A New Foundation for the Disciplines of Philosophy and Psychology:

Unification without Consilience

by

Cecilea Mun

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Graduate Supervisory Committee:

Cheshire Calhoun, Chair
Bernard Kobes
Michelle Shiota

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ABSTRACT

Do emotions help explain our behaviors? Can they condemn us, excuse us, or mitigate our moral responsibility or blameworthiness? Can they explain our rationality and irrationality, or warrant such attributions? Can they be justified or warranted? Are they constitutive aspects of our consciousness, identity, characters, virtues, or epistemic status? The answer to these questions, at least to a significant extent, depends on what emotions are. This illustrates the importance of what emotions are to academics across multiple disciplines, as well as to members of governing bodies, organizations, communities, and groups. Given the great importance of emotions to various aspects of our lives, this dissertation is about the relevance of the topic of emotion as an area of study for the discipline of philosophy. This dissertation is also broadly about the need to bridge the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge between various distinct disciplines, thereby contributing to the process of unifying knowledge across the various disciplines within the realm of academia.

The primary aim in this dissertation is to initiate the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across disciplines of academia. To do so, however, this dissertation aims to bridge some disciplinary divides between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I fulfill this aim by first demonstrating that interdisciplinary research and theorizing is needed within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I do this by considering how the problem of skepticism arises within these two disciplines. I also derive, propose, and argue for the acceptance of a new foundation for academic research and theorizing in response to the problem of skepticism. I refer to my proposal, in general, as The Proposal for Unification without Consilience.
(UC). This proposal is constituted by the following basic principles: the fundamental intentionality thesis (FIT), the thesis of rational universalism (TRU), the first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism, the fundamental base for interdisciplinary research and theorizing (Base⁸), and the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing (C⁴).
DEDICATION

To ends and new beginnings.

In memory of my father,

Pok Nok Mun

(March 25, 1951 – April 20, 2013)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Historically, those who were recognized by their society as experts in some area of importance, lovers of wisdom, or purveyors of truth were not always divided into distinct disciplines as they typically are today. For example, we might refer to Aristotle as a philosopher or a scientist, and perhaps more narrowly as an ethicist, metaphysician, logician, philosopher of language, rhetorician, biologist, physicist, etc.; but during earlier times he was simply referred to as a philosopher. Although one point in time cannot be identified as “THE” turning point that led to the consequences of deep disciplinary divisions, given that such consequences are typically results of complex causal networks rather than some linear causal chain,¹ one might still argue that these divisions were at the time at least a result of what was at some point thought of as a need. For example, one might trace the division between philosophy of mind, psychology, or physiology back to René Descartes or Franz Brentano. At least one of them might be said to be an important historical figure for all three disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and physiology.

René Descartes found it necessary to draw deep ontological divisions in order to clarify his first principle of knowledge. This was his principle of existence, which

¹ Such linear causal chains may only exist in artificial conditions, such as in experimental conditions. See James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
asserted that, “I am, I exist.” Brentano found it necessary to do so in order to gain more clarity on various psychological, physiological, or physical concepts. But in fulfilling their needs, each accepted a false statement as a premise for their argument. Descartes accepted the false assumption that he had no senses, body, shape, extension, or movement. Brentano accepted the false premise that no physical phenomena have the property of intentional in-existence. Furthermore, influenced by the scientific observations of Galileo Galilei, as well as his own, Descartes accepted such false assumptions in order to establish new foundations for the sciences. Brentano sought to establish new foundations for the discipline of psychology. Both Descartes and Brentano also rejected Aristotle’s ontology of persons. Descartes divided the mind from the body.

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2 René Descartes, “Meditations of First Philosophy,” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, vol. 2 (1984; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 17. Note that Descartes’s principle of existence is not what is typically referred to as the “cogito,” which is short for “cogito ergo sum” and understood as “I think, therefore I am.” The cogito in fact is not presented in Descartes’s Meditations.


4 Note that it does not matter whether or not he knew he did. It still remains a fact that he did.

5 Franz Brentano, Psychology, 89. Note that it does not matter whether or not Brentano knew he did. It is still true that he did.


8 Franz Brentano, forward to the 1874 edition to Psychology, xxviii.
and Brentano later divided the mind or body from their purpose, reason, function, or telos—their intentionality.

It may be said of Descartes that when he conceived his project in the *Meditations of First Philosophy* and the *Discourse on Method of Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences* that he intended to create new foundations for philosophy and the sciences by “turning Aristotle on his head.” The result of Descartes’s inquiry, at least at the end of his Meditations, was a completely dualistic ontology. This led to either the acceptance of skepticism or theism, whereby theism was the only route to knowledge. The foregoing thus suggests that the consequence of this kind of skepticism is at root located in the type of method of doubt Descartes employed—one which seemed to have required him to accept at least one false premise. He rejected not only what he was unsure about or did not know, but also what he knew.⁹

One might attempt to argue that the history of philosophy, at least from Descartes to perhaps this point, stands as a testament against the wisdom of turning Aristotle on his head, at least in philosophy. For to do so, Descartes relied on what can be referred to as *Descartes’s Method of Doubt*, which led him to accept a false premise. I, however, am not making such an argument. Things might depend on how the *turning* is to be done.

One may be rightly doubtful, and ought to be doubtful, when in certain epistemic

conditions. I believe, however, that it can be safely said that the foregoing case with Descartes’s argument does suggest that one ought not accept any false premise in any argument unless one is making an argument by *reductio ad absurdum*, in which case one ought to be careful not to forget that if one does *not* derive a contradiction then their argument is invalid.

Aristotle also conceived of methods for conducting inquiries on various types of subjects. Each of his books can be understood as containing an explanation and a demonstration of these methods: *Analytica Posteriora* (Logic), *Physica* (Physics), *De Anima* (Psychology and Biology), *Metaphysica* (Metaphysics), *Ethica Nichomachea* (Nichomachean Ethics), *Politica* (Politics), *Poetica* (Rhetoric and Poetics).\(^\text{10}\) It may also be argued that Aristotle himself in fact initiated these distinctions between academic disciplines.\(^\text{11}\) However, unlike Descartes and Brentano, Aristotle did not distinguish the various disciplines of his academia—the *Lyceum*—as they are distinguished today. The various disciplines in Aristotle’s Lyceum were more so distinct areas of study within a single discipline. Research and theorizing within each of these disciplines were all carried out in accordance with Aristotle’s first principles for first philosophy, i.e., under Aristotle’s ontology. In contrast, Descartes and Brentano respectively demarcated the boundaries of academic disciplines along the lines of distinct ontologies. Descartes did so along the lines of a dualistic ontology, and Brentano did so along the lines of an


ontological trinity.\textsuperscript{12} Regardless, however, of how the various disciplines came to be distinct, independent disciplines, there is now a need to unify knowledge between the sciences and the humanities. This fact has been made apparent in recent public exchanges between various scientists and philosophers.\textsuperscript{13}

Furthermore, emotions affect our judgments \textit{orr} actions.\textsuperscript{14} They affect how we understand others and ourselves as individuals, as members of a social group, as members of a community, \textit{orr} as a member of a society. They also affect how we understand humanity as a natural kind. We often judge, act, and create policies based on our understanding of what emotions are. Emotions serve as evidence for our moral \textit{orr} epistemic status as rational agents. We appeal to the appropriateness of emotional

\textsuperscript{12} I discuss Brentano’s ontological trinity in chapter 2.


\textsuperscript{14} For the purpose of clarity, I adopt the following conventions throughout this body of work: I use the term ‘or’ to indicate the usage of an exclusive disjunction and I use the term ‘orr’ to indicate the usage of an inclusive disjunction.
responses as an indication of a wrongdoer’s moral or rational sensibilities. The failure to appropriately respond to emotional situations have led to the stigmatization and marginalization of various members of our society as irrational or abnormal persons.

Emotional responses influence the formation and adoption of various corporate, social, or public policies. Our emotions or our attributions of emotions affect our moral or legal judgments. Yet, do emotions help explain our behaviors? Can they condemn us,


excuse us, orr mitigate our moral responsibility? Can they explain our rationality and irrationality, orr warrant such attributions? Can they be justified orr warranted? Are they constitutive aspects of our consciousness, identity, characters, virtues, orr epistemic status? The answer to these questions, at least to a significant extent, depends on what emotions are. This illustrates the importance of what emotions are to academics across disciplines, as well as to members of governing bodies, organizations, communities, and groups.

§1.1 Primary Aim & Chapter Summaries

Given the need for bridging current interdisciplinary divides between various academic disciplines, and given the great importance of emotions to various aspects of our lives, this dissertation is ultimately about the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across disciplines of academia by encouraging interdisciplinary research and theorizing about emotions. More specifically, the primary aim of this dissertation is to argue that there is now a need to bridge the divide between the discipline of philosophy and the discipline of psychology in some form or another,

and to provide some preliminary foundations for doing so.\textsuperscript{19} This dissertation, however, will not aim at addressing the study of emotions across the broad range of disciplines in academia. It will instead focus primarily, but not only, on bridging the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology within the field of emotion, as well as such interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge between the disciplines of psychology and philosophy.

I fulfill the primary aim of this dissertation in three major phases: phase 1, phase 2, and phase 3. In phase 1 and 2, I address the discipline of philosophy and argue that there is a need for interdisciplinary research and theorizing within the areas of philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science. I also provide and argue for the various components of my proposal of unification without consilience. In phase 1, which is constituted by chapters 2 and 3, I rely on studies in the philosophy and psychology of emotion to argue that various challenges are generated or made more tractable within the areas of philosophy of mind and epistemology. For the purpose of clarity, I refer to the sub-phases of my main argument as sub-arguments.

More specifically, in chapter 2, I present sub-argument 1 and sub-argument 2 of my main argument, wherein I demonstrate that there is a need to study both the

philosophy and psychology of emotion within the area of philosophy of mind. The result is a revision of one of the canonical theses of philosophy—the thesis of intentionality as the mark of the mental. In chapter 3, I rely on the philosophy and psychology of emotion to illustrate that there is such a need in the area of epistemology. The result is a revision of at least one of the theses within a set of three canonical theses that is currently held within the discipline of philosophy—I refer to the set of these three theses as *Grice’s rationality theses* (*GRT*). I also refer to the sub-phases of my main argument that are presented in chapter 3 as *sub-argument 3, sub-argument 4, and sub-argument 5*, and I refer to the thesis of intentionality that is derived as an alternative to the current canonical thesis of rationality as the *fundamental intentionality thesis* (*FIT*). Finally, I refer to the thesis of rationality that is derived as an alternative to at least one of the three theses of *GRT* as the *thesis of rational universalism* (*TRU*).

Phase 2 of my main argument is presented in chapter 4, which consists of two sub-phases. I refer to these two sub-phases as *sub-argument 6 and sub-argument 7*. In sub-argument 6, I consider three fundamental challenges that must be overcome by any endeavor to pursue knowledge regarding a particular subject or within a particular field of inquiry. I refer to these three challenges as *the problem of translation, the problem of the criterion, and the problem of underdetermination*. I refer to the set of these three challenges as *the problem of skepticism*. I consider how the problem of skepticism arises during any endeavor to pursue knowledge, while focusing primarily on interdisciplinary pursuits for knowledge between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology especially in the field of emotion.

In sub-argument 7, I draw on the interests, concerns, and methods within the
areas of philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and metaphysics to provide a solution for addressing the problem of skepticism. One aspect of this solution is the construction and proposal of an interdisciplinary taxonomy of theories of emotion, which I refer to as a *meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion*. I also refer to the basic principles with which this taxonomy is constructed as the *first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism*. These *first principles* constitute a second aspect of my proposed solution to the problem of skepticism. Although these first principles are essentially a set of *bridge principles* for understanding the relations between various philosophical and psychological theories of emotion, they are intended to help identify how various theories in general can be understood as sharing the same or kindred first principles. Thus they constitute the general first principles for understanding the relations between various theories on a particular object of study across the disciplines of academia.

Furthermore, I take a pragmatic stance and argue for four principles of rigorous interdisciplinary research and theorizing. I refer to the set of these four principles as the *four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing* (C⁴). They constitute a third aspect of my proposed solution to the problem of skepticism. I also derive the *principle of folk intuitions*, which constitutes a fourth aspect of my proposed solution to the problem of skepticism. I refer to the principle of folk intuitions as the *fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing*. Thus the adoption of FIT and TRU as canonical theses within both the disciplines of philosophy and psychology, along with the first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism, the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing, and the fundamental base of
interdisciplinary research and theorizing constitute the whole of my solution to the problem of skepticism—what I refer to as the solution of *Unification without Consilience* (*UC*).

In chapter 5, I address the discipline of psychology and present phase 3, the final phase of my main argument. Phase 3 consists of two sub-phases, which I refer to as *sub-argument 8* and *sub-argument 9*. The foundation for sub-argument 8 was set down during phases 1 and 2 of my main argument. In sections 5.1-5.3, I present sub-argument 8 by first drawing on the arguments presented in phases 1 and 2 in order to argue that there is a need within the discipline of psychology to bridge the disciplinary divide between the disciplines of psychology and philosophy. I then reiterate my proposal of UC as a new foundation for the interdisciplinary pursuit of knowledge between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology as a solution to bridging the disciplinary divides that exist between the disciplines of psychology and philosophy. I then present sub-argument 9 in section 5.4 by responding to one possible objection toward my argument in support of the acceptance of UC by the discipline of psychology. Then in section 5.5, I present a final argument in support of UC. I also briefly summarize the two central aims of this dissertation and how these aims were fulfilled. Finally, I hope the success of this dissertation, in fulfilling its intended aim, is taken by other disciplines across academia as a model and demonstration of one way the project of unifying the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across the disciplines of academia can be accomplished.
CHAPTER 2

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND EMOTIONS

Currently, emotions are typically overlooked within the discipline of philosophy as a principle subject of philosophical investigation.\(^\textit{20}\) This is especially so in contemporary works within the area of philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science. Ethics, however, given the foundations provided by Hume,\(^\textit{21}\) and inspired by Aristotle in one way or another,\(^\textit{22}\) have begun to flourish.\(^\textit{23}\) One reason is that emotions are typically treated as paradigmatic or non-paradigmatic cases of the typical objects of investigation within these areas of research. In the philosophy of mind, for example, emotions are treated generally as


\(^{22}\) Aristotle, *Ethics*, 300-552.

mental phenomena, impressions, feelings, conative states, propositional attitudes, dispositions, orr composites of these and other states. They are rarely treated as what they are in-themselves—emotions. The primary aim of this chapter is to illustrate the relevance of the philosophical and psychological study of emotion to philosophers of mind, and to encourage further exchange between research on emotions and the mind. It will do so by illustrating how the philosophical and psychological study of emotion can significantly challenge a central thesis within the philosophy of mind—Brentano’s thesis that intentionality serves as the mark of the mental. I refer to this thesis as Brentano’s Thesis (BT). This thesis can also be understood as a canonical thesis within the discipline of philosophy, and especially within the area of philosophy of mind. This aim is carried out in two sub-phases, which I refer to as sub-argument 1 and sub-argument 2. The main point of phase 1 is to argue that the question of what emotions are is significant to questions about the mind, and especially questions about consciousness.

In sub-argument 1, which is presented throughout the course of sections 2.1-2.4, I define BT and present a brief discussion of its history and significance within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I also provide initial conditions for falsifying BT. I also illustrate how interdisciplinary research and theorizing about emotions from within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology, present considerable challenges to at least some theories of consciousness. Next, I present sub-argument 2 in section 2.5 by

considering three possible objections to sub-argument 1 and provide responses to each of these possible objections. I conclude sub-argument 1 in section 2.6, by briefly summarizing what I presented throughout sections 2.2-2.5. I also summarize the significance of my conclusions to the discipline of philosophy and psychology.

§2.1 The Tradition of Fundamental Intentionality

Consider the experience of fear upon seeing an uninvited stranger standing in one’s kitchen. Ask anyone if the fear in this case would be about or directed at any particular object or aspect of the world. They would most likely exclaim, “Why, the stranger standing in the kitchen of course!” Consider a second case of my arachnophobic friend. He is told one day that there is a spider under his desk, near his foot. He does not take the time to see if there actually is a spider by his foot. He simply jumps back in fear. If we ask whether my friend’s fear was directed at or about anything in the world (real or otherwise), one would surely identify the spider, which may or may not actually be under the desk, as the object of my friend’s fear. These and similar examples suggest that emotions are intentional in the sense that they have the property of being “directed at” or “about” some object or aspect of the world (real or otherwise). 25

This notion of something being about or directed at some aspect of the world (real or otherwise) is thought to capture at least part of what it means for something to be ‘intentional.’ This notion of intentionality, although perhaps not this particular term or definition, can be found in the works of Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers. 26


as well as in Indian philosophy. John Deigh traces the notion of intentionality, however, back to the Medieval Scholastics, and then to the 20th century philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano. Deigh also suggests a significant difference between the Scholastic usage and Brentano’s use. At one point Deigh tells us that, “The older schools, particularly the Scholastics, used the notion of intentional being to understand various states of mind including emotions.” He reports later that, “Intentionality, when reintroduced into the philosophy of mind in the late twentieth century, was proposed as the mark of the mental (Brentano 1973, p. 88).” It is Brentano’s use of the term ‘intentional’ that I refer to when speaking of the traditional fundamental notion of intentionality although Peter Simons notes that Brentano did not used the term ‘intentionality.’

Brentano not only took the Scholastic use of ‘intentional’ to refer to the property of a mental event having “reference to a content” or having a “direction toward an


29 Ibid, 825.

30 Ibid., 848.

object,” he also held that all and only mental phenomena exhibit this property.\(^{32}\) As Brentano argues in the following passage:

> Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

> This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.\(^{33}\)

Given the foregoing interpretation, we can summarize Brentano’s argument in the following way:

**Brentano’s Argument for Mentality**

- **MN:** All mental phenomena have the property of intentional in-existence.
- **NoFl:** No physical phenomena have the property of intentional in-existence.
- **BT:** All and only mental phenomena have the property of intentional in-existence.

BT is a central thesis within the philosophy of mind, and within the discipline of philosophy in general.\(^{34}\) One might even say it is a canonical thesis of philosophy.\(^{35}\)


\(^{33}\) Brentano, “The Distinction between the Mental and the Physical.”

\(^{34}\) For examples of theories in philosophy of mind that rely on BT or one of its premises in some way see David J. Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience,” *The Future for Philosophy* (2004), http://consc.net/papers.html.

MN represents a slightly different form of BT, I refer to it as ‘MN.’ NoFI stands for ‘no fundamental intentionality.’ In this and subsequent sections, I generate some challenges to BT, MN, and NoFI. To do so, I first clarify some terms, and then set up some initial conditions for generating these challenges. I begin by clarifying the following terms: mental event, phenomenal event, conscious event, physical event, and intentional event. I also clarify the corresponding term-compliments that seem to require further clarification. Furthermore, it should be noted that I employ these terms, along with their term-compliments, to function as generic catch all terms that refer to any mental event, physical event, or notion of intentionality that would fall under the scope of my arguments.

In terms of mental events, this would include Brentano’s notion of “mental phenomena,” Searle’s notion of “intentional states,” any relevant synonyms that Searle provides,” David Bourget’s notion of “possible phenomenal states,” and any relevant synonyms that Bourget provides. In terms of physical events, this would include Brentano’s notion of “physical phenomena,” Searle’s notion of “physical states,” any relevant synonyms that Searle provides, Bourget’s notion of “non-mental phenomenon,” and any relevant synonym that Bourget provides. In terms of intentionality, this would


37 Ibid.
include Brentano’s notion of “intentional in-existence,” Searle’s notions of “as-if intentionality” and “intrinsic intentionality” that he derives, and Bourget’s notions of “derived” and “underived intentionality.”

A mental event is any event that is necessarily characterized as a type of mental event. For example, seeing the color yellow would be a mental event since seeing is necessarily characterized as a type of mental event. It may also be characterized as a physical event, but this would not make it a non-mental event. It is neither conceptually, logically, nor metaphysically possible for an act of seeing to occur without the subject being a subject of some phenomenal event that is related in some way to the object that is seen.

Ibid.

In case one is concerned with how I define ‘mental event’ or any other term that I define here, I offer the following consideration: We ought not define a ‘mental event’ or any other type of event discussed here as an event that would necessarily exclude them from being some other type of event since one of the issues at hand pertains to whether or not there are some things that can be physical events as well as intentional events of some kind. The fact that one can re-describe any physical event as a mental event, conscious event, or intentional event is no proof of the fact that those events are in fact mental events, conscious events, or intentional events. This ability to re-describe a physical event as an event of one of the other types of events may simply be due to the fact that what it means for something to be mental versus non-mental, conscious versus non-conscious, or intentional versus non-intentional event is underdetermined.

For the purpose of clarity I will use the convention of expressing the phenomenal content of any experiential or conscious event with the use of italics or dashes as it is shown here with ‘seeing’ and later on with the generic phenomenal content of a phenomenal event: ‘something-it-is-like.’ The lack of the use of italics or dashes should be taken to indicate that what is being referred to is an event, which can be phenomenal or conscious but need not be.

I will use the term ‘necessarily’ to indicate the properties of logical, conceptual, nomic, and metaphysical necessity throughout this dissertation unless I note otherwise. For a discussion of these types of logical relations see David J. Chalmers, “Supervenience and Explanation,” The Conscious Mind, 32-89.
A phenomenal event is an event that is necessarily characterized as an experiential event, an event with a *something-it-is-like* that makes that event the type of event that it is.\(^\text{42}\) Having this *something-it-is-like* quality is what makes a phenomenal event a “phenomenal” event. We can also refer to phenomenal events as conscious events, which are events that are necessarily conscious events. A smoke detector, for example, cannot *see* smoke although it can detect it. A smoke detector detecting smoke is also not a conscious event although you seeing smoke would be a conscious event. A non-mental event is an event that is not necessarily characterized as a mental event. Eating a bowl of strawberries or cherries, for example, is a non-mental event since eating need not be characterized as a mental event. Non-mental events may also be conscious events, but this need not be the case. For example, when I am eating a bowl of strawberries or cherries I am the subject of a conscious event, but when a robot or a philosophical zombie eats a bowl of strawberries or cherries they are necessarily not subjects of any conscious event.\(^\text{43}\)

An intentional event is an event that is necessarily characterized as an intentional event. Intentional events are necessarily about or directed at some object (real or otherwise). This is what makes the event an intentional event. For example, seeing the color yellow, eating a bowl of strawberries or cherries, *seeing-the-color-yellow*, and *eating-a-bowl-of-strawberries-orr-cherries* are all necessarily about or directed at some object (real or otherwise). So both types of events are intentional events. What follows


\(^\text{43}\) See Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*. 

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from this is that some mental events and some physical events are intentional events. A *non-intentional event* is an event that is not necessarily characterized as an intentional event. For example, running, walking, etc., are all non-intentional events. This is because none of these are necessarily directed at or about some object. Although it should be noted that being a non-intentional event does not necessarily imply that there are no intentional events of that type. For example, running to get the mail is necessarily an intentional event, but it is also a type of non-intentional event—running.

A *physical event* is an event that is necessarily characterized as a physical event. Eating a bowl of strawberries or cherries is a physical event because it is both logically and metaphysically necessary for one to have some sort of physical or material form that is capable of performing the act of eating in order for one to be *eating*. To illustrate this point, consider the following question: Is it conceptually, logically, nomically, or metaphysically impossible for ghosts or spirits to eat a bowl of strawberries or cherries? If so, then I propose that the reason is that eating a bowl of strawberries or cherries is a physical event. It is possible, however, for philosophical zombies to eat a bowl of strawberries or cherries, although it is impossible for robots to eat a bowl of strawberries or cherries. A *non-physical* event is one that is not necessarily a physical event. Thinking, contemplating, judging, and caring, etc., are all non-physical events because it is not necessary for one to have some physical or material form in order to

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44 I will use the term ‘impossible’ to indicate the properties of conceptual, logical, nomic, and metaphysical impossibility throughout this dissertation unless I note otherwise.

45 This would be so given that ‘eating’ is done for the purpose of nourishment since robots do not necessarily require nourishment and the possibility of eating anything would only apply to things that necessarily require nourishment.
perform any of these actions. For example, it is conceptually, logically, nomically, and metaphysically possible for ghosts or spirits to be thinking, contemplating, judging, and caring.\textsuperscript{46} This does not imply that things with physical or material forms cannot be subjects of non-physical events. For example, it is possible for robots and philosophical zombies to be thinking, contemplating, and judging.

Given the foregoing definitions, one should note that it is impossible for both robots and philosophical zombies to be imagining, dreaming, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling. The reason for this is because these kinds of events are all conscious events. It is also impossible for ghosts and spirits to be seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling since these events are phenomenal events as well as physical events, which necessarily requires some physical or material form in order for one to be the subject of any of these events. Seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling are also intentional events. They are necessarily directed at or about some aspect of the world. Therefore, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling are all conscious, physical, and intentional events.\textsuperscript{47} The fact that seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling are all conscious, physical, and intentional events not only allows us to differentiate animals, including human beings, from robots and philosophical zombies, it also allows us to differentiate robots from philosophical zombies. Furthermore, it also allows us to propose at least one reasonable solution to at least part of the hard problem of consciousness,

\textsuperscript{46} I will use the term ‘possible’ to indicate the properties of conceptual, logical, nomic, and metaphysical possibility throughout this dissertation unless I note otherwise.

\textsuperscript{47} One might question what type of event is an emotional event? I’d say that’s a very good question. It is at the least an intentional event; but as to whether or not it is a physical event or a mental event, I’d say it depends on one’s theory of emotion.
specifically the question of why we have phenomenal consciousness: We have phenomenal consciousness because phenomenally conscious experiences allow us to know!⁴⁸ I refer to this thesis as the thesis of the final cause of consciousness (FC⁵):

The Thesis of the Final Cause of Consciousness

FC⁵: Phenomenal consciousness allows us to know.

I will not argue for this conclusion within this body of work, but at least some arguments from Chalmers’ Constructing the World may be relied on in support of this conclusion, especially if one considers the implications of understanding his Cosmoscope as an empathy machine, and the role it plays in his argument for the scrutability of all ordinary truths.⁴⁹

Finally, the fundamental notion of intentionality may be defined in various ways. Consider the again the passage in which Brentano presents his argument for the traditional notion of fundamental intentionality (BT):

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could,

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⁴⁸ One should note, however, that although phenomenal consciousness allows us to know, it is not sufficient for allowing us to know that we know. Furthermore, it is also possible for one to know that one knows without knowing how one knows, although one should know how one knows that one knows.

therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.\textsuperscript{50}

In the above passage, Brentano provides at least two ways of understanding the notion of intentionality. One is the most general way of understanding this notion of intentionality—that of “something having reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity.” Brentano refers to this notion of intentionality as “intentional inexistence.” In philosophical discussions about intentionality, this notion of intentional inexistence is generally understood as referring to the property of “being about” or “being directed at” some aspect of the world (real or otherwise). This is a general one, as Brentano might say, a “not wholly unambiguous” notion of intentionality. This notion of intentionality demarcates the genus of intentionality. The notion of intentionality that Brentano applies to all mental phenomena is a species of this genus, and Brentano refers to it by the term ‘intentional in-existence,’ with the use of a hyphen. It is this notion of intentionality that I am referring to when I speak of the traditional notion of fundamental intentionality.

Brentano defines this notion of intentionally more narrowly than the first by noting that it is “characteristically exclusive of the mental phenomena.” It is this notion of intentionality that Brentano regards as the mark of the mental, and he defines this notion of intentionality as the property of “contain[ing] an object intentionally within themselves.”\textsuperscript{51} One might ask, however, what it means for a phenomenon to “contain an

\textsuperscript{50} Brentano, “The Distinction between the Mental and the Physical.”

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
object intentionally within themselves.” We can gain more clarity on what is meant here by considering the passages that immediately follow the previously cited text:

But here, too, we come upon controversies and contradiction. Hamilton, in particular denies this characteristic to a whole broad class of mental phenomena, namely, to all those which he characterizes as feelings, to pleasure and pain in all their most diverse shades and varieties...

In reality, what Hamilton says is not entirely correct, since certain feelings undeniably refer to objects. Our language itself indicates this through the expression it employs. We say that we are pleased with or about something, that we feel sorrow or grieve about something. Likewise, we say: that pleases me, that hurts me, that makes me feel sorry, etc. Joy and sorrow, like affirmation and negation, love and hate, desire and aversion, clearly follow upon a presentation and are related to that which is presented...Even Hamilton recognizes the fact that presentations occur without exception and thus even here they form the basis of the feeling. Thus his denial that feelings have an object seems all the more striking.

One thing certainly has to be admitted; the object to which a feeling refers is not always an external object. Even in cases where I hear a harmonious sound, the pleasure which I feel is not actually pleasure in the sound but pleasure in the hearing. In fact you could say, not incorrectly, that in a certain sense it even refers to itself, and this introduces, more or less, what Hamilton was talking about, namely that the feeling and the object are “fused into one.” But this is nothing that is not true in the same way of many phenomena of thought and knowledge, as we will see when we come to the investigation of inner consciousness. Still they retain a mental inexistence, a Subject-Object, to use Hamilton’s mode of speech, and the same thing is true of these feelings...Hamilton spoke of a fusing into one of the feelings with the mental impression, but when carefully considered it can be seen that he is bearing witness against himself here. Every fusion is a unification of several things; and thus the pictorial expression, which is intended to make us concretely aware of the distinctive character of feeling still points to a certain duality in the unity.

We may, therefore consider, the intentional in-existence of an object to be a general characteristic of mental phenomena which distinguishes this class of phenomena from the class of physical phenomena.  

In the above passage, Brentano argues against Sir William Hamilton’s claim that the property of intentional in-existence fails to appropriately demarcate the class of mental phenomena. Hamilton’s reason, as Brentano tells us, is that Hamilton denies the

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52 Ibid.
property of intentional in-existence as being characteristically held by feelings, which include pleasures, pains, and emotions, and are taken to be mental phenomena. In response, Brentano argues that Hamilton in fact admits that feelings do have the characteristic of intentional in-existence, especially when Hamilton speaks of how the “feelings and the object are fused into one.” Thus the property of intentional in-existence, according to Brentano, refers to the property that is had by mental events whereby one understands the object of that mental event, the object that the mental event is directed at or about, to be “fused into” or “contained in” the experience of the mental event itself. Here then we can give the following definition for the traditional notion of \textit{fundamental intentionality} (FI):

\textit{Traditional Fundamental Intentionality}

FI: An intentional event is a mental phenomenon whereby one understands the object of the mental phenomenon, the object that the mental phenomenon is directed at or about, to be necessarily “fused into” or necessarily “contained in” the experience of the mental phenomenon itself.

Although FI may serve as an adequate definition of the traditional notion of fundamental intentionality, understood in terms of Brentano’s notion of intentional in-existence, we cannot accept this definition for the purposes of this dissertation. One reason is that Brentano’s definition is a stipulated definition. We can see that this is the case if we consider the final conclusion he draws in the last paragraph of the previously cited passage. As he states, “we should consider the intentional in-existence of an object to be a general characteristic of mental phenomena which distinguishes this class of phenomena from the class of physical phenomena.” The stipulated feature of this definition is that Brentano builds into the definition for the mark of the mental a
demarcating condition for the physical, making the two categories mutually exclusive in one fell swoop. Note that in the previously cited passage it is in virtue of considering the “intentional in-existence of an object to be a general characteristic of mental phenomena which distinguishes [mental phenomena] from the class of physical phenomena.” Thus the traditional notion of fundamental intentionality—Brentano’s notion of intentional in-existence—serves not only to mark the mental, but in the service of marking the mental it simultaneously serves to demarcate the class of the physical from the class of the mental.

This is problematic since what is at issue is whether or not Brentano’s argument for BT is a sound argument. If we accept his stipulated definition of intentional in-existence, then the soundness of his argument is a foregone conclusion since stipulated definitions are analytic definitions and thus serve to either carve nature at its joints or carve out nature’s joints. I propose we proceed with the following generalized definition of the fundamental notion of intentionality, which I refer to as the notion of fundamental intentionality generalized (FIG):

**Fundamental Intentionality Generalized**

FIG: A fundamentally intentional (i.e., f-intentional) event is an event whereby one understands the object of that event, the object that the event is directed at or about, to be necessarily “fused into” or necessarily “contained in” the event itself.

We can also derive a generalized notion of intentionality that is consistent with FIG, but not fundamental for demarcating the realm of the mind. I refer to this notion as the notion of illusory intentionality (ILL):

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53 Ibid.
**Illusory Intentionality**

ILL: An illusorily intentional (i.e., ill-intentional) event is an event whereby one understands the object of that event, i.e., what that event is directed at or about, in such a way that makes the event an intentional event that is necessarily not a fundamentally intentional event.

In regard to the notions of FIG and ILL, the notion of f-intentionality defined by FIG should also be understood as a substitution for Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistence throughout this body of work unless I note otherwise. I use the term f-intentional event to refer to intentional events that fall under the definition of FIG. The ‘f’ stands for ‘fundamental.’ ILL should be understood as a counterpart to such notions as “as-if intentionality” and “derived intentionality.”\(^5^4\) This is because ILL is intended to capture the same essential meaning of the notion of intentionality that these notions of intentionality are attempting to capture. I refer to these types of events, those that fall under the scope of ILL as *ill-intentional* events. The ‘ill’ may be understood to stand for ‘ILL’ or ‘illusory.’ Given all the foregoing terminological clarifications, we can present Brentano’s argument for BT as a categorical syllogism in the following way:

**Brentano’s Argument for Mentality Generalized**

- **MN:** All mental events are f-intentional events.
- **NoFI:** No physical events are f-intentional events.
- **BT:** All and only mental events are f-intentional events.

Philosophers of mind are careful to maintain a distinction between f-intentional and ill-intentional events since BT is not a universally held thesis among philosophers of mind or among philosophers in general. Given FIG and ILL, there are several ways that

\(^5^4\) Searle, “Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality”; Bourget, “Consciousness Is Underived Intentionality.”
one can go about challenging BT. One way is to show that BT is false. I have already shown this to be the case while clarifying terms at the beginning of this section.

According to BT, all and only mental events are f-intentional events. As discussed earlier in this section, however, eating a bowl of strawberries or cherries is not a mental event.\(^{55}\) It is a physical event, although it is also a necessarily intentional event. So eating a bowl of strawberries or cherries is a non-mental event that is also an f-intentional event. Given these terms and definitions, I argue in the subsequent sections that BT is at best unwarranted and at worst false. Furthermore, I will do so by relying on philosophical and psychological theories of emotion in order to illustrate how these theories are able to generate challenges to BT.

§2.2 Falsifying Conditions for Falsifying Brentano’s Thesis

The two premises of the argument for BT are MN, which asserts that “All mental events are f-intentional,” and NoFI, which asserts that “No physical events are f-intentional.” In order to simplify things as much as possible, we can use the operation of obversion on NoFI to yield the statement “All physical events are ill-intentional events,” as well as replace ‘physical events’ with its semantically equivalent term ‘non-mental events.’ This yields the statement, “All non-mental events are ill-intentional events.” I also refer to this simplified version of NoFI as “NoFI.” Furthermore, the contraposition of NoFI is the statement “All f-intentional events are mental events,” which is, for all intents and purposes of this dissertation, essentially FI. I refer to this simplified version of FI as ‘FI’ as well. The foregoing leaves us with the following four statements:

\(^{55}\) Note that eating a bowl of strawberries or cherries is distinct from eating-a-bowl-of-strawberries-or-cherries. Another way to allude to the distinction noted here is to consider the following fact: being the New Truth is not the same as being-the-New-Truth.
MN, ILL, and Corresponding Contrapositives

MN: All mental events are f-intentional events.
ILL: All ill-intentional events are non-mental events.
NoFI: All non-mental events are ill-intentional events.
FI: All f-intentional events are mental events.

Statements MN and ILL, and statements NoFI and FI, are logically equivalent statements. This, however, does not entail that they have the same conditions of falsification. The falsifying conditions for each of the respective statements noted above are as follows:

**Falsifying Conditions for MN, ILL, NoFI, and FI**

MN<sub>F</sub>: Provide a case of some mental event that is not an f-intentional event.
ILL<sub>F</sub>: Provide a case of some ill-intentional event that is not a non-mental event.
NoFI<sub>F</sub>: Provide a case of some non-mental event that is not an ill-intentional event.
FI<sub>F</sub>: Provide a case of some f-intentional event that is not a mental event.

These falsifying conditions are conditions that if fulfilled, show that the corresponding premises of BT, and their contrapositives, are false. I present four theories of emotion in the following section and explain how these four falsifying conditions can be fulfilled by the category of cases generated by these theories of emotion.

Furthermore, the category of cases generated by the fourth theory of emotion discussed in the subsequent section also generates a challenge for Searle’s more recent account of intrinsic intentionality and as-if intentionality. Searle differentiates the notions

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57 We can understand the subscript ‘F’ to indicate a world at which the corresponding statement would be false.
of intrinsic intentionality from the notion of *as-if* intentionality by referencing the “aspectual shape” of intrinsically intentional states.\(^{58}\) We can understand the aspectual shape of an intrinsically intentional state as a possible way of thinking about or experiencing the state that makes *that* state the type of state that it is. As Searle puts it, “Thoughts and experiences and hence intrinsic intentional states generally, have a certain sort of aspectual shape. They represent their conditions of satisfaction under aspects.”\(^{59}\) Searle gives the examples of desiring water, desiring H\(_2\)O, thinking about his thirst for water, and thinking about his thirst for H\(_2\)O in order to illustrate in part what he means by “aspectual shape.” All of these examples are different ways that one can desire or think about the same intentional object. *Desiring-a-glass-of-water* has an aspectual shape that is different from the aspectual shape of *desiring-a-glass-of-H\(_2\)O* even if both *desires* have the same glass of liquidity stuff we call “water” or “H\(_2\)O” as their objects. These intentional states are also intrinsically intentional states in virtue of the fact that they have these aspectual shapes. This is because only things that can be thought of in some way or another can be thought about in different ways. *As-if* intentional states, such as spoken and written words of a language (the spoken sounds and written marks of a language), are not intrinsically intentional states because they receive their intentionality, as well as their intensions, from a speaker’s or author’s thoughts, which are intrinsically intentional states. Furthermore, Searle suggests that the way these physical entities (sounds and marks) gain their intentionality, and thereby become *as-if* intentional states is by

*intentional transference.* As Searle puts it:

\(^{58}\) Searle, “Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality,” 51.

\(^{59}\) Ibid, 53.
The mind imposes Intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically Intentional by intentionally transferring the conditions of satisfaction of the expressed psychological state to the external physical entity.\textsuperscript{60}

Exactly how this process of intentional transference is supposed to work is unclear, but this need not worry us here.\textsuperscript{61} The important thing to note for our purposes here about the notion of intentional transference is that according to Searle, non-mental phenomena, such as physical entities, can only come to be intentional when the conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state is transferred from a mental state to a physical entity.

Searle also provides the following definitions for his two theses of “intrinsic intentionality” and “as-if intentionality,” although one should note that these are stipulated definitions since Searle, to my knowledge, has yet to provide a sound argument from which he derives either of these notions. I respectively refer to these two notions together as Searle’s \textit{INT/AS-IF intentionality theses (INT/AS-IF)}:

\textbf{INT/AS-IF Intentionality Theses}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{INT:} All beings capable of intentional states are beings capable of conscious states.\textsuperscript{62}
  \item \textbf{AS-IF:} All intentional states are in principle possibly conscious states.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{itemize}

Note that INT and AS-IF are distinct theses compared to FIG and ILL. This is consistent with the fact that Searle’s aims run in the opposite direction compared to Brentano’s

\textsuperscript{60} Searle, “What Is an Intentional State?” 89.

\textsuperscript{61} It should be noted that according to Searle, the ontology of intentionality is not very important, so we need not worry about the specific details of how this transference occurs. What is important, according to Searle, are the logical and semantic relations that are involved. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 92.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
argument for BT. Unlike Brentano’s argument for BT, Searle does not attempt to derive a
theory of consciousness from his notions of intentionality. Searle instead relies on
intuitions about language and consciousness in order to derive a notion of intentionality.
Doing so insulates Searle’s account from several challenges that are generated in the
course of the following section, but it does not insulate it from all such challenges.

§2.3 Challenging Brentano’s Thesis

In the philosophy of emotion, cognitive theorists typically account for the
intentionality of emotions by referencing some form of thought, which is defined in terms
of judgments, propositional attitudes, seeing-as, construals, appraisals, etc.

Such
identifications give cognitive theorists a prima facie explanation for how emotions are
intentional. In contrast, contemporary noncognitive theorists typically offer causal-
functional accounts to explain the intentionality of emotions.

Both approaches seem to

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64 Aristotle and Richard McKeon, “Ethics,” in Introduction to Aristotle (New York The
Modern library, 1947); Jean-Paul Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (London:
Methuen & Co., Ltd, 1962); Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the
Meaning of Life (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993); Cheshire Calhoun, “Cognitive Emotions?”
Calhoun and Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Claire
Emotions, eds. Rom Harré (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 32-56; Donald Davidson,
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Rom

65 A. Scarantino and P. Griffiths, “Don’t Give up on Basic Emotions,” Emotion Review 3,
no. 4 (2011); Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological
Categories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); David Hume, “Book Two: Of
the Passions,” in A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J.
Norton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); René Descartes, Elizabeth
Sanderson Haldane, and G. R. T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 2
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1967); Deigh, “Cognitivism in the Theory of
Emotions”; Jan Slaby, “Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body,” Phenomenology
and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2008).
assume some aspect of the fundamental notion of intentionality, which regards intentionality to be the mark of the mental, and both approaches aim to explain how emotions are or can be intentional.

§2.3.1 Cognitive Theories of Emotion

Martha Nussbaum presents a contemporary cognitive theory of emotion.\(^{66}\) She refers to this theory as a “cognitive-evaluative” theory of emotion, and it identifies emotions as cognitive mental events that are constituted by assents. As assents, emotions are types of judgments, but they are not any type of judgment. They are assents to eudemonistic appraisals or evaluations. In being judgments of eudaimonistic appraisals, emotions involve assents to the predications of salience, significance, and importance of some aspect of the world (real or otherwise) with respect to the subject’s well-being. The specific type of judgment involved serves to identify each emotion as the type of emotion it is, and the eudaimonistic appraisals serve to identify the judgment as a judgment of a specific type. The fact that emotions are judgments entail that they are both cognitive and intentional states. Their intentionality, however, is imparted by the eudemonistic appraisals to which they assent. These appraisals are not identical to the judgments that

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\(^{66}\) Theories of emotion can be categorized in accordance with a variety of taxonomic principles. The categories of “cognitivism”, “noncognitivism,” and “social constructionism” are often employed within the discipline of philosophy. **Cognitive theories of emotion** are theories that typically trace their tradition back to philosophers like Aristotle, Epictetus, and Jean-Paul Sartre, who regard emotions to necessarily entail some type of cognitive mental state, such as a propositional thought, judgment, belief, appraisal, etc. **Non-cognitive theories of emotion** are theories that typically trace their tradition back to philosophers like Hume and William James. In contrast to cognitive theories of emotion, non-cognitive theories typically hold that emotions do not necessarily entail some type of cognitive mental state. **Social constructionist theories of emotion** are typically cognitive theories of emotion, and they typically hold that emotions do not constitute a natural kind. See chapter 4 for a discussion and presentation of various taxonomies of theories of emotion.
are the emotions; they instead figure into the judgments as preconditions of those judgments. They are the preconditions to which the judgments assent. The judgments account for how emotions are intentional. They are the vehicles for what make emotions intentional—the intentional content of emotions: the eudaimonistic appraisals.

Eudaimonistic appraisals play a vital role in accounting for the intentionality of emotions despite the fact that they are preconditions of emotions, and thus distinct from them. This is because emotions are not intentional simply by being judgments of any kind. For example, sensory perceptual beliefs, such as those that are rooted in the five senses of touch, sight, hearing, tasting, and smelling, may also be understood as assents to appraisals, where “appraisals” are understood simply in terms of the act of assessing some object as having a certain property or quality. When one is feeling something soft, seeing something blue, hearing something loud, tasting something sweet, or smelling something foul, it may be said that one is assenting to the appraisal that some object is soft, blue, loud, sweet, or foul. What differentiates the category of emotions, as cognitive intentional states, from other cognitive intentional states, such as perceptual beliefs or disinterested thoughts, are the eudemonistic appraisals to which the emotions assent. The

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67 There is some ambiguity between Nussbaum’s account of emotions presented in *Upheavals of Thought* and what states in her précis for Upheavals of Thought. As she states in her précis, “Upheavals argues that emotions are evaluative appraisals that ascribe high importance to things and people that lie outside the agent’s own sphere of control.” Martha C. Nussbaum, “Précis of Upheavals of Thought*,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68, no. 2 (2004). The fact that there is such an ambiguity, however, does not affect the arguments presented here. Since if Nussbaum does not claim the interpretation given here as her account of emotion, this would not make it any less of an account of what emotions are. So this account would still serve to generate counterexamples to MN and ILL.

68 In regard to the notion of vehicles of intentionality see Fred Dretske, “Experience as Representation,” *Philosophical Issues* 13 (2003).
eudemonistic appraisals constitute the differentia of emotions as cognitive intentional states. They also explain how emotions are cognitions since they may be regarded as independent cognitive states in their own right. Emotions are thus doubly cognitive on Nussbaum’s account. Emotions may be cognitive as judgments or they may be cognitive as having appraisals as the contents to which emotions assent. Thus how emotions are intentional states and what the intentionality of emotions consists in can come apart; and when they do, the eudaimonistic appraisals are what explain why emotions are intentional states.

This can be more clearly brought into view when we consider how Nussbaum allows the evaluative appraisals and judgments that constitute emotions to take various non-linguistic or non-propositional forms. As Nussbaum states:

There are many kinds of cognitive activity or seeing-as in which ideas of salience and importance figure: there are pictorial imaginings, musical imaginings, the kinetic forms of imaginings involved in dance, and others. These are not all reducible to or straightforwardly translatable into linguistic symbolism, nor should we suppose that linguistic representing has pride of place as either the most sophisticated or the most basic mode.69

By suggesting that the “cognitive activity or seeing-as in which ideas of salience and importance figure” may take various forms, Nussbaum is suggesting that there are two aspects to an emotion’s intentional content: the content and the structure of the content. The content is what the emotions are said to be “about” and the structure of the content is the specific form that the contents of emotion take.70 The contents of emotion, which are derived from the evaluative appraisals to which emotions are assents, are thus distinct


70 In regard to the notion of form see Aristotle, “*De Anima,*” Bk.1, Ch.1, ll402b-03b.5.
from the form of these contents. In other words, we can distinguish the content of an emotion from its *mode of presentation* in Nussbaum’s account.\(^\text{71}\)

The way these contents are structured, which tells us what modes of presentation the intentional content of an emotion can take, is more so related to questions regarding the proper vehicle of intentionality rather than what the intentionality of emotions *consists in*. By distinguishing the form of the intentional content from its content, and thus differentiating concerns regarding the proper vehicles for the intentionality of emotions from concerns regarding what the intentionality of emotions consist in, Nussbaum seeks to accommodate the emotions of human infants and non-human animals as being both cognitive and constituted by assents to eudaimonistic appraisals. Since the emotions of human infants and non-human animals are not likely to take propositional form, distinguishing the intentional content from its modes of presentation allows Nussbaum to maintain the claim that while the emotions of human infants and non-human animals are types of judgments or assents to an evaluative appraisal, they need not be propositionally structured. In doing so, Nussbaum not only re-conceptualizes the structure of judgments, she also allows us to identify what is most important about emotions that explain their intentionality. Regardless of the structure of an emotion’s intentional content—regardless of the vehicle, form, or mode of presentation—which tells us *how* emotions can be intentional, Nussbaum’s account leaves unaltered the claim that emotions are assents to appraisals of how aspects of the world (real or otherwise) bear on the subject’s well-being. Thus not only is it the case that the question of how

\(^{71}\) Regarding “mode of presentation” see Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience.”
emotions are intentional is distinct from the question of what makes emotions intentional, it is also the case that when it comes to concerns regarding the intentionality of emotions the most relevant feature that needs to be accounted for is the relation between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and how they bear on the subject’s well-being. For Nussbaum, this relation is accounted for by eudaimonistic appraisals, which are external to the judgments that are the emotions.

Here then, we have a category of mental events that have ill-intentionality according to FIG since they are types of events in which the object of that event, i.e., what the event is “about” or “directed at” that makes the event the type of event that it is, is necessarily not “fused into” or “contained in” the event itself. This is because, given that emotions are judgments, which entails that their contents are assents to evaluative appraisals, and so according to our common sense ordinary intuitions may be said to be “intentional,” FIG would discount them as having f-intentionality since FIG necessarily requires the object of the emotion to be “fused into” or “contained in” the judgment, which is impossible. There is no way to take the stranger standing in your kitchen or the spider sitting by my friend’s foot, if there was one sitting by his foot, and “fuse” them into either my judgment, your judgment, my friend’s judgment, or anyone else’s judgment. How does a person even begin to “fuse” a mental state, i.e., the judgment that is fear, joy, sorrow, or whatever other emotion you would like to consider, with a physical person, a physical spider, or a physical anything? So FIG would regard the category of emotions generated by Nussbaum’s cognitive evaluative theory of emotion to be a category of mental events that are not f-intentional events. In other words, FIG would regard Nussbaum’s category of emotion to be ill-intentional mental events, i.e., mental
events that are not necessarily f-intentional events. Yet, these emotions are mental states since they are judgments of some kind. Thus, given FIG, Nussbaum’s theory of emotion generates a category of cases that fulfill MN_f as well as ILL_f, and therefore prove MN and ILL to be false or likely to be false. This in turn challenges the justification or warrant for BT, which necessarily regards f-intentionality to be the mark of the mental. Note that in response to the foregoing, neither Brentano, Searle, nor Bourget can appeal to such causal relations in their account of f-intentionality since their account necessarily denies the possibility of any causal relation being held between mental events and physical events; and given this, it seems we have located the root of the mind-body problem, the explanatory gap, and the hard problem of consciousness.

§2.3.2 Noncognitive Theories of Emotion

Jesse Prinz’s theory of emotion also relates aspects of the world (real or otherwise) to a subject’s well-being. Prinz, however, presents a non-cognitive, perceptual theory of emotion that characterizes emotions as perceptions of bodily changes that represent core relational themes, such as having “experienced an irrevocable loss.”72 As perceptions of bodily changes, we can understand emotions as phenomenologically simple mental events, experientially similar to Hume’s impressions if you like.73 Yet these simple feelings, on Prinz’s account, are intentional. These perceptions of patterns of bodily changes take on the representational contents of the calibration files that are associated with types of emotion. These calibration files are simple data structures in


73 Hume, “Book Two: Of the Passions.”
memory that are postulated to hold representations of emotion elicitors. Emotions represent how aspects of the world bear on the subject’s well being in virtue of the following sequence of emotion processing. First, a pattern of bodily changes is reliably caused by the activation of a representation in a calibration file for an emotion of a certain type. This process is carried out by what Prinz refers to as the “initiation pathways” of emotion processing. Second, patterns of bodily changes reliably cause perceptions of these patterns.

This process is carried out by what Prinz refers to as the “response pathways” of emotion processing. The response pathways and initiation pathways are both constituted by dedicated pathways of neurophysiological subsystems. The initiation pathways are constituted by perceptual, cognitive, and memory subsystems along with various bodily control centers. The response pathways are constituted by three hierarchically structured subsystems that are parts of the larger somatosensory system. These three systems that constitute the three levels of the response pathways are thought

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75 Ibid.
to be fairly modular, in the Fodorian sense. They process information from bodily control centers to brain centers that perceive bodily changes. Given these two major sequences of events, our emotions (as perceptions of patterns of bodily changes) represent the core relational theme instantiated by the general property that is shared by all the representations held within a calibration file for a specific type of emotion.

To explain how calibration files pass on their intentional contents to perceptions of bodily changes (feelings), Prinz offers an evolutionary, causal-functional account of the intentionality of emotions. According to Prinz, we and other animals that share our phylogenic history are genetically predisposed to set up certain calibration files for a narrow range of perceptions through various evolutionary processes. The fact that we are predisposed to set up calibration files suggests a sense in which calibration files can be

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76 Fodorian modules are thought to exhibit nine essential characteristics: 1) they are localized, meaning they have a dedicated neural architecture that can be specified in the brain, 2) they are subject to characteristic breakdowns, 3) they are mandatory, meaning they are automatically activated by that they process, 4) they are fast, meaning they occur quickly or reflexively, 5) their outputs are shallow, meaning the information they produce is fairly simple, 6) the information processed during the intermediary stages of each system’s information processing is inaccessible to higher subsystems of information processing, 7) their intermediary stages of information processing are informationally encapsulated, meaning information cannot be sought from other systems during the intermediate stages of information processing within each subsystem, they are ontogenetically determined, meaning they develop in a characteristic pace and sequence, and 9) their inputs are domain specific, meaning they have a narrow range of possible inputs. Jerry A. Fodor, *The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983); Prinz, *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion*, 232.

said to be “innate.” The actual files, however, are established by our interactions with aspects of the world (real or otherwise) since we are only evolutionarily disposed to set up such calibration files. For example, the calibration file for fear is initially set up by our experience with fear-inducing perceptions, such as looming objects and loud noises, which we have been predisposed by evolution to respond to with the emotion of fear. When we are initially faced with some looming object or loud noise, representations of these objects are placed within a dedicated calibration file, which establishes the calibration file for fear. Since evolution has predisposed the set-up of a calibration file for fear, and the representations in this calibration file are hardwired to produce a prototypical pattern of physiological changes, both the calibration file for fear and the pattern of bodily changes that are caused by the activation of a representation in the calibration file for fear have the function of representing the core relational theme associated with fear.

The representational content of a calibration file is determined by the abstract property that all the representations within a single calibration file track in virtue of reliably causing the pattern of bodily changes that the representations within a calibration file are hardwired to cause. Thus the representational capacities of the emotions are given

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78 One might question whether this is the correct interpretation of Prinz’s suggestion that some emotions are innate. Prinz states that, “in saying that fear (or something like fear) is innate, one is actually committed to the view that there is a genetic predisposition to form a calibration file comprised of certain kinds of representations,” Prinz, *Gut Reactions*, 101. The genetic predisposition here can be understood in two ways: either we are genetically predisposed to set up a calibration file for fear simply as part of our ontogenetic development without any inducement from external environmental factors or we are predisposed to set up calibration files as part of our ontogenetic development through the influence of external environmental factors. I think he means the second. This interpretation can be further supported by Prinz’s discussion of how young macaque monkeys develop snake phobias, Ibid, 74-75.
by the evolutionarily established functions of the initiation and response pathways of emotion processing. In other words, the functions of these evolutionarily given pathways endow the perceptions of prototypical patterns of bodily changes with their capacity to represent core relational themes. The perception of a prototypical pattern of bodily changes (the feeling that is the emotion) is thus, an intentional state. More specifically, since core relational themes are about relations between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and how they bear on the subject’s well-being, emotions are intentional by representing how aspects of the world (real or otherwise) bear on the subject’s well-being. Emotions are therefore intentional in virtue of the evolutionary functions of the initiation pathways and response pathways that produce them. The vehicles for the intentional contents of emotion are perceptions of bodily changes (feelings). The perceptions of these patterns of bodily changes are the forms or modes of presentation of the intentional contents of emotion. The intentional contents are also not represented in the emotion (the perception of bodily changes/feelings) they are instead represented by the emotion. The initiation pathways of emotion processing, however, are regarded to be external to the emotion subsystems.79 They initiate the response pathways, and it is in the response pathways rather than the initiation pathways where emotions are realized.80

79 Ibid., 102.

80 Psychological theories are typically categorized into basic emotion theories, appraisal theories, social constructivism, and theories of psychological construction. Basic emotion theories typically hold that emotions constitute a natural kind category, appraisal theories typically hold that emotions necessarily entail at least some dimension of appraisal, social constructivist typically hold that emotions serve important social functions, and theories of psychological construction typically deny that emotions are natural kinds. See chapter 4.
Prinz’s theory of emotion, therefore, generates a second category of mental events that are ill-intentional events. This is because, although emotions are mental events, since they are types of perceptions, they do not “contain” their objects or have their object’s “fused into” the type of mental event that they are. Emotions fail to fulfill this necessary condition for f-intentionality for the exact same reasons why the category of emotions generated by Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion fail to fulfill this condition. It is impossible for emotions to do so. Once again, as with the category of emotions generated by Nussbaum’s account, the category of emotions generated by Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion has as their objects aspects of the world (real or imagined). So, since it is impossible to “fuse” a physical object with a perceptual state, FIG would characterize the cases of emotion generated by Prinz’s perceptual theory as mental events that are not f-intentional events. Thus Prinz’s category of emotions would be regarded by FIG to be ill-intentional events that are mental events. The truth of these last two conclusions entail the fulfillment of MN_F and ILL_F, and thus show MN and ILL to be false or likely to be false. This in turn challenges the justification or warrant for BT, which necessarily regards f-intentionality to be the mark of the mental.
§2.3.3 Appraisal Theories of Emotion

Klaus R. Scherer refers to his theory as a component process theory of emotion,\(^81\) which is typically identified as an appraisal theory of emotion in psychology.\(^82\) As such, it exemplifies psychological theories of emotion that have made explicit attempts to account for the intentionality of emotions. Scherer’s component process theory defines emotion as, “an episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the organism.”\(^83\) This definition does not characterize emotions in terms of any mental phenomena. Although emotions involve subjective emotional experiences, which are understood as feelings, Scherer resists identifying emotions with such feelings due to methodological considerations for empirically investigating emotions. Thus emotions are identified as episodes or processes

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whereby a series of five independently functional, but interrelated subsystems, are activated and synchronized in response to features of the environment that are evaluated as being significant to an organism’s well-being. The five subsystems that are involved in the realization of an episode of emotion are the information processing subsystem, support subsystem, executive subsystem, action subsystem, and monitoring subsystems. These five subsystems respectively underwrite the five components that constitute an emotional episode: the cognitive, neurophysiological, motivational, motor expressive, and subjective feeling components.

Emotions also necessarily involve appraisals of various stimuli (real or otherwise). These appraisals or evaluations are carried out by the information processing subsystem, which marks the beginning of the emotion process. The other subsystems are respectively responsible for action preparation, planning, communication of intentions, and giving rise to subjective feeling. Information from stimulus evaluation checks that are aspects of the information processing subsystem are carried into all the other subsystems, and the responses of each subsystem are thought to reliably co-occur with the results of these stimulus response checks. “Modal” emotions, according to Scherer, are the emotions that we typically refer to in ordinary language, such as ‘fear,’ ‘joy,’ ‘guilt,’ etc. Each emotion type is defined by a prototypical pattern of stimulus evaluation checks, along with a prototypical pattern of subsequent changes or responses of the other four subsystems. What marks the end of the emotion process is the desynchronization of the five subsystems, which indicates the resolution of the significance of the stimulus event or object. Thus, given that emotions are processes, they

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
can be intentional in the sense that these processes serve the function of evaluating and responding to objects or events that are significant to the subject’s well-being.

Despite Scherer’s view that emotions are to be defined as processes, he also entertains the suggestion that the term ‘emotion’ be restricted so as to refer only to the subjective feeling states of the monitoring subsystem, which “actively possesses the state changes that constitute the emotions.”85 Thus if we were to restrict the term ‘emotion’ to the subjective feeling states of the monitoring subsystem, then emotions would be intentional on Scherer’s account in so far as these subjective feeling states are feelings of evaluating and responding to objects or events that are significant to the subject’s well-being. As such, all emotions according to FIG would count as ill-intentional mental events. This conclusion would follow from what is essentially the same reason why Nussbaum’s and Prinz’s categories of emotion would be regarded as ill-intentional mental events according to FIG. As subjective feeling states, emotions would be mental events since they are types of perceptions, however, they do not “contain” their objects or have their object’s “fused into” the subjective feeling states that would be the emotions. Just as the categories of emotion that are generated by Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion and Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion failed to fulfill FIG’s necessary condition for f-intentional states having their objects “fused into” or “contained in” the mental state that are emotions, the category of emotions generated by Scherer’s component process theory of emotion would also fail to fulfill this necessary condition of FIG, which asserts that, “f-intentional events are events whereby one understands the

object of that event, the object that the event is directed at or about, to be necessarily ‘fused into’ or necessarily ‘contained in’ the event itself.” This conclusion would, for all the intents and purposes of this dissertation, follow from what is essentially the same reason that the category of emotions generated by Nussbaum’s and Prinz’s theories of emotion would fail to fulfill FIG’s necessary condition for f-intentional states. It is impossible for emotions to do so. On Scherer’s account, like Nussbaum’s and Prinz’s, emotions have aspects of the world (real orr imagined) as objects, and it is impossible to “fuse” a physical object with a perceptual state. So FIG would characterize the cases of emotion generated by Scherer’s perceptual theory as mental events that are not f-intentional events, which would make them ill-intentional mental events. This last conclusion entails the fulfillment of MN$_F$ and ILL$_F$, which in turn prove MN and ILL to be false orr likely to be false. This in turn challenges the justification orr warrant for BT, which necessarily regards f-intentionality to be the mark of the mental.

If we do not restrict the term ‘emotion’ to the subjective feeling states of emotion processing, then emotions may be taken to be non-mental f-intentional states. This is because emotions are defined by Scherer as “an episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the organism.”\footnote{Scherer, “Toward a Dynamic Theory of Emotion: The Component Process Model of Affective States,” 32.} In this sense, Scherer’s theory of emotion is a global theory of emotion. Emotions are episodes or time slices of an organism’s existence, which are marked by the synchronization of all five organismic subsystems in response to features of the
environment that are appraised as significant to the subject’s well-being. The global nature of Scherer’s account entails that every aspects of an organism would be a component of every emotional episode, including the eliciting stimuli (real or otherwise).\textsuperscript{87} This is because the synchronization of the five subsystems are essentially constituted by the activation of a network of necessary causal relations, which includes the causal relation between the stimulus (real or other wise) and the essential features of the information processing system that are activated by the stimulus.\textsuperscript{88} Thus an episode of emotion would include the eliciting event (the object of the emotion) in virtue of the object (which is also the stimulus) being “fused into” or “contained in” the emotional episode by necessary causal relations that exist between the stimulus event and the information processing system. Thus, given FIG, the category of emotions generated by Scherer’s component process theory of emotion would be f-intentional non-mental events since episodes of emotion are not necessarily mental events, but are necessarily f-intentional events. This conclusion entails the fulfillment of Fl\textsubscript{f} and NoFl\textsubscript{f}, and accordingly proves MN and ILL to be false orr likely to be false. This in turn challenges the justification orr warrant for BT, which necessarily regards f-intentionality to be the mark of the mental.

\textsuperscript{87} This modification of the notion of intentionality may seem at first to be patently ridiculous, but I argue in section 2.5 that something like this may be more patently true than not.

\textsuperscript{88} Note here that by “essential” I do not mean “innate.” I am indicating that the causal networks of the information processing system postulated by Scheré’s account “define” the information processing system as the type of information processing system that it is. I’m not sure if Scherer holds this view, but it is neither inconsistent with his view nor contradictory to his view.
§2.3.4 Theories of Psychological Construction

James A. Russell presents what is referred to as a psychological constructionist theory of emotion. According to Russell’s theory of psychological construction, emotions are not natural kinds. In other words, emotions are not to be explained by any underlining neurophysiological or biological systems or mechanisms of emotion. Russell also offers two distinct accounts of what emotions are. Emotions are either emotional episodes or emotional meta-experiences. Emotional episodes (EEs) are events in which various components like core affect, appraisals, expressions, autonomic changes, instrumental actions, subjective experience, attributed affect, meta-experience, or regulation fit a folk emotion concept. Although some of these components are necessary in order for an EE to be instantiated, according to Russell


90 Note that much of what is presented here is my summary of James Russell’s view, which was worked out during a series of email exchanges with him. Although much of the proceeding account is essentially Russell’s account, he was willing to leave some of the particular details of this account up to me to fill in. So Russell may deny or be silent on some of the details of the accounts present here. I have marked these details with the use of the symbol “†” in the footnote. This should not be a problem, however, since regardless of whether or not this account is held by Russell, it remains a theory of emotion that is able to generate a category of cases that we would ordinarily refer to as cases of emotion. One interesting project might be to work out how this theory of emotion might relate to Plato’s theory of emotion.
no one component is necessary for the instantiation of an EE.\textsuperscript{91} These components of an EE may be experienced, but all the components need not be experienced. For example, autonomic changes or facial expressions need not be experienced. It also need not be the case that any of these components are experienced as an EE. This is because what makes an EE the type of EE that it is, what is responsible for the realization or instantiation of an EE, is a fitting relation that an EE has with folk emotion concepts. This "fitting-relation" is not indexed to any particular time or individual. It need not be the case that the components of an EE fit a particular folk emotion concept held by some particular person, at some specified point in time for the EE to be instantiated. It need only be the case that there is some point in time at which the components would fit a folk emotion concept. The folk emotion concept that categorizes, and thus instantiates, an EE also need not be made relative to any particular individual or speaker. If we take an eternalist’s perspective on time (the status of the past, present, and future),\textsuperscript{92} we can understand EEs as objective features of the world that are instantiated by folk emotion concepts.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{91} I think this might be a bit problematic for his view and I discuss why in chapter 3. For now, we can simply note that this may present a potential problem for Russell’s view and bracket it off to the side. I also suggest that Russell ought to require, at minimum, the intentional object and some assessment of the object to the subject’s well-being as necessary conditions for any EE. We can understand Russell’s theory, along with the addition of this suggestion and any subsequent additions I make to the foundational theory laid by Russell, as an \textit{instrumental-realist theory of emotion}.\textsuperscript{†}


\textsuperscript{93}†
Emotional meta-experiences (EMEs) are subjectively categorized experiences of at least some of the components of EEs. These experienced components are, like EEs, categorized according to some folk emotion concept. EMEs, however, are instantiated when the categorizations of the experienced components of EEs cause subjects to see themself as having an emotion of some type.\textsuperscript{94} Also, on Russell’s account, seeing oneself as having an emotion of some type is not the same as being aware that one is having an emotion of some type. According to Russell, one is aware of having an emotion of some type if and only if one accurately categorizes the components of one’s EE. In either case, both EEs and EMEs are regarded as ‘emotional’ because they involve folk emotion concepts. In an EE, however, the involvement is “external” to the subject; the folk emotion concept categorizes the event, from “outside” the subject, as a type of event. In this way, emotional episodes exhibit an objective feature that is consistent with a third-person perspective. In an EME, the folk emotion concept is involved from “inside” the subject's experience. In other words, the difference between an EME and an EE can be understood by noting that in all EMEs the subject performs the act of categorization, while in all EEs the categorization occurs without the need of any individual (subject of the EE or otherwise) to perform the act of categorization. We can say that categorization is “subjective” in EMEs since the subject of an EME carries out the act of categorization, whereas categorization is “objective” in EEs because the categorization does not depend on any subject performing an act of categorization.

\textsuperscript{94} In this sense one might compare Russell’s account of EMEs to what are referred to as \textit{higher order theories of consciousness} or \textit{HOT theories of consciousness}. See Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience.”
Given the above, EEs and EMEs, are intentional in virtue of the folk emotion concepts that partially instantiate them in virtue of a fitting relation. Russell understands folk emotion concepts as scripts. These scripts have narrative structures that organize the various components of an EE orrr EME in terms of a causal sequence. As Russell notes, “each emotion has its own script including its eliciting events, conscious feeling, facial expression, vocalization, action, physiological manifestation, label, and so on aligned in a causal and temporal order.”  95 The causal and temporal ordering of the various components of an emotion thus leads subjects of EMEs to see the various physiological, expressive, and behavioral aspects of their EEs as being caused by, about, orrr directed at some event or object. In doing so, the antecedent event is related to the subject’s well-being. An emotional meta-experience, then, is an experience in which one sees one’s state (conscious feeling, facial expression, vocalization, action, orrr physiological manifestation) as being caused by some antecedent event or object that is significant to the subject’s well-being. This perception involves a relation between aspects of the world (real orrr imagined) and the subject’s well-being. EMEs, however, would fall under Bourget’s category of deferential derivations since the instantiation of any token EME would depend on the subject’s use of a folk emotion concept, which would exist independently of any particular token EME.  96 Note that Russell would deny that the folk emotion concept would be a necessary component of an EME. I see this to be a problem

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95 Russell, “Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion,” 165.

96 Bourget, “Consciousness Is Underived Intentionality.”
and suggest that for any EE, a folk emotion concept and the object of the instantiated EE are necessary components of the instantiation of an EE.  

An EE, however, is necessarily instantiated by any folk emotion concept that an EE would fit since the existence of a fitting relation is what realizes or instantiates any EE. Furthermore, an EE is not necessarily a phenomenal state since there need not be a something-it-is-like for any subject of an EE to be the subject of that EE. It is possible for subjects of EEs to be completely unconscious of the fact that orr unaware of the fact that they are subjects of an EE. It might be said that such EEs are regular occurrences when one considers how often third-person attributions of emotion occur outside of a subject’s conscious experience or awareness. The narrative structuring of the components of EEs that are instantiated by the folk emotion concepts that instantiate orr realize EEs make EEs intentional states. Given this, the intentionality of EEs would be f-intentional since the intentionality of an EE partially depends on the folk emotion concept that instantiates the EE as an EE. In other words, the intentional content of an EE, which is imparted by a folk emotion concept, would not be external to an EE since the folk emotion concept is part of what instantiates an EE. It may be said that an EE is realized or instantiated when it matches some folk emotion concept, however, it should be noted that this kind of matched intentionality is distinct from the kind of matching that occurs in the cases of

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\[98\] Note that from this point on, much of the foregoing are details that I have filled in based on my understanding of Russell’s account, but not worked out in conjunction with Russell.
“matching derivations” that are discussed by Bourget.\textsuperscript{99} In the case of an EE, the matched intentionality can be said to be an objective feature of an EE, as well as the world, since the relevant fitting relation is an objective feature of the world. It is not necessary for any particular individual to employ the fitting relation (i.e., perform an act of categorization) for an EE to be instantiated.\textsuperscript{100} Since a folk emotion concept includes at least some type of eliciting event as a component of that folk emotion concept, an EE would constitute a category of non-mental f-intentional events. An EE would not be a non-mental event since the components of an EE are not necessarily mental events. As noted earlier, according to Russell’s account, the components of an EE are things like core affect, appraisals, expressions, autonomic changes, instrumental actions, subjective experience, attributed affect, meta-experience, orr regulation. EEs would, however, be f-intentional events according to FIG since EEs would have their objects “fused into” or “contained in” the EEs in virtue of the objective fitting relation that matches the components of an EE with the relevant folk emotion concepts, thereby instantiating an EE of a certain type. Thus EEs are non-mental events that are also f-intentional events according to FIG. This conclusion entails the fulfillment of FL\textsubscript{F} and NoFL\textsubscript{F}, and thus proves MN and ILL to be


\textsuperscript{100} One might object by arguing that EEs would have ill-intentionality since EEs necessarily rely on folk emotion concepts, and these folk emotion concepts may be thought of as intentional states that are external to EEs since all folk emotion concepts depend on some individual introducing the concept into ordinary language. I address this objection in at the end of this section, in section 2.5.
false orr likely to be false. This in turn challenges the justification orr warrant for BT, which necessarily regards f-intentionality to be the mark of the mental.

To summarize the foregoing, in chapter 1, I discussed how the fundamental notion of intentionality is related to current concerns in the philosophy of mind, epistemology and metaphysics. Then at the beginning of chapter 2, specifically in section 2.1, I provided an analysis of Franz Brentano’s argument for BT. BT not only established the notion of fundamental intentionality as the mark of the mental, it also demarcated the realm of the mental from the realm of the physical and thereby established an ontological gap not only between what is mental and what is physical, but also between those who study the mind in terms of its mental attributes (philosophers) and those who study the mind in terms of its physical attributes (psychologists). Then in section 2.2, I presented four statements that were simplified versions of Brentano’s premises for BT, along with four statements that act as falsifying conditions of these premises. I also discussed John Searle’s notions of intrinsic and as-if’ intentionality, and how it relates to Brentano’s argument for BT. Finally, in section 2.3, I presented four theories of emotion and showed why each theory generates an emotion category that would satisfy at least one of the four falsifying conditions that were presented in the previous section. Given these four theories of emotion, all four of the falsifying conditions were fulfilled, activating all four challenges to BT. This brings sub-phase 1 of my main argument to a close. In the next section, I derive an alternative principle of fundamental intentionality by beginning with a derivation for an alternative principle of fundamental intentionality for emotions and then explaining how this more narrow principle can be generalized.
§2.4 Deriving the Fundamental Intentionality Thesis

In section 2.3, I presented Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion and Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion. These two theories respectively represent contemporary cognitive theories of emotion and contemporary noncognitive theories of emotion.\(^ {101}\) As such they are essentially contradictory theories of emotion. Nussbaum’s theory essentially holds that all emotions are cognitive mental states whereas Prinz’s theory denies that all emotions are cognitive mental states. This difference regarding what emotions are between the two theories amount to a nontrivial, nonverbal, metaphysical dispute about what emotions are.\(^ {102}\) The primary source of disagreement between the two accounts is about how emotions are intentional. Although both accounts agree that emotions are mental states, they disagree on the way these mental states have the intentional contents that they are thought to have. They disagree on what the appropriate form, vehicle, or mode of presentation the intentional contents of emotion can take. Despite this point of contention, however, both accounts give the same answer to the question, “Why are emotions intentional?” Both accounts agree that the intentionality of emotions involves relations between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and the subject’s well-being. After distilling away the theory dependent features of what emotions are according to each account, two features remain as being shared by both accounts. This indicates that the two remaining features of emotion are regarded to be

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\(^ {102}\) In regard to trivial or verbal disputes see D. J. Chalmers, “Verbal Disputes,” *Philosophical Review* 120, no. 4 (2011).
fundamental features of what emotions are by philosophers of emotion. I refer to the first as MN\textsuperscript{e} since it is essentially MN, but restricted to the context of emotions. I refer to the second as the \textit{fundamental intentionality thesis of emotion} (FIT\textsuperscript{e}):

\textit{The Fundamental Intentionality Thesis of Emotion}

FIT\textsuperscript{e}: The f-intentionality of emotions consists in relations between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and their significance to the subject’s well-being.

\textit{Fundamental Features of Philosophical Theories of Emotion}

MN\textsuperscript{e}: All emotions are mental events.

FIT\textsuperscript{e}: The f-intentionality of emotions consists in relations between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and their significance to the subject’s well-being.\textsuperscript{103}

Now given that MN\textsuperscript{e} and FIT\textsuperscript{e} are what remains after clearing away the theory-laden aspects of each view, I propose that MN\textsuperscript{e} and FIT\textsuperscript{e} are independent theses. I also propose that MN\textsuperscript{e} is not in fact a fundamental feature of what emotions are. My argument for both these claims are as follows. I refer to it as the \textit{argument for deflating mentality} (ADM):

The fact that MN\textsuperscript{e} and FIT\textsuperscript{e} are characteristic features of both cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotion betrays the influence of BT or at least one of its premises. We can see this if we consider the following. First, note that FIT\textsuperscript{e} is a definition. It gives the meaning of the intentionality of emotions. FIT\textsuperscript{e} is therefore an analytic claim, and given FIT\textsuperscript{e}, we can see that it does not depend on MN\textsuperscript{e} in order to be true. We can also see that MN\textsuperscript{e} does not depend on the truth of FIT\textsuperscript{e} in order for it to be true. Thus MN\textsuperscript{e} and FIT\textsuperscript{e} are independent claims. Given that these are both independent claims and FIT\textsuperscript{e} is an analytic claim, it can be set aside for the time being. Now we can ask ourselves, “What

\textsuperscript{103} Jesse J. Prinz offers a formulation of the intentionality of emotions that is similar to FIT\textsuperscript{e} in Jesse J. Prinz, \textit{The Emotional Construction of Morals} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
kind of claim is $\text{MN}^e$, and where did it come from?" Some may take $\text{MN}^e$ as an analytic claim as well, I suggest that it is not. It suggest $\text{MN}^e$ is a hypothesis—a preliminary assumption—about the world, i.e., a contingent, universal claim about emotions. Furthermore, it seems to be functioning as a preliminary assumption that may be discharged once the right kind of conclusion can be derived. If my assumptions are correct, then we should ask ourselves what that right kind of conclusion might be.

Perhaps FIT$^e$ can help at this point:

\begin{quote}
FIT$^e$: The f-intentionality of emotions consists in relations between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and their significance to the subject’s well-being.
\end{quote}

When we consider FIT$^e$, it seems that FIT$^e$ presupposes the following claim about emotions: “All emotions are f-intentional states.” This is because FIT$^e$ can be true only if it is also true that all emotions are f-intentional states. I refer to this as the \textit{thesis of intentional emotions} (TIE):

\begin{quote}
The \textit{Thesis of Intentional Emotions}
\begin{itemize}
  \item TIE: All emotions are f-intentional states.
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

This gives us the following two universal claims about emotions: TIE, which asserts that, “All emotions are intentional events,” and $\text{MN}^e$, which asserts that, “All emotions are mental events.” Given these two universal statements, let us assume that TIE is the right kind of conclusion that we are looking for. If this is the case then we should ask ourselves how TIE was derived given $\text{MN}^e$? Once we do so, we should be able to see that if TIE was the right kind of conclusion that we are looking for, then NoFI orr BT must have been presupposed as well. The reason for this is because TIE can only be validly derived if NoFI orr BT are true. Consider the following arguments, which I refer to as the
arguments for discharging MN\textsuperscript{e}.

**Arguments for Discharging MN\textsuperscript{e}**

MN\textsuperscript{e}: All emotions are mental events.
NoFI: All non-mental states are ill-intentional events.
TIE: All emotions are f-intentional events.

- ORR-

MN\textsuperscript{e}: All emotions are mental events.
BT: All and only mental states are f-intentional events.
TIE: All emotions are f-intentional events.

One might ask whether MN\textsuperscript{e} was instead the right conclusion we are looking for, making TIE a possible preliminary assumption for deriving MN\textsuperscript{e}, but this would also entail that both Prinz and Nussbaum also took it to be true that “All intentional states are emotions,” and I suspect both would deny this to be the case. Thus it is most likely the case that BT orr NoFI were influential to the philosophical understanding of the intentionality of emotions. If we grant this conclusion, then we can dispense with MN\textsuperscript{e} since in section 2.3 NoFI and BT were proven to be false or likely to be false. We can dispense with MN\textsuperscript{e} because once we eliminate BT orr NoFI from the above arguments, both of the arguments turn out to be invalid. Furthermore, if both of the arguments for TIE are invalid, then MN\textsuperscript{e} is no longer needed. TIE, however, is still needed in order for FIT\textsuperscript{e} to be true. Thus we can conclude that if all emotions are f-intentional states (TIE), then the intentionality of emotions consists in relations between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and their significance to the subject’s well-being (FIT\textsuperscript{e}). We can thus state the fundamental intentionality thesis for emotions as a conditional statement in the following way:
**Fundamental Intentionality Thesis for Emotions**

FIT*: If all emotions are f-intentional events, then the intentionality of emotions consists in relations between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and their significance to the subject’s well-being.

FIT* can also be understood as a contextualized version of a more general fundamental intentionality thesis. We can see this by first considering the similarities and differences between emotions and other intentional states, and then once again eliminating the differences in order to distill a pure form of the fundamental intentionality thesis.

Besides the species of emotion, there are at least three more species of f-intentional events: *thoughts, perceptions*, and *actions*. Thoughts, perceptions, and actions all involve relations between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and some significance to the subject of the event. This feature is also shared with all emotions. Thus it is a fundamental feature of intentionality. This gives us the following genus for the notion of *fundamental intentionality*:

**Fundamental Intentionality Thesis**

FIT: If an event is an f-intentional event, then the intentionality of the event consists in at least one relation between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and some significance to the subject.

Furthermore, none of these three species necessarily involve relations between some aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and the subject’s well being. Thus the differentia of the intentionality of emotions lies in the fact that the relevant relation involved is between the aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and the subject’s well-being. Now one interesting question is, “What is the differentia for every other species of intentional events?” I have some ideas, but this is beyond the current aim of this dissertation. So I
will leave this to others or perhaps for some other time. One place one might look is in Aristotle’s *De Anima*.

§2.5. Replies to Three Possible Objections

In the foregoing sections, I presented four theories of emotion in order to derive an alternative principle of fundamental intentionality—the fundamental intentionality thesis (FIT). In this section, I argue for the acceptance of FIT as the new canonical thesis of intentionality within the discipline of philosophy by responding to three possible objections. One might object by arguing that EEs would have ill-intentionality since they necessarily rely on folk emotion concepts, and these folk emotion concepts are intentional states that are metaphysically distinct from EEs given that the existence of any folk emotion concept depends on at least some individual introducing the concept into ordinary language. A second reason that may be given for the conclusion that EEs are ill-intentional events might be that the intentionality of the folk emotion concepts, which are logically distinct from EEs, are transferred onto EEs. Brentano, as well as Bourget, might offer the first argument and Searle might offer the second. I offer the same two arguments in response to both. The first takes the stance of conceptual analysis and argues for the invalidity of both arguments. The second takes a pragmatic stance and aims to motivate the acceptance of my first argument.

§2.5.1 Reply from the Conceptual Stance

First, even if folk emotion concepts were intentional states, it need not follow that EEs are ill-intentional. One might argue that folk emotion concepts gain their intentionality from objective features of the world. This harkens back to the “ridiculous”

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104 Aristotle, “De Anima.”
revision of the concept of intentionality that I briefly noted in section 2.3.3, footnote 88. Many people, including philosophers, seem to accept that properties such as redness and scariness are objective features of the world. If this is the case, then there is no non-circular, principled reason why intentionality could not be an objective feature of the world. Given some evidence from cognitive neuroscience and the fact that our minds/brains are products of evolution, it seems more patently true that at least some objective feature of the world exhibit the property of intentionality, especially when we consider our capacity for emotions, theory of mind, and both written and spoken language.\footnote{Regarding our capacity of theory of mind see Alvin I. Goldman, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Philosophy of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Natalie D. Eggum et al., “Emotion Understanding, Theory of Mind, and Prosocial Orientation: Relations over Time in Early Childhood,” The Journal of Positive Psychology 6, no. 1 (2011); W. V. Fabricius et al., “Developing Theories of the Mind: Children’s and Adults’ Concepts of Mental Activities,” Child development 60, no. 6 (1989); P. J. Schwanenflugel, W. V. Fabricius, and J. Alexander, “Developing Theories of Mind: Understanding Concepts and Relations between Mental Activities,” Ibid.65(1994); P. J. Schwanenflugel, R. L. Henderson, and W. V. Fabricius, “Developing Organization of Mental Verbs and Theory of Mind in Middle Childhood: Evidence from Extensions,” Developmental psychology 34, no. 3 (1998).} Consider again the object of third person attributions of emotion. Being the type of beings we are makes us not only subjects of experiences, but also objects of other’s experiences. As objects of experience we exhibit objective features that are studied from a third person perspective by psychologists and neuroscientists. These objective features seem to include objective features of intentionality, which may be properties of both mental and physical states.
§2.5.2 *Reply from the Pragmatic Stance*

Second, several problems in the philosophy of mind, such as Searle’s *problem of meaning*, Chalmers’ *problem of the explanatory gap* and *hard problem of consciousness*, and what Searle refers to as the *indeterminacy of translation*, the *inscrutability of reference*, and the *relativity of ontology* may become more tractable, and perhaps even resolvable, once we accept the that at least some non-mental events or physical events have f-intentionality. I address the problem of meaning and offer a general strategy for resolving the problem of the explanatory gap, the indeterminacy of translation, the inscrutability of reference, and the relativity of ontology.

Once we accept the fact that at least some objective features of the world have f-intentionality, we can see that intentionality may not be unidirectional. This may in turn provide a more elegant solution to what Searle refers to as the problem of meaning. The property of intentionality typically works in one direction. For example, when I see a bowl of strawberries or cherries one would say that I am *seeing-a-bowl-of-strawberries-or-cherries*. This is the experiential state that I am in. My *seeing* is intentional since it is directed at or about the bowl of strawberries or cherries that I am looking at. The intentionality flows in a certain direction. My *seeing* is about the world, so the direction of intentionality seems to flow from me to the world. Searle suggests that this indicates a


“mind-to-world direction” of fit for the content of my seeing. Searle also suggests that connotative states, such as desires and emotions, have a “world-to-mind direction of fit.” Here the intentionality flows from the world to mind. But what does any of this mean? Searle clarifies by suggesting that with states like beliefs, which have a mind-to-world direction of fit, we hold at “fault” the subject (the mind) of the intentional state when there is a failure of fit. With connotative states, like desires and emotions, which have a world-to-mind direction of fit, we supposedly hold the object of the intentional state (the world) at “fault” rather than the subject of the intentional state when there is a failure of fit. This analysis leads Searle to the problem of meaning, and his distinction between intrinsic and as-if intentionality. This problem of meaning is essentially the problem of explaining why physical phenomena can come to have intentionality. Searle puts the problem in the form of the following question: “How does the mind impose intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically intentional, on entities such as sounds and marks that are, construed in one way, just physical phenomena in the world like any

110 Ibid., 77.
111 Ibid., 88.
112 This fact may tell us more about Searle and others who share this intuition than the notion of intentionality. A Taoist or a Stoic may not share such an intuition, although Jean Paul Sartre might agree with Searle’s claim. See Edward Gilman Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as a Spiritual Ideal in Early China (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003); Epictetus, “Epictetus Discourses,” (1925; 1998), Book I.11; Sartre, Sketch of a Theory of Emotions.
other?" Here, Searle is referring to spoken and written language, which is why he refers to this as the problem of meaning. This question is essentially the question of how spoken and written languages, which are realized or instantiated as physical events, come to have the meanings that they do. More generally, this is a question about how physical objects gain their intentionality. Searle’s solution is to suggest that the intrinsic intentionality of mental states are transferred to physical objects. In other words, spoken and written words (the sounds and marks that we understand as having intentional content, i.e., that we understood as having semantic meanings or semantic content) have their meanings or intentional and semantic contents as being aspects of a language. They come to have their intentional contents in virtue of the f-intentional thoughts of the speaker, listener, or reader by the process of what I referred to earlier as “intentional transference.” With the process of intentional transference, the intentionality is imparted by a mental state and not “fused into” or “contained in” but rather “transferred” to the physical objects. Thus, given FIG, these spoken and written languages would have ill-intentionality or what Searle might call as-if intentionality.

Let us grant Searle’s arguments that in cases of spoken and written languages, we would have cases of as-if intentionality or ill-intentionality in the way that Searle suggest. Now imagine you are somewhere surrounded by people or with at least one other person. You may be anywhere you’d like, and you may be doing anything you’d like to imagine yourself doing, as long as there is at least one other person there with you in some way. I assume that you are someone with a mind, with intentions, and you can

\footnote{114} Ibid.

\footnote{115} You could also be looking at yourself through a mirror.
speak a language, perhaps even more than one. You have thoughts about this and that. Both your thoughts are intentional. Your thoughts may be about or directed at other thoughts, such as a flying-spaghetti monster. We can call these imaginations. Some might say imaginations are not in the world, but if you are in the world and if you are imagining something, then it seems that this imagination must also be in the world. All your thoughts have a phenomenal quality or characteristic. There is a *something-it-is-like* to have the thoughts you are having. Some of these thoughts may be experiences that you did not intend to have (in the sense that you did not have a desire or plan to have them), did not purposefully bring them about (in the sense that you did not make yourself have them), or are not able to keep yourself from having them (such as daydreams). These too are intentional in the sense that they are about or directed at some aspect of the world (real or otherwise); we might even say they have f-intentionality.\footnote{This notion of understanding one’s intention to do something as a plan can be found in J.L. Austin’s “Three Ways of Spilling Ink,” J.L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers*, 3rd ed. (New York: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1961; 1979), 272-87.}

You also have a body. You perform actions and there is something it is like to perform these actions. Some of these actions are intended and others are not. All your intended actions may be said to be f-intentional. For example, you see that your coffee cup is empty and you get up from your chair, walk over to the coffee maker, and preform all the other steps you do in order to have another cup of coffee. These actions, from the moment you noticed that your cup was empty to having that first satisfying sip of your

\footnote{Note that any beliefs that fall under these three categories of thoughts may be pose a problem for notions of rationality that regard reason responsiveness to be a necessary characteristic of any rational beliefs. The relevance of this point is discussed in chapter 3. In regard to the notion of *reason responsiveness* see Derek Parfit and Samuel Scheffler, *On What Matters* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).}
second cup of coffee, were all experiences you had. There was a something-it-is-like to
see that your coffee cup was empty and to get yourself a second cup. These actions were
also intentional. At some point between seeing your empty cup and taking that first sip of
your second cup, your actions were about or directed at something. They were about or
directed at getting yourself a second cup of coffee.

Now we might ask, are all intentional actions that are similar to these intrinsically
intentional? If so, what is it that makes these actions intentional? Was it the desire to get a
second cup of coffee? No. Not every desire is manifested in an action, so a desire alone
does not make your actions an intentional act. Was it your intention to get a second cup
of coffee? No, and for similar reasons why your desire alone would not make your
actions an intentional act. Was it the experience of your actions that make your actions an
intentional act? No. You may have these same experiences and yet simply be a brain in
vat. Your actions were intentional because your actions were purposeful. Your actions
had a satisfaction condition, a condition for success. You either achieved getting
yourself a second cup of coffee or you did not. The condition of success marks the limit
of your intentional act at one end. What marks the other? Perhaps that you wanted or
desired to have a second cup of coffee? But where did this desire come from? Was it
always lurking somewhere in your unconscious mind, as a disposition simply waiting to
spring forth? Perhaps you have a disposition, preference, likings, or feature likings for

118 Regarding brains in vats see From Psychosemantics: Individualism and Supervenience
The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam’s “The

119 Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience:“

coffee, but did you have a disposition for that second cup of coffee? Let us assume that you did have such a disposition, what explains why this disposition was activated? Your disposition, desire, or intention for that second cup of coffee was activated when you saw that your cup was empty. This then marks the limit of your action at the other end. Your disposition, desire, or intention also remained with you until the end. So your disposition, desire, or intention is a component of your intentional act. We may add in your experience of your actions as a component of your intentional act, but you may not have had experiences throughout the course of the act. This would not make your act of getting yourself a second cup of coffee any less of an f-intentional act, let alone an intentional act.

Finally, let us say, unbeknownst to you, a few people saw you getting yourself a second cup of coffee. They may not have known you were getting yourself a second cup of coffee, but they did see that you were getting yourself a second cup of coffee. While they were watching you get a second cup of coffee, one had the thought that she should call her mother, another felt the cream might have soured, and a third had no thoughts at all; but they all saw you get yourself a second cup of coffee. How is this possible? They could not have transferred any intentional content to the physical states manifesting the intentional act (you getting yourself a cup of coffee). This is possible because there are at

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least some objective physical features of the world that have intrinsic intentionality. These are our intentional actions, and our emotions are as well. Thus regardless of whether or not there are physical events with ill-intentionality, this does not negate the fact that there are objective physical features of the world that have f-intentionality.\footnote{Not that despite what John Searle has argued in the past, his current position in very much in line with the conclusions drawn in this and subsequent chapter, as well as the two major aims of this body of work. See John R. Searle, “What Is to Be Done?” \textit{Topoi} 25, no. 1 (2006).}

\textit{§2.5.3 Third Objection and Reply}

A third objection, which I believe to be a more serious objection, has to do with the ontology of intentionality. As noted previously, Searle suggests that the ontology of intentionality is irrelevant to concerns about f-intentionality and ill-intentionality.\footnote{Idem., “Intentionality and Its Place in Nature”; Idem., “What Is an Intentional State?”} As he notes regarding our empirical ignorance about the details of how our thoughts and actions come to have intentional content:

\begin{quote}
More for our present discussion our ignorance of how it all works in the brain is an empirical ignorance of details and not the result of a metaphysical gulf between two incommensurable categories, the “Mind” and the “Body,” which would prevent us from ever overcoming our ignorance.\footnote{Idem., “Intentionality and Its Place in Nature,” 6.}
\end{quote}

The reason why Searle denies that there is no metaphysical gulf which explains our ignorance of how “it all works in the brain” is that Searle in fact accepts the conclusion that there are objective physical features of the world that have f-intentionality. As he proclaims:

\begin{quote}
In sum, certain organisms have intrinsic intentional states, these are caused by processes in the nervous system of these organisms and they are realized in the structure of these organisms. These claims should be understood in as naturalistic
\end{quote}
a sense as the claims that certain biological organisms digest food, that digestion is caused by processes in the digestive tract, and that it all goes on in the stomach and the rest of the digestive tract... 126

So why is it that Searle cannot know or cannot say that he knows that there are objective physical events in the world that have f-intentionality? The reason is that he has not given any argument for the existence of such states. As he tells us, “Some philosophers feel that I am unjustified in simply asserting the existence of intrinsic intentional mental states and events in the world.” 127 Searle is responding here to the question from skepticism. This question is the of how one knows any matter of fact in the world. What is needed is an argument for the conclusion that physical events have f-intentionality. I have given such an argument in the foregoing, but what is needed is not simply an argument. What is needed is a sound argument, and it is here that the ontology of intentionality, as well as the world, becomes significant.

As I shown in section 2.1, Brentano provides a valid argument for BT. BT led to the understanding of f-intentionality in accordance with FIG, which in turn demarcated what was to be understood as ill-intentional. At one point in time, this argument or some version of it must have been taken as sound if its conclusion was accepted as the canonical thesis of intentionality within the discipline of philosophy. If this is true, then it must be that case that all the premises were also understood to be true. An important question then is, “Why were MN and NoFI understood as being true? It is not my place to answer this question with regard to the discipline of philosophy, and in some sense to do


127 Ibid.
so is beyond the aim of this dissertation. The question is relevant, however, in that it
directs us not only to the importance of the ontology of intentionality, but of the world.

Although Brentano provides a valid argument for BT, the truth of BT would only
follow if the world itself were a certain way. The truth of BT would follow if and only if
the ontology of the world was such that the premises of BT were true: if there were only
two mutually exclusive fundamental substances—mental substance and physical
substance. Thus if the ontology of the world were such that there were only mental
substances and physical substances, and these two types of substances were necessarily
distinct, then the premises of Brentano’s argument for BT would be true, which would in
turn render his argument sound. Therefore, only under such conditions would Brentano’s
argument be sound. Only under such conditions would Brentano’s argument guarantee
the truth of BT. I also noted, however, in section 2.1 that Brentano simply stipulates the
truth of BT. Why would Brentano offer a valid argument for the truth of BT only to
stipulate the truth of BT. I suggest that Brentano did so because he knew his argument
was unsound. Brentano saw a need to establish the truth of BT in order to contribute to
the progress of the science of psychology. He saw a need to do so because he believed at
the time that this was the only way he would achieve a consensus on a new definition of
psychology. As he argued:

If, then, the new definition of psychology were connected with the new
metaphysics just as inseparably as the old definition was with the old, we would
be forced either to look for a third definition, or to descend into the fearful depths
of metaphysics.
Happily, the opposite is true. There is nothing in the new definition of
psychology which would not have to be accepted by adherents of the older school.
For whether or not there are souls, the fact is that there are mental phenomena.
And no one who accepts the theory of the substantiality of the soul will deny that
whatever can be established with reference to the soul is also related to mental
phenomena. Nothing, therefore, stands in our way if we adopt the modern definition instead of defining psychology as the science of the soul is also related to mental phenomena...Consequently, the adoption of the modern conception simplifies our work.\textsuperscript{128}

Brentano, however, was a philosopher, a scientist, and an ordained priest, and consistent with these three roles, I propose that Brentano’s ontology of the world was neither a dualistic nor a monistic one, but in fact a \textit{trinity}. He believed that the mind, the body, and the soul were three distinct substances. Yet as a psychologist, he presented and defended an argument that relied on a completely dualistic ontology. I suggest that Brentano intentionally submitted and defended what he knew to be an unsound argument in order to contribute to the progression of the science of psychology. Brentano’s argument for BT, as I have shown in the foregoing sections, is unsound because it does not accurately reflect the way the actual world is, i.e., its premises are false. To provide a valid argument for a conclusion that is stipulated to be true was thus Brentano’s way of presenting the illusion of a sound argument. One might ask in response to my foregoing argument how I would know that the world is such that mental events and physical events are necessarily not distinct orr that physical events are not necessarily non-intentional events. My response would be that the answer to \textit{that} question is irrelevant to the unsoundness of Brentano’s argument for BT. As long as it is a \textit{fact} that the world is such that mental events and physical events are not necessarily distinct orr that it is not impossible for physical events to be f-intentional events, Brentano’s argument is unsound. Therefore, BT is not justified, and so should not be accepted as true.

§2.6 Conclusion

Throughout chapter 2, I argued that the philosophical and psychological accounts of emotion illustrate not only that the notion of f-intentionality in accordance with FIG is false, they also call into question the standard contemporary distinction between f-intentionality and ill-intentionality, which assume the truth of BT, MN, orr NoFI. They suggest that this distinction is fairly vague at best and dubious at its worst. My analysis of the notions of f-intentionality and ill-intentionality, given FIG, illustrates the fact that the difference between f-intentionality and ill-intentionality depends not on the ability to identify the essential features of a particular state or event which renders it essentially or necessarily f-intentional or ill-intentional, but instead on specifying what makes the intentional state orr event in question the kind of state it is (other than being an intentional state orr event). If this is so, then old arguments must be reassessed and new arguments must be put forth in order for any type of state or event to be placed on the mantle of intentionality.

I also argued in section 2.3 that the two psychological theories of emotion considered appeal to FIT in order to make sense of what emotions are. It can also be shown that many other psychological theories of emotion, such as basic emotion theories and social constructivist theories provide accounts that fulfill this necessary condition.129

Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to do so, one can safely conclude that psychological theories of emotion in general are also concerned with questions about the intentionality of emotions. Once this conclusion is accepted by philosophers and psychologists alike, we are not only in a position to argue that we ought not limit the scope of intentionality \textit{simply} to states of mind, but we are also in a position to argue that the mind alone ought not be given pride of place when analyzing the meaning of \textit{f}-intentionality. Furthermore, once philosophers and psychologists accept that academics in both disciplines are concerned with questions about the intentionality of emotions, it should become fairly obvious that there would be no principled, non-arbitrary, non-circular reason to deny \textit{f}-intentionality to any vehicle, form, or mode of presentation that can make sense of the notion of \textit{f}-intentionality.

The foregoing also demonstrates at least two significant ways the philosophical and psychological study of emotion can contribute to the problems of consciousness in the philosophy of mind. One way is by illustrating how the philosophical and psychological study of emotion can yield challenges to the current canonical thesis of intentionality within the discipline of philosophy. A second way is by clarifying the notions of \textit{f}-intentionality and ill-intentionality, as well as their relation and significance,

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to the notion of consciousness. In carrying out these two aims, this chapter called into question two central assumptions in philosophy of mind. It called into question the claim that the notions of f-intentionality and consciousness are essentially intertwined such that only mental states can be bearers of f-intentionality. The second claim that was called into question was that the philosophical and psychological study of emotion is unable to make any exceptional contribution to the study of consciousness and the philosophy of mind. Finally, I argued for a positive interpretation of these results within the discipline of philosophy by suggesting some possible benefits of adopting FIT as the new canonical thesis of intentionality for the discipline of philosophy.

Finally, as noted in chapter 2, “Two Aims and Chapter Summaries,” chapters 2, 3, and 4 are primarily intended to address the discipline of philosophy rather than both the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. For those psychologists who are concerned, however, about the significance of this chapter to their interests and concerns, I recommend that such psychologists consider the following question: When one studies the human mind, what is it that one is in fact studying? Is it the case that one is simply studying a relation between some stimulus and some response, or some cause and some effect of some machine that we call in ordinary language a “body,” a “brain,” or a “person”? My answer is that what psychologists study, like philosophers of mind, are people, persons, or individuals. As people, persons, or individuals we are not only citizens of some country or members of some institution, organization, community, or some family, we are living beings with thoughts, perceptions, dreams, hopes, fears, and so on. We are living beings with intentional states. It is this fundamental fact that unites
psychologists and philosophers, i.e., both the disciplines of philosophy and psychology share the same object of inquiry—living beings with minds. Thus, as I have argued in this chapter, it is important for philosophers, especially philosophers of mind to take into account both philosophical and psychological theories of emotion.
CHAPTER 3

EPISTEMOLOGY AND EMOTIONS

The relevance of emotions to our concerns about knowledge and rationality often go unnoticed within the area of epistemology. One reason is that emotions are often portrayed in opposition to the epistemic ideals of reason, rationality, or good judgment. A second reason is that, as with the area of philosophy of mind, emotions are treated as either paradigmatic or non-paradigmatic cases of the typical subjects of investigation. Within the area of epistemology the typical subjects of investigation are perceptions, beliefs, or judgments. Thus talk of the rationality of emotions, as well as conceptions of the epistemic role of emotions, are typically couched within the language of justified true beliefs. Doing so regularly results in treating emotions as instrumental reasons or values for practical decision-making, which often leads to the conclusion that emotions are irrational.

In this chapter, I rely on the philosophy and psychology of emotion to argue that there is a need in the area of epistemology for interdisciplinary research and theorizing within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I do so in three sub-phases, which I refer to as sub-argument 3, sub-argument 4, and sub-argument 5. Sub-argument 3, which is presented in section 3.1-3.5, begins with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational in section 3.1, and derive what I refer to as the criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (COR$^o$). In section 3.2-3.3, I illustrate the various ways in which emotions have been characterized in relation to the notion of rationality. Emotions can be understood as being epistemically rational, evaluatively rational, and biographically
rational. In section 3.4, I focus on the epistemic rationality of emotions, and I identify how the standard notions regarding the epistemic rationality of emotions are rooted in at least four canonical philosophical theses: the thesis of *epistemic rationality as reason responsiveness* (RR) and a set of three theses that I collectively refer to as *Grice’s Rationality Thesis* (GRT). Sub-argument 4 is presented in sections 3.6, wherein I argue that GRT, along with the failure to appropriately consider the role of emotions in our epistemic endeavors, generate challenges for at least some theories of rationality. I subsequently move on to present sub-argument 5, throughout sections 3.7-3.8. I argue in section 3.7, that the rationality of emotions are *superordinate inference rules* and as such can be understood as ways of sense-making. I refer to this principle as the *fundamental epistemic principle of emotions* (**K**). This principle is derived by first deriving the *thesis of rational universalism of emotion* (**TRU**). Then in section 3.8, I conclude sub-argument 5 by deriving an alternative fundamental principle of rationality to that of R in GRT from **TRU**. I refer to this thesis as the *thesis of rational universalism* (**TRU**). I also bring sub-argument 5 to a close by first taking the stance of conceptual analysis and arguing that the acceptance of FIT entails the acceptance of TRU, and second by taking the pragmatic stance and arguing in favor of the adoption of TRU as an alternative canonical thesis to R in GRT. I also suggest that all other relevant thesis of rationality be revised so as to maintain logical consistency among the various thesis of rationality that are held within the discipline of philosophy and psychology. Finally, in section 3.9, I briefly summarize what I accomplished is throughout sections 3.1-3.8, and I summarize the significance of these achievements for the disciplines of philosophy and psychology.
§3.1 What is Meant By the “Rationality of Emotions”?

In regard to the rationality of emotions, some may argue that it does not make sense to speak of emotions being rational in-themselves, i.e., that emotions qua emotion are neither rational nor irrational. For example, Amélie Rorty suggests that neither token episodes of emotion and emotion-types are rational or irrational. As she argues:

Emotions are not, as such, rational or irrational, nor are specific emotion-types as such rational or irrational. Rather, a person can in a particular situation be rational or irrational in being frightened, grieving, jealous, just as he can be rational or irrational in what he wants or what he does.

Rorty’s observation makes two important points that ought to be pried apart. First, it suggests that emotions qua emotion are neither rational nor irrational in-themselves. Second, it suggests that when we are concerned with the rationality of emotions themselves, we are concerned the rationality of an individual in light of the fact that the individual is experiencing an emotion or an emotion of some type. It is the rationality of the individual that is under consideration and not, strictly speaking, the rationality of emotions. I accept the second point, but maintain that the first point is a theory dependent claim. I argue for the theory dependence of the first claim throughout this chapter by giving reasons for accepting that emotions qua emotion orr emotion types qua the type of emotion they are can be said to be rational and irrational. For now, however, let me explain how one can accept the second claim and deny the first.

When I speak of the “rationality” of emotions I mean to refer to a capacity for being rational and irrational. One can accept that when we speak of the rationality of

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emotions, we are speaking of the rationality of individuals. It is the individual, the person,
or the animal to which we attribute the property of being rational and irrational when we
speak of their emotions as being rational or irrational. To say that emotions themselves
can be rational or irrational is not to deny that the individual is the one who is being
rational or irrational in having the emotions they are having. Yet when we speak of the
rationality of an individual in having the emotion they are having—when we judge one’s
anger to be rational or irrational—we are not simply speaking of the individual’s
capacity to reason in virtue of the fact that the individual is a human being, a rational
agent, or some animal capable of having thoughts and performing actions. We are
speaking of the individual’s capacity to reason in virtue of their emotional experience.
When we ask whether a man’s shame is rational or irrational, we are asking whether the
man’s shame manifests his rationality. If we judge that sometimes his experience of
shame is rational, and other times his experience is irrational, then we accept that the
man’s shame manifest his rationality.

Once again, by “rationality” I refer to one’s capacity to reason.\textsuperscript{132} If we judge the
man’s shame on a certain occasion to be rational, then we have judged the manifestation
of his rationality in his experience of shame on that occasion to be reasonable or
appropriate. If we judge that his shame is irrational, then we have judged his shame (the
manifestation of his rationality in his experience of shame) on that occasion to be
unreasonable or inappropriate. If we deny that the man’s shame can ever be rational or
deny that it can ever be irrational, then we are denying that the man’s shame can manifest

\textsuperscript{132} This notion of rationality is consistent with the notion of rationality proposed by
Derek Parfit in Parfit and Scheffler, On What Matters.
his rationality. This is because to say that something is rational only makes sense if there is some comparative sense in which we can say that that thing is irrational, and to say that something is irrational only makes sense if there is some comparative sense in which we can say that that thing is rational.

Consider, for example, the rationality of beliefs. We do not say that beliefs are always rational or that beliefs are never rational. We say that some beliefs are rational and some beliefs are irrational. The distinction between rational and irrational beliefs is underwritten by an understanding that rational beliefs are those that are supported by good reasons. This criterion for rational beliefs is what establishes the distinction between rational beliefs and irrational beliefs, and it is in contrast with rational beliefs that we can make sense of what it means to say that beliefs are irrational. The rationality of some thing, i.e., whether a thing has the capacity to reason, is thus underwritten by some standard or normative criterion for determining when the individual is being rational and when the individual is being irrational. In other words, to speak of an individual’s “rationality” or the “rationality of emotions” is to suggest there is at least some norm against which an individual’s rationality can be evaluated as being either rational or irrational. Although in practice we typically take one’s rationality for granted and attend to questions regarding the irrationality of individuals when we are presented with a reason to do so, the normative standard is typically put in positive terms as defining what is rational, and what is irrational is typically evaluated in opposition to this normative standard.
When we speak of the rationality of an adult human being, we are typically speaking of the individual’s capacity to reason about holding beliefs. This is so regardless of whether or not the individual is aware of the fact that, for example, when one reasons that one should order the fried tofu with brown rice and a fennel salad, instead of the prime rib with a loaded baked potato and a fennel salad, one is reasoning about what beliefs one ought to hold and not just about what one’s stomach ought to hold.

We also say that one ought to hold a rational belief rather than an irrational belief, and that these normative standards are given by the norms of logic as well as social norms of various kinds, including epistemic norms, moral norms, prudential norms, linguistic norms, norms of power, and norms of social status. Analogously, to speak of the rationality of emotions or types of emotion in-themselves is to say that there exists some normative standard—given by what emotions are or what an emotion type is—by which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated in light of the fact that they manifest our rationality. Thus if there are such standards for emotions, then it is quite plausible to suggest that emotions qua emotion, or emotion types qua the type of emotion they are, are at times rational and at times irrational. The antecedent of this conditional thus expresses what I refer to as the criterion of ontological rationality for emotions (CORe), and I show in later sections how it is possible for emotions to fulfill this criterion:133

133 Note that CORe is consistent with the view that the properties of being rational or irrational are attributed to individuals at some point in time, place, and within a certain context.
Criterion of Ontological Rationality for Emotions

COR*: For every type of emotion there exists some normative standard, given by what emotions are or what the emotion type is, by which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated in light of the fact they manifest our rationality.

Theoretical discussions of what emotions are do not suggest that emotions are to be understood as entities in their own right, as if emotions have their own existence outside the architecture of mental or physiological capacities of beings capable of emoting. Theories of emotion instead presuppose that emotions are essentially aspects of such mental or physiological capacities. When theorists speak of emotions, they are speaking of aspects of an individual. To suggest that emotions qua emotion orr emotions qua some emotion type are either rational orr irrational is to suggest that individuals are at times rational orr irrational in virtue of simply having an emotional experience, orr in virtue of having an emotional experience of a certain type rather than another type. It suggests that an individual can be rational orr irrational in accordance with some mental orr physiological capacity, which can be evaluated or judged against a normative standard that is given by the nature of that capacity. This is what it means to say that an individual’s emotion orr emotional experience manifests their rationality.

Given that when we speak of the rationality of emotions themselves, we are speaking of the rationality of individuals, and also granting that emotions qua emotion orr emotions qua emotion types are capable of being rational and irrational, we need to explain why emotions (as some mental orr physiological capacity belonging to an individual) can be rational and irrational in accordance with some normative standard that is given by what emotions are. We need to explain why emotional creatures can be rational orr irrational in light of at least some of their emotional experiences. We
need to explain the *rationality of emotions qua emotion*. I begin this task by first differentiating the concerns regarding the rationality of emotions qua emotion from other concerns where emotions are involved in judgments of rationality.

§3.2 The Instrumental Rationality of Emotions

The rationality of emotions is widely discussed among philosophers, psychologists, as well as economists, sociologists, and anthropologists. Many of these recent concerns, however, have focused largely on the question of how emotions are related to rational decision-making rather than how emotions themselves are rational.\textsuperscript{134} We can understand such concerns as concerns regarding the instrumental role of emotions in rational decision-making rather than concerns over the rationality of emotions. I refer to understanding the instrumental role of emotions in rational decision making as the *instrumental rationality of emotions*. Strictly speaking, concerns regarding the *rationality of emotions*, as it is understood in this body of work, involve concerns about the rationality of emotions themselves. They involve questions regarding the *rationality of emotions qua emotion*. This is not to suggest that the rationality of emotions entails that emotions are always rational or never rational. Nothing can always be rational or never be rational since, as I argued in the previous section, the rationality of any thing is underwritten by some normative standard for judging the thing as being rational and irrational. Such normative standards cannot be established if something is either always rational or never rational. Thus the rationality of any thing depends on it being possible for that thing to be at times rational and at times irrational. This conclusion is necessarily

\textsuperscript{134}Rorty, “Varieties of Rationality, Varieties of Emotion,” 344.
true. It expresses a tautology. The *rationality* of some thing simply means that things *capacity for being rational and irrational*.

One might argue that emotions are irrational when understood in contrast to rational beliefs, judgments, or decisions. The idea here is that emotions are always irrational because beliefs, judgments, or decisions based on emotions are often inconsistent with beliefs, judgments, or decisions that are not based on emotions. To illustrate this point, consider the following information provided by Amos Tversky and Dale Griffin. In one study, Tversky and Griffin found that assessments of well-being based on a *model of choice* could often diverge from assessments of well-being based on a *model of judgment*.135 Assessments of well-being based on a model of choice, according to Tversky and Griffin, are ones in which well-being is determined by the choice one makes, whereas assessments of well-being based on a model of judgment determine well-being based on a subject’s judgment of satisfaction or happiness.136

In their study, Tversky and Griffin gave the following scenario to approximately sixty students:


Imagine that you have just completed a graduate degree in Communications and you are considering one-year jobs at two different magazines.

1. At Magazine A, you are offered a job paying $35,000. However, the other workers who have the same training and experience as you do are making $38,000.

2. At Magazine, B you are offered a job paying $33,000. However, the other workers who have the same training and experience as you do are making $30,000.\textsuperscript{137}

They then asked approximately half the students the question, “Which job would you choose to take?” and asked the other half the question, “At which job would you be happier?”\textsuperscript{138} They found that eighty-four percent (84\%) of the students who were asked the first question chose option (A), the job that offered the higher salary compared to the other option, but also gave an even higher salary to other equally qualified employees. They also found that sixty-two percent (62\%) of the students that were asked the second question expected they would be happier with option (B), the job that offered the comparatively lower salary, but also gave an even lower salary to equally qualified employees. The purpose of Tversky’s and Griffin’s study was to determine how assessments of well-being based on a model of choice compared to a model of judgment were susceptible to what they referred to as the “contrast effect.”\textsuperscript{139}

For my discussion here, however, we can understand assessments of well-being based on judgments of satisfaction or happiness as \textit{emotion-based judgments} and we can

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 113.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 114.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid. The contrast effect, according to Tversky and Griffin, refers to the effect that a past experience can have on one’s occurrent determination of well-being given the past experience is sufficiently similar to one’s occurrent experience. Ibid., 101-02.
understand assessments of well-being based on choice as *utility-based judgments*. Given this, one can suggest that in consideration of the results provided by Tversky and Griffin at least some of these emotion-based judgments involve irrational emotions. One may argue that given a within-subject design, where the same group of students would be given both questions, any student who would choose option A (the higher salary) for the first question, while also choosing option B (the lower salary) for the second question, are being irrational given that they are being inconsistent in their assessments of well-being. The idea here is that if utility-based judgments set the standard for the rationality of judgments, then emotion-based judgments would have to reflect the same outcomes as utility-based judgments in order to be regarded as rational judgments. Thus the emotion-based judgments of well-being would be deemed rational if students who chose option A also determined that they would be happier with option A, given a within-subject design. The emotion-based judgments of students who would choose divergent responses or who would choose option B for both options would be deemed irrational since in both cases the standard for being rational was set by utility-based judgments. Therefore, emotions would be taken as irrational either because the judgments that follow from them fail to consistently reflect the conclusions of utility-based judgments or because they never reflect the conclusions of utility-based judgments.

There are two points I want to make in response to this kind of argument. Both responses rely on the general criticism that there may be a potential category mistake occurring with arguments like the above. First, one may be confounding two separate rational decision-making processes. Emotion-based judgments may have their own
standard of rationality. So it may be problematic to contrast emotion-based judgments with utility-based judgments, and then hold utility-based judgments as the standard for rational judgments. Second, even if we grant that emotion-based judgments are always irrational to the extent that they fail to consistently reflect the same outcomes given by utility-based judgments are irrational because they never reflect utility-based judgments, this does not entail that emotions are themselves always irrational. Concerns regarding the rationality of emotion-based judgments are not the same as concerns regarding the rationality of emotions themselves. Concerns regarding the rationality of emotion-based judgments are concerns about the instrumental role of emotions, i.e., they are concerns about the instrumental rationality of emotions.

To further illustrate the distinction between the instrumental rationality of emotions and the rationality of emotions, let us consider the following scenario. You decide to go see a movie one afternoon with your friend. It happened to be the movie *The Royal Tenenbaums*, directed by Wes Anderson. You have never seen any other movie by Wes Anderson but it made no difference to you since your friend, who is a big Wes Anderson fan, wanted to see the movie. After the movie, you were quite happy about the experience. You thoroughly enjoyed the movie. As you were leaving the theatre, you tell your friend how happy you were about the movie she chose and that you thoroughly enjoyed it. Your friend then asks you if you want to go see the next Wes Anderson movie when it comes out. Seeing that you enjoyed *The Royal Tenenbaums* and reasoning that you would also enjoy another Wes Anderson movie, you say “yes.” In such a case, the emotion of happiness played an instrumental role in your decision to accept your friend’s
invitation to see another Wes Anderson movie. In such cases, we can ask whether or not your decision based on your emotional experience of seeing *The Royal Tenenbaums* and other relevant concerns, such as your relationship with your friend and the relevant standard for what is rational, was a rational decision. The answer may be “yes” or “no,” depending on the finer details of the situation. In either case, this question is not strictly speaking about the rationality of your emotion of happiness itself. In other words, in this case we are not asking if the experience of happiness upon seeing the movie *The Royal Tenenbaums* was rational or irrational. Rather, we are asking whether your decision, based partly on your emotional experience of happiness about seeing *The Royal Tenenbaums*, was rational or irrational. We are asking about the rationality of your decision to see another Wes Anderson movie in light of your experience of happiness upon seeing *The Royal Tenenbaums*. We asking about the rationality of your emotion-based judgment, which illustrates the instrumental role that emotions can play in making-rational decisions.

Questions about the instrumental rationality of emotions are not limited to the role of emotions in rational decision-making. They may also involve questions regarding the role of emotions within systems of communication, social relations, or social conventions of etiquette. For example, consider *The Royal Tenenbaums* scenario again, but this time you did not enjoy the movie. In fact, you outright hated it. You thought it was slow, tedious, and tiresome. However, since your friend enjoyed it so much and you did not want to ruin her evening, you put a happy smile on your face and simply pretended that you enjoyed it. Now, we can ask, was it rational or irrational for you to
pretend you enjoyed the movie when in fact you did not? The answer here can also be “yes” or “no” depending on various details of the situation, such as your relationship with your friend and your understanding of your friend’s personality. Nevertheless, the point is that we are not asking about the rationality of either your emotional response of hatred or your failure to respond with happiness either during or after seeing the movie. We are asking instead whether or not, given that you hated the movie, it was rational of you to act as if you did not hate it. Such concerns regarding the rationality of pretense emotions are also concerns about the instrumental rationality of emotions. Questions about whether it is rational or irrational to enact pretense emotions are about the instrumental role emotions play or ought to play in communicating and maintaining social relations, which are to be judged against social norms for appropriate communication and maintaining relationships.

§3.3 The Epistemic and Evaluative Rationality of Emotions

Emotions can also be said to be rational and irrational in virtue of their epistemic rationality, their biographical subjectivity, or as third person attributions. In order to explain further the distinctions between these ways of understanding the rationality of emotions, consider Cheshire Calhoun’s distinction between the epistemic subjectivity of emotions and the biographical subjectivity of emotions. Calhoun explains that the subjectivity of emotions can be understood in two distinct ways: emotions are thought to

\[140\] For example, if one had a nice meal at some nice restaurant, then one may judge a similar meal at a similar restaurant more negatively due to the contrast between the experience at the previous restaurant and the experience at the second restaurant. That one would judge the second meal more negatively is thought to reside in the contrast effect made possible by the previous experience. See Amos Tversky and Dale Griffin, “Endowment and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being.”
be subjective in light of their epistemic subjectivity, and they are also thought to be subjective in light of their biographical subjectivity.¹⁴¹ Both types of subjectivity have been implicated in criticizing emotions as irrational. These are distinct ways of understanding the subjectivity emotions, and so each yields a distinct understanding of the irrationality and rationality of emotions. The epistemic subjectivity of emotions refers to the characterization of emotions as being unreliable in terms of failing to accurately reflecting objective facts about the world or as being entirely incapable of reflecting any kind of objective fact. Thus emotions are typically denied any epistemic value either in terms of expressing claims of knowledge or playing any role in justifying knowledge claims. As Calhoun notes:

The most common uses of “subjective” and “objective” are both epistemic and evaluative. “Subjective,” always used pejoratively, indicates a lack of adequate justification or of representativeness. Saying that a belief is subjective is a way of critically implying a lack of good, justifying reasons. When applied to emotions, this implies that emotions are based on false or unjustified beliefs, or that emotions have no cognitive content at all. Thus we should take emotional people’s judgments with a grain of salt, and in pursuing knowledge, we should purge ourselves of the biasing influence of emotion. Labeling emotions as “subjective” works to undercut their epistemic significance and, given the premium we place on knowledge, their significance period.¹⁴²

How the epistemic subjectivity of emotions became the basis for criticizing emotions as being irrational may be illustrated by the following case. I have a friend who has an irrational fear of spiders. He flees for his life whenever there is any spider lurking about. He sees a harmless daddy-long leg and takes flight. Given the plausibility of such a case, the epistemic subjectivity of such cases of fear can be explained in two different

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¹⁴¹ Calhoun, “Subjectivity and Emotions.”

¹⁴² Ibid., 107.
ways. Framed in accordance with a cognitive theory of emotion, we can understand this experience of fear to be epistemically subjective in the sense that what my friend believed about the world, which elicited his fear, was either false or unjustified. My friend’s fear presupposed that daddy-long legs are spiders and that as such they are dangerous. This was what my friend’s fear was about. This is what he believed about the world that explains why he was afraid. Nevertheless, daddy-long legs are not spiders and they are not dangerous to him. My friend also had no good reason to think that they are spiders and dangerous to him since he knew that daddy-long legs are not spiders and are not dangerous to him. Thus my friend’s fear not only proves to be an unreliable source of knowledge, but it also suggests that my friend is being irrational when he heads for the door at the mere inkling that a daddy long leg might be lurking nearby. Understanding emotions to be epistemically subjective, and thus irrational in this sense, suggests that emotions must meet the standard of epistemic objectivity in order to be regarded as rational. Given that emotions are understood as being akin to beliefs, it is generally accepted that the standard of epistemic objectivity requires emotions to be true and well warranted in order for emotions to be regarded as rational. In other words, like beliefs, the ideal of epistemic objectivity require emotions to be forms of knowledge in order to

143 Note that Parfit would not necessarily regard these cases as cases of irrationality since, as he states, “we act rationally if we act in some way because we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth would give us sufficient reason to act in this way, irrationally if we act in some way despite having beliefs whose truth would give us clear and strongly decisive reasons not to act in this way,” Parfit and Scheffler, On What Matters.
be regarded as rational just as the ideal of epistemic objectivity require beliefs to be forms of knowledge in order for beliefs to be regarded as rational.\textsuperscript{144}

The second explanation, framed within a traditional noncognitive theory of emotion, would suggest that emotions are epistemically subjective in light of the fact that they fail to have any content that can be assessed in terms of epistemic subjectivity and epistemic objectivity. In short, given a noncognitive theory of emotion that understands emotions as unanalyzable simple impressions that lack any representational content, emotions are thought to be beyond the purview of rational assessment. Much of contemporary theorizing about the rationality of emotions themselves, especially within the philosophy of emotions, takes place against the background assumption that concerns regarding the rationality of emotions are about the epistemic subjectivity of emotions in these two senses. For example, Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion and Jesse Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion are theories of emotion that respectively attempt to make sense of how emotions can be regarded as either epistemically objective in the first sense, or epistemically objective in the first sense and epistemically subjective in the second sense. Because we are interested in the rationality of emotions qua emotion, I will focus primarily on concerns regarding how emotions may be regarded as epistemically objective in the first sense. I refer to such concerns as concerns regarding the epistemic rationality of emotions.

Another way we can understand the subjectivity of emotions, as Calhoun argues, is to understand emotions as being subjective in light of their biographical subjectivity.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{144} Note that what is understood to be ‘knowledge’ within the context of the notion of epistemic rationality is demarcated by the criteria traditional criteria of knowledge as justified true belief.

\textsuperscript{145}
The biographical subjectivity of emotions, according to Calhoun, refers to the fact that emotions reflect personal histories and values. The idea here is that emotions reflect a personal point of view. As Calhoun explains:

More specifically, I have in mind a personal point of view from which an individual’s own conceptual framework and evaluative system come into play in her perceptions, judgments, and emotional responses. Because we have such widely varied biographies, we are exposed and disposed to widely varied forms of conceptualizing the world. That means not only differences in the terms through which we think, but also differences in what we notice, remember, and forget, or in what gets conceptually elaborated or dropped. By the same token, the differences in our biographies produce differences in evaluation so that we find significance or triviality, urgency or indifference in different places.¹⁴⁶

To further illustrate this notion of epistemic subjectivity, consider a scenario of a woman watching a hockey game at a local café. Some may not be interested at all in hockey or any type of sport. They may find no meaning or value in such events. For the woman at the café, watching hockey holds some value, some meaning in which she makes sense of the world around her. Perhaps this value and meaning is rooted in her childhood, perhaps it was a sport she was particularly good at, or the joy of watching hockey games with her family or friends led to a fondness for the game itself. Her joy at watching this game is imbued with the value she has for the game itself, and perhaps the game she is watching is even more so steeped with value and meaning because it is a game between her home team and a rival team. Her home team is her team, and so her pride is on the line alongside the pride of the hockey players, their coach, and the other fans that call the team their own.

This notion of biographical subjectivity, as Calhoun notes, is often understood as a type of epistemic subjectivity because, like the other two senses of epistemic subjectivity, it is used to ground claims against emotions as sources of knowledge.\textsuperscript{147} It is contrasted with a notion of epistemic objectivity, and so what is rational as arriving at truths from a biographically objective perspective. From a biographically objective perspective, our view of the world is to be purified from our personal biases—from our personal histories and values. As Calhoun puts it, biographical objectivity amounts to “taking up an impersonal, impartial, disinterested viewpoint.”\textsuperscript{148} As Calhoun argues, however, the biographical subjectivity of emotions may be distinguished from notions of epistemic subjectivity, which implies that emotions cannot be a proper source of knowledge. Thus the biographical subjectivity of emotions does not in itself render emotions irrational since the biographical objectivity and the biographical subjectivity of emotions cannot be neatly mapped onto the distinctions between epistemic objectivity and epistemic subjectivity. For example, consider Calhoun’s example of the tomato farmer who has toiled away for years in order to build his tomato business.\textsuperscript{149} From the farmer’s biographically subjective viewpoint, his tomato farm is priceless. It represents to him years of hard work and memories working with his wife and children, but from a biographically objective point of view, it is only worth as much as he can get for it given the current demand for farms and state of the farm itself. Now, let us assume that the farmer has accepted a fairly good price for his farm considering the current market

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 113.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 111.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
conditions. Let us suppose that he in fact made a profit on selling his farm. He received a price that anyone who had no personal investment whatsoever in the farm they were selling would be happy about. Nevertheless, the farmer is sad. What explains his sadness is the fact that from a biographically subjective point of view his farm was priceless. From his biographically subjective viewpoint, he sold his farm at a great loss.

Given the distinction between epistemic subjectivity and objectivity, and biographical subjectivity and objectivity, we can understand the rationality of emotions in a sense that is distinct from concerns regarding epistemic rationality of emotions. Judgments about the rationality of emotions when placed only against the background distinction between biographical objectivity and biographical subjectivity may be judgments about whether or not one’s emotional response from a biographically subjective point of view is consistent with an emotional response from one’s biographically objective point of view. In this sense, one would hold the emotional response from the biographically objective point of view to set the standard for what counts as a rational response. If the farmer accepts the market value of his farm as part of his biographically subjective point of view, then the farmer may not consider the selling of his farm to be such a great loss. Thus he may not be so sad, and this may be assessed as a rational emotional response. In some cases, the standard for a rational response may be upheld by the biographically subjective point of view. For example, feelings of love, attachment, jealousy, may all only be rational from a biographically subjective point of view.

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It is also possible to keep the biographical objectivity of our emotional responses apart from the biographical subjectivity of our emotional responses. We may in fact be able to hold these two points of view simultaneously, even if we are able to focus only on one of these perspectives at a time. In such cases, we may choose to hold the emotional response from either the biographically objective point of view or the emotional response from the biographically subjective point of view to be the rational response. Thus either one or the other emotional response would be deemed irrational depending on which perspective is regarded to be the rational perspective or the perspective that yields a rational response. In this case as well, the rationality of our emotional responses from a biographically objective and biographically subjective point of view are rooted in the idea that one of these points of view sets the standard of rationality, and the rationality of one is to be judged in terms of being consistent or inconsistent with the other point of view. Given these possible outcomes, which takes into consideration only the biographical objectivity and subjectivity of emotions, the rationality of emotions in terms of biographical objectivity and biographical subjectivity may be distinguished from concerns regarding the rationality of emotions in term of the epistemic objectivity and epistemic subjectivity. Such cases regarding the rationality of emotions—cases that are understood in terms of the biographical objectivity and the biographical subjectivity of emotions that are distinct from the epistemic objectivity and the epistemic subjectivity of emotions—may be regarded as cases regarding the evaluative rationality of emotions.

We may also admit that given both the biographically objective and biographically subjective points of view, these two different perspectives allow for
assessments of rationality in their own right and not in comparison with the other perspective. If we, however, do regard each emotional response to be rational in its own right, we would then have to look for something outside the biographically objective and biographically subjective point of view to fully comprehend the rationality of these emotions. One way of doing so is to fall back onto concerns regarding the epistemic objectivity and epistemic subjectivity of emotions. In this way, concerns regarding the rationality of emotions from the biographically objective and biographically subjective point of view may be respectively reduced to concerns regarding the rationality of emotions from the epistemically objective and epistemically subjective point of view. In the following section, I consider Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive theory of emotion and Jesse Prinz’s non-cognitive theory of emotion primarily with respect to concerns about the epistemic rationality of emotions, although I also discuss how concerns regarding the evaluative rationality of emotions can be accommodated by the various features that may be required in order to provide a full account of the epistemic rationality of emotions.

Given the forgoing, I narrow the scope of this section to questions about the epistemic rationality of emotions. By doing so we can derive some necessary conditions for the epistemic rationality of emotions. In other words, we can determine, at least to a certain extent, what kind of normative standards are required in order to make sense of the epistemic rationality of emotions. Furthermore, if there are such normative standards, and these normative standards are established in one way or another by the nature of our emotions—by some aspect of our emotional responses that make them the kind or type of responses that they are, we can conclude that COR⁵ has been satisfied; and in light of this
conclusion we can regard emotions to be rational qua emotions or qua the type of emotion they are. It is important to note, however, that although I refer to the following concerns as concerns regarding the epistemic rationality of emotions, the distinctions between the epistemic rationality of emotions, the evaluative rationality of emotions, and the instrumental rationality of emotions are conceptual distinctions, and as such may be difficult to make clear in practice with respect to our lived emotional experiences. I also want to make clear that I do not deny importance of the evaluative rationality of emotions or the instrumental rationality of emotions when understanding the relationship between emotions and judgments of rationality. I do deny that these aspects of our emotional lives are strictly speaking about the rationality of emotions qua emotion when isolated from concerns about the epistemic rationality of emotions. I also deny that concerns regarding the evaluative rationality and instrumental rationality of emotions can be wholly reduced to concerns regarding the epistemic rationality of emotions.

§3.4 Cognitivism, Noncognitivism, and Epistemic Rationality

Concerns regarding the epistemic rationality of emotions can be traced back to philosophical debates between cognitive theorists of emotion and non-cognitive feeling theorists of emotion during the late twentieth century. As mentioned in chapter three, one reason for the rise of cognitive theories of emotion over noncognitive feeling theories of emotion, in philosophy during the late twentieth century, was that noncognitive feeling theories at the time were not equipped to explain why emotions can be said to be rational and irrational in terms of being epistemically objective or subjective. The idea was that because noncognitive feeling theories denied that emotions had any cognitive content,

150 Calhoun, “Subjectivity and Emotions,” 115.
Since emotions were primarily equated with simple feelings or impressions, they were thought to be incapable of being rationally assessable. The key assumption here was that “rational assessment” was primarily understood in terms of reason responsiveness.\(^{151}\) Thus, given that emotions were thought to be incapable of responding to reasons in light of their noncognitive nature, noncognitive theories were criticized for their inability to account for the fact that emotions can be rationally assessable.

Although cognitive theorists in philosophy typically accept the epistemic rationality of emotions—that emotions are rational with respect to truth, justification, or knowledge—not everyone agrees that cognitivists are on the right track. For example, Prinz denies that emotions are strictly speaking capable of being epistemically rational and irrational.\(^{152}\) So I propose we begin our pursuit for an explanation of how or why emotions are with a standard cognitive account in philosophy that regards emotions to be capable of rational assessment. I rely on Nussbaum’s cognitive evaluative theory of emotion for this purpose. After doing so, I contrast Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion and argue that although Prinz accepts that emotions are strictly speaking neither rational nor irrational, his account is able to make sense of talk about the epistemic rationality of emotions. By contrasting Nussbaum’s and Prinz’s view, we can see how concerns regarding truth and appropriate warrant or justification have played a central role in understanding the epistemic rationality of emotions. Furthermore, given that considerations about the epistemic rationality of emotions are primarily concerned with

\(^{151}\) Parfit and Scheffler, *On What Matters.*

how our emotions can be true and how our emotions can be appropriately justified or warranted, I move on to argue in the final section of this chapter that the epistemic rationality of emotions is intimately intertwined with both the intentionality and discreteness of emotions. In short, I argue that judgments about the epistemic rationality of emotions depends, not only on the fact that emotions have intentional contents, but also the fact that such contents are specifically cashed out in terms of conditions for identifying discrete emotion types. I introduce concerns regarding the rational assessment of shame in order to illustrate this point, and I end the chapter with my argument for accepting TRU° and TRU.

§3.4.1 Cognitive Theories of Emotion

In chapter 3, Martha Nussbaum presents what can be regarded as a standard cognitive theory of emotion in philosophy. According to her view, emotions are cognitive mental states that are constituted by judgments or assents to eudaimonistic appraisals orr evaluations. Given this, emotions are rationally assessable in two distinct ways according to Nussbaum’s account: emotions may be said to be “true” or “false” and they may be said to be “justified” or “unjustified,” “reasonable” or “unreasonable.” As Nussbaum explains, “it is of course a consequence of the view I have been developing that emotions, like other beliefs, can be true or false, and (an independent point) justified or unjustified, reasonable or unreasonable.” Emotions are true or false for Nussbaum in two ways. They are “true” or “false” to the extent that the content of the emotion, the judgment, or

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154 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, 46.
assent accurately, corresponds with aspects of the world.\textsuperscript{155} As she illustrates, “So if I believe my mother to be dead and grieve, and she is not really dead, my emotion is in that sense false.”\textsuperscript{156} Here, the judgment that constitutes the emotion may be something like, “My mother is dead and I have experienced a loss of great value.” We can understand the propositional content of this judgment—the content that some aspect of the world is such-and-such—as “My mother is dead.” Thus if Nussbaum was incorrect about her mother’s passing, her grief could be said to be epistemically subjective, and thus irrational, because the propositional content would not accurately reflect the way the world actually is. It would not be true that Nussbaum’s mother is dead, and because of this, it would not be true that she has experienced a great loss of value. In this sense, the rationality of the emotion depends on the fulfillment of veridicality condition for the emotion’s propositional contents, i.e., they depend on the condition that the propositional contents of the emotion accurately reflect or correspond with the way the world really is.

Besides being “true” or “false” in terms of the veridicality of their propositional contents, emotions can also be “true” or “false” in terms of the veridicality or correctness of their eudaimonistic appraisals.\textsuperscript{157} As Nussbaum explains, again using the example of her grief upon her mother’s passing:

In a different way, the judgment can be false if I am wrong about the evaluative aspects of the judgments: my emotion says (inter alia) something about

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 46-47.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 46.
mothers, namely that they have tremendous value, and that this element too can be true or false.\textsuperscript{158}

This second sense in which emotions can be “true” or “false” focuses on the ascription of value by the appraisal to which the emotion is an assent. It is because of these ascriptions of value that emotions are thought to be eudaimonistic. I refer to such ascriptions as constituting the eudaimonistic content of emotions. In the above example the eudaimonistic content is given by the judgment that, “I (Martha Nussbaum) have experienced a loss of great value.” Nussbaum can judge that she has indeed experienced a loss of great value only after ascribing to her mother the property of being greatly valuable to Nussbaum’s well-being.\textsuperscript{159} The emotion of grief and the eudaimonistic judgment share the same content since the emotion of grief is a judgment of having experienced a loss of great value. Accordingly, since eudaimonistic judgments are eudaimonistic in virtue of being assents to evaluative appraisals, our emotions are “eudaimonistic” by entailing evaluative appraisals made from within our own scheme of values and goals. As Nussbaum continues:

\begin{quote}
Emotions contain an eliminable reference to me, to the fact that it is my scheme of goals and projects. They see the world from my point of view. The fact that it is my mother is not simply a fact like any other fact about the world: it is what structures the geography of the whole situation, and we cannot capture the emotion without including that statement.\textsuperscript{160}
\end{quote}

Thus emotions can be “true” or “false” in this second sense if the ascription of value—the eudaimonistic appraisal to which the emotion assents—is wrong or incorrect. As Nussbaum states:

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 47.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 52-53.
Eudaimonism has two aspects: we are saying that such-and-such is an important part of my own scheme of goals and ends, but we typically think that this is so because of some real value the item possesses: it is such that, without that thing (or a thing of that sort), my life would be incomplete. And in building a conception of eudaimonia for themselves people often seek to build in just those items about which such true evaluative claims can be made…For this reason, Chrysippus plausibly said that grief (along with other emotions) contains not only the judgment that an important part of my life has gone, but that it is right to be upset about that: it makes a truth claim about its own evaluations. Emotions can be true or false in that sense too.\textsuperscript{161}

In the above passage, Nussbaum explains how emotions can be “true” or “false” relative to the truth of the ascription of value to her mother, which permitted her to make the judgment that she has experienced a loss of great value. Here then, the judgment that is the emotion admits a subtle distinction that also allows a two-pronged assessment of its rationality with respect to truth.

Consider again Nussbaum’s grief over her mother’s death. The grief is the judgment that, “My (Martha Nussbaum’s) mother is dead and I have experienced a loss of great value.” The conjunct that Nussbaum’s mother is dead only has propositional content. Thus it is true or false simply based on whether or not it accurately reflects the state of the world as being such that her mother is dead. The truth of the judgment that Nussbaum has experienced a great loss also depends on the truth of the claim that Nussbaum’s mother is dead since her experience of great loss is about her mother. So in so far as the truth of the second conjunct depends on the propositional content that Nussbaum’s mother is dead, it too has propositional content. The conjunct that Nussbaum has experienced a loss of great value also has eudaimonistic content. Its truth also depends on the truth or sincerity of the ascription of value that Nussbaum has given to

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 52.
her mother. It depends on whether or not Nussbaum’s mother was indeed a valuable aspect of Nussbaum’s well-being. If Nussbaum’s mother did not play a valuable role, let us say for the reason that her mother was an absent parent and was thus estranged from Nussbaum, then ascribing great value to her mother would be in this sense “false” or “incorrect.” Nussbaum may believe her mother is still a valuable aspect of her well-being, but believing so would be different from it actually being the case. If despite her belief, Nussbaum’s scheme of goals and other values failed to reveal the way in which her mother actually had such value, her assent to the appraisal that she indeed had such value and so experienced a great loss—her emotion of grief—would therefor be incorrect or false. Thus emotions can be “true” or “false” in two senses: relative to the veridicality conditions for their propositional contents, as well as the veridicality conditions for their eudaimonistic content.

The veridicality condition for an emotion’s eudaimonistic content requires an emotion to accurately reflect or correspond with the actual value that the intentional object of our emotion has, relative to our well-being.\footnote{Ibid., 47. One particularly clear way of understanding what the veridicality conditions of the eudaimonistic contents of emotion involve has been described by Bennett Helm in “Emotions and Motivation in Neo-Jamesian accounts.” Bennett Helm, “Emotions and Motivation in Neo-Jamesian Account,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie, Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). As Helm explains, emotions involve a commitment to import, i.e., emotions involve a commitment to the value of things. Ibid., 310. Furthermore, in that emotions involve a commitment to import, Helm argues that they involve a “projectable, rational pattern of emotions and desires.” Ibid., 313. For example, if it were important to me that I am always on time to any meetings I might have with students, then I might become angry at myself if I find myself in a position where I might be late.} Because an understanding of the
rationality of our emotions—in terms of the veridicality conditions for their propositional and eudaimonistic contents—involves understanding the rationality of emotions in terms of truth, I refer to our assessments regarding the epistemic rationality of emotions with respect to the veridicality of their propositional contents and the veridicality of their eudaimonistic content as assessments of truth.

Besides understanding the rationality of emotions in terms of assessments of truth, emotions can also be understood to be epistemically rational and irrational in terms of being “justified” or “unjustified,” “reasonable” or “unreasonable,” as well as “appropriate” or “inappropriate.” For cognitivist in philosophy, these ways of characterizing the rationality of emotions depend on whether or not one has warranted reasons for holding the judgment that identifies the emotion as an emotion of a specific type. As Nussbaum illustrates regarding the reasonableness of a mother’s grief upon being told that her beloved child had died:

A separate issue is the issue of reasonableness. Suppose she believes that her child is dead because the news is brought to her by a person whom she trusts and whom she believes to be in a very good position to know how things are with her child. In that case her belief that her child is dead might be false, but it seems to be reasonable. If, on the other hand, she believes the news because she hears a casual rumor from a very untrustworthy person, her belief is unreasonable regardless of its truth. In this way, the reasonableness of one’s emotion is

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My anger would thus involve a commitment to the importance of being on time. Also, this commitment to the importance of being on time would also suggest a projectable rational pattern of other emotions and desires: I would be happy or pleased with myself if I were always on time, I would have the desire to make sure to get up and be ready in time to make my appointments, etc. Helm also suggests that the genuineness or, in terms of veridicality conditions discussed here, the veridicality conditions for the eudaimonistic contents involved in an emotional experience is set by the projectable, rational pattern of emotions and desires that can be associated with the value presupposed in an emotional experienced. In Helm’s words, “When the relevant evaluative perspective is sustained by a projectable, pattern of emotions with a common focus, the commitment is genuine…”
independent from the issue of truth: reasonableness concerns issues of evidence and reliability, in a way that truth does not.\textsuperscript{163}

Here then, we have a second sense in which emotions can be regarded as epistemically rational and irrational according to Nussbaum. This, unlike assessments of truth, does not depend on the accuracy of the propositional content or the eudaimonistic content. Emotions are instead deemed rational and irrational relative to the reasons one has for assenting to the truth of the propositional content or eudaimonistic content. In other words, emotions may also be rational and irrational relative to the reasons one has for having the emotion that one has. I refer to such assessments of rationality as \textit{assessments of warrant}, and I refer to the conditions which assessments of warrant must meet in order for one to be appropriately warranted in experiencing the emotions that they are experiencing as \textit{strength conditions} for warranted emotions.

As the above passage illustrates, the mother’s grief is rational despite being false because she had good reasons to judge that her child was dead. The person who brought her news of her child’s passing was, at least at the time of the mother’s experience, trustworthy and in a good position to know of such information. In such a case, the mother’s emotional response was strongly warranted. It appropriately fulfilled the strength conditions for a warranted emotional response. Other than second hand information from a seemingly reliable source our perceptions alone may also provide us with such reasons. For example, Nussbaum was directly presented with the fact of her mother’s passing when she saw her mother’s body lying before her. Thus according to Nussbaum’s account, emotions may be deemed epistemically rational in two different

ways: in terms of assessments of truth and in terms of assessments of warrant. In response to such an account regarding the epistemic rationality of emotions, one may counter with two standard objections to cognitivist accounts of the rationality of emotions. The first objection asserts that although cognitive theories are able to account for the rationality of human adult emotions, they run aground when making sense of human infant emotions and the emotions of non-human animals.\(^{164}\) The objection, briefly summarized, runs as follows: Given that cognitive theories of emotion equate emotions with judgments that have propositional content and that the emotions of human infants and non-human animals lack propositional content, cognitive theories are unable to make sense of the rationality or irrationality of emotions. Thus cognitive theories fail to provide a coherent account of emotions and their rationality.

It is important to note that the term ‘proposition’ is often used in one of two ways in philosophy, and although their uses are related, the difference in their use makes a considerable difference to understanding the implications of Nussbaum’s account. Philosophers typically mean one of two things when they use the term ‘proposition’:

**Standard Meanings of ‘Proposition’**

Proposition\(^5\): A statement, which is a sentence in some language that asserts the content of that sentence (i.e., what the statement asserts) as a fact (truth) about the world.

Property\(^5\): The property that all the contents of propositions\(^5\) share in order to allow them to assert the contents that are asserted by propositions\(^5\).

Propositional\(^5\) Contents: The contents of thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc., that are entertained, held in mind, or constitute the contents of proposition\(^1\); what propositions\(^5\) are “about” or “directed at.”

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\(^{164}\) Ibid.
Proposition\textsuperscript{W}: A possible fact about the world, which is a possible truth that can be asserted at least in principle by some language.\textsuperscript{165}

Property\textsuperscript{W}: The property that all the contents of propositions\textsuperscript{W} share in order to allow them to be asserted in principle by some language.\textsuperscript{166}

Propositional\textsuperscript{W} Contents: The contents of thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc., that are entertained, held in mind, or constitute the contents of proposition\textsuperscript{S}; what propositions\textsuperscript{S} are “about” or “directed at.”

Given these two possible ways of understanding what a proposition is, whenever the objection noted in the previous paragraph uses the term ‘propositional,’ this term should be understood as referring to some property had by the contents of a subset of proposition\textsuperscript{W}. I refer to the subset of propositions\textsuperscript{W} that can at least in principle be asserted by a statement in some language and by the individual who can be described as a user of that language as proposition\textsuperscript{L}. Moreover, I refer to the property that all the


\textsuperscript{166} Note that by “some language” I mean any language, which includes possible languages, non-human languages, obsolete languages, extinct languages, eradicated languages, currently existing languages, etc. There is a question as to whether or not one ought to include impossible languages. Currently, I would say that although the answer may depend on what is meant by ‘impossible language,’ whether or not one ought to include impossible languages may still be an interesting question given any specification of what it means for something to be an ‘impossible language.
contents of proposition\textsuperscript{L} share in order to allow them to be expressed at least in principle by any individual that can be described as using propositions\textsuperscript{L} as the \textit{property\textsuperscript{L}}, and I refer to the contents of thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc., that are entertained, held in mind, or constitute the contents of proposition\textsuperscript{L} as \textit{propositional\textsuperscript{L} contents}:

\textit{Linguistic Propositions}

Propositions\textsuperscript{L}: A subset of propositions\textsuperscript{W} that can be asserted in principle by a statement in some language as well as in principle by the individual who can be described as a user of the proposition\textsuperscript{W}.

Property\textsuperscript{L}: The property that all the contents of proposition\textsuperscript{L} share in order to allow them to be expressed at least in principle by any individual that can be described as using propositions\textsuperscript{L}.

Propositional\textsuperscript{L} Contents: The contents of thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc., that are entertained, held in mind, or constitute the contents of proposition\textsuperscript{L}; what propositions\textsuperscript{L} are “about” or “directed at.”

The same can be said, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, of propositions\textsuperscript{S} and proposition\textsuperscript{W}, as I have indicated in the recently provided list of standard meanings of ‘propositions.’ Therefore, understanding propositional contents as having the property L, and so as having propositional\textsuperscript{L} contents, requires an explanation of how those who can be at least in principle described as using propositions\textsuperscript{L}, and so be understood at least in principle as bearers of states with such propositional\textsuperscript{L} contents, can at least in principle be individuals who can assert the proposition\textsuperscript{L} that they can be described as using.\textsuperscript{167} If we add to this requirement the assumption that the acquisition and use of a language sufficiently differentiates rational beings from arational beings, then we can see how the emotions of infants and non-human animals may or may not pose a difficulty for traditional cognitive

\textsuperscript{167} Note that I continue to use the term ‘proposition’ whenever its ambiguous meaning makes no significant difference in understanding a particular point, and when significant differences may follow, I use ‘proposition\textsuperscript{S},’ ‘proposition\textsuperscript{W},’ or ‘proposition\textsuperscript{L}.’
theorists of emotion depending on how such theorists relate the content of infant and non-human animal emotions to some notion of a proposition. If we accept that only language users are rational, and so only mental states, including emotions and beliefs, that have propositional contents can be rational, then if one had the intuition that infants and non-human animals have rational emotions, one would find oneself in a bit of a pickle.

Some might say that infants and non-human animals are not language users. Given this, infants and non-human animals could only be properly described as using propositions when they form their beliefs, have emotions, or perceive the world. Thus one would have to give up either the assumption that only language users are rational or the assumption that infants and non-human animals have rational emotions. The second disjunct may also entail that one would have to deny that infants and non-human animals are capable of having rational beliefs or rational perceptions. Understanding propositional contents in such a way, essentially assumes that the acquisition and use of a language affect the structure of our mental states (thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc.), and allowing them to be susceptible to reason and thus rational. Thus those mental states that have propositional contents are thought to differ from mental states that have propositional contents but not propositional contents.

The typical response from cognitive theorists in philosophy to these kinds of objections is to bite the bullet and deny that infant and non-human animals have emotions that can be rational and irrational. As Deigh recognized, however, cognitivists may not

168 We can similarly understand how the notion of evidential justification, in regard to knowledge, would be mediated by the particular notion of ‘proposition’ employed by some evidentialist theory of justification.
want to be too ready to give up the rationality of infant emotions or the emotions of non-human animals.\(^{169}\) For if we add, as cognitivists typically do, that the intentionality of emotions depends on emotions having propositional\(^{L}\) contents, then the cognitivist should also be ready to give up the infant emotions and the emotions of non-human animals. These criticisms are applicable to earlier cognitive theories that characterize emotions in terms of having propositional contents; such criticisms are not applicable to Nussbaum’s account. Property\(^{L}\) does not refer to the contents of emotion, as I have suggested in chapter two. It instead refers to the structure, form, vehicle of representation, or mode of presentation for the contents of representation or perception. As noted in chapter 2, Nussbaum does not require the judgments that constitute emotions to have such propositional form. According to Nussbaum’s account, the evaluative judgments that constitute emotions may be loosely structured evaluative recognitions that take the form of non-propositional imaginings.\(^{170}\) Thus Nussbaum rejects the narrow use of the term ‘propositional contents,’ which refers to propositional\(^{L}\) contents.\(^{171}\) Furthermore, despite the fact that emotions may be constituted by evaluative recognitions that take the form of non-propositional imaginings, according to Nussbaum’s account their rationality may still be assessed in terms of assessments of truth and assessments of warrant in so far as these judgments have propositional\(^{W}\) and evaluative content. For example, an elephant’s experience of grief at the death of a cherished partner may be rational if the elephant has

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\(^{171}\) Note that there is some ambiguity in Nussbaum’s account regarding whether or not she denies the necessity of propositional
in fact lost something of great value, despite the fact that it lacks evidential reasons to warrant the elephant’s judgment. It would also be rational if it were warranted in holding this evaluative recognition regardless of whether or not the content of the elephant’s emotional response lacks propositional form.\textsuperscript{172}

The second standard criticism of cognitive theories of emotion stems from the observation that adult human beings are susceptible to what John Deigh refers to as “ineducable” emotions.\textsuperscript{173} According to Deigh, these emotions, such as the fear of falling while in a secure location, are ineducable. They are irrational but not in virtue of any assessments of truth or warrant. The irrationality of these emotions depends instead on the fact that they are reflexive responses that fail to be amenable to reason. Such responses, like the experience of perceptual illusions, are not amenable to reason because their occurrence, unlike some of our beliefs, cannot be mediated by reasons, which are typically taken to be other beliefs. In response to such criticisms, Nussbaum suggests that the intentional content of fear is the subject’s fragility or mortality, in which the value of our self and the helplessness of our human condition lie,\textsuperscript{174} rather than the thought that the subject is in a secure location not liable to falling. Thus, given that we are all fragile mortal beings, the assent to the thought that one is in a precariously dangerous situation

\textsuperscript{172} If this is the case, I beseech everyone to imagine the incredible grief experienced around the world by those emotional creatures of all kinds (humans and otherwise) who have lost a loved one at the hands of human greed, objectifying curiosity, sadistic pleasure, and dehumanizing pride and self-righteousness. I hope that such imaginings will motivate those who are able to enact the changes necessary to end such needless suffering to do so, especially those who’s actions may be the direct causes of such suffering.

\textsuperscript{173} Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions}, 127-28.

\textsuperscript{174} Deigh, “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions,” 850.
(the intentional content of fear), incited by the context of looking down from the edge of a precipice, would be a rational response to the extent that being such a fragile mortal being that values its own existence is a good reason to believe that one is in a precariously dangerous situation.\footnote{Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions}, 70.} Such an explanation, however, requires the appeal to what Nussbaum refers to as “background emotions,” which she defines as “evaluative judgments that persist through situations of numerous kinds,” and “situational emotions” or “episodic emotions,” which according to Nussbaum occur when background emotions are brought to consciousness by a particular situational context.\footnote{Ibid., 71.} So for Nussbaum, our fear of dying may always be unconsciously lurking in the background until the right situational context, such as looking down from the edge of a cliff even while in a secure location, brings this fear to conscious awareness as a situational or episodic emotion.

Accordingly, unlike some contemporary cognitivist theories of the late twentieth century, Nussbaum’s account of the epistemic rationality of emotions does not depend on whether or not the emotion has any propositional content; yet similar to these accounts, an emotion’s rationality depends on the way in which the emotion’s cognitive content (the content that makes emotions cognitive states) appropriately corresponds with aspects of the world (fulfill veridicality conditions of both their propositional content as well as their eudaimonistic content) or if the subject has good reasons for holding the judgment that is the emotion (fulfills the strength condition for a warranted emotion). Emotions are thus rational in terms of assessments of truth and assessments of warrant.
Furthermore, it is important to note that Nussbaum’s account of the structure of an emotion’s intentional content is conceptually independent of, although related to, her account of the rationality of emotions. The rationality of normal human adult, infant, and animal emotions do not depend on the structural differences between a rational and irrational emotion’s content. The rationality of emotions does not depend on emotions being structurally propositional. Rather, normal human adult, infant, and human animal emotions are all rational to the extent that the appraisals and assents involved accurately correspond with the way the world actually is or to the extent that the subject has good reasons for assenting to the intentional content of the emotion regardless of the structure of the appraisals and assents.

§3.4.2 Noncognitive Theory of Emotion

Prinz provides an account in which emotions can be understood as either rational, irrational, or arational from one perspective and arational in themselves, qua emotions, from another perspective. To clearly understand how these two perspectives follow from Prinz’s view, we must first understand how emotions constitute a functional part of a rational system—a system that can be described as involving truth, inference, and justification. As Prinz explains:

We can think of emotions as conclusions to arguments. The mental representations used in the initiation pathway are like premises. They are the grounds on which the emotion is based. The calibration file is a mechanism that uses premises to trigger an emotional response. It specifies what kinds of information can serve as an emotion trigger. In that respect, it is like a collection of inference rules (e.g., If you see a snake, experience fear). The transition from a representation of an elicitor to an emotion can be regarded as an inference. It is a move from one group of meaningful states (representations of elicitors) to another (the emotion), and one can describe the former as reasons for the latter.177

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177 Ibid., 69-70.
As indicated by the above passage, emotions for Prinz play a functional role within a rational system constituted by representations of emotion elicitors, calibration files, and emotions. These aspects of the rational system can be understood in terms of “premises” (representations of an emotion elicitor), “inference rules” (calibration files), and “conclusions” (emotions) of arguments. Given that normative assessments of rationality or irrationality of emotions are appropriate only if one is responsible for one’s emotions,178 emotions can be understood on the one hand as rational and irrational in two ways: they can be rational (or irrational) if they fulfill (or lack) “premise warrant” or if they fulfill (or lack) “inference warrant.”179 An emotion lacks premise warrant, according to Prinz, if what elicits an emotion is a false perception, false judgment, or the subject lacks the appropriate reasons for believing that the content of the representation that elicits an emotion (the “premise”) accurately corresponds with relevant aspects of the world, and can be held responsible for these failures. An emotion lacks inference warrant according to Prinz if the relevant calibration file (the inference rule) contains a representation of an inappropriate elicitor for which the subject could be held responsible.180 As Prinz explains:

The fact that emotions can be regarded as conclusions to arguments does not demonstrate that they are amenable to normative assessment. Normative assessment requires responsibility. There are at least two ways in which a person can be held responsible for her emotions. These correspond to premise warrant and inference warrant. Suppose Jones feels proud because she thinks she is prettier than Smith. In actuality Smith is better looking, and Jones simply failed to properly appreciate her beauty. Jones’s smug delight is prefaced on a thought that

178 Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion, 238.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid., 237-38.
is neither true nor adequately supported; it lacks premise warrant. Now suppose that physical attractiveness is not worthy of pride...if pride is an emotion that is reserved for achievements, it is usually inappropriate to be proud of one’s appearance. If Jones feels proud of her genetically determined looks, and she has access to information and skills to banish looks from her calibration file, then she can be criticized for her emotions. Here, pride lacks inference warrant.\textsuperscript{181}

Here then, we can see how responsibility has a crucial role in ascriptions of rationality to our emotional responses. According to Prinz, responsibility is a necessary condition for normative ascriptions, which ascriptions of rationality and irrationality are.\textsuperscript{182} Furthermore, the normative status of emotions depends on the fact that emotions are part of a rational system. They are products of a rational system, which also includes initiation pathways (representations of elicitors and calibration files) that are external to the emotion system. It is in light of this connection with the initiation pathways that emotions can be normatively assessed. As Prinz continues to explain:

\begin{displayquote}
There are, in sum, two places for normativity to get a foothold in our emotional responses. We can be held responsible for having emotions based on bad premises or bad inferences, provided that we are responsible for those premises and inferences.

...Conversely, there are cases in which people are not held responsible for their emotions. If someone experiences euphoria because of the chemical change that is caused by someone else, she may not be responsible for her reaction...Similar points may apply to emotions produced by facial feed-back, phobias, or affective disorders.

I draw two interim conclusions. First, the contrast between emotions and paradigm perceptual states is not sharp. Both are amenable to normative
\end{displayquote}

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 238.
assessment in some cases and not in others. Second, the normative assessment of an emotion arises because of features of its initiation pathways.\textsuperscript{183}

Thus on the one hand, emotions are derivatively regarded as either rational, irrational, or arational depending on the status of the mental states involved in the initiation pathways. Ascriptions of rational and irrational emotions depend on whether or not the subject can be held responsible for either the representational content of the emotion elicitor or the representation contained within the calibration file for a specific emotion type. Emotional responses, which are caused by representations of elicitors or representations within a calibration file for which one cannot be held responsible, are arational emotions.

On the other hand, Prinz suggests that emotions ought to be said, strictly speaking, to be arational in themselves, i.e., they ought to be regarded as arational qua emotion. This is because the normative assessments of emotions are derived from the initiation pathways, which are external to the emotion system. Thus emotions themselves, as products of an emotion system isolated from the initiation pathways from which they gain their normative status, fail to meet the requirements of responsibility that normative assessments require, according to Prinz. As Prinz concludes:

The second point suggests that emotions themselves may never be normatively assessable in their own right. Hume (1739/1978, II.iii.3) says, “a passion can never, in any sense, be called unreasonable, but when founded on a

\textsuperscript{183} Note that it is a controversial claim that normative ascriptions require an individual to be \textit{agentially} responsible. Although one may argue that all normative ascriptions require some notion of responsibility, it is possible that some normative ascriptions rely primarily on non-agential understandings of what it means to be “responsible for an act.” For example, some normative ascriptions may rely primarily on weighing ethical values, the pragmatic or ethical value of the consequences of normative ascriptions, socially accepted conventions or norms, or even statistical norms.
false supposition.” In other words, the normative status of an emotion may derive entirely from the states that cause it.\textsuperscript{184} Thus according to Prinz’s account, emotions can be said to be rational, irrational, and arational as products of a rational system, but they are arational qua emotions.

Although Prinz does not strictly speaking regard emotions qua emotion to be susceptible to rational assessments, his account of how we can make sense of talk about the rationality of emotions is fairly similar to the way in which Nussbaum accounts for the rationality of emotions. Furthermore, Prinz concludes that emotions qua emotion are not in themselves amenable to rational assessment because he does not include the initiation pathways of emotion processing as part of the emotion system. Representations of emotion elicitors and calibration files, which are aspects of the initiation pathways, are external to what emotions are. Thus insofar as representations of elicitors and calibration files are respectively associated with premise warrant and inference warrant the rational assessment of emotions are also strictly speaking external to emotions. Given this, Prinz’s account is unable to make sense of the rationality of emotions qua emotions. Emotions are only derivatively rational and irrational qua emotion on Prinz’s account. Nevertheless, we can continue on to compare and contrast Prinz’s account regarding the derivative rationality of emotions with Nussbaum’s account of the rationality of emotions qua emotions in order to gain some insight into those features or facts about the world that philosophers of emotion take as evidence for the rationality of emotions despite the derivative or intrinsic nature of the rationality of emotions, i.e., what I respectively refer

\textsuperscript{184} Prinz, \textit{Gut Reactions}, 239.
to as the *instrumental rationality of emotions* and the *rationality of emotions qua emotion type*.

§3.5 Modes of Emotional Rationality

Prinz’s account also suggests that emotions can be assessed as rational and irrational in terms of assessments of truth and assessments of warrant. Emotions may be irrational if the content of the emotion elicitor (perception or cognition) fails to accurately correspond to the actual state of the world (e.g., Jones thinking she is prettier than Smith when in fact Smith is prettier) or if the subject lacks good reason to believe that the content of the emotion elicitor obtains (e.g. Jones is presented with reasonable evidence that she is not prettier than Smith but still thinks that she is).\(^{185}\) Thus, given both Nussbaum’s and Prinz’s accounts we can conclude that the epistemic rationality of emotions depends on at least two necessary features of what emotions are: 1) that emotions are in some sense amenable to assessments of truth, and 2) that emotions are in some sense amenable to assessments of warrant. In contrast to Nussbaum’s account, however, Prinz’s account merges assessments of truth and the assessments of warrant into one type of assessment—the assessment of “premise warrant.” Prinz also does not explicitly include assessments of truth in terms of evaluating the eudaimonistic content of a representation that elicits an emotional response. In other words, Prinz does not explicitly address how assessments of evaluative rationality may play a role in assessments of premise warrant. Insofar as assessments of premise warrant allow for such assessments, and eudaimonistic appraisals can be assessed in terms of assessments of truth, the fact that Prinz’s account does not explicitly address concerns regarding the

\(^{185}\) Ibid.
evaluative rationality of emotions is only trivially problematic. Thus, given that both Nussbaum and Prinz agree that the rationality of emotions can be assessed in terms of assessments of truth and assessments of warrant, we can conclude that concerns regarding the epistemic rationality of emotions is independent of concerns regarding the cognitive or noncognitive nature of emotions. Furthermore, regardless of whether emotions are taken to be essentially cognitive or noncognitive mental states, it is clear that the epistemic rationality of emotions is thought to necessarily depend on assessments of truth and assessments of warrant.

One might suggests that what underwrites these two essential features regarding the epistemic rationality of emotions is the understanding that the purpose or function of rationality is the acquisition of knowledge. Thus the general notion of *epistemic rationality* may be understood in terms of what may be referred to as *reason responsiveness*. Derek Parfit characterizes this notion of reason responsiveness in regard to a general account of epistemic rationality in the following way. I refer to these notions as notions of *epistemic rationality* (ER) and *epistemic irrationality* (EI):

*Epistemic Rationality as Reasons Responsiveness*

ER: We act *rationally* if we act in some way because we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth would give us sufficient reasons to act in this way.

EI: We act *irrationally* if we act in some way despite having beliefs whose truth would give us clear and strongly decisive reasons *not* to act in this way.

This understanding of the general notion of epistemic rationality—what I refer to as the *thesis of reason responsiveness* (RR)—can be regarded as another canonical thesis of the discipline of philosophy. Support for this conclusion can be found in the fact that although both Nussbaum and Prinz both provide theories of emotion that can make
sense of our ordinary talk about the rationality of emotions, we are not strictly speaking assessing the epistemic rationality orrr irrationality of our emotional responses themselves according to Prinz’s account. In other words, according to Prinz’s account, emotions qua emotion orrr qua the type of emotion they are cannot strictly speaking be said to be rational or irrational. This is because for Prinz the epistemic rationality of emotions with respect to assessments of truth and assessments of warrant are derived from the rationality orrr irrationality of the judgments or perceptions that are not essential to what emotions are. This difference between the way in which Nussbaum is able to account for the rationality of emotions, and the way in which Prinz is in one sense able to and in another sense unable to account for the rationality of emotions, speaks in favor of the fact that RR is a canonical thesis of rationality within the discipline of philosophy. This is because the notion of reason responsiveness in regard to rationality, especially against the background assumption that reasons are to be understood in terms of the framework of justified true beliefs and so must be beliefs of some kind, allows Nussbaum to apply such a notion of rationality to make sense of why emotions are strictly speaking rational in themselves. Recall that on Nussbaum’s account, emotions are a type of judgment, and so may also be understood as a type of belief. This very same notion of rationality, however, is what allows Prinz to make sense of the rationality of emotions in the derivative, instrumental sense that he describes while also barring him from being able to provide an account of the rationality of emotions, in strict sense of the phrase “of emotion” (i.e., qua emotion) since emotions on Prinz’s account are not types of belief.

Although the thesis of reason responsiveness may be regarded as a canonical thesis of rationality within the discipline of philosophy, it alone would not exhaust the
numerous canonical theses of rationality that are currently held within the discipline of philosophy. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to address all of the theses of rationality, however, I do address three more canons of rationality that are currently held within the discipline of philosophy. Paul Grice identifies all three as canonical theses of rationality that are held within the discipline of philosophy.\footnote{Grice, \emph{Aspects of Reason} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).} I refer to the set of these as \textit{Grice's Rationality Theses (GRT)}:

\textit{Grice's Rationality Theses}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[L:] That it is part of the business (possibly, even the prime business) of logical theorists to distinguish the various modes of inference (non-demonstrative as well as demonstrative) which enter into reasoning, and to systematize the principles of each such mode, thereby explaining and perhaps (as theorists are want to do) strengthening assent to (or even, in some instances, undermining assent to) the principles of inference which are intuitively found acceptable at a pre-theoretic stage, and so constitute the initial data for the theorist.\footnote{Ibid., 5.}

  \item[D:] Reasoning consists in the entertainment (and often acceptance) in thought or in speech of a set of initial ideas (propositions), together with a sequence of ideas each of which is derivable by an acceptable principle of inference from its predecessors in the set.\footnote{Ibid.}

  \item[R:] The principles of inference are which govern reasoning are non-empirical in character.\footnote{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}

The thesis of reason responsiveness can be understood as being derived from this more basic set of canonical theses. Due to time constraints, I will regard explaining how the thesis of reason responsiveness can be derived from GRT to be beyond the scope of this dissertation, however, I will note that the bulk of the explanation depends on D and
R. What is important to our discussion here is thesis R. If we consider RR and to try to understand how R may have played a role in the derivation of RR, we can see that R, relative to RR, functions so as to restrict what would count as sufficient reasons to act and decisive reasons not to act. According to R, the principles of inference, which determine what kind of beliefs would count as acceptable or legitimate reasons for some conclusion, are non-empirical in character. Thus according to R, no principle of inference may be empirically grounded and only principles that are grounded by *a priori* reasoning may serve as principles of inference. So *contingent principles of inference* would be regarded as impossible, self-contradictory, or would lead one to reason irrationally whereas *a priori* principles of inference would be taken as possible and necessary for grounding the rationality of any legitimate inference. One interesting observation that one might make at this point is that Hume’s distinction between contingent propositions, what he referred to as “matters of fact,” and *a priori* propositions, what Hume referred to as “relations of ideas,” can be respectively mapped on to this distinction between contingent principles of inference, which there are none, and *a priori* principles of inference.\(^{190}\) R also lies at the heart of Hume’s argument against induction, giving rise to what is often referred to as the *problem of induction*, as well as a characterization of what one might call *causal reasoning* as simply a habit or custom of the mind.\(^ {191}\)

Given R, we can suggest a third way of understanding how emotions may be said to be rational and irrational besides taking them as being assessable in terms of truth or warrant in some sense or another. We can attempt to understand the rationality of

\(^{190}\)Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.*

\(^{191}\)Ibid.
emotions by postulating a set of inference rules for emotions, and then understanding our emotional responses as inferences that are derived from such inference rules. This is exactly what Prinz proposes as an alternative way of understanding the rationality of emotions. According to Prinz, when we assess the rationality of emotions in such a way, we are evaluating our emotional responses in terms of “inference warrant.” An emotion has inference warrant if its calibration file (inference rule) contains representations that are appropriate for or consistent with the emotion type that the calibration file represents. This kind of rational assessment of our emotions is intended to handle cases in which one experiences an irrational emotion of a certain type despite the fact that one has adequately assessed the facts that were involved (succeeded in assessments of truth) or that one has appropriately connected these facts to the emotion activated (succeeded in assessments of warrant). Failures in inference warrant thus amount to failures in adequately conceiving a certain type of emotion. In order to further clarify what is meant by the notion of inference warrant, consider again Prinz’s example of Jones’s pride. If it were the case that Jones had a representation within her calibration file for pride, which entailed that one can be proud of one’s genetically determined beauty, then the pride she experiences every time she looks in a mirror is rational as long as she is in fact beautiful. In such cases, the fact that she is beautiful fulfills the veridicality conditions for assessments of truth and the strength conditions for assessments of warrant. One may, however, still attribute to Jones some property of irrationality. In such cases, Prinz explains Jones’s irrationality by appealing to the notion of inference warrant. Jones failed to ensure that her calibration file (inference rule) for pride appropriately reflected what one might regard as the standard concept of pride—pride is about valuing one’s achievements. By allowing
the representation of Jones’s genetically determined beauty to be stored within her calibration file for pride, Jones’s may have failed to ensure that she arrived at an adequate concept of pride. Given Nussbaum’s and Prinz’s ways of assessing the rationality emotions, we can conclude that emotions can be said to be rational orrr irrational in four distinct ways. I refer to these four ways of assessing the rationality of emotions as the *Standard Criteria of the Rationality of Emotions* (SCOR\textsuperscript{E}):

*Standard Criteria of the Rationality of Emotions*

Truth\textsuperscript{P}: Emotions can be rational and irrational with respect to assessments of truth regarding their relevant propositional contents.

Truth\textsuperscript{V}: Emotions can be rational and irrational with respect to assessments of truth regarding their relevant eudaimonistic contents.

Warrant\textsuperscript{P}: Emotions can be rational and irrational with respect to assessments of premise warrant.

Warrant\textsuperscript{I}: Emotions can be rational and irrational with respect to assessments of inference warrant.

As with Prinz’s account of the assessments of premise warrant, however, the rationality and irrationality of emotions in term of inference warrant are not strictly speaking about ways in which emotions are rational orrr irrational qua emotion. Negative assessments of inference warrant, on Prinz’s account, are more so about failures of epistemic virtues rather than failures in epistemic rationality.\textsuperscript{192} This is because the rationality and irrationality of emotions in terms of inference warrant are derived from considerations of whether an individual has appropriately satisfied epistemic norms that govern the acquisition of linguistically shared emotion concepts. Furthermore, inference

\textsuperscript{192} In regard to epistemic virtues see Ernest Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology, Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
warrant involves normative assessments of language acquisition. Thus, given that Prinz regards emotions to be a natural kind, and so it is possible for us to experience emotions without the acquisition of any concepts, there seems to be some inconsistencies in Prinz’s theory of emotion that needs to be worked out or Prinz’s account does not account for the rationality of emotions qua emotion. Nevertheless, given these four distinct ways in which one can make sense of the rationality of emotions, which all reflect at least one theses under GRT. This conclusion brings sub-argument 3 to a close, and I now turn to the task of illustrating how GRT, along with the failure to consider what emotions are in their own right from within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology, leads to challenges for at least some theories of rationality.

§3.6 Shame, Epistemic Rationality, and Hermeneutic Injustice

Within both the disciplines of philosophy and psychology, shame has been typically characterized as an emotion of global negative self-assessment, in which the subject necessarily accepts or assents some negative self-evaluation of the whole self, as

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193 Such inconsistencies may have been resolved in Prinz’s subsequent books. See Jesse J. Prinz, *Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Biases* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002); Idem., *The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Idem., *Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape the Human Mind* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013). I must admit, however, that I would not know at this point in time since I have yet to have an opportunity to look into these texts.
a being of some kind, an agent, or a member of some group or community. More specifically, it is typically thought that during an experience of shame the subject holds not only a negative self-assessment, but also intensely focuses on oneself as an object of the negative evaluation. It is thought that subject not only sees oneself as having failed in some way, but also that the subject comes to see or focus on one’s whole self as being deficient in some way. I refer to this kind of account as the standard account of shame.

Within the discipline of psychology, the standard account can be traced back to Helen Block Lewis’s formative work *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis.* It is here that H.B. Lewis suggests that the proximal stimulus, as well as cognitive content, of shame is a “deficiency with the self.” H.B. Lewis also goes on to differentiate shame from guilt by noting that, “the proximal stimulus of guilt is some action (omission) by the self, which by implication is able.” More recently, June Price Tangney, Ronald Dearing,  

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196 Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis.*

197 Ibid., 84-86.
and Michael Lewis have elaborated on H.B. Lewis’s account of shame by suggesting that shame is a self-conscious, self-evaluative emotion. As a self-conscious emotion, it is thought to be an emotion in which one is intensely focused on aspects of the self. As an emotion of self-evaluation, the intense focus on the self is understood to involve a negative self-evaluation regarding the whole self as defective in some way. Tangney and Dearing note that, “shame involves fairly global negative evaluations of the self (i.e. “Who I am”)” whereas “guilt involves a more articulated condemnation of a specific behavior (i.e. “What I did”).”\textsuperscript{198} Michael Lewis states that, “shame represents a global attack on the self.”\textsuperscript{199}

Within the discipline of philosophy, perhaps also influenced by H.B. Lewis’s and Helen Merrell Lynd’s accounts of shame,\textsuperscript{200} a standard account is espoused by Gabriele Taylor, Bernard Williams, and Martha C. Nussbaum.\textsuperscript{201} According to Lynd, experiences of shame are experiences of exposure. As Lynd states, “The exposure may be to others but, whether others are or are not involved, it is always…exposure to one’s own eyes.”\textsuperscript{202} Taylor identifies the intentional content of shame as a “self-directed adverse judgment.”\textsuperscript{203} Williams notes that, “The root of shame lies in exposure in a more general

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{199} Tangney and Dearing, \textit{Shame and Guilt}, 18.

\textsuperscript{200} Lewis, \textit{Shame}, 75.

\textsuperscript{201} Lynd, \textit{On Shame and the Search for Identity}.

\textsuperscript{202} Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment; Williams, Shame and Necessity; Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law.

\textsuperscript{203} Lynd, On Shame and the Search for Identity, 28.
sense, in being at a disadvantage: in what I shall call, in a very general phrase, a lose of power.” Although Williams, unlike many standard accounts of shame, places a special emphasis on the role of an “other,” his account still requires the subject to internalize a global negative self-assessment. As he observes, in some cases “…the idealised [sic] other will do. But that other still performs a function, of recalling to the subject a person in the eyes of whom the subject has failed, has lost power, is at a disadvantage.”

Nussbaum claims that, “shame involves the realization that one is weak and inadequate in some way in which one expects oneself to be adequate.”

Although several factors contributed to the dominance of the standard account of shame in both psychology and philosophy, one notable cause is the methodological reliance on prototypical cases of shame experiences—cases of shame that reflect the standard account. I refer to these cases of shame as prototypical cases of shame only in the sense that they are cases that are most often recognized by academics as legitimate cases of shame. In this sense, prototypical cases of any emotion be said to be in constant flux, evolving with the needs of the community for which ‘prototypical cases’ serve as prototypes or exemplary cases of some type of emotion.

In philosophy, Williams cites numerous instances of such cases of shame from Homeric literature. Taylor cites Max Scheler’s well-known case of the artist’s model who

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204 Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, 64.

205 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 220-21.


207 As far as I am aware, it is an open question as to whether the standard account is also most readily recognized by ordinary folk intuitions as legitimate cases of shame.
experiences shame when she becomes aware of the fact that the artists no longer regards her as just a model, and other cases from fictional literature. In psychology, the reliance on prototypical cases of shame may be illustrated by the methods of clinical research. The standard account informs the way the actions or behaviors of subjects are scored, coded, or interpreted. H.B. Lewis employed a method for assessing her patients’ verbal responses that relied on the standard distinctions made between guilt and shame. As she notes:

Guilt anxiety is scored wherever a phrase (clause) contained a reference to “adverse criticism, abuse, condemnation, moral disapproval, guilt or threat of such experience.” Shame anxiety is scored whenever a phrase or clause contains reference to “ridicule, inadequacy, shame, embarrassment, humiliation, overexposure of deficiencies or private details or private details, or threat of such experience.” It is apparent that these criteria for the existence of shame and guilt anxiety in verbal productions follow both common understanding of these states and clinical concepts about them.  

Such empirical methods for identifying shame in turn help provide a significant amount of empirical support for the standard account, however, alternatives to the standard account have been proposed by academics within both the disciplines of philosophy and psychology.

In philosophy, John Deigh argues for an account of shame in which the subject of the experience need not hold a negative self-assessment or global negative evaluation of the self. According to Deigh’s account, the experience of shame is “a reaction to…the threat of demeaning treatment one would invite in giving the appearance of someone of lesser worth.”  

Cheshire Calhoun argues that, “what inspires (moral) shame is the

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208 Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, 170-71.

recognition of who we are for those with whom we share a moral practice” rather than a negative self-evaluation that is either internally accepted or externally imposed.  

David Velleman argues for an account of shame in which the experience of shame is defined by a “sense of vulnerability of being displayed as less than the master of his self-definition and therefore less than a qualified agent.” Unlike standard accounts of shame, these views emerge by introspecting on non-prototypical cases of shame. Deigh for example discusses the case of Crito’s shame, which is felt in response to the thought of the possible condemnations he may be subjected to by his fellow Athenians in regard to Socrates’s death. Calhoun discusses Adrian Piper’s experience of shame as a student criticized for identifying herself as black when she could pass as white. Velleman discusses these kinds of cases of shame as cases of “inchoate shame,” which he defines as cases of shame where the subject experiences shame, typically as a response to deliberate acts of shaming, but does not hold the global negative self-assessment that the standard account attributes to all subjects of shame.


In psychology, psychologist Paul Gilbert argues for a bifurcated account of shame.\(^{215}\) By distinguishing internal shame from external shame, his account seeks to straddle the two divides between the standard account and alternative accounts that seek to place the central focus of shame on the importance of others’ perspectives. Internal shame reflects the important features of shame that is captured by the standard account. According to Gilbert, it is “linked to complex memory systems…and self-evaluations where attention turns inward to the self and self-feelings and judgments (Tracy & Robins, 2004).”\(^{216}\) External shame in contrast captures the important features of shame that is suggested by alternative accounts of shame presented in philosophy. As Gilbert suggests, “when the focus of shame is on what others are thinking about the self, this can be called external shame. Here the attention and monitoring systems are externally directed, focused primarily on what is going on in the minds of others.”\(^{217}\) Furthermore, such experiences of external shame need not involve a negative self-evaluation. As Gilbert explains:

External shame requires an ability to anticipate how others might judge a behavior or personal attribute. When behavior is controlled purely by external shame, people who think they can avoid discovery may engage in socially shamed behavior, such as visiting a prostitute. If caught, the person might appear and even feel ashamed by the scrutiny of others (being caught); but it cannot be said that


\(^{217}\) Ibid., 294.
the shame is internal shame because the person may have the view that prostitution should be legalized and that he has done nothing bad or wrong.\textsuperscript{218}

Here then we have at least two different accounts of what the intentional content of shame may be. Given this, how we understand the rationality of a subject’s experience of shame may depend on what it is that we identify as the appropriate or correct intentional content of shame since what is identified as the appropriate or correct intentional content of shame establishes the societal norm on which assessments of warrant, including Prinz’s assessment of inference warrant, would be based. If the intentional content of shame were understood to be a global negative self-assessment and only a global negative self-assessment, then cases of shame in which one does not experience a global negative self-assessment would be assessed as irrational cases of shame.

Consider for example the case of Adrian Piper’s shame as recounted by Calhoun. As Calhoun tells it:

Refusing to pass as white, although she could, Piper identifies herself on graduate school applications as black. When she shows up at the reception for new graduate students she is approached by a professor, one of her intellectual heroes, who remarks “with a triumphant smirk, ‘Miss Piper, you’re about as black as I am’.”\textsuperscript{223}

This is one of a series of occasions on which Piper feels what she calls “groundless shame” in response to those who accuse her of passing for black or passing for white. Her shame is groundless because she does not share her shamers’ particular moral criticism of her that she is manipulative or deceitful.\textsuperscript{219}

In the above case of Adrian Piper’s shame, we have a case in which the subject experienced shame, but did not accept a global negative self-assessment. Given this, if we

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{219} Calhoun, “An Apology for Moral Shame,” 137.
were to take the standard account of shame as accurately cashing out the intentional content of shame, then we would conclude that Adrian Piper’s experience of shame would be an epistemically irrational case of shame since her emotional response would fail to adequately fulfill the strength condition for assessments of warrant. In Piper’s case, one would suggest that the belief, judgments, seeing-as, or the representation that elicited her experience of shame was something like, “A professor whom I admire believes that I am manipulative or deceitful.” Given this, her judgment, belief, seeing-as, or the representation that elicited her experience of shame would fulfill the veridicality condition for assessments of truth. It was in fact the case that a professor whom she admired thought she was being manipulative or deceitful. Thus her experience of shame would not be criticizable in terms of being “false” or “irrational” with respect to assessments of truth. Her experience of shame, however, would be criticizable in terms of assessments of warrant, given that the intentional content of shame is identified as something like the subject of shame holds a global negative self-assessment. The belief that a professor whom one admired believed that one was being manipulative or deceitful does not by itself serve as a sufficient reason for holding a global negative self-assessment. This condition alone does not necessarily entail that one would also hold a global negative self-assessment. Thus if we grant that the intentional content of shame is taken to be what the standard account suggests, Piper’s assessment that a professor whom she admired believed her to be manipulative or deceitful would not warrant such an experience of shame. In light of this conclusion, one would have to conclude that such cases of shame are irrational cases of shame. To many, this may seem like a
perfectly acceptable conclusion, yet to many others such conclusions may be taken as reflecting and reinforcing specific structural inequalities that are in place within a given society that serve to undermine, marginalize, and stigmatize certain specified members of that society.  

Miranda Fricker discusses such phenomena as cases of "hermeneutic injustice." Due to considerations of time and length, providing a detailed account of hermeneutic disablement and its role in reinforcing conditions of epistemic injustice is beyond the scope of this current project. So, I leave a promissory note to provide a discussion of the relation between the epistemic rationality of emotions qua emotion and Fricker’s notions of epistemic and hermeneutic injustices, and its grave importance to the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and society as a whole.

As Calhoun observes, there are three other possible outcomes rather than an experiences of shame:


One can respond instead with giving reasons for why the shamer’s assessment is wrong, thereby appealing to the shamer’s capacity as a rational agent to recognize that they were mistaken. Another possible response is to dismiss the shamer, along with the shamer’s negative assessment. This second option essentially diminishes the shamer’s status as a legitimate participant of a shared moral practice. The final possibility is to simply accept that one possesses an identity that the shamer, and other possible participants in a moral practice, would find shameful, while neither experiencing shame nor rejecting the legitimacy of the shamer’s status as a participant in a shared moral practice.223

Thus on the one hand, the experience of shame when one does not hold a global negative self-assessment would be an epistemically irrational case of shame if the standard account of shame was taken to be the correct account of shame’s intentional content. If shame were about the attribution of a global negative self-assessment, then the fact that one does not hold such a negative self-assessment would make the experience of shame unwarranted. Furthermore, cases of shame in which the subject attests to not holding a global negative assessment despite the subject’s experience of shame might be regard as irrational not by questioning the strength of one’s warrant for one’s experience of shame, but by questioning its veridicality. Rather than seeing one as having no reason to be ashamed, and so irrational by being unwarranted, one may be viewed as appropriately warranted while at the same time lacking either self-knowledge orr emotional honesty (integrity).224 In either case, one may be regarded as being irrational in terms of the content of their emotion being non-veridical, although the case of inauthenticity would not be accurately described as a non-veridical emotional experience. Thus some may suggest that even though Piper reported not holding a global negative self-assessment, she in fact did hold such a negative assessment, and so is either delusional or simply


224 In regard to integrity see Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt.
lying about the fact that she did not. In such a case, Piper would have been attributed with an irrational emotion of shame. Her experience of shame would have been regarded as irrational not because she was unwarranted in feeling shame, but because she was warranted and yet failed to recognize that she was so warranted. Thus her shame would have been irrational in that it would have failed to appropriately indicate to her that she had good reasons to be ashamed. In other words, Piper may have attributed a global negative assessment to herself, and so experienced shame, while also failing to recognize that she made this self-attribution because her shame failed to reflect the fact that she held a global negative self-assessment. Here shame in this case would have been non-veridical, and therefore lack any truth-value. On the other hand, if the intentional content of shame was taken to be, as Calhoun suggests, something like the judgment, belief, seeing-as, or representation that through the eyes of a legitimate participant in a shared moral practice one holds a shameful identity, then Adrian Piper’s experience of shame would not be regarded as an irrational case of shame. It would fulfill the veridicality conditions for assessments of truth because Piper’s judgment, belief, seeing-as, or representation that a professor whom she admired thought she was being manipulative or deceitful is true. It would fulfill the strength conditions for assessments of warrant because this judgment, belief, seeing-as, or representation would be adequately connected to the intentional content of shame—that a participant in a shared moral practice sees one as being shameful.

We can thus see how the epistemic rationality (and irrationality) of a token emotional experience depends not only on the emotion’s veridicality and warrant, but a
Iso the emotion’s intentional content. In understanding how the intentional content of an emotion can affect the rationality or irrationality of a token experience of emotion, we can see how an emotion of a certain type—as a superordinate inference rule—can modulate the rationality or irrationality of our emotions. In accordance with a reliabilist account of justification, emotions as inference rules are, somewhat heuristically speaking, the mechanisms or reliable processes that operate on the intentional content of emotions. So from an external, reliabilist account of what makes a warranted, veridical emotion justified, the answer is emotions as superordinate inference rules. Note that from this reliabilist perspective, the intentional contents of emotions constitute the information that emotions, as superordinate inference rules, operate on. The intentional content provides the content, whereas the emotions, as superordinate inference rules provide the forms. Emotions as superordinate inference rules can thus be understood as that which structures and weights the contents of our experience. 

This conclusion that the epistemic rationality of emotions qua emotions depends on the emotion’s veridicality, warrant, intentional content, and the fact that emotions are at times rational and at times irrational in themselves ought to be distinguished from the conclusion that our assessments of the rationality (and irrationality) of our own emotions or another’s emotions, respectively from the first or third person perspective, depends on assessments of truth, assessments of warrant, and what comes to be identified as the

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225 Such an understanding of what emotions are—as superordinate inference rules—are akin to an understanding of emotions are superordinate programs. See John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, “The Evolutionary Psychology of the Emotions and Their Relationship,” in Handbook of Emotions.
intentional content for a specified emotion type. I refer to this as the principle of the epistemic rationality of emotions (ER°):

Principle of the Epistemic Rationality of Emotions

ER°: The epistemic rationality of an emotion qua emotion depends on the emotion’s veridicality, warrant, and intentional content of that emotion; the fact that emotions are at times rational and at times irrational in themselves ought to be distinguished from the conclusion that our assessments of the rationality and irrationality of our own emotions (from the first person perspective) or another’s emotions (from a third person perspective) depends on assessments of truth, assessments of warrant, and what is identified as the intentional content of the emotion type in question.

Both these conclusions suggest that there is a fact about the rationality of our emotions, what the intentional contents of emotions are, as well as their truth and warrant. The first conclusion, however, expresses these facts, and the second expresses how we practically contend with these facts. Another way of putting the difference might be to suggest that the first takes the rationality (and irrationality) of emotions, the intentional content, the warrant, and the truth of our emotional experiences as objective features of the world. The second conclusion is silent about the objectivity of these aspects of our emotional experiences, and instead expresses how our normative practices attempt to track these facts. Perhaps an even more precise way of putting the difference would be to say that the first conclusion expresses a necessary truth if it were true, and the second conclusion expresses a contingent truth even if it were true.

§3.7 The Rationality of Emotions Qua Emotion as Modes of Sense-making

In section 3.6 I discussed several ways in which one might understand the rationality and irrationality of emotions. We can understand emotions to be rational and irrational in terms of assessments of truth with respect to the propositional contents of
emotion, assessments of truth with respect to the eudaimonistic contents of emotion, assessments of warrant, and assessments of inference warrant. Given the foregoing discussion on shame, however, we can posit another way of understanding the rationality of emotions that has not been postulate by any theory of emotion that I am currently aware of. It is distinct from understanding the rationality or irrationality of emotions in terms of the biographical subjectivity and the biographical objectivity of emotions. It allows us to understand how emotions are rational and irrational, strictly speaking. It allows us to explain how emotions satisfy COR. This fifth way of understanding the rationality of emotions, i.e., how emotions can be at times rational and at times irrational qua emotion or an emotion type is to understand emotions as superordinate inference rules. I refer to this statement as the thesis of rational universalism for emotions (TRU):

The Thesis of Rational Universalism for Emotions

TRU: Emotions can be at times rational and at times irrational qua emotion or an emotion type is to understand emotions as superordinate inference rules.

I also refer to the fundamental epistemic principle of emotions as ‘K,’ which stands for ‘knowledge’ given the context of emotions.

The propose that ways in which emotions are said to be rational or irrational in terms of assessments of truth with respect to the propositional contents of emotion, assessments of truth with respect to the eudaimonistic contents of emotion, assessments of warrant, and assessments of inference warrant are derived from this fifth way in which emotions are strictly speaking, rational and irrational. It can even be said that this way of understanding the rationality and irrationality of emotions is to understand emotions to be arbiters of rationality rather than subjects of rational assessment. The relevant distinction
that needs to be made here is a distinction between emotion types and token experiences of types of emotion. Token experiences of a type of emotion are rational or irrational in themselves—qua the type of emotion that they are—in virtue of the reliable operation of the type-level emotion as a superordinate inference rules. Thus emotions, as superordinate inference rules, are origins of rationality.

In this respect, the rationality and irrationality of token experiences of emotion, such experiences can only be appropriately assessed in terms of the normative conditions that emotions themselves provide. In this sense emotions run outside considerations of logical systems that dictates how assessments of warrant are evaluated, along with what is regarded to be rational thought and rational judgment, that are derived from GRT and reflected in RR. Emotions are instead on par with that which functions to produce rational thought and judgment in accordance with logical rules of inference that are derived from GRT. One might suggest that that which functions to produce rational thoughts and judgments are one and the same with that which functions to produce emotions.\footnote{Prinz, \textit{Gut Reactions}, 238. Similar accounts have provided by William A. Cunningham and Tabitha, Ronald De Sousa, and Bennett Helm.} Although I do not deny this possibility, I cannot say as of now whether or not I would agree. Regardless of whether or not the mechanism(s) of emotion is one and the same with the mechanisms of rational thought, belief, or judgments, emotions remain arbiters of their own rationality. Furthermore, if we consider the fact that whether or not beliefs are regarded to be epistemically rational or epistemically irrational depends not only on whether or not the relevant beliefs are true or justified, but also on what makes a belief true or justified, then understanding emotions to be superordinate inference rules,
should reasonably qualify such understandings as considerations about the epistemic rationality of emotions qua emotion.

Moreover, just as we can call into question what counts as “knowledge” by calling into question the kind of justification we are willing to accept as a legitimate form of justification, we can question whether emotions as superordinate inference rules can justify the epistemic status of emotions if these superordinate inference rules were conceived in terms of underwriting an internalistic, evidentialist form of justification or an externalistic, reliabilist form of justification. Thus concerns regarding the epistemic status of justified true beliefs given an externalistic reliabilist account of justification compared to an internalistic evidentialist account of justification can be expanded to cover questions about the epistemic status of token, warranted, veridical emotions given an externalistic reliabilist account of warrant compared to an internalistic evidentialist account of warrant. If one were to understand the epistemic status of token, warranted, or veridical emotions in terms of an evidentialist’s account of warrant (or justification), I propose that understanding emotions as superordinate inference rules allows the features or properties that allow one to recognize one’s evidence as warranting (or justificatory) evidence, which warrant their emotional response, as evidence or reasons that warrant one’s emotional response. In this sense, superordinate inference rules can be

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understood as capacities that allow us to be capable of making such recognitions. It should also be noted that such an account of emotions as superordinate inference rules does not require one to posit that one must be aware of or is able to report the superordinate inference rules that allow one to recognize what counts as evidence or reasons for their emotional experiences. Thus the notion of emotions as superordinate inference rules suggests that an evidentialist justification of warranted emotions ultimately depends on a reliabilist meta-justification. If an evidentialist explains that one is warranted in having a veridical emotion of shame only if one is aware of or is able to give reasons for having a global negative self-assessment, given that the intentional content of shame is that one have such a negative self-assessment, then the emotion of shame as a superordinate inference rule is what allows one to recognize such reasons as reasons for having an experience of shame. Given all of the foregoing, we can conclude that understanding emotions as superordinate inference rules allows us to understand emotions as a way of making sense of our phenomenal experiences, others, our selves, and the world we experience. I refer to this principle as the fundamental epistemic principle of emotion (K):

\[ \text{K}: \text{Emotions are superordinate inference rules and as such can be understood as ways of sense-making.} \]

Emotions are ways of sense-making, and as such are necessary for understanding and knowing ourselves, others, and the world we inhabit. Note that the same or similar arguments can be made, mutatis mutandis, for the same or similar concerns about knowledge.
§3.8 Deriving the Thesis of Rational Universalism

In coming to understand how the epistemic rationality of our emotional responses depend not only on the veridicality of emotions, whether or not emotions are warranted, the intentional contents of emotions, and emotions as superordinate inference rules, we can also see how emotions can be said to be rational and irrational qua emotion. As argued in section 3.1, to say that emotions qua emotion, or that emotion types qua emotion types, are rational or irrational is to say that there is some normative standard that is given by what emotions are as a genus or a species, by which our emotional responses can be assessed or evaluated. Given this, the identification of such standards would allow us to conclude that emotions are rational or irrational not only in terms of notions like instrumental rationality, biographical rationality, and epistemic rationality, which are often framed in terms of the language of justified true beliefs, they also allow us to conclude that emotions are rational or irrational in themselves, qua emotion or qua the type of emotion that they are. The fact that emotions fulfill this condition—that of allowing us to conclude that emotions qua emotions are rational or irrational in themselves fulfills COR$. COR$ was introduced in section 3.1, and according to COR$, for every type of emotion there exists some normative standard, given by what emotions are or what the emotion type is, by which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated in light of the fact they manifest our rationality. It is the fulfillment of this criterion regarding the ontological rationality of emotions which allows us to conclude that emotions are rational or irrational qua emotion or the type of emotion they are. I also argued that the intentional content alone is not enough to make full sense of the
rationality of emotions. I did so by bringing into view a significant aspect of the rationality of emotions that often goes ignored: *Rationality requires a mechanism, process, or capacity with which the intentional content of a certain type of emotion, such as shame, can be recognized as cases of shame.* This requirement, for all intents and purposes of this dissertation, is reflected in COR².

Although certain aspects of such mechanisms, processes, or capacities must be innately given, academics within both the disciplines of philosophy and psychology typically agree that emotions must be open to modifications by experience, especially given cross-cultural empirical findings on emotion.²²⁹ This conclusion not only makes sense of a vast amount of empirical evidence that supports the notion that various aspects of the world are socially constructed at the least to a certain extent, it is also consistent with current empirical research from cognitive neuroscience and neuroscience in regard

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to the plasticity of various structures and functions of the brain.\textsuperscript{230} I referred to such mechanisms, processes, orr capacities as emotions in the sense that they are understood in terms of superordinate inference rules. Given emotions as superordinate inference rules, we can derive the intentional contents of various types of emotion, and so what would count as justification for an emotion of a certain type.

We are also endowed with the capacity to experience emotions as various types in virtue of being endowed with emotions as superordinate inference rules. Thus emotions are rational orr irrational in light of the type of emotion they are, and what makes an emotion the type of emotion it is is the superordinate inference rule, which allows us to fallibly recognize various emotion types. Thus emotions, as superordinate inference rules, can be regarded as that which sets the normative standard for assessing the rationality of an emotion of a certain type, which is given by the nature of the type of emotion in question. It is the fact that emotions are superordinate inference rules that allows us to identify their intentional contents and set the normative conditions on which token experiences of emotion are to be assessed as being either rational orr irrational.

Finally, the foregoing conclusion suggests that there is a tight connection between the intentionality of emotions and the rationality of emotions. \textsuperscript{FIT\textsuperscript{e}} and the conditions that


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satisfy SCOR\textsuperscript{e} are so intimately intertwined that one cannot be instantiated without the other. From this point on, I refer to the conditions that satisfy SCOR\textsuperscript{e} also as “SCOR\textsuperscript{e}.” Thus if we accept FIT\textsuperscript{e}, then we ought to also accept the plausibility of emotions as superordinate inference rules, which ultimately satisfy COR\textsuperscript{e}. I also noted in section 3.4 that GRT and RR are canonical theses that are currently accepted within the discipline of philosophy, especially within the area of epistemology. Given this, it follows that interdisciplinary research on emotions from within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology present a considerable challenge to GRT and RR.

In chapter 2, I derived FIT from FIT\textsuperscript{e}, which involved the appeal to interdisciplinary research on emotions from within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. The conditions that fulfill SCOR\textsuperscript{e}, however, are so intimately intertwined with the FIT\textsuperscript{e}, such that accepting one would eventually lead one to accept the other once one moves beyond the discourse in philosophy of mind on the topic of consciousness and into the discourse in epistemology on the topic of rationality. As I have previously argued, what satisfies SCOR\textsuperscript{e} is the understanding of emotions as superordinate inference rules. Thus if one accepts FIT, then one must also accept FIT\textsuperscript{e} since FIT was derived from FIT\textsuperscript{e}. This conclusion also entails that if one accepts FIT, then one must also accept SCOR\textsuperscript{e}, given my argument that FIT\textsuperscript{e} and the SCOR\textsuperscript{e} are so intimately intertwined that by accepting either FIT\textsuperscript{e} or SCOR\textsuperscript{e} will force one to accept the other, especially when one moves between the discourses of philosophy of mind and epistemology. SCOR\textsuperscript{e}, however, is inconsistent with at least R of GRT, which is the thesis that the principles of inference that govern reasoning are non-empirical in character. As noted earlier, although
some aspect of SCOR will be innate, there is ample agreement among academics across the disciplines of philosophy and psychology that emotions are at the least subject to the influences of experience. I thus propose a less restrictive thesis governing the forms of legitimate principles of inference. I offer the following thesis as a candidate for replacing R as one of the fundamental principles of rationality, and I refer to this thesis as the Thesis of Rational Universalism (TRU):

**Thesis of Rational Universalism**

TRU: The principles of inference that govern reasoning may be empirical in character as long the empirical aspects of such inference rules make sense of associated intentional contents and are well ground in rigorous empirical evidence that support such inference rules as postulates of reasoning.

Furthermore, if TRU, as well as FIT, are accepted as a canonical thesis within the discipline of philosophy, it should be noted that all other related thesis ought to be updated in order to maintain consistency within the various canons of philosophy.

One upshot of accepting TRU is that it would allow us to understand various modes of inductive reasoning as legitimate rational principles of inference, including causal reasoning. The benefits of this consequence would be wide in scope, such as insuring the treatment of many marginalized individuals, including infants and non-human animals, as rational beings. It can lead to the acceptance of a fallible notion of knowledge, which would also work to insure many marginalized individuals, including infants and non-human animals, as epistemic agents. A third benefit that I will mention here is that TRU, along with L, would legitimize the study of inductive reasoning, such as causal reasoning, as a focus within the area of logic. One mutually beneficial consequence for the disciplines of philosophy and psychology is that the resources that
are unique to each discipline may be brought to bear practical solutions for problems within the area of psychometrics, which would benefit empirical and theoretical researchers in both fields. One should note, however, that this upshot would entail a revision of L to the extent that psychologist would be regarded to be on par with logicians who intend to concentrate on the problems of psychometrics. Furthermore, we can understand cooperative efforts between psychologists and logicians to solve various problems within the area of psychometrics in terms of psychologists providing the content on which logicians would work to derive the various fundamental forms of inductive reasoning.

§3.9 Conclusion

In chapter 3, I relied on philosophical and psychological theories of emotion in order to illustrate that there is a need for interdisciplinary research and theorizing within area of epistemology, especially with respect to the field of emotions. The result was a revision of at least one of the three theses I identified as Grice’s rationality theses (GRT). To do so, I relied on the philosophy and psychology of emotion to argue that there is a need in the area of epistemology for interdisciplinary research and theorizing within the discipline of philosophy and psychology. I presented three sub-arguments in support of the main argument that was presented in this dissertation. I referred to these sub-arguments as sub-argument 3, sub-argument 4, and sub-argument 5. Sub-argument 3 was constituted by sections 3.1-3.4, and discussed what it means for emotions to be rational. Sub-argument 4, was presented throughout sections 3.5-3.7, in which I argued that emotions are superordinate inference rules and as such can be understood as ways of
sense-making. I referred to this principle as the *fundamental epistemic principle of emotions* (K<sup>5</sup>). This principle was derived by first deriving the *thesis of rational universalism of emotion* (TRU<sup>5</sup>). Finally, I presented sub-argument 5 in section 3.8, thereby closing phase 1 of my main argument. In section 3.8, I first took the stance of conceptual analysis and argued that the acceptance of FIT entails the acceptance of TRU. I then took the pragmatic stance, and I argued in favor of the adoption of TRU as an alternative canonical thesis to R in GRT within the discipline of philosophy and psychology. I also suggested that all other relevant theses of rationality be revised so as to maintain logical consistency among the various theses of rationality that are held within the discipline of philosophy.

Finally, as with chapter 2, these conclusions are primarily directed at the discipline of philosophy rather than both the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. For those psychologists, however, who are concerned with the significance of this chapter to the discipline of psychology, I ask them to consider a question similar to the one I had asked in the conclusion of chapter 2: When one asks whether or not a partner, a sibling, a parent, a friend, a coworker, or another member of one’s community is rational or irrational, how are we to answer this question? Although epistemologists are typically concerned with questions about knowledge, they are also concerned with questions about rationality or irrationality. For questions regarding knowledge necessarily leads philosophers to questions about rationality or irrationality. In other words, epistemologists and psychologists share the same object of inquiry—rational beings who are subjects of rational assessments. Thus, as I have argued in this chapter, it is important
for philosophers, especially epistemologists, to take into account both philosophical and psychological theories of emotion.
CHAPTER 4
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND EMOTIONS

In chapters 2 and 3 I argued for a need to bridge the disciplinary divide at least
between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology, especially within the areas of
philosophy of mind and epistemology. In this chapter, I present phase 2 of my main
argument by arguing that there is also a similar need in the areas of philosophy of
science, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. To argue for this conclusion, however,
I illustrate how the interests, concerns, and methods within the areas of metaphysics, the
philosophy of language, and philosophy of science can yield solutions for resolving
practical and theoretical issues within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I
illustrate this by demonstrating how the interests, concerns, and methods within the areas
of metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science can offer solutions to
three problems that arise for any pursuit of knowledge. Phase 2 consists of two sub-
phases, which I refer to as sub-argument 6 and sub-argument 7. Sub-argument 6 is
presented throughout sections 4.1-4.3, and I present sub-argument 7 throughout sections
4.4-4.7. In section 4.1, I present a brief analysis of the problem of skepticism. In section
4.2, I present a survey of various philosophical and psychological theories of emotion. In
section 4.3, I identify how the problem of skepticism may arise within the field of
emotion, especially within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. Then in section
4.4, I derive the first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism by relying on
philosophical and psychological theories of emotion, and offer them as a component of
my solution to the problem of skepticism. Then, in section 4.5, I offer of a demonstration
of how these first principles can help undercut the problem of skepticism by deriving my first bit of knowledge about the external world. I refer to this bit of knowledge as the meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion. Then, in section 4.6, I argue that the acceptance of FIT and TRU entails the acceptance of a third canonical thesis for the disciplines for philosophy and psychology. I refer to this third canonical thesis as the *principle of folk intuitions or the fundamental base for interdisciplinary research and theorizing*. I also take the pragmatic stance and argue in support of the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing. In section 4.7, I argue for four pragmatic principles for interdisciplinary research and theorizing, which I refer to as the *four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing*. These four pragmatic principles constitute the final components of my solution to the problem of skepticism. I conclude chapter 4, in section 4.8, by presenting FIT, TRU, the first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism, the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing, and the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing as my proposal for a new foundation for philosophy and psychology: *unification without consilience* (UC).
§4.1 The Problem of Skepticism

The problem of translation, the problem of the criterion, and the problem of underdetermination,\(^ {231} \) in the sense that I use for the purposes of this dissertation, are not unique to interdisciplinary research and theorizing. They are also foundational questions of philosophy, including the philosophy of science.\(^ {232} \) From a philosophical perspective, one can argue that these three challenges begin with a certain kind of question in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, or philosophy of language. This is the general question about what is. It is the question “What is x?” where x stands for any object of study. From a metaphysical perspective, we can understand this kind of question as a question about ontology. It is a question about what exists. Some examples of these questions are as follows: What is mind? What is body? What is knowledge? What is rationality? What is meaning? What is emotion? What is shame? What is good?

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\(^{232}\) Note that the area of philosophy of science in essentially demarcated by narrowing the scope of the interests, concerns, methods, and collective bodies of knowledge to topic of the sciences as the primary object of inquiry. For example, consider Rudolph Carnap’s discussion in “On the Character of Philosophic Problems,” *Philosophy of Science* 1, no. 1 (1934).
From an epistemological perspective, we can understand this kind of question as a question about how we know what is, which not only involves questions about what is “knowledge,” but also about what constitutes legitimate methods for acquiring knowledge. Some examples of these questions are as follows: How do we know what exists? How do we know what is substance? How do we know what is mind? How do we know what is body? How do we know what is knowledge? How do we know what is rationality? How do we know what is meaning? How do we know what is emotion? How do we know what is shame? How do we know what is good?

From the perspective of philosophy of language, we can understand these questions as questions about what one means when they employ some term in some language in order to speak of what is. In other words, when we ask the question “What is X?” where X stands for some particular object of study, from the perspective of a philosopher of language, we are asking the questions “What do we mean by X?” and “How do we know what we mean by X? Some examples of these questions are as follows: What do we mean by “existence” and how do we know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “substance” and how do we know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “mind” and how do we know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “body” and how do we know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “knowledge” and how do we know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “rationality” and how do we know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “good” and how do we know what we mean by it?

Earnest Sosa gives a similar formulation of this question, as well as the question of “What is?” in Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid,” in Epistemology: An Anthology (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2008).

know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “meaning” and how do we know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “emotion” and how do we know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “shame” and how do we know what we mean by it? What do we mean by “good” and how do we know what we mean by it?

The problem of translation, the problem of the criterion, and the problem of underdetermination may go by various names within the discipline of philosophy. John Searle respectively refers to these three challenges as the three problems of “indeterminacy of translation,” “inscrutability of reference,” and “the relativity of ontology.”235 All three types of problems are problems that plague academics regardless of their discipline. They are challenges that any person, group, organization, or discipline will face when pursuing any kind of knowledge about the world we inhabit. All three problems are also interrelated to the extent that a solution to one of these problems may lead the way to resolving at least one other problem, and the failure to solve one may result in the impossibility of solving any of the other two. What this suggests is that these three problems may in fact be the same problem understood from various perspectives. I refer to the set of these three problems as the problem of skepticism.236 Evidence for this

235 Searle, “Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person.”

236 Barry Stroud refers what I call “the problem of skepticism” as “skepticism about the external world.” See Barry Stroud, “The Problem of the External World,” in Epistemology: An Anthology, eds. Jaegwon Kim Ernest Sosa, Jeremy Fantl, and Mathew McGrath (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2008). One might ask whether or not there would be a problem of skepticism if either there were no such thing as an external world or if there were no external world. As suggested by E1, the first epistemic precondition listed above, my answer is “no,” and if one disagrees, being consistent with my own position, I take a skeptical stance and respond by stating that it is the other’s burden to prove that it does without falling into any contradictions or inconsistencies within their own position.
conclusion can be found in the fact that these three problems arise within the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the philosophy of science given the following set of epistemic preconditions:

*Epistemic Preconditions for Generating the Problem of Skepticism*

E1. We must assume that there is an external mind-independent world that we are in some sense able to gain knowledge of.

E2. We must assume that we do not know any facts about the world prior to making any attempts to answer the question, “How can we know facts about the world?”

E3. We must assume that some facts about the world are knowable, but we do not know if all facts about the world are knowable.

E4. We must assume that we are capable of constructing some language.

E5. We must assume that we are capable of observing some facts in the world, but we do not know which of our experiences are observations of facts in the world and which of our experiences are experiences of our own imaginations.

E6. We may assume that there is some ideal language \( L \) with which all the knowable facts may be expressed, but we do not know how many ideal languages exist.

E7. We may assume that all the expressions of all the knowable facts about the world are logically consistent within some ideal language \( L \), but we do not know if there are any unknowable facts about the world that are inconsistent with such an ideal language \( L \) when expressed in *that* ideal language.

E8. We may assume that we are sincerely interested or motivated for one reason or another in answering this question about how we can know facts about the world.

The above set of stipulations may be taken as setting the epistemic pre-conditions for any member of a linguistic community who aims to answer the question, “How do we
Given these stipulations, we can regard the question of how we know various facts about the world in three distinct ways: 1) From the perspective of a philosopher of language, 2) from the perspective of an epistemologist, or 3) from the perspective of a scientist. When we attempt to answer the question “How do we know facts about the world?” from within any of these three perspectives, we end up respectively running into the problem of translation, the problem of the criterion, and the problem of underdetermination. Furthermore, the most relevant epistemic precondition that leads us down the path to the problem of skepticism is the second clause of E5, which states that we do not know which of our experiences are observations of facts in the world and which of our experiences are experiences of our own imaginations.²³⁸ It is especially this precondition, in conjunction with the traditional notion of fundamental intentionality, the problem of illusions, Hume’s problem of illusory causation, principle R of GRT, and the asking of the question “How do we know facts about the world?” which lead some to throw their hands up in the air and forsake the possibility of knowledge. I have independently argued for rejecting the traditional fundamental notion of intentionality, the problem of illusions, Hume’s problem of illusory causation, and principle R throughout chapters 2-3. I also derived and offered FIT and TRU as respective alternatives to the canonical theses of traditional fundamental

²³⁷ This question is, for all intents and purposes of this dissertation, essentially the same as the question “What is?”

²³⁸ Note that this aspect of E5 is essentially, for all intents and purposes of this dissertation, the same as the false statement Descartes accepted as true, which I spoke of in chapter 1 when I began this dissertation. It is also, for all intents and purposes, essentially the same statement as Descartes’s premise that we cannot tell the difference between dreaming and not dreaming, as well as his premise that there could be an evil demon deceiving us about what we take to be known.
notion of intentionality and rationality. Finally, FIT and TRU constitute the first two components of my solution to the problem of skepticism.

Granting my conclusions thus far, I turn now to argue that the problem of skepticism no longer presents itself as a considerable problem. To do so, in section 4.2, I present various theories of emotion from within the discipline of philosophy and psychology. In section 4.3, I identify various potential problems for interdisciplinary research and theorizing about emotions between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology, including the problem of translation, the problem of the criterion, and the problem of underdetermination. In section 4.4, I offer the third component of my solution to the problem of skepticism, and I illustrate how it can lead us to knowledge. This third component is the set of first principles of the meta-framework of meta-semantic structural pluralism. I also illustrate how they can be applied to a particular area of interdisciplinary research and theorizing: area of emotion. The result is our first bit of knowledge: the meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion. The meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion also serves to undercut the problem of translation. Then, given the meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion, which is for all intents and purposes of this dissertation, a mapping of potential ontological states of the world, I derive a second piece of knowledge about the world: the principle of folk intuitions. I also refer to this principle as the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing. This second piece of knowledge also works to undercut the problem of the criterion. I take the pragmatic stance and offer four general principles for testing various ontological possibilities captured under the meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of e
motion. I refer to these four pragmatic principles the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing. These four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing do not aim at undercutting the problem of underdetermination. They instead aim to illustrate that underdetermination is evidence for at least some kind of knowledge of a mind-independent reality. Finally, FIT, TRU, the first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism, along with the meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion, the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing, and the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing constitute my proposal of a new foundation for interdisciplinary research and theorizing, especially between, but not limited to, the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I refer to this proposal as my proposal for unification without consilience (UC), and I conclude this chapter by presenting arguments in favor of its adoption by members of the discipline of philosophy.

§4.2 Theories of Emotion

Philosophical and psychological theorizing about emotions are rooted in a shared historical past, but divergent methodological commitments influenced which aspects of emotional experiences were emphasized as theoretically relevant and which criteria should be employed in defining what emotions are. These similarities and differences are reflected in each discipline’s current taxonomy of theories of emotion. Thus intradisciplinary taxonomies are inadequate for the advancement of interdisciplinary research and theorizing, especially between philosophers and psychologists of emotion. In philosophy, the taxonomic categories that were especially prevalent during the late twentieth century, and are still held to a great extent within the current discourse, arose
primarily from a single concern: Whether or not either beliefs, judgments, appraisals, 
seeing-as, construals, etc., (thoughts) and perceptions of physiological responses (feelings) 
were both necessary and sufficient for experiencing any emotion. This is not to suggest 
that philosophers were not concerned with other aspects of emotions, but rather that the 
care of the thoughts or physiological responses was placed at the 
front when theorizing. Thus many philosophical theories of emotion were divided 
into two general camps: cognitive theories and noncognitive feeling theories.\textsuperscript{239}

\section*{4.2.1 Cognitive Theories of Emotion}

Influenced by theorists such as Aristotle, the ancient Stoics, Spinoza, or Sartre, as 
well as the methodology of conceptual and linguistic analysis, cognitive theories of 
emotion held that thoughts rather than feelings were essential features of emotions. It is 
important to note, however, that these theories did not necessarily deny any association 
between emotions and the feelings or physiological responses that are often related with 
emotions. Rather, because of their strong reliance on conceptual and linguistic analysis, 
cognitive theorists were primarily concerned with how various emotions ought to be 
analytically defined. So they rejected the claim that feelings and physiological responses 
were essential defining features of what emotions are. They understood the physiological 
and behavioral aspects of emotions to share a contingently causal relation with emotions 
rather than a relation of logical necessity. Martha Nussbaum presents a cognitive-


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evaluative theory of emotion that serves as a contemporary example of cognitive theories in philosophy.240

According to Nussbaum, emotions are eudemonistic judgments or evaluative recognitions. Both are assents to appraisals about how aspects of the world pertain to the subject’s well-being. Some of these assents to appraisals are biologically given. As Nussbaum states, “certain specific fears are also ubiquitous, and dictated by our animal heritage: the fear of snakes, for example appears to be innate and based on perceptual schemata that have adaptive significance.”241 Others are socially constructed. As Nussbaum continues, “It is evident that behavior associated with emotion differs greatly...But it is likely that differences run deeper, affecting the experience of the emotion itself.”242 Both, however, are constitutive of emotions because the type of judgment or recognition associated with an emotion defines each emotion as a certain type, such as grief, anger, and joy. Thus these judgments or recognitions are thought to share a logically necessary relation with emotions. Physiological responses and feelings may also be associated with such appraisals, but they are not constitutive of what emotions are since no specific set of physiological responses or feelings can be identified as sharing a logically or a causally necessary relation with an emotion of a certain type. Certain physiological responses or feelings, however, are characteristically associated with types of emotional experiences. I further elaborate on Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive theory of emotion in chapter 3 and chapter 4. In chapter 3, I focus on Nussbaum’s

240 See Prinz, Gut Reactions; Deigh, “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions.”

241 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 150.

242 Ibid., 150-51.
account of the intentionality of emotions, and in chapter four, I focus on her account of
the rationality of emotions.

§4.2.2 Noncognitive Theories of Emotion

Noncognitive feeling theories were often associated with theories of emotion that
were presented by René Descartes, John Locke, David Hume, and William James. In
contrast with cognitive theories of emotion, noncognitive feeling theories were identified
as theories of emotion that held feelings to be essential features of emotions while
denying that thoughts (defined as being distinct from sensory perceptions) were essential
features of emotions.\textsuperscript{243} These theories did not deny that some form of thought was often
associated with an emotional experience of a certain type. They instead regarded thoughts
to be non-essential causes of emotions. Jesse Prinz presents a contemporary version of
such noncognitive feeling theories.

According to Prinz, emotions are perceptions of patterns of bodily responses that
represent how aspects of the world bear on the subject’s well-being. In short, emotions
are embodied appraisals. Prinz denies that there is a one-to-one correlation between a
pattern of bodily changes and an emotion type. An experience of a type of emotion is
instead directly correlated with a body-state prototype. A body-state prototype is a
prototype representation of an emotion type, which contains a unique set of various
bodily responses as its content. Because a body state-prototype is a prototype
representation of an emotion type, all of the bodily responses that fill in the content of the
representation do not need to be detected for an emotion of a specific type to be
experienced. An emotion of a specific type is experienced when a sufficient number of

\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., 141.
bodily changes in the content of the prototype representation are detected and thus perceived. Thus prototypical patterns of bodily changes reliably co-occur through body-state prototype representations with types of emotional experiences and they represent relations between aspects of the world and the subject’s well-being. They are also constitutive of what emotions are since they are products of emotion systems that evolved to produce states that serve this representative function. Emotion systems are thus physically realized by their causal efficacy of producing embodied appraisals, and different types of embodied appraisals are physically realized by their covariance with prototypical patterns of bodily changes. In addition, since the emotion systems are evolutionarily adaptive systems that evolved to represent relations between aspects of the world and the subject’s well-being, and every emotion is a product of the emotion systems, Prinz concludes that emotions are a natural kind.

Evaluative judgments or appraisals, such as those postulated by Nussbaum and other cognitive theorists as constituents of emotions, are regarded to be inessential causes of emotions. This is because, as Prinz argues, emotions can be elicited by simple perceptual states. One example that Prinz gives to illustrate this point is the experience of snake phobias in macaque monkeys. Macaque monkeys develop snake phobias when they witness other macaque monkeys displaying aversive responses to snakes. Once such phobias are acquired, macaque monkeys experience fear at the mere sight of a snake. Thus, given that the mere perception of a snake can cause an experience of fear, it is concluded that thoughts are unnecessary causes of emotions. I further elaborate on Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory of emotion in chapter three and chapter 4. I focus
primarily on Prinz’s account of the intentionality of emotions in chapter 3, and I focus primarily on his account of the rationality of emotions in chapter 4.

§4.2.3 Hybrid Theories of Emotion

Although cognitive and noncognitive feeling theories dominated the discourse on emotion in philosophy, two alternative categories of theories of emotion also arose around the late twentieth century: hybrid theories of emotion and social constructionist theories of emotion. These theories were recognized or developed and introduced within the philosophical discourse on emotion in contrast to both cognitive and noncognitive feeling theories of emotion. Drawing from the historical influences of both cognitive and noncognitive theories of emotion, hybrid theories of emotion regarded both thoughts and feelings or physiological responses to be necessary constituents of what emotions are.²⁴⁴Thus hybrid theories of emotion rejected the dichotomous framing of concerns over the nature of emotions that was largely established by debates between cognitive and noncognitive theories of emotion.

Aaron Ben-Ze’ev presents a hybrid theory of emotion. According to Ben-Ze’ev, emotions are complex phenomena that are describable at various levels, including psychological, physiological, biological, and philosophical.²⁴⁵At the psychological level emotions are states composed of cognition, evaluation, motivation, and feeling. These four components constitute the mental components involved in an emotional experience. The cognitive component describes the object of an emotional experience. The evaluative

²⁴⁴Prinz, Gut Reactions, 74-75.

component involves an appraisal of the object of emotion. The motivational component involves a desire or readiness to act that is consistent with the evaluation of the emotional object, and feelings are described as “modes of awareness, which express our own states.”

Of the four mental components that constitute an emotion, Ben-Ze’ev regards the evaluative component to be the most important. This is because he ultimately regards emotions to be evaluative attitudes. He also believes that the evaluative component provides the most reliable way of distinguishing one type of emotion from another. Ben-Ze’ev, however, does not reduce what emotions are to their evaluative components. He does not believe that the evaluative component alone is sufficient for the generation of an emotion.

Furthermore, the feeling component is not to be equated with the neurophysiological states that are associated with emotional experiences. Feelings are non-intentional mental states that constitute the qualitative experience (awareness) of one’s own state. At the physiological level, neurophysiological changes occur during an emotional experience, such as increase in adrenaline output and blood flow. These neurophysiological changes are understood to have a “complimentary relation of support or correlation” with the mental components at the psychological levels such that the psychological and neurophysiological states “constitute different aspects of the same event.” Thus Ben-Ze’ev tentatively concludes that it is in principle possible to identify different emotion types based on the neurophysiological changes associated with each type.

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246 Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, 64.

247 Ibid., 51.
At the biological level, emotions are not natural kinds, although this is not made explicitly clear. As Ben-Ze’ev states, “Emotions constitute an adaptive mechanism in the sense that they are flexible, immediate responses to changing stimuli.”

Thus en-Ze’ev provides an evolutionary functional account of emotions at the biological level, yet this biological account does not presuppose any biological emotion system or mechanism. At the philosophical level, the fact that emotions are composed of evaluative attitudes takes on cognitive, communicative, and moral functions. Because emotions as evaluative attitudes are indications of personal value, they allow us to perceive morally salient properties, express personal values, and regulate our moral behavior.

§4.2.4 Social Constructionist Theories of Emotion

Social constructionist theories of emotion in philosophy included theories of emotion from across several disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Drawing from the works of scholars such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, George Herbert Mead, and Erving Goffman, social constructionists across disciplines held that emotions are not natural kinds. They also held that the most valuable aspect of emotions, which defined what emotions are, were the social-functional roles

248 Ibid., 51.


251 Hochschild, The Managed Heart.

252 Lutz, “The Domain of Emotion Words on Ifaluk.”
they served within a specific culture or society. Social constructionists in philosophy, however, typically hold the view that emotions are some form of thought. Thus philosophical social constructionists often aligned themselves with cognitive theories of emotion despite constituting a distinct category of theories of emotion.

Clair Armon-Jones provides a good example of a social constructionist theory of emotion in philosophy. According to Armon-Jones, emotions are kinds of attitudes, such as beliefs, judgments, or desires. Like Nussbaum, Jones suggests that most emotions are culturally determined rather than determined by natural evolutionary processes, but she also accepts that some emotional responses are biologically innate. That she believes so is made explicitly clear. Although in regard to the tenets of social constructionism in general Jones states that, “Constructionism maintains that emotions are constituted by non-natural attitudes,” she also states a preference for the weaker version of social constructionism, which “concedes to the naturalist the existence of a limited range of natural emotion responses.”253 This weaker version of social constructionism, according to Jones, challenges the claim that emotions are natural kinds by granting the there are both primitive and non-primitive emotional responses while at the same time holding that the emotions associated with these responses are socially constructed because they are constituted by culturally informed and situated attitudes. This is because the intentional contents of the socially constructed attitudes (what they are about) are determined by the beliefs and values of a particular culture or community since emotions (as attitudes) are learned through the process of enculturation. Through the process of enculturation, an individual acquires cultural knowledge (beliefs, values, norms, and expectations) in order

to understand and use emotions in culturally appropriate ways. Furthermore, an appropriate emotion is a socially prescribed set of responses for a given situation. The prescriptive aspect of appropriate emotions is grounded by the claim that emotions are culturally constituted for the purpose endorsing and sustaining cultural values.

§4.2.5 Fundamental Concerns in Philosophy of Emotion

These four philosophical categories of theories of emotion (cognitive theories, noncognitive theories, social constructionist theories, and hybrid theories) reveal the relevant concerns of academics within the discipline of philosophy. They reveal that philosophers of emotion, mostly influenced by the framework of scientific investigation, are primarily concerned with the following:

Fundamental Concerns of Philosophers of Emotion

Mind or Body: Whether emotions are cognitive or noncognitive mental states; whether emotions, as mental states, are related to the neurological, physiological, or biological responses that are typically associated with experiences of emotions, i.e., whether the neurological, physiological, or biological responses that are typically associated with emotional experiences are necessary or sufficient for emotions.

Intentionality: Whether they can be intentional mental states and if so, how.

Rationality: Whether they can be rational and irrational mental states and if so, how.

This is not to say that psychologists of emotion were only concerned with these three questions, but rather that these three questions were placed at the forefront of theorizing. What it does suggests, however, is that few psychologists are currently concerned with whether or not either thoughts or feelings are both necessary and sufficient for an experience of any emotion.
§4.2.6 Basic Emotion Theories of Emotion

In psychology, the two most prevalent taxonomic categories that arose during the late twentieth century were that of basic emotion theories of emotion and appraisal theories of emotion. Influenced by authors such as René Descartes, Charles Darwin, William James, and Carl Lange, basic emotion theories understood emotions to be evolutionarily adapted mechanisms with distinct neurophysiological correlates.254 As such, each basic emotion is thought to have distinct neurophysiological, expressive, or feeling components; to be universally found in all human beings; to be homologous with the emotions of non-human animals that share our phylogenetic history. Although emotions are also understood to be initially (in terms of early developmental stages) elicited by automatic appraisals of a narrow range of evolutionarily and biologically determined stimuli, it is also generally accepted that emotions may be elicited by slower, more deliberate appraisals in more mature stages of emotional development. In either case, basic emotion theories postulate that each type of emotion is elicited by a single appraisal state (categorical appraisal) of a certain type rather than a unique set of various types of appraisals states (dimensional appraisals).

Paul Ekman presents a basic emotion theory of emotion.255 According to Ekman, each basic emotion type is constituted by neurophysiological, expressive, and

254 Ibid., 38.
motivational responses to basic life situations. These responses are products of an evolutionary adapted biological mechanism (affect program), which is a central mechanism in the brain that coordinates the various elements of each type of basic emotion. Thus each basic emotion and emotions as a whole is a natural kind. This central mechanism is physically realized by its causal efficacy in producing basic emotions, as well as non-basic emotions. A set of distinct neurophysiological correlates are also thought to be universally found in all human beings and is homologous with the emotions of non-human animals that share our evolutionary past. These neurophysiological responses are prewired within the central emotion mechanism by evolutionary processes to be elicited by a narrow range of environmental stimuli that are quickly and automatically appraised. These responses are not only neurophysiological, they also involve a refractory period, during which information that is relevant to each emotion type experienced is available to the central emotion mechanism. Automatic appraisals are also carried out by automatic appraising mechanism, although more deliberate appraisals may elicit various types of basic emotions or non-basic emotions as well. These deliberate appraisals are typically responses to vague or acquired stimuli. The acquisition of new emotion stimuli, as well as new response behaviors, is a result of experience and cultural learning. Once a stimulus or behavioral response is acquired, it can become automatically appraised or carried out. The central emotion mechanism may also acquire distinctive thoughts, memories, and images, which come to be associated with various emotion types. All this speaks to the openness or plasticity of the central emotion mechanism, which makes it possible for cultural and individual differentiations in our
emotional repertory—variations on a theme—without denying that emotions are natural kinds or that each basic emotion type is a natural kind.

§4.2.7 Appraisal Theories of Emotion

Influenced by theorists such as Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hume, and Sartre, current appraisal theories of emotion understand emotions to be processes rather than some mental, neurophysiological, or physiological state.\(^{256}\) These processes involve psychological, neurophysiological, and physiological changes elicited and sustained by dimensional appraisals rather than categorical appraisals.\(^{257}\) Appraisal theories also postulate that emotions are adaptive and that some emotions are universally found across cultures and various animal species that share our phylogenetic history. The adaptive

\(^{256}\) Note that the term ‘appraisal theories of emotion’ can be understood to have at least two meanings. First, it may refer to a set of any theory of emotion that regards appraisals to be important to emotions. I am not using the term ‘appraisal theories of emotion’ here in this way. ‘Appraisal theories of emotion,’ as it is used here, refers to a set of psychological theories of emotion that are understood to hold a specific set of assumptions about emotions, and some of these assumptions are understood to distinguish these theories from basic emotion theories, social constructivist theories, and psychological constructionist theorists. Furthermore, in the current psychological discourse on emotions, appraisal theories of emotion are often referred to as ‘component process theories of emotion’ or ‘dimensional theories.’ However, it might be important to note that the term ‘dimensional theories,’ which refers to a set of theories that use dimensional approaches or methods to identify discrete emotion categories, is not necessarily coextensive with the terms ‘appraisal theories’ or ‘component process theory.’ For example, James Russell’s and Lisa Feldman Barrett’s psychological constructionist theories may be regarded as “dimensional theories,” but they are not appraisal theories or component process theories of emotion.

nature of each emotion type is not biologically inscribed in an innate, fully modular mechanism or emotion system. As with basic emotion theories, however, the adaptive nature of each type of emotion is grounded in the functional aspects of several independent biological subsystems or components that are also constituents of a loosely constituted, non-modular emotion system. Thus in so far as emotions are products of this loosely constituted, non-modular emotion system, emotions are natural kinds. As such, emotion types, along with their correlated patterns of appraisals and responses, would be universally found among human beings and non-human animals as long as both human beings and non-human animals have faced similar situations that are significant to their well-beings and have developed capacities to similarly deal with these situations.

As discussed in chapter 2, Klaus R. Scherer component process theory of emotion exemplifies current appraisal theories of emotion.\textsuperscript{258} According to Scherer, emotions are processes of synchronized changes in cognitive, neurophysiological, motivational, motor, and subjective monitoring subsystems that are brought about by dimensional appraisals of stimulus events that are significant to a subject’s well-being. Scherer refers to these dimensional appraisals as “stimulus evaluation checks.”\textsuperscript{259} Although these stimulus evaluation checks play an ongoing role within the process of emotion rather than simply initiating various responses, the emotion process is initiated by a single appraisal state—an evaluation of a stimulus event as being relevant to the subject’s personal or social goals. Although Paul Ekman’s basic emotion theory and Klaus Scherer’s appraisal theory

\textsuperscript{258} ‘Dimensional appraisals’ refers to sets of several distinct types of appraisals and ‘categorical appraisals’ refers to single appraisals of various types.

\textsuperscript{259} Scherer, “Emotion as Emergent Processes: They Require a Dynamic Computational Architecture,” 3463.
of emotion, basic emotion theories and appraisal theories typically assume that emotions serve biologically adaptive functions, are natural kinds, are concerned with how appraisals are involved in emotional experiences, and believe in the importance of identifying relations between appraisals and neurobiological responses involved in emotional experiences. Accordingly, the discourse on emotion within psychology during the late twentieth century focus primarily on concerns that differentiated basic emotion theories from appraisal theories of emotion. Given this dichotomous framing of the discourse on emotion by basic emotion theories and appraisal theories of emotion within the field of psychology, the introduction of social constructivist theories and psychological constructionist theories in psychology served a similar function within the psychological discourse on emotion as hybrid theories and social constructionist theories did within the philosophical discourse on emotion.

§4.2.8 Social Constructivist Theories of Emotion

Social constructionist theories in psychology go by the name of social constructivist theories, yet they share the same basic assumptions held by social constructionists in other disciplines: emotions are not natural kinds and what defines emotions are the social-functional roles they serve within a specific culture or society. In contrast with many social constructionists in philosophy, however, social constructivists do not typically deny that emotions have biological, physiological, or behavioral constituents. James R. Averill provides a prime example of current social constructivist
theories of emotion. According to Averill, emotions are social roles, internalized schemas, or rules that guide our actions and behaviors, or socially constituted syndromes of responses. Emotions may be composed of various kinds of states, including psychological, physiological, biological, and behavioral states, but emotions are not reducible to any of these components of emotional experiences. Rather than identifying either a single or a set of components as the essential defining feature or features of emotions, Averill suggests that emotions represent a family resemblance category.

The notion of a family resemblance category, which originates with Ludwig Wittgenstein, refers to a fuzzy set in which members of the set are related by sharing some feature with another member, yet no single necessary or sufficient condition can be said to define the set as a whole. Accordingly, neither thoughts nor physiological responses are necessary or sufficient for any particular emotional experience or for the experience of any particular type of emotion. Thoughts or physiological responses, however, may be non-trivial components of some particular emotional experience or an experience of a specific type of emotion, depending on the needs of a particular culture or society. The coherence of the various elements that may be involved in an emotional experience, such as thoughts, physiological responses, behavior, and subjective feelings, are explained by the various feeling rules held by a particular culture or institution rather than evolutionarily adapted biological mechanisms or systems. These feeling rules are


learned through the process of enculturation, and they embody the various values of a particular culture or institution. Thus what all emotions have in common is that they all serve important functions within a society and are correlated with other behaviors that serve such functions.

§4.2.9 Psychological Constructionist Theories of Emotion

Marian Gendron and Lisa Feldman Barrett have traced the historical tradition of psychological constructionist theories of emotion to Herbert Spencer and William James. Theories of psychological construction deny that emotions are evolutionarily adaptive mechanisms with distinct neurophysiological, expressive, behavioral, and feeling components. Thus psychological constructionists, like social constructivists, regard emotions to be non-natural kinds. Unlike social constructivists, however, psychological constructionists focus primarily on how emotions are constructed at the level of the individual rather than the social. In other words, psychological constructionist emphasize the individual, intrapsychic and physiological aspects of how emotional experiences are socially constructed rather than the social-functional aspects of how emotional experiences are socially constructed. Theories of psychological construction also deny that emotions are elicited by appraisals and that at least some emotions may be universal across cultures and across non-human animals that share our phylogenic history. They instead regard emotions to be products of individual psychological interpretations. They hold that an act of categorizing particular core affective states

(bodily feelings of with negative or positive valence and arousal), thoughts, and behaviors, as aspects of an emotion of a certain type, instantiates a token experience of an emotion of that type. Thus psychological constructionists reject the causal connection between the intrapsychic events involved in an emotional experience and the core affect, behavioral, or expressive aspects of an emotional experience. Some psychological constructionist, however, accept core affect to be necessary components. Finally, psychological constructionists also deny that any unique or prototypical combination of these components of emotion defines what emotions are or any emotion type.

James A. Russell provides a prime example of such a theory. According to Russell, emotions do no exist as biologically or socially structured experiences that share any necessary physical properties. What exist are emotional episodes (EE), emotional meta-experiences (EME), attributed affect, and core affect. Emotional episodes, or EE from here on, are events in which various components like core affect, appraisals, expressions, autonomic changes, instrumental actions, subjective experience, attributed affect, meta-experience, and regulation fit a folk emotion concept. These components of an EE may be experienced, but it is not necessary for all of the components to be experienced. For example, autonomic changes and facial expressions need not be experienced. Categorization by the subject of the an EE is also unnecessary for the instantiation of an EE. In both cases of EE and EME, the experiences are emotional because they involve the categorization of an EE or a EME by a folk emotion concept,

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but in and EE the involvement is *external* to the subject. The folk emotion concept categorizes the event from *outside* the subject simply as an event of a certain type. In an EME the involvement is from *inside* the subject’s experience. In all EME the subject is the one who performs the act of categorization, in an EE categorization occurs without the need of any individual performing the act of categorization. We can then say that the *categorization is subjective* in an EME because the act of categorization involves a subject and the *categorization is objective* in an EE because the categorization does not depend on any subject who is performing an act of categorization. Furthermore, because emotion concepts are embedded within social and cultural norms, categorizing one’s experiences in accordance with an emotion concept effectively situates these experiences within a system of social and cultural norms. Accordingly, emotional meta-experiences play a mediating role in emotion regulation.

Like emotional meta-experiences, attributed affects are also subjectively experienced events. The difference between these two categories of experienced events is that attributed affects arise from attributing an object as the cause of some core affective state. Insofar as a meta-emotional experience attributes an object as being the cause of a core affective state, it too would be an experience of attributed affect. According to Russell, however, not all attributed affects, such as likings and dis-likings, are meta-emotional experiences. Core affective states are thus necessary, but not sufficient for attributed affects. Core affective states are simple subjective states of experiencing a degree of pleasure or displeasure (valence) and a degree of arousal. Core affective states are ubiquitous; they underlie every minute of our conscious experiences. Yet, none of the members of these four categories are unified into a category of emotion.
Russell gives no specific principle in order to do so. In short, Russell is an eliminativist about emotion. According to Russell’s account, emotions do not exist as a unified class since, strictly speaking, emotions don’t exist according to Russell’s account.265 It should be mentioned, however, that some psychological constructionists do not deny that emotions constitute a unified class.266

§4.2.10 Fundamental Concerns of Psychological Theories of Emotion

These four psychological categories of theories of emotion (basic emotion theories, appraisal theories, social constructivist theories, and psychological constructionist theories) reveal the relevant concerns of academics in psychology. They reveal that psychologists of emotion, mostly influenced by the framework of scientific investigation, are primarily concerned with the following:

Fundamental Concerns of Psychologist of Emotion

Natural Kind Status: Whether or not emotions are natural kinds.

Physical Correlates: What the underling neurological, physiological, or biological mechanisms of emotional experiences are.

265 One ought to note that Russell’s conclusion regarding the non-existence of emotions takes folk emotion terms as necessarily positing “entities” of some sort. See Russell, “Emotion, Core Affect, and Psychological Construction,” 1262. Thus Russell’s rejection of the existence of emotions ought to be understood as a denial of the existence of emotions as they are conceived in accordance with what Russell understands to be the referents of folk emotion terms.

Build Model of Mind-Body Interaction: The ways in which appraisals (as cognitions or perceptions) and physiological responses are related to emotions. This is not to say that psychologists of emotion were only concerned with these three questions, but rather that these three questions were placed at the forefront of theorizing. What it does suggests, however, is that few psychologists are currently concerned with whether or not either thoughts or feelings are both necessary and sufficient for an experience of any emotion.

§4.3 The Problem of Skepticism in the Field of Emotion

Here we have two distinct taxonomies of theories of emotion that share certain similarities but also differ in various significant ways. For example, given the shared historical tradition between cognitive theories of emotion in philosophy and appraisal theories of emotion in psychology, these theories share the feature of emphasizing the importance of appraisals or evaluations; although, it should be noted that basic emotion theories in psychology also regard appraisals to be important features of emotions. Furthermore, due to the influence of scientific methods in psychology, neither appraisal theories nor basic emotion theories deny the constitutive role of physiological or behavioral responses in emotional experiences. In contrast, due to the reliance on conceptual and linguistic analyses, as well as the assumption that only thoughts are capable of having intentional content, many cognitive theories in philosophy conclude that only thoughts are essential to emotions. This is because the method of conceptual analysis—the identification of the various necessary and sufficient conditions entailed by a concept—led many cognitivists to identify the intentional content of emotion (what emotions are about) as essential to what emotions are. Furthermore, the use of linguistic
analysis—the analysis of language use to gain insight into the nature of the object of
analysis—helped cognitivists ground the conclusion that the intentional content of
emotions were essential to what emotions are by legitimizing the use of linguistic
evidence to conclude that there is a logically necessary relation, rather than a contingent
causal relation, between emotions and their intentional contents.

An example of this kind of reasoning can be illustrated by Anthony Kenny’s
criticism of earlier noncognitive feeling-theories put forth by modern scholars such as
Descartes and Hume. As Kenny argues:

Emotional attitudes, like other mental attitudes, have formal objects; some
philosophical errors about the emotions which we considered in the first part of
this book might be described as mistakes about their formal objects. Descartes
and Hume, with the philosophers and psychologists who followed them, treated
the relationship between an emotion and its formal object, which is a logical one,
as if it were a contingent matter of fact. If the emotions were internal impressions
or behavior patterns there would be no logical restrictions on the type of object
which each emotion could have.267

As we can see from the first line of the above passage that Kenny takes the
intentional contents of emotions, what Kenny refers to as the “formal objects” of
emotions, to be essential constituents of what emotions are. As he states, “Emotional
attitudes, like other mental attitudes, have formal objects.”268 We can also see that Kenny
regards the relationship between emotions and their intentional contents to be a logical
relationship. This can be seen in his criticism of Descartes, Hume, and those who
followed them, where he states, “They treated the relationship between an emotion and

267 Feldman Barrett, “Emotions Are Real.”
its formal object, which is a logical one, as if it were a contingent matter of fact.”

Thus Kenny concludes that, given the logical relationship between emotions and their intentional contents, the intentional contents of emotions are essential to what emotions are. The premise that there is a logical relationship between emotions and their intentional contents is supported by the analysis of linguistic evidence. As Kenny argues:

In fact, each of the emotions is appropriate—logically, and not just morally appropriate—only to certain restricted objects. One cannot be afraid of just anything, or happy about anything whatsoever. If a man says that he is afraid of winning £10,000 in the pools, we want to ask him more: does he believe that many corrupts, or does he expect to lose his friends, or to be annoyed by begging letters, or what?...Again, if a man says that he feels remorse for the actions of someone quite unconnected with him, or is envious of his own vices, we are at a lost to understand him.”

The above passage illustrates how linguistic evidence is put forth by Kenny to ground the claim that there is a logical relationship between emotions and their intentional contents. The idea is that the way in which we understand the meaning of linguistic expressions places restrictions on emotion concepts, and these concepts are thought to reflect the nature of what emotions are. Thus, given that we cannot understand the meaning of one’s statement about one’s fear or remorse if the statement violates a restriction on what the concepts of fear or remorse allow as the intentional contents for fear or remorse, the intentional contents of fear or remorse are thought to have a logically necessary relationship with what fear or remorse is. If we consider a sentence like “I am overjoyed that I lost all my money in the recent stock market crash,” we would notice that such a sentence makes no sense orr, at the least, it would be interpreted as sarcasm. It

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269 Ibid.

270 Ibid.
would makes no sense, especially, if we withheld positing any reason for wanting to loose all of one’s money during a recent stock market crash. What this suggests is that the concept of being overjoyed restricts the intentional content of being overjoyed to fulfillments of one’s desires. So to be overjoyed logically entails (in virtue of what it means, perhaps analytically, to be overjoyed) that one is in a state that is about or directed at fulfillments of one’s desires.

We can also see that Kenny presupposes that only beliefs, and so some form of thought, are proper vehicles for the intentionality of emotions. As he states:

It is not, of course, correct to say e.g. that the formal object of envy is another’s good tout court: one must say that it is something believed to be good and believed to belong to another… The description of a mental attitude such as an emotion, unlike a description of the formal object of a non-intensional action, must contain reference to a belief. Only what is wet can be dried; but something which is merely believed to be an insult may provoke anger.271

As the above passage indicates, Kenny holds the belief that the intentional contents of emotions suggest that the appropriate vehicle for such contents must be something like a belief. This is especially so since Kenny holds the belief that beliefs alone can give rise to emotions, as indicated by his statement “something which is merely believed to be an insult may provoke anger.” Thus beliefs, and so some from of thought, were taken to be essential to emotion in virtue of being the only appropriate vehicle for the intentional contents of emotions.272 The physiological or behavioral responses associated with these emotions were not thought to share a similar logical relation with the intentional contents of emotions. Thus they were denied the status of constituting an

271 Ibid., 192.

272 Ibid., 193-94. John Deigh makes a similar observation regarding Kenny’s argument in Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions.
essential element of what emotions are. However, one might question whether or not the logical relation between emotions and their intentional contents warrant the conclusion that thoughts are necessary or essential components of emotions.\textsuperscript{273} As I argued in chapter 2, doing so confounds the intentional contents of emotions with the vehicles of such contents.

Noncognitive feeling theories of emotion in philosophy are similar to basic emotion theories in psychology in the sense that both regard thoughts to be unnecessary for emotional experiences. Many basic emotion theories, however, would deny that emotions are reducible to the physiological states or perceptions of physiological states involved in emotional experiences. According to basic emotion theories, both appraisals of external stimuli (automatic/noncognitive or deliberative/cognitive) and expressive or behavioral responses are essential features of emotions. This difference can be further illustrated by contrasting Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion with Ekman’s basic emotion theory of emotion. As noted earlier, emotions are perceptions of bodily changes according Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion. More specifically, they are perceptions of bodily changes that activate body state-prototype representations. Furthermore, although these bodily changes, according to Prinz, may be caused by cognitive thoughts or non-cognitive perceptual states—which can be, but perhaps not wisely, interpreted respectively in terms of Ekman’s theory as slow, deliberate appraisals or fast, automatic appraisals—cognitive thoughts are not regarded by Prinz to be constituent elements of what emotions are. They are causes of emotions rather than constituents of emotions.

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid., “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions,” 834-35. For example, John Deigh argues that the fact that emotions have intentional content does directly entail that emotions involve belief.
In Ekman’s basic emotion theory these appraisals are understood to be essential to what emotions are, regardless of whether or not they are cognitive states. Ekman defines emotions in terms of physiological responses, but they are physiological responses to basic life situations. As such, two essential features of such physiological responses, according to Ekman, are that they are caused by certain types of categorical appraisals (either automatic or deliberate), and that these physiological changes in turn cause certain behavioral or expressive responses. For Ekman, then, he causes of emotion, as well as certain neurophysiological, behavioral or expressive responses are essential features of what emotions are. So various philosophical and psychological theories of emotion share similar roots and have various features in common, yet they also differ in various distinct ways. These similarities and differences are reflected in the name of each theory’s taxonomic category, but it is easy to oversee this and simply regard these names as simple descriptions of the theories captured by the categories. Given this, communication between philosophers and psychologists are likely to become confused. For example, it is easy to imagine how a discussion between a philosopher and a psychologist of emotion discussing the advantages or disadvantages of, what could be called, ‘cognitive-appraisal theories’ might be frustrated. Unbeknownst to the psychologists, the philosopher may have in mind something akin to Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion, whereas unbeknownst to the philosopher, the psychologists may have in mind something akin to Richard Lazarus’s cognitive-relational-motivational theory.\footnote{Ibid., 835.} The philosopher might argue that cognitive-appraisal theories are inadequate because they fail to take into consideration other notable aspects that seem to be necessary to emotion, for
example, the physiological responses of emotional experiences. “They do not,” the psychologist responds. “Appraisals cause patterns of physiological responses.” “Yes,” replies the philosopher, “But the physiological responses are not essential to what emotions are.” “I think you are misunderstanding cognitive-appraisal theories,” suggests the psychologist. “No, I think you are misunderstanding cognitive-appraisal theories,” counters the philosopher, and so on. This problem of communication between theorists within distinct fields illustrates, in a very mundane and ordinary way, how the problem of translation can arise.²⁷⁵

The problem of translation, put in its most basic form, is the problem of translating statements of one language L₁ into statements of another language L₂, and checking to ensure that one has adequately translated the statements in language L₁ into statements of language L₂, while being as faithful as possible to the intended meanings of the statements of language L₁.²⁷⁶ Many ordinary folks, and perhaps quite a few, philosophers and psychologists may not see any problem here, especially if one happens to be a speaker of more than one natural language. I agree that there really isn’t much of a problem here and part of the aim of this chapter is to illustrate the unproblematic nature of this problem, however, before one can offer any kind of solution to any kind of problem, one must be able to first understand what it is that their solution is supposed to


²⁷⁶ See Carnap, “Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages”; Quine, Pursuit of Truth: Revised Edition. One could also replace the clause “while being as faithful as possible to the stress the significance of understanding the notion of “translation” in terms of some notion of equivalence. Some general possibilities for the meaning of the term ‘equivalence’ would be semantic, intentional, narrow, behavioral, observational, evidential, pragmatic, wide, syntactic, structural, functional, formal, isomorphic, etc.
solve. So we must, at the least, be able to take the perspective one who understands such cases to give rise to such problems. I suggest we can do so by first ensuring that we are presupposing the seven epistemic preconditions, or at least the first three, that I listed at the beginning of this chapter. Then, we must add one additional presupposition to generate a fairly strong intuition about how there could be a problem of translation in kinds of cases noted above. I refer to this condition as the *Condition of Illusorily Incommensurable Worlds (IIW):*

**The Condition of Illusorily Incommensurable Worlds**

IIW: We must assume that it is possible for a speaker of L₁ and a speaker of L₂ to be distinct individuals, while also maintaining that it is possible for these two speakers to inhabit an ontologically distinct world (i.e., a set of worlds that have no property in common) but we are ignorant as to whether or not these two speakers actually inhabit ontologically distinct worlds.

If we take at least the first epistemic preconditions I listed at the beginning of this chapter into consideration while also presupposing IIW and then ask ourselves the following question, one should be able get at least some inklings of the problem of translation. In terms of the example of the two emotion researchers/theorists provided one might ask the question, “When a cognitive-relational-motivational theorists in psychology tells a cognitive-appraisal theorist in philosophy that she is overjoyed about finally completing her dissertation, would the philosopher be able to understand exactly what the psychologist meant and how would the philosopher go about proving that she does?”

Granting that in non-hypothetical, real world scenarios such occasions are more likely to occur among philosophers and psychologists who are not well versed in the other

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discipline’s taxonomy and feel no need to be, even so, without an alternative shared taxonomy of theories of emotion, such exchanges may be more likely to occur. One reason is that it is easy to assume one’s own disciplinary taxonomy as the relevant taxonomy in such conversations where taxonomic terms may be similar, but differ significantly in terms of their referents.278 Although, given certain epistemic conditions, from the theoretical perspective, one may always be asked, “How does one know.”279

One solution might be to subsume theories in one discipline under the other discipline’s taxonomy, yet the taxonomy prevalent in each discipline reflects the various interests and methodological commitments that are specific to each field. Thus simply subsuming theories of emotion specific to one discipline under the taxonomic categories of the other discipline unfairly privileges the concerns and interests of one discipline over those of the other. I refer to this kind of solution as a conciliatory approach to interdisciplinary research and theorizing, which carries the connotation of the hegemony of one discipline over all others.280 This is especially problematic for establishing a shared taxonomy for interdisciplinary research and theorizing about emotion. Accordingly, such strategies for establishing a shared interdisciplinary taxonomy of

278 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions; Lazarus and Smith, “Emotion and Adaptation.”

279 For an interesting discussion this problem of the infinite regress of reasons, as well as a very interesting response to it, see Peter D. Klein, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons,” in Epistemology: An Anthology, eds. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, and Matthew McGrath, Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000; 2008).

theories of emotion fail to provide appropriate interdisciplinary conditions where theorists can work together on mutually defined concerns. Practical difficulties also arise from categorizing both philosophical and psychological theories of emotion under a single discipline’s taxonomic scheme. On the one hand, most emotion theories in psychology would be regarded as hybrid theories in philosophy. Thus the taxonomic scheme available in philosophy would categorize a vast majority of interestingly distinct theories of emotion into one category. Basic emotion theories, appraisal theories, and some psychological constructionist theories would all fall under the category of hybrid theories in philosophy since these theories accept that both some form of thought and feeling are necessary for emotional experiences. On the other hand, since many cognitive theories of emotion in philosophy either deny or leave unspecified how thoughts are related to other aspects of emotional experiences, it is difficult to see how such philosophical theories, as they stand, would be incorporated into any one of the psychological categories of emotion theories previously discussed.

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281 An interdisciplinary approach may also be frustrated by problems with communication where terms (not necessarily terms referring to categories of theories of emotion) may differ, but refer to the same thing. For example, psychologists of emotion often speak of “external or internal stimuli,” which may at times refer to what philosophers speak of as “cause of emotion” or “objects of emotion,” which may both differ from the intentional content of emotion Jesse J. Prinz and Paul Griffiths also present alternative taxonomies that for interdisciplinary research. I do not deny the usefulness of these alternative taxonomies. The benefit of the one presented here over those presented by Prinz and Griffiths is that each category contains theories from both philosophy and psychology, allowing theories in both disciplines to see how their theory might related to theories in the other discipline. I discuss this further toward the end of the paper.
§4.4 Meta-Sematic Structural Pluralism

As a partial response to this problem of skepticism, I offer in the following section the first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism, which are offered as bridge principles that are intended to respond to the problem of translation. These bridge principles, however, do not address the problem of translation by offering a way to map any one language to another. It instead addresses the problem of translation by offering principles to assist in the initial development of a shared language that is intended to help academics from multiple disciplines understand and see that they in fact share the same world rather than inhabit multiple incommensurable worlds. I demonstrate this by applying these first principles to philosophical and psychological discourses on emotion in order to construct a meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion. This taxonomy of theories of emotion carves out a conceptual space that allows academics from one discipline to see that they share the same theoretical world with academics from another discipline. In doing so, it provides the initial steps toward helping academics understand and see that they in fact inhabit the same world.

§4.4.1 Metaphysical Perspectives on “What is Emotion?”

The question of what emotions are from the metaphysical perspective is concerned with whether emotions are objective kinds or subjective kinds. These two ideas—objective kind and subjective kind—were intended to respectively capture concerns regarding the status of emotions as a natural kind or a social construction, while side stepping various issues regarding what it means for something to be a natural kind or
a social construction. An objective kind is defined here as a category of things that have the possibility of being independent of human construction. It is this possible independence from human construction that defines an objective kind, and its members, as something “natural,” and therefore “real,” in contrast with something that is “artificial,” and therefore something “unreal” or “unnatural, rather than the fact that existence is predicated of them. Besides the fact that my definition includes the notion of possibility, it is consistent with Scarantino’s notion of “ontological independence.”

282 Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion; Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. I avoid using the term ‘natural kinds’ to refer to what I call ‘objective kinds,’ and I avoid using the term ‘social constructions’ to refer to what I call ‘subjective kinds.’ My reasons for doing so are as follows: First, whether or not the emotion class is regarded to be a natural kind depends not only on the type of theory of emotion one holds, but also on one’s notion of what a natural kind is. Louis C. Charland, “The Natural Kind Status of Emotion,” *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 53 (2002): 511-37. For example, in regard to the question of whether or not emotions constitute a natural kind category, Charland argues that many philosophical views that deny that emotions constitute a natural kind category of emotion can be understood as theories that are in fact consistent with understanding emotions to constitute a natural kind category if one were to rely on Richard Boyd’s definition of natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters. Ibid., 524-30. Specifically, he believes that these theories understand emotion to be a psychological kind, which falls under a natural kind account according to Boyd’s definition. Psychological kinds, according to Charland are psychological states that are understood to be irreducible to other psychological states (e.g., vision and cognition), and what identifies emotions as constituting a distinct natural kind category is that they all have the same property of being a distinct kind of representational state. Ibid., 522. Furthermore, he attributes the failure of these theorists to recognize that emotion is a natural kind category to their reliance on a defunct Aristotelian notion of natural kind, which takes natural kinds to be clearly identifiable in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Ibid., 530. Thus my category of objective kinds is intended to sidestep these issues in order to identify what is most important to those who regard emotions, as well as the category of emotion, to be natural kinds. Second, the idea that emotions are socially constructed was traditionally introduced in contrast to the idea that emotions are natural kinds. It is currently the case, however, that many theories that regard emotions to be natural kinds also regard many emotions to be socially constructed. Thus the notion of social construction no longer does the job that it was initially intended to do, and my notion of subjective kinds is intended to capture what is most important to those who initially regarded emotions, as well as the emotion class, to be social constructions.
In order for a category of things to have the possibility of being independent of human constructions, and thus be an objective kind, it is necessary for the category to be unified in accordance with a feature of the world that has the possibility of being independent of human conceptualizations. One possible feature is that the members of the category all share some non-arbitrary physical property or properties, including causal properties of efficacy. Such properties unify the members of an objective kind as members of that kind and make it possible for the category, as well as its members, to be what they are without the need of human conceptualizations. For example, Water is an objective kind. All things that are Water are thought to be real and to have non-arbitrary physical properties—being constituted by H₂O molecules—that identify them as members of the objective kind Water. Something that is not an objective kind is Chair. Although chairs have physical properties, these properties are arbitrary and do not contribute to identifying any chair as a Chair. What are used to identify a chair as a Chair are not its arbitrary physical properties but rather its structural form and functional properties. This does not preclude the idea that objective kinds have functional properties. For example, a vertebrate-heart is an objective kind. Not only do all vertebrate-hearts have physical properties that partially identify them as a Vertebrate-heart, but they also all share the function of pumping blood throughout the body of creatures with a spinal column. Furthermore, the physical property that partially identifies them as a Vertebrate-heart is intimately related to their functional property. That vertebrate-hearts are made of cardiac muscles partially defines them as a Vertebrate-heart as well as allows them to perform the function of pumping blood throughout the body of creatures with spinal
columns. Thus the functions of objective kinds may also be defining features of what they are, especially because these functions are intimately related to their non-arbitrary physical properties. Although there are such things as artificial vertebrate-hearts, these are not Vertebrate-hearts. They have the function of vertebrate-hearts but fail to have the non-arbitrary physical properties that partially constitute what vertebrate-hearts are. Thus they are not members of the objective kind Vertebrate-heart since they fail to be constituted by cardiac muscles.

*Subjective kinds* may also have physical properties that may be said to “define” them as the kind of thing they are. For example, it may be said that a planet has physical properties that define it as a Planet, but it is an arbitrary fact—based on human conceptualizations—that these physical properties have come to define what planets are. Thus the fact that Pluto is no longer a planet is not a discovery since it not being so was established by fiat, which involves human conceptualizations. The property of being manufactured or “man-made” is also not a defining feature of subjective kinds. For example, diamonds and manufactured diamonds constitute the objective kind category of Diamond. They are unified by the non-arbitrary, physical property of carbon atoms bonding into tetrahedral units. They also have functional properties that are intimately related to this physical property; nevertheless, these functional properties do not define them as what they are since the functional properties depend on human conceptualizations. For example, because of their molecular structure, diamonds have the property of being the hardest things known to man, and given this they are used in industrial production for making precision cuts. This function is not a function that defines diamonds as an objective kind.
A subjective kind is defined here as a category of things that necessarily depend on human conceptualizations in order to constitute a unified category. These are ontologically dependent categories. Human conceptualizations typically involve attributing arbitrary properties, including functional properties, to identify things as members of a subjective kind. Thus a subjective kind may have members that are, using Barrett’s terminology, “ontologically objective” or “ontologically subjective” things. One may also have nested kinds in which one type of objective or subjective kind is constituted by other types of objective or subjective kinds. What makes a subjective kind a subjective kind is some arbitrary, stipulated, conventional, or merely operational definition that serves to unify all the members into one kind. Furthermore, human conceptualizations typically involve the attribution of arbitrary properties, including functional properties, in order to conceive a category of things to be the kind of thing they are. For example, as mentioned previously, chairs and planets are subjective kinds. What makes a chair a Chair are not its physical constituents, but rather that it has a certain structure (a seat and legs of some kind) and is conceived of as having the purpose of being sat on. This also does not mean that physical constituents are not necessary for members of subjective kinds to exist. A chair obviously needs to be made of something in order for it to exist, but the physical properties of a chair do not contribute to the chair being identified as a Chair. A chair can be made of steel, wood, plastic, straw, or what have you, but that it is made of any of these materials is not what identifies the chair as a Chair. An institution, such as the International Astronomical Union (IAU), is also a subjective kind. Although it is constituted by a collection of people, a mere aggregate of
people does not constitute the IAU. All institutions depend on its members having a common purpose, which is determined by human conceptualizations, and it is around this purpose that the actions of the members are organized. One common purpose shared by members of the IAU is specifying what counts as a Planet. It is also important to note that although some philosophical theories of emotion and many psychological theories of emotion explicitly address the question of whether or not emotions are a natural kind, many cognitive theorists in philosophy and some psychological theories do not do so. So my conclusions regarding the stance these theories take on the question of what emotions are from the metaphysical perspective should be taken as tentative conclusions.

§4.4.2 The Semantic Perspective on “What is Emotion?”

From the general semantic perspective, the question of what emotions are is understood as being concerned with the meaning of folk emotion terms, including the term ‘emotion.’ This understanding of what emotions are from the general semantic perspective can be further differentiated into at least two semantic levels. I refer to one level as the primary semantic level, on which the meanings of emotion terms are analyzed from the perspective of a speaker who belongs to a particular linguistic community. I refer to the second level as the meta-semantic level, on which the relations between the meanings of emotion terms within two or more theories or linguistic communities are analyzed. I refer to understanding the meaning of emotion terms from this meta-semantic level as the meta-semantic perspective on what emotions are. Although this section deals primarily with the question of what emotions are from the meta-semantic perspective, I briefly discuss how theorists understand the question of
what emotions are at the primary semantic level in the following. Furthermore, I will only be concerned with the meta-semantic perspective on the relation between the meaning of folk emotion terms, which are elements of what theorists call ordinary, natural, or folk languages, and the meaning of these same terms according to particular theories of emotion.

Unlike answering the question of what emotions are from the metaphysical perspective, where one may have as many answers as there are particular theories of emotion, there are generally only two answers to the question of what emotions are from the meta-semantic perspective: “Yes, folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms” or “No, folk emotion terms are not or ought not be understood as trans-theoretical terms.” I refer to those who answer “yes” as optimists about ordinary language emotion terms, and I refer to those who answer “no” as pessimists about

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ordinary language emotion terms. The difference between optimists and pessimists can be conceptually specified by the different working assumptions about ordinary language that each position assumes. One way to clarify the distinction between an optimist and a pessimist is to ask whether one regards folk emotion terms to be what Hillary Putnam refers to as “trans-theoretical terms.” A trans-theoretical term, according to Putnam, is defined as a term that has the same referent in different theories. If a theorist understands folk emotion terms to be trans-theoretical terms in relation to ordinary language and the language of their theory, then the theorist would understand his or herself as referring to the same sorts of things as speakers of ordinary language. This would be the case regardless of whether or not any of the speakers shared the same emotion concepts.

Therefore, if a theorist regards folk emotion terms to be trans-theoretical terms in relation to ordinary language and the language of their theory, then that theorist would be an

284 These discussions typically cash out these disagreements in terms of three possible relations between folk-psychological and scientific understandings of the term ‘emotion.’ I do so in terms of two possible relations, lumping together the first two ways discussed by Russell into one general position. As I understand these three approaches, the first two ways of relating folk-psychological conceptions with scientific conceptions arise from a shared assumption regarding the purpose of scientific research and theorizing—that scientific research and theorizing should ultimately seek to make sense of or clarify folk-psychological conceptions of emotion. Scarantino draws what may seem to be a similar distinction by distinguishing what he respectively refers to as the “Scientific Emotion Project” form the “Folk Emotion Project.” Andrea Scarantino, “How to Define Emotions Scientifically,” Ibid.4 (2012).

285 Although these distinctions are similar, Scarantino’s distinctions do not squarely map on to my distinctions regarding what emotions from the meta-semantic perspective. I take academics in both philosophy and psychology, as well as other disciplines, to be committed to providing an accurate description of emotions (de re). This seems to generally lead one to be committed to something like the Scientific Emotion Project. So both pessimists and optimists, in my view, are committed to the Scientific Emotion Project. Thus in Scarantino’s terms, the question I am interested in is whether or not emotion theorists understand the Folk Emotion Project to be relevant to the Scientific Emotion Project?
optimist about ordinary language emotion terms. If the theorist denies that folk emotion terms are trans-theoretical terms in relation to ordinary language and the language of their theory, then that theorist would be a pessimist about ordinary language emotion terms. Thus according to pessimists, they would not be speaking of the same sorts of things when using a folk emotion term that was redeployed within the language of their theory as lay people would be speaking of when they employ folk emotion terms from within ordinary language.

If we were to understand the meanings of folk emotion terms as the concepts that are associated with the meanings of folk emotion terms, then one might ask how it is possible for a term to have a single referent while at the same time be associated with two or more distinct theories of emotion. In other words, one might question how it is possible for two distinct theories of emotion that have distinct conceptions of what emotions are to refer to the same sorts of things. One answer lies in Putnam’s causal theory of meaning. According to Putnam’s causal theory of meaning, the meaning of a term can be decomposed into what is referred to as a term’s ‘extension’ and a term’s ‘intension.’ The intension of a term does not determine the extension of a term. The extension of a term is the class of things that is denoted by a term. It is, as Putnam states, “simply the set of things the term is true of.” For example, some emotion theorists would say that the extension of the term ‘fear’ is a psychological state of believing or judging that one is in danger, i.e., the term ‘fear’ is true of all and only psychological

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287 “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.”
states of believing or judging that one is in danger. The intension of a term is understood in terms of a term’s sense.\textsuperscript{288} Thus two terms can have the same extension, but differ in intension (sense). The best way to illustrate what is meant by the intension of a term is by example. Putnam uses the terms ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’ in order to illustrate this distinction. As Putnam notes, the terms ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’ may denote the same class of things, that is, as long as all and only creatures with a heart are also creatures with a kidney. In such cases, both terms have the same extension. ‘Creature with a heart,’ however, seems to have a different kind of “meaning” compared to ‘creature with a kidney.’ This difference in “meaning” is a difference in their senses. It is a difference in their intension. Given that terms have both intensions and extensions, it is possible for two people to have different conceptions associated with a term, while at the same time be referring to the same thing. The referent of a term is not fixed by a term’s intension, according to Putnam’s causal theory of meaning.\textsuperscript{289} It is instead fixed by what Putnam refers to as an “introducing event,” in which a term is first introduced by the use of an “approximately correct definite description.”\textsuperscript{290}

Although it is not entirely clear, at least to me at this point, what Putnam means by an “approximately correct definite description,” I suspect that part of what he means can be explained in the following way. An approximately correct definite description for

\textsuperscript{288} Ibid., 216; Gottlob Frege, “Sense and Reference,” Philosophical Review 57(1948).

\textsuperscript{289} Frege was the first introduced the distinction between the intension and extension of a term, along with the use of the terms ‘sense’ and ‘reference.’

\textsuperscript{290} Putnam, “Explanation and Reference,” 198-203.
a term is a definite description that helps identify the referent of the term. The description may not be entirely correct or true since the person who introduced the term may not have been in the appropriate epistemic position such that the description could be entirely correct. Even though the approximately correct definite description, however, might not be entirely correct, it allows a speaker to communicate to some other person to what the term refers. For example, consider a hypothetical case of tigers. Let us say that at one point in time there was no term that referred to tigers. Later on, some individual who was only exposed to orange tigers decided to name these large cat-like creatures with black stripes ‘tiger,’ and that individual used the definite description “the large cat like creatures that are orange with black stripes,” which is a category of animals, to help communicate what he was referring to when he used the term ‘tiger.’ One might say that the individual who gave tigers the name ‘tiger’ used an approximately correct definition description in naming tigers ‘tiger.’ This definite description is not entirely correct since there are tigers that are neither orange nor striped. This was, however, unknown to the speaker who named tigers ‘tiger.’ Furthermore, let us say the speaker who named tigers ‘tiger’ was able to use the definite description to successfully indicate to some other person that the term ‘tiger’ referred to tigers. Given that the definite description was correct enough to successfully convey the referent to which the speaker was referring, the definite description may be understood as being “approximately correct.”

Once an introducing event occurs for a particular term, the referent for that particular term is fixed, regardless of whether or not the approximately correct definite description used to help identify the referent of the term undergoes various changes or
corrections. This is because the only requirement for a term’s referent to remain fixed from speaker to speaker is that each speaker’s acquisition of the term is causally linked to the initial introducing event. Thus changes to the approximately correct definite description associated with a term may occur without affecting the extension of the term. For example, let us say that a particular person acquires as a child the term ‘tiger’ by the use of the same definite description used by the speaker who initially named tigers ‘tiger.’ The child acquired the use of this term from someone who, through a long causal chain of language acquisition, was causally linked to the introducing event in which the referent was established. Thus the child’s acquisition of the term was also causally linked to this introducing event. Later on, the child grows up to become a zoologist and eventually discovers that the approximately correct description he relied on as a child in order to learn the referent for ‘tiger’ was not entirely correct. He comes to find out that there are other creatures that are not orange, not striped, but have the same genetic characteristics of those creatures described by the approximately correct definite description “the large cat-like creatures with orange with black stripes.” Once this occurs, the zoologists may alter the definite description used when the zoologist teaches other speakers what the term ‘tiger’ refers to. The zoologist might use the definite description “the species with XYZ genetic characteristics and are usually large, cat-like, orange with black stripe, but sometimes white with or without black stripes.” In this way, the definite description associated with a particular term may undergo change without affecting the extension of the term. Accordingly, a term may have more than one intension, such as the one associated with the original approximately correct definite description and another
associated with the revised approximately correct definite description, and yet have a single extension. We can also understand these approximately correct definite descriptions, as well as those that are not so correct or even those that are downright false, as concepts that are associated with various terms. From here on, I will simply speak of “concepts” rather than “intensions,” although my understanding of these two terms is that they are not metaphysically equivalent or referentially equivalent terms. They may, however, be logically equivalent terms.

§4.4.3 Terminological Meta-semantic Perspective:

Given that a single term may come to be associated with more than one concept while still maintain a single referent, it seems that the referent(s) and the concept(s) associated with a specific term may come apart. Also, since the concept or concepts associated with a terms a definite description of the intended referent or referents, there are at least three possible ways that the concept(s) and referent(s) associated with a folk emotion term can be related to the concept(s) and referent(s) associated with the same term when it is redeployed in a theoretic or scientific language. These three possibilities—what I refer to as meaning-relations (i.e., relations between a term, a concept or a family of concepts, and a referent)—are as follows. I refer to these rules as Terminological Meaning-Relations (T-Rules):

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291 Ibid., 200. Note that this interpretation may diverge from Putnam’s causal theory of reference, where he speaks of stereotypes rather than concepts. Ibid., “Explanation and Meaning.” I use concepts here in a very ordinary, non-technical, folk sense to simply capture what I believe to be the crucial role of a definite description in Putnam’s causal theory of reference. It should be noted, however, that in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” Putnam does speak of the sense of a word as a concept.
**Terminological Meaning-relations**

Identical Terms: A term in ordinary language is associated with the same referent and the same concept as the same term in a theoretic or scientific language.

Trans-theoretic Terms: A term in ordinary language is associated with the same referent and the same family of concepts as the same term in a theoretic or scientific language.

Polysemous Terms: A term in ordinary language is associated with a distinct but related referent and a distinct but related concept or family of concepts as the same term in a theoretic or scientific language.

The first possible meaning-relation captures the idea that ordinary language and a theoretic or scientific language may share the same term in so far as the term has the same intension and the same extension in both languages. This does not, however, entail that the same term serves the same purpose in both languages. For example, the term ‘diamond’ may have the same intension and the same extension in ordinary language as it would in a theory of gemology, but the term may serve different functions in one language compared to the other. In ordinary language, it may function to support inferences about marriage, whereas in gemology it may function to support inferences about crystalline structures, specific gravity, or refractive index. The second meaning-relation captures the idea that speakers of two different languages can use the same term in order to refer to that same thing, while at the same time conceptualizing the referent in different ways. Although this would suggest that trans-theoretical terms serve different functions within each language, unlike identical terms it would necessarily be the case that trans-theoretical terms serve distinct functions since each term has a distinct intension relative to some language. This does not entail, however, that the terms are completely independent and cannot serve the same function in both languages. For
example, a trans-theoretical term would serve the same function of identifying the extension’s spatial-temporal location in both languages. This would also be the case for identical terms. The third meaning-relation captures that idea that speakers of two different languages share the same term while the term has different but related meanings relative to each speaker. This would entail that a term serves a distinct function in one language compared to another language. Although we can say a term, relative to a two distinct languages, may have the same general functions of supporting inferences and identifying the spatial-temporal location of the referents to which a term refers, since the term would have a different intension and a different extension in one language compared to the other, the specific inferential function or spatial-temporally localizing function the term would serve would be different in one language compared to another distinct language.

When we consider these three possibilities, we may conclude that any of these relations may actually obtain between the referent(s) and concept(s) associated with any folk emotion term as it is understood by speakers of ordinary language and the referent(s) and concept(s) associated with the same term as it is understood by philosophers or psychologists in general, however, for this current project we are primarily concerned with the question of which of these three relations are thought to obtain between the referents and concepts of folk emotion terms in general and the referents and concepts of these same terms when they are employed in a specific philosophical or psychological theory of emotion. We are thus concerned with whether or not folk emotion terms as they are used in ordinary language and the same terms as they are used in a philosophic or
scientific theory are identical terms, trans-theoretical terms, or polysemous terms. How an emotion theorist answers this question determines that theorist’s meta-semantic perspective on the question of what emotions are.

§4.4.3.1 Pessimism about Ordinary Language

One answer that an emotion theorist might give is that most, if not all, of the meanings associated with folk emotion terms in ordinary language are not related in any significant way to the meanings associated with the same terms employed in the theorist’s theoretical language. I refer to such theorists as pessimists about ordinary language. I refer to these theorists as “pessimists” because those who argue that the meanings of folk emotion terms in ordinary language are unrelated to the meanings of the same terms in their theory often do so based on the claim that most, if not all, of the concepts associated with ordinary language emotion terms are not approximately correct definite descriptions. They suggest that most, if not all, folk emotion concepts are more incorrect than correct. Such arguments typically assume that folk emotion concepts, which are associated with folk emotion terms, entail that each emotion type as well as emotions as a whole is an objective kind.292 Given that these folk emotion concepts describe the intended referents of folk terms, it is then concluded that folk emotion terms

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292 Ibid; Ibid., “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Although this is a controversial claim, I take it for granted for the purpose of constructing an alternative taxonomy for interdisciplinary research and theorizing. The problem with this assumption is that no one really knows what folk concepts are. For example, in contrast to the pessimist’s assumption that folk emotion terms entail the idea that emotions are natural kinds, Errol Bedford employs the analysis of ordinary language use to argue that folk emotion terms, contrary to what some theories think, do not have meanings that serve the function of referring to or naming states of feeling or some natural kind. See Errol Bedford, “Emotions and Statements About Them,” in The Social Construction of Emotions, ed. Rom Harré (New York: Blackwell, 1986).
refer to something like basic emotions, which are constructs posited by psychological theories of emotion. Then evidence is brought forth to suggest that either folk emotion terms actually refer to several disparate kinds or that there is no empirical evidence to support positing the existence of either a discrete basic emotion category or a category of basic emotions as an objective kind. In either case, it is concluded that folk emotion terms fail to refer. They fail to refer in the first case because folk emotion terms fail to refer to unified categories of objective kinds. They fail to refer in the second case because the evidence suggests that nothing fulfills the description given by a concept that is associated with each emotion term. Thus pessimists about folk emotion terms seem to liken folk emotion terms to terms like ‘phlogiston’, which at one point in history was thought to successfully refer to some real thing, where “real” was understood as an objective kind. It was later discovered that no non-arbitrary, physical feature of the world actually fit the definite description associated with the word ‘phlogiston.’ It was thus concluded that the word ‘phlogiston’ never in fact referred. However, pessimists also accept that folk emotion terms and their associated concepts have important functions that are independent of their referential capacities.

Pessimists also understand that one aim of scientific research and theorizing is the discovery and explication of objective truths about the world. So they take the prescriptive stance that scientific theorizing should not use folk emotion terms since these terms fail to refer. Accordingly, they suggest a revisionist strategy for scientific pursuits. They propose that emotion theorists and researchers abandon or alter the use of folk emotion terms in order to adopt a new theoretic or scientific language. Given this
prescribed disassociation with folk emotion terms and their associated meanings,
Pessimists hold that folk emotion terms and scientific emotion terms are not or ought not
be understood as identical terms or trans-theoretical terms. They typically suggest that
these two categories of emotion terms are or should be understood as polysemous terms.

§4.4.3.2 Optimism about Ordinary Language

Optimists about ordinary language emotion terms hold the opposing view that the
concepts associated with folk emotion terms in ordinary language are approximately
correct definite descriptions, especially in the sense that they refer to interesting and
unified sets of phenomena.\textsuperscript{293} This does not entail that according to optimists there is a
one-to-one correspondence between a specific emotion term and a specific physiological
or neurophysiological state or a unique set of these states; nor does it entail that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between a specific emotion term and a specific thought or
behavioral pattern. It does entail that emotion terms have a one-to-one relation with a
category of objective kinds or a category of subjective kinds, and denies that there are no
such categories.

Optimists also accept, either implicitly or explicitly, that there is a reciprocal
relation between ordinary language and theoretical languages of philosophy and

\textsuperscript{293} I assume, however, that many academics typically believe that folk emotion terms are
associated with emotion concepts that characterize emotions as some sort of natural kind.
I assumed this for the purpose of constructing the alternative taxonomy presented in
chapter one, and I will continue to do so for my purposes in this chapter. Thus in
accordance with this assumption, I interpret theorists who argue for some type of basic
emotion theory or a theory of emotion as a natural kind to be an optimist about ordinary
language emotion terms, unless they explicitly stated in some article that I was aware of
that they hold something akin to a pessimistic position on ordinary language emotion
terms. Yet later on in chapter five, I will challenge this assumption that the meaning of
folk emotion terms necessarily assume that emotion are natural kinds.
psychology. Theorizing begins with folk emotion terms, which reflect folk intuitions, and the process of theorizing aims at elucidating, clarifying, and correcting the folk concepts associated with folk emotion terms. These clarifications and revisions are not understood as independent theoretical achievements, but achievements of the society as a whole. Thus optimists seem to accept that a folk emotion term in ordinary language and the same term in a theoretic or scientific language are associated with the same referent and the same family of related concepts. They liken ordinary folk emotion terms to terms like ‘water,’ where earlier folk concepts, as well as the theoretical concepts that were put forth to elucidate or clarify them, may have been imprecise, broad, or even incorrect to a certain extent, but they were still approximately correct definite descriptions. When philosophers and scientists, working with the Aristotelian conception of water, eventually discovered that water was H₂O, this reconceptualization did not entail a change in reference. Thus when the contemporary concept of water replaced the older Aristotelian concept in philosophic and scientific communities, as well as in the community at large, there was no linguistic shift that occurred. The reason being that these terms were understood to be trans-theoretical terms. Thus optimists answer, “yes” to the question of whether or not folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms.

§4.4.4 Conceptual Meta-Semantic Perspective

Although optimists typically hold that folk emotion terms do successfully refer and pessimists typically hold that folk emotion terms fail to successfully refer. Each perspective, however, understand the meanings of emotion terms, as theoretical or
scientific terms within their own theory, differently from the way they understand how
the meaning of folk emotion terms generally relate to theoretical or scientific meanings of
these same terms. Understanding the meanings of folk emotion terms in this way involves
an analysis of meaning at the primary semantic level, where what is analyzed is the
meaning of an emotion term as it is used within a single philosophical or scientific theory
of emotion. So an alternative set of possible meaning-relations, which are relations
between terms, concepts, and referents that define the meaning of a term, would apply. At
the meta-semantic perspective of ontological meaning-relations, emotion terms may be
said to have any of the following three kinds of meaning-relations within a particular
theory of emotion: objective, subjective, and relative meaning-relations. I describe these
three kinds of meaning-relations further below. To help clarify the distinctions between
these three different kinds of meaning-relations, it might be helpful to keep in mind that
an objective meaning-relation is the only kind of meaning-relation that maps a term onto
to a category of objective kinds or a set of categories of objective kinds. Subjective
meaning-relations and relative meaning-relations map a term onto a category of
subjective kinds, which may have objective kinds or subjective kinds as members. A
term, along with its referent and relevant meaning-relation, is what I refer to as a concept.
I also speak of accuracy-conditions for meaning-relations, which refer to the condition(s)
that a concept must fulfill in order for any expression that uses a term associated with the
relevant meaning-relation must fulfill in order to have the possibility of being true.²⁹⁴

²⁹⁴ Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*; Goldie, *The
Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration*; De Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion*; Scherer,
“Emotion as Emergent Processes: They Require a Dynamic Computational
Architecture”; Ekman and Cordaro, “What Is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic”; Harré,
Finally, the terms for each of the categories of ontological meaning-relations discussed below were formulated in accordance to the following rule for formulating such terms, which I refer to as the *rule for the nomenclature of conceptual meaning-relations* (*o-rule*):

**Rule for the Nomenclature of Conceptual Meaning-Relations**

Terms: Secondary Adjective + Primary Adjective + ‘Meaning’

Examples: *objective meaning-relation, purely subjective meaning-relation, heterogeneous meaning-relation, relatively subjective meaning-relation*

In order to illustrate how these possible meaning-relations may be applied to a theoretical understanding of the meaning of a particular emotion term, i.e., the concept that is associated with a particular emotion term, I provide a meta-semantic analysis of the term ‘emotion’ with respect to the following theories of emotion: Paul Ekman’s basic emotion theory, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory, Klaus Scherer’s component process theory, James A. Russell’s psychological constructionist theory, Lisa Feldman Barrett’s conceptual act theory, Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory, and James R. Averill’s social constructivist theory.

A *conceptual meaning-relation* is a function that maps a term in question, such as the term ‘emotion,’ to a referent class. The primary adjective indicates the kind of referent class that a term is mapped on to by the meaning relation, such as a class of

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*The Social Construction of Emotions.* The idea of ‘meaning-relations,’ along with the four meaning-relations described, and ‘accuracy-conditions,’ as they are presented here, are not, as far as I am aware, a part of any standard meta-semantic theory in philosophy. It might, however, be possible to somehow incorporate these ideas into a pre-existing semantic theory or re-express these ideas in terms of a pre-existing semantic theory. For example, it might be possible to re-express some these ideas in term of Chalmers’s two-dimensional semantics, however, to show this is beyond the scope of the current project.
objective kind or subjective kind. If there is a secondary adjective, the secondary adjective may indicate the characteristic of members of a class of subjective kind: purely (constituted only by subjective kinds), heterogeneously (constituted by both objective kinds and subjective kinds) objectively (constituted by only objective kinds), orr it may indicate a way that a term may be mapped on to the members of a class of subjective kinds. One important thing to note in regard to understanding the meaning of terms at the meta-semantic level is that the meanings of terms at this meta-semantic level, essentially, maps a theoretical term, in accordance with the relevant theory’s first principles, to an ontological genus, class, or members of an ontological genus or class. In this sense, the ‘meanings’ of terms at the meta-semantic level are constituted by the interplay of at least two sets of meaning-relations: terminological meaning-relations and conceptual meaning-relations. Given that a term, its relevant meaning-relations, and its referent constitute what I refer to as a “concept,” it follows that the analysis given here of the meaning of the term ‘emotion’ at the meta-semantic level is an analysis of a particular theorist’s concept that is associated with the term ‘emotion.’

§4.4.4.1 Objective Meanings

Paul Ekman’s basic emotion theory, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory of emotion, and Klaus Scherer’s component process theory of emotion may all be regarded as theories that understand the term ‘emotion’ to have objective meaning. For Ekman, emotions are “discrete physiological responses to fundamental life situations that have been useful in our ancestral environment” that are products of biologically innate “affect
programs.” For Prinz, emotions are “embodied appraisals” that are products of biologically given “emotion systems.” For Scherer, an emotion is “an episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the organism.” These definite descriptions, which define the intension of the term ‘emotion’ for each theorist, are thought to be approximately correct definite descriptions of the referent. Thus ‘emotion,’ according to both theories, refers to a class of objective kinds since all emotions are unified on all three accounts by the non-arbitrary physical property of being products of some emotion system, which is physically realized by its causal efficacy.

§4.4.4.2 Purely Subjective Meanings

Lisa Feldman Barrett’s conceptual act theory of emotion and Russell A. James’s psychological constructionist theory of emotion understand the term ‘emotion’ to have a pure subjective meaning. According to Barrett’s theory, emotions are a “variety of mental states that represent your own feelings of your experience or someone else’s behavior named with emotion words.” Although Russell does not subscribe to the usage of folk emotion terms within his theory, it can be said that what the folk understand to be emotions are what Russell understands to be either emotional episodes or emotional


meta-experience according to his psychological constructionist theory of emotion. An emotional episode is “any occurrent event that sufficiently fits a prototype [folk emotion concept/script] to count as an instance of that emotion,” and an emotional meta-experience is the “perception of one’s own emotional episode in terms of one or more specific emotion categories.”

These descriptions not only serve to respectively define the concept associated with the term ‘emotion’ for Barrett and Russell, but for Barrett it also serves to unite a variety of different kinds of mental states, such as “core affective states, mental acts of categorization informed by ‘emotion knowledge’ learned from past experiences, and executive control,” into a single category. Given that the unifying principle—that emotions are a variety of mental states that represent our own feeling of our experience or someone else’s behavior named with emotion words—necessarily depends on emotion words, which are human conceptualizations. Thus the class of mental states that are defined by this principle is a subjective kind according to Barrett’s theory. Strictly speaking, Russell’s account denies that the term ‘emotion’ has any referent. Yet, if he were to accept that the term ‘emotion’ referred, then the referent would most likely be a subjective kind since the unifying principle would have to unite at least two distinct categories of things, which are both subjective kinds. So Russell’s would-be referent for the term ‘emotion’ would be a subjective kind.

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299 Barrett, Gendron, and Huang, “Do Discrete Emotions Exist?,” 431.

300 Russell, “Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion,” 147.
§4.4.3 Heterogeneously Subjective Meanings

Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion is also an example of a theory that understands the term ‘emotion’ to have a subjective meaning. According to Nussbaum’s theory, ‘emotion’ refers to at least two distinct classes of referents. Some emotions seem to constitute a class of socially constructed, subjective kinds whereas others seem to constitute a class of innate, objective kinds. As Nussbaum observes regarding the difference between non-human animal and some human emotions:

Animals have emotions about other animals with whom they share a society; but human societies transmit practices of emotion labeling and normative evaluation that actually enter into the content of the emotions their members will have. The thesis of “social construction,” in its most plausible form, is the thesis that these practices, in their specificity, make a difference to a society’s emotional repertory.\(^{301}\)

Yet, Nussbaum also notes the following, which seems to suggest that not all human emotions are fundamentally the same:

But certain specific fears are also ubiquitous, and dictated by our animal heritage: the fear of snakes, for example appears to be innate and based on perceptual schemata that have adaptive significance. Fears of thunder and lightning, of sudden loud noises, of large animals - all of these, once again, are ubiquitous and highly functional.\(^{302}\)

The class of socially constructed emotions would constitute a class of subjective kinds because their status as a type of socially constructed emotions is essentially dependent on the social-cultural values, meanings, and functions of these evaluative appraisals. The class of innate, evolutionarily given emotions would constitute a class of objective kinds in so far as those evaluative appraisals or recognitions are regarded to be products of

\(^{301}\) Barrett, Gendron, and Huang, “Do Discrete Emotions Exist?” 431.

\(^{302}\) Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, 150-51.
some unique evolutionarily, adapted mechanism that is realized by its causal efficacy.\textsuperscript{303} These two distinct classes are unified into a single class of subjective kinds by the concept that “Emotions are forms of intense attention and engagement, in which the world is appraised in its relation to the self.”\textsuperscript{304} The reason why this principle unifies the two previous classes into a single class of subjective kinds is that although this concept identifies the general function that all emotions share, it does not identify a non-arbitrary, physical property as being associated with such a function. Thus the principle is essentially dependent on human conceptualizations. Such a principle would be similar principles that classify biologically analogous traits into a single category rather than biological principles that classify biologically homologous traits into a single category.\textsuperscript{305}

\textit{§4.4.4.4 Relatively Subjective Meanings}

Finally, James R. Averill’s social constructivist view of emotion seems to understand the term ‘emotion’ to have a relative-subjective meaning. For example, consider the following passage in which Averill notes the various ways in which the term ‘emotion’ can be conceived:

\begin{quote}
In cognitive terms, emotions may be conceived of as belief systems or schemas that belief systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{303} Ibid., 151.

\textsuperscript{304} Nussbaum does not seem to give any indication as to whether or not she believes this to be the case, but regardless of whether or not she accepts this interpretation of her view she her account would still hold that emotions are subjective kinds. An explanation is given in the subsequent passage.

\textsuperscript{305} Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions}, 106. Interestingly enough, Nussbaum’s theory of emotion seems to fulfill the description of a kind of theory that Paul Griffiths speculates may support the current folk-psychological understanding of what emotions are, as descried by Griffiths.
When conceived of in this way, the question arises, What is the source of emotional schemas? The more traditional answer to this question is that emotional schemas became hardwired into the nervous system during the course of evolution - that they represent innate affect programmes (Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1981).

Regarding his social constructivist theory of emotion, Averill remarks:

In contrast, a constructivist view assumes that emotional schemas are the internal representation of social norms or rules.

In more behavioral terms, emotions may be defined as socially constituted syndromes. By syndrome I mean a set of interrelated response elements (physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses, subjective experiences). Some of these component responses may be biologically based (e.g., certain expressive actions). However, the way the components are organized into coherent syndromes is determined primarily by social and not biological evolution. Another way of stating this same idea is that emotions are transitory social roles - that is, institutionalized ways of interpreting and responding to particular classes of situations.306

In the above passage, Averill seems to suggest that the term ‘emotion’ is actually associated with several distinct concepts. The first concept, that emotions are the “belief systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior,” is associated with a cognitive theory of emotion.307 The second concept, in accordance with basic emotion theories of emotion, is that emotions are the “innate affect programmes” that “guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior.”308 The third concept, in accordance with social constructivist theories of emotion, is that emotions are “the internal representation of social norms or rules” that “belief systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of

307 Averill, “The Acquisition of Emotions During Childhood,” 100.
308 Ibid.
responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior."309 The fourth concept, from a behavioral perspective, is that emotions are “socially constituted syndromes” where by “syndrome” he means “a set of interrelated response elements (physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses, subjective experiences).”310 The fifth concept is that emotions are “transitory social roles - that is, institutionalized ways of interpreting and responding to particular classes of situations,” which seems to speak from the sociological point of view.311

Although Averill presents a total of five concepts, he seems to accept that each of these concepts, except the concept of emotion from the perspective of basic emotion theory, are concepts that are associated with his use of the term ‘emotion.’ That he rejects the concept of emotion from the perspective of basic emotion theory is evidence by the following. On the one hand, in introducing every other concept, besides his own and the concept he attributes to basic emotion theorists, Averill marks each introduction with suggestive phrases, such as “emotions may be conceived,” “emotions may be defined as,” or “another way of stating the same idea is that,” which follow immediately after his explication of the concept he introduced with the phrase “may be defined as.” All these phrases indicate that Averill allows or grants the association of these three concepts with his use of the term ‘emotion.’ They are acceptable since emotions “may” be conceived or defined in these ways. On the other hand, his introduction of the concept he attributes to basic emotion theorists is marked by the description, “The more traditional answer,”

309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
311 Ibid.
which seems to suggest a cold conceptual distancing. This is then immediately followed by the introduction of the social constructivist concept, which is explicitly associated with his view, with the use of the stark phrase “by contrast.” This phrase seems to successfully sever his view from the view he attributes to basic emotion theorists. So out of the five concepts Averill introduces, he only associates four of these concepts with the term ‘emotion.’

Furthermore, the cognitivist concept and the social constructivist concept seem to constitute a distinct family of concepts, whereas the behavioral concept and the sociological concept seem to be distinct concepts in their own right. The behavioral and sociological concepts seem to each be distinct concepts because there is no indication from the concepts alone that they are related in any way to any of the other three concepts. Neither of these two concepts epistemically, logically, metaphysically, conceptually, or physically entails the other. The cognitive concept and the social constructivist concept also fail to share an epistemic relation, but they seem to be related in the other four possible ways that concepts are relatable. The fact that no epistemic relations hold between these concepts may be brought into view when one considers the following cases: If I knew that emotions were belief systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior, I would not necessarily know that emotions are socially constituted sets of interrelated physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses, and subjective experiences, and vice versa. So the cognitive concept does not epistemically entail the behavioral concept, and vice versa. Similar arguments can be
made, *mutatis mutandis*, regarding the epistemic relations between the each of the remaining pairs of concepts.

In terms of logical relations, if it were true that emotions are beliefs systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior, it would not follow necessarily from the rules of logic alone that emotions are socially constituted sets of interrelated physiological changes, expressive reactions, and vice versa. So the cognitive concept of emotion would not logically entail the behavioral concept, and vice versa. Similar arguments can also be made, *mutatis mutandis*, regarding the logical relations between the behavioral concept and the social constructivist concept, as well as between the sociological concept and both the cognitive and social constructivist concepts.

It is also not the case that the cognitive concept logically entails the social constructivist concept. If emotions are belief systems or schemas that belief systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior, it would not follow necessarily from the rules of logic alone that emotions are the internal representation of social norms or rules that guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior. The social constructivist concept, however, does logically entail the cognitive concept. To understand why the cognitive concept does not logically entail the social constructivist concept, but the entailment between the two concepts do hold in the opposite direction, we simply need to consider Averill’s account of the relations between the cognitive concept, the basic emotion concept, and the social constructivist concept of emotion.
As Averill notes while considering the possible ways in which one could account for the ‘emotional schemas’ stated in the cognitivist’s conception of emotions, “The more traditional answer to this question is that emotional schemas became hardwired into the nervous system during the course of evolution - that they represent innate affect programmes.”\textsuperscript{312} He then notes that, “By contrast, a constructivist view assumes that emotional schemas are the internal representation of social norms or rules.”\textsuperscript{313} It is clear from these two passages that Averill’s conception of emotion, from the perspective of a cognitive theory, does not necessarily entail the logically consistent concept of emotion from the perspective of social constructivism. While Averill recognizes that the concept of emotion, from the perspective of a cognitive theory of emotion, is logically consistent with either the concept of emotion from the perspective of a basic emotion theory or from the perspective of a social constructivist theory, he also recognizes that these two concepts are either contradictory or inconsistent since he offers one as a contrasting case of the other. Thus the cognitive concept would not logically entail the social constructivist concept since it entails either the social constructivist concept or the basic emotion concept; but this would then mean that both of these concepts would logically entail the cognitive concept. So, although the cognitive concept does not logically entail the social constructivist concept, the entailment does hold in the opposite direction. Thus the social constructivist concept and the cognitive concept can be understood to constitute a distinct family of concepts, according to Averill. We would not include the basic emotion concept since he seems to disavow the adequacy of that concept.

\textsuperscript{312} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{313} Ibid.
Since we are primarily concerned with the question of whether or not the four concepts Averill associates with the term ‘emotion’ share any significant relation that would allow us to regard them as constituting a distinct family of concepts, and we already established that the cognitive concept and the social constructivist concept do share such a relation, we may concentrate in the following on whether or not either the behavioral concept or the sociological concept are either metaphysically, conceptually, or physically related to any of the other three concepts. To help us determine whether or not the behavioral concept metaphysically entails any of the other three concepts, we can ask: If it were true in all possible worlds that emotions are socially constituted sets of interrelated physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses, and subjective experiences, would it then follow that in all possible worlds emotions would be either belief systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations, the internal representation of social norms or rules that guide the appraisal of situations, or institutionalized ways of interpreting and responding to particular classes of situations? In so far as there is some metaphysically possible world in which emotions are biological adaptive sets of interrelated physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses that are regarded to be socially constituted, perhaps because the adaptations arose from merely causal-mechanistic interactions between social creatures, then the answer is no. This metaphysically possible world seems to suggest that the behavioral concept would not entail any of the other three. Could the metaphysical entailment hold in the other direction? Again, the answer is no, especially if there is some metaphysically possible world inhabited only by emotional minds, metaphysical idealist, or mind-body
dualist who strictly identify emotions with the mind.

As for the sociological concept, if it is true in all possible worlds that emotions are institutionalized ways of interpreting and responding to particular classes of situations, does it follow that it is true in all possible worlds that emotions are belief systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations or internal representation of social norms or rules that guide the appraisal of situations. In so far as there is some metaphysically possible world in which emotions are simply actions performed in accordance with external institutional rules, then the answer is no. Could the metaphysical entailment hold in the other direction? Again, the answer is no, especially if there is some metaphysically possible world inhabited by social creatures who do not or cannot create institutions. Thus it seems that the behavioral and sociological concepts share no metaphysical relation with any of the other four concepts.

Furthermore, these metaphysically possible cases that served as counter-examples to there be any significant metaphysical relationships between the behavioral concept and the other three concepts, as well as those examples used to speak against any significant metaphysical relationship between the sociological concept and the other three concepts, also serve to speak against there being any significant conceptual relation that holds between the same pairs of concepts. For any of these concepts to be conceptually related to the other in a significant way, it must be the case that it is not possible for one to conceptualize a case where one concept holds and the other does not. Since every metaphysically possible case presented in the previous paragraph is also a conceptually possible case, it follows that none of these concepts are conceptually related in a significant way.
We can also ask if the behavioral or sociological concepts of emotion posited by Averill are physically related in a significant way. To test the relation let us ask: If emotions are socially constituted sets of interrelated physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses, and subjective experiences, would it necessarily follow in virtue of any natural law of this world that emotions would be either belief systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations, the internal representation of social norms or rules that guide the appraisal of situations, or institutionalized ways of interpreting and responding to particular classes of situations? In so far as it is thought that “emotions” are thought to refer to sets of “interrelated” physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses, and subjective experiences that are regarded to be socially constituted in virtue of the fact the “interrelation” between the various elements are explained by socially constructed interpretations or conceptualizations, and there are no natural laws in this world that require sets of physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses, and subjective experiences that are not related in terms of any materialistic causal connection to necessarily cause or be caused by beliefs, schemas, internal representations, or institutionalized ways of interpreting and responding to things, then the answer is no. Are there such “emotions”? James A. Russell seems to think so. Would the entailment go the other way? In so far as beliefs, schemas, internal representation of social norms or rules that guide the appraisal of situations, and institutionalized ways of interpreting and responding are thought to cause, in virtue of natural laws, non-socially constituted evolutionarily adaptive, biological mechanism to cause sets of interrelated physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental...
responses, and subjective experiences, the answer is no. Are there such emotions? Many realists about emotions seem to think so. Given the plausibility of the opposing views presented, I conclude that there are no significant relations between the behavioral concepts and of the other three concepts.

Finally, we are left with the question of whether or not the sociological concept is physically related to the other three concepts. To determine if there are any such relations, we can ask: If emotions are institutionalized ways of interpreting and responding to particular classes of situations, would it necessarily follow, in virtue of any natural law, that one would have either a belief system or schema that guides the appraisal of situations, or that one would have an internal representation of social norms or rules that guide the appraisal of situations? In so far as institutionalized ways of interpreting and responding to particular classes of situations need not cause one to hold either a belief system or schema that guides the appraisal of situations, or an internal representation of social norms or rules that guide the appraisal of situations, the answer is no. Also, are there such emotions? If simply smiling can cause joy, and a flight attendant or a sales clerk can smile at a consumer, simply because it is their job to do so, and without any belief system or schema to guide their appraisal of situations or without any internal representation of social norms or rules that guide their appraisal of situations, then the answer is no. Does the entailment go the other direction? If emotions are belief systems and schemas or internal representation of social norms or rules that guide the appraisal of situations are thought to be innate, evolutionarily adaptive, biological mechanisms, then the answer is no. Are there any such emotions? Many non-human
animals that are incapable of creating institutions may have such emotions.

Given all of the foregoing, it seems that we can safely conclude that although the cognitive concept and the social constructivist concept constitute a distinct family of concepts, the behavioral concept and the sociological concept seem to each constitute a distinct class of their own. So we have at least three distinct concepts, one being a family of concepts, which are associated with Averill’s use of the term emotion. With respect to the referent of emotion, according to Averill’s social constructivist view, emotions are the internal representation of social norms or rules that guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of responses, and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behavior. Furthermore, each distinct concept is a definite description of some referent that functions to define ‘emotion’ for a specific linguistic community: cognitive theorists, social constructivists, behaviorists, orr sociologists. Accordingly, because Averill identifies himself as a social constructivist, it is reasonable to conclude that this is what he believes to be the referent of the term ‘emotion,’ in accordance with his theory. So the term ‘emotion’ refers to a single class of subjective kinds. In conclusion, we have here an example of a subjective relative meaning where a term is thought to refer to a single subjective kind class that is constituted by both objective and subjective kinds while also associated with multiple distinct concepts or distinct families of concepts that each belong to a distinct linguistic institution.

§4.4.5 The First Principles of Meta-Semantic Structural Pluralism

The meta-framework of meta-semantic structural pluralism is a set of first principles that are intended to help guide interdisciplinary research and theorizing across
a variety of disciplines, however, this meta-framework may also serve to help guide research and theorizing from within a single discipline. The first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism seeks to do so by providing academics a way to establish, at the least, an initial starting point for understanding not only the features of various particular theories that differentiate them from other theories that aim to fulfill the same goal, but also the essential, structural similarities that are shared by various particular theories across a variety of disciplines, as well as within a single discipline. The meta-framework of meta-semantic structural pluralism may also help guide the construction of theories by providing academics with an initial set of questions that one might want to consider when constructing a theory of emotion. It also provides a set of possible positions that one might consider in response to those questions. These first principles were established through the course of section 4.4. I also illustrated how such first principles might be applied in order to establish the initial conditions for interdisciplinary research and theorizing that it was intended to. I now offer below a simple statement of these first principles in order to provide a clearer idea the particular first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism:

The General Principle of Meta-Semantic Structural Pluralism

META$: The general principle of meta-semantic structural pluralism is the principle of deep perspective-taking. In order to understand how one might go about conducting interdisciplinary research across disciplines, one must be able to consider various theories about a particular object of study from within a number of different perspectives.

Semantic Perspective

META$: The semantic perspective on an object of study understands the question, “What is X?” in terms of the question, “What is the meaning of the term, word, or concept of ‘X’, where ‘X’ represents a particular term, word, or concept that is associated with the object of study in question?” The answer to this question
will depend on a variety of factors, including what the object of study is and from which disciplinary perspective one chooses to understand the object of study. The aim of taking the semantic perspective is to understand the variety of ways other academics might understand the meanings of the various terms that may be used to speak about or conceive either the object itself or aspects of the object of study in question.

**Metaphysical Perspective**

META\textsuperscript{M}: The metaphysical perspective on an object of study understands the question of “What is X?” in terms of the question, “What kind of thing is X, where X represents the object of study in question?” The aim of the metaphysical perspective is to understand the variety of different things that the object of study can be identified as being. There are at least two ways to understand an object of study—as an *objective kind* or as a *subjective kind*.

**Terminological Meta-semantic Perspective**

META\textsuperscript{L}: The terminological meta-semantic perspective on an object of study understands the question of “What is X?” in terms of the question “What is the relationship between ordinary language orr ordinary concepts about X, and the language orr concepts employed by a particular theory of X?” The aim of the meta-semantic perspective is to understand a theorist's view of the relation between ordinary language and the language of their theory. Theorists may hold divergent terminological meta-semantic perspectives while holding the same metaphysical perspective orr the same semantic perspective on some object of study. There are at least two ways of holding a terminological meta-semantic perspective, both of which invoke distinct terminological meaning relations—*optimism* and *pessimism* about ordinary language.

**Conceptual Meta-semantic Perspective**

META\textsuperscript{C}: The conceptual meta-semantic perspective on an object of study understands the question of “What is X?” in terms of the question “What is the meaning of the term, word, orr concept of x, where x represents the larger genus, class, or category of which the object of study is taken as a member. There are at least four ways of holding a conceptual meta-semantic perspective, and each perspective invokes a distinct *ontological meaning-relation*—an *objective meaning-relation*, purely *subjective meaning-relation*, *heterogeneous meaning-relation*, or a *relatively subjective meaning-relation*.
§4.5 Meta-Semantic Taxonomy of Theories of Emotion

Given these various perspectives that one might take, especially in regard to the question of what emotions are, I propose that an alternative solution to addressing the problem of translation is to construct and adopt an alternative taxonomy of theories of emotion, especially for the purpose of conducting interdisciplinary research and theorizing within the field of emotion. To do so, I identify various philosophical and psychological theories of emotion along the intersections of the two metaphysical positions and the two terminological meta-semantic positions on the question “What is emotion?” I refer to the resulting taxonomy of emotion theories as meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion. According to this taxonomic scheme, philosophical and psychological theories of emotion may fall within one of four general categories of theories of emotion. I refer to these four categories as realism about emotion, instrumentalism about emotion, eliminativism about emotion, and eliminative-realism about emotion. In the following sections I describe each of these categories in more

314 Ibid. The labels for these categories have been inspired by the categories of realism, instrumentalism, and material eliminativism in the philosophy of mind; however, it is important to note that the categories of realism, instrumentalism, and eliminativism about emotion are not constituted by the same set of theories that respectively constitute the categories of realism, instrumentalism, and eliminative materialism. Furthermore, although the terms ‘realism,’ ‘instrumentalism,’ or ‘eliminativism,’ as they are used here, do not carry the same meaning (extension and intension) as the terms ‘realism,’ ‘instrumentalism,’ and ‘eliminative materialism’ used in philosophy of mind, there are some overlaps that may be of interests. In other words, one of the intentions behind the use of these specific terms was to provide possible nodes through which theories of emotion can be related to theories of mind, thereby providing avenues through which the two discourses can be brought together.
detail and provide a general description of the kinds of psychological and philosophical theories that would fall under each of the four taxonomic categories.\textsuperscript{315}

\textit{§4.5.1 Realism about Emotion}

Realists are optimists about ordinary language from the meta-semantic perspective on the question of what emotions are. They claim that there is an important relationship between folk emotion terms and theoretical or scientific emotion terms. More specifically, clarifying and laying bare the meaning of folk emotion terms is thought to be a central task of theorizing about emotion. Thus it is assumed that there is a tight relationship between folk emotion concepts and theoretical or scientific emotion concepts. These concepts belong to the same family of emotion concepts. Theoretical or scientific emotion concepts are corrected, clarified, or further elucidated versions of folk emotion concepts. The way in which realist attempt to ground both folk emotion concepts and emotion concepts used in theoretical or scientific research is to claim that both ordinary language emotion terms and theoretical or scientific emotion terms have the same referents. Thus they regard folk emotion concepts to entail some approximately correct definite description of such objective kinds and they regard folk emotion terms to be trans-theoretical terms. From the metaphysical perspective, realists claim that emotions are an objective kind. They hold that all emotions are unified by some objective, non-arbitrary, physical property or set of properties that can possibly exist independent of human construction. These essential elements are typically characterized in terms of innate, biologically given emotional mechanisms or systems, which are

thought to be responsible for the cohesion of various elements of an emotional experience. Thus realists generally understand emotions to involve distinct causal connections between the psychological (perceptions, thoughts, appraisals, etc.), neurophysiological, feeling, expressive, or behavioral aspects of emotion:

Essential Characteristics of Realism about Emotion

Primary Meta-Semantic Perspective: Optimism about ordinary language
Secondary Meta-Semantic Perspective: Objective meaning-relations
Metaphysical Perspective: Emotion is a class of objective kind
Semantic Perspective: Theory dependent

The following psychological and philosophical theories of emotion would fall under the category of realism about emotion:

Typical Kinds of Realist Theories of Emotion

Psychology: Basic emotion theories that commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms. Appraisal theories that regard emotions to be an objective kind, and cognitive theories that regard emotions to be objective kinds.

Philosophy: Noncognitive feeling theories and hybrid theories that regard emotions to be an objective kind and commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms.

§4.5.2 Instrumentalism about Emotion

Like realists about emotion, instrumentalists about emotion are also optimists about folk emotion terms. They hold that folk emotion terms are or ought o be understood as trans-theoretical terms. They also hold that the folk concepts associated with these

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terms are approximately correct definite descriptions of what emotions are, even if such concepts are need of further clarification and refinement. Thus it is thought that folk emotion terms are or should be grounded by theoretical or scientific emotion concepts. In this sense, instrumentalists are similar to realists in that they both answer “yes” to the question of what emotions are, understood from the meta-semantic perspective. From the metaphysical perspective, unlike realism and more consistent with eliminativism, instrumentalism denies the claim that emotions are an objective kind. They deny that there is some objective, non-arbitrary, physical property or set of properties that are independent of human construction, which unify all emotions into an objective kind. What unifies all emotions into a single category, according to instrumentalists, is dependent on human conceptualizations. Emotions are alike in that they involve a unique class of conceptual category, judgment, appraisal, social role, social function, or the like:

**Essential Characteristics of Instrumentalism about Emotions**

- Primary Meta-Semantic Perspective: Optimism about ordinary language
- Secondary Meta-Semantic Perspective: Subjective meaning-relations
- Metaphysical Perspective: Emotion is a class of subjective kind
- Semantic Perspective: Theory dependent

The following philosophical and psychological theories of emotion would fall under the category of instrumentalism:

**Typical Kinds of Instrumentalist Theories of Emotion**

Psychology: Social constructivist theories that commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms. Psychological constructionist theories of emotion that commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms (I am not aware of any that currently exist).
Philosophy: Social constructionist theories that commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms. Cognitive theories and hybrid theories in philosophy that regard emotions to be a subjective kind and commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms. Noncognitive feeling theories, basic emotion theories, appraisal theories that regard emotions to be a subjective kind and commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms (I am not aware of any that currently exist).

§4.5.3 Eliminativism about Emotion

Eliminativism about emotion is a more uncommon position held among emotion theorists compared to realism and instrumentalism about emotion. This is because eliminativists deny that folk emotion terms are trans-theoretical terms. Theorizing about emotions has typically been carried out under the opposing assumption of optimism about ordinary language emotion terms. Why eliminativists answer “no” to the question of what emotions are from the meta-semantic perspective is because they understand folk emotion terms to have meanings that are inadequate for the pursuits of scientific research and theorizing. This understanding of the meanings of folk emotion terms is rooted in two interdependent claims. First, it is assumed that folk emotion terms incorporate the claims that each emotion type is an objective kind and that emotions as a whole are objective kinds. It is then concluded that folk emotion terms suffer from reference failure because there is no evidence to support positing of any emotion type as an objective kind or posting emotions as an objective kind. Second, from a metaphysical perspective, eliminativists claim that emotions are subjective kinds. Thus not only do folk emotion terms fail to refer, but it is not possible for them to ever refer. From the metaphysical perspective, eliminativists also typically postulate that things like perceptions, core affect,
neurophysiological states, changes in neurophysiological states, bodily feelings, and actions are objective kinds rather than emotions. Emotional experiences are subjective experiences that are constituted by these various objective kinds and they are unified by the fact that they all are perceptions that employ folk emotion concepts. Thus emotions are a subjective kind. In other words, there is no non-arbitrary, physical property that unifies all our emotional experiences. Given that folk emotion terms have problematic meanings and that no emotion type or emotions as a whole is an objective kind, eliminativeness also suggest that the language of scientific theorizing about our emotional experiences be revised so that folk emotion terms are eliminated from scientific discourse. They do not suggest this for ordinary language or other theoretical languages about emotions because they believe that scientific theorizing about emotional experiences ought to be done under the assumptions that theoretical claims have a truth-value, that theoretical claims can express knowledge about the world, and that the way in which the first two assumptions hold true is by referring to objective kinds. Thus since emotions are regarded to be subjective kinds, they are not regarded as proper objects of science:

*Essential Characteristics of Eliminativism about Emotion*

- **Primary Meta-Semantic Perspective:** Pessimism about ordinary language
- **Secondary Meta-Semantic Perspective:** Subjective meaning-relations
- **Metaphysical Perspective:** Emotion is a class of subjective kind
- **Semantic Perspective:** Theory dependent

The following philosophical and psychological theories would fall under are the category of eliminativism:
**Typical Kinds of Eliminativist Theories of Emotion**

Psychology: Social constructivist theories and psychological constructionist theories are committed to the claim that folk emotion terms are not or ought not to be understood as trans-theoretical terms.

Philosophy: Cognitive theories and hybrid theories in philosophy that regard emotions to be a subjective kind and commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are not or ought not to be understood as trans-theoretical terms (I am not aware of any that currently exist).

§4.5.4 **Eliminative-Realism about Emotion**

Eliminative-realism about emotion is also an uncommon position compared to realism and instrumentalism about emotion. This can be attributed to the fact that eliminative-realists, for similar reasons given by eliminativists about emotion, deny the claim that folk emotion terms are not or ought not to be understood as trans-theoretical terms. Thus eliminative-realists also answer “no” to the question of what emotions are from the meta-semantic perspective. They are pessimistic about folk emotion concepts. Like eliminativists about emotion, eliminative-realists understand the project of theorizing about emotion, especially scientific theorizing about emotion, to be distinct from the project of theorizing about folk emotion concepts. Like eliminativists about emotion they hold that truth and knowledge about the objective world is the proper aim for scientific theorizing, whereas theorizing about folk emotion concepts is thought to aim at understanding the practical functions of these concepts. They also do not believe that folk emotion concepts are approximately true definite descriptions of what emotions are. They argue that folk emotion concepts incorporate the assumption that each emotion type as well as emotions as a whole is an objective kind and then offer evidence to suggest that folk emotion terms refer to various disparate kinds, even within a single
category of an emotion type. Therefore, eliminative-realists, in accord with eliminativists about emotion, propose that folk emotion terms suffer from reference failure and ought to be eliminated from the vocabulary and conceptual framework of scientific theorizing about emotion. From the metaphysical perspective, unlike eliminativists about emotion, eliminative-realists about emotion do not deny that emotions are real, objective kinds. Eliminative-realists, like realists about emotion and unlike instrumentalists or eliminativists about emotion, understand emotions to be an objective kind. Emotions are a unified category that is independent of human construction. There are non-arbitrary, physical properties that unify all emotions into a single unified class. Typically, these physical properties are properties of a biologically given mechanism or system of emotion. They are causal relations that are imposed by an emotion mechanism or system that explains the cohesion between the psychological (perceptions, thoughts, appraisals, etc.), neurophysiological, feeling, expressive, or behavioral aspects of emotional experiences:

**Essential Characteristics of Eliminative-realism about Emotion**

- Primary Meta-Semantic Perspective: Pessimism about ordinary language
- Secondary Meta-Semantic Perspective: Objective meaning-relations
- Metaphysical Perspective: Emotion is a class of objective kind
- Semantic Perspective: Theory dependent

The following philosophical and psychological theories would fall under are the category of eliminative-realism:

**Typical Kinds of Eliminative-realist Theories of Emotion**

- Psychology: Basic emotion theories that commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are not or ought not to be understood as trans-theoretical terms.
Philosophy: Cognitive feeling theories and hybrid theories that regard emotions to be an objective kind and commit themselves to the claim that folk emotion terms are not or ought not to be understood as trans-theoretical terms.

§4.5.5 Families of Emotion Theories

In regard to sub-categories within the categories of realism, instrumentalism, eliminativism, and eliminative-realism about emotion, I propose that theories within each of the categories defined here be related in terms of a families of theories of emotion rather than delineating further sub-categories that focus on more narrow necessary or sufficient conditions. In contrast with family resemblance categories, the notion of families, as it is used here, is more akin to Ekman use when referring to families of emotion.\(^\text{318}\) All family categories, unlike members of family resemblance categories, have members that share at least one essential feature. This essential feature qualifies each member as a member of the family. Nevertheless, some family categories maybe said to have fuzzy boundaries, especially when sharing essential properties can come in degrees. Organizing theories within the categories of realism, instrumentalism, eliminativism, and eliminative-realism in accordance with a family principle of categorizations is more consistent with interdisciplinary pursuits of theorizing about emotion. It allows us to see how various theories of emotion can share certain essential features and yet differ in other significant ways. This allows theories of emotion to be more clearly defined, while also being able to accommodate idiosyncratic intradisciplinary features that are essential to understanding and appreciating a particular theory. It should also be noted that although one may acquire some interesting insights if

one were to initially organize theories of emotion from across various disciplines based on a family resemblance principle of organization, the construction of such a category of emotion theories would provide conceptual clarity only to the extent that it would clearly illustrate the nebulous relations that hold among these theories of emotion.

§4.5.6 Benefits of a Meta-Semantic Taxonomy of Theories of Emotion

In this section argue for the acceptance of this alternative taxonomy for the purpose of interdisciplinary research and theorizing about emotions by noting some of the potential benefits that framework of meta-semantic structural pluralism may be able to provide. I would like to make it clear, however, that the meta-framework of meta-semantic structural pluralism, along with any alternative taxonomy it can provide, is not intended to displace pre-existing taxonomies of any discipline. Current intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary taxonomies successfully serve the various purposes for which they were established. This is why they remain in use. These taxonomies, however, reflect the methods, interests, and goals of intradisciplinary research and theorizing; they are as such inadequate for serving the purposes of interdisciplinary research and theorizing that seeks to go beyond the more narrowly defined methods, aims, and goals of intradisciplinary research and theorizing. Thus a taxonomy that is able to illustrate how various theories of emotion from across multiple disciplines can share fundamental principles would be beneficial for interdisciplinary research and theorizing about what emotions are. The meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion presented here is able to fill this need. By doing so, this alternative taxonomy also provides a broader perspective on how theories of emotion can be related and categorized in terms of mutually defined interests
and concerns. Also, although it concentrates on theories of emotion primarily from philosophy and psychology, I indicate how some anthropological and sociological theories can be accommodated in the appendices. Thus the meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion offers a way of understanding how theorists in various disciplines may be working towards a similar account of what emotions are, which allows for the possibility of seeing pre-existing theories of emotion in a new light.

The alternative taxonomy proposed here also allows for the possibility of speaking of theories of emotion in a way that is unconstrained by intradisciplinary biases. In doing so, it provides the beginning of a common language for the pursuit of interdisciplinary aims, a language that will hopefully provide access points to an intersubjective field of mutual understanding. This taxonomy is also able to disentangle the various perspective that may be involved regarding the question of what emotions are, while also illustrating how theories that share the same stance within one perspective may be yield completely distinct conclusions due to differing stances being held within wholly different perspective on the question of what emotions are. In addition, because this taxonomy is based on two mutually defined areas of concern that are fundamental to any complete theory of emotion, this taxonomy will endure as long as theorists maintain these two fundamental claims regarding what emotions are. This is a distinct benefit compared to other pre-existing taxonomies, which may become irrelevant as theories undergo revisions even if theories maintain their metaphysical and meta-semantic perspective.

\[319 \text{See appendix D.}\]
Thus this taxonomy is also able to adequately track when a theory has undergone a significant paradigm shift.

This taxonomy also has predictive power in the sense that it can be used to generate frameworks for new theories of emotion. Because it unifies various theories of emotion from various disciplines along fundamental concerns, it allows us to see what other kinds of theories are possible. It helps us understand what types of theories, in accordance with philosophical, psychological, anthropological, or sociological taxonomic categories, are necessarily excluded from certain categories within this alternative taxonomy. By doing so, we can come to understand how various philosophical and psychological theories, as well as some anthropological and sociological theories, do or do not necessarily stand in opposition to each other. Furthermore, this allows us to conceptualize what other types of theories are possible as well as how theorists might proceed in order to bring the project of unification without consilience to fruition.320

Finally, the meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion provided here allows us to recognize how the problem of the criterion would arise when researching and theorizing about emotions. Given the variety of theories of emotion that are currently available within the field of emotion, one might ask how is one to determine which theory is the right theory, which then gives rise to the problem of the criterion. In its basic form, within the context of the field of emotion, this is the problem of determining what

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if any criteria could be relied on in order to adjudicate between these disparate theories of emotion. The meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion, however, at the same time allows us to derive a third thesis that ought to be accepted as a canonical thesis for both the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I refer to this thesis as the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing. In the following section, I illustrate how this alternative taxonomy of theories of emotion allows us to recognize this as a decisive criterion for theorizing about emotions: the principle of folk intuitions.

§4.6 Deriving the Fundamental Base of Interdisciplinary Inquiry

It may seem surprising to many that I suggest that the taxonomy presented here allows us to recognize a criterion for an adequate theory of emotion. This can be done because it can be shown that theories within all four of the major categories of theories of emotion presented here actually do hold this criterion as a criterion for an adequate theory of emotion. Note that the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing is not to be equated with answering, “yes” to the question of what emotions are from the semantic perspective. They are not logically equivalent statements although they are logically consistent statements. To state that folk emotion concepts are or ought to be grounded in theoretical or scientific emotion concepts (i.e. answering “yes” to the question of what emotions are from the semantic perspective) is to suggest that there is an interdependence between folk emotion concepts and theoretical emotion concepts. More specifically, it is to suggest that part of the meaning of folk emotion terms depends on or ought to depend on theoretical, including scientific, emotion concepts. In other words, answering “yes” to the question of what emotions are from the semantic perspective
amounts to suggesting that folk emotion concepts are deferential concepts.\textsuperscript{321} The meanings of deferential concepts depend on what experts mean by these concepts. This is noticeably different from the statement that an adequate theory of emotion must recognize the fact that folk emotion terms serve the fundamental purpose of identifying the explananda for theorizing about emotions. The fact that folk emotion terms serve such a purpose need not entail that folk emotion concepts are deferential concepts. Thus it is possible for the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing to be true while the claim that folk concepts are or ought to be deferential concepts is false.

I illustrate this through a discussion of Paul Griffith and Andrea Scarantino’s account, as well as with a discussion of James A. Russell’s account, of how scientific theorizing about emotions ought to proceed. Before I do, one should note the significance of understanding that at this current point, I have argued for the benefit of an alternative taxonomy of theories of emotion only for the purpose of interdisciplinary. Furthermore, my aim in this chapter is to argue for the acceptance of the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing, again, only for the purpose of interdisciplinary research and theorizing. Thus I am currently silent about whether or not the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing is an appropriate criterion for intradisciplinary research and theorizing about emotion. With these considerations in mind, I now turn to illustrating how the alternative taxonomy of theories of emotion presented in chapter one allows us to identify a fundamental criterion for an adequate interdisciplinary theory of emotion.

§4.6.1 Realism and Instrumentalism about Emotion

As previously noted, answering “yes” to the question what emotions are from the meta-semantic perspective is not logically equivalent to the claim that adequate folk emotion concepts are deferential concepts, which depend on the theoretical, including scientific, work for further clarification and correction. These two claims are logically consistent statements. In addition, if one were to accept that folk emotion concepts are or ought to be deferential concepts, this would be sufficient for giving folk emotion terms the vital role of identifying the explananda for theorizing about emotions. Those who are committed to the claim that folk emotion concepts are deferential concepts take folk concepts, along with their associated terms, as starting points for theorizing about emotion, and they seek to further clarify these concepts. The aim is to ground folk emotion concepts in theoretical or scientific concepts, and the process of doing so begins with understanding the various ways in which folk concepts are employed. In taking these concepts and terms as initial starting points for theorizing about emotions, those who answer “yes” to the question of what emotions are from the semantic perspective take for granted the fact that folk emotion terms have established referents. These referents are regarded to be either objective or subjective kinds, but in either case they are regarded as proper objects of theoretical or scientific investigation. Thus, given that realists and instrumentalists both hold the claim that folk emotion concepts are or ought to be grounded by theoretical or scientific emotion concepts, we can see that these theorists also hold that an adequate theory of emotion ought to recognize the fact that folk emotion terms serve the fundamental purpose of identifying the explananda for researching and theorizing about emotions.
§4.6.2 Eliminative-Realism about Emotion

What might be more controversial is the claim that eliminativists and eliminative-realists also hold the claim that an adequate theory of emotion ought to recognize the fact that folk emotion terms serve such a valuable function in theorizing about emotion. Eliminativists and eliminative-realists both reject the claim that folk emotion concepts are or ought to be grounded in theoretical or scientific concepts of emotion. Even though these theories of emotion answer “no” to the question of what emotions are from the semantic perspective, they all recognize not only that there are folk emotion terms, which are associated with folk emotion concepts, but also that the referents of these terms require explanations. For example, although Scarantino and Griffiths provide an account of scientific theorizing about emotions that rejects the semantic claim that folk emotion concepts are or ought to be grounded in scientific emotion concepts. Their account includes the suggestion that theorizing about emotions initially begins with making sense of the meanings of folk emotion terms. Both Paul Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino present eliminative-realist accounts of what emotions are. From the metaphysical perspective both Griffiths and Scarantino hold that emotions are real, objective kinds. These emotions are referred to as biologically basic emotions. One example they give is the biologically basic emotion of fear produced by a sudden loss of support. Specifically, they note that such occasions of fear involve:

A distinctive and possibly universal signal, a distinctive physiology, an automatic appraisal tuned to an antecedent universally present in all cultures, presence in other primates, quick onset, brief duration, unbidden occurrence,
distinctive thoughts, memories, and images, and distinctive subjective experiences (Öhman & Mineka, 2001).³²²

These experiences of fear are thought to belong to the category of real biologically basic emotions because they involve various elements that typically cohere together, and so provide a basis for projecting characteristics of the whole category from a representative sample within that category. Furthermore, these biologically basic emotions do so because they implicate Paul Ekman’s criteria for biologically basic emotions—that basic emotions involve:

1. Distinctive universal signals
2. Distinctive physiology
3. Automatic Appraisal, tuned to
4. Distinctive universals in antecedent events
5. Distinctive appearance developmentally
6. Quick onset
8. Brief duration
9. Distinctive thoughts, memories, and occurrences
10. Distinctive subjective experience (Ekman, 1999, p. 56)³²³

In addition, according to both Scarantino ad Griffiths, although these biologically basic emotions are real objective kinds, they cannot be sufficiently mapped on to folk emotion terms, especially given the folk emotion concepts associated with these terms. The reason is that they regard folk emotion terms to be polysemous terms, and so are associated with more than one concept, and they regard the extension of at least some folk emotion terms


³²³ Ibid.
to be too heterogeneous. Folk emotion terms not only refer to what Griffiths and Scarantino regard to be real emotions (basic emotions) but also other aspects of emotion that are not real in terms of being objective kinds. Given that emotion terms are thought to have more than one referent in light of their polysemy, and the aim of science is only to study what is a real objective kind, Griffiths and Scarantino suggest a modification of folk emotion terms for the purpose of using these terms in scientific research while also indicating that the modified terms are not to be associated with folk emotion concepts. They suggest the use of the subscript ‘B’ or ‘BASIC’ to indicate that the emotion term being used in scientific theorizing is not the same as a similar folk emotion term, and so is not a to be associated with folk emotion concepts, but instead is to be associated with a scientific emotion concept and a corresponding referent. Thus the biologically basic emotion of fear produced by a sudden lost of support would be an experience of ‘fear_B’ or ‘fear_BASIC,’ rather than simply an experience of ‘fear,’ which without the designated subscript indicates the application of a folk emotion term that picks out more than one referent and is associated with more than one folk concept. Even given their suggestion that scientific emotion terms should be demarcated from folk emotion terms, however, both Scarantino and Griffiths recognize that folk emotion terms play the vital role of identifying the explananda for theorizing about emotions. For both Griffith and Scarantino consider two possible options for scientific theorizing about emotion—neologisms and modifying current folk categories—and they opt for the second option rather than the first. As they state:

Two main options should be considered. One is using neologism (e.g., threat-coping system), while the other is using modified versions of the folk categories, signaling that what we are referring to is not the whole folk category, but just part of it (e.g., fearB or fearBASIC). As one of us has argued, this decision cannot be taken a priori, it depends on the extent to which the folk categories and the revised basic emotion categories overlap (see Scarantino, in press a, in press b). We claim, but do not argue here, that there is sufficient overlap between the set of items that satisfy Ekman’s criteria of biologically basic-ness and the set of items that fall into folk categories to make the terminological choice of angerB, fearB, disgustB, happinessB, sadnessB, surpriseB, etcetera, preferable to the choice of neologism.325

As indicated by the above passage, folk terms seem to serve a similar purpose for Scarantino and Griffiths as they have for both realists and instrumentalists—they seem to provide an initial starting point for scientific theorizing about emotion. Both Scarantino and Griffiths understand the extent to which the referents of folk terms and scientific terms diverge is a matter of empirical investigation.

Scarantino imagines the process of scientific theorizing about emotion to go something like the following.326 One begins with folk emotion terms, and their associated referents and concepts, in order to initially identify what it is that a scientific theory of emotion is supposed to explain. Given that these folk emotion terms are polysemous and have multiple referents, the goal of science is to identify and focus on the referents that are thought to be real objective kinds, and to provide further clarification or correction of the concepts associated with these referents. Thus once research and theorizing are in progress, if evidence suggests that what scientists have been studying are indeed objective kinds, then science ought to modify folk emotion terms by adding the pertinent subscript, thereby reintroducing the folk emotion term as a new theoretical or scientific

325 Scarantino and Griffiths, “Don’t Give up on Basic Emotions,” 449.
326 Ibid., 450.
term. This new term would also be associated with a new theoretical or scientific concept and a distinct, narrower, referent. The decision to introduce a new scientific emotion term will be based on the degree of divergence between the referents of folk emotion terms, which are associated with folk emotion concepts, and the phenomena that scientists find themselves investigating. Given that eliminative-realists hold that folk emotion terms are polysemous, and so have multiple referents. They also hold when one of those referents are discovered to be a natural kind, this discovery warrants the introduction of a new theoretical or scientific term. The assumption that folk emotion terms are polysemous, and so have multiple referents, is what grounds their claim that these terms are more incorrect than correct. So folk emotion terms would play the crucial role of providing an initial starting point for researching and theorizing about emotion. These folk emotion terms help initially identify the explananda for such research and theorizing. Thus Scarantino and Griffiths also seem to hold that folk emotion terms serve a valuable purpose of identifying the explananda for theorizing about emotion.

§4.6.3 Eliminativism about Emotion

In contrast with Griffiths and Scarantino, Russell A. James provides an eliminative account of emotions. From the metaphysical perspective of what emotions

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327 Andrea Scarantino, “How to Define Emotions Scientifically,” Ibid. 4 (2012). Note that Jesse J. Prinz, who also presents an eliminative-realists account of emotions in philosophy, also seems to hold a similar view regarding how the process of research and theorizing about emotions does or ought to proceed. According to Prinz, ordinary language emotion terms do not have a one to one relation with a category of discrete emotions. However, he also seems to hold that some emotion terms do identify the proper referents for researching and theorizing about emotions.

328 Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion.
are, Russell argues that emotions, strictly speaking, are not real in terms of constituting an objective kind with essential elements that are ontologically independent. He rejects that there are mechanisms or systems of emotion that explain the cohesion of various elements of emotional experiences. Thus from a semantic perspective, Russell suggests that the term ‘emotion,’ and other related emotion terms, such as ‘anger,’ ‘fear,’ ‘joy,’ etc., be eliminated from the vocabulary of science. Russell also recognizes that there are such things as “emotional” manifestations, which are subjective kinds. These manifestations are the actual referents of folk emotion terms. These manifestations are, for Russell, either manifestations of core affective states and other components as emotional meta-experiences or emotional episodes. These events become “emotional” when they are categorized via folk emotion concepts. As Russell states, “To perceive oneself as afraid is to categorise oneself by means of the concept of fear. It is to establish a meaning of one’s state via the concept of fear.”\footnote{Russell, “Emotion, Core Affect, and Psychological Construction,” 1259-83.} Thus on Russell’s account, emotions are psychologically constructed experiences.

Like Scarantino and Griffiths, Russell is also committed to the tenets of scientific realism. He holds that scientific claims have truth-values and that the truths of these claims are determined by whether or not they correctly describe objective kinds. Thus Russell denies that science should aim at further clarifying and correcting these folk concepts since they fail to accurately describe what emotions really are. Russell does not deny that folk emotion terms, along with their referents, have a prominent place in theorizing about emotion. He recognizes that folk terms do in fact refer to what emotions really are. They refer to conceptualized manifestations of core affect, which are not
objective kinds. Thus he denies that the referents of folk emotion terms are the proper objects of scientific investigation. He also denies that the folk emotion concepts that are associated with these terms are approximately correct definite descriptions of their referents. According to Russell, folk emotion concepts regard emotions to be real objective kinds. Thus he suggests that both the referents of folk emotion terms and their associated folk emotion concepts ought to be eliminated from the linguistic and conceptual framework of any approximately true scientific theory of emotion. Yet, folk emotion terms can lead us to identify the explananda for which a scientific theory of emotion ought to explain since they refer to subjective kinds that are composed of real objective elements. According to Russell, these objective elements—core affective states—are the proper objects of scientific research and theorizing. Thus Russell suggests that scientific research and theorizing ought to speak of core affective states rather than emotions, fears, etc., and should focus on providing approximately true definite descriptions of these states.

In light of these conclusions, we may safely suggest that realists, instrumentalists, eliminativists, and eliminative-realists all recognize that folk emotion terms serve the vital purpose of identifying the explananda for theorizing about emotion. Thus, given this consensus, it seems that an adequate theory of emotion must recognize that folk terms serve the fundamental purpose of identifying the explananda for theorizing about emotion. I refer to this principle as the principle of folk intuitions about emotions (Base⁶).

**The Fundamental Base of Inquiry about Emotions (Base⁶)**

Base⁶: An adequate theory of emotion must recognize that fold emotion terms serve the fundamental purpose of identifying the explananda for research
and theorizing about emotions.

Given this principle, we can further generalize it by relativizing the principle to some ordinary object of inquiry G, which would give us the following generalized principle of *folk intuitions*, otherwise referred to as *the fundamental base for interdisciplinary research and theorizing generalized* (Base⁶):

*The Fundamental Base of Interdisciplinary Inquiry Generalized*

Base⁶: An adequate theory of any ordinary object of inquiry must recognize that folk terms serve the fundamental purpose of identifying the explananda for research and theorizing about that object.

I offer the following argument in support of generalizing Base⁵ to Base⁶: As argued throughout chapters 2 and 3, evidence from the philosophy and psychology of emotion warrants the conclusion that philosophers and psychologists are both interested and concerned about the intentionality and rationality of emotions. This conclusion suggests that philosophers and psychologists share at least some of the same interests and concerns regarding the intentionality and rationality. Furthermore, by relying on both philosophical and psychological theories of emotion, I argued throughout chapters 2 and 3 that FIT and TRU ought to be accepted as canonical theses for the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. Finally, given these arguments, if FIT and TRU are accepted as canonical theses for the disciplines of philosophy and psychology, this would entail the acceptance of the generalized principle of folk intuitions, i.e., the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing since folk intuitions are ultimately derived from FIT and TRU. Also, as some evidence in support of the truth of Base⁶, consider the current discourse on consciousness within the philosophy of mind. The current discourse on conscious recognizes three basic options as viable possibilities regarding
the notion of consciousness: dualism, monism, orr instrumentalism. There was, however, a fourth position not so long ago, referred to as “eliminative materialism.” The position of eliminative materialism basically amounted to an elimination of folk terms by restricting the language of explanation to materialistic, non-mental, non-folk terms. The problem with this position, however, is that such a completely reductionist position effectively eliminates itself from the discourse on consciousness since the term “consciousness” is itself a non-materialistic term. In contrast with eliminative materialism, Daniel Dennett’s instrumentalist position seems more viable, although it also attempts to provide a reductive account of consciousness. What keeps Dennett’s view as a possible theory of consciousness is that his instrumentalist position at least gestures towards what is at least a fundamentally mental feature of consciousness—the feature of f-intentionality. Dennett, however, unlike dualistic or monistic views treats the notion of intentionality, along with the notion of consciousness, as a mere fiction or epiphenomenon. Furthermore, we can also see the importance of the principle of folk intuitions by comparing the discourse on consciousness with the discourse on emotion. As I have argued above, the discourse on emotion may be mapped out in accordance with the meta-semantic taxonomy of theories of emotion. Furthermore, what the principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism yield are four basic types of theories of emotion: realism, instrumentalism, eliminative-realism, and eliminativism about emotions. When


331 See Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.

we compare these four basic categories of theories of emotion to the four basic categories of consciousness, we can observe that all four categories of theories of emotion remain viable options of theories of emotion unlike the four categories of theories of consciousness just discussed. Furthermore, the most significant feature that all four of these categories of emotion have in common with the three categories of consciousness that the position of eliminative materialism lacks is that each theory at least gestures at the significance of folk emotion terms. The position of eliminative materialism does so from a methodological stance whereas the position of eliminativism does so from a conceptual stance. Thus evidence from the discourse in the area of philosophy of mind and the area of the psychology of emotion at least warrants the generalization of Basec to Baseg.

Finally, I offer a further speculative claim regarding the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing. I believe that the reason why the principle of folk intuitions is assumed by realists, instrumentalists, eliminativists, and eliminative-realists about emotions is because they all hold an even deeper more general assumption regarding the relationship between folk terms and emotion: that folk emotion terms, regardless of the concepts that may be associated with them, in an extremely general and
vague way, mark the boundaries of what emotions are. The domain of emotion, and so theorizing about emotion, is ultimately demarcated by the referents of folk emotion terms, which ultimately reflect our intuitions about what emotions are. Thus a theory that fails to recognize that folk emotion terms serve the function of identifying the explananda for theorizing about emotions effectively eliminates itself as an adequate theory of emotion. This account of what folk emotion concepts entail seems to suggest that laypeople have some extraordinarily sophisticated notions about what emotions are. I think these characterizations are essentially myths regarding folk concepts of emotion. I suggest that theorists do not actually know what folk concepts actually entail. These characterizations of folk concepts of emotion are theorists’ attributions of what they believe folk emotion concepts entail. Furthermore, seeing that arguments regarding what emotions are rely on what folk emotion concepts entail, I suggest that rather than assuming what folk concepts entail from our theory-laden perspective, we actually go out and ask the folk what they think emotions are. I suspect that laypeople give vague and varied answers to the question of what emotions are. If this is the case, perhaps the vagueness and variability of laypeople’s answers ought not to be taken as implying that emotions are or are not natural kinds, entities, affect programs, social constructions, etc.,

333 Russell, “Emotion, Core Affect, and Psychological Construction,” 1270. Many theorists have made claims about what folk concepts and intuitions entail. I am highly skeptical about these attributions. For example, Russell has notes that, “the everyday concept of emotion presupposes: that an emotion is separate from its causes, its manifestations, and its consequences…that an emotion (or its equivalent, and affect programme or neural module) is an entity that causes these manifestations (expression, instrumental action, peripheral nervous system changes, and so on); that emotion is an entity that is qualitatively different from other psychological entities, especially the mechanisms of rational thought, but also behavior, conation, and so on,” Ibid., 1262.
but rather that folk concepts do not, in fact, place such narrow constraints on researching and theorizing about emotion that theorists seem to think.\textsuperscript{334}

\textbf{§4.6.4 Is the Fundamental Base Trivial?}

One might object to the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing by suggesting that it is a very weak or trivial criterion for an adequate theory of emotion since no theory of emotion that fails to meet such a criterion, and so the criterion does no work for theorizing about emotion. Although this criterion can be regarded as weak, given that no theory of emotion would fail to meet such a criterion, this does not imply that the criterion does no work. What this criterion does is demarcate the very boundaries of what can count as a theory of emotion. It serves to separate out theories of emotion from theories of affects, attitudes, state likings, feature likings, or the like, which constitute distinct categories compared to the category of emotion.\textsuperscript{335} These may be adequate theories of affects, attitudes, state likings, etc., but they cannot be adequate theories of emotion unless these theories also indicate how affects, attitudes, state liking, etc. are relevantly related to the referents of folk emotion terms.


\textsuperscript{335} See Fehr and Russell, “Concept of Emotion Viewed from a Prototype Perspective; Lindquist et al., “Do People Essentialize Emotions? Individual Differences in Emotion Essentialism and Emotional Experience.”

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For example, consider John Pollock’s theory of evaluative cognition, which subsumes a theory of state likings and feature likings. Pollock’s general project is to provide a theory of rational choice for human agents—cognitive agents with specific kinds of faculties and limitations. In providing this account, Pollock was concerned with the question of how human agents, as cognitive agents with such faculties and limitations, should go about deciding what actions to perform. In answering this question, Pollock observed that as cognitive agents we take part in what he referred to as the doxastic-conative loop. According to Pollock, the doxastic-cognitive loop is the process by which, “cognitive agents form beliefs representing the world, evaluate the world as represented, and perform actions executing plans”. There are two major components to the kind of cognition involved in the doxastic-conative loop: epistemic cognition and practical cognition. Epistemic cognition, as Pollock explains, “is the kind of cognition responsible for producing and maintaining beliefs.” Thus Pollock’s account of epistemic cognition is an account of how we arrive at various beliefs about the

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338 Ibid., 4.

339 Ibid., 3.

340 Ibid., 23.
world. Practical cognition, on the other hand, “evaluates the world, adopts plans, and initiates actions.”

An important feature of practical cognition is the process by which values are attached to features of the world. This is because it is only given that features of the world have some value (in some sense or another) that we can go on to evaluate the world and determine what actions would be most rational. An account of this process is what Pollock refers to as a theory of evaluative cognition: a theory, “according to which values are encoded in feature likings, and later are stored into an evaluative database.” Within the theory of evaluative cognition, values first become attached to various features of the world through the process by which state likings are formed. State likings are cognitive states of liking (disliking, or being ambivalent or apathetic towards) one’s current states. They are not necessarily intentional states, since state likings need not be about one’s current state. Instead, as Pollock notes, “it is better described as a feeling.” As Pollock explains:

It is a psychological state characterized by a parameter (the degree of state liking) that varies over time. In this sense, it is like numerous other psychological states, including happiness, depression, fear, and so on. We can be happy or depressed about something, and we can fear some particular thing, but we can also feel happy, depressed, or afraid without those attaching mentally to any particular object.

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341 Ibid., 3.
342 Ibid.
343 ‘Rational’ in terms of ‘real rationality’, for Pollock.
344 Pollock, Thinking About Acting, 67.
345 Ibid., 41.
346 Ibid.
As the above passage indicates, state likings are similar to other psychological states, such as happiness, depression, fear, etc. However, the similarity between state likings and these other psychological states lies only in the fact that they all have what psychologists commonly refer to as hedonic valence. Hedonic valence is often regarded as the intrinsic positive or negative qualitative feeling of psychological states. States with positive hedonic valence are felt to be intrinsically liked, and states with negative hedonic valence are felt to be intrinsically disliked. Emotions are often spoken of as having a hedonic valence.

For example positive emotions, such as joy, pride, and happiness are regarded to be “positive” emotions because they all share the quality of having a positive hedonic valence. Negative emotions, such as guilt, shame, anger, and fear, are regarded to be “negative” emotions because they all share the quality of having a negative hedonic valence. Although state likings are similar to emotions in this way, they are not to be identified with emotions. State likings are more appropriately feelings rather than things like beliefs and they are distinct from individuated feelings like happiness or joy. As Pollock puts it, “a state liking is more like a conglomerate of all the different kinds of positive and negative feelings we can have. It is a kind of generic “positive or negative attitude.” Feature likings are propositional attitudes. They are therefore similar to beliefs, but they are not beliefs. They are intentional states whose objects are the

\[347\] Ibid.

\[348\] Ibid., 42.
features liked or disliked. As Pollock states, “the intentional state of feature liking is functionally similar to believing that the feature that is the object of the liking will tend to be conducive to liking your situation.” Feature likings, are thus, attitudes of preference for a certain state of affairs. Furthermore, they are formulated based on cumulative state likings. Cumulative state likings are the products of “accumulating (integrating) state likings over time,” and as such they contribute to feature likings to the extent that they constitute the abstract value (the cumulative state liking) of a feature. As Pollock explains, the abstract value of the feature is “the average amount of cumulative state likings caused by being in a state exemplifying that feature,” given that, “a feature [of the world] may [causally] contribute different amounts of cumulative state likings in different states.” For further clarification, consider an example given by Pollock regarding eating a bowl of ice cream. As Pollock illustrates, “Eating a bowl of ice cream may result in an initial positive state liking, followed by a negative contribution to state liking when, because I am lactose intolerant, it gives me indigestion” In this case, Pollock recounts a particular experience with eating a bowl of ice cream. He notes that when he is eating a bowl of ice cream, at that time he has a certain degree of state liking for the current state of affairs that he is in. This is a general positive feeling towards a

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349 Ibid., 40.
350 Ibid., 38.
351 Ibid., 140.
352 Ibid., 44.
353 Ibid.
state of affairs that is caused by him eating ice cream. Thus a feature of the world that his state liking is relevant to is the eating of a bowl of ice cream.

Furthermore, he notes that after some time has passed, he experiences a certain negative feeling toward his current state of affairs (indigestion), which was also caused by him eating a bowl of ice cream. So, if we consider the period of time over which he experienced both a positive and negative feeling in response to eating a bowl of ice cream, we can see that Pollock had experienced two different kinds of state likings that were causally related to the feature of eating a bowl of ice cream. Given this, the average of the two feelings (state likings) caused by the feature of eating ice cream constitute Pollock’s cumulative state liking of eating a bowl of ice cream, and so constitutes Pollock’s abstract value for the feature of eating a bowl of ice cream. Assuming that Pollock’s cumulative state liking for eating a bowl of ice cream constitutes a positive rather than negative abstract value, the feature liking for eating a bowl of ice cream for Pollock (in this case) would be similar to something like believing that eating a bowl of ice cream would be conducive to liking his current (or future) situation if he were to pursue the act of eating a bowl of ice cream.\textsuperscript{354} Thus feature likings can be understood as preferences for a certain state of affairs.

I have so far discussed only part of what amounts to Pollock’s theory of evaluative cognition. The other parts pertain to how abstract values are stored in memory and computed for the use of practical decision-making. I do not elaborate on this account because it is tangential to the central claim that I am making, but briefly put, according to Pollock only those values (primitive values) that cannot be computed by the process of

\textsuperscript{354} Ibid.
conjunction are stored in memory. Abstract values, besides primitive values, are retrieved from the database through a process referred to as database calculation. What is pertinent, however, is that Pollock’s theory of evaluative cognition, as a theory of how values are generated, is a theory of how states with hedonic valence contribute to the generation of preferences. Given that emotions have hedonic valence, and so should be able to contribute to the generation of preferences as described by Pollock, this theory may be related to questions about how emotions can either contribute to the formation of preferences and the process of rational decision-making. Furthermore, in understanding how emotions play a role in evaluative cognition, we can come to understand at least some of the instrumental roles play in our other conative and doxastic processes. Nevertheless, Pollock’s theory does not entail a theory of emotion. It does not address the question of what emotions are, nor does it provide any indication as to how emotions would be or could be a part of our rational decision-making processes. It simply uses emotions to further illustrate what state likings are. Thus the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing serves the function of separating out such theories from theories of emotion. This may explain why no such theory falls under the four categories of theories of emotion provided by the taxonomy of emotion theories presented here in this chapter. Finally, the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing works to undercut the problem of the criterion. The problem of the criterion, as stated earlier, is essentially the problem of establishing an adequate criterion.

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355 Please note that this is a general and simplified account of Pollock’s theory of evaluative cognition.

for defining the relevant object of inquiry for any particular pursuit of knowledge. The principle of folk intuitions, also known as the fundamental base for interdisciplinary research and theorizing, works to undercut this problem by offering an criterion for demarcating at least the boundaries of the object of inquiry that is sufficiently independent of the interests, concerns, and methods of academia. The principle of folk intuitions orr fundamental base for interdisciplinary research and theorizing is thus, for academics, our access to some of the mind-independent aspects of the world that we share as academics with non-academic folks and other living beings of the world.

§4.7 The Four Cornerstones of Interdisciplinary Research and Theorizing

The problems of translation may also be understood as being either merely verbal disagreements or actual substantive disagreements.\textsuperscript{357} If they arise from merely verbal disagreements, then no alternative language is necessary to overcome them. These issues may be resolved by requiring theorist to clearly define their terms, their presuppositions, and what their theories do and do not imply, as well as what their theories are silent about. It may be helpful however, for others to be involved with this process of helping various theorists make such clarifications. I refer to the set of these requirements as the principle of clarity. Also, if they arise from substantive disagreements, then although an alternative language may be able to resolve these problems, to establish such a language (taken to its limits) is to establish a single, unified theory that is mutually agreed upon by all experts of emotion. Thus a second principle would be that researches and theorists are committed to establishing a unified theory in regard to the object of study. I refer to this

\textsuperscript{357} See Chalmers, “Verbal Disputes.”
principle as the principle of interdisciplinarity. A similar set of considerations can be made, mutatis mutandis, regarding merely verbal and substantive agreements. One should note that although it is necessarily the case that establishing such a language is an interdisciplinary endeavor, I grant that it is an empirical question as to how such an endeavor would be actually carried out and what the end result may be.

A third pragmatically useful principle would be the principle of multi-modal falsification. Academics may be concerned about being cautious when researching and theorizing about emotions from both an intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary perspective on research and theorizing. Different cultures have different emotion concepts and emotion and researchers theorists ought to take care with identifying discrete emotions or emotions as natural kinds. Also agree that if we grant the assumption that concepts can be "reduced" in some form or another (in virtue of identity relations, causal relations, significant correlation, supervenience, or what have you) to the activation of localized brain regions, then recent findings in cultural neuroscience and neuroanthropology do seem to suggest that such distinctions exist. Granting the basic assumptions about the plasticity of the brain and the influences of biology, culture, and environment in establishing, concretizing, and extinguishing neural connections, this seems to be a reasonable conclusion. Yet, we ought to also ask how much such findings contribute to the strength of the conclusion that such cultural differences necessarily exist. Rather than making arguments regarding the general reliability of neuroscientific findings, my argument relies on the fact that sociologist, anthropologist, linguists, historians, psychologists, and philosophers have established the cultural variation of
emotion concepts to be a fact long before the advent of neuroscience.

I am not suggesting that cultural neuroscience and neuroanthropology are not useful for emotion research and theorizing. I am merely suggesting that if the relevant point here is that different cultures have different emotion concepts, and that we should take care in identifying emotions based on these concepts, then we should consider what it might mean to take such care. In other words, if neuroscience found that there were no differences in localized neural activity between members of distinct cultures, would this suggest that the considerable amount of cultural differences observed by sociologists, anthropologists, linguists, historians, psychologists, and philosophers were in some sense false? Although the possibility exists, it would not necessarily follow that these alternative findings are some how wrong or false. It could be that what needs to be revised are the assumptions of neuroscience. Similar considerations would seem to apply to any finding, made by any single method within any single discipline that diverges from the pre-existing body of knowledge that has been established by either a single discipline or multiple disciplines through multiple methods. I would think that this kind of inter-methodological cross checking is an important aspect of "taking care" in any scientific endeavor.
A fourth pragmatically useful principle would be the principle of intellectual integrity. I propose that rigor should involve protocols for transparency in empirical research, including access to and analysis of experiments resulting in null hypotheses. It should also involve restraint from drawing conclusions that go beyond what the evidence and current body of knowledge about emotions warrants. Academics should also be encouraged to openly challenge alternative empirical findings and theoretical conclusions, while collaborating on or clarifying their theories in conjunction with other academics who share their general views. Replication studies should also be a standard practice performed by empirical researchers across all sciences. Researcher and theorists should also take care to clearly define the most central terms that are relevant to understanding their experimental design, hypothesis, or framing of a theory. Academics should also be required to clearly state what it is that they do and do not presuppose, what their theories do or do not imply, and what their theories are silent about. §4.8 Conclusion: Unification without Consilience

In conclusion, I offer my proposal of Unification without Consilience (UC) to the disciplines of philosophy and psychology.

Two Canonical Interdisciplinary Theses

FIT: If an event is an f-intentional event, then the intentionality of the event consists in at least one relation between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and some significance to the subject.

TRU: The principles of inference that govern reasoning may be empirical in character as long the empirical aspects of such inference rules make sense of associated intentional contents and are well ground in rigorous empirical evidence that supports such inferences rules as postulates of reasoning.
The Fundamental Base of Interdisciplinary Inquiry

BASE\(^8\): An adequate theory of any ordinary object of inquiry must recognize that folk terms serve the fundamental purpose of identifying the explananda for research theorizing about that object.

The General Principle of Meta-Semantic Structural Pluralism

META\(^8\): The general principle of meta-semantic structural pluralism is the *principle of deep perspective-taking*. In order to understand how one might go about conducting interdisciplinary research across disciplines, one must be able to consider various theories about a particular object of study from within a number of different perspectives.

*Semantic Perspective*

META\(^9\): The semantic perspective on an object of study understands the question, “What is X?” in terms of the question, “What is the meaning of the term, word, or concept of ‘X’, where ‘X’ represents a particular term, word, or concept that is associated with the object of study in question?” The answer to this question will depend on a variety of factors, including what the object of study is and from which disciplinary perspective one chooses to understand the object of study. The aim of taking the semantic perspective is to understand the variety of ways other academics might understand the meanings of the various terms that may be used to speak about or conceive either the object itself or aspects of the object of study.

*Metaphysical Perspective*

META\(^10\): The metaphysical perspective on an object of study understands the question of “What is X?” in terms of the question, "What kind of thing is X, where X represents the object of study in question?” The aim of the metaphysical perspective is to understand the variety of different things that the object of study can be identified as being. There are at least two ways to understand an object of study—as an *objective kind* or as a *subjective kind*.

*Terminological Meta-semantic Perspective*

META\(^1\): The terminological meta-semantic perspective on an object of study understands the question of “What is X?” in terms of the question “What is the relationship between ordinary language or ordinary concepts about X, and the language or concepts employed by a particular theory of X?” The aim of the meta-semantic perspective is to understand a theorist's view of the relation between ordinary language and the language of their theory. Theorists may hold divergent terminological meta-semantic perspectives while holding the same metaphysical perspective or the same semantic perspective on some object.
of study. There are at least two ways of holding a terminological meta-semantic perspective, both of which invoke distinct terminological meaning relations—optimism and pessimism about ordinary language.

Conceptual Meta-semantic Perspective

META*: The conceptual meta-semantic perspective on an object of study understands the question of “What is X?” in terms of the question “What is the meaning of the term, word, or concept of x, where x represents the larger genus, class, or category of which the object of study is taken as a member. There are at least four ways of holding a conceptual meta-semantic perspective, and each perspective invokes a distinct ontological meaning-relation—an objective meaning-relation, purely subjective meaning-relation, heterogeneous meaning-relation, or a relatively subjective meaning-relation.

Four Cornerstones of Interdisciplinary Inquiry

Interdisciplinarity, Clarity, Multi-modal Falsification, Intellectual Integrity
CHAPTER 5
THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES

As noted in preface, one of the primary aims of this dissertation is to argue in favor of the project of unifying the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across the disciplines of academia. I also noted that in order to do so, I would focus primarily on arguing for the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge of the discipline of philosophy and the discipline of psychology, and hope that other disciplines will take this dissertation as an example and follow suit if possible. Furthermore, although I relied on resources from both the discipline of philosophy and the discipline of psychology in order to present phase 1 and phase 2 of my main argument, I must admit that much of what I have argued thus far can be interpreted as primarily addressing the interests and concerns of the discipline of philosophy. In this final chapter, I present the final phase of my main argument, phase 3, and conclude my dissertation by addressing the discipline of psychology and proposing that the discipline of psychology also accept my proposal of unification without consilience (UC) as at least a possible solution to the problem of skepticism, as it arises within the discipline of psychology with respect to research and theorizing within the field of emotion. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate by example that UC may be a viable foundation that can unite at least some of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across the sciences and the humanities.

Phase 3 constituted by two sub-phases, which I refer to as sub-argument 8 and sub-argument 9. Sub-argument 8, which is presented in section 5.1-5.3, illustrates that
there is a need within the discipline of psychology to bridge the disciplinary divide between the disciplines of psychology and philosophy. It does so by first illustrating how the problem of skepticism arises within the discipline of psychology, especially within the field of emotion. Second, it argues that the discipline of psychology alone, much like the discipline of philosophy, may not be able to resolve such problems of skepticism.

Then, in section 5.2, I offer UC as a possible solution to such problems of skepticism and I take a pragmatic stance to argue in favor of the acceptance of UC by the discipline of psychology. Finally, I conclude this dissertation by offering a brief summary of what has been accomplished within this body of work, and await my committee’s decision.

§5.1 The Scientific and Folk Emotion Projects

The discourse that primarily focuses on research and theorizing about emotions can be divided in any number of ways. Andrea Scarantino draws a distinction between what he refers to as the “Folk Emotion Project” and the “Scientific Emotion Project.”

Scarantino defines the Folk Emotion Project as the project that “aims to offer a descriptive definition of the conditions of membership of traditional emotion categories such as emotion, anger, and so on.” He further elucidates what he means by noting that the Folk Emotion Project “aims to offer a prescriptive definition of the conditions of membership of natural kinds of emotion, natural kinds of anger, and so on.” In contrast, Scarantino defines the Scientific Emotion Project as the project that “aims to offer a prescriptive definition of the conditions of membership of natural kinds of emotion.”

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358 Scarantino, “How to Define Emotions Scientifically.”
359 Ibid., 364.
360 Ibid.
emotion, natural kinds of anger, and so on.” He further clarifies the distinction between these two projects by stating that:

Whereas the Folk Emotion Project has the accurate reconstruction of the boundaries of traditional emotion categories as its primary objective, the Scientific Emotion Project has the transformation of such categories into useful scientific tools as its primary objective.

Scarantino also provides the following sets of criteria for respectively distinguishing between successful and non-successful Folk Emotion Projects, and successful and non-successful Scientific Emotion Projects. According to Scarantino, in order to determine whether or not a researcher or theorist working on a particular Folk Emotion Project has succeeded in fulfilling the aims of this project, we need to ask if the definitions accounts for all the empirical data about the referents of folk emotion terms. As Scarantino puts it:

If a definition aims to be descriptively adequate, we should ask: Does it account for all empirical data about what we call in English “emotion,” “anger,” etcetera? If the definition aims to be prescriptively adequate, we should ask: Does it individuate a natural kind of emotion, or a natural kind of anger?

To determine whether or not a researcher or theorists working on the Scientific Emotion Project has succeeded in fulfilling the aims of this project, Scarantino suggests that we need to ask if the definition individuates emotion as a natural kind or a discrete emotion as a natural kind. As Scarantino states:

A good prescriptive definition, unlike a good descriptive definition, does not aim to tell us what makes something a member of a traditional emotion category. Rather, it aims to tell us what makes something a member of a transformed

361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
363 Ibid., 365.
category K that achieves two objectives: It is a natural kind and it preserves some similarity to the nonnatural kind it transforms.\textsuperscript{364} I agree with Scarantino’s definition of the Folk Emotion Project and the Scientific Emotion Project to a certain extent. Although I accept his general definition of both, I do not share his sentiment that the Folk Emotion Project and the Scientific Emotion Project are mutually exclusive projects. In contrast to Scarantino’s view, which I referred to as a pessimistic meta-semantic perspective about emotions in chapter 4, I argue in the following for an optimistic interpretation of the Scientific Emotion Project. According to this understanding of the Scientific Emotion Project, although it is true that the scientific research and theorizing about emotions aims at providing a prescriptive account of what emotions are, I not only deny that the Scientific Emotion project is not necessarily mutually exclusive with the Folk Emotion Project, but I also argue that the Scientific Emotion Project necessarily depends on the Folk Emotion Project in order to achieve its aims. Thus I argue that what we ought to understand the “Scientific Emotion Project” in terms of a \textit{Unified Project of Emotion} (UP\textsuperscript{6}), which takes the position that the Folk Emotion Project is an essential element of the Scientific Emotion Project.

The foundations for my argument in support of UP\textsuperscript{6} were laid down in previous chapters, so I will simply restate the relevant conclusions of my arguments rather than reiterate them in their entirety. In chapter 4, I argued that folk emotion terms neither universally designate nor fail to universally designate that emotions are natural kinds. I also offered an explanation of why this would be the case. I suggested that the concepts associated with folk emotion terms are approximately correct definite descriptions in so

\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.

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far as they are successfully they can be successfully employed by competent users to refer to the same sorts of things. Given this understanding of folk emotion terms and Scarantino’s understanding of the Folk Emotion Project and the Scientific Emotion Project, I illustrate in the following section the need to bridge the disciplinary divide between the disciplines of psychology and philosophy by illustrating how the problem of skepticism arises within the endeavors of the Scientific Emotion project if we take Scarantino’s definition of the Scientific Emotion Project as a prescriptive definition for understanding the interests, concerns, and aims of the Scientific Emotion Project.

In recent years the meaning of folk emotion terms have been under attack. Several theorists have argued that the concepts associated with folk emotion terms are false.365 Paul Griffiths, for example, argued for the conclusion that folk emotion concepts fail to be approximately definite descriptions of what emotions are.366 According to Griffiths, folk emotion terms fail to refer to a unified category of referents. As Griffiths states:

I have argued that the vernacular concept of emotion groups together all states which produce passivity. Affect programs and the less well understood higher cognitive emotions are grouped together under the concept of emotion simply because both produce a form of passivity.367

Furthermore, Griffiths assumes that the folk emotion concepts necessarily entail that emotions are natural kinds. As Griffiths states:

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367 Ibid., 245.
I argue in the next section that the vernacular concept of emotion was introduced because certain mental states appeared to have a cluster of features (passivity playing a role in defining this cluster). The introduction of a kind term means the postulation of a causal homeostatic mechanism underlying the cluster of observed features.  

Furthermore, given that the folk concept ‘emotion’ conceives of emotion to be a natural kind, and so posits a single causal homeostatic mechanism that underlies the cluster of observed features that are associated with various types of emotions, Griffiths concludes that the folk concept ‘emotion’ fails to refer or at least only partially refers, and so fails to serve as an adequate guide to scientific research and theorizing about emotions. As Griffiths continues to state:

But it turns out that this feature cluster is explained by a different causal homeostatic mechanism in different instances. This produces a situation of “partial reference.” Identifying either of the two new theoretical categories as the referent of the vernacular concept is equally justified and equally unjustified. Retaining the vernacular concept is not an option, at least for the purpose of induction and explanation, because now there is no epistemic warrant for supposing that discoveries about some emotions will extend to all other emotions.  

\[368\] Ibid., 242. Note that Griffiths suggests here that introducing a “kind term” into natural language indicates the “postulation of a causal homeostatic mechanism that underlies the cluster of observed features.” Furthermore, since Griffiths understand causal homeostatic mechanisms that underlie clusters of observed as identifying features of natural kinds, Griffiths is implying that the introduction of a kind term is necessarily the introduction of a natural kind, which seems problematic since terms like ‘pencil’ and ‘automobile’ are “kind terms,” but these terms do not postulate any natural kind, although they may postulate causal homeostatic mechanism that underlie clusters of observed features of these kinds—people.  

\[369\] Ibid.
Thus Griffiths, consistent with the meta-semantic position of pessimism about folk emotion terms, concludes that, “the research in this book suggests that the general concept of emotion has no role in any future psychology.”

One immediate response to Griffiths’ argument is that it ignores the possibility of polysemy and assumes that folk emotion terms are primarily associated with concepts that characterize emotions or emotion as a natural kind. Second, evidence is submitted in order to suggest that folk emotion terms refer to various disparate categories of things. I, on the other hand, propose to put aside these responses in order to plainly address Griffith’s arguments and the like. I do so by offering the following reductio ad absurdum: Granting the assumption that folk emotion terms are not polysemous, and so supposing that each folk emotion term is associated with only one concept, it is possible to derive a conclusion that contradicts the preliminary assumption that the same emotion term necessarily refers to the same category of things. The fact that the meanings of emotion terms are always learned, and often by the use of ostensive orl demonstrative definitions, one is often left to infer the precise concept that is associated with a specific emotion term. Thus the failure to correctly acquire the appropriate concept that is associated with a folk emotion term in one’s language is always a possibility. This conclusion, however, contradicts the preliminary assumption that each folk emotion term is associated with only one concept. Thus we may conclude that the preliminary assumption that each folk emotion term is associated with only one concept is false.

It may be difficult at times to differentiate between cases in which the employment of the same folk emotion term actually refers to disparate categories of

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370 Ibid., 247.
things from cases in which the same folk emotion term actually involves the employment of two distinct concepts (such as a concept that is typically associated with a folk emotion term and one that is idiosyncratically associated with a folk emotion term). Yet, in so far as a speaker is regarded to be a competent user of folk emotion terms, and is thereby able to successfully communicate one’s intended referent through one’s employment of a folk emotion term, we can safely conclude that such conditions can at least establish some norms of accuracy. Thus we can distinguish between competent uses of a folk emotion term relative to a specified language from an idiosyncratic use of that term. Furthermore, since competent uses of folk emotion terms can be distinguished from idiosyncratic uses, and we can accept that any one folk emotion term can in fact refer to a variety of disparate categories, we may want to ask how one ought to understand the various ways in which folk emotion terms can be employed in order to begin to understand how folk emotion terms are employed. The benefit of doing so is that the consideration of such possibilities may leads us consider the various logical, metaphysical, and conceptual relations that are possible given our ordinary intuitions about a specific emotion term. Furthermore, such logical, metaphysical, and conceptual possibilities may be able to guide one to think beyond more narrow intradisciplinary conceptualizations of how folk emotion terms are employed, which in turn may provide a less narrowly theory-laden interpretation of any empirical evidence that has been gathered during subsequent steps of inquiry. Given the foregoing, I now turn to illustrate how a pessimistic meta-semantic perspective can lead to the problem of skepticism within what one might refer to as the “Scientific Emotion Project.”
§5.2 Crisis in the Scientific Emotion Project

A number of psychologists of emotion have observed that the psychological study of emotion has been in a state of “crisis.” For example, Emotion Review, a respected journal that aims to foster interdisciplinary research and theorizing on emotion, recently published two special issues focusing on these concerns.\textsuperscript{371} Furthermore, the general consensus regarding this state of “crisis” identifies the lack of a consensual definition of emotion as the significant cause of this “crisis.” As James A. Russell notes in his introduction to the most resent special edition on the definition of emotion:

Emotion researchers face a scandal: We have no agreed upon definition for the term—emotion—that defines our field. We there- fore do not know what events count as examples of emotion and what events theories of emotion must explain. Fundamental questions continue to defy resolution: Is emotion a useful term in studying human nature, or it is best localized to a specific time and place (as would the terms Roman emperor or Brahman widow)? Is emotion a proper scientific term? Must scientific usage coincide with everyday usage? All these questions arise anew for the terms for subcategories of emotion: fear, anger, joy, and the like.\textsuperscript{372}

In the same issue, Klaus Scherer notes his frustration with the current state in the following way:

There is no commonly agreed-upon definition of emotion in any of the disciplines that study this phenomenon. This fact leads to endless debates and hampers the cumulative progress of research. It also constitutes a major impediment to interdisciplinary dialogue and research collaboration.\textsuperscript{373}

In response to this call for the establishment of a consensual definition of emotion some have argued that the typical project of scientific research and theorizing about emotion


\textsuperscript{372} Scarantino, “How to Define Emotions Scientifically,” 364.

ought to be distinguished from scientific research and theorizing about folk emotion terms. For example, Andrea Scarantino attempts to distinguish the scientific research and theorizing on emotion, which he refers to as the “Scientific Emotion Project” from, what he refers to as the “Folk Emotion Project.”

If it is true that the Scientific Emotion Project is currently facing a crisis, we must first be sure to clearly identify the source of the problems in order to provide appropriate solutions. A brief survey of the various articles presented in the two special edition dedicated to defining emotion reveal the following issues associated with the lack of a consensual definition, the questionable nature of emotion, and the meanings of folk emotion terms:

1. Fruitless debates.374
2. Major impediments to interdisciplinary dialogue and research collaboration.375
3. The misplaced tendency to separate cognition from emotion.376
4. Unfalsifiable theories.377
5. Blind to cultural differences due to emphasis on English words.378

When considering these problems that are thought to arise from the lack of a consensual definition, none of these seem to be directly correlated with the methodological commitments of optimism. Furthermore, if the aim of emotion research and theorizing is to arrive at a theory of emotion, which includes a definition of emotion, then the solution

375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
378 Andrea Scarantino, “How to Define Emotions Scientifically,” Ibid.
to the crisis cannot be a mutually agreed upon definition of emotion. If this is indeed the solution to the identified crisis, then the crisis just is the Scientific Emotion Project, and if the solution to the crisis is not a mutually agreed on definition, then the crisis is not rooted in a lack of such a definition. Note that this conclusion, however, does not entail that the identified problems cannot be resolved by a consensual definition of emotion. It does mean that if we grant that the problems are not simply problems that are typically associated with scientific research and theorizing, then these problems must have other causes.

One possible cause is the problem of translating research written in the language of one theory into the language of another theory. These problems of translation may be problems of merely verbal disagreements/agreements or actual substantive disagreements/agreements. If they arise from merely verbal agreements/disagreements, then no alternative language is necessary to overcome them. These issues may be resolved by requiring theorist to clearly define their terms, their presuppositions, and what their theories do and do not imply, as well as what their theories are silent about, which is what the principle of clarity, of the four cornerstones of the interdisciplinary research and theorizing, recommends. If they arise from substantive disagreements/agreements, then although an alternative language may be able to resolve these problems, to establish such a language (taken to its limits) is to establish a single, unified theory that is mutually agreed upon by all experts of emotion. Thus the problems associated with translation in these cases would lie either in the expert’s failure to translate their theory into one that can be understood by their peer, or is simply an aspect
of the Scientific Emotion Project. Furthermore, as argued in chapter 4, the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing are intended to at least in part address these problems of translation, which I also argued in chapter 4 are versions of the problem of skepticism. These pragmatic principles essentially work in to ways to address the problem of translation. First, they establish interdisciplinary norms that aim to counter practices within the disciplines of psychology and philosophy that may lead to problems of translation as a result of some ambiguity in expressing one’s theory. As academics committed to the principle of interdisciplinarity, it is our responsibility to provide others with a manual of translation, at least to a certain extent. Second, they establish norms that help academics identify the presence of ambiguities within their views, as well as provide norms that aim to establish conditions in which the problem of the underdetermination of theories by evidence can be understood as a part of a solution to gaining knowledge about a mind-independent world. All four principles that constitute the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing, and perhaps other principles that are either not aspects of the four cornerstones or are not included as one of the four cornerstones, are necessary in order to achieve this end.  

Another reason for some of these problems may be the method of pessimism, especially in regard to certain oversights that might occur when we assume that experts of emotion are committed to explicating folk concepts. I agree that different cultures have different emotion concepts and that emotion theorists ought to take care with identifying

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379 For example, we may want to include something akin to Chalmers’ principle of coherence. See Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. I leave the discovery, development, and proposal of other necessary principles to the results of rigorously testing these four principles as a part of UC.
discrete emotions or identifying emotions as natural kinds. For example, if we grant the assumption that concepts can be reduced in some form or another (in virtue of identity relations, causal relations, significant correlation, supervenience, or what have you) to the activation of localized brain regions, then recent findings in cultural neuroscience and neuroanthropology do seem to suggest that such distinctions exist.\footnote{380 See Downey and Lende, *The Encultured Brain: An Introduction to Neuroanthropology*.} Granting the basic assumptions about the plasticity of the brain and the influences of biology, culture, and environment in establishing, concertizing, and extinguishing neural connections, this is a reasonable conclusion. Yet, we ought to also ask how much such findings contribute to the strength of the conclusion that such cultural differences exist.

I am not suggesting that cultural neuroscience and neuroanthropology are not useful for emotion research and theorizing. I am merely suggesting that if the relevant point here is that different cultures have different emotion concepts, and that we should take care in identifying emotions based on these concepts, then we should consider what it might mean to take such “care.” In other words, if neuroscience found that there were no differences in localized neural activity between members of distinct cultures, would this suggest that the considerable amount of cultural differences observed by sociologists, anthropologists, linguists, historians, psychologists, and philosophers were in some sense false? Although the possibility exists, it would not necessarily follow that these alternative findings are some how wrong or false. It could be that what needs to be revised are the canonical theses of the discipline neuroscience orr the canonical theses of any of the other discipline. Similar considerations would seem to apply to any finding
made by any single method within any single discipline that diverges from the pre-existing body of knowledge that has been established by either a single discipline or multiple disciplines through multiple methods. It is precisely at this point that the problem of skepticism arises in the form of the problem of underdetermination of theory by evidence. Given the position of pessimism about folk terms, theories are no longer anchored to some mutually established external criterion that is capable of adjudicating between underdetermined theories or is capable of transforming the evidence of underdetermination into confirmatory evidence for the existence of a shared, mind-independent external world. Thus Scarantino’s conception of the Scientific Emotion Project, which holds the terminological meta-semantic position of pessimism about ordinary language with respect to the science of emotion as the relevant object of inquiry, leads either to skepticism about an actual shared mind-independent world, or is ultimately self-defeating if it understands the ultimate aim of science to be the discovery some truth about a mind-independent reality.

§5.3 Crisis as a Call for Unification

In contrast to the previously given interpretation of “crisis” within the Scientific Emotion Project, I offer here an alternative understanding of this “crisis,” one that is framed in accordance with the principles that constitute UC. First, it is an acknowledgment or reiteration of the aim or ultimate purpose of the Scientific Emotion Project. Definitions, of any kind, including emotions have holistic meanings. They are meaningless outside a theory, i.e., a language. A definition of what emotions are is thus a theory of emotions; and a theory of emotion is a language that defines and employs
emotion terms. The meta-semantic perspective (pessimism or optimism) defines on aspect of a theory's framework, and the metaphysical perspective defines another. These are the presuppositions on which a theory is built. Furthermore, theories are built in order to contribute to the process of building a body of knowledge regarding what emotions are. We can regard this body of knowledge as THE theory of emotion; a single, consistent, unified theory that is mutually accepted by experts on emotion as an explanation of what emotions are. Thus the call for a single mutually agreed upon definition of emotion is not a call for a solution to what some might refer to as a “crisis” within the psychology of emotion. It is a reiteration of the purpose and ultimate aim of the Scientific Project of Emotion. It is the affirmation and, perhaps, a recommitment, to the ultimate aim of establishing a single theory of emotion that is mutually agreed upon by emotion experts and confirmed by folk intuitions. Second, the call for a consensual definition of emotion is both the recognition of a need and a call for constraints in research and theorizing about emotions. This necessity of constraints for research and theorizing about emotions is not only evident in complaints about fruitless debates, impediments to interdisciplinary dialogue and research, and unfalsifiable theories, but also in the actual state of research on emotions. Although many academics of emotion would agree that progress is indeed occurring within the Scientific Emotion Project, the invalidity of research methods have always shadowed the discipline of psychology. Thus, as I understand the Scientific Emotion Project, and all other scientific projects undergoing what some might call a period of “crisis”, such crises are calls for renewing a scientists commitment to the project of unification as well as a call for a foundation on
which such a project can flourish. I am answering this call, and my answer is my proposal of *Unification without Consilience (UC)*.

§5.4 Reply to a Possible Objection

One may argue that disagreements over whether or not emotions constitute a natural kind may also lie at the heart of the problems associated with fruitless debates, impediments to interdisciplinary dialogue and research collaboration, misplaced tendencies to separate cognition from emotion, unfalsifiable theories, orr blindness to cultural differences. Such an argument would locate the “crisis” within the Scientific Emotion Project at the terminological meta-semantic perspective. Given that optimism is committed to the Scientific Emotion Project as much as pessimism, and that these two methodological commitments mutually exclude the other, one relevant question that needs to be answered in order to argue against either one of these positions is the question: What is the Scientific Emotion Project? In other words, besides the fact that the Scientific Emotion Project is committed to studying and understanding what emotions are, what else is involved in conceiving the Folk Emotion Project? Like any project of inquiry in academia, regardless of the discipline, the answer to this question will depend on the fundamental principles that are held to be true within a particular discipline and by a particular researcher or theorists. The fundamental principles of the natural sciences are generally those of scientific realism. Scientific realism, broadly speaking, is generally defined by three theses: 1) that claims about theoretical or scientific terms are to be given a literal interpretation and so these claims have truth-values, 2) that claims about theoretical terms can express knowledge about the world, and 3) that science is concerned
with investigating the mind-independent existence of the world.\textsuperscript{381} That the natural sciences, like biology, chemistry, and physics, generally conceptualize their projects in accordance with the doctrine of scientific realism is not surprising; and although some might find this to be a controversial methodological commitment,\textsuperscript{382} it is not controversial that the Scientific Emotion Project is conceived in accordance with the doctrine of scientific realism, broadly speaking.

Granting for the time being that the Scientific Emotion Project refers to science of psychology and that the Scientific Emotion Project is conceived in accordance with the doctrine of scientific realism, broadly construed, it is false to claim that the Scientific Emotion Project is committed to scientific realism, strictly speaking. Although psychologists of emotion understand that theorizing about what emotions are to be centrally concerned with providing a true account of emotions and hold that true theories of emotion provide knowledge of the world, it is by definition false that psychology is committed to the third thesis of scientific realism. In so far as psychology is the scientific study of the human mind and behavior, psychology is not concerned with investigating the mind-independent existence of the world. This, of course, is not to suggest that psychologists are not concerned with investigating the mind-independent aspects of mind and behavior.

The difference between these two ways of conceptualizing the concern with mind independence makes a considerable difference. To understand that psychology is


\textsuperscript{382} Note that such a controversy may be an indication of that these disciplines, like the discipline of psychology, are also undergoing similar “crises” or “calls.”
concerned with investigating the mind-independent existence of the world is self-contradictory, and so is meaningless. To understand psychologists to be concerned with investigating the mind-independent aspects of mind and behavior is to understand that one of the principle concerns that drives the discipline of psychology is the concern with identifying and understanding the aspects of mind and behavior that are given by nature, and thus a natural kind. This concern, however, is essentially, related to a second concern that drives the discipline of psychology—to identify and understand what aspects of mind and behavior are not given by nature, and so are socially constructed. These two concerns are in fact one-and-the-same. To understand questions related to one of these concerns, it is necessary that one understand how that same question is related to the other concern. Thus we can conclude at this point that the Scientific Emotion Project is concerned with making claims about emotions that are to be literally understood, and so are subject to truth-conditions and are intended to express knowledge.

The concern regarding the natural kind status of emotions has to do with the question of what emotions are from a metaphysical perspective and the concern with the value of the meanings of folk emotion terms has to do with the question of what emotions are from the terminological meta-semantic perspective (pessimism and optimism). Although the interplay of these two perspectives yield various theories of emotion, these two perspectives are logically, conceptually, and metaphysically distinct. In order to suggest that the cultural diversity of emotion concepts, and so the differences in the meanings of folk emotion terms, are meaningfully related to the natural kind status of emotions, it must be shown that the cultural diversity of emotion concepts imply that
emotions are not natural kinds or that emotions being natural kinds imply that emotion concepts are not culturally diverse. I refer to these two statements as CD\textsuperscript{e} and NK\textsuperscript{e}:

CD\textsuperscript{e}: If emotion concepts are culturally diverse, then emotions would not constitute a natural kind.

NK\textsuperscript{e}: If emotions constitute a natural kind, then emotion concepts would not be culturally diverse.

These two possible relations and their logically equivalent statements exhaust the possible ways that the cultural diversity of emotion concepts can be related to the natural kind status of emotions and vice versa in order to ground any arguments that rely statements about one in order to derive conclusions about the other. Some pessimists have attempted to argue against optimism by assuming the truth of CD\textsuperscript{e}. I am, however, also confident that all academics will, in sincerity, deny that NK\textsuperscript{e} is true. So the question is whether or not the pessimist can legitimately assume the truth of CD\textsuperscript{e}. Of course one might say that the answer to this question is theory dependent. I not only argue that truth-value of CD\textsuperscript{e} is not only independent of any theory of emotion, but I am also confident that all emotion researcher and theorist believe that statement CD\textsuperscript{e} is false. In order to argue for this conclusion, I ask academics to consider NK\textsuperscript{e} again, along with following question QI\textsuperscript{n}.

“QI\textsuperscript{n}r” stands for questions about intuitions relativized to the context of natural kinds.

**Question about Intuition on Diversity of Terms and Nature Kinds**

NK\textsuperscript{e}: If emotions constitute a natural kind, then emotion concepts would not be culturally diverse.

QI\textsuperscript{n}: Do you rationally believe that NK\textsuperscript{e} is true?

One might suggest that the truth of NK\textsuperscript{e} is epistemically open since we have no
way of knowing whether the statement is either true or false given our current body of
knowledge. Nothing we know suggests that NK⁶ is false. Also note that nothing we know
suggests that CD⁵ is true. Furthermore, I am confident that no emotion researcher or
theorists would sincerely and rationally answer, “yes,” to this question, especially given
the human capacity for symbolic representation. There are also analogous cases of natural
kinds that are associated with culturally diverse concepts of such natural kinds that serve
as some evidence against the truth of NK⁶. For example, cows are a natural kind, yet the
cultural concept associated with the American English folk term 'cow' and the cultural
concept associated with its cognate in Hindu Sanskrit 'gow' or 'gau' are very different. Therefore every reasonable emotion researcher or theorist ought to either be sincerely
agnostic about the answer to QIⁿ or ought to believe that NK⁶ is false, and so answer
“no” to question QIⁿ?

Furthermore, given this conclusion, it would logically follow that every emotion
theorist believes in the truth of the proposition that would make statement CD⁵ false since
statement CD⁵ is logically equivalent to statement NK⁶ by the logical rule of inference
referred to as transportation, which states that statements of the kind “If p, then q” are
logically equivalent to statements “If ~q, then ~p.” In other words, statements that have
these forms, given the shared contents, will have the same truth-values. So, if one were
ture, then the other statement, by logical necessity would also be true; and if one were
false, then the other statement, by logical necessity would also be false. Thus statement
CD⁵ and statement NK⁶ will necessarily have the same truth-value according to the rules

of logic, and given the validity of the rule of transportation, it would follow that all academics who believe that NK\(^e\) is false ought to also believe that CD\(^e\) is false given the rational norm of logically consistency. Furthermore, the same can be said, mutatis mutandis, about those who are agnostic about NK\(^e\). Those who hold some other beliefs about the truth-values of CD\(^e\) and NK\(^e\) would bare the burden of proof to show that their beliefs are either not false or not irrational in some appropriate way, which includes the condition of not being inconsistent or running into circularities. Thus in so far as having logically consistent beliefs is rational, all academics who sincerely believe that NK\(^e\) is false, which I am assuming is everyone, can be said to also have a belief that rationally denies the truth of CD\(^e\). Thus one ought to be able to confidently conclude that all emotion theorists and researchers would rationally believe that it is false that the cultural diversity of emotion concepts implies that emotions are not a natural kind. Thus concerns regarding the legitimacy of pessimism or optimism in establishing the basic principles of "The Scientific Emotion Project" are distinct from concerns regarding the natural kind status of emotions.

One important consideration to note, however, is that this conclusion does not suggest that statement CD\(^e\) is in fact false. Whether or not CD\(^e\) is in fact false is an empirical claim. The foregoing conclusion, however, does show that the cultural diversity of emotion concepts, as well as the heterogeneity of folk emotion concepts in any one “non-ideal” language, are logically and conceptually independent of the natural kind status of emotion. We can draw the same conclusions, mutatis mutandis, about discrete emotions and any other postulate natural kind. Furthermore, we can draw a corollary c
Conclusion about the relationship between either logical or conceptual facts and metaphysical facts: that neither logical nor conceptual facts entail any metaphysical facts. As to whether or not metaphysical facts entail any logical or conceptual facts, I leave open to further investigation. One ought to also note that what I have argued does not suggest that we need not be careful with how folk emotion concepts are actually used in emotion research and theorizing. UC includes a provision for taking such care through the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing, as well as the fundamental base of interdisciplinary research and theorizing.

§5.5 Final Conclusion

The primary aim in this dissertation was to initiate the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across disciplines of academia. To do so, however, this dissertation aims to bridge existing disciplinary divides between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology, and to provide some preliminary foundation for doing so. I fulfilled this aim by first demonstrating that interdisciplinary research and theorizing is needed within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology, and especially within the field of emotion. This was demonstrated by considering how the problem of skepticism arises within each discipline independent of the interests, concerns, and interests of the other discipline, especially in regard to the field of emotions. Second, I derived, proposed, and argued for the acceptance of a new foundation for the disciplines of philosophy and psychology as a response to the problem of skepticism. I refer to this proposal as the Proposal for Unification without Consilience (UC). This proposal is constituted by the following basic principles: the fundamental intentionality thesis (FIT),
the thesis of rational universalism (TRU), the first principles of meta-semantic structural pluralism, the fundamental base for interdisciplinary research and theorizing (Base^8), and the four cornerstones of interdisciplinary research and theorizing.

Furthermore, in the process of deriving the principles of UC, I have established the foundations for a fundamental theory to that unifies a theory of consciousness and a theory of emotions. I refer to this foundation as the foundation for a fundamental unified theory of consciousness (META^fc). These foundations are constituted by UC, the following principles for a fundamental theory of consciousness and emotions: the final cause of consciousness (FC^c), fundamental intentionality thesis of emotion (FIT^e), the principle of distinct conceptual and phenomenal contents, the structure of content relations for ordinary adult humans, the five fundamental principles of causation, criterion of ontological rationality for emotions (COR^e), principle of the epistemic rationality of emotions (ER^e), thesis of rational universalism for emotions (TRU^e), and the fundamental epistemic principle of emotion (K^e).

Finally, I conclude my dissertation by offering the following argument for the acceptance of UC or the rigorous testing of UC, in order to determine whether or not it can provide the initial conditions for fruitful interdisciplinary research and theorizing between the disciplines of psychology and philosophy in accordance with its primary intent, before making any decision to accept or reject my proposal: As members of academia we ought to be committed to the following the rule of reason: Given a sound or cogent argument for some conclusion, we ought to accept the truth of that conclusion as long as there are no competing sound or cogent argument that supports an alternative
conclusion that is inconsistent with the conclusion that was initially drawn. This dissertation provides sound or cogent arguments for the conclusions that are essential to fulfilling the central aim of this dissertation. I therefore propose that the disciplines of philosophy and psychology accept the conclusions of my sound or cogent arguments as true. In other words, I propose that the disciplines of philosophy and psychology accept UC and META. Furthermore, I propose that it is up to the members of the disciplines of philosophy and psychology who deny the soundness or cogency of any one of my arguments to first fulfill their burden of proof, as I have in this body of work, by presenting me with their sound or cogent argument that is intended to support their conclusion, and by me giving me the courtesy and respect as a fellow member of academia to appropriately respond to their argument.
REFERENCES


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———. “Email Correspondence.” (2013).


LIST OF TERMS

**AS-IF:** All intentional states are in principle possibly conscious states.

**Brentano’s Thesis (BT):** All and only mental phenomena have the property of intentional in-existence.

**Base**⁻: An adequate theory of emotion must recognize that fold emotion terms serve the fundamental purpose of identifying the explananda for research and theorizing about emotions.

**Base**⁻: An adequate theory of any ordinary object of inquiry must recognize that folk terms serve the fundamental purpose of identifying the explananda for research and theorizing about *that* object.

**Conscious events:** Events that are necessarily conscious events; phenomenal events.

**Condition of Illusorily Incommensurable Worlds (IIW):** We must assume that it is possible for a speaker of L₁ and a speaker of L₂ to be distinct individuals, while also maintaining that it is possible for these two speakers to inhabit an ontologically distinct world (i.e., a set of worlds that have no property in common) but we are ignorant as to whether or not these two speakers actually inhabit ontologically distinct worlds.

**CD**⁻: If emotion concepts are culturally diverse, then emotions would not constitute a natural kind.

**D:** Reasoning consists in the entertainment (and often acceptance) in thought or in speech of a set of initial ideas (propositions), together with a sequence of ideas each of which is derivable by an acceptable principle of inference from its predecessors in the set.

**Epistemic Rationality as Reason Responsiveness (RR):** ER and EI.

**Epistemic Rationality (ER):** We act *rationally* if we act in some way because we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth would give us sufficient reasons to act in this way.

**Epistemic Irrationality (EI):** We act *irrationally* if we act in some way despite having beliefs whose truth would give us clear and strongly decisive reasons *not* to act in this way.

**ER**⁻: The *epistemic rationality of an emotion qua emotion* depends on the emotion’s veridicality, warrant, and intentional content of that emotion; the fact that emotions are at times rational and at times irrational in themselves ought to be distinguished from the conclusion that our assessments of the rationality and irrationality of our own emotions (from the first person perspective) or another’s emotions (from a third person
perspective) depends on assessments of truth, assessments of warrant, and what is identified as the intentional content of the emotion type in question.

**Fundamental Intentionality (FI):** An intentional event is a mental phenomenon whereby one understands the object of the mental phenomenon, the object that the mental phenomenon is directed at or about, to be necessarily “fused into” or necessarily “contained in” the experience of the mental phenomenon itself; All f-intentional events are mental events.

**Fundamental Intentionality Generalized (FIG):** A F-intentional event is an event whereby one understands the object of that event, the object that the event is directed at or about, to be necessarily “fused into” or necessarily “contained in” the event itself.

**FI_{f}** Provide a case of some f-intentional event that is not a mental event.

**FIT^{e}:** The f-intentionality of emotions consists in relations between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and their significance to the subject’s well-being.

**Grice’s Rationality Thesis (GRT):** L, D, and R.

**Identical Terms (IT):** A term in ordinary language is associated with the same referent and the same concept as the same term in a theoretic or scientific language.

**INT: All beings capable of intentional states are beings capable of conscious states.**

**Illusory Intentionality (ILL):** An event whereby one understands the object of that event, i.e., what that event is directed at or about, in such a way that makes the event an intentional event that is necessarily not an f-intentional events; All ill-intentional events are mental events.

**ILL_{l}:** Provide a case of some ill-intentional event that is not a non-mental event.

**INT/AS-IF:** All beings capable of intentional states are beings capable of conscious states and all intentional states are in principle possibly conscious states.

**Intentional event:** An event that is necessarily characterized as an intentional event.

**L:** That it is part of the business (possibly, even the prime business) of logical theorists to distinguish the various modes of inference (non-demonstrative as well as demonstrative) which enter into reasoning, and to systematize the principles of each such mode, thereby explaining and perhaps (as theorists are want to do) strengthening assent to (or even, in some instances, undermining assent to) the principles of inference which are intuitively found acceptable at a pre-theoretic stage, and so constitute the initial data for the theorist.
Mental event: An event that is necessarily characterized as a type of mental event.

**META**: The conceptual meta-semantic perspective on an object of study understands the question of "What is X?" in terms of the question "What is the meaning of the term, word, or the concept of x, where x represents the larger genus, class, or category of which the object of study is taken as a member. There are at least four ways of holding a conceptual meta-semantic perspective, and each perspective invokes a distinct ontological meaning-relation—an objective meaning-relation, purely subjective meaning-relation, heterogeneous meaning-relation, or a relatively subjective meaning-relation.

**META**: The general principle of meta-semantic structural pluralism is the principle of deep perspective-taking. In order to understand how one might go about conducting interdisciplinary research across disciplines, one must be able to consider various theories about a particular object of study from within a number of different perspectives.

**META**: The terminological meta-semantic perspective on an object of study understands the question of “What is X?” in terms of the question “What is the relationship between ordinary language orr ordinary concepts about X, and the language orr concepts employed by a particular theory of X?” The aim of the meta-semantic perspective is to understand a theorist's view of the relation between ordinary language and the language of their theory. Theorists may hold divergent terminological meta-semantic perspectives while holding the same metaphysical perspective orr the same semantic perspective on some object of study. There are at least two ways of holding a terminological meta-semantic perspective, both of which invoke distinct terminological meaning relations—optimism and pessimism about ordinary language.

**META**: The metaphysical perspective on an object of study understands the question of “What is X?” in terms of the question, “What kind of thing is X, where X represents the object of study in question?” The aim of the metaphysical perspective is to understand the variety of different things that the object of study can be identified as being. There are at least two ways to understand an object of study—as an objective kind orr as a subjective kind.

**META**: The semantic perspective on an object of study understands the question, “What is X?” in terms of the question, “What is the meaning of the term, word, or concept of 'X', where 'X' represents a particular term, word, or concept that is associated with the object of study in question?” The answer to this question will depend on a variety of factors, including what the object of study is and from which disciplinary perspective one chooses to understand the object of study. The aim of taking the semantic perspective is to understand the variety of ways other academics might understand the meanings of the various terms that may be used to speak about orr conceive either the object itself or aspects of the object of study.
MN: All mental phenomena have the property of intentional in-existence; All mental events are f-intentional events.

MNc: All causal claims are products of some faculty of our mind.

MNc: All emotions are mental events.

MNr: Provide a case of some mental event that is not an f-intentional event.

NKc: If emotion constitutes a natural kind, then emotion concepts would not be culturally diverse.

NoFI: No physical phenomena have the property of intentional in-existence; No physical events are f-intentional.

NoFIr: Provide a case some non-mental event that is not an ill-intentional event.

Non-intentional event: An event that is not necessarily characterized as an intentional event.

Non-mental event: An event that is not necessarily characterized as a mental event.

Non-physical event: An event that is not necessarily a physical event.

Criterion for Ontological Rationality of Emotions (CORc): For every type of emotion there exists some normative standard, given by what emotions are or what the emotion type is, by which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated in light of the fact they manifest our rationality.

Optimist about ordinary language emotion terms (Optimist): Individuals who answer the question of what emotions are from the metaphysical perspective in roughly the following way, "Yes, folk emotion terms are or ought to be understood as trans-theoretical terms."

Pessimist about ordinary language emotion terms (Pessimist): Individuals who answer the question of what emotions are from the metaphysical perspective in roughly the following way, "No, folk emotion terms are not or ought not be understood as trans-theoretical terms."

Phenomenal event: An event that is necessarily characterized as an experiential event, an event with a something-it-is-like quality that makes that event the type of event that it is.

Physical events: An event that is necessarily characterized as a physical event.
**Polysemous Terms (PT):** A term in ordinary language is associated with a distinct but related referent and a distinct but related concept or family of concepts as the same term in a theoretic or scientific language.

**Property**\(^S\): The property that all the contents of propositions\(^S\) share in order to allow them to assert the contents that are asserted by proposition\(^S\).

**Property**\(^L\): The property that all the contents of propositions\(^L\) share in order to allow them to be expressed at least in principle by any individual that can be described as using propositions\(^L\).

**Property**\(^W\): The property that all the contents of propositions\(^W\) share in order to allow them to be asserted in principle by some language.

**Proposition**\(^S\): A statement, which is a sentence in some language that asserts the content of that sentence (i.e., what that statement asserts) as a fact about the world.

**Proposition**\(^L\): A subset of propositions\(^W\) that can be asserted in principle by a statement in some language as well as in principle by the individual who can be described as a user of the proposition\(^W\).

**Proposition**\(^W\): A possible fact about the world, which is a possible truth that can be asserted at least in principle by some language.

**Propositional**\(^L\) **Content:** The contents of thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc., that are entertained, held in mind, or constitute the contents of proposition\(^L\); what propositions\(^L\) are “about” or “directed at.”

**Propositional**\(^S\) **Content:** The contents of thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc., that are entertained, held in mind, or constitute the contents of proposition\(^S\); what propositions\(^S\) are “about” or “directed at.”

**Propositional**\(^W\) **Content:** The contents of thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc., that are entertained, held in mind, or constitute the contents of proposition\(^S\); what propositions\(^S\) are “about” or “directed at.”

**Question about Intuition on Diversity of Terms and Natural Kinds (QI\(^n\)):** Do you rationally believe that NK\(^S\) is true?

**R:** The principles of inference that govern reasoning are non-empirical in character.

**Standard Criterion for the Rationality of Emotions (SCOR\(^S\)):** Truth\(^P\), Truth\(^E\), Warrant\(^P\), and Warrant\(^I\); the conditions that satisfy SCOR\(^S\).
TC\(^c\): The truth-values of our causal claims ultimately depend upon whether or not the causal relations that are asserted by are causal claims are actually instantiated in the world, relative to the speaker’s context.

Terminological meaning relations (T-Rules): Tripartite meaning relations that are shared between concepts, referents, and folk terms.

The Fundamental Epistemic Principle of Emotions (K\(^e\)): Emotions are superordinate inference rules and as such can be understood as ways of sense-making.

The Fundamental Intentionality thesis (FIT): If an event is an f-intentional event, then the intentionality of the event consists in at least one relation between aspects of the world (real or otherwise) and some significance to that subject.

The Thesis of Rational Universalism for Emotions (TRU\(^f\)): Emotions can be at times rational and at times irrational qua emotion; an emotion type is a superordinate inference rule.

The Thesis of Rational Universalism (TRU\(^g\)): The Principles of inference that govern reasoning may be empirical in character as long as the empirical aspects of such inferences rules make sense of associated intentional contents and are well ground in rigorous empirical evidence that support such inference rules as postulates of reasoning.

The Problem of Illusion: Philosophical problems that are consequences of the problem of the arguments from illusion.

The Proposal of Unification without Consilience: FIT, TRU, BASE\(^g\), META\(^g\), META\(^s\), META\(^m\), META\(^l\), META\(^e\), and C\(^a\).

The Unified Project of Emotion (UP\(^c\)): An understanding of the Scientific Emotion Project which takes the position that the Folk Emotion Project is an essential element of the Scientific Emotion Project.

TIE: All emotions are f-intentional events.

Trans-theoretic Terms (TT): A term in ordinary language is associated with the same referent and the same family of concepts as the same term in the a theoretic or scientific language.

Truth\(^p\): Emotions can be rational and irrational with respect to assessments of truth regarding their relevant propositional contents.

Truth\(^F\): Emotions can be rational and irrational with respect to assessments of truth regarding their relevant eudaimonistic contents.
APPENDIX A

DIAGRAM OF MAIN ARGUMENT
Note that Brentano holds two distinct metaphysical perspectives. The first is the metaphysical perspective of a scientist of his time, wherein he denied the metaphysical perspective he held as a Catholic priest. I refer to this as his psychological perspective. The second is the metaphysical perspective he held as a Catholic priest. I refer to this as his the perspective of his ontological trinity.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE**
Blue: All physical phenomena
Red: All and only mental phenomena
Yellow and Black: Non-existent phenomena

**ONTOLOGICAL TRINITY**
Blue: All physical phenomena
Red: All and only mental phenomena
Yellow: Nonphysical, nonmental, intentional phenomena
Black: Non-existent phenomena
APPENDIX D

META-SEMANTIC TAXONOMY OF THEORIES OF EMOTION
META-SEMANTIC TAXONOMY OF THEORIES OF EMOTIONS

**METAPHYSICAL PERSPECTIVE:**
Are Emotions Objective Kinds or Subjective Kinds?

- **Objective Kind** – Essentially independent of human construction; its identity is grounded in at least some material property.
- **Subjective Kind** – Essentially products of human construction; its identity is not grounded in any material property.

**SEMANTIC PERSPECTIVE:**
Are Folk Emotion Terms Trans-Theoretical Terms?¹

- **Optimist** – The intentions of ordinary language emotion terms are approximately correct definite descriptions, and as such, theoretical and scientific pursuits ought to aim at further clarifying, refining, or elucidating them.
- **Pessimist** – The intentions of at least some ordinary language emotion terms are not approximately correct definite descriptions, and as such, ought to be distinguished from theoretical or scientific emotion terms.

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<th>OBJECTIVE KIND</th>
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<td><strong>REALISM</strong></td>
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<th><strong>ELIMINATIVISM</strong></th>
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<td>Psychological Eliminativism:</td>
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<td>Philosophical Eliminativism:</td>
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<td>- None that I am aware of.</td>
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**ELIMINATIVE-REALISM**
Psychological Eliminativism-Realism:

- Psychological Eliminativism:
- None that I am aware of.