territorialize sovereignty, power, and identity, it is the names that differentiate between sovereignties, powers, and identities. Over time, names offer us durability and, over space, they profess external difference and internal identity. The external difference that names indicate, difference between states, regions, towns, and seas endow us with the sense that we can set off from here and go to there. We can then return to our starting point and we will really have come home, to the same place we left from. This is especially true if we bear a name that is identical or similar to that of the place to which we return. For example, if I am ‘northerner’ returning to the north or, as in the case we will discuss, a Macedonian returning to Macedonia then it will seem obvious that we have returned home.

As we carry our own name with us, we know that, when we do return, we will be able to represent ourselves as the person who left and we will be able to speak to our old friends who will know us by our name. It is this contrast between the continuation of our name and the changing of the name of the place we are in that underpins our conception of movement. After we return to our friends, we can tell them that we really went to another place, one with a different name. We can describe the place to them knowing that they will be able to go there too.

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The place continues to exist as its name remains unchanged. To go there, our friend will key in the name of the place into a GPS and follow the directions.

In this project, I argue that names, whether they be those of individuals, ethnic groups, or states fail to deliver on this promise of lasting homogenization and differentiation. They fail on several accounts. While names make claims to a representation of identifiable physical structures, the lack of a sovereign center to finally fix that name to the thing for which it is taken to be a proxy allows room for the play of fractured sovereignty. The multiplicity of names that result from this dispersed naming power are not interchangeable but refer to overlapping and overhanging spaces. This means that we are not simply considering rival names for some single immutable being. Rather, since the name has a constituting property, the deficit of an authoritative name throws open doubts of existence. The lack of a recognized nominator inhibits any sort of decision on what or who gets a name, how far in time and space the label extends, and how we may verify the name.

This project, rather than simply show a failure of the name to keep its promise, is an exploration of the clash between those who would overcome this failure, who would finally fix the doubt and fill in the room for play, and those who are able to use the ambiguity that it creates to go on with their lives\(^3\). Those who would govern, who would name, and thus divide and preserve order

attempt to create practices to fix names to states, peoples or individuals. The practices are
designed to give substance and consequence to names, to underpin the verifiability of names.
While these goals will not be achieved without significant cooperation from those who would not
want to do so, practices are not controlled by one voice and vary in the subject positions that are
available in them, they are nevertheless goals that are pursued. Others, whose goal is not to
govern but to escape governance, or to escape an inconvenient or undesirable name, are
sometimes compelled to participate in these practices. My question specifically then becomes,
when compelled to participate in these naming practices, how do women and men, whether they
claim to act in their own name or that of a collectivity, use the ambiguity that is present due to
the impracticability of naming, in order to resist the fixing of an unwelcome or inconvenient
name.

As well as investigating this inevitable back and forth between effected order and blatant
disorder, I want to make a qualitative, political point about the natural ambiguity at play in
names. As already alluded to, it is this gap in certainty that often allows people to go on living
their lives. With a side-by-side existence of alternative names, where the final decision is
indefinitely postponed, the people involved can continue to peaceably enjoy the privilege of
thinking in terms of that name. Alternative realities coexist. Attempts at final decisions regarding

4    Roxanne Doty, "Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in
the reality or authenticity of seemingly rival names are invariably violent. However, while violence against an individual or a certain piece of infrastructure can achieve its goal, violence against abstracts, such as a name, cannot. Therefore, any decision to use the necessary coercion to decide once and for all a correct name becomes perpetual. In the following chapters, the violence used will vary qualitatively. However, in terms of deciding the name, it will always fail. It may serve to make people’s life more difficult and will kill some. It will never be sufficient to stop the oscillation between names though. Alongside my argument that people will find ways, even in the violent practices designed to fix a name, to carry on with another name in defiance, is this argument that allowing them to do so is qualitatively less violent.

NAMING CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

But the name and naming has long been an issue for relations between nation-states. Perhaps the most famous and currently salient issue of naming and resistance to naming in international relations is the dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia. Since its independence from Yugoslavia, declared in 1992 with general recognition the following year, the Republic of Macedonia has been locked in a dispute with Greece over the use of the name ‘Macedonia’. On 8th April 1993, the United Nations admitted “the State whose application is contained in document A/47/876-S/25147” to membership and, for convenience, designated that the State

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would be “provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. [FYROM]”

This did not end the dispute over the name and, almost a year later, the conflict escalated. In February 1994, then Prime Minister of Greece, Georgios Papandreou, imposed a trade embargo on his new northern neighbor with the aim “to force Gligorov's [President of Macedonia] government to become less intransigent in the UN negotiations [on the name and related issues] and to alert foreign governments which were losing interest that this was a vital but still unresolved issue.” Alert them it did and the European Commission, with the backing of EU member-state foreign ministers referred Greece to the European Court of Justice for taking “unilateral measures towards FYROM aimed at preventing trade through the port of Thessaloniki of goods coming from or going to FYROM as well as the import into Greece of products from FYROM.”

The Greek government objects to the use of the name Macedonia by the country to its north. They insist that Macedonia “is a Greek word” and that “it refers to the Kingdom and civilization of the ancient Macedonians, who belong to the Greek nation and constitute an incontrovertible

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6 Ibid.
8 European Commission - IP/94/278 06/04/1994, The Commission decides to refer the Greek embargo of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Court of Justice
piece of Greek historical and cultural heritage. While they place parts of the ancient kingdom in “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in Bulgaria, and in Albania,” they counter that “its largest part is found in Greece.” The case that the Greek government is building against the use of the name Macedonia by its neighbor is presented as one of historical fact. This appeal to the writers of legitimate history is an appeal to what some would consider a sovereign center – the sovereign center of history. The article calls “the concept of a ‘Macedonian nation’, which has been cultivated systematically through the falsification of history.” Doing so, it creates a boundary between the sovereign center of legitimate history (the one that affirms the Greekness of Macedonia) and the periphery of junk history or falsified history which affirms and strengthens the position of that sovereign center.

This move is an attempt to bound the possible meanings linked with the name Macedonia. It is a bid to limit meaning to names also associated with the name Greece. The view taken by the Greek government in this case is that there are authoritative (historical) sources that can determine the proper use of names. Not all meanings that are ascribed to a name are legitimate. For the government of Greece, there are ways to limit the meaning of names that we have said have infinite meaning. For them, appeals to history can be made to decide the legitimate use of a name. Not any old history is relevant though, judgment is also required to discern between history and ‘falsified history’. This in itself is an attempt to limit the meaning of the name

10 Ibid
11 Ibid
12 Ibid (my emphasis)
history. This inevitably leads to a politicization of the meaning of the name Macedonia. With the lack of a sovereign center to finally decide the limits of the meaning of Macedonia, the name refers us to a boundless plethora of meanings. These meanings, in the context of nation states and national sovereignty align themselves contradictorily and a negotiation is established between ‘Greek’ meanings and ‘Slavic’ meanings of the name.

A further justification for this name dispute offered from the Greek side is captured in the words of Ambassador Manolis Kalamidas to Greek scholar Nikolaos Zahariadis. The latter reports the ambassador, a foreign policy advisor to current Prime Minister but then Foreign Minister Antonios Samaras, as saying: "Recognizing Skopje under the designation Macedonia plants the seed for future turmoil because it allows Skopje to harbor territorial claims and pursue them at some future date when international circumstances are more favorable." This explanation, however improbable such a situation might be, goes some way to showcasing the significance of naming in international relations. For the ambassador, there is a tangible and real link between the name Macedonia and a piece of territory. The connection is so strong that, despite obvious disparity in capability in favor of Greece, the use of the name Macedonia by another nation state is in and of itself a security threat to a much larger, richer, better connected, and militarily more powerful state.

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13 Zahariadis, 312
The Macedonian government sees the conflict over the name as “irrational.\textsuperscript{14}” Moreover, at least publicly, the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party frame the matter as a technical one connected to entry to NATO and the European Union\textsuperscript{15}. Solving the name issue for the Macedonian government is not to reestablish a fundamental historical truth but to come to a pragmatic agreement. The governing party does, however, place further significance on a possible resolution to the name issue. In pursuing such a resolution they insist that they will not “accept ideas or proposals that would endanger the Macedonian national identity, distinctness of the Macedonian nation and Macedonian language.\textsuperscript{16}” This endows the naming of the state with the potential to alter the ontological makeup of the nation and its language. As already mentioned, the name affords its referent a distinctness from all other states that do not bear the name. For the Macedonian side, the sovereign center of history is not cast in the chief role in this circumstance. The name itself becomes a sort of authority for them though. Altering the name can alter the fundamental identity of the nation that claims to bear it and threatens to fold its people into an indefinite mélange of peoples.

If the disagreement between Greece and Macedonia about the name is the most famous one, it is not the only one to have taken place. The Republic of Ireland has gone through a process of naming and renaming over the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century that is described by British-Irish studies

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid 190
scholar, John Coakley. Following the removal of the King from the politics of Ireland in 1949, the government in London preferred to call the newly freed Ireland the Irish Republic. On their part, Dublin designated their president President of Ireland. The British rejected this on the basis that it seemed to claim the province of Northern Ireland, which, after all, was Ireland too. A president of Ireland, for the British government, suggests a leader who would be a president of the whole island. So again we encounter a system where a morphologically different name is preferred by one side in the dispute in order to differentiate between two sovereignties.

A compromise was nevertheless struck between the British and Irish government. As a result, in international treaties between the two sides, rather than agreeing to an identical document, and thus having the heads of state and government put their own names on documents referring to names that were an anathema to them, the sides agreed to sign documents that differed only in the names given to the various territorial entities. Thus, representatives of the London government took home a treaty between the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ and the ‘Republic of Ireland’. Dublin’s government would leave with a treaty between ‘Ireland’ and the ‘United Kingdom’. This arrangement lasted until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The agreement was the first one signed between the “the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland' and `the Government of Ireland."

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18 Ibid., 53
19 Ibid., 54
Before the agreement, the designation Irish Republic was favored by two groups. The traditional Irish Republicans, inspired by the Fenian 32-county republic saw this historic ideal in the name. Their historical opponents, the British government also preferred this nomenclature. For the Irish Republicans the ‘Irish’ in Irish Republic united the island. The whole territory was Ireland and so the republic was one for all living on the island. For the British government, it was the ‘Republic’ part of the name that was important. This divided the island of Ireland between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland\textsuperscript{20}.

This double understanding of the name ‘Republic of Ireland’ emphasizes how names in international relations cannot be decided by a sovereign center. In this example, both Irish Republicans and British nationalists favour the same name for different reasons. There is not independent meaning to the name and thus there is no decision as to who is rightly pleased with the name, the Republic of Ireland. Rather there is a constant contradiction that is made possible by an understanding that Irish Republicans and the British government are enemies and that no appeals can be made to an outside authority for clarification regarding the authoritative owner of the name. The contradiction functions when the enmity is understood and when the two parts of the name Irish and Republic are esteemed differently in proportion to each other by the conflicting sides.

The name ‘Irish Republic’ is not remarkable in the context of the state system where other entities hold similar names. The ‘French Republic’, the ‘Italian Republic’, and the ‘Hellenic Republic’ all share this style of name. While they seem natural and fit into what is understood

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 57
about the nation-state, the Irish and British case really shows how the combination weakens the strength of the meaning of the constituent words. The ethnic adjective in these formulations promise universality. It is a republic for all the Italians, all the French, or all the Hellenes. However, where the noun ‘republic’ refers to a state with control over a geographic territory, as it is prone to do, then the appeal to the nation is limited. Assuming that Italians outside of Italy participate less in the Italian Republic, the promise of a republic for Italians is stymied by their geographic distance from the territory. In the Irish example, the British can rest safe in the knowledge that the Irish Republic, as a geographically defined entity does not reach the Irish living in the province of Northern Ireland even as the Irish Republicans revel in a republic for all Irish.

Often, the process of naming is depicted as being the act of a sovereign. Ludgar Mülle-Wille explains the naming of the Canadian Eastern Arctic in these terms. His story is one of rival sovereignties one native to the land and the other conqueror from Europe. In Nunavik, a Gazetteer was produced that contained indigenous place names from around the region. This was then put to a council of elders for approval. Following the approval of the Inuit Elders of their Gazetteer, the Avataq Cultural Institute appealed to the Commission de toponymie du Québec for recognition of the name ‘Nunavik’ for the region. Permission was granted. Building on this success, 2,200 further Inuit toponyms were approved by Canadian authorities. Commenting on this success, Mülle-Wille concludes “within a few years, the aboriginal Inuit place name system
has been transferred into written tradition at an equal level with the encroaching exogenous place names of mainly French and English origin.”

In the short example above we see sovereign centers consulting and agreeing upon how to name places. The Inuit Elders give their approval to a Gazetteer prepared in order to preserve the oral traditional toponyms. Their approval is not final however and recognition is sought from the real sovereign, the Canadian authority. While the Gazetteer claims to be a collection of names already in use to refer to the places, there is apparently still a requirement for confirmation of the identity of these places from the commission which is set up to govern such names. The reasons that these indigenous names did not belong to the places as much as the exogenous ones is because they had not yet attained the level of written tradition which is guarded by the sovereign government. The role that naming plays in claims of sovereignty and rival sovereignties starts to become apparent. The appeal to a sovereign center, whether it be an independent historical record free of falsification or a board of people set up to decide the undecidable names, is a common one that nevertheless fails to finally decide.

Nevertheless, what must be taken into account in the above example is that, in order for those names to come about and to be approved by the council of elders, they must, at some level have preexisted that procedure. In other words, for the names to final make it into the Gazetteer, they must first have existed without the book. No doubt, these names existed as alternatives to the

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ones in the Gazetteer that they replaced. The names that they replaced did not cease to function either. Though presently unfavored by the authorities, they forever exist alongside the official names. Under another set of political circumstances they may again become official themselves. However, this is not a requirement. Those original names continue to exist alongside the newer names. They provide enough ambiguity to maintain questions about the identity of the place, the people living there, and movement through those places.

THE REGION OF MACEDONIA AND ITS DIVISION

Recognizing that it is useful to delimit certain named spaces that will feature in the discourse of this project, I now endeavor to do so. Before such a distinguishing of parts, however, I must recognize an inability to escape from a to and fro of competing narratives, none of which completely control the scene. The imposition of names to these parts pretends to exert control over the landscape. Such control, though, is always temporary, extremely temporary, so as to render effectively vain any claims of a successful ordering. With this in mind, this caveat that any order I impose at this point will be undone in its very doing, following an account of another’s attempt to order space, I offer a description of my territory.
Above the village of Zrze in the municipality of Dolneni, Macedonia\textsuperscript{22} sits a monastery. The monastery is staffed by young monks, who, among other work, tend a garden on the site. The garden, which sits on the edge of a dramatic cliff and overlooks the plain of Pelagonia was the site of an explication given to me by one of the inhabitants of the monastery. The monk explained that the plain I was looking at was the plain of Patagonia\textsuperscript{23}. The villages on the plain, including Zrze, had a long history and had farmed the rich land and enjoyed unrestricted communication with one another. It extends all the way south past Prilep to Lerin, which the Greeks call Florina. The border with Greeks dissects the plain and controls communication between its two sides.

Despite the lofty view we shared of this fertile valley, the judgment that the monk, endowed with all of the authority that the Macedonian church could offer, made on the valley was one of many. One may further endow the description of the space with the strength of physical geography. The flat plain contrasted sharply with the craggy mountains surrounding it. However, his ordering of space cannot make any serious claim to universality. As soon as he spoke of the valley as separate from the mountains,

\textsuperscript{22}This municipality can be seen outlined in Map 2. It is the black-colored area. It features the area around Prilep which can be found in the center of the Republic of Macedonia. On Map 1, Prilep can be found in the middle of the red-colored section.

\textsuperscript{23}Map 2 is designed to show this plain. Its northern extent coincides with the municipality of Dolneni, which is colored black on the map. The plain extends southward between Krusevo and Prilep. Further south, Bitola sits on its western edge. The plain ends in mountains and lakes just south of Florina (Lerin) which lies on the Greek side of the current border.
separate from the other valleys across those mountains, he entered into a spatial politics that may, at that very incident, have been contradicted from another monastery across the valley where a monk was explaining the division and conflict between villages. Of course, this is not to say that this other, imagined version of the space was any accurate a representation. The main problem, and a problem taken seriously in this work, is that there is never one controlling narrative that orders space in a way that is not disputed.

While the boundaries of the region of Macedonia are constant source of controversy, they can be, and usually are, roughly delimited so as to focus attention on the area widely understood to constitute Macedonia. As well as the contested outer boundary, there are borders within the region that divide it along current nation-state boundaries. By their nature, these state borders, while not completely without dispute, are nonetheless more generally accepted than the outer boundary which often does not line up with a current, legal border. In this section I describe the geographic labels that I use in this project to discern peoples and lands. Specifically, I define the region of Macedonia, and its subdivisions: Vardar Macedonia, Pirin Macedonia, and Aegean Macedonia. In doing so, I recognize that these are politically charged terms. Indeed, I was once asked not to mention the name ‘Macedonia’ in a presentation in Thessaloniki despite the fact that both people with a Greek nationalist outlook and those with a Macedonian one would agree that the city is a Macedonian one. However, in the interests of clarity, and of setting up the difference

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24 This partition was established by the treaty of Bucharest in 1913 and has changed little since then. Andrew Rossos, “The British Foreign Office and Macedonian National Identity, 1918-1941,” Slavic Review, vol. 53, number 2, Summer 1994

that I will eventually argue is simultaneously active and non-active depending on politics, I offer this brief definition of terms.

The part of Map 1 on page 2 colored in red, blue and green is one representation of the region of Macedonia. Rather than see the above graphic as the superimposition of order upon unordered, or otherwise ordered, space, I would conceptualize it otherwise. What appear to be layers on the map are not, in fact layers. They are not an attempt to slice up the world horizontally. Any such attempt would imply either that the lower layers are either foundational or subliminal. In order to guard against the perception of privilege to any of the non-layers, they must be considered to be at once there and not there – more like a line made of infinitely small points with infinitely small spaces between them than geologically-modeled layers. Because these points and spaces take up infinitely small space and are arranged alternately you can allow for a space to really mean three different things all at the same time. It is all Macedonia, it is the intersection of several modern states, and it is the meeting of three different Macedonias. This is not an offer where you get to choose one of the options. The space is synchronously filled by multiple competing meanings and is nevertheless not full because it is open enough to allow for other political impositions of meaning. It is upon this basis that the rest of this project really depends. While I will go on to describe the terminology of the above meanings that I have encountered in my conversations and readings, I can in no way guarantee any of them as the correct, current, or final interpretation. As we will see, such names are negotiated at every second and in every situation. The geography of Macedonia, its extent and its internal divisions and the Macedonia of
geography, its situation in the world, its relationship to other political entities, as infinite even as these are, continue to be written, continue to be negotiated. Even our monk, looking out from his position of seeming privilege on top of the mountain with his claims of theocratic authority, is thwarted by the politics that goes on in the villages below.

This region is situated in the southern Balkans and consists of all or part of the territory governed by five modern nation-states. It somewhat corresponds with the area occupied by the three early twentieth century ‘Macedonian’ vilayets of the Ottoman Empire. These were Kosovo, which contained modern day Skopje, Monastir, which included the area around modern Bitola, and Salonica, oriented around Thessaloniki\(^26\). Bordering this region, and indeed claiming parts of it as their own territory, are the states of Bulgaria to the East, Serbia (and Kosovo) to the North, Albania to the West, and Greece to the South.

The map above is intended to define the use of three geographic designators that are important to my project. The different colored regions on the map represent the partition of Macedonia into the territory of three modern nation-states. The green region is known as Pirin Macedonia and is the small part of Macedonia that is in Bulgaria. The blue region is known as Aegean Macedonia and, in terms of modern, Greek administrative areas, comprises part of East Macedonia and Thrace, the whole of Central Macedonia, and the whole of West Macedonia. The red region is

known as Vardar Macedonia and constitutes the whole of the Republic of Macedonia as well as small parts of Albania and Serbia.

Pirin Macedonia, which is so named after the mountains that dominate the region, has had varying degrees of autonomy and recognition of its Macedonian minority. It is currently designated by contemporary Bulgarian authorities as Blagoevgrad Province after its principle city. Other cities in this region include Goce Delchev and Sandanski, named after heroes of the struggles in the region against Ottoman rule. These individuals are national figures in both Bulgaria and Macedonia and appear in the national anthem of the latter. Very little of what is covered in this project takes place in this region and Pirin represents the smallest of the three divisions of Macedonia spoken of here.

The part of the region named Vardar Macedonia is roughly equivalent to the present day Republic of Macedonia. It takes its name from the river that runs from the northwest to the southwest part of the state. That same river runs through Aegean Macedonia, where the Greeks call it the Axios, and empties into the Aegean near Thessaloniki/Solun. It is in this part of Macedonia that many of the Aegean Macedonians finally settled. Vardar Macedonia became constituted as the Peoples Republic (and then the Socialist Republic) of Macedonia as a constituent part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following the end of the Second

27 Rossos includes a quote from a British officer stationed in Sofia who states, in 1922, that “Bulgarian sovereignty over the district… is purely nominal and, such as it is, is resented by the irredentist Macedonian element no less strongly than is that of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government over the adjacent area [Vardar Macedonia or “Old Serbia”] within their frontier." Rossos,
World War\textsuperscript{28} and around the time that Aegean Macedonia, as part of the Greek state was overcome by civil war. As I shall further explain, chapter three is an investigation of how refugees from the Aegean part of Macedonia were received here in Vardar Macedonia and to what extent this constituted a return home from their refuges in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and other third countries.

Aegean Macedonia, so named because of its Aegean coastline, is the part of Macedonia which is now under the control of Athens. It constitutes the largest section of the Macedonian region and is the birthplace of the people to whom I refer in this project as Aegeans or Aegean Macedonians. The Macedonians who were born here, or who have strong family connections to the area, play the main part in this dissertation. The largest city is Thessaloniki which is considered the co-capital of Greece by the Greeks and is historically the largest and most cosmopolitan city of the Macedonian region and historically has been an important seaport in the region. It is the contemporary crossing from Vardar to Aegean Macedonia and the application for birth certificates that I consider in the second chapter of this project. The fourth chapter, that focuses upon events in the 1990s in Florina/Lerin also takes place in this part of Macedonia. The city is located in the west of Aegean Macedonia not too far south of Bitola which is featured on the map above.

\textsuperscript{28} Milenkoski and Talevski
EXILE OF THE AEGEAN MACEDONIANS

This project concerns itself chiefly with people who were born in the Aegean part of Macedonia that I have described above. While population exchanges resulting in the exile of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia have been taking place for some time, I concentrate on persons involved in a specific iteration of this expulsion of Slavs from the region. In this section I carve out an Aegean Macedonian population based on the experience that they had in the final stages, and following, the Greek Civil War. I begin in the summer of 1948 when, under the orders of the Greek Communist Party and with the help of the Red Cross, they leave their homes and villages in Aegean Macedonia and are evacuated to, what they often refer to as, the democratic countries of Eastern Europe. Indeed, the term Egejci, for which I use the English translation Aegeans, is often reserved exclusively for the refugees of the Greek Civil War\(^{29}\) and not those who may have left the region as a result of prior pressures.

After recounting some of their experiences in these other countries, we then return with them back to Macedonia, Vardar Macedonia. While not everyone who can be referred to as Aegean Macedonian actually made this trip – some of them remained in the democratic countries, some went to Australia and Canada, and others went directly to Yugoslavia - the people on whose stories and on whose company I have relied on in the writing of this work mostly did. This section, then, outlines the circumstances in this movement and thus designates a group of people with this shared background.

It was bombardment from the Greek monarchist forces, who were supported by Britain and later by the United States that forced the evacuation of Aegean Macedonian villages. Donka Piskaceva –Gruevska lived in the village of Setina, now found under its Greek name Skopos, halfway between Lerin (Florina) and Voden (Edessa) about 2 miles from the then Yugoslav-Greek border. She describes bombardment that forced her family and her across the border:

There followed a terrible bombardment over the village…in a panic the whole village was fleeing toward the border…On the main road a column of exhausted and frightened villagers formed…In a short time everyone reached the border each thinking only of his life. Then at the border we heaved a sigh of relief, happy that we were alive and sure that there was no bombardment.

Other than this impromptu evacuation, which resulted in the old people and young children being admitted to Yugoslavia and the older children and adults being sent back to fight as partisans, there was a more organized and orderly removal of children from the war-torn area. In March 1948, approximately eighteen months before the close of the Greek Civil War, the leadership of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) announced its plan to evacuate children between the ages of three and fourteen from the warzone of northern Greece. The children, in groups of twenty-five and led by a ‘mother’ assigned to them from the village women, walked across the mountains and into Bitola in Vardar Macedonia. From there, they were placed on trains, often not knowing

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30 Donka Gruevsk-Piskaceva, *Prekrsen zivot* 65-66
where they were going and sometimes separated from siblings, that eventually arrived in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Vojvodina in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Around twenty-eight thousand children were evacuated from the theatre of the Greek Civil War in this way.

In the countries of their new hosts they were housed in the palaces of the pre-war aristocrats, in army barracks and other locations. They were known as ‘Greek children’ and there was often little distinction between those of Macedonian ethnicity and those of Greek heritage. At school, all the child refugees studied together and the only opportunity for difference was that they were allowed to choose between a Greek literature class and one in Macedonian literature. In fact, local teachers and others responsible for the children were often ignorant of the distinction. One of the people I interviewed, who was evacuated to Poland, related a story that happened as she was learning the local language at school. At one point, her teacher asked her why she could pronounce the Polish language so well and her classmate Eleni had such a hard time. The informant explained that she was Macedonian and thus a speaker of a Slavic language. Much of the Polish vocabulary was similar to the language that she had spoken at home with her parents in Aegean Macedonia. On the other hand, Eleni was a Greek and her native language very different from Polish. Eleni was learning a completely new set of vocabulary.

This event does not only show how the refugees were housed and educated together without a lot of regard to ethnicity. It also shows something of a negotiation of identity. My informant used the difference perceived by the teacher to negotiate a negation of her membership in the
community of ‘Greek Children’ and to construct, in that moment, in the context of that class, and with that teacher, a Macedonian identity based on a Slavic background she shared with her Polish teacher. Part of the goal of this project is to highlight moments where these negotiations of identity take place and show how they are ultimately temporary and circumstance specific. Nevertheless, as shown here in the exchange between teacher and pupil, individuals, even children, have plenty of scope to negotiate an identity even with a host government.

Friendships between Greek and Macedonian children were common. One story published by the Association of Children Refugees from the Aegean Part of Macedonia tells of two girls, one Greek one Macedonian, sent to Czechoslovakia. Vaska Petrovska explains “In the train we were together the whole time, and when we arrived, together with the other children we were placed in [a] shelter for old people, Macedonian refugees after the defeat in the Civil War. Since then we never separated from each other, we went to learn Czech language together.” According to the story, they remain friends to this day and, since Vasilika Damjanidi doesn’t speak Macedonian, they converse in Czech.32

It was agreed at a general meeting of Communist Parties in Bucharest in November 1953, five years after the organized evacuation of Aegean Macedonia by the KKE, that the democracies of

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32 Victor Cvetanoski, The Golgotha of the Macedonians in Greece, (Skopje: The Association of Children Refugees from the Aegean Part of Macedonia, 2009) 111
East Europe would assist the reunification of families divided by the exile. Family reunification involved the children moving to various countries including Canada, Australia, the USA, and, closer to home, FYR Macedonia, Greece, and Bulgaria. The fourth chapter of this project deals with those who returned to Macedonia and asks the question of whether or not this was a homecoming.

OUTLINE OF THE THREE CASES DEALT WITH IN THIS PROJECT

The rest of this project continues as follows. The second chapter is a discussion review of work that already deals with names. It offers a theoretical background to the further study of names and naming in the context of this project as already outlined.

Chapter three deals with a journey I took with Aegean Macedonians back to the villages of their birth. It takes place on a bus travelling towards the international border between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece, or Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, next to Lake Dojran. From the border crossing, the bus carries its passengers, many of whom were born in this part of Macedonia, on to their various villages. From their villages we go to town hall after town hall in an attempt to apply for certificates of birth for the native Aegeans on the bus. This chapter is a record of the events that took place on this trip. Specifically, it deals with the ambiguity of names, the possibility that is left for play and resistance to attempts at fixing identity, and the impossibility

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34 Greek laws allowed the return to Greece of only those who were Greek by descent.

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of showing once and for all that a person is really the name that they are given. It also serves as a testament to the difficulties faced by Aegean Macedonians who wish to return to their places of birth. The narrative is based heavily on my own eyewitness account of the two days spent with these people on the bus, in their villages, and in hotels where they were once at home. It is put together from notes made at the time and from memories of the events.

Insofar as chapter three tackles issues of identity, chapter four deals with problems of movement implicated in names and naming. It takes place as the Aegean Macedonians, displaced as described above, return from their exile to Macedonia. Is this really a return though? In response to this question, I introduce my concept of political movement. Some Macedonians from the Aegean part of Macedonia left their places of refuge in Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and travelled to Skopje in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. To what extent could this be said to be a return to Macedonia? Through investigating this point I elaborate a theory of political movement by exploring the capacity of a name to join home space. As well as to join space, how does the name bridge time?

In chapter five, we deal with an incident in the Aegean part of Macedonia that occurred in September 1995. Incited by a sign that displayed the name of their town in both the Greek and Cyrillic (Macedonian) script on the headquarters of the Rainbow Party, local townspeople, led by the mayor and other dignitaries, stormed the headquarters and confiscated the sign. The incident, and the ensuing court case where senior members of the party were charged with inciting
violence, is used to explore attempts to decide the undecidable, the decision of the name. It investigates originary violence which, being used to decide the undecidable, must then be forgotten and hidden under the order of law. It is in this chapter that we take a close look at the failure of violence to decide the name and the tenacity of oscillation.
CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS IN A NAME?

As stated in the opening chapter, this project is an investigation into names and naming practices and what impact these practices have on some issues of world politics. The topic has received a good deal of attention from geographers, often in the context of place names, philosophers, sociolinguists, and anthropologists. Their studies have been concerned with who can name, what functions a name performs, and what names are. In international relations, despite the fact, as we saw in chapter one, that names and naming have long been implicated in relationships between nation states, study of the issue of names and naming seems to have been mostly left to international lawyers. While the now historic turn in international relations to a bigger role for language opens wide the door for an application of names and naming into issues of world politics, names and naming have not been a main theme of study in international relations theory.

This chapter will bring into detail the theory that is introduced in the introduction chapter. Names and naming are scenes of conflict and cooperation where states engage with one another and with national peoples that they would claim to represent. Not only are these actors agents in these engagements, they are made and remade during these negotiations that constantly occur. Britain, without making a claim to act in its own name, a name that has been spoken and heard and written and read in international relations for a very long time, without claiming to represent the interests of a British people, cannot function as a nation-state in international relations. It is through making these appeals to be recognized as the correct bearer of its own name that it enters
into our imagination as a state that has existed for two hundred years or so. Through its name, and the naming of some as British we can imagine that it is this large group of people acting through the nation-state. Britain becomes its name as it celebrates historic events related to its namesakes in the past, as it keeps and breaks agreements that other Britains have entered into. These negotiations with the international community, and with its own people, both ask the world to agree that it really is the same Britain that has always existed and restricts its actions to actions that reinforce its claim to the name. This is what makes names and naming so important to our project.

These struggles govern citizenship, movement, trade, and other world politics related themes and so are legitimate points of focus for international relations scholars. On that basis, the chapter continues with a reading of various texts on naming taken from the fields mentioned above. This provides a basis from which we can explore some of the themes of names and naming and consider what they might say about the themes and topics that I have said are relevant to international relations. Following this initial review of some of the naming literature, I set about developing the claims I have already made about names and naming with the help of work from Jacques Derrida and Jean-Francois Lyotard.

One of the more fundamental debates surrounding names and naming is what the connection between a name and the thing it names is and so we will start by looking at this. Next, I take a preliminary look at the instability built into names themselves. At that point I will concentrate on
translation and look at this instability as a problem for nation-states. Following this introduction
to the instability of names, I look at some of the qualities that names ascribe either to the named
or to the namer itself. In this section I will look at, among others, the qualities of possession and
security in relation to naming. I then move on to the violence of naming and consider Jacques
Derrida’s reading of Levi-Strauss. Following this I return to my theme of instability within
names themselves. I look at Jean-Francois Lyotard’s discussion of the name as the lynchpin of
reality and show, with this model, how the name fails to hold up reality.

DARTMOUTH AND THE FLOWING FOUNDATIONS OF NAMES

Ethnographer Susan Bean concludes that proper names are fundamentally indexical.\(^\text{35}\) That is,
names belong to their bearers and are not dependent upon the presence of any defining
characteristics. In this, she agrees with J S Mill who, more than one hundred years ago asserted
that Dartmouth, were the mouth of the river Dart to be dislocated by earthquake, would continue
to be called Dartmouth even though it might no longer be located by the mouth of the Dart.\(^\text{36}\)
This conception of the relationship between name and named suggests that the named doesn’t
have to prove itself to be the name it bears. It does not have the wherewithal to do so if it wanted
to. Correspondingly, should a rival to the named come and attempt to prove its right to the name,
it would have no means to accomplish this. For example, a rival city wishing to claim the name
Dartmouth would profit nothing from claiming to be situated at the mouth of the Dart. Proof that


it was so situated would bestow as much right to the name as any other city not so placed. Further, Dartmouth College can get away with its name despite being located on the banks of the Connecticut River with no proximity to a river Dart or, for that matter, the mouth of any river.

The important implication of this sort of conception of a name is the one already stated. If there is no way to prove that the name belongs to one state or another, one nation or another, then there is no restrictions on what a namer wishes to call a city, a state, a people, or anything else for that matter. We see some of the consequences of this in European enlargement debates involving non-European countries in the Maghreb and, to some, Turkey. The fact that the organization is called the European Union does not prevent speculation that non-European countries can be involved in it. In fact it would be difficult to argue that the whole of the European Union as constituted is really European. French Guinana which, as an overseas department of France, is part of the European Union is located some five thousand miles from the European continent and yet we can still refer to a European Union. With the ability to refer to states and international organizations by any name comes the reality that there can be no proof that a state, for example, really is the name they say. There are no foundations upon which to judge such a claim.

Somewhat to the contrary, John Searle argues that these foundations can be built intersubjectively. Through his theory of institutional facts, he suggests something of a

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foundation for names. Institutional facts are, for Searle, epistemically objective because there is a general acceptance that it is his assertion that meaning is collectively ascribed to a symbol to the point that it becomes an institutional fact. While the existence of a touchdown in football, which is one of the examples he uses, is ontologically subjective, it is dependent upon the perceptions of humans, we can still objectively say that one team scored 3 touchdowns and the other 2. The thing that interests us here is that he asserts that “the symbolization has to carry the deontic powers, because there is nothing in the sheer ontological facts that carries the deontology by itself.” Following this proposition, while Dartmouth does not necessarily need to be at the mouth of the Dart, it is nevertheless factually linked to its name because the collection of people who live and work in the town are known by many others to inhabit Dartmouth. This, he claims, creates an objectivity that is not ontological but is an objectivity. Here I take toponyms, names given to places, as being somewhat comparable, perhaps a subset, of these symbolizations. Doing so, we can read Searle as claiming that the power of states to demand allegiance, to require specific treatment at the hands of one another, in Searle’s words, their deontology, lies not in any physical attributes we may attribute to them – population, military, history, culture, territory for example, but rather in their name, in their symbolization and the acceptance of this at the hands of others. Where I find difficulty with Searle’s account of institutional objectivity is that it assumes a community who understand the phenomenon in the same way. It is necessary to his assertions that a phenomenon has the same significance to all members of a group. He also

38 Ibid., 20
assumes that these understandings are consistent enough over time that they constitute an objective reality.

The indexical understanding of a name does allege a spatio-temporal relationship of sorts, though. This relationship is between the name, namer and the named\textsuperscript{39}. At one point, when the name was bestowed upon the named, the two were spatially and temporally proximate. This was achieved at a baptism or some other ceremony more or less formal. In colonial times when European explorers went abroad over the seas, we can imagine them setting foot on a beach and at that moment naming the land. Certainly, it took more than a single proclamation on a seashore, it took journal entries and picking an appropriate name that would be adopted by the powerful. However, once someone has been to the far away island and called it a name while there, we can use the name to refer to the named despite the distance between us who are uttering the name and the island that we consider named thus\textsuperscript{40}. This prompts further questions. How close, temporally or spatially, must one be in order to successfully name? Is any place a valid place to perform a naming? Can anyone do this or is it restricted to certain nominators?

Ultimately though the answers to these questions are limited to people who have been proximate to the named and who have performed some sort of naming ceremony.

**CHALLENGES TO REALIZING STATES AND THEIR NAMES**

If the connection between name and named is unstable then the bindings within the name, those that connect the name to itself are themselves only superficially strong. By this, I am writing

\textsuperscript{39} Bean, 307

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
about the internal integrity of the name. One of the things that really undermines that integrity is language difference. I said that Searle relies on a universal significance of each name within a group and a difference in language undermines the slightest pretense at this. For Evangelos Kofos, a well respected Greek scholar who has involved himself both academically and politically in his country’s name dispute with Macedonia, names are not equivalent across languages. He notes the difference in meaning attached to the nouns Μακεδόνες and it seeming Slavic equivalent Македонцы. While in English we would hold these two words of equal value translating them both as Macedonians, Kofos points out the difference in meaning between the two. For him, Македонцы are citizens of the republic of which Skopje is the capital and a million and a half local Slavs. Μακεδόνες, on the other hand, are the two and a half million ethnic Greeks living in the Greek region of Macedonia. This illustrates the instability caused by translation of the name Macedonian which is given to two peoples considered, by many, to be unrelated. It is unstable because we cannot guarantee that when the name is used that we know which people we are referring to. We already know that it is not possible to prove which people really are the Macedonians – Dartmouth doesn’t have to be at the mouth of the Dart. So, we have at least two distinct groups with that name and no real way to say which is really the true Macedonian.

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41 Having been born in Edessa, Macedonia and being a loyal Greek, Kofos may count himself among these people.
42 Evangelos Kofos, "The controversy over the terms ‘Macedonians’ and ‘Macedonian’: a probable exit scenario." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 5.1 (2005): 129-133, 129
43 We will discuss some more fundamental causes of this instability later.
It is easy to see how the preceding example impacts the heart of international relations theory, the nation-state itself. If a name can describe two at a time, that is at least enough to cause confusion and to bring the self-identity of states into serious question. If it is just the name that distinguishes between states then the separation of states is a flimsy affair. It isn’t only names of nations or states themselves that are important in the crafting and maintenance of states though. Sometimes other types of names interfere with statecraft. One example of this is in the naming of the sea between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese archipelago. With the occupation of the peninsula by Japan in the early 20th century, the name of the sea that Koreans had known as the East Sea was changed, in the absence of any Korean representation to the International Hydrographic Organization, to the Sea of Japan. Not only was Korea reoriented into a sea bearing the name of its neighbor-occupier, but the humiliation affected the first line of its national anthem invoking God to protect Korea: “Until that day when Mt. Baekdu is worn away and the East Sea's waters run dry.” The restoration of the name Korea to the list of nation states (in its two forms) was not accompanied by a renaming of the Sea of Japan. Korea’s protests about the name of the sea really betray an impotence in the face of this undesirable name. It is a weakness that speaks to the question of who can name that has to do with proximity. Being on the shores of the sea, both Korea and Japan are as physically proximate as possible to the sea. However, it seems that Japan’s success, and Korea's failure, in the naming of the sea is in the hands of others.

44 Dong-hee Chang, Keynote Speech to 18th International Seminar on Sea Names, March 8, 2012
While this foundational truth of a name is elusive, the correct connection of a toponym with its ancestral source has been known to bring authority to those recounting such etymologies. In Kuipers’ study of the Weyéwa on the Indonesian island of Sumba, authority to perform an important ceremony hinged on the ability of one of the villagers to recount the story of how the village got its name. The descendents of the main protagonist in the story were the ones responsible for leading the feast. This relies on a name having an origin and a meaning linked to events that can be recounted. Had the villager sung his account and, instead of accepting it, his fellows had complained that the story belonged to another place, authority to perform the ceremony would have still been in question. Whether or not the name of the village has any foundation that can be independently verified, the ability of one to control the name to the point that they can convince others in the community that their account is correct enables him to assume a position of responsibility.

In their study of the naming of Victorian fishing boats, those used to fish in Victoria, Australia that is, Dwyer, Just, and Minnegal argue that the namer matters. Names of the boats reflect either the personal affiliations or the intentions of those who name the boat. Overall, these names serve...
to socialize the sea upon which these vessels perform their functions. In arguing this they offer a rebuttal to the work of those who claim that proper names are without meaning beyond a label for the thing named. Affiliations of the namer of the boat were most common. Names of wives and children predominated this sort of name giving. The second most popular method of naming was what the authors termed Hero-Classical. These names did not come from any personal connection between the boat owner and the boat. These names reflected the hopes that the boat would enable the operator to catch a certain type of fish or that the boat itself would become a great hunter like Nimrod.

To this point we have mostly looked at the unverifiable nature of names and naming and have said that because names have no certain foundation, there is no clear way to tell what a name should or should not be, to what or whom a name really always refers, or even who can name and when they can name. Despite the lack of foundation for names, they play an important role in world affairs. As I will explain in this section names promise a lot. They allow us to order international society and to inscribe states and nations into culture. Names allow these ideas to be spoken and written and thus allow the attribution of qualities, not least the quality of ownership and belonging, and ideas to states and people, naming plays a role in security and allows confusing jungles of the unfamiliar to be cleared. Names also perform the role of a right - the right of self expression, the right to say who you are. These roles are not exhaustive but they form the basis for the rest of this section.

48 Ibid p.7
Names order society by replacing the named with the name and thereby introduce the named into the order of culture. The name allows the named to be written about and spoken about. It allows the named to become the theme of songs, studies, and films. In international relations it is the name that we find on lists of United Nations members, on military uniforms, and international trade treaties. In so far as recognition of states is the basis of their existence, and since all states are recognized as the rightful barer of their name, the name is intimately wound up in the very existence of states. It is difficult to imagine a state existing, much less participating in international relations, without being inscribed into culture by its name. Much of international relations is conducted by names and on behalf of names. One does not have to read far into international treaties before one is faced with a list of the names of signatories. It is the name of a state that allows it to be party to these agreements. It is this representation which allows it to be included in international affairs.

Part of being inscribed into culture, of being attributed qualities, is that the name can become a locus of power where control of it, assuming such a possibility, can give control of the qualities attached to the name. In the Puccini opera Turandot and the German folktale Rumpelstiltskin we see the control of a name connected with great rewards, the same can be observed in accounts of relations between states. Kofos, for example, insists that:

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Whoever monopolizes the Macedonian name might well claim title deeds to whatever is associated or defined by that name: the history, the culture, the peoples as well as the entire geographical region of Macedonia.\textsuperscript{50}

He further explains:

In an indirect way it [whoever succeeds to impose upon foreign languages its own version of Macedonian] lays claim to anything identified as ‘Macedonian’, diverse ‘Macedonian’ historical and cultural values, even commodities from different Macedonian regions or countries.\textsuperscript{51}

Names have a serious role in international relations then. First of all, names package a range of goods—histories, cultures, peoples, regions, and commodities. Thinking of names as fulfilling this sort of a function, though, raises some complicated questions. What if more than one name is attached to a certain object? And then, if one subject claims one of the names, and another the other, then with which do the title deeds reside? How can we discern which things are identified as Macedonian in order to claim them?

Secondly, the ability to control the use of the name, to claim the name as one’s own exclusive property, is to capture all of those goods associated with the name. It isn’t quite that simple, though. To claim the name, to possess the rights to it, it is necessary to you to convince others, those who speak another language to enact your version of the name, your claim to the name, in their own language. Claiming a name has to be endorsed by a community but, in the few examples we have already encountered in this work, it is plain to see that unanimity is rarely if ever achieved in these issues. Therefore, and this is key to this project, ownership of a name is an end that is never reached. One of the main practical contributions of this dissertation to

\textsuperscript{50} Kofos, 130
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid 132
international politics and, in particular, naming disputes is that it shifts away from trying to figure out who rightfully owns the name – which is impossible – to taking interest in the maneuvers and plays actors take in order to move towards control of a name.

This theme of ownership is taken up in Pricilla Parkhurst Ferguson’s reading of Paris Street names. Commenting on the literary culture of Paris and the corresponding proliferation of streets named after French authors such as Voltaire and Victor Hugo, Ferguson writes as though the writing of one’s name on the street confers an ownership:

Voltaire, Montaigne, Victor Hugo, and Balzac have their streets in the prestigious, central sections. With a boulevard, a quai, a rue, a cite, and an impasse Voltaire can claim 3.7km, which rank him second only to the 4.3km of the rue Vaugirard.

For Ferguson “nomination makes a fundamental gesture of possession” so artists who have streets named after them in some way own the space. The location of the name of the artist in a prestigious central location endows that artist with prestige. An analogue in world politics might be the physical location of an embassy. The building which bears the name of foreign states can occupy space that is closer or further away from seats of government. Taking London as an example, Canada House and South Africa House are located in Trafalgar Square at the bottom of the Mall, the processional street that leads up to Buckingham Palace. The Palestinian mission, however, is quite a distance outside of London’s inner ring road. Canada and South Africa enjoy

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53 Ibid., 388
54 Ibid., 386
the company of names such as Whitehall, Trafalgar, Nelson, Westminster, Charles I, and St Martin. Palestine, in comparison, finds company in Hammersmith and the ubiquitous King St.

If we consider the bearers of names as somewhat belonging to the name, or belonging to the one that can control the name, then name choice can be an act of resistance to that ownership or acquiescence to it. Shobhana Chelliah explains how, in the Indian subcontinent, speakers of Meithei show support or opposition to continuing political integration with India through use of personal names. Those supportive of Indian political authority, but who cherish pre-Hindu identity, move fluidly between pre-Hindu name forms and Hindu-influenced name forms. Those oppose India use exclusively pre-Hindu name forms for one another55.

The question of who possess the named opens several possibilities though. For Kofos, we could say that there are two types of possession when it comes to the name. The first is that some things (culture, space, states, people) belong to the name in that they are identified by it. This primary possession is fully realized in a secondary possession where those who control the name lay claim to everything that the name possesses. Those controlling the name can perhaps be said to be the namers. They are not that in the same way that a priest baptizing a baby is. They are not the first ones to proclaim the name. Rather, because a name is never fully conferred, never complete and final, those that Kofos worries about controlling the name are those who speak and write the name. They are those who participate in the ongoing process of naming. He, and

anyone else who wants to finally fix a name, are right to worry about changes in meaning of the name. This is unpreventable. Ownership then, belongs to the name and those who participate in naming. In the case of the street names, we talk about the owner of the street as a person who shares the name of the street. The one who shares the name is not the one that makes the decision to name the street. On the other hand, he is in some ways still the namers. He gives his name, and all that is attached to it to the street, the street perhaps takes on the qualities that belong to the name – literary ones maybe or royal ones.

Along with implying possession either by the namers of of the place or by the one who shares the name, names can also be used to bring qualities other than possession. One example of this is the deliberately misleading naming of Greenland which “played a role in the political economy of place promotion.” In the context of the argument about whether a place name has significance beyond its indexical one, this property of naming has something important to say. While Greenland is not particularly green, and so the name really does apply without being an accurate descriptor of what it names, there is some intention to make it green in the minds of would be immigrants. The name is not attached to physical qualities of the land but it is intended to convey on the landscape a veil of fertility and hospitality and in so doing perform physical qualities.

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Another quality that names are said to be able to bestow upon a place is security. American forces in Baghdad transformed the foreign capital into an analogue of a North American city by altering the names of streets, airports roads and localities\(^{57}\). The goal was a military one. As Rose-Redwood et al. explain:

> with a more familiar set of toponyms at their disposal US soldiers were better able to navigate throughout Iraq and ‘pinpoint locations’ of potential interest.\(^{58}\)

Names are able to familiarize the foreign. Endowing unfamiliar places with familiar names can facilitate navigation and control over an area. This picture casts names as a powerful transformative force that alters a place. It shows how the qualities of a place can be adjusted through the practice of naming. This situation also shows that names need not necessarily be universally used in order to effect such a transformation. Presumably, the Sunnis in Iraq went on calling the parts of the city with the names they had used under Saddam Hussein. Maps were still bought and sold with those Arabic names inscribed on them. Nevertheless, to the American soldiers, the city was transformed from an incomprehensible spaghetti of unintelligible words, to a straightforward city of the plains, a Kansas City complete with its own Main Street. It was changed thus, chiefly through the use of naming practices.

The above discussion of the Americanization, for the benefit of the US Army, of Baghdad shouldn’t lead us to accept a straightforward account that implicates the name in a sort of

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 454
\(^{58}\) Ibid., 454
obvious cultural hegemony backed by military or economic superiority. Yurchak, in his account\textsuperscript{59} of the renaming of the St Petersburg public space following the fall of state socialism in the Soviet Union offers a nuanced account of the imposition of seemingly foreign names. He dismisses the thought that new names of shops and cafes in St Petersburg (e.g. ‘Luxury’, ‘City’, ‘Smile Market’) were merely importations of English speaking market economies. Rather, these new names are “the result of the interaction between these different cultural materials and histories…a production of something quite new.”\textsuperscript{60} These new names performed several functions. They performed a radical change from the Soviet naming system which was tightly controlled and predictable, they represented the change as desirable and legitimate, they claimed credit for this radical change for the authors of the name (the business owners), and they created a group of private business owners and clientele by publically representing them\textsuperscript{61}. This account endows the authors with quite a lot of agency and sees them able to make their own name, to create themselves through a name. It also affords them the ability to radically change the public space, much like the Americans did in Bagdad except here in St Petersburg, the effect is more general.

As well as a relationship between place names and the physical qualities of a location, names in the international system of states are seen as rights. States are said to have a right to a name. For lawyers, a name is a legal identity in the absence of which a state will “lose its capacity to

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 412
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 414
conclude agreements and independently enter into and conduct its relations with other juridical persons. Therefore, the name of the state appears to be an essential element of its juridical personality and its statehood. The name animates the state by providing a personality that allows the state to interact with other personalities, other states, individuals, corporate entities, etc. Only in the performance of these interactions does the state exist. So, the name is an essential element of statehood.

If a name is essential to statehood, it apparently does not follow, in international law, that a change in name, even one brought about by a complete change in form of government, constitutes a change in the nature of the state. A state undergoing such a change is nevertheless the inheritor of all the rights and duties it took on under its old name. As well as a change in name over time, a phenomenon that has happened more than forty times since 1982, state names are multiplied by the official languages in their home country and in the UN, by the considerations of shortened versions of the official names, by acronyms, two letter country codes, and commonly used nicknames. So, what I might refer to as Spain might be just as well designated: The Kingdom of Spain, Reino de España, es, l’Espange, etc. The multiple names in this case do not usually signify more than one state. It may be appropriate to assume, that for international lawyers, a state can be animated one time and that the name that breaths legal life into a state is immaterial. This view of names clashes somewhat with Kofos’ argument that

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63 A. Michael Froomkin, “When We Say Us, We Mean It.” Hous. L. Rev. 41 (2004), 845
64 Ibid., 847 As explained in the UN source cited by Froomkin, many of these name changes have been the result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
65 Ibid., 846-8
Makedonci and Makedones are different peoples despite the fact that they are, respectively, the Macedonian and Greek translations of the English Macedonian.

**The Violence of Names**

Coming to see names as a right held by people, nations, and states somewhat hides the violence of names and naming. By inviting states to take up their rights to a proper name, we invite them to commit violence against themselves. One of the later chapters deals with some physical violence related to naming but here, with the help of Jacques Derrida, I outline what I am talking about when I refer to the violence of names and naming. The process of naming is itself violent as it encodes the professed particularity into a system of relations of difference. The following account is a description of three violences inherent in naming.

The account of these violences is taken from Derrida’s reading of Levi-Strauss.

There was in fact a first violence to be named. To name, to give names that it will on occasion be forbidden to pronounce, such is the originary violence of language which consists of inscribing within difference, in classifying, in suspending the vocative absolute. To think the unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of arche-writing: arche-violence, loss of the proper, of absolute proximity, of self-presence, in truth the loss of what has never taken place, of a self-presence that has never been given but only dreamed of and always already split, repeated, incapable of appearing to itself except in its own disappearance.66

The right to be named, the right to one’s own name is the right to inflict this first violence on oneself. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the name is the means by which the named is

inscribed into culture. We now come to see the full implication of what we mean by culture. We see culture cast as a system of difference, in fact the system of difference mentioned by Derrida. The existence of the subject simply as itself is impossible. Only with inscription into the system of difference through a linking and juxtaposition of the name with other names does a subject come into view. It is a paradox that only by negating the absolute identity of the subject, and this is the violence of which Derrida first talks, by defining it against other identities, can a subject come into being. Being named then is the loss of what was never possible in the first place – a self-present self identity. A name is a mechanism for being comparable with others, it is a technology of socialization.

This inscription into difference means of coming into being deemphasizes the role of the one who names. For Searle, institutional facts could come about independently of other institutional facts. There simply has to be broad intersubjective agreement about what constitutes, to use Searle’s own example, a touchdown. Searle does not claim that the touchdown comes into existence by entering into a system of difference with other institutional facts like a field goal, a kickoff, a try (in rugby), a goal (in soccer), etc. It is enough that some knowing subjects bundle a set of ontological facts together with the name ‘touchdown.’ For Searle, there is no violence against the self-identity of an institutional fact which can stand for itself. As there is no first violence of naming in Searle, there is not then a second or a third which we now go on to discuss.
The second violence is “reparatory, protective” and “prescrib[es] the concealment of writing.” In Derrida’s reading of Lévi-Strauss, this violence is the concealment of the proper name of the people of the Nambikwara culture amongst whom it is forbidden to use the proper name. In issues of world politics, the name itself is not often hidden. Names of states, as we have already said are really what allow them to fully participate in world politics and hiding it would be almost unimaginable. While names are not hidden, the violence of names and naming is covered over. This is a concealment of writing even if not in the way that Levi-Strauss observes it in the Nambikwara. The concealment of writing in international relations amounts reveals itself in the discourse of self expression. In terms of states, this self expression takes the form of having other states recognize your state under the name of your choosing. While this promises to exalt your identity to the pantheon of nation-states, it actually binds you into a system of difference where any self-identity is unintelligible.

Concealment of writing enables the commission of a third violence which “consists of revealing by effraction the so-called proper name, the originary violence which has severed the property from its property.” In other words, this third kind of violence takes place once something has been named and after that name has been concealed. It is the revelation of the first violence, the violence of naming which inscribed a subject in the system of difference. The above paragraph, the one that reveals the concealment of writing could be offered as an example of this sort of

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67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
violence then. Inasmuch as it discredits the self-identity of states, it reveals the inscription of the state into the system of signs and the resulting loss of properness. Work that reveals the system of states as a hegemony of status-quo interests that allows change within the system but fights to prevent the disintegration of the state system performs this third violence.

**Names as the Lynchpin of Reality**

Part of the first violence mentioned is the movement to fixity. The inscription of the name into the system of difference promises to bring a stability to named, it promises to place the name in its proper context and to create something like an institutional fact as described by Searle if by different means. Jean-Francois Lyotard describes how names act to form an illusionary fixed reality. Lyotard shows proper names acting as a form of deictic that appear fixed through their invariability. Instead of referring to ‘here,’ which changes to ‘there’ as the speaker moves, we have a place name (e.g. Macedonia) which remains the same irrespective of the position of the speaker or writer. Names “transform now into a date, here into a place, I, you, he into Jean, Pierre, Louis.”\(^{70}\) The name is the lynchpin.\(^{71}\) For Lyotard, names make reality. Adapting Lyotard’s examples for our Macedonian purposes, an ostensive statement here is Macedonia is not enough for reality, neither is the descriptive Macedonia is the land of Alexander. Not only are both types of statement required but it is required that ostension, the here is Macedonia part, and meaning, the land of Alexander, be linked. The proper name fulfills this function by replacing the deictic, a word whose significance is dependent upon the context and the position

\(^{70}\) Lyotard and Van Den Abbeele, 10
\(^{71}\) Ibid., 11
of its utterer, in this case ‘here’, in the first sentence with the name Rome. Then you explicitly connect the deictic with the descriptive. Thus we have *This is Macedonia, the land of Alexander*. There seems to be here a fixing of the landscape not unlike Searle’s institutional fact. We have a meaning attached to a stable place by a proper name. Unlike the violence outlined in Derrida, there seems to be no negation of the subject as self identical.

In the formation of this fixed reality then, it is required that the name have some meaning to it, some significance. However, following Bean and Mill, we have already discussed how names are not anchored to any foundations in their meanings. We can therefore begin to see many different meanings attached to one name without any way to decide which are the more appropriate. Indeed in such formulations as: *Macedonia is the land of Alexander, the modern Balkan nation-state, the former Yugoslav Republic, the environs of Thessaloniki, the land that the Vardar River runs through, the region of Greece, the place that exports Ajvar, etc.* there is usually no inclination to choose between them. And, because all there is to be said has not been said about Macedonia, or any other place, the meaning of Macedonia is infinitely variable.\(^{72}\)

Despite the immutability of the name itself, it doesn’t lose the variability of the deictics in whose place it would stand. Paraphrasing Lyotard, “[Macedonia] is an "image" of many *heres* actualized in many phrases\(^{73}\)” So Macedonia is the ‘here’ where Alexander the Great was born, the place I conducted my research, and the place where many Aegean Macedonians live. Insofar

\(^{72}\) *Ibid* p.12

\(^{73}\) *Ibid* p.10
as naming does enable a fixed reality, it is one that is limited to an image fractured by its own multiplicity. Names, in fact do not, cannot, and should not follow the “principle attributed to Antisthenes: one name per referent, one referent per name,” Macedonia, and any other toponym refers to an infinite number of heres – exactly as ‘here’ does itself.

This infinite meaning is not polysemous but rather a case of dissemination. IJsseling explains the difference:

Polysemy refers to a multitude of meanings that are essentially governable and controllable. The many and different meanings can be determined and registered. Dissemination is about the phenomenon that the production of meaning is never fully controllable.

An example would be useful to illustrate the difference and its implications for those who would more clearly demarcate the boundary of the name Macedonia. An example of dissemination though is difficult. Writing at all, in acknowledgement of dissemination, is a difficult task. When meaning is not fully controllable there is always the possibility, even the probability, that some of what I am trying to convey about dissemination is lost to the reader. However, by way of example, take the following statement from the Greek Ministry of the Exterior:

Historically, the term “Macedonia”, which is a Greek word, refers to the Kingdom and culture of the ancient Macedonians, who belong to the Hellenic nation and are unquestionably part of Greek historical and cultural heritage.

We can take this as an attempt to control the meaning of the name, Macedonia. The Greek authorities are attempting to limit the use of the name to, what seems to them, a specific

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74 Ibid. p.10
75 Samuel IJsseling, "Mimesis: On Appearing and Being, trans." Hester IJsseling and Jeffrey Bloechl (GA Kampen: Pharos, 1997), 54
76 Greek Foreign Ministry, FYROM Name Dispute, http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/
historical context. This shows that the author has a polysemous view of the name. It has many meanings but through careful writing we can control the meaning and limit it to one specific meaning. Understanding this term under the auspices of dissemination tempts us to look for ways that their definition of the word escapes the boundaries set for it. We can show that the term Macedonia gets out of control even in this careful statement.

So, even with the careful attempt to control the meaning of Macedonia in the sentence above, there is still room for play and doubt. First of all, the qualifier ‘historically’, allows us to imagine that perhaps what follows in the statement does not apply anymore. Either that or, outside the discipline of history, the statement tells us nothing. Next, while we are told that Macedonia and Macedonians are ‘Hellenic’ or ‘Greek’ this does not foreclose the possibility that the Republic of Macedonia, in its present configuration, is Greek or Hellenic itself. We could understand, if we rely on this description alone, that Greece is welcoming the Macedonians into its own national community. After all, the Foreign Ministry leave us alone to decide what Greek and Hellenic mean. Are they synonyms? Do they only refer to the current Greek state? What about Asia Minor? If it could include the Pontus region could it not also include the state they call FYROM? We see Greek cultural and historical heritage everywhere don’t we? We see Washington, DC decked out in full neoclassical splendor. What is therefore different about the relationship of Macedonia to Greece? Since they are only talking about Macedonia, ‘the Greek word’ is it possible that there is another word, Makedonija for example, that through its non-Greekness escapes from this definition? Is Macedonia really even a Greek word? It is pronounced
differently from the word that is usually used in Greek which would be transliterated *Makedonia*. Which ancient Kingdom of Macedonia does it refer to anyway? There is not a scholarly consensus of what the ancient kingdom of Macedonia really constitutes.

The questions and comments on that small statement by the Greek Foreign Ministry is supposed to partly display the openness even following an attempted narrowing of the meaning of Macedonia. Since even the Greek government who are skilled writers and have a strong inclination to do a good job of narrowly defining the name Macedonia cannot fully close the possibility that the Republic of Macedonia is Macedonian, the argument for dissemination over polysemy is a strong one.

So, what we adapt from Lyotard here is a boundless bound. On the one hand, the name, with its immutable quality is the lynchpin of reality, the differentiator of one *it* from another. On the other hand, because the name must be linked with a description as well as a deictic, and because the potential descriptors with which the name can be linked are unending, the name contains unmeasured meaning. This paradox is an important one for this project. The boundless part of the concept allows play, while the bounded part demands, and promises, order. We are left with a fractured reality, one where the name does and does not operate to divide and define the world. Even when it operates, it is only able to point us towards infinite meanings and ask us to decide ourselves. Not only is the signifier *Macedonia* filled with many possible values, none more real
than another, we also see an emptiness where yet more value awaits attachment. The history of Rome continues to be written.

The name, as a function of difference, can never stand for itself, on its own merits. While we have spoken about the name receiving meaning, it can only exist in opposition to other names. Jacques Derrida asks whether or not proper names, kept secret, unknown even to the bearer, can represent themselves, can stand on their own feet. His answer is that such a name cannot exist in a pure form, there is no proper idiom. “If an idiom effect or an effect of absolute properness can arise only in a system of relations and differences with something else that is either near or far, then the secret proper name is right away inscribed-structurally and a priori-in a network where it is contaminated by common names.” This contamination with common names is important to Derrida because he is about to claim that “the proper name bears confusion in itself…to the extent to which it can immediately become common and drift off course toward a system of relations.” It is this problem that one attempts to overcome with the ostensive, the *this, you, this one!* The ostensive is accompanied by some sort of a gesture pointing to the place or person that we intend the proper name to refer to. How do we ensure though, that the gaze of the other is drawn towards the correct *it of this is it*? It is a problem we have already encountered in this chapter, it is a question of how people attempt to prove that they really are that name, that the

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78 *Ibid* 107-8
name, as a quasi-deictic points uniquely to them. Of course, it is impossible, but there exist important practices that are set up to perform exactly that illusion.

This discussion of the name as a replacement for the deictic omits the temporality of naming, its process. Temporality of naming is important to this project too. Part of the appeal of the name is a promise, or, in the terms of semiology, a deferred presence. The structure of “classical semiology” presupposes that the sign, which defers presence, is conceivable only on the basis of the presence which it defers and moving toward the deferred presence that it aims to reappropriate. In the terms of world politics, a name of a state or a nation refers to the bearer of the name despite the fact that the state itself can never be present. A state or nations name is the instantiation of an entity that we can never be in the presence of. An abandoning of this basis of presence leads Derrida to conclude that “the signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences.” What I want to add to this aspect is in some ways its inverse. What happens to this chain of difference when the difference in the sign is effaced by an identical signifier. How big is the sign? Can it contain all the difference within itself that is affixed to the name France. If we take my adaptation of Lyotard seriously, and if signifiers, in this case names, are attached to an infinite and growing meaning, and if we substitute that

80 *Ibid.*, 9
81 *Ibid.*, 11
meaning for the signified of the sign, how can the difference between signs be separated from the difference within them?

For example, let’s see the United States as an isolationist country and an interventionist one as invited to do so in two newspaper stories dating from the past twelve months. This attaches these two seemingly contradictory values to one name, the United States. Now, let us assume that x is an isolationist state and y is an interventionist one. State x and State y are fictional, self-identical one and there is a clear difference between them, one is isolationist and the other interventionist. There is no difference within them and so their respective names represent an internal identity and external difference. Let us now compare our simplified United States to x and y. We find that the United States is the same as x and the same as y. It is internally differentiated and identical to two states bearing different names. If the name United States means the things we have been invited to believe it means then it fails to create a self identical unit that is easily differentiated from x and y. To the extent that it is possible, I take up this question in chapter 4.

In Babel, the proper name is a place for gathering but is confounded by the inability to establish a precise referent. God punishes the people “for thus having wanted to make a name for themselves, to give themselves the name, to construct for and by themselves their own name, to

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83 Simplified in that it considers only two descriptors: isolationist and interventionist.
gather themselves there…, as in the unity of a place, which is at once a tongue and a tower, the one as well as the other, the one as the other.” This analysis opens up a vision of a name as a refuge, somewhere to dwell, to establish oneself. The people attempt to create a name and “to gather themselves there.” It further allows us to see what I will come to call the undecidability of the proper name. The place, the one that would be represented by the name, is as much a tongue as it is a tower, a language, and a structure. Derrida emphasizes this point when, earlier in the piece, he tells us, referring to Voltaire, “Babel means not only confusion in the double sense of the word, [the confusion of languages and of the architects building the tower] but also the name of the father, more precisely and more commonly, the name of God as name of father.” The confusion of the name of God and the common noun ‘confusion’ adds to this undecidable question of where to gather.

The question arises in Derrida’s reading of the account of the Tower of Babel about whether we can name ourselves or whether names are given to us from the outside. In the story of Babel it is precisely because the ancient men try to make a name for themselves that they are confounded. The name that it becomes called by then becomes a signifier of confusion. If we accept Voltaire’s translation of the ancient language that Babel contains the name of God therein, we see that the name the people end up with is not one of their own choosing. They are named after

85 *Ibid.*, 219
86 Voltaire points out that “Ba signifies father in the oriental tongues, and Bel signifies God,” while the Bible states an equivalence between the proper name ‘Babel’ and the common noun confusion. See *ibid.*, 219
God. Their attempt to find security in a name of their own creation results in the name ‘confusion,’ the name of someone else, and their own scattering. This does not portend well for self-determination.

Since a great portion of this project plays out within the story of the modern state of Greece, it is useful to turn to the work of Michael Hertzfield regarding Greek national identity. It is of course not only that Hertzfield discusses Greek national identity that he is useful to this project but rather that he recognizes a negotiation within the Greek identity that, in some ways as I shall describe, is dependent upon names. No one, no state, no people ever has only one name. Though, through violence (see chapter 5), one or more of the names may be forbidden, unspoken, or even unknown (see chapter 3) or unpronounceable, the negotiation, the navette travelling between the various points (names) continues on, never able to rest, carries on never able to finally arrive and settle.

Even if there were one name, however, the infinite, ever expanding meaning attached to a single name renders every name vulnerable to a negotiation with itself. Hertzfield shows this when he writes about Greece’s relationship with ‘Europe.’

Greeks today express their ambivalence about their cultural affiliations by a variable use of “Europe” both to include and to exclude themselves. Inclusion alludes to the founding role of Classical Greece in Europe, while exclusion represents the adoption of a self-view as oriental and illiterate.87

87 Michael Herzfeld, Anthropology through the looking-glass: critical ethnography in the margins of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 42
Leaving aside, at least for now, the illiterate oriental and the literate European, this variable use of the name “Europe” is significant for what we are doing here. It is first of all noteworthy that this variable use of “Europe” should not be surprising. Given what we have said about the name already, that it contains an undefined amount of meaning, it should be the expectation rather than an anomaly when we see one of them being used variably. However, if we want to emphasize the point that the meaning attached by the name can be contradictory here is an empirical example of just that which Herzfield provides us. In Greek usage “Europe” contains the Greeks and it does not contain the Greeks.

If for Lyotard the endlessness of the meaning attached to names is based on the possibility of writing - not everything that can be written about Rome has been written- for Hertzfield it is a history or istories (and not History) that allows for alterity within the meaning of the name. His history “makes possible the recognition of the recognition of a domestic alterity – of Turkish elements in Greek life.” Referring to meaning attached to the name of Greece, via ‘Greek life,’ as Turkish when it contradicts the Hellenistic ideal, is an attempt to purge undesirable meaning from the name. It is however, the attempt to purge it, the labeling of it as foreign which ultimately draws attention to the contradictions within the meaning attached to the name.

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88 Ibid., 42
Herzfield employs this dichotomy between the imperfect, human, Turkish, feminine *Romiossini* and the, law-abiding, codified, and masculine Hellenism. In so doing, he points anthropologists away from a “rule-bound concept of the past, highly idealized and conformist…that has dehistoricized and universalized itself,” and towards “the internal, practical history of Greece…of the villages and towns, of social life.” This use of two names for the study of Greek anthropology sets off the same sort of negotiation that we have been speaking of. It allows for, and even privileges, a fallen concept of Greekness.

More significant for this project is the splitting of the meaning that might otherwise be attached by the name Greece to a deictic sign like ‘here’ or ‘there’ or ‘those/this people’ That there is no final arbiter does prevent a clear, authoritative differentiation of name bearers. This disorder does not prevent attempts, particularly by modern governments, to demarcate and to clarify.

This project owes something to ethnography and as such attempts to represent a group of Aegean Macedonian refugees in the Republic of Macedonia. By now, ethnography has a reputation for generalizing the experience of the ethnographer and, usually, the wealthy elites of the village where the ethnographer plies his trade, and the important people, traditions, practices,

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89 Ibid., 93-4
90 Ibid., 94
institutions, and events of the subjects of ethnographies are dependent on the view of the writer. Ethnography is complicated in this context, however. It contains field work, interviews and archival research. It involves me, the participant observer, travelling to a land populated by others in order to see how they live. I am starting from the position though, that the people I am investigating are negotiating their identity. They are their own ethnographers in that they write and rewrite their people, their ethnos, through their participation and their implication in naming practices. Further, the Aegean Macedonians, on whom I concentrate throughout this project, are not the only participants in the practices that name them and bring them into being. Their ethnos, then, is written by themselves in conjunction with border guards, police men, administrators in town halls, party and association officials, movies, and one another. In this sense my work here aims only to be a record of particular portions of that ethnography on which no one and no group enjoy the final word.

As we have already begun to say, this group is an important one because of their experiences of exile and their presence in a land that is at once home and foreign. So my research focus with these people, one that was gladly accepted and directed in some ways by the Aegean Macedonian exiles themselves, was their movement from Greece to Eastern European countries.

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92 Ibid., 160
93 The Greek word γράφω (grapho), to write forms the last part of ethnography.
94 Έθνος (ethnos), ‘nation’ or ‘people’ forms the initial part of the word ethnography.
and then to the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. Not only was their movement important to me, but also the attempts of various states to either expel, refuse entry to, or make these exiles stay in their respective territories. These attempts involved naming practices and elicited resistance and cooperation in these naming practices from the Aegean Macedonians.

Giorgi Donevski, who passed away during my time in Macedonia was highly influential in providing sources for this ethnographic research. He was a long-time leader and friend to the Aegean Macedonian exiles in Macedonia. He organized groups and, at the time of his passing, was working with lawyers to try to help the exiles claim their family properties in Greece. He was a well known and well loved advocate of these people. It was he that provided me with names and phone numbers for about twenty Child Refugees from Aegean Macedonia. Now well one in life, those I contacted, and those I met in the club that Giorgi kept in the basement of a high rise in Aerodrom municipality, were more than happy to talk to me about their experiences in their native villages, their exile to Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Vojvodina, etc. Those interviews really gave me a sense of their background and what was at stake in a study about home and identity. I reference some of the interviews in this work but their value extended even beyond that of the few quotes contained in here. They provided the impetus and the direction to find out more about the issues of name, home, and identity in Macedonia. Giorgi also referred me to two archives. One was the Cinematheque of Macedonia and the other was the State Archive of the Republic of Macedonia. In the former I was able to watch the films: *Po Dolinata na Vardar* (1950), *Crno seme* (1971), *Crveniot Konj* (1981), and *Inkoninuo*, a
documentary made about the exile of Aegean Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia. All of these films had reference to the Aegean Macedonians and their contents came up in interviews with members of Giorgi’s society. They allowed me to participate in some of the cultural heritage of the Aegean Macedonian exile. In the State Archive of Macedonia, I was given access to the files of the Society for Refugees from the Aegean Part of Macedonia. The file contained minutes of meetings from local and national boards of the society mostly from the fifties. The file also contains lesson plans used for teaching the Aegean Macedonian who they are as Macedonians. Papers viewed here constituted primary sources for looking at how Aegean Macedonians were accepted and how they were organized when they started to come home to the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. I used these sources extensively in chapter four where I deal with the question of whether Aegean Macedonians returned home when they came to SR Macedonia.

Finally, the experience I gained as a participant observer when Aegean Macedonians went to apply for birth certificates in their places of birth in Greece formed the basis of my chapter three. Travelling with Giorgi Donevski and members of his society gave allowed me the opportunity to see the naming practices that take place on the border. Participating in their applications for birth certificates presented me with a view that showed the actions of the Aegean Macedonians as well as those representatives of the Greek state who participated in naming practices. It made me a witness to these practices in an immediate way that did not rely on the accounts of others.
CONCLUSION

As we move on to the stories of the Aegean Macedonians and their encounters of naming with nation states in the Balkans and elsewhere, we now have a concept of the name and its significance to the study of nations and states. While states are said to have the right to bear the names that they select for themselves as a form of self-determination, not all states are able to control their own names. Not only are they not always allowed to select their own name but even selecting a name is negating their self-identity or self-presence which is a violence that states and nations are asked to perform on themselves. It is through a name that nations, states, and nation-states are inscribed into culture, into a system of signs that function through difference to one another making self-determination a thin illusion.

As well as being the vehicle through which states and people abrogate any pretence to self-identity, names also are seen to indicate ownership connections within the international system. Names can unite territory, people, culture, and products and can facilitate control by anyone able to control the use of that name. It is not just the property of ownership that the name expresses and facilitates but it also can bestow other properties upon the named as in the case of Greenland which was named with the intention of making it more economically attractive. In Baghdad, naming was used to make the city more navigable and secure for American forces operating in the region.

We have also seen that names, although they may be designed to fix reality by offering an invariable way to write and talk about places and people that would otherwise be referred to by a
string of deictics, have infinite meanings attached which multiplies and fractures reality. This state of affairs is exasperated by the lack of foundational connection between name and named as Mill argued long ago about the city of Dartmouth. This combines a multiplicity of meanings for each name with a lack of foundation for deciding between contradicting meanings. These features of naming play themselves out in the history of the Aegean Macedonians whose stories we now consider.
CHAPTER 3
WHAT IS YOUR NAME?

Early on a Sunday morning we waited for the bus outside of the Holiday Inn in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. The bus had been organized by the group, Nezaborav, which is a club of some three thousand people who were born in, or have close family ties to the Aegean part of Macedonia. There were a handful of people sheltering from the dark morning under the porch of the hotel when I arrived. A man, who must have been in his seventies, greeted me. We had met in the club on Friday when we were both paying our fare for this trip. Our conversation, partly in Greek and partly in Macedonian, was a mixture of weather and the challenges of being a Macedonian in Greece. The Aegean part of Macedonia, or simply Macedonia if you are the government of Greece, was our destination that day. There, members of this organization and their guests would visit their native villages and, as a demonstration of their human rights, apply for birth certificates in town halls staffed by Greek functionaries.

In this chapter, I want to focus on two ‘discursive practices’ that I divide spatially from one another. Both of them occurred during the course of this excursion. Both of them belong to the class of phenomena that I have referred to in my introduction as naming practices. The first is the border crossing. It is at the border that we are asked to prove that we are the name that we say we are. Since, as was argued in the last chapter, this is an impossible task – there is no basis for a name - then what is it that we really do during the border crossing and how is it determined that we have successfully completed the assignment that we are given? The second practice I discuss
here is related to the recording of births. Part of the trip was devoted to the application, at Greek
town halls (demarcheia), for copies of the Aegeans’ birth certificates.\textsuperscript{95} Part of the proof that you
are the name you say you are is your certificate of birth. It is a record that a person, who was
born in such a place at such a time was called a certain name by someone who was at close
proximity to that person. It works like the naming of a discovered territory as we discussed in the
last chapter. These two practices, then, involve one being asked to certify to another that they are
the name they say they are.

The Aegean Macedonians case is an important and informative one for several reasons. Often,
names of individuals are not disputed by states. Any dispute could be settled by connecting the
name of the individual to the name of a state. This is what a passport does. The name on the front
of the document, the name of the state, is well known. This well known, and perhaps respected
name, reinforced by armies of soldiers and diplomats, underwrites the name of the individual
. This is not the same as saying that names of states themselves are not problematic. Indeed, in the
case of Macedonia, the name is openly and famously problematic. The Aegean Macedonians
themselves also have problematic names, at least in the context of proximity to Greece. The
names which they are known in their families and in their Macedonian passports are not the
names that were registered by the Greek authorities where they were born. These people then
have the added difficulty, and added room for play, of two names. They have the name that they

\textsuperscript{95} When referring to these places I will refer to them in transliterated Greek for which the singular will be
rendered demarcheio. I would like to try to convey the foreignness of the places to the people with whom
I travelled. In addition, since the word contains the idea of Demos, people, it will be appropriate to use it
while discussing the role it is designed to play in the construction of people.
are known by and the name that was registered as an attempt to document their existence by the Greek authorities.

In this chapter I show how the naming practices are set up, how they fail to finally fix a name, and what tactics those caught up in the practices have at their disposal in order to make life go on in a situation where they cannot show that they are the name that they are known by. In this event, those working in the name of the Greek state, attempt to co-opt the naming practices in order to establish names for people born within the performed borders of the Greek state, as well as the places and parents of these people. These names that they attempt to establish are ones that conform to a supposed Greek idiom, which stands to represent the assertion that all people whose origin is within the borders of modern Greece are Greek, they come from Greek progeny, and Greek villages. Ultimately this practice fails to link these people and places unambiguously to a Greek name that is itself an ideal that is constantly reiterated but never able to establish itself as a sovereign idiom. Aegean Macedonians, with smiles on their faces and in the way that one would answer a quiz show question, with Slavic accents, present themselves to the Greek authorities using Greek names for themselves, their villages and their parents. They present themselves as ignorant of their Greek names, they guess at the names. We will discuss these tactics that allow Aegean Macedonians to pass through these tests and visit the site of their native villages. We will discuss them in the context of Jacques Derrida’s negotiation.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. Following a brief description of the events that dislocated the Aegean Macedonians, I will discuss the practices in which I played a part in September 2011 in the land that lays on the borderlands of Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. I will first discuss the border crossing both on that day and as described by some of those I spoke to in their former experiences. I will then discuss the different but related practices of the demarcheio. Before that, though, I present what I mean when I talk about discursive practices.

**Discursive Practices**

Since they are an important part of my work in this chapter, a discussion of discursive practices is warranted. It only during such practices and by such that meaning, as temporary and mutable as that meaning may be, can be gleansed from what may represent itself as a physical act. I deal with the border checkpoint and the demarcheio in terms of them being sites of such practices. I want to highlight the *practice* of discursive practices. I see them as rites that one participates in. The approach to the border, where the symbols of nation states such as flags and police uniforms adorn the location, is a procession to a site consecrated by the state for the purpose of admitting foreigners and natives. Bearing the correct artifacts, the passport, the stamp, the biography, maybe even hotel receipts as evidence, one enters into a liturgical negotiation with a proxy of the state. Like all discursive *practices* we are not talking about words on page, writing is not limited to the written word. In these locations, as we shall see, people are produced, not in the sense of

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fixed, stable individuals, but as one who is constituted and reconstituted through the various
discursive practices in which they participate.\textsuperscript{98}

This is not to suggest that, because the practice of crossing the border produces individuals and
states supposed to be involved, that they do so in the same way every time. Similar, even, if there
was a way to differentiate and compare them, identical discursive practices are used for different
purposes depending upon time and circumstance.\textsuperscript{99} The practices that I discuss here are used by
some Aegeans to produce themselves as Aegean Macedonians at the same time that other people
are trying to reproduce Greeks.

\textbf{CROSSING THE BORDER}

At the end of the road “Marshal Tito,” that runs along the shores of lake Dojran lies one of the
three border crossings between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. It was here that,
following a meandering trip around Macedonia picking up the dispersed members of our group,
we arrived prepared for the crossing into the Hellenic Republic. The Macedonians on board the
bus had been instructed by their leader, Gjorgji Donevski, that they might well be asked to give
their names, the names of the villages where they were born, and the names of their fathers. It
was explained to them that, were they to be asked, they should answer with the Greek versions of
these names. One lady was worried because, being so young when she left Greece, she had never
heard her Greek name spoken, nor seen it written. She was therefore ignorant of it.

\footnotesize \textsuperscript{98} Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harré, “Positioning: The Discursive Production of Selves,” \textit{Journal for the
Theory of Social Behaviour}, Vol 20, No.1, March 1990 p.46
\footnotesize \textsuperscript{99} Jansen, 394
Leaving Macedonia was a straightforward affair. Like the experiences I have had with borders in England and the United States: handing over my passport and getting it back with or without a new stamp in it. We handed our passports to the organizer of the event and he handed them to the Macedonian authorities. Aside from about 25 Macedonian passports we also handed a French passport, five American passports, and a couple of Australian ones. The negotiation of identity was more obvious when those passports were handed on to the Greek border agents. Since the border agents do not recognize passports issued by a government with the name The Republic of Macedonia, they insisted that those of us travelling with these passports use a separate sheet of paper that is provided by the Greek authorities. These sheets are not objectionable as they do not contain the name of the state where their bearers hold citizenship. However, since there were many of our number without these sheets, we were delayed while the Greek authorities handwrote these forms and stamped them. In a reconstruction of this delay, I will suspend my account of the crossing here. Border crossings are sites of hospitality and, since names and identities are strongly implicated in affairs of hospitality, I will break here to discuss hospitality in some detail.

Awaiting Hospitality

Hospitality has been important to the modern study of International Relations since Immanuel Kant’s (1795) *Perpetual Peace* proscribed the treatment of visitors from foreign states with hostility. In this section I want to clarify to engage in a negotiation of hospitality. In this

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100 Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A philosophical essay* (Boston: American Peace Society, 1897), 19
negotiation, I intend to foreground the role of the name in hospitality. Derrida associates the question of the name with hospitality and it requires little work to frame his concept of hospitality as a question of names. So, after a brief exploration of Kant’s concept of hospitality, I will emphasize the concept of the name in the hospitality questions formulated by Jacques Derrida. All this I do with a view to exploring the name and its role in mobility across borders.

A traditional liberal concept of hospitality focuses on the individual, the citizen of a foreign state and how that person can expect to be treated by another state of which he is not a member. The way Kant articulates the rights, privileges and interdictions of hospitality make them seem very compatible with the rules governing immigration to liberal states in the contemporary world. Indeed they are. Kant’s code of hospitality: recognizes the division of the Earth into peoples, each of which possesses a land; allows host states to refuse entry to would-be visitors; disavows any perceived right for a stranger to remain permanently in the land of another; protects the guest from hostility on the condition that he “occupies his place peacefully.”

These assumptions create a difficult environment for the crossing of Aegean Macedonians into the Greek-governed land that they were born in. If we take Macedonians and Greeks as peoples then dividing the Earth into separate peoples separates Greeks and Macedonians. If each of these peoples is said then to possess a land then, as currently constituted in international law and norms, the land that the Aegean Macedonians were born in, the one that they wish to visit on this

\[101\text{Ibid., 19}\]
trip, is currently apportioned to the Greeks. Further, the Greek state is allowed by Kantian hospitality to refuse entry to the Aegean Macedonians insofar as they are visitors and a separate people. Finally, as well as allowing the Greek authorities to refuse permanent leave to remain to the Aegean Macedonians, Kant protects the peaceful Macedonians from hostility. Following the advice of Donevski and presenting themselves as Greeks to the border police is thus a well thought out tactic. Rather than present themselves as guests at the mercy of the Greek authorities, they present themselves as Greeks who belong in Greece. In doing so, they cross the border of identity in order to cross the international border.

In universal hospitality, Kant sees a precursor to world citizenship or “cosmopolitical right”.

Since the:

"community of the nations of the earth, in a narrower or broader way, has advanced so far that an in justice [sic]in one part of the world is felt in all parts, the idea of a cosmopolitical right is no fantastic and strained form of the conception of right, but necessary to the unwritten code, not only of the rights of states but of peoples as well…"

Kant's eye may be fixed on achieving perpetual peace and universal citizenship but his hand does not extend that far. While 'community' is singular, he renders 'nations' in the plural – again separating the Aegean Macedonians from the Greeks that they fought alongside in resistance to the Germans, Italians, and Bulgarians and during the Greek Civil War and, as a result, from the land of their fathers. Consistent with this imagined world of nations, his third definitive article for perpetual peace limits membership in a world community to the principle of universal hospitality. Thus, the Aegean Macedonians and the Greeks are joined together only in the act of

\[102 \textit{Ibid.}, 21\]
hospitality including the hospitality of the border where we now await the return of our papers. Of course, this hospitality is itself tightly circumscribed.

The German philosopher argues that the affording of hospitality is not a “philanthropy” but a required concession based on natural law. The unruled surface of Earth, or the global commons as it is often referred to, belongs to all mankind equally. The commons, Kant mentions seas and deserts but we could add air today, both divides the peoples of the Earth because of its uninhabitability and unites them because of the free access to other peoples it allows. The Atlantic Ocean may be a vast expanse void of habitation and therefore divide people in America from people in Europe. However, the fact that there are no measures to prevent free movement of ships on its surface and aircraft above it makes it a permanent connection between the two peoples. This connecting property of unruly regions of the Earth is based on the premise that "Originally, however, no one had any more right than another to occupy any particular portion of the earth’s surface." It therefore contravenes Kantian natural law for Barbary Coast pirates to raid ships in adjacent waters. The telling word in the above quote, however, is ‘originally.’

The prior paragraph really explains not a natural law of hospitality but one of communication. Where the surface of the Earth is still common - in deserts and seas, it is against natural law to prevent access. This law is a prerequisite for the establishment of friendly relations between the

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103 Ibid., 19
104 Ibid., 19-20
105 Ibid., 19
106 Ibid., 20
peoples of the Earth. While this establishes a natural right for members of one people to
approach the homeland of another, what are their rights when they arrive? Kant's account of
these rights, brief as it is, reflects more on what is outside the rights of a foreigner than what
those rights comprise.

First, Kant affirms, nothing gives the foreigner the right to be a permanent visitor. Thinking of
the other role in traditional hospitality, that of host, the potential for a guest or visitor to someday
attain the role of host is completely off the table at this point. This eventuality is not even made
possible by its interdiction. Even leave to remain in the company of strangers “for a time
requires a specific “friendly agreement.”

The right that the stranger is allotted in Perpetual Peace is the right “not to be treated as an
enemy when he arrives in the land of another.” Although we might breathe a sigh of relief that
the stranger will not be slaughtered or imprisoned on sight, this quoted text also does something
else. Slightly later on in the paragraph, Kant asserts that “Originally, no one had more right than
another to a particular part of the earth.” This original condition has now surely past for Kant
and this passing allows him to speak of “land of another.” As possessor of the land, the
stranger’s host has the right to refuse to receive him. The proviso articulated by Kant is that in
refusing to receive him, the host cannot cause the destruction of the traveler.

107 See Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 6
108 Kant, 19
109 Ibid., p.19
110 Ibid., p.19
111 Ibid., p.21
These aspects of Kant's theory are particularly important. The highest status that a foreigner can even imagine in this work of Kant is that of "permanent visitor". This constructs a world of naturalized peoples, a world where the Aegean Macedonian, as a Macedonian (and not a Greek) can never be at home in the land where he was born. It is a right for Aegean Macedonians to approach the Greeks across the desolate space between the border stations. It is an expectation that, once the Macedonian has reached the Greek border post, that he be spared of violent confrontation, however, it is impossible for that Macedonian visitor to ever achieve any status beyond that of a guest amongst a foreign people. This implies that the guest from abroad is always the recipient of hospitality for as long as he will sojourn in the land of the other. If the strangers, out of benevolence, agree to allow the migrant to remain, he remains a guest.

While hospitality as discussed by Kant constitutes a familiar state-centric view of the concept, which makes the state’s capacity to extend hospitality unproblematic, and makes hospitality dependent on international agreement between states, Jacques Derrida’s critique\(^{112}\) has called into question this view. Kant’s permanent stranger is almost entirely subject to the whim of the host state. His right is only the right not to be violently confronted or to be denied entry where such a denial would result in his demise. In the works of Derrida, we have a very different stranger. In traditional (specifically ancient Greek) hospitality, Derrida sees a foreigner with real

rights, a party to an agreement that extends beyond the not being killed or sent to his death but also being tolerated, having his differences tolerated. One of the reasons that his work is so useful to this project is that, going beyond a simple natural rights argument, Derrida opens up questions of identity that are intertwined with hospitality.

Derrida summons the figure of Socrates as he stands before the Athenian tribunal to defend himself. While we will remember that Socrates refuses to appeal to the sentiments of the men there gathered by bringing wife and children to plead for him, Derrida outlines one plea that Socrates does make on his own behalf. The concession that Socrates seeks is hospitality, to be treated as a foreigner. Why does Socrates, a native of Athens, though admittedly a foreigner to the court, wish to be treated as a foreigner? Derrida explains simply that: "at Athens, the foreigner had some rights…a right of hospitality for foreigners." The words that Derrida puts into the mouth or mind of Socrates are: "if I were foreign, you would accept with more tolerance that I don't speak as you do, that I have my own idiom." Hospitality is thus rendered in this scene as a tolerance of difference. Socrates’ demand for hospitality here is not a demand that his life be spared. As we all know, his life is not spared and even when offered to him by a friend later in Crito he does not prize it enough to break the laws and retain it. The sort of hospitality that is described by Derrida in this passage, then, turns away from Kant’s imperative not to kill the foreigner to an expectation that the foreigner will have his differences tolerated.
Going further, the notion that Socrates can ask for hospitality in Athens at all is a break with any Kantian convention. If Kant sets up a world of peoples each with their own territory with universal hospitality extended at the borders of these territories only then Socrates, as an Athenian, who spoke daily in the market place, is not at a territorial border, at least not an immediately recognizable one and so cannot be recognized as a beneficiary of hospitality in the Kantian sense. His foreignness is not derived from birth in another state, or another city, but rather from his unfamiliarity with the idiom of the court and the rhetoric of the young. Casting Socrates as a potential recipient of hospitality in his home (and native) city of Athens opens up hospitality and increases beyond number the size of the pool of potential guests.

Significant it is to note that that which is tolerated is not a difference in language, Socrates is not a Barbarian, but a difference in idiom. It is this very point that follows in Of Hospitality "That the foreigner, the xenos is not simply the absolute other".

The foreigner is intelligible. As well as enjoying tolerance of his difference, the foreigner, through the pact he makes, the xenia also takes on an agreed identity. Or, as put by Derrida,

> Precisely because it is inscribed in a right, a custom, an ethos, and a Sittlichkeit, this objective morality that we were speaking about last time presupposes the social and familial status of the contracting parties, that it is possible for them to be called by their names, to have names, to be subjects to law, to be questioned and liable, to have crimes imputed to them, to be held responsible, to be equipped with namable identities, and proper names. A proper name is never purely individual.

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113 Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, 21
114 *Ibid.*, 23
But intelligibility is not enough in the Greece-Macedonia dispute. Macedonia was invited into the community of nations, the United Nations under a name given it by the organization: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. While sufficient as an interim name for use in the United Nations, it is not a name by which it can be invited to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Hospitality is produced by what seems like a dialectic. This productive opposition is described by Jacques Derrida in the fifth of a series of seminars given in Paris in January 1996. Entitled *Pas d’hospitalité* (Step of hospitality/No hospitality), 115 this work describes a difference between the law of hospitality and the laws of hospitality. For Derrida, 116 the law of hospitality initiates an impossibility. The law of hospitality, or hospitality as absolute hospitality, or unlimited hospitality demands that we “say yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before any anticipation, before any identification whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of another country, 117 a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or female. 118 The law of hospitality, then, is

Derrida emphasizes identification here and enriches it by later explaining that this law requires us “to give the new arrival without asking a name” 119 The law of hospitality, then, is

115 These two possible translations are the ones used by Rachel Bowlby translator of Derrida and Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality. I refer to this book when I cite the lecture.
116 Although not for all see Roxanne Doty, “Fronteras Compasivas and the ethics of unconditional hospitality,” *Millenium- Journal of International Relations*, 2006
117 This “citizen of another country” is more complicated in the Macedonia Greece case since Greece does not recognize the Republic of Macedonia as another country. At the Greece-Macedonian border, the Greek authorities will tell you that you are entering Macedonia only when you pass their inspection.
118 Derrida and Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality, 77. (Emphasis in original.)
119 *Ibid.*, 77. (My emphasis)
characterized by the lack of the question of a name. It demands that we give all without asking a name.

The laws of hospitality amount to the constitutive antithesis of the impossible law of hospitality. They are an attempt to render real what would otherwise be an “abstract, utopian, illusory” concept. In the attempted implementation of this utopian hospitality, conditions are added. We see this in hospitality laws implemented by modern nation-states. In these regulations, we see that questions are required. Who are you? Where do you come from? What is the name of your father? Where were you born? How long will you stay here? Why did you come here? This first question demands that you answer with a name, an intelligible name. Again the question of the name arises. It is essentially this requiring of a name that separates the laws of hospitality from the law of hospitality. While this dialectic between name and no name might define the two constituent parts of the concept of hospitality, the dialectic is complicated by a further question of the name. If the laws of hospitality require we ask a name before we allow someone to become a guest what name shall we agree upon? Derrida sets up these related questions nicely thus:

Is it more just and more loving to question? [as pertaining to the laws of hospitality] or not to question? [as pertaining to the law of hospitality] to call by the name or without the name? to give or to learn a name already given?

We see then that the opposition that produces the concept of hospitality can be expressed as the question of the name, to ask or not to ask. The case of the Aegean Macedonians that I discuss here is a case that directly refers to this question of names. For reasons yet to be explained in this

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120 Ibid., 77
121 Ibid., 29
paper, these people are known by at least two names. Sometimes, they are aware that they are known by another name but do not know what that name is. While the unknown name is a keyword that allows them entry to the path that leads to a reclamation of their past, they are left to guess it. Aegean Macedonians have often been assigned a secret identity that they can only learn during games of trial and error.

At the time that the *decata begalci* were born, in Greece, an ethnic Macedonian would likely be given two names. The first one, and the one they are most likely to know is a Macedonian name. This name would have been given by her parents and would have been known in the village. However, when the birth or christening was registered with the Greek authorities, these authorities would register the name as a rough Greek equivalent. For example, the name of Macedonian Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski is a Slavic name. Had he been born in 1930s Greece his name may have been registered as Nikolaous Grouios. It is probable that he would never have heard this name used to refer to him. Because there is usually more than one way to Hellenize the name, and because many of the *decata* do not know Greek, this name could be completely unknown to him all his life. Especially where the child was very young when she was evacuated, she may well never have heard the Greek version of her name and may not realize that it exists.

Being known by a name that is not familiar to you, or is not your familiar name, refers us to this question of the name. When we offer hospitality, do we do it to someone with a name already

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122 This is precisely the name of his Aegean Macedonian grandfather.
given or do we give a new name? While it is not my intention to answer the question of whether or not this is “more just or more loving,” it is my intention to explore the negotiation of identity that this type of hospitality demands. How have Aegean Macedonians encountered the question of the name and what have they done under these conditions? How have the laws of hospitality, on the wrong end of which they have often found themselves, invited them to negotiate their identity.

As stated, the laws of hospitality represent the attempt to render hospitality within a legal framework. Laws of hospitality govern relationships between individuals, relationships between a sovereign and his people, between sovereigns, and between sovereigns and the people of other sovereigns. For example Arizona’s ‘Castle Doctrine’ law regarding the use of deadly force in the protection of one’s home expressly forbids the use of deadly force against an “invitee. 123” This law is certainly an attempt to legislate a particular concept of hospitality one, in fact, that draws from Kant’s prohibition of violence against the peaceful guest. It is criminally non-hospitable to invite someone to your home and then kill them (or threaten to do so). Clearly, it is Derrida’s laws of hospitality rather than law that govern the justifiable use of force. People other than those with a legal right to be in the structure or an invitee are defined as intruders and the use of deadly force against such a trespasser can be justified in the law. This would not be the case should the law of hospitality be in effect and we accepted all who come.

123 Arizona Revised Statutes, 13-419 Paragraph C 1
Diplomatic relations between states are also governed by the laws of hospitality. Section 2 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states that “The establishment of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent.” Again, states are not excepting whoever comes in this convention. Before the establishment of a diplomatic mission, questions will be asked, among the first of these questions will no doubt be what is your name? Who are you who want to represent yourself to us? Only when states have negotiated mutually acceptable answers to these questions do diplomatic missions become assigned. There are no Basque diplomatic missions.

BACK TO THE BORDER

Back at the border, the preparation of the paperwork for the twenty people that didn’t have it took over two hours. During this time, one of the border policemen entered the bus. He was asking some of the passengers (in Greek which several of the questioned did not understand) questions about where they come from. What is your name? he would ask. The decata begalci would try to pronounce the Greek version of their names. Some knew the names and gave them, others struggled and were helped by others on the bus to Hellenize their names. What was your father’s name? Again, the Macedonians on the bus would Hellenize the names of their parents, the names of villages where they were born. I count this as a negotiation of identity and will speak more about it later. Here it is enough to say that these Hellenized names result from and exist only in this very specific negotiation between decata begalci who wish to visit their native land and Greek authorities.
The name issue, as it is known in popular discourse surrounding the issue that Greece and Macedonia have over the constitutional name of the latter is actually a names issue. This became further apparent as we crossed onto the now Greek side of the border and the people on the bus started to talk about where their villages were located? The change in names of these villages created a sense that the topography that was remembered by these people no longer existed at least not on the road signs or maps. As well as the change in names of villages, mountains, rivers, and lakes had also changed. This caused difficulties in planning routes through the homeland of these people, some of whom remembered well the names of their villages and surrounding topographic markers but could not find them on maps or road signs.

Before moving on to the Greek side of the border, though, there is something to be said about border control. It has been argued that borders are a place where the citizen submits fully to the might of the sovereign. The would-be traveler, the would-be guest, recipient of hospitality, surrenders an account of his identity to the border authorities which ultimately decide whether he is thereby admissible. This account of a powerful sovereign and a submissive subject is one which I counter with this story of negotiation. The identity that is finally agreed upon as a basis for acceptance into the country is the result of a negotiation. It is one that was not necessarily in existence before the negotiation took place.

Mark Salter investigates how airports succeed in "securitizing identity". Drawing from Michel Foucault's confessionary complex, where subjects are rendered docile in the face of state
interrogation,\textsuperscript{124} he represents the sort of relationship between sovereign host and potential guest that I dispute here. His work describes power in the airport, at least its sources, as diffuse. Authority is exercised from multiple centers. Amongst the agencies exercising governance of the airport are the airlines, national aviation security agencies, private airport and airline operators, the International Civil Aviation Authority. While the sources of power are diffuse, the exercise of that power is very concentrated and, according to his theory, irresistible. These powers are focused on the airport, a place where mobile citizens, deviants within the nation-state structure congregate, in order to regulate and surveil deviant behavior.\textsuperscript{125}

Although he does not do so explicitly (how could he), Salter links his study of the airport with our study of hospitality. "For the citizen, the immigrant, the refugee or the asylum seeker," attests Salter, "airports are places of extreme interrogation of one's identity and home\textsuperscript{126}" This linking of identity and home is important to our study and is this pressure that mobile people[s] come under at locations such as airports, national borders, and police stations, that initiates the game where identities - names, both of people and of homes, become malleable. As mentioned before, the role of the traveler in determining his identity is seriously limited in this article by Salter. As he puts it "a traveler is the author of one's [sic] identity, but not the final arbiter of his/her belonging.\textsuperscript{127} Somewhat nullifying this authorship, though, is something of a submission

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Ibid.}, 52
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid.}, 52
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ibid.}, 53
to authority described in this piece. When dealing with the confessionary complex of Foucault within airports, Salter remarks "As travelers are conditioned to confess their history, intentions, and identity, they submit to the examining power of the sovereign." While what Salter is saying here is perfectly reasonable, it omits something important. It is reasonable in that, when one answers a question one is unavoidably agreeing to the validity of the question and its asker. In this way the answerer is submitting themselves to the asker. However rather than putting themselves under the power of the sovereign, they are surrendering a mutually acceptable avatar. Since identity is the result of negotiation, as Derrida writes, "A proper name is never purely individual," both parties submit. They submit in the way that one submits an object. The authority submits narratives that can be used by the traveler that aid in the production of a narrative. In turn the guest-applicant submits this produced narrative.

The specific process that interests Salter in this work is the request of an individual to enter a space and the adjudication of a government official of that claim. Although Salter acknowledges differences between crossing different borders, this "'deep structure' of sovereign politics," represents something universal for Salter. Representing oneself at the border constitutes about one half of this 'deep structure', this resigning of the social contract. It is both a resignation of the contract in that in presenting yourself and requesting entry you resign any right you have to the protection of the sovereign. In the same move you resign the contract by

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128 Ibid., 59
129 Mark Salter, "When the Exception becomes the rule: borders, sovereignty, and citizenship" Citizenship Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2008), 366
130 Ibid., 366
presenting yourself as a loyal subject of sovereign power and make the Hobbesian promise to 
obey the decision of the sovereign. This presentation of oneself to the sovereign is a main subject 
of my work here. It points us back from the topic of performative borders towards the theme of 
hospitality. We do not need to gaze distantly since, recalling Kant, it is at the border that 
hospitality makes its domain. In the presentation of oneself before the sovereign, one must 
"confess all manner of personal information including economic, social, and psychological 
factors for our travel and our return home." More fundamentally, we must confess our name. 
In order to be offered hospitality we must represent ourselves with a name that is legible to the 
sovereign.

As we have seen though, in the case of the Aegean Macedonians, they are not confessing their 
name. The name that they consider theirs is illegible to the Greeks. It is incomprehensible and 
unacceptable. Sometimes they do not know the name. In what sense then can it be said that these 
people are confessing their identity in the face of the sovereign? While Salter's work emphasizes 
the power of the sovereign to demand submission of something personal, I would like to argue, 
with Derrida, that a proper name is never purely personal. It is social property that is negotiated 
in the sorts of spaces that Salter investigates such as the airport and other border crossings.

Also, these negotiations take place in other places. When the taxi driver asks me where I am 
from on the way back home from the embassy we engage in a similar negotiation. Of course he 

131 Ibid., 369
does not wield the power of a sovereign state but nevertheless the question demands that I answer with a name that is agreeable to us both. When I answer with the name of my native town, Hartlepool, this is usually not satisfactory. It has no meaning to my interlocutor and so another question follows until I can give an answer that is legible. Although a very useful place to start, hospitality is not only acceptance into a sovereign state but also into a taxi, or a school, or the home of a potential friend, a landlord. Identities that ultimately refer to states, to sovereigns, are negotiated all the time.

For Salter, mobility has long been perceived as threatening behavior. Salter wants to preserve the border as a specific state of exception and consciously privileges the decision of the sovereign made at the location of the border. Combined with his image of the docile supplicant at the border, Salter writes a rather formidable, demigod of a sovereign. In this work I will present a rather different narrative where the sovereign and the applicant engage in a mutually constitutive negotiation. The identity of both being constructed by ear and contingently on the basis of the extension and acceptance of hospitality. While it may not qualify under Salter's definition of sovereign politics, it is nevertheless politics and at least as worthy of attention as an overbearing sovereignty reducing all who come into contact with it to quivering confessors.

Salter argues that the performance of sovereignty is most apparent, not in decisions to exclude or include foreigners or refugees, but in the decision to exclude citizens. These excluded citizens are the real constitutive outside of the protected inside. Therefore, even the insiders are not

132 Ibid., 366
safe.\(^{133}\) This also is relevant to the Aegean Macedonians. Georgi Donevski is convinced that Aegean Macedonians who were children at the time of their evacuation from Greece are entitled to Greek citizenship. A removal of the automatic right of entry to the place where one is a citizen adds weight to an argument that nobody is really at home, at least not permanently. The threat that the sovereign can deport you at any time or can refuse your return to your native land is enough to make you a stranger. In the same way that Kant's foreign citizen can only ever be a long term visitor in your country, so is this the most any of us can hope for. What about the sovereign though, the one who excludes or accepts. Is the sovereign the only host? Reaching this conclusion would have serious implications for liberal political theory and politics as it is understood in much of the world today. Should all citizens turn out to be long-term visitors with the sovereign as the sole host then sovereignty begins to look distinctly alien to citizens. Salter ultimately shares this conclusion\(^ {134}\). Where I aim past Salter is with my assertion that sovereigns are not the only ones equipped to change their mind. There is not a fixed herd of sheep watched over by the wolf-Leviathan. Rather, when the wolf gets hungry for sheep, citizens can present themselves as goats.

A journalist born in Romania to Aegean Macedonian parents related a story. When travelling from Macedonia to Greece for work he used to have to fill in a form at the border. On the form was a space for nationality. He would write Macedonian in that space. In response, the Greek

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 374-375
\(^{134}\) Ibid., 375
officers would insist that he write FYROM.\textsuperscript{135} When he would refuse to do that, the Greek authorities would let him leave it blank. It is possible that the authorities filled in FYROM after the journalist had left the border. However, not writing it in himself shows the power that he had to negotiate his nationality at the border. He was not free to write what he wanted but was free not to write what he didn’t want.

Roxanne Doty investigated immigration and identity in the historic case of post-World War II Britain. While Britain, she says, might be considered an unlikely case of an identity that is not fixed fast, actually, there are no unlikely cases. Her fundamental assumption that identity is "not fixed and stable but are rather always in the process of being constructed and reconstructed\textsuperscript{136}" can be used to somewhat undermine the power of the sovereign at the border. When we consider identities as being always in a process we see that, while the sovereign may really think he is demanding that we uncover something real, fixed, and pertinent, we cannot give that. Our identity, particularly with regard to nationality but also even our name, is open to negotiation and at borders, wherever they are constructed, is where this negotiation takes place. In this sense, we answer Derrida's question of the name, with a no. When asked do we offer hospitality to someone with their own name or do we give a new name, or do we not ask a name we answer that names are social and are open to negotiation.

\textsuperscript{135} As the acronym of [the] Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, this is usually offensive to Macedonians.

Doty argues that "the construction of foundational grounds occurs through discursive practices that attempt to fix meaning." Understanding the issue like this, we can identify hospitality as one of these discursive practices. Hospitality, at the border and elsewhere, discursively produces a (potential) host and a (potential) guest. At places like border lines, a negotiation of identities takes place that attempts to fix the identities of the negotiators; at least for a time.

This work of Doty's focuses on the measures taken by the British state to deal with the ambiguity of its own identity arising from increasing immigration to the commonwealth. The identity of the immigrants themselves is handled more incidentally. Her illustration of the "tension between universality and particularity" at the heart of the discourse of Commonwealth identity includes the following quote: "We are responsible for them, and they think of themselves, as anybody who has been there knows, as British people. Oh yes they do. It is rather moving." This quote, as well as illustrating the tension between universality and particularity is also suggestive of a negotiation in progress. As Doty points out, there is the tension between constructing a ‘we’ and a ‘them.’ This also suggests a negotiation of identity. The speaker would probably set himself up as a final arbiter but nonetheless the claims of Britishness from the Commonwealth citizens is an important influence on his perception.

APPLYING FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATES

\[^{137}\] *Ibid.*, 248

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Names were also the focus of discussion in the demarcheio (Town Hall) in Nea Zichni. The Vrodous or Sharlija mountain range separates the Greek peripheries of Serres and Drama and divides Greece from Bulgarian municipalities bearing the names of prominent 20th century revolutionaries that feature in the Macedonian national anthem such as Jane Sandanski and Gotse Delchev. To the south of these mountains, on the road between Serres and Drama lies the village of Nea Zichni. It was about noon when we arrived there having been informed by workers in the Serres demarcheio that the records for a village where three of our number were born were kept in Nea Zichni.

What happened in this town hall was reminiscent of what we had encountered at the border of Greece. We entered a room which served as the office for four local government functionaries. Explaining, in pretty good Greek, that we had come to apply for birth certificates for these three people so that they could later apply for Greek passports, Georgi Donevski began the exchange. The man at the desk closest to the door demanded the names of all those who were making an application. Georgi had briefed the applicants beforehand that they should use the Greek names that would have been recorded in the Greek records at the time of their birth. Two brothers answered with their Greek names. The third applicant, a woman, was not sure what her Greek name was. With Giorgi’s help, she took an educated guess. The Greek functionary wanted to verify the names of these people by seeing their papers. As evidence the applicants handed over their Macedonian passports. This caused two objections from the functionary. The first was “How can there be a country called Macedonia? Is there a country called Macedonia?” While the
Macedonians wanted to refer to the state to prove their names, the name of the state was questioned. The second objection was:

You told me that your name was [Greek name] however, in this document [that I do not recognize because it has the name of a fictional state] it is written [Macedonian name]

After objecting in this way the man looked up the names. While he found the names of the two brothers listed with their family in his records he could not find the name that the lady had guessed was her Greek name. While he had found the records of the two brothers the functionary refused to issue the birth certificates. Next to the names of the brothers were written words to the effect that the Greek state had removed citizenship from the children. The sovereign had, in the absence of these children, judged that they no longer desired to be Greek citizens.

Dimitar Chulev, the journalist who was born in Romania to Aegean Macedonian parents and who now lives in Skopje recounted an experience he had on a visit to his native village. There he visited a woman who lived next to him when he was a boy. It was the first time he had seen her in decades and she was now an elderly lady. He said that when he told her that he was Dimitar who she had looked after when he was a child she replied with disbelief “You can’t be Dimitar Chulev.” The evidence she offered in support of her statement was that “Dimitar was a small boy, you are old.”

Of course, this is an experience that perhaps we all have at some time. We run into an old lady who knew us when we were children. She tells us that she cannot believe we are the small boy who damaged some of the flowers in her garden while playing football and brought new ones to
replace them. We then try to convince her that yes indeed we did it. We recall some of the other
details surrounding the incident or recall other memories we expect they share. This conversation
is a negotiation of sorts. The incongruity of the way we look, speak, and act now compared to
when we were seven years old demands an explanation. In a way, the elderly interlocutor is
correct. We are not the boy that played football in her yard. Our faces are different, we are older,
larger, we speak a different language from that child. Perhaps the only thing that stays the same
is the name. So we use the name to claim the little boy that we are not any longer.

Anyone who has followed the dispute between Greece and Macedonia over the constitutional
name of the latter will recognize in the above example more than a little of this dispute. In this
work I want to deal with names. We have already begun to see how the name issue cannot be
separate from issues with other names. When an Aegean Macedonian takes out his passport to
prove he really is the name that he claims to be and is confronted with the objection that the
name you appeal to for verification of your own name itself needs verification. Then, when a
woman is unable to give her name because she does not know the correct Greek formulation of
it, again we see the implication of the name dispute causing disputation of names of individuals.

In the same way that an adult claims a young boy by his name and so is only a name, is a state
anything more than a name? When we talk of the survival of states are we not simply discussing
the successful continuation on a claim to a name. What else can we be referring to? Are we

\[ \text{Here we catch a glimpse of Derrida’s “systematic play of differences” where concepts, in this case names, simply refer to other concepts. What results is a deferral of meaning. Jacques Derrida, "Differance," Margins of Philosophy, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), 11.} \]
talking about the government? No. Governments in some states (Italy) change as often as once a year but we do not talk about the death of Italy every time this happens. What about constitutions? If states were constitutions then French history would begin in 1958 with General DeGual. This would be an unusual and unacceptable conclusion to draw. The fact that France can refer to its current constitution as the Fifth Republic itself belies this sort of position. Is a state a history? If it were a history, and if we understood history as a series of interrelated events and the understanding and social significance of these events then how could they ever be jeopardized? How could armies and navies protect or menace an entity that is built on things in the past, things that no longer are? Is it a culture, a way of life? If my parents culture, their idiom, their memories, the way they spend their spare time is not exactly mine, (and can it really be?) then do I belong to a different state? If one British person plays cricket on the village green and another plays football in the street then is that the same state or different? If playing cricket on the green ceases does Britain cease? Did Britain die when fox hunting was banned? Or when football was invented? Or when the industrial revolution brought trains and ended canal transportation did the state die? What more is there to a state than the continued convincing (but certainly not substantive) claim upon the name? Having your name accepted by your peers or accepting the one that they give to you? The survival of the state is the survival of the name. When we take these questions seriously we link identity and hospitality and start to see how the problems facing Aegean Macedonians with regards to their names is rooted in the laws of hospitality.
CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL MOVEMENT FROM MACEDONIA TO MACEDONIA

According to the electoral program of VMRO-DMPNE, the governing party of Macedonia, a “separate museum for the exiles from the Aegean part of Macedonia”139 is to be built in Skopje. It is due to be completed in 2014 and has a budget of MKD 5,000,000 or about USD 135,000. This separate museum is to be under the auspices of the Museum of Macedonia, which, with a budget twice that of this special museum of the exiles, will also receive new premises. In the special museum of Aegean Macedonians “their Golgotha” will be exhibited “through authentic documents, photographs and objects”140

MUSEUMS AND NATIONAL SPACE

Thanks to the work described by Handler and Gable in their *The New History in an Old Museum*, we can question how “ideologies and interests…underpin or are reinforced by those representations of culture”141 exhibited in the museum. Museums are not simply “repositories of cultural and historical treasures.”142 On that basis, we can wonder what the curators of the new museum, under the direct charge of the ruling party in Macedonia wish to tell us about the Aegeans. The new museum of the exiles can be seen to reflect the position the exiles themselves occupy in Macedonian national space, at least in the minds of its creators, in the following way.

140 Ibid
142 Ibid., 8

98
The exiles occupy a space that is simultaneously equivalent to and different from the space of the Museum of Macedonia. In one sense, their artifacts are at home in the national space. In this interpretation, one points to the new museum coming under the auspices of the Museum of Macedonia, its location in Skopje, and its inclusion in the development plan of the nationalist VMRO-DMPNE party. In another sense, the artifacts are separated from the national space signified by the Museum of Macedonia. They are in a separate museum, funded by a separate budget. The struggles they have experienced are known as their Golgotha when described in the political platform.

My argument in this paper is that one reason for our ability to say that Aegean Macedonians live both inside and outside of the national space, which seems like a contradictory state of affairs, is the phenomenon of political movement. When we engage in political movement we alter the meaning associated with space, in this example the national space. In manipulating this meaning of space we shift the Aegean Macedonians beyond the border of what counts as national space and back again. Therefore these exiles can be both home and away in Macedonia because the meaning attached to the space we are assessing allows enough room for the play of politics, a politics of naming space and people. This has real implications for international studies – not least investigations of diasporas to which I now turn my attention.

DIASPORA AND ITS RELIANCE ON DIFFERENTIATING SPACE
Current discussions of diaspora are centered on the idea of movement, physical or spiritual, from one defined space, usually associated with a homeland, to another, usually foreign space. They rely on knowing where the group belongs and whether that group currently resides in their homeland or not. It would be difficult to identify a group as part of a diaspora if they currently lived in the homeland where they longed to be, wouldn’t it? While studies on diaspora have examined a range of non-physical space, none escape the problem caused when the division of space is contested – as it always is.

Safran’s definition of diasporas has been influential in the study of the phenomenon. Its six diaspora-defining characteristics, without exception, rely on an ability to separate domestic and foreign spaces and to determine whether a potential diaspora resides in one or the other. As a corollary, they require that we identify the supposedly diasporic group with a homeland. While I do not have space here to discuss all six, I will, by way of example, show how two of them make the assumptions mentioned. The first of these criteria state that “they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original ‘center’ to two or more ‘peripheral,’ or foreign regions.” Applying this test to any ‘they’ poses the problem of identifying a center distinct from the periphery. Without such a distinction we can never say whether people have been dispersed from a center. Also present in this criterion is the idea of dispersal, of movement from

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one space to another. If the differentiation of space is possible then deciding whether people have moved from one to the other is unproblematic.

If it isn’t, though, how can movement be discerned? Macedonians, specifically Aegean Macedonians would meet Safran’s first criterion if we understood the difference between center and periphery unproblematically. We could make an argument that the traditional region of Macedonia, comprising contemporary Macedonia, parts of Greece, and parts of Bulgaria, is the center and that Australia, Canada, both of which hold many Macedonians, are the two peripheries. What about those Aegean Macedonians who have moved from Macedonia, via a third country to a Macedonia that is sometimes considered a different Macedonia?

Safran’s fifth criterion has a similar need for the identification of qualitatively different spaces. It goes as follows: “they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return.” This time again, we are asked to designate a homeland for a group of people who are defined by movement. Further, we must be able to differentiate that from their current place of abode if any sort of return is to be effected. If we wanted to know whether or not the people to whom I spoke constitute or do not constitute a diaspora, we would have to be able to know whether the place that they now live, Macedonia, is separated from their ancestral homeland, Macedonia. Only if they agree that they are no longer in Macedonia can they seek a return to Macedonia. Yet, if they agree that they are

\[144\] *Ibid.*
now not in Macedonia then they divide the territory of Macedonia into an authentic Macedonia and a Macedonia that is so in name only.

Clifford offers an alternative way to identify diaspora based on “decentered lateral connections…and a shared, ongoing history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance.” This is more promising and less reliant on the differentiation of space. With the help of Rouse, Clifford makes the point that spaces seemingly separated by distance, like Aguililla and Redwood City, “become effectively a single community.” This position represents an opposing pole to the argument that distance must separate the diaspora from its homeland. It is a movement towards a single community but still spreads that single community across space that can be identified and differentiated by the different names attributed to the cities where the diaspora resides. While motioning to a position that undercuts the need to distinguish space, Clifford also wants to hold onto it. He uses distance from a center, and thus relies on distinguishing spaces, as a defining feature of diaspora by positing that distance from the center is an important point in distinguishing a diaspora from a borderland community.

Michael Baumann traces the development of the meaning of the word diaspora from its historical links to the Jews. Looking at the word diaspora as a second to third century BC neologism,

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147 Clifford, 303
148 *Ibid.*, 304

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Baumann describes it as a technical word to describe the “Jewish existence far from the ‘Promised Land’." It is used at that time to distinguish the enforced separation from Jerusalem under Babylonian captivity, which was described as exile, from the choice to enjoy a higher standard of living away from the war torn region. This has two assumptions. One is the common thread running through the diaspora literature generally that diaspora involves being far separated from home. The second involves some agency on the part of those dispersed. Though they could return home, they choose to remain separated from their homeland for the time being because of the less than ideal circumstances that persist there. To make such a judgment, though, those involved must understand that they are separated from their home, that where they live now is not their homeland. On top of this, we must think that they can see their homeland well enough from where they are to discern the current political or economic situation and make a judgment about it. We must also assume that they control their own movement.

Beginning from the concept of diaspora and the insistence of those who work in this area that space be clearly differentiated is useful in broadening the impact of the problem discussed in this paper, namely the problem of dividing space from itself and assigning it as homelands to groups. Not only have we to consider how physical space is divided, which is the main focus for this

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paper, but beyond a physical geography lies that of the “mental and social. How are we to divide up a mental landscape and detect movement between its distinct parts?

How can we tell whether a group constitutes a diaspora? When ideas such as center and periphery have been exposed as ineffective and in a world of movement how can we tell the migrants from the indigenous, the host from the guest? How do we know when someone is at home or not?

These questions apply to the group of Aegean Macedonians discussed in the previous chapter. It is them that I have in mind when I ask these questions. Their stories begin towards the end of the Greek Civil War in 1948. A major part of the Macedonians in Greece, because of promises of recognition of their nationality and the provision of schools and churches in their own language, sided with the democratic forces in the conflict. While some Macedonians disavow the leftist politics of the movement and insist their motives were entirely nationalist, and others distance themselves from any form of nationalism even now, the promise of a homeland in the Aegean part of Macedonia, a place where the Macedonians could attend school and church in their mother tongue was enough to entice their participation in a war against the right wing Greek government. Men, and later many women, over the age of 14 were drafted into the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG), closely linked to the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and fought alongside Greeks (often under Greek officers). Their strength, and their expected homeland was

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150 Kim Knott, “Space and Movement” in Knott and McLoughlin, 80
centered in the north outside of the main towns. Villagers in the mountains sheltered and supplied the fighters of DAG and provided auxiliary services.

When we use this as our starting point to talk about a potential homeland for the Aegean Macedonians we see how, even though these people had lived in these villages for their whole lives, and their parents and grandparents before them, their belonging to the place is put in doubt. Even before the coming flight from this place they are both at home and not at home. They are fighting to remain at home in their villages, but fighting also to make it truly their home where they can realize the promises of the KKE by being allowed to speak their language and worship in their own churches. Aegean Macedonians are fighting to achieve a homeland in their homes.

In retaliation for these services to the communist side of the war, the ‘monarcho-fascist’ forces, as my interviewees referred to them, supported by British and American militaries, bombarded these villages. Towards the end of the war, when only elderly women and children were left there, and bombs were still falling, it was decided to evacuate the children. This would free up remaining women to go to the front to fight. This began a massive a new stage in the massive exodus of Slavs from the Aegean part of Macedonia. Therefore, without achieving a homeland in their homeland, being both at home and separated from their homeland by the coming defeat of their side in the Civil War, they were expelled from their homeland before they achieved it.
The children were evacuated to democratic countries in Eastern Europe in groups led by (usually) elderly ‘mothers.’ Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia (Vojvodina in the beginning) were the usual destinations of these children. Some of them spoke Greek and others didn’t but, as explained in another chapter, all were usually known as Greek refugees. The leaders of DAG, along with the political leadership of the KKE went into exile in Taskent following defeat in the war, which many claim was decided at Yalta anyway.

CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

From this discussion of diaspora we move to a glance of the critical geopolitics program. This chapter is about names and space and so it makes sense to consider some of the more critical work on discursively produced spatialities and their relationship with world politics. During this discussion, and more so in the next sections, I will flesh out my theory of political movement and how names play a role in both distancing people from and returning them to their homes. In this section I argue that critical geography and geopolitics opens a space for me to discuss the discursive production of space. They have called attention to changing representations of space and the dependence that these representations have on hegemonic powers and the relationship of other societies to these powers. My look at political movement is inspired by this denaturalization of world space. However, my thoughts on political movement take me away from the hegemony that critical geographers often find in these discursive productions of space. Rather than building controllable representations of the world, political movement suggests a constant flux in space so as to disavow any recourse to hegemonic discourses.
Critical geographers have highlighted the inconstant quality of space as experienced by people. John Agnew charts the journey towards understanding the Earth as the world.¹⁵¹ As early as the 15ᵗʰ century, European voyages of discovery effected a subjective view of space and moved towards a view of the world as a whole via its impact on cartography. Since “the practice of navigation over the open sea required a precise positioning of the travelling self in relation to the world as a whole,¹⁵²” then “perception of space was no longer totally abstract.¹⁵³” There was the expectation that maps reflected what was really out there and that, by looking at the whole world drawn in a seemingly objective way, all on one page, a view of the whole world as if from space was possible. This re-visioning of world politics is a historicization of the movement from an abstract world governed by conjecture to an objective rendering of the Earth.

While this historicization accepts the variability of space and our imaginings of it, it doesn’t capture the vacillations that occur in that imagination. In Agnew’s account, the movement is unidirectional. We move from the cartography of conjecture of the ancients to the modern ‘objective’ view that sets the stage for world politics. As a result of this unidirectional movement, there is really only one politics under discussion, that of Europe and its offshoots. While this makes Agnew’s theory a one of massive global significance as a destabilization of the status-quo rendering of world politics, it does miss the to and fro of political movement that I

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¹⁵² Ibid., 19
¹⁵³ Ibid., 19
describe below. My contention, which I articulate in a field much more local than global, is that while it can seem like there is one dominant view of world political geography, at least on a local level, there are competing narratives which defy any global generalization. Further, these rival geographies vacillate from one imagining of local geography to another moving people and places in the process.

Another project of critical geography is to expose the western centrism of spatial divisions of the world. These divisions are often based on levels of development with region imagined as more or less developed often depending on how much like Europe they are. Toal illustrates this point with reference to the discourse of the Cold War and the Truman Doctrine which “spatialized a free world, a slave world and a world that has to choose between the two.” In the same work, his focus in the paper, he also mentions the spatialization of a Third World that is a target for development. This sort of categorization of space is also represented by what Agnew calls ‘time as space.’

Alternative systems of governance are classified as the product of backward societies that resemble the past of the West. Even modern Italy has a “straightforward inheritance from the

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155 Agnew, Geopolitics.
past” constituting a “political practice which is based on the exchange of favors.” This view is unsettled with the reminder that “the ideal of civic maturity is hardly realized anywhere on earth.” However modern we might see a region or a country as being, this does not exempt that locality from the reality of political favor exchange.

Again, this is a useful critique of the allocation of qualities to world spaces. It denaturalizes the universalist ideas of development and modernity. It also casts differences between regions or states as alternative modernities rather than as manifestations of the pasts of more advanced spaces. The focus of critical geopolitics tends to be on the defining of geographical boundaries between societies. Critical geographers open up discourses of spatialization but tend not to focus on the variance of space that at first glance seems occupied by one society. In its foregrounding of hegemonic power exercised through such spatializations, it doesn’t pay attention to the alternatives that occupy the same geographic space thus fracturing that space and casting it in such a way that it can no longer be referred to as simply one space. It can’t really because what it is taking on is a globalized hegemonic way of looking at the world. My treatment of space in this chapter is particularistic in that it takes inspiration from events in a relatively small geographic space and investigates how space is defined and redefined across very small spaces of time and circumstance.

\[156\text{Ibid.}, 41\]
\[157\text{Ibid.}, 41\]
I have said that critical geographers concentrate their attention on hegemonic discourse. This is another difference between what I am trying to do here with political movement and what the critical scholars of geopolitics have been successfully doing. Agnew and Corbridge, leaders in the type of scholarship we are discussing here, state that:

Spatial practices and representations of spaces are dialectically interwoven. In other words, the spatial conditions of material life are shaped through their representations as certainly as representations are shaped by the spatial contours of material life.\(^\text{158}\)

For them there is a reflexive relationship between what is really out there and representations of what is really out there. This is important, in part, because it privileges some political and scientific elites who best understand what is really out there and so become purveyors of authoritative representations of space. Specifically “those in authority in the Great Powers or within the hegemonic state (if there is one) have the power to constitute the dominant geopolitical discourse.”\(^\text{159}\) These dominant discourses are tenacious and “even challenges often must conform to the ‘terms of debate.’”\(^\text{160}\) At the level of global discourse, these arguments have some appeal. If you take pronouncements of governments and the media that report them seriously it is conceivable that you can find a coherent dominant discourse. It is my contention, however, that such dominant geopolitical discourses have much less influence in the face of local expertise and that competing spatializations live on side by side. These may be particular to regions, circumstances and times. They can go on independently of any sort of global dominant

\(^{158}\) Agnew, and Corbridge, 47
\(^{159}\) Ibid., p.49
\(^{160}\) Ibid., p.49
discourse and the existence of these very localized representations of space belie the saliency of any overarching worldview.

**Political Movement**

Now that we see the children evacuated and the parents, those that survived the fighting, exiled from the homeland that was not quite yet a homeland, we turn to the question of return. If the people I am referring to, those refugees from the Aegean part of Macedonia, are to be considered a diaspora then there must be some prospect of a return home. It is this issue which leads me to my concept of political movement. A useful starting point for a discussion of the concept is a claim made about the refugees of the Greek civil war; the claim that “[m]ost never returned home.” The refugees referred to left Greece around 1948, immediately prior to the defeat of the communist forces, with which many ethnic Macedonians in Greece fought, and took refuge in the democratic countries of eastern Europe. Later, many were reunited with their families in Skopje and other Macedonian cities north of the Greek border. The claim that most never returned home excites the question: what about those who settled in Macedonia? Did they return home?

To say that they did not return depends upon a distinction between multiple ‘Macedonias.’ It assumes that the Macedonia in which they now live is not the same as the Macedonia from which they fled. The name is the same but the space it is supposed to represent differs. Names

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play an important part in this concept. In our case, the name remains the same but the space that name represents is considered qualitatively different – it is not home.

Remember that Lyotard shows proper names acting as a form of deictic that appear fixed through the invariability of their form. So, while ‘here’ can be any place (it could be here, or here, or even here), Rome, is considered to occupy a particular place. Macedonia is similarly expected to be one unchanging place. This is the source of stability and changelessness that space, appropriately endowed with a name, conveys to us. A feature of Lyotard’s system is that there is one name that is to attach meaning to a defined space. The name connects so much description to one place, one here, that it creates an over determined system. *Rome is the capital city of the empire, the modern capital of Italy, the ancient city, the rail terminus, the home of Lazio football club, the city where the European Economic Community was founded by treaty, etc.* Because all there is to be said has not been said about Rome, the meaning of Rome is infinitely variable[^162]. It is in this infinitely variable meaning that politics acts. In different circumstances, in different relationships, and at different times, limited subsets of these infinite meanings are brought to bear. And, in the changing meaning of the word, people are ushered across borders, alienated from their home here and repatriated there. Without moving themselves, the ground underneath them moves as meanings are altered, fixed, and liquefied.

[^162]: *Ibid.*, 12
In understanding space in this overdetermined way, political movement goes someway to countering what John Agnew describes as the view from nowhere pervasive in studies of the international.

“[B]ecause of the strong tendency to associate space with stasis or changelessness…state-centricity has continuing normative attractions…It provides a grounded set of socio-geographic units for both longitudinal and cross-sectional data analyses.”

A concept of political movement is a movement away from the grounded set of units towards a world of shifting ground that offer no basis upon which to make data analyses. It undermines the set of units that offer themselves as a ground upon which to base studies of world politics. The metatheory of fixed points of reference, data points, depends upon the idea that the ground contains some meaning in itself, some self identity. It is an attractive one. The physical appearance of geographical features changes very slowly and often not at all in several generations. With technologies of cartography based on the fixing of points in relation to seemingly immoveable features and abstract grids of Cartesian coordinates, space appears rigid and even self-defined. However, accepting space as identical to itself is a capitulation to the idea that Agnew calls “a view from nowhere.” Political actors, including nation states, have views based on “partiality and situatedness.” This leaves space, like anything else, open to politics.

The political part of political movement consists of a negotiation, in Derrida’s sense of the word, between two poles. The image of being between two positions and moving backwards and forwards from one to the other gives us the sense of the political contingency that exists in this
interstitial place. This negotiation is itself a political movement where we are in a constant flux between two poles and can never settle on one.¹⁶³ For example, in the case that we discuss here, we can never fully discern the true Macedonia from the false one because names cannot be proven and the meaning of Macedonia continues to be written. Since there is no way to distinguish between the different Macedonias and the movement from one to another can never be finally decided, we can never rest at one of the poles and so the movement between the poles is perpetual. This inability to rest on solid ground is what the politics of political movement implies. This movement, and the attempts to stop it once and for all at one of the poles, to decide once and for all the real Macedonia is the politics of political movement, in fact, it can be thought of as the movement of politics.

The movement of political movement is a little less abstract but no less contingent. This movement is the effect of rendering someone home or away by striking a particular political position. Since these political positions are contingent upon time and circumstance, people can be and are moved regularly and quickly between belonging and not belonging, between being a stranger or a host. Movement understood in these terms can be experienced even when standing still. Take my opening discussion regarding the museum for example. Without any physical movement on their part, the museum moved them backwards and forwards across the border of the national space. So this movement then is between or within political spaces like states for

example that are themselves political in the sense we have already described. Whether or not people move, the movement of politics can take them from their homes.

**Names and Political Movement**

The final component is names. Names supply the vehicle for both politics and movement. It is by proclaiming one name and not another that political stances are made manifest. It is also, as we shall see in the case of exiles from the Aegean part of Macedonia, the means by which we know if we have moved, if we have returned home or not. We move from place to place under the steam of names. It is names, displayed next to roads, on GPS devices or map books that provoke a sense of change in location. Some see these road signs as the evidence of the presence of a central authority, or the cultural norms and nation building of a sociopolitical elite. Names are not only held as evidence of a central organizing authority or a reference to an original nominator. Names orient and locate people and peoples. Due to the political nature of names already described, then, people are relocated on the basis of politics and this is the movement of political movement.

The removal of signs bearing the names of towns during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 led to a major disruption of Red Army operations. As Czech writer Milan Kundera explains: “Overnight the country had become nameless. For seven days, Russian troops

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wandered the countryside, not knowing where they were.\textsuperscript{166} That the capacity of a professional military force to move is severely limited by the absence of names begins to speak to their requirement for movement.

As well as the disorientation of not knowing where they were, the removal of names disrupts the movement of the invading troops. It is not only that they didn’t know where they were. Kundera can only describe them as wandering the countryside and not moving from one place to another: he cannot tell us where they were. Without a change in names there is no movement, not in the sense of a from here to there movement, only a wandering. Concurrently, with a change in names there is movement. In this account of the nameless Czechoslovak countryside, it is the lack of change in names rather than the absence of names that is the crucial factor. Indeed, there was one name, Czechoslovakia, which made the event relevant to the Czech writer, which nevertheless did not change as the soldiers wandered its countryside.

Azaryahu concentrates his work on the significance of names and what they can and cannot tell us about official histories and changes in regimes. For example, he is interested in the changing street names of Paris as a “use of names of streets and squares for the purpose of political representation.\textsuperscript{167}” The investigation of political movement is not primarily one of this political representation in the manner of Azaryau’s work. It is also the effects of the breakdown of names,

\textsuperscript{166} Azaryahu, 317

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid p.313
when one name, like Macedonia, is endowed with meanings that suggest multiple places. All this assumes, but mostly neglects, any claims to political representation that names may have. Rather, it concerns the possibility of movement in the midst of these representations, their contradictions and temporality. The result of the change, clash and clang of representations is that movement is at once hindered and facilitated.

Movement across political borders is performed by a change in names and related symbols. As you cross the border between Macedonia and Greece, where movement between spaces is performed by flags, checkpoints and questions, formal and informal, you are immediately greeted with a paradox. Pulling away from the post of the Greek border police, and entering Greece, you are greeted with a road sign emblazoned with the phrase: ‘Welcome to Macedonia’. The ‘welcome’ part of the sign suggests a move from one political space to another yet the name remains the same. What those who put the sign there, the Greek authorities want it to say is welcome to the region of Macedonia, this constituent part of the Republic of Greece. Welcome away from that imposter Macedonia. However, the incongruity of the welcome, the performance of the border crossing, and the name of the place sets off yet another negotiation, the back and forth between difference and identity. The identical name on either side of the border calls attention to movement between political entities as a performed, artificial, and arbitrary phenomenon contingent, in part, on a change in names. It destabilizes the border.

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168 Derrida, *Negotiations*, 12
Here, though, we are concerned with movement from Macedonia to Macedonia, a movement between spaces whose identical name is a vain protest of a negotiation that goes on in its meaning. The claim of identity, a political one for sure, draws attention to political movement, a movement activated by a political stance. The political stance of the sign in Greece welcoming you to Macedonia, or indeed directing you to take the ‘Macedonia wine route’ through the countryside, is an attempt to erase the name of the territory from which you have travelled there. Moreover, you will not see any signs to lead you back to the Republic of Macedonia but instead placards will bear the name of its capital Skopje, FYROM or even, directing you back 20 years, Yugoslavia. As movement between political spaces is determined by names, the politics of naming, or naming with political intent, interferes with movement. And so, movement becomes dependent upon standing still and maintaining a (political) position. You can deny movement without the border.

Showing the results of this split in the name, this failure of the lynchpin between deictic and meaning, I ask that we return to the claim made that most of the refugees from the Greek Civil War never returned. In supporting that claim, John Agnew states that the refugees stayed “in Yugoslav Macedonia.” The adhesion of Yugoslav to the name Macedonia is a result of the failure of the name under political weight. With the further name ‘Yugoslav’ connected to the name, the possibility of a Macedonian political movement to an unfamiliar Macedonia is maintained. With the political addition, refugees are divided from their homeland and remain
estranged from the land of their nativity. The modifier divides the meaning that might be connected with Macedonia

Fleeing towards a name is hazardous. As one current union leader from Aegean Macedonia reported during an interview, he thought that in Pirin Macedonia his people, the Macedonians, would be at home. The Macedonian Committee set up to help them adjust to life in this Macedonia became a target of protest though as Macedonians were asked to take on Bulgarian citizenship.169

Before beginning with the histories offered by the child refugees (now well into their later years of life), I want to discuss the questioning of the equivalence of the names Macedonia and Macedonia in the context of border controls. The equivalence of the name Macedonia with the name Macedonia is called into question at the border in at least two ways. One of the ways is the refusal of entry for bearers of a passport which bears the name the Republic of Macedonia. As discussed in the previous chapter, Macedonians are issued with a Greek document for receiving visa stamps that does not contain the name Macedonia with the accompanying meaning of the government and territory of the Republic of Macedonia.

DISPERAL FROM THE HOMELAND

I now offer a brief account of the flight of Macedonians from the Aegean part of Macedonia to third countries that I am putting together using some of the interviews that I conducted in

169 Personal interview
Macedonia. This is intended to give some background to the rest of the chapter which deals with those people who came from those lands beyond the name Macedonia to Macedonia. I am hesitant to use the word return in the context of these refugees. A return to Macedonia is made possible by the name. The name Macedonia and its connection to the territory that overlaps the territory of Greece and the Former Yugoslavia make possible such a return. However, there is enough difference between Macedonia and Macedonia, in terms of government, social organization, landscape, language, etc. There is then a negotiation in the return to the homeland.

One of the children who were taken from the dangers of the Civil War raging near his home told me of his flight from Greece. He was a child in Voden/Edessa during the Second World War. His father was a partisan fighting with the Democratic Army of Greece. He told me that following the end of the Second World War, because of the leftist political position of the partisans, the Greek government began terrorizing them following the withdrawal of the occupying forces. This was the reason, he told me, that women and children were fleeing. In the winter of 1946, when the man was six years old he fled to the mountains surrounding his town. His party were disguised as fish merchants to pass clandestinely through the town of Voden

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170 Even though Macedonians often only spoke their native tongue at home, the surrounding environment, particularly in the towns was filled with Greek language in the Aegean Part of Macedonia. In the Macedonia they returned to, this was not the case.
171 Voden is the Macedonian name for the town and Edessa the Greek name. The town is situated in northern Greece near to where much of the fighting in the later stages of the Civil War took place. It is about 30 miles south of the border with what was then Yugoslavia and what is now the Republic of Macedonia.
(Edessa) which, like the other towns in the region, were controlled by the Greek government. Crossing the border with them were columns of about 300 women and children.

As discussed earlier the status of the homeland and the connection of the Aegean Macedonians openly vacillates in this account. At first you can read homeland into the narrative. The man was a child and had lived in the area all his short life. His father served in the militia nearby and he used the Macedonian name of the town throughout his account except to explain that the Greeks call it something different. On these terms, the actions he is describing are a quitting of his homeland due to terrorization from a national government that was not his own. On other terms, that the nearby militia unit belonged to the Democratic Army of Greece, that he could escape unrecognized from the area, and that the government was persecuting him and his family for their political positions, suggests that the homeland was not fully theirs and did not really afford them much of a home. This narrative of leaving under duress and in secret was a recurring theme in the stories of the Aegean Macedonians that I interviewed. In fact, many of their stories began with this motif. The focus on this clearly represents that an unwillingness on the part of the refugees to leave their homes and villages and this would be consistent with a homeland that you feel fondly for and would not leave voluntarily.

An important detail that this man wanted me to be sure of, as we shared a drink at the ABC Tennis Club, is that their destination was Macedonia and not Yugoslavia. This characterizes their flight from their home, in some ways, as not a quitting of their homeland altogether. The journey
from Voden to Bitola, where they were housed temporarily in the homes of Jews who had been sent to death camps by the Bulgarian occupiers, would not have required moving through any land not known to the voyagers as Macedonia. In that sense, travelling to Macedonia (and not Yugoslavia) would have meant that, in the terms of political movement, there was not a movement. The significance of his insisting that he fled to Macedonia, the same place from where he fled, is that he remained in his homeland. Due to the poverty of Macedonia at the time, he and the others were unable to be absorbed and so, helped by the International Red Cross, they were directed to Vojvodina (in northern Serbia), specifically Gakovo and Sombor. This movement is qualitatively different as it moves my interviewee and his fellow travelers beyond the space named Macedonia to another part of Yugoslavia. Because of the politics of the time, we can say he remained in Yugoslavia during this second movement but he represented it as a temporary exile from his homeland.

The memories he shared from his time in Vojvodina were related to the food that they had for them to eat there. They ate beans and potatoes directly from one large pot. They opened a school there and it was the first time that he had access to education in his own language. In Voden, everything outside the home had been conducted in Greek, again casting doubt or at least vacillation on the status of the city as a home for Macedonians. Following the defeat of the partisans in Greece in 1948-49 the man’s father went to live in Skopje. By then, Macedonia was more organized. This meant that my interlocutor and his compatriots living in Vojvodina could return home. In Serbia they were foreigners but in Macedonia they were at home in the politics
of the man telling the story. In other politics, that of Tito I imagine, as a Yugoslav he is as at home in Serbia as in Macedonia.

This man, like thousands of others who fled Greece around the same time, has been stripped of his land and citizenship. He would like them back. He supports his claim to the right to live in Voden again by pointing out that he has around fifty relatives that live there and if they enjoy that right then why shouldn’t he? What is the difference between him and them? Hearing him say this is like hearing the case for Aegean Macedonia, Voden in particular as a homeland. He connects the place with family and explains draws comparisons between himself and his blood relatives that still live in the town.

A woman told me of fleeing Macedonia by ship from Albania. She did not know where she was heading but, after a lot of travel, and after having seen a dead man thrown overboard, the ship arrived in Gdansk, Poland. From there the children were loaded onto trains. Again the refugees were ignorant of their destination. She was relocated to a specially built village in Hungary. It was shared by both ethnic Greeks and Macedonians. On Sundays they listened to Greek music. All inhabitants of the village were known as Greek political refugees. Hungarians referring to the refugees as Greeks is inspired by the fact that, Macedonian or not, they came from Greece. This appellation suggests that the Maceonians were not in exile from their homeland but from a land as equally foreign as Hungary. Inhabitants of the village lived like a big family and held reunions in Thessaloniki between 1973 and 1975.
This lady describes her time in Hungary as temporary and related that every year on New Year’s day, it was common in the village to speculate that this would be the last year they would spend in Hungary. They had no citizenship while they were there and travel was difficult for the Macedonians. In 1984 Hungary issued a directive that meant Greek political refugees should either take Hungarian citizenship or leave. My informant didn’t want to come to Macedonia citing the difference in culture between Hungary and the Balkans. She thought she would adjust but found it more difficult than she expected.

There was one school in the settlement that both Greek and Macedonian children attended. The difference in instruction was constituted by a choice of Macedonian or Greek literature.

In 1976 the woman was given a visa to visit Greece but it was forbidden her to visit any of the border villages. She was not able to see her village until 1989. When she did, the house of her family was just some stumps, some steps, a wall, and a pile of stones. She wept like a child.

RETURN TO MACEDONIA?

Was this return to the pile of stones a return home for my informer? Many of the decata begalci resettled in Macedonia, the part of it which was until 1992 a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, with the help of the International Red Cross. For many, it was a matter of being reunited with their families. Their parents were in Skopje or other Macedonian cities sometimes with older siblings. The Red Cross, in cooperation with authorities in the Eastern Bloc countries, found

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172 This was the case with the famous Macedonian artist.
the children that had been separated from their parents almost a decade previously and reunited those willing with their families. Some of the children’s parents had emigrated to Australia, America, or the Soviet Union and children of those parents sometimes joined them there. A well known Macedonian artist who was himself a child refugee informed me that a lot of his cousins live in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Many of his other cousins, whom he visits, live in Greece, in Kostur, Lerin, Voden, and Solun.

Thinking of names and political movement, as these children were reunited with their families, they moved from states with names like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to a place, Macedonia, with the name of the homeland where they had been separated from their parents. Not only did the space have the same name as their lost homeland but it was contiguous with that place. They moved home. Since the refugees who had been born and ejected from Macedonia called themselves and their language Macedonian, the territory which bore their name claimed to be something more natural and permanent than the childrens homes and villages they had left behind. Perhaps more than that, though, is that it promised to be the place they left from. Understanding Macedonia as a united whole asks us to consider that these refugees left from Macedonia around 1948 and returned to the same place about a decade later. However, by some political understanding, they had never lived in this home before. Understanding Macedonia as a group of separate parts with one part in Greece, one in Bulgaria, and another in Serbia demands that we agree with Agnew that the refugees never returned home.

173 Interview
174 Respectively Kastoria, Florina, Edessa, and Thessaloniki in Greek.
If names are the lynchpin between ostensive statements and meaning then they might also prove to bind the meaning of a group of people and a territory holding the same name. As already described, the tension comes when there is political division within the meaning. Whilst discussing the movement of the Aegean Macedonians from their villages and towns in northern Greece, we have said that their movement has been linked to the name Macedonia. The people in question were either moving towards what they thought was Macedonia or imagining a return to their home. There are examples of this backwards and forwards between a united Macedonia – homeland of the Aegeans in the history of the association responsible for their integration into Macedonia.

In the ‘Extended Plenary Meeting of the Chief Board of the Association of Refugees from the Aegean Macedonia’ an expectation was articulated about the participation of these immigrants in the People’s Republic of Macedonia, Yugoslavia. It discusses their status:

“We found ourselves refugees in the course of the war for our people, but not refugees in alien territory but in our own land – in the free part of our fatherland – the Free People’s Republic of Macedonia. There is no question that we just enjoy political freedom, no question of less than full equality formal and real. Let us remember this land as our free fatherland, let us participate as much in her building as in the management of the state apparatus. Let us participate in state and political life, mass organizations and in the party. Rightly the comrade participants in DAG pose the request for recognition of their ranks, because the Macedonian participated in DAG as a Macedonian with the ultimate aim – the liberation of Macedonia. Let us enjoy the right to vote, to be elected and to elect from the local organs to the National Assembly. Let it show so much that our fight
is part of the fights of the entire Macedonian nation and the continuation of Free Macedonia is equal with that of our brothers from Vardar Macedonia.\textsuperscript{175}

In the quotation above we already begin to see the vacillation between identity and difference. The Aegean Macedonians are ‘refugees’ but in their ‘own land.’ The repetition of “let us”\textsuperscript{176} suggests that participation in political life and the remembering of this land as our land is not already present. While their fight is part of the fights of the Macedonian nation, it is nevertheless their fight, peculiar to them. What makes it even more the fight of the Aegean Macedonians is that it is “equal with that of our brothers from Vardar Macedonia.” It is this sort of vacillation that illustrates the politics of movement.

When I read that document, I can’t help but think of Roxanne Doty’s treatment of this tension between identity and difference.

“Here we find a tension between universalism and particularism, identity and difference that involves, on the one hand, the claim that ‘we’ and ‘they’ are the same, one universal brotherhood of man, and, on the other hand, the claim of difference that is implicit in these terms. This tension could be held at bay and the question of what difference was could be deferred as long as most of ‘them’ stayed ‘there’. But when they came to the ‘mother country’ in large enough numbers the tension approached its limit.\textsuperscript{177}”

In our statement above we find a ‘we’ – the refugees from Aegean Macedonia - and we find a ‘them’ – our brothers from Vardar Macedonia.’ While the we and the them are separable under the terms mentioned, they are also “equal”. Vardar Macedonia itself has another identity “The

\textsuperscript{175}Одржани на проширенот пленарен состанок на главниот одбор на ЗБоЕМ 10.VI.1951 год
Accessed at the Macedonian National Institute of History, Skopje, Macedonia
\textsuperscript{176}Translated from da + first person plural form of the appropriate verb
\textsuperscript{177}Doty, “Immigration,” 248
Free People’s Republic of Macedonia”. Again we see two names, sometimes they are equivalent and sometimes they contrast with one another. Depending on these phases of identity and difference is the status of the refugees as having returned home or as still being abroad and estranged from their home. This short passage of speech spoken by one speaker contains in it disagreement over the subjectivity of the principle actors in that narrative.

The ‘we’ and the ‘them’ mentioned above both play the role of deics Lyotard’s triadic model of reality. Remember that the name was the lynchpin that held together the deictic with the reality. In this vacillation between identity and difference where the deictic goes from we to them, the name sometimes remains constant and sometimes changes. Sometimes the we refers to Aegean Macedonians and in those instances the them refers to Vardar Macedonians. However, both can be subsumed under the name Macedonian.

Though in their ‘fatherland’ questions of equivalence and difference arise. From the minutes of the meetings of the “Glavniot Odbor na Makedoncите od Egejska Makedonija” (Chief Board of the Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia, “the board”), we can see an unstable distinction between (local) Macedonians and (Aegean) Macedonians. This distinction occurs in the context of a housing shortage that adversely affected the new Macedonian refugees.

Not only was there a shortage of accommodation in Macedonia but the accommodation that was available was often reserved for local people. As Slavjanka, a member of the board described it: “even if enough apartments were built, this issue would not be resolved for us because our
[people] who inhabited new apartments…the local boards took the apartments from our [people] and gave them to others. This happened in Kumanovo, Štip, and Skopje… A very fundamental division is written into this statement. ‘Naši’ (ours, our people) is used for those who are thrown from their homes, and ‘drugi’ (others) are the ones who are favoured by the housing authorities. Maybe the housing shortage is solved for these others but it is certainly not resolved for “us.”

The ‘others’ are not defined beyond the simple distinction that they are not ours. ‘Ours’ are further described. There is a man called Sotir whose family “came from Greece.” Despite having lived in his apartment for two months he was thrown out. Ours also include “the girls from the [children’s] home ‘11th October.’” When they applied for housing they were told that Aegeans should “go to your board and let them give [apartments] to you.”

This incident shows that a division between ‘Aegeans’ and others recognized by local authorities. In the case of Sotir, ejected from his home of two months, his foreignness to Macedonia is performed in the description of him and his family having come from Greece. This alternative rendering of Aegean Macedonia is devoid of any name to connect him to his new home in the PR of Macedonia. It is a political act.

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179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
The organized refugees also took a very conscious part in writing the subjectivity of Macedonians generally. One of the ways they did this was in offering courses on the history of the Macedonian people. This was an attempt to fix a subjectivity that had been somewhat contradictory. Lazo Damovski, who was on the Skopje City Board of the Association of Refugees from the Aegean Part of Macedonia pointed out the contradiction in the subjectivity of the refugees. “Our membership is not familiar with the national history and the fundamental progeny of the Macedonians. One part believes that we are descendents of Alexander the Great, others that we are of the same tribe as the Bulgarians…” Curing this lack of understanding of the true origin of Macedonians was important in the battle against “Greater Bulgarian and Greater Greek chauvinistic tendencies as well as the revisionist staff of the Communist Party of Bulgaria and the Communist Party of Greece.” The remedy to this crisis of subjectivity was instruction in history. The course was to be split into five sections: “From Samuil to the Turkish Occupation, from the Turkish occupation to Ilinden, From Ilinden to the Balkan wars, from the Balkan wars to the German Occupation, 1945-48, and then from the evil declaration of the Cominform until now.”

The above movement by the Skopje Board displays a concern over the subjectivity of the Macedonians. The subjectivities currently held by the membership leave them vulnerable to Bulgarian and Greek narratives about who they are and where they belong. In order to protect

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181 Gradski Odbor na Skopje, (1950), 1.II.50г, Accessed at the Macedonian National Institute of History, Skopje, Macedonia
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
their membership from such influences, they must be brought to understand their progeny in a certain way. The content of the instruction is not to be had in this exchange. However, we learn a lot about the proposed subjectivity simply from the way the course is divided.

This discussion of political movement and the spaces through which that movement has taken place began with a discussion of diaspora. The basics of diaspora involve a homeland, estrangement from that homeland, and a desire, at least under certain circumstances, to return to that homeland. Throughout this chapter we have seen that discursive space through which migrants, refugees, and diasporas move, is dependent upon names that give themselves to multiple political interpretations. Infinite meanings are attached to Macedonia to the point where only politically can we decide whether or not the Aegean Macedonians had a homeland to be estranged from. Further, it is politically contingent – dependent on how we represent the Macedonian political space, whether or not Aegean Macedonian refugees had been estranged from that homeland when they crossed a political border into Yugoslavia. Then, taking seriously John Agnew’s statement that most refugees never returned home, we saw that it is possible to return to a home that you have never really been to before, to return to a homeland that you may never have been present in before.

Political movement, rapid vacillation between being at home and away almost simultaneously is one of the results of the name as the lynchpin of reality. Because names can hold contradictory meanings, Macedonia can be at once united and divided, it can both contain internal borders and
not contain them. Depending upon the situation and the people involves, Aegean Macedonians are at home in the Republic of Macedonia where their artifacts lie in the national museum and they are refugees still with their artifacts in a special museum for refugees.
CHAPTER 5

FLORINA/LERIN: THE VIOLENCE OF NAMING IN AEGEAN MACEDONIA

So far we have looked at how people have been in naming practices and how they have resisted real attempts to render them intelligible within a system of signs. We have further glanced at the role of names in what I have called political movement. Implicit in both of those stories is a violence or force. A violence or force, we have said, has been enacted on and within the meaning that the name links with a person, a body. In the case of political movement, that violence can be located in the meaning attached to geography, including the people that are written within the land. What was implicit in those preceding considerations I treat explicitly in this chapter.

SITUATING FLORINA/LERIN

Map 2 shows the city of Florina/Lerin situated in the south-west corner of the Pelagonian plain just over seven miles south of the current Greece-Macedonia border. It is approximately eighteen miles south, across the plain, of Macedonia’s second city, Bitola, which itself was once known by a Greek name – Monastiri, and it is just shy of one hundred miles west of Greece’s ‘co-capital’, and largest city and port of the Macedonian region, Thessaloniki. Administratively, the city forms a part of Greece’s West Macedonia region along with the Kastoria, Kozani, and Grevena prefectures. The Greek regions of West Macedonia, Central Macedonia, and – partially-East Macedonia and Thrace make up the region that we have referred to as Aegean Macedonia.

\[184\] For reasons that are about to become very obvious, I am going to use both the Greek and Macedonian name for this city in the formulation: Florina/Lerin as my default.

\[185\] Known as Solun to the Macedonians.
and is colored blue on Map 1. Florina/Lerin has a population of 56,374\(^{186}\) when the surrounding countryside is taken into account. In terms of party politics in the region, few (just under 40\%\(^{187}\)) turned out to vote in the recent June 2012 elections\(^{188}\) and those that did were split roughly the same as the country as a whole with the center-right ‘New Democracy’ in first place and left-wing conglomerate ‘SYRIZA’ in second. The geographic situation of Florina/Lerin, and its changing population have made it liable to a negotiation of identity and name over its history. Before we move on to discussing a recent outbreak in name inspired violence in the city, I will provide some background.

Florina features in Loring Danforth’s account of Greece’s attempted Helenization of the part of Macedonia awarded it following success in the Balkan wars.\(^{189}\) While Central and Eastern Macedonia were subject to an influx of ‘Greeks’ from Turkey and Bulgaria, Western Macedonia, and particularly Florina/Lerin was less impacted by this population influx.\(^{190}\) Danforth credits the maintenance of a separate Macedonian identity in Florina/Lerin and other West Macedonian localities to class. Many of the Slavic speakers there were poorer and held small farms isolated from the Greek influence of the towns.\(^{191}\) Therefore, in 1930 Slavic-speaking Macedonians were about 61\% of the population of Florina/Lerin and her environs.\(^{192}\) According to a survey of local

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\(^{186}\) Hellenic Statistical Authority, Population Distribution, 2011 Census

\(^{187}\) Greek Interior Ministry, Parliamentary Elections June 2012

\(^{188}\) The nationwide turnout was 62.5\%


\(^{190}\) *Ibid.*, 69


authorities carried out by anthropologists Jane Cowan and Helleen Van der Minne in 1993, two years before the events we discuss in this chapter, in that year, 64% of the rural inhabitants of the Florina prefecture, excluding the town itself, were Slavic-speakers. Despite the passage of time, and despite official Greece’s claim that there are only Greeks living in Greece, Florina/Lerin retains some considerable diversity.

The slavophone Macedonians, resident in Florina/Lerin and the rest of Aegean Macedonia since before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, have encountered a concerted effort by the Greek government to disavow a Slavic identity including the language that they speak at home and the Slavic names they use to refer to places and people. Kiselenovski, a Macedonian historian, estimated that, in this region, there lived some 240,000 slavophones, the vast majority of which lived in the west of Aegean (Greek) Macedonia around the centers of Kastoria/Kastur, Florina/Lerin and Edessa/Voden. Even though the Greek census of 1928 reported only one third of this number, it is clear that there was a sizable population of Slavs in this part of Greece. Writers of an unabashedly pro-Greek government history of Greece, John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis describe the situation that Greek refugees from Constantinople and Smyrna saw as they migrated to “western Greece” They tell us that in Aegean (Greek) Macedonia of the

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195 Western Greece as opposed to present-day Turkey, which the authors consider Eastern Greece.
1920s “Greek- speakers where not everywhere in the majority.” This Slavic linguistic majority, who had remained in their homes in this region following the end of the Greek-Turkish War in 1922 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which had led to population exchanges between Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, came under great pressure to Hellenize during the 1930s. According to Rossos (who quotes mainly Kiselenovski and other Macedonian scholars), the Greek government “went so far as to ‘Greekocize’ the personal names and surnames (of Macedonians)”. Also, “a special law was passed and published in the official government newspaper which ordered the replacement by Greek names of all the Slavic names of cities, villages, rivers, mountains, etc.” Florina/Lerin was one such place whose name was changed.

1995 VIOLENCE

It is here in Florina/Lerin that on September 6th 1995, members of a group named “Rainbow,” a political party representing some of the Macedonian minority still present in the city, hung up a sign that caused a violent reaction among their fellow citizens. In this section, I will describe the events of that day, beginning with the nature of the sign, going on to talk about some of the events that led to the local police removing the sign and then move on to the burning of the offices of Rainbow during a visit of the Mayor and Police Chief to the premises. Following this account I make the claim that violence, as it is discussed earlier in this chapter, is best described with reference to this theory of Derrida.

197 Rossos and Evans, pp.285-6
In September 1995, Ουράνιος Τόξος/Виноградо (Rainbow), a political party representing the Slavo-Macedonian inhabitants of northwestern Greece/Aegean Macedonia opened an office in the Macedonian town of Florina/Lerin. On the building containing these offices, the leaders placed a sign that announced the name of the party in both Greek and Macedonian. According to a final judgment of the Europeans Court of Human Rights given on 29th September 2005, on 13th September 1995, “the public prosecutor at the Florina Criminal Court ordered the removal of the sign on the ground that the inclusion of the party’s name in Macedonian was liable to sow discord among the local population. As well as the Greek and Macedonian translation of the name of the party “Rainbow,” the Slavic name of the town was also used. Featured on the sign were the words Лерински Комитет. (Lerin Committee [of the Rainbow Party]).

It was this reference to the Slavic name of the town that appears to have been among the main concerns for public prosecutors in Florina/Lerin. In the indictment of Rainbow leaders Vasilis Romas, Costas Tasopoulos, Petros Vasiliadis, and Pavlos Voskopoulos, the prosecution proclaims “Among other words written therein, there were the words ‘Lerinski Komitet’ written in linguistic idiom. These words, in combination with the fact that they were written in a foreign language, in the specific Slavic linguistic idiom, provoked and incited disharmony among the area’s citizens. That none of the other specific names featured on the sign occupy such a

198 Like the Aegean Macedonians already discussed, the party bears both a Greek and a Macedonian name. For convenience, I will refer to it by the English translation ‘Rainbow’ unless circumstances require otherwise.
199 Ouranio Toxo and others v. Greece, No. 74989/01, ¶13, ECHR 2005-II
200 Indictment for the trial at the Single-Member Misdemeanor Court of Florina on October 14, 1997, quoted in Greek Helsinki Monitor & Minority Rights Group- Greece, Greece against its Macedonian
privileged part of the indictment, we will progress on the basis that it is the use of the Slavic name of the town, alongside the Greek, which was the main incitement of violence in the town.

The violence that was incited began, in the terms of the ECHR judgment two days after “the local authorities had clearly incited the population of Florina to gather in protest against the applicants [Rainbow leaders] and some of their [local authorities] members had taken part in the protests.” This official incitement of violence is important to the idea of the violence underpinning society’s order as we shall see when we discuss Derrida’s theory in detail. The incitement that the judgment refers to can be found in a Resolution drafted by the Prefecture Council of Florina, which at the time was run by the centre-right party \textit{Νέα Δημοκρατεία} (New Democracy). In the Resolution they refer to the sign hung outside the offices of Rainbow as containing “progressive content, in the unacceptable Skopjan script, which questions the Greek character of Florina (see Lerinski Komitet)”. Then calling for action they order “all the Political, Trade Union and Cultural Associations and…particularly the Local Authorities and the representatives of the Government, to take a position regarding the actions committed by the treacherous clique of Voskopoulos & Company.” It did so on the ground that these men violated a law. While “to take a position” is perhaps not an incitement to violence, the tone of the resolution, which refers to the leaders of Rainbow as “hirelings of Skopje…puppets of Skopje’s minority. The Rainbow trial, (Kifisia: Greek Helsinki Monitor and Minority Rights Group, Greece, 1998)

\footnote{201} Ouranio Toxo and others v. Greece, No. 74989/01, ¶42, ECHR 2005- II

\footnote{202} Resolution, quoted in Greek Helsinki Monitor & Minority Rights Group- Greece pp.43
propaganda… a treacherous clique\textsuperscript{203} is inflammatory and is mostly oriented around the foreignness of this political party.

Beyond the making of political statements, the local authorities, according to some sources, actually participated personally in the violence. \textit{Adesmeftos Typos}, a newspaper with Greek nationalist leanings, reported that, following the removal of the offending sign by the police commissioner and its replacement with a cardboard one by Rainbow activists,

“Mr. Dimitris Stylou, Mayor of Florina, and the whole municipal council went to the offices of the Rainbow organization and took down the provocative inscription. Then, they set up a fire and, while singing the song, ‘Renowned Macedonia, country of Alexander’ they burnt it.\textsuperscript{204}"

A similar story in \textit{Eleftherotypia}, a more radical newspaper, describes the mayor being “at the head\textsuperscript{205}” of a large group of citizens gathered in the center of Florina/Lerin who later “set fire to fitted carpets, inscriptions, as well as leaflets which they found in the offices.\textsuperscript{206}” When the police and fire brigade responded they did so “without making any arrests.\textsuperscript{207}” The violence that was enacted against the Rainbow organization (specifically and tellingly against its name on a sign) was sanctioned, if not perpetrated, by the established authorities in the city.

\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{204} Adesmeftos Typos, 15/9/1995, quoted in Greek Helsinki Monitor & Minority Rights Group- Greece pp.70
\textsuperscript{205} Eleftherotypia, 15/9/1995, quoted in Greek Helsinki Monitor & Minority Rights Group- Greece pp.72
\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Ibid}
Fotios Kolettis, President of the Florina/Lerin district organization of New Democracy, as part of his sworn testimony in the 1998 trial of the Rainbow leaders explains why local authorities acted in the way they did against the Rainbow Offices. He asserts that “everybody put the blame for the displaying of the sign on the competent authorities of the prefecture (Public Prosecutor - Prefecture - Local Council - Police) and they threatened that if the authorities do not intervene to remove the specific sign, they will take the law into their own hands and will remove it themselves.” “The people of Florina,” continues the civil servant, “have fought for many years so that this town remained Greek.” This claim to law, particularly to an already present law which justifies the people in acting against the sign that casts doubt upon the Greek nature of Florina/Lerin will need to be addressed and will receive attention later.

While the local leader of New Democracy emphasized the violent feelings which caused political and government officials to act against the banner, Michael Tsotskos, local leader of PASOK, the recently out of favor center-left party, spoke of the peace that the intervention was intended to bring. He testified that:

Under the present conditions prevalent in the Balkans today, I would say that the above action renders only bad services to our country and to the peoples of the Balkans, and I fear very much that it serves some transatlantic third parties who have a stake in the destabilization of the broader area of the Balkans. Our land, and the broader area, are in need of normality, peace, cooperation among its peoples and development.

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208 Excerpts from sworn statements in Helsinki Monitor & Minority Rights Group- Greece, Greece against its Macedonian minority The Rainbow trial, 81
209 Ibid., 82
While it is peace and stability that is emphasized here, the testimony seems to say pretty much the same as the one given by Tsotskos’ political opponent in the other party. Namely, that the sign disrupts the peace, in this case in the interests of “some [nameless] transatlantic third parties.” However, one subtle difference is important to notice between the two claims. The difference concerns the current state of the region. If we go back to the statement of Kolettis, we see that there was a law referred to. This law, presumably, was that Florina remain a space without the national ambiguity introduced by signs with Cyrillic script. His account of the violence, then, was based on the premise that the authorities were able to act from a ground of law to return Florina/Lerin to an established order. Tsotskos seems to begin his testimony on the opposite premise. Specifically he asserts that Our land, and the broader area, are in need of normality, peace, cooperation. suggesting that Florina and Aegean (Greek) Macedonia, rather than being a settled question, is actually in some turmoil to which this event adds. This disputes the idea of authorities acting on previously set law and bringing the community back to an original settlement.

The above account of the violence that occurred in Florina/Lerin illustrates what is at stake in naming. This case is one where the threat of a renaming provoked a violent reaction that was marked by the participation of people who are not usually associated with this sort of action. It is clear that the sign, the board bearing the alternative name of the city, was the target of the violence and well as those who fabricated it. This is obvious from the charges brought against the party leaders that we read above. Those charges focused on the displaying of the sign,
particularly the words Lerin Committee in conjunction with the script and the language of that name. It was the name, the attempt to rename that led to the charges. Further, the Florina criminal court demanded that the sign be removed. We have heard the account of how the mayor and the council went to remove the sign and in a ritual involving a patriotic song destroyed the sign with fire. This deployment of political leaders, patriotic songs, courts, and fire was primarily against the name, or at least signs and papers displaying the name. So, we already begin to connect violence with the name.

THE LAW TO COME AND THE PRODUCTION OF PAST VIOLENCE

The particular problem with the name seems to be associated with the script and language of the name. In fact, Greek authorities will not refer to Macedonian as a language at all, and certainly won’t call it a ‘Macedonian.’ Above, they refer to the language as the Slavic idiom. This allows a much more direct reference to the work of Jacques Derrida on foundations of authority. According to Derrida, “the violence of an injustice has begun when all the members of a community do not share the same idiom throughout.” The leaders of Rainbow, in their reference to their city as Lerin, in their demonstration of the “Slavic linguistic idiom” on their sign exhibit, in a very literal fashion, that they employ an idiom which is not shared by the community. Remember that, at least according to the testimonies of the authorities, people in the

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211 I man this both in the sense of without embellishment and of the letter.
town were offended by the idiomatic use of the name of their town and threatened to take it down themselves if the local council did not act.

What was it, in this case, which caused such a violent reaction to the appearance of the foreign idiom? What made it foreign? In answering this question we are required to suspend, to a certain degree, the structure of time, certainly the order of cause and effect. The separation of these idioms, here in the form of the representation of Lerin, a Slavic alternative, is itself a product of the violence which it also causes. In the same words that Derrida uses to explain the founding of law (generally), the founding of this difference between Lerin and Florina and thus the law (specific to this case, written and not) that the city in which Rainbow established offices should be referred to only as Florina “consists of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretive violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate.” The violence that included the removal of the original sign, the confiscation of the second, cardboard sign, and the burning of the carpets in the Rainbow office can be said to be this performative coup de force. Then, as well as the violence being directed against the name, the violence produces the violence of the name Lerin.

The actions of the Mayor and council produce the violence of the name Lerin insofar as it is part of an ongoing violence which creates the foreignness of the Slavic idiom. This makes the

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212 Derrida, Force of Law, 13
violence of the name a product of its own product since the violent property of the name becomes apparent only after violence is used to remove the name. Once the alternatives Florina/Lerin are created, and once it is accepted that there is a true identity of the city, then violence must decide between the two identities. In the sense that it is a product of its own product it corresponds precisely to the account that Derrida gives of revolutionary violence. “All revolutionary discourses justify the recourse to violence by alleging the founding, in progress or to come, of a new law.” In our case we have seen how the people of Florina have been fighting and (in the case we discuss) are still fighting that Florina remain Greek. In this sense the new law, the one that insists, Florina is Greek is still to come in the sense that it is still being held up as an ideal that must be defended against doubt caused by Slavic signs. This is clarified in Derrida’s explanation that: “As this law to come will in return legitimate, retrospectively, the violence that may offend the sense of justice, its future anterior already justifies it.” In September 1995 agents of a foreign nation, Skopijans in the terms of the Greeks, tried to subvert Florina and were rebuffed by the inhabitants. The foreignness of this nation though was not decided until after they were rebuffed. In this way, the violence that was perpetrated was justified by its effect which was to exorcise the Slavic identity from within its borders.

It might seem unfair or unusual to retroactively attribute violence to the placing of the sign Lerin. If, as I am arguing, the utterance of the name Lerin became a violent act, an act of force, only following the violence to remove the name and became violent in the law to come, it might be tempting to absolve the authors of the sign from any complicity in the violence. To do so,

\(^{213}\) Ibid., 35
\(^{214}\) Ibid., 35
though, would perform a great disservice to Voskopoulos and his friends. First of all, it would identify Rainbow as helpless victims of the oppressive actions of the Greek authorities. It would debarb their action in constructing and placing the sign out there in the first place. Surely this is a brave attempt at the discovering of the Slavic identity that has until this point been hidden. Negating the force of the sign erected by the Rainbow leadership would neutralize their power to enact change in their community. As well as ignore the real power that Rainbow has in its illicit naming practice, it would be unfair to the Greek population to paint a picture of unidirectional violence, a violence in response to a nonviolent act. In order to further clarify exactly what I see as violent in the actions of Rainbow, I turn again to Derrida’s work on authority.

VIOLENCE AND THE COVERING AND UNCOVERING OF FLORINA/LERIN

At this point we have seen how the act of naming can become violent acts through a law to come. However, the relationship between force and names does not end there. By means of further investigation of the work of Jacques Derrida on the theme, we will see how force was employed in Florina/Lerin seeks to suppress the name, to make the name known and, in addition, to erase itself from the scene. This break down of violent practices is influenced by Derrida’s discussion of Lévi-Strauss’ experience, recorded in Tristes Tropiques where a game played with young girls turns into an example of the violence of names. When one little girl is hurt by another, she runs to Lévi-Strauss’ and discloses the name of her adversary. This is a remarkable event because it is forbidden for the members of the group to use proper names for one another. Having understood that her name was being told, the other girl comes and reveals the name of
the first in the ear of the visitor. With the encouragement of the anthropologist, the children are soon led to reveal the names of the children and then the adults.

The violence in this scene is described by Derrida. “There was in fact a first violence to be named.” The extent of this violence, though it is a prerequisite of the story of the war of names, only becomes apparent during it. While the people all have been named, the lack of knowledge of the name covers over this original violence. It is a violence, however, that is “To think the unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of the arche-writing: arche-violence, loss of the proper…”215 For international relations fundamentally, and for our specific example of Florina/Lerin, this sort of inscription has implication. In as far as states in the international system are said to be sovereign, unique, and independent actors, they should be taken as proper to themselves. However, inasmuch as they are named, inscribed into a system where they are defined against one another- Macedonia is not Greece, is not Iran- they cannot be self-present or self-possessed. In other words, this violent inscription is an attack on “a self-presence which has never really been given but only dreamed of and always already split…incapable of appearing to itself except in its own disappearance.”216

If naming effects an undermining of uniqueness of states, if it makes their existence negative and dependent on not being one another, then it does something additional to Florina/Lerin. It is not so much that it makes Florina/Lerin dependent upon the other names in the system, rather, since

215 Derrida, Of grammatology, 112
216 Ibid. 112,
names negate one another, the presence of the name Lerin threatens to negate the name Florina. Without an understanding of negotiation between poles, without a conception of identity as a back and forth between rival identities where none of the poles are a resting point but merely delimit the course travelled, then this threat of negation can appear to undermine what some would see as the true identity of the city.

We see from the above account, in statements about inhabitants fighting to maintain the Greek identity of their city, that the negotiation of identities that is always present in everyone and in every place, indeed, in every name, is not recognized. Rather the struggle that occurs there is framed in a way that there is only one city, Florina, that will be lost forever should it become Lerin. So, taking into account the above description of the violence of naming, of inscribing names in a system of differences, we are left with the construction ‘Florina is not Lerin.’ In this situation, we are forced, by that system of difference, to ask for resolution to the question where are we? We are exposed to a violence that says to us that, because Florina is not Lerin, and because you are only in one place, this place must be either Lerin or Florina. This is doubly violent when we take into consideration that neither Florina nor Lerin can exist self-presently. They can only exist negatively as in the formulation Florina is not Lerin. Therefore to choose one is more to deny the other than it is to assert that choice. The system of differences itself then endows names with a sort of violence where the existence of one name is the negation of the other. It promotes violence to maintain the one name under the threat of the other name.
Derrida’s second violence is the one which in the story of the quarrelling children is figured by the interdiction of the revelation of the proper name. As stated above, the proper name has been given and has destroyed the property of the name by inscribing it. However, its concealment by decree is another violence associated with the name that “is reparatory, protective, instituting the “moral,” prescribing the concealment of writing and the effacement and obliteration of the so called proper name, the originary violence…” In the Florina/Lerin case, this aspect of violence would be well hidden if we didn’t know where to look for it. While I provide some background of the city above, the account of the case of violence begins with the display of the sign with the name Lerin. Somehow, this completely conceals the naming that brought the name Florina into being. That is, when we encounter the September case, the city is already called Florina. The force that brought that state of affairs into being is buried in the background. Rather, it is dispersed between the future and the past. We read in the background section that the area was once heavily inhabited by Macedonians who called themselves and their districts by different names. From this we deduce that some form of renaming violence, accompanied as it was by population exchanges, language suppression. In this way we lose the violence of naming in the past. We move it into the future when we move forward from the display of the Lerin sign to the violence which sees it ceremonially burned and its authors prosecuted in court. The violence of naming the city Florina is thus seen as either a past event or a reaction to the attempted renaming of the city. It is this concealment of the originary violence, which we can never really uncover.

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217 Ibid
218 Again, I have attempted to counter this effect by giving some historical background but all that really achieves is to move the effect backwards in time one hundred years.
but only move further backwards and forwards into history that constitutes the second form of violence.

**LAW, AUTHORITY, AND THE NAMING OF FLORINA/LERIN**

Having set out a description of two different kinds of violence and how they play out with regards to the naming of Florina/Lerin, I now move forward towards a discussion of Derrida’s piece entitled *Force of law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority*. In my reading of this I explore the relationship between violence and the law, violence and authority that has already played a role in explaining what happened in Florina/Lerin in 1995. Following that discussion, although it may seem a superfluity, I move to present a link between authorship, authority, and name. This connection which we have already been discussing between violence and name, the name as violence, the name as authorizing violence, has been useful to understand the event that constitutes the moment of this paper. To be clear, and to serve as a reminder, that event is the erection of a name-bearing sign, its destruction by violence, and the subsequent court case that sought to undo the violence of the destruction that occurred in Florina/Lerin.

Derrida begins his discussion of the law as a force that justifies itself:

> When one translates “to enforce the law” into French by “appliquer la loi,” for example, one loses this direct or literal allusion to the force that comes from within to remind us that law is always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is justified in applying itself even if this justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable.\(^{219}\)

\(^{219}\) *Ibid., 5*
First it is worth noticing the concealment of force that Derrida himself performs when he translates from English to French. Of course, what is really interesting to us here is the reference to force itself. This passage though draws our attention to law as a violence and one which justifies itself. We already mentioned a law in the context of the events in Florina/Lerin. Here though, we see how Florina being the only name for itself is a law in this context. While we may judge the violence used to suppress the name Lerin as unjustified, forcing the point that the city is Florina and not Lerin seeks to justify itself in its action. In fighting to remove the possibility of a Lerin, Florina authorities enact, or as Derrida points out, enforces the law that the city is only known as Florina. It is only a law following the removal of the sign, that is it becomes a law only during its enforcement.

In addition to this idea of law enforcement, there is the expression that law is always an authorized force. Here I read the term ‘authorized’ in a very specific way. It is authorized in that it is attributed to an author, it gains an author. Because it is the law, let us confine our thoughts to the law of the state or the ‘law of the land,’ the authorship of the violence, of the authorized force belongs to the state or the local community. Conversely, though, as we have seen, this force “justifies itself”. We can talk about this paradox as the violence within the violence. While force is attributed to an authorizing subject, it is at the same time the force which justifies itself and so needs no author, no authority. We are left with the law as a special sort of violence one which, on the one hand, at least in our case, is perpetrated by the correct people, those authorized to use force by the sovereign Greek state, but which, on the other, is not beholden to the name of the one who practices it because it can justify itself. The actions in Florina/Lerin authorize
themselves through enforcing the law this is Florina (not Lerin). They are perpetrated and thus authored by the Mayor and the Council.

That which justifies the law, the part of the law that justifies itself, this “fiction,” is nothing more, nothing less, than force. Derrida very deliberately places this force of law within law itself. The implication is other than making the obvious claim that “law [is] in the service of force…for example an economic, political, ideological power that would exist outside or before it.” Instead, goes the claim,

“The operation that consists of founding, inaugurating, justifying law (droit), making law, would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate.”

At the same time that this explanation produces a self sustained rupture within language, a law that can speak for itself and be defined positively, it is yet defined negatively against the backdrop of other laws, preexisting laws that are unable to validate it.

This idea of law might seem quite totalitarian. To accept that laws are authorized only by the violence inherent in their enforcement would deny the liberal habit of basing laws on natural rights, more recently human rights, utility, or other such justifications which usually explicitly renounce violence. For example, we saw that the testimony of the local PASOK leader in Florina justifies the violence of the authorities with the words: “Our land, and the broader area, are in need of normality, peace, cooperation among its peoples and development.” This specifically

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220 Ibid 939
221 Ibid p.941 and 943
denies the *enforcement* of the law, the violence of it by stating that the government’s actions were to restore peace. In arguing that law authorizes itself, establishes itself under its own force, we are putting ourselves in opposition to this sort of justification.

What makes this conception of law much less totalitarian is when we consider that both the naming and the renaming of Florina/Lerin were laws in this sense. Neither set of actions are justified by any source beyond themselves. As covered in chapter 3, names are unjustifiable. There is no recourse to any outside authority such as geographic features that can determine the name of a person or a city. The sign and its burning are therefore only justified from within themselves. However, the fact that both events are justified in this democratizes the naming process. The law: this is Lerin is held in equal standing with its rival law: this is Florina. We can no more say that those erecting the sign have any more or less right to do so than those who burned it. This undermines any attempt to a dictatorship of names where we recognize one as being more right than the other. So, it is clear why Florina/Lerin is used throughout this chapter.

It is then possible to take a position where this performative violence has a relationship with laws that have already been somehow established. It is a negative relationship where the rupture caused by the performative violence *cannot* be supported or invalidated by the current law. A new law, one that is a real rupture, can only be said to contain this violence should we be able to show that it is neither allowed nor disallowed by current law. This is significant in the sense that
it allows us a law by which to judge whether a specific violence is this performative, ‘legal’,
vioence. It is also important in that it suggest the following problem with the idea of an original
law.

If what I am calling a rupture here, and I use it with reference to the emergence of a new sign in
a system of signs, here laws, can only be defined negatively, against a preexisting set of laws
that, however, can neither justify nor invalidate the law, then how can the first rupture have
occurred? In the same way that language can only have come on the scene according to an
always already present model, so too must law have come about that way. An originary violence
that was not a violence in that it did not rupture or disturb what was there because it came when
nothing was there.

The relationship between violence, law, and its author is a complicated one. Above, I have
claimed that the self-authorizing violence connected to law is both within law and without. That
is, the violence is authorized both by itself, itself as author, and from without. This is a result of
my double reading of the word authorized in the above passage cited from Derrida. As well as in
the sense of being made authoritative, I am using authorize with the meaning that an author of
the violence is brought into being by the violence. It authorizes itself because there is no law that

\footnote{Not legal in the sense of legitimate or abiding with the law but legal in terms of being internal to \textit{droit}
or justice.}
either confirms its legitimacy or precludes its possibility. It also authorizes itself by constituting its own author, bringing into being an actor, an auctor.\textsuperscript{223}

Taking what we have said above about self-authorization along with Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty, we can democratize sovereignty in a way that multiplies sovereigns. As Schmitt famously opens his \textit{Political Theology} “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” He further explains this as follows:

\begin{quote}
About an abstract concept there will be in general no argument, least of all in the history of sovereignty. What is argued about is the concrete application, and that means \textit{who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public interest or order le salut publique, and so on.}
\end{quote}

This reference to a ‘who,’ to a deciding actor, an actor on behalf of the public is what I wish to draw attention to here. In the double understanding of authorization this ‘who’ constitutes a split in the ideal of sovereignty, a split between violence and the actor that I have said that violence brings about and is perpetrated by.

Also, as well as the one who decides, I wish to include in the sovereign the one who does not decide. Or rather, the one who undecides the already decided. This undecision is also a violence, one which reveals what has been hidden, or speaks that which was erased. In the specific case of names, it pronounces a forbidden, or hidden name, which reminds us of the negotiation between alternative names spoken of in a previous chapter that is a prominent landmark in this discussion.

\textsuperscript{223} This is the Latin agent noun derived from the verb augēre - to make to grow, originate, promote, increase (OED). It is a root of the words author, actor, authorize and related words.
of Florina/Lerin. The negotiation, never really resolved yet perhaps driven underground, is violently interjected where stillness seemed to dwell and so: decided becomes undecided.

One thing that we see in the particular example of Florina/Lerin is the multiple actors, the multiple deciders. There are those who decide and those who undecide. This, I argue constitutes a dispersion of violence that constitutes many sovereigns, it distributes sovereignty to people who act. This multiplicity undermines a view of sovereignty as “a homogeneous and continuous presence that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique centre of decision presiding over a coherent ‘self’, and that is demarcated from, and in opposition to, an external domain of difference…” 224

It denies every part of this ideal including any coherent ‘self’ that some actors would want to produce. It takes Hobbes’ mythical bellum omnium contra omnes as being unresolved by the invention of the supposed Leviathan- nation-state. It controverts any sense of a peaceful domestic sphere in opposition to “an external domain of difference.”

This explanation of law, violence, naming, and authorization helps us to better understand what was going on in Florina/Lerin in 1995. It helps us to understand the nature of the violence of naming and renaming. In no way, though, is this discussion of violence and naming restricted to this one case. Foundational violence and democratized sovereignty plays out everywhere. To stay with Derrida, he gives an account of the imposition of the French language on France. It is already easy to see how this example would parallel the Florina/Lerin case that we now consider. “One founding violence of the law or of the imposition of state law has consisted in imposing a

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language on national or ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{225} This statement both supports what we said earlier that the violence surrounding Rainbow’s sign being an expression of this sort of founding violence and sets up the example of France.

France experienced this violence “on at least two occasions first the Villers- Cotteret decree consolidated the unity of the monarchic state by imposing French and by forbidding Latin.\textsuperscript{226} The second occasion was “the French Revolution, when linguistic unification sometimes took the most repressive pedagogical turns.\textsuperscript{227}” In mentioning the first example, Derrida does not let the Latin that was replaced off lightly. “It is true,” he says, “that Latin was already a violent imposition and that from this point of view the passage from Latin to French was only the passage from one violence to another.\textsuperscript{228}” While we have seen the imposition of Greek upon the Slavic minority in this paper we have not seen the prior imposition of Slavic languages on the inhabitants of what is northern Greece (other than in the case we now consider.) Further, we have not investigated the imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet by Greek monks on the Slavs themselves.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This project set out to investigate names and naming practices in international politics. We proceeded on the basis that names failed to fulfill their promise as indicator of stable identities throughout time and across space. We wanted to look at how actors in global politics used this failing to make life go on. People often want to move. They flee from violence, they want to return home. What is the role of naming in this? How are people allowed to move or prevented from doing so because of their names. How does movement affect your name, the name of your parents and the name of your home? What about toponyms? How are they deployed to move whole peoples from one place to another and how do they prevent those people from returning? These are the questions that we found and discussed as we contemplated names and naming and their consequences for people and states.

The study focused on the experience of Aegean Macedonians, mostly those who were evacuated shortly before the end of the Greek Civil War. In world politics, it is probable that the case of Macedonia is, if certainly not the only one, the best known and the most salient naming dispute. It probably gets the most attention in western media because the Republic of Macedonia’s entry into both NATO and the European Union are being blocked because of protests from Greece regarding its name. These consequences of naming may have some impact on the day to day lives of people in Macedonia. What I have focused on here, though, are the more personal effects of naming, rather than the dispute over the name of Macedonia, on people.
The Aegean Macedonians are especially implicated in this most famous of name disputes. Having been born in Greece, and having been assigned Greek identities by the authorities there, many now live in the Republic of Macedonia. When the Greek government dispute the name of their northern neighbor they also dispute the names of these Macedonians born in Greece. Particularly, I have looked at their ability to be at home in the various places that they have travelled. Being at home, being a guest, passing border posts, and making new lives for themselves in foreign lands all depended on the name that they could negotiate for themselves and for their people. It is the Aegean Macedonians, then, that have most obviously been implicated in this naming dispute in terms of their personal life. Living in this situation has also made them most clearly involved in practices that seek to name them, particularly those that seek to associate their names with Greece of with Macedonia.

In this chapter we will first discuss some of the empirical findings of this study. Through interviews, participant observation, and the reading of archival information, I saw some things happening that I described in my other chapters. I found that naming practices associated with borders happened deep within national boundaries, names are a result of negotiation and are never simply determined by their bearers, names of places affect movement and attachment of people through them and to them, names are supported with reference to other names, but they also contain their own force or violence by which the name justifies itself. It is fitting to start this chapter with a discussion of how we have come to these conclusions before moving on to discuss
their implications for both theory and policy and finishing with some possible expansions for this research.

We saw how discursive practices of naming can occur at border crossings. In the case of the Aegean Macedonians, the naming practices started long before their encounter with the Greek authorities. Dozens of miles before the border, the leader of our group was already involved in identity negotiation with the rest of the company. In anticipation of the Greek authorities and remembering past events were others had been denied entry into Greece for using their Macedonian names and places of birth as answers to Greek questions, Donevski advised the use of Greek personal names and Greek toponyms in order to secure entry to Greece. The power of the border extended well beyond the time and place were the crossing actually took place. Both the past border, where some were denied entry on the basis that the places they were born never existed, and the future border, the one we would cross later that day, effected a naming practice on the bus before we had reached the official crossing. Naming practices are therefore not neatly contained in certain spaces and are not confined to certain times.

Names are never really owned by their bearers but are the result of a negotiation between the bearers and those who would give them hospitality. We saw this also on the bus, this time at the border crossing, when the border guard boarded our bus and started asking questions. Already primed by our leader to use Greek versions of their Macedonian names or to use the Greek names they knew they had been given by Greek town halls more than half a century earlier, the passengers on the bus attempted to give these. For some it was easy, they knew their Greek names. For others though, it was not that simple. They had never heard their Greek names and
didn’t know enough about the language to formulate a convincing one out of their Macedonian name. Later, in the town hall, one lady guessed her Greek name and got it wrong. Their ignorance of their Greek names and their quick manufacture of one for the occasion demonstrates how these names did not belong to the bearers. While some had them on the tips of their tongue for use in such situations, others did not have them at their command. These names became theirs only for a brief time, only when coached by their leader, and only when asked by a Greek border police officer or town hall administrator. Their names were not their own.

Change in names can really upset the topography of a place. Names are negotiated, never permanent. A change in name though can make a place unfamiliar. Aegean Macedonians, going to visit their homes, a place they expected to be familiar with, when confronted with the new names given to Aegean Macedonian villages and towns were disoriented in their own home. And it is not only the travelers on that bus who were disoriented by the change of names. Can we ever really answer the question whether or not the Aegean Macedonians, in moving to the Republic of Macedonia returned to their home or not? Furthermore, those who fled to Pirin Macedonia thinking that there they would be home and finding that they had to become Bulgarians to remain there surely found themselves on the wrong end of naming. Or rather, they did not retain control over the meaning of the names they claimed as their own.

The example of those who found themselves not at home in Pirin Macedonia brings us to another observation that matching a toponym to a demonym does not always afford people a homeland.
While the man I interviewed who explained his decision to move to Bulgaria and away from it was a Macedonian, while he moved to Pirin Macedonia and so identified himself with the country he was living in, nevertheless he found that he was not at home in Pirin Macedonia. His situation was complicated by another name, Bulgaria, which he had to take on in order to stay in Pirin Macedonia.

We can further see from this experience that names do not enjoy hegemony over territory. In Pirin Macedonia, the name Macedonia is not enough to label the territory. We have to add names like Pirin and Bulgaria. In so doing, we complicate the link between demonym and toponym. Only when we have a Pirin Macedonian or a Bulgarian Macedonian, as opposed to just a Macedonian, can we more safely link them with the land described with those names. This multiple names inhabiting one space model complicates and confuses the linking of people to spaces. It also complicates their movement. We saw that those who moved to Yugoslavia described this as a move to Macedonia, to the free part of their land. With both possibilities, Yugoslavia and Macedonia open it allows both narratives that describe those who fled as exiles in Yugoslavia and those that describe them as moving to another part of their land. Taking these as different sorts of movement, the multiple names attributable to one part of the country make it impossible to finally decide whether a group of people are exiles, a diaspora, at home, etc.

Further complicating this connection of demonym and toponym, is the possibility of division between ours and theirs even within a single demonym. We saw this when we looked at the
tension between the Aegean Macedonians and the locals in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. When issues such as housing arose, there was a tendency both in local authorities and in refugee groups to see one set of Macedonians as theirs and another set of Macedonians as almost foreigners. This might be expected and may seem like a well known phenomenon. When we look its implications for names and naming though, it becomes a very serious problem. If being Macedonian is not enough to belong, to be at home, in Macedonia, then the link between demonym and toponym is very much undermined. This does serious damage to the idea of national self-determination.

Names cannot stand for themselves but are underwritten by other names. In the town hall, the worker there asked the birth certificate applicants to show him identification to prove that they really were the names that they said they were. Again, they had given Greek names, this time because their records in Greek would be found under those names, but, to prove them, they offered their (Macedonian) passports. The administrator did not want to accept their passports as proof of their names because he did not recognize the name on the front of the passport. Without the well known and recognized name of a state to guarantee the name of the bearer of the passport, their names and identities were questioned. This situation was also negotiated however, since the worker did eventually agree to look up the names in his record book and found two of the names.
Finally we have seen how names contain a force within them similar to the force of law. Names can be enforced by violence and this violence can reveal the earlier violence of naming. In Florina/Lerin, the violence perpetrated by some town officials against a sign that through into question the name of the city was a case of violent renaming. This violence further revealed the violent imposition of the name Lerin and, by association the equally forceful renaming.

The research supports the conception of the name that I connected with Susan Bean and JS Mill in chapter two of this dissertation. The lack of a connection between physical or other features and the name allows some of our conclusions. Firstly, since this connection doesn’t exist, a situation can arrive where one place has more than one name. I have described that phenomenon in this chapter by saying that a name does not exercise hegemony over a specific territory. This doesn’t only go for territory but for people also. There are is no way to move from physical features to name or vice-versa in a way that makes one name right and the other wrong. The Aegean Macedonians are equally their Macedonian name and their Greek name. There is no way to decide and any decisions are made in negotiation with time, space, and potential hosts or guests. Similarly, Florina/Lerin is as much Florina as Lerin and no appeal to geography or history can make one of those names more correct. If, contrary to Bean and Mill, there were some way to decide from the geography of Florina/Lerin, or the physical make up of the Aegean Macedonians then we could decide by an appeal to something outside of politics what the real names were and we would not see the negotiation that we saw on the bus nor the violence we saw in Florina/Lerin.
Kofos’ worry that anyone who can control the name Macedonia can control its culture, history, and land is misplaced. One of our findings is that names are never really owned by their bearers and I will extend that slightly in this context and say that they are never controlled by anyone. In the last chapter we talked about polysemy vs. dissemination. We have concluded that names are the product of negotiation and are temporary in that they are only valid within the negotiation that is taking place. Therefore, no one person or entity controls the name and Kofos therefore has nothing to worry about in that regard.

Another of the conclusions from this project is that there are divisions within demonyms. Therefore, my second reassurance to Kofos is that that even were some entity or people able to somehow control the meaning of the name Macedonia, or Macedonians, it is unlikely that this name would be relevant to all people who could be called by it. In fact, Kofos aids me in this argument. He divides Μακεδόνες from Μακεδονικά and in doing so really supports the conclusion. Any attempts to control the name Macedonian would be likely to go the way of the Bulgarian attempts to do so as described in chapter four or even the attempts to unite Aegean and Vardar Macedonians described in the same chapter.

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229 Kofos, 130
I also find support in these conclusions for the use of naming as securing. The topography can be altered radically by renaming places. The way I have shown this in the project is through the experience of the Aegean Macedonians’ disorientation on returning to their native regions. They came equipped with names for the landscape and inhabited parts of it that differed from the names on the signposts. This led to attempts to convert the names on the signs to names they knew. The unfamiliarity of many of the Greek names for their villages and mountains made the landscape more difficult to navigate for the Aegean Macedonians on the bus. Similarly, in Milan Kundera’s novel discussed in chapter three, the Russian troops were disoriented by a lack of names. Rose-Redwood, Alderman, and Azaryhu’s argument that American forces secured Baghdad partly through the use of naming, finds support in this dissertation.

We can also find significance in our empirical findings for the theory of Lyotard. Control over the meaning of the name, fixing the meaning and creating a knowable reality using names as the lynchpin proves absolutely impossible. With so many meanings attachable to each name, and no way to decide between them, each name is expected to bind infinite meaning to each ‘here’ or to each ‘him’ or ‘her.’ What we are left with then is not a model of a fixed reality built on a collection of ‘heres’ and ‘thems’ each impregnated with meaning by names. Following this study, every here has more than one name where each name affixes infinite meaning to the here. We have people with more than one name attaching infinite meaning with each name. In short, the fixing of reality through naming results in numberless heres occupying each unit of space and

\[230\] Rose-Redwood Alderman, Azaryahu
unlimited subjectivities for each legal person. These heres and these subjectivities are always in the process of negotiation.

This dissertation has also added to the literature on diaspora. Since diaspora is so dependent on space: a homeland and distance from that homeland, projects like this one, that complicate space make diaspora contingent on politics. My discussion in chapter four of political movement describes this dependence. Names and naming alter boundaries as negotiations progress. What is your homeland in one occurrence of discursive practice can easily change during another. The quality and characteristics of the space are changed through the negotiation of names. Without a homeland to be away from and to dream of return to, diaspora becomes a concept that is hard to really talk about. Now, what we have seen in this project does not suggest that we cannot talk of a homeland at all. It doesn’t completely negate any idea of diaspora. It does however, make space contingent on politics and on negotiation and so firmly positions diaspora into the contingent and political realm. Remember, the status of the Aegean Macedonians in the Socialist Republic of Macedonian was both host and guest, even in the same speech.

There are implications in this study for the currently fashionable fascination with identity cards, biometric passports, stricter airport security measures, etc. These attempts to affix meanings related to security to names and then to affix those names to people are, like the attempts discussed in this dissertation, bound to fail. Since all that can be known about a person is still to be written, the meaning attached to anyone is always incomplete. Information known about that person is the result of negotiation, is contingent, and contradictory. One person may have several
names, each associated with different, or the same, meanings that would be attached to him or her by security groups. With such an inability to say exactly who it is that is immigrating to the homeland or boarding an airplane, those charged with preventing the dangerous people are going to have to work very hard to justify their positions.

Another result of this inability to positively identify, to absolutely fix a name that means something in itself, something stable and non-contradictory, is to assuage the fears of those who worry about the power of government and others to know too much about them. It is tempting to worry that governments can gather personal data – data that reveals the real you, your views and intentions, your interests and concerns. However, any identity that you have is a negotiated one and one that is contingent upon time and circumstances. You are not the final arbiter of your identity but neither is any other agency. Attempts to pin your identity to an intelligible narrative that endures over time and space will fail.

This theme of stable subjectivities can be applied to states. One way to broaden this study would be to look at how nation states, perhaps some of the successful ones like Greece and France that are both mentioned here, have gotten away with their claims to have endured over time. Further claims to have stood for certain values over that time would be even harder to defend yet states seem to get away with it. How does the present past and future of the United States, that of a state committed to human rights and the defense of democracy over centuries, persist despite strong contradictions? This is the next step to this study. Since this study shows the contingency
and arbitrariness of names and naming, how do some names endure and their contradictions seem to be hidden or perhaps ignored. If border crossings, their approaches, political speeches, movement, and exiles are sites of naming practices that affect persons, which ones affect names of states. We have seen names of states negotiated too in this project in those same sites but I think there are more of these practices to look at, some of which might be peculiar to states.

Names and naming practices are significant in the lives of mobile populations and in the relations between the states that they move between. Names are also foundationless and unable to be stabilized by a sovereign center despite efforts, often on the part of nation states, to do so. This makes them a complicated and legitimate site for further investigation. In the cases discussed in this project, we have seen unsuccessful attempts to stop the to and fro of the negotiation that constitutes naming practice. We have seen this negotiation used for political purposes and exploited successfully by people to enable the continuation of movement. This is a positive message to people whose home consists of multiple sites the borders of which are in flux and negotiation.
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