Biopolitics in the Age of Shakespeare

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is positioned at the intersection of philosophy, theology, and critical theory in order to explore the way early modern literature may be enlisted as a vehicle for a return to an ethically informed humanism, specifically with regard to how Western culture currently understands the contingent categories of “life” and “the human.” While a great deal of critical work is currently being marshaled in the field of biopolitics, scholarly focus continues to be placed on the materiality of the physical body, or what I term “biopolitical materialism.”

What remains underexplored, however, is the reality that “life” and “the human” are deeply relational categories that should not be reduced to such material instances alone. Historically, and especially in the early modern period, “life” and “the human” are understood as interconnected and widely networked. Although such materialism indeed becomes solidified in the seventeenth-century, I seek to recuperate an ethical challenge to contemporary biopolitical materialism through an extended dialogue with early modern thinkers. By turning to works “in the Age of Shakespeare” I return attention to the originary epoch of what has been described as our “modern event horizon.” I argue that within the very historical period that gives rise to the practice of biopolitical materialism exists a rich textual archive of resistance to this troubling phenomenon in the form of neighborly concern and the acknowledgement of shared creaturely estate.

Chapter One inaugurates my argument by turning to Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, reading as its central theme the tragic effect inherent to dissociating the individual from the community. The remaining three chapters attend to neighborly forms given expression in three of Shakespeare’s late plays: Chapter Two considers the potential
political orientation of grace in *Measure for Measure*; Chapter Three positions neighborliness as a series of posthuman encounters in *The Winter’s Tale*; and Chapter Four explores an early modern understanding of hospitality as stewardship at work in *Timon of Athens*. I conclude by turning to philosophy and political theology in order to suggest a way to think “life” as an ethical relation *with, in, and through* “the Age of Shakespeare.”
For Ginger and Penelope
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If I am not for myself, then who will be for me? And if I am only for myself, then what am I? And if not now, when?
—Rabbi Hillel, Babylonian Talmud

It is proper to every gathering that the gatherers assemble to coordinate their efforts to the sheltering; only when they have gathered together with that end in view do they begin to gather.
—Martin Heidegger, “Logos”
INTRODUCTION

Biopolitics in the Age of Shakespeare

If ethics without politics is empty, then politics without ethics is blind.
—Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding

The theater is the political art par excellence; only there is the political sphere of human life transposed into art. By the same token, it is the only art whose sole subject is man in his relationship to others.
—Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition

“Biopolitics in the Age of Shakespeare” offers a supplemental narrative to new historicist and cultural materialist understandings of early modern English literature and culture. Its readings eschew the now commonplace critical-theoretical binaries of subject/object and subversion/containment in favor of a wider discourse of networks, plurality, and ethics. In short, this dissertation reads within “the Age of Shakespeare” an argument for the human condition conceived of as a relational experience, the shared phenomenology of creaturely estate, rather than as an autonomous and objectifiable subjectivity.

As its title suggests, the target of my approach falls under the theoretical heading of biopolitics. Each chapter defines and situates its particular biopolitical terms in passing, yet to broadly summarize, biopolitics marks the incorporation of biological life into the apparatus of the state. Put simply, biopolitics is the political management of life in all of its lexical nuances: human, animal, environmental, pre- and post-mortem. The work of Michel Foucault and his theoretical descendants, particularly Italian political

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theorist Giorgio Agamben, locates the birth of modern biopolitics in the West in the seventeenth-century near the close of the Renaissance, especially as it is articulated in the Hobbesian political theology of the *Leviathan* (1651). In the chapters that follow I argue that the West’s biopolitical crises, in their varied early modern and modern iterations, arise from materialist thinking. This is not to disparage materialism wholesale, but rather to articulate a particular crisis in material thought: the instrumentalization of life.

Just as Foucault and Agamben trace the origins of Western biopolitics to the seventeenth-century, Martin Heidegger and Claude Lévi-Strauss similarly map the emergence of modern Western instrumental thinking to the early modern period, especially in the scientific rationalism of seventeenth-century thinkers such as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Isaac Newton. The effect of instrumental thinking on the politics of life is to render what Foucault terms *biopower*. Following Foucault, biopower operates in two distinct yet interrelated strains. In its first iteration the body is treated as a machine, understood in terms of production and economic use and managed by various state apparatuses such as the military, public education, and private employment. For Foucault the second form of biopower centers on the reproductive capacity of life and how this might be leveraged best to statistical advantage (e.g. birth/death rates and population control as espoused under the ideology of the sanctity of life). Further, in its

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most egregious form biopolitics operates as thanatopolitics, the management of death itself, as demonstrated by the work of Timothy Campbell, Roberto Esposito, and Achille Mbembe.\textsuperscript{4} I would stress, however, the degree to which materialist thinking as instrumentalization comports as political practice, whether over life or death.

Christopher Breu has located a lacuna within the overlapping fields of biopolitical theory, materialist theory, and political economics. In a recent call to action he writes,

Yet as powerful as biopolitics and thanatopolitics are as concepts…they need to be theorized more fully in relationship to both materiality and political economy.\textsuperscript{5}

Breu takes up his own call by turning to the experimental literature of the late twentieth-century.\textsuperscript{6} I explore this critical gap and also theorize its potential by turning to literature “in the Age of Shakespeare,” roughly speaking that of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This archive is both precursor to and concomitant with the rise of biopolitical and instrumental thinking previously established in the seventeenth-century. As such “the Age of Shakespeare” offers a productive textual and temporal locus from which to think both materiality and political economy otherwise. The chapters that follow posit a networked materiality attended to and enjoined by the spiritual emphasis still widely resonant in the early modern thought of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Plays by Marlowe and Shakespeare, as well as poetry, sermons, conduct manuals and


\textsuperscript{6} Breu, \textit{Insistence of the Material}.
other literature of the age are read for their religious relief. I use this term intentionally in its sense of prominence and contrast, as well as to suggest deliverance from oppression by the arrival of a substitute or replacement.  

Throughout its chapters this dissertation renders materiality in terms of political theology, particularly in religion’s etymological carriage as *religare*, a site of communal binding (re-ligature) that bears ethical force. Julia Reinhard Lupton intuits that to conceive of religion in its aspect as *religare* is “to acknowledge moments of radical interdependence: of each human on other humans, of the human on the creaturely, and of secular writing on sacred writing.”  

Political theology in this sense is phenomenological encounter; it is the call of the other in proximal closeness to oneself, a politics of dwelling in lived nearness. My political-theological through-line in this dissertation is one well-worn in the spiritual writing of the Renaissance: *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.* Whether in the globalized world of first-century Palestine or the emergent market economy and empire of the early modern period with its similarly globalizing cast, the question that follows this divine injunction remains equally relevant and resonant, then and now: *And who is my neighbour?*

Each of this project’s four chapters takes up an aspect of neighborliness through early modern example, whether attending to the tragic dissociation of the individual from the community in Marlowe’s *Faustus*, the consideration of grace as a potential

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7 *OED*, s.v. “relief.”


9 Mk. 12:31 and Lev. 19:18; all biblical citations here follow the King James Version. On the Great Commandment in its Pauline theological cast, see Rom. 13:8-10.

10 Lk. 10:29.
orientation for political restructuring in Measure for Measure, posthuman others as
neighbors in The Winter’s Tale, or the early modern call to enact hospitality as
stewardship in Timon of Athens.

As an instance of political theology the divine command toward neighbor love is
plural in its operation and intertextual in its calling, existing simultaneously in inscription
and application as Hebrew and Greek, Jewish and Christian, ancient and modern. More
importantly, this spiritual fiat is intended to be neither empty theology nor idealized
theory; material action is required: Thou shalt. Working from this political-theological
trajectory, political economy is similarly rethought in each of the dissertation’s four
chapters along the vector of religare as a spiritual economy espousing the care of and for
others, whether human, animal, environmental, or object in orientation.

THE AGE OF SHAKESPEARE

In his preface to the First Folio (1623), Ben Jonson famously opined that
Shakespeare is “not of an age, but for all time.” My readings take Shakespeare, and at
times his contemporaries, to be equally atemporal. As Jonathan Gil Harris has shown,
matter in the time of Shakespeare proves itself to be rather untimely.11 This is of course
not to disavow a discernible likeness to or traceable origin of the modern West in the
early modern period with its rise of the Market, proliferation of new technologies and
access to information, as well as its rapid urban development at the expense of the rural.12

11 Jonathan Gil Harris, Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare (Philadelphia: University of
12 On the rise of the Market in the early modern period and its after effects see Richard Halpern, The
Poetics of Primitive Accumulation: English Renaissance Culture and the Genealogy of Capital (Ithaca:
Nevertheless, Shakespeare is equally coterminous with pressing issues today. As W.H. Auden once remarked, works of art read us; “if the plays do read us, they can help us to historicize our present.” The book culture of Renaissance Studies certainly corroborates such a position with its recent production of Shakespeares that espouse a bard invested in posthuman, eco-critical, and animal-minded discourse to name but a few theoretical trends in academe’s contemporary Zeitgeist.

In order to alleviate anxieties that may arise upon charges of anachronism or presentism I defer to Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes, who concede that we can never, finally, evade the present. And if it’s always and only the present that makes the past speak, it speaks always and only to—and about—ourselves. It follows that the first duty of credible presentist criticism must be to acknowledge that the questions we ask of any literary text will inevitably be shaped by our own concerns, even when these include what we call ‘the past.’ The irony which that situation generates constitutes a fruitful, necessary and inescapable aspect of any text’s being. Perhaps it’s the basis of the only effective purchase on Shakespeare that we’re able to make.


Sharon O’Dair puts it this way: “one might fruitfully suggest—and I will do so now—that, for all its hauteur, historicist Shakespeare rides on the back of presentist Shakespeare.”

Although this project is historicist in nature, it is presentist in its desire to think with Shakespeare and early modern literature more broadly. That is, it thinks the past and present in tandem with an eye toward the ways the two may inform and enhance an understanding of both. Thus, for the purposes of this project I use Shakespeare to trace the confluence of biopolitical thought across what we tend to recognize (periodize) as “early modern” and “modern.”

My methodology in large part follows the “Religious Turn” in early modern literary criticism. The approach I take to political theology is equally informed by what has come to be termed “New Perspectives on Paul” in religious studies and continental philosophy. Both are enhanced by critical theory and read religion broadly and Pauline theology specifically as sites of resistance to supersessionist narratives where Christianity replaces Judaism, Protestantism supersedes Catholicism, and the secular overrides the sacred. As recent scholarship demonstrates, the religious atmosphere of the early modern

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17 In this aspect I follow Julia Reinhard Lupton’s example, see Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
19 Texts in this sub-field are vast and wide ranging. For a general overview of the field in its emergent state, see the oft-cited review essay by Ken Jackson and Arthur Marotti, “The Turn to Religion in Early Modern English Studies,” Criticism 46.1 (2004): 167-90.
20 A survey of this movement relative to Shakespeare studies is provided by Julia Reinhard Lupton in her review essay, “The Pauline Renaissance: A Shakespearean Reassessment,” The European Legacy 15.2 (2010): 215-20. My engagement with Faustus in Chapter 1 takes up the impress of Paul on early modern and contemporary political thought, see especially n.20.
period is simply too diverse to be reduced to such antiquated and linear narratives.\textsuperscript{21} Instead these respective religious turns emphasize the interconnectivity and interdependence of the human experience within the wider networks of our personal, social, and political encounters.

My archival choices reflect this emphasis. Marlowe’s \textit{Faustus} opens my engagement with “the Age of Shakespeare,” in part due to its historical situatedness at the opening of the sixteenth-century stage but primarily because of what I read as its concern for communal association. Shakespeare’s late plays—\textit{Measure for Measure}, \textit{The Winter’s Tale}, and \textit{Timon of Athens}—form the core archive of my Renaissance dramatic texts. My interest in these plays arises from their religious nature and ethical charge. As I read and re-read these late works I continue to encounter Shakespeare the man, the mortal man, looking back on life as one is wont to do near the end. Perhaps not unlike the writer of Ecclesiastes, the Shakespeare of these late plays pens dramatic encounters that challenge audiences, and perhaps even his younger self, to conceive of life otherwise than autonomous investment. The human condition is written here as an array of ethical and deeply relational engagements, religious in the sense of \textit{religare}, a moral binding of oneself to others in our collective human drama.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that the tapestry of my early modern analysis is equally stitched through with Heideggerian thread. Heidegger took as his philosophical project nothing less than the \textit{destruktion} of the binary thinking he viewed as underwriting Western philosophy (and subsequently politics). Heidegger’s methodology seeks to rescue Western thought from such dyadic opposition by advocating

thinking as a practice of openness to plurality with an eye toward care and indebtedness. This is especially true of his later writings. Heidegger and his descendants, though writing from a distinctly twentieth- and twenty-first century vantage, provide both helpful terminology and critical perspective from which to approach Western biopolitical crises, then and now. The chapters that follow thus borrow from Martin Heidegger, Simon Critchley, Emmanuel Lévinas,22 Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze,23 and Jacques Derrida in order to approach their respective thinking with “the Age of Shakespeare.”

Chapter One turns to Faustus in order to argue that the crisis of Western biopolitics arises from instrumental materialist thinking. Biopolitics, in this sense, is understood as materialist polity. Reading Marlowe against an established critical grain, I argue that his use of early modern discourses on magic as well as the play’s religious investment advocates a conception of selfhood relative to communal attachment rather than the long-recognized model of the autonomous modern individual that emerges on the historical scene from the Renaissance world stage. The second chapter reads Measure for Measure as a specifically biopolitical play in order to suggest that Shakespeare’s Vienna is a theatrical proving ground for the practice of grace as a form of political mediation and remediation, a corrective to Angelo’s absolutist thanatopolitics. Chapter Three engages Shakespearean political life in its posthuman turns as animals, environments, and objects in The Winter’s Tale. The play’s resurrection theme, I argue,


23 On Deleuze as Heidegger’s most direct philosophical heir, see Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
prompts religious and philosophical consideration of the potential politics afforded by feminine plurality. The fourth and final chapter reads in Timon of Athens an early modern call for the practice of hospitality as stewardship and an alternate political economics as oikos-pneumatics, an inspired economy concerned with the care of and for others through an investment in relational dwelling. In my concluding remarks I turn to the philosophy of Heidegger and Pauline Messianism in order to propose a way of thinking life differently with “the Age of Shakespeare.”

The readings that follow position early modern plays at the intersection of new materialisms and scriptural ethics, and offer, I hope, a fresh perspective of approaching “the Age of Shakespeare” that is sustained by the themes of citizenship as stewardship and shared creaturely estate.
ONE

*Doctor Faustus*, Phenomenology, and the Illusion of Materialism

The basic error of all materialism in politics...is to overlook the inevitably with which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, material object.

—Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*

Who would not be proficient in this art?

—Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus*, 1.3.29

*Idou ho anthrōpos.* Behold the man. This well-known scriptural phrase from St. John is perhaps more readily discerned by its translation in the Vulgate, or Jerome’s Bible as it is referred to by Faustus, a text dismissed in passing during his infamous opening soliloquy. *Ecce homo.* Behold the man. Translation performs a type of lexical alchemy in its ability to transubstantiate word or concept from one state of being to another. Such transignification has the power to both occlude and illuminate meaning. The Latin *ecce* (behold) of John 19:5, for example, proves more telling in its precursive Greek iteration. *Idou* (behold), a conjugated form of the verb *horaō*, means to see, perceive, attend to, discern, experience. To “behold the man” is thus a Johannine invitation to experience human subjectivity by attending to phenomenological encounter.

I use the term *phenomenology* to signify an “inquiry into the conditions of human appearing,” one whose concern is the human subject as its point of reference, “but often within an arena constituted by the attentive presence of other people as well as the draw

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1 All references to New Testament Greek cite Eberhard Nestle, *Greek New Testament* (London: British and Foreign Bible Society, 1904). Bible citations in English follow the King James Version unless otherwise noted. For the sake of textual consistency with other early modern English texts cited herein, Hebrew Bible references use the KJV Old Testament translations.


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of things.” I argue that in Doctor Faustus Marlowe scripts not a Cartesian phenomenology premised on radical doubt and the indubitability of the individual self, but a communal phenomenology not unlike that of Job’s silent friends who sit shivah at his time of utter nakedness and abjection. In this biblical drama although Job is not dead he is attended as though he were. In Faustus Marlowe stages our encounter with his eponymous character in similar fashion, ensuring that we too, like Job’s attendants, sit shivah in silent witness to a man’s tragic fall from grace. The phenomenological encounter of Job 2:13 is literally rendered in the Hebrew as yashab, to dwell with. The medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides defines yashab in his Guide for the Perplexed (1204) as a state of remaining constant in one’s proximal relationships, whether in consistent relation to God or one’s fellow man. To invoke this chapter’s primary theoretical interlocutor Martin Heidegger, yashab is a state of dwelling-with, which is to say living in relational care for and proximity to others. It is such proximity to which I will turn attention in Marlowe’s Faustus. Its Prologue concludes and thus Marlowe’s play begins with an idou ho anthrōpos, an invitation to think phenomenologically as we attend to “this the man that in his study sits” (l. 28).

3 Julia Reinhard Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 15. I have borrowed Lupton’s definition of phenomenology in large part because of its Heideggerian associations, particularly as the draw of both people and things, from which I draw upon in this chapter. Heidegger proposes such phenomenological interconnectivity in his essay “Building Dwelling Thinking,” a text to which I turn in Chapter 4. This through-line in Heideggerian thought, however, is manifest in “The Question Concerning Technology” and “Letter on Humanism,” my central Heidegger texts for the present argument.

4 In the Jewish tradition sitting shivah is a seven day ritual of mourning, a communal sitting with (yashab, literally “dwelling with”), observed to honor the dead and help the mourner deal with his or her loss.


6 Christopher Marlowe, The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, in English Renaissance Drama: A Norton Anthology, ed. David Bevington et al. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 250-85. All quotations from Faustus follow this A-text edition. Variations between the A and B texts do not significantly affect my
What does it mean to behold the man? To behold Faustus, I contend, is to witness the human condition in tragic isolation. For Faustus ever shuns the community of human contact for the contractual promise of magic’s power, an illusion that is only delivered when one is divorced from true community. Such is the Faustian script. The individual self, I argue, is precisely what Marlowe casts under doubt in his *Tragical History of Doctor Faustus*. I propose that through Faustus’ tragical history Marlowe stages a critical moment in the history of Western thought as it began to conceive of the self, tragically, as autonomous, commodifiable, and objectifiable. And although these specific terms do not appear in Jacob Burckhardt’s *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860), this watershed text pens the narrative of Renaissance individualism as the birth of the modern individual. Burckhardt’s is a story of human *autopoiesis*. By his telling the autonomous self arrives onto the world stage during the early modern period; this is an objectified self to be sure (indeed the highest object of human study), what Stephen Greenblatt will later describe as a self-fashioning individual.7

This chapter argues that such a thesis, like magic, is an illusion. This illusion operates variously in its performances as theatrical, critical-theoretical, and political sleight of hand. Its misdirection centers power in the individual and thus ever positions personhood as a site of potential use. In *Faustus*, I suggest, Marlowe leverages both early modern English discourse on witchcraft as well as scriptural references well-known in the period to emphasize personhood relative to the shared human experience of creaturely life rather than as an autonomous, materialist selfhood. *Faustus* read in this way is thus a

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warning against such (mis)use of the human condition. This tension, I will show, manifests itself in a particular Faustian material locus, the contract, or more specifically, the differentiation between contracts and covenants, law (nomos) and spirit (pneuma). I thus begin my engagement with “the Age of Shakespeare” in an intentionally Marlovian turn, for there is perhaps no better early modern text to situate the problem of what I am calling materialist thinking (or the illusion of materialism) than Marlowe’s Faustus.

My reading of the play diverges necessarily from the popular account of Faustus as the Marlovian overreacher and secular hero. Yet Marlowe’s argument in Doctor Faustus, as I read it, is no less a radical tragedy. I will return to this point in due time. Before I do so, it is helpful to first chart a particular genealogy of “radical” thinking. The term radical is derived from the Latin radix, root. Jonathan Dollimore’s Radical Tragedy, now in its third edition reissue, perhaps best locates the radix or root of what I engage in this dissertation as the problem of materialism. Dollimore’s insightful and influential reading of early modern subjectivity is uncompromisingly Marxist, which is to say materialist. For Marx, and the cultural materialists like Dollimore who follow in his wake, selfhood arises from the material conditions of social reality, not the other way around. To be clear, I do not intend to dismiss the importance of the material conditions of daily living. However, under materialism as I describe it here, when attention is repeatedly turned to things, to the material artifacts of living, over time life itself becomes understood as a material artifact. Put another way, when phenomenology becomes materialist people become things.

Instrumentalization and materialism are often inevitable bedfellows. Heidegger makes this point in his own reading of Marx where he praises “the Marxist view of
history [as] superior to that of other historical accounts,” precisely for its existential, which is to say phenomenological, concern for selfhood constituted by the attentive presence of other people as well as the draw of the things which form the tangled experience of day-to-day living. For Heidegger the problem lies neither with Marx nor his particular brand of materialism, but with the temptation of materialist thinking itself to lapse into instrumentalization. As Heidegger puts it, “[t]he essence of materialism is concealed in the essence of technology,” by which he means our modern inclination to instrumentalize. In Heideggerian parlance technology always signifies a mode of thinking. Yet rather than reveal the truth of Being, Heidegger argues, modern technology (all Western thought following Plato) occludes Being by perceiving humans, animals, the environment, and objects (the entire cast of life’s daily existential drama) as what he terms standing reserve. Defined in simple terms, standing reserve is use-value to be harnessed. Heidegger terms this instrumentalizing process a challenging-forth, the forceful channeling of human and non-human alike into objectified use. To give an initial example of this phenomena by way of Faustus, Helen is not a whole person but merely a face, one that famously “launched a thousand ships / And burnt the topless towers of Ilium” (5.1.90-91). Whether by Agamemnon, Menelaus, or Faustus, Helen is reduced to the standing reserve perceived in her political use-value. Her personhood is denied at the expense of challenging-forth what Foucault would call in his later work her biopower: Helen is the face that launched a thousand ships.

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9 Ibid., 243-44.
The biopolitical encounters with which this dissertation engages arise from the problem of perceiving selfhood as wholly material. Or rather, a material selfhood consigned to the operation of exploitative use. This chapter turns to Heidegger and his philosophical descendants Emmanuel Lévinas and Simon Critchley in order to conceptualize and articulate the problem of materialist thinking, particularly in its narrative of the autonomous individual subject, a narrative bearing dire consequences according to Marlowe’s Faustian account. Reading *Doctor Faustus* as a locus for such thought, this chapter also brings to the fore its Judeo-Christian precedent archived by both allusion and indirect cultural association, the resonant call to repentance inspired within the play, as an early modern corrective to such materialist thinking emergent in its own cultural moment. The call to repentance, as I will show, is to be understood as a call for return to community and relational dwelling.

The narrative of cultural materialism, to recall Dollimore, is one of alienation, both in the Marxian sense of being alienated *by, from, and as* one’s labor, but also in the existential sense of experiencing an alienated selfhood torn at the site of religion and politics in their concomitant ideological pull. Indeed, following Marx, Dollimore understands religion as the opiate of the masses. His reading of *Faustus* as an example of subversion through transgression reads thusly as one might expect. I propose that Marlowe’s radical tragedy stems from an alternate *radix*. *Faustus*, I argue, is a religious play in the sense of religion’s operation as ligature, an association of communal

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10 While Dollimore’s reading of *Faustus* does emphasize alienated selfhood, it does not argue for an individual, autonomous self. Rather, Dollimore’s is an argument of a culturally produced (cultural materialist) self and should not be equated with my critique of those critics who posit an idealist individual conception of the self as emergent in the early modern period. See, *Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries* (New York: Palgrave, 2010), 174.
(covenantal) bond; religion as *religare.*\(^{11}\) The narrative that I would trace in *Faustus* is thus not of alienation and individualism but of association and identity relative to communal affiliation, one that is deeply Pauline in its call.

I thus begin necessarily by adducing Marlowe’s investment in the religious, particularly through the thinking of St. Paul. Next, I turn attention to self-fashioning and the illusion of the individual in order to argue that Marlowe’s identity politics as they are enacted in *Doctor Faustus* and drafted in Donne’s meditations and sermons recognize (re-cognize) selfhood relative to the *socius,* what Critchley refers to as a *dividual,* one attached to community by force of an ethical call to action. Though a secular philosopher, Critchley nonetheless builds his dividual subject from the foundation of predominantly theological thought, borrowing largely from Lévinas’ concept of the face-to-face, a notion deeply religious and avowedly Judaic in its gesture. The remaining three sections of the chapter continue to trace this communal through-line across *Faustus*’ tragical history. I first assess the circular motions of magical incantation as they are enacted by Faustus in isolation, reported by King James’ in his *Daemonologie,* and read through Heidegger relative to standing reserve. Secondly, I turn attention to what I have termed “Faustian Politics,” the differentiation between covenant and contract, as I continue to map this trajectory of thinking. The chapter closes by tracing the call to repentance (*metanoia*) recurrent throughout Marlowe’s treatment of the Faust myth which I read as a call to change the way one conceives of oneself, not as an autonomous individual but rather a dividual subject bound to the ethical call of the other.

\(^{11}\) For a more detailed engagement with this concept, see Chapter 3, n.3.
Paul Marlowe is a central character in the dramatic action of Doctor Faustus though he has no lines of direct speech. He exists by allusion and inference, an interstitial figure (a spirit) first invited into the discursive space of this Faust myth rather ironically through Faustus’ disputation of the divine:

Jerome’s Bible, Faustus, view it well.
[He reads] “Stipendium peccati mors est.” Ha!
“Stipendium,” etc.
“The reward of sin is death.” That’s hard. (1.1.38-41)

Despite his instruction, Faustus does not view well the text laid before him. On the contrary, his reading of Romans 6:23 is famously incomplete. The “hard” truth of his reading cuts the Apostle off mid-thought. The full verse reads:

For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.

Ever the self-willed legalist, Faustus halts his study too abruptly, in this instance at the semicolon, taking its punctuation as an invitation for full stop rather than contemplative pause. The intent of Paul’s epistolary (communal) address is here held in suspension, nullifying its message of redemptive grace and return. I submit that Paul operates throughout Faustus as a silent partner, ever present, yet often silenced by Faustus’ legalistic dismissals. Even so, he is not rendered mute. The cultural presence of Paul’s

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12 My conceptualization of Paul Marlowe is indebted to Lupton’s work arguing convincingly for the impress of St. Paul’s writings as they come to bear in Shakespeare’s thinking. Here I am drawing particularly on her formulation of the character she has called Paul Shakespeare; see Thinking with Shakespeare, 219-46.
voice resonates in the timbre of repentance as it rings throughout the play, tolling, like Donne’s communal bell, in remembrance of our human interconnectivity.  

Paul Marlowe is equal parts hermeneutician and heretic, not unlike Christopher Marlowe himself. In his aspect as hermeneutician we might follow Leo Kirschbaum who avows, “[w]hatever Marlowe was himself, there is no more obvious Christian document in all Elizabethan drama than Doctor Faustus.” Indeed by John Ingram’s telling, “no finer sermon than Marlowe’s Faustus ever came from the pulpit.” Yet it is upon the charges of Marlowe’s atheism by both his early modern contemporaries and modern literary critics alike that I build my structure for an argument advocating the religious nature of Faustus and its subsequent religious reading. I do so partially by way of Paul Marlowe, which is to say by way of Paul’s impress on Marlowe’s thinking as evidenced through the Pauline associations in the play. The aspect of Marlowe’s atheism I would trace in this chapter is his heterodox use of Pauline thought relative to repentance as a return to community. Faustus’ dilemma, I would suggest, is not the private internal struggle to assess one’s status as either elect or reprobate, but the desire for communal affiliation which he rejects and to which he is unwilling to return, both due to a crisis of

13 Donne serves as a crucial interlocutor in this chapter’s argument, as does his Meditation XVII with its well-known and oft-quoted aphorisms, “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main” and “never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.” For the present time, however, his voice must be necessarily deferred.


15 John Ingram, Marlowe and His Poetry (London: Harp, 1914).

16 Sixteenth century charges of Marlowe’s atheism are famously made in Richard Baines calumny against the playwright; see the “Baines Note” (BL Harley MS.6848 ff.185-6). For anti-Christian readings of Faustus see Dollimore, Radical Tragedy; Paul H. Kocher, Christopher Marlowe: A Study in His Thought, Learning, and Character (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), 104; and Harry Levin, The Overreacher: A Study of Christopher Marlowe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 132. Citations for Kocher and Levin have been borrowed from Kristen Poole, “Dr. Faustus and Reformation Theology,” in Early Modern English Drama: A Critical Companion, eds. Garrett A. Sullivan Jr. et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 107 n.9.
materialist thinking. Marlowe, I maintain, is a heterodox reader of Paul; he thinks Paul differently than dogmatic Calvinist readings can fully account. At its heart the Reformation was a paradigmatic re-thinking with the Epistles of St. Paul.\(^\text{17}\) He was the lens through which to re-view the early modern world. To quote Critchley, who positions Paul’s writings as an address to anyone politically and ethically minded no matter their era of birth or point of origin, “the spirit of Paul is the movement of reformation.”\(^\text{18}\) Such spirit, I argue, moves in \textit{Faustus}.

As Julia Reinhard Lupton has shown, Paul has recently undergone his own “Renaissance” in early modern literary criticism, religious studies, and continental philosophy.\(^\text{19}\) No longer viewed as the author \textit{par excellence} of supersessionist typology, “in which Christianity supplants Judaism [and] Protestantism overcomes Catholicism,” Paul has been relocated to the moment of his own cultural hybridity where he lived simultaneously as a Roman citizen, Jewish Pharisee, and Christian Apostle.\(^\text{20}\) Such relocation demonstrates how his thinking is both Jewish and Christian in its aspect, and while political, remains plural rather than polarizing in its thought. Turning specifically to


the early modern literature where Paul operates as an intertextual touchstone, scholars such as Gregory Kneidel, Ken Jackson, Lowell Gallagher, Kathleen Biddick, Jonathan Gil Harris, Jenifer Rust, and Lupton herself have demonstrated with great acumen the degree to which “Renaissance writers are able to loop back into the Messianic caches of the Hebrew Bible while still maintaining their Christian orientations.” These Messianic caches, which follow Giorgio Agamben’s work in *The Time that Remains*, are archived in the Pauline call for lived action in the “time of the now” (*ho nyn kairos*) given in his address to the Romans. This lived action of the now, according to Agamben’s reading of Paul, is neither eschatological nor soteriological, but immanent, which is to say phenomenological: it is to be lived in one’s daily interactions with others today—now. This is a community-oriented Paul concerned with living ethically and politically in the present.

Such a Paul, located simultaneously in the archive of Renaissance literature as well as at the intersections of religious studies, critical theory, and continental philosophy, recognizes the uneven development of the Reformation in England. This

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21 Ibid. For bibliographic citations see 219-20, nn.10-11.


Agamben emphasizes the Pauline necessity to *seize* the moment, to participate in time’s contraction by responding to immediate occasions for speech, action, and new affiliation. For Agamben, Messianic time conjoins Judaism and Christianity, yet ultimately belongs to neither. Agamben accuses both the priests and the rabbis of neutralizing the Messianic impulses for which they found themselves responsible. Agamben recovers in Paul a Messianism for everyone, derived from a reading of the Epistles but supported by ventures in philosophy and linguistics, and ultimately disengaged from theology. (Lupton, “The Pauline Renaissance,” 217)

23 By “uneven development of the Reformation in England” I mean to express a non-wholly Calvinist religious perspective. Poole argues convincingly for a complicated, non-uniform bearing to English religious thought during the Elizabethan era, see “Dr. Faustus and Reformation Theology.” Brian Cummings’ recent work similarly advocates a non-univocal comportment to Reformation thinking, demonstrating instead porous boundaries between the categories such as “religious,” “secular,” and “self,” see *Mortal Thoughts: Religion, Secularity & Identity in Shakespeare and Early Modern Culture* (Oxford:
Paul is neither Jew nor Gentile, Catholic nor Protestant. I argue that in *Faustus* Marlowe uses Paul in the sense of this Renaissance bearing, a Paul of scriptural avocation not doctrinal or creedal affiliation: Paul as one who calls sinners to repentance, those alienated, to community.

If Paul Marlowe serves as the ground upon which I build my religious reading of *Faustus* as a text concerned with *religare*, the binding and rebinding of the wayward individual to the fold of communal investment, then the foundation laid atop such ground is what Critchley terms the dividual subject, selfhood conceived relative to the *socius* and attached to community by force of an ethical call to action.

**SELF-FASHIONING**

The allure of individualism, its illusion and its flaw, forms the topic of discussion at the opening of *Faustus’* final act:

FIRST SCHOLAR: What ails Faustus?

FAUSTUS: Ah, my sweet chamber-fellow! Had I lived with thee, then had I lived still, but now I die eternally. Look, comes he not? Comes he not?

SECOND SCHOLAR: What means Faustus?

THIRD SCHOLAR: Belike he is grown into some sickness by being oversolitary. (5.2.2–8)

Faustus’ ailment, as Marlowe tells it, is that he is “oversolitary.” His individualism precipitates his demise. I use the verb *precipitate* not only in its theological sense of

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Oxford University Press, 2013). For a postmodern theological approach to understanding the Reformation and Reformed thinking in tandem with and as precursors to philosophers such as Heidegger, Derrida, Lévinas, and Deleuze, see Carl Raschke, *The Next Reformation: Why Evangelicals Must Embrace Postmodernity* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004).
being cast down headlong, but also to demonstrate Faustus’ action in bringing about this end, an action constituted in the material artifact of the soul-selling contract and completed through an idolatrous belief in its unbreakable materiality.\textsuperscript{24} This legal object, as I will show in due course, bears efficacious force. In the language of chemistry \textit{precipitate} also describes an act of physical separation, the separation of a substance in solid form from a solution.\textsuperscript{25} My \textit{precipitate} thus also intends to recall Mephistopheles’ on-stage alchemy as this early modern chemist produces his chafer of coals in order to render liquid once more Faustus’ would-be solid blood, thereby allowing the deed of gift to be conscripted.\textsuperscript{26} The significance of this scene is taken up more fully in my later distinction between contracts and covenants, as well as the role they play in Faustian Politics. For the present moment, however, my emphasis would remain on Faustus’ individualist ailment as expressed by the First Scholar.

“My sweet chamber-fellow,” Faustus remarks to his friend, “Had I lived with thee, / then had I lived still” (5.2.3-4). One way of reading this exchange is to suggest that life arises in community. By Faustus’ telling life is only \textit{lived} in relational proximity; it is his separation from the \textit{socius}, born from and sustained by his desire for magic, that effects Faustus’ death. He tacitly acknowledges this (“then \textit{had} I lived still”) as he capitulates his doom to his friends. Faustus speaks of his life here in past tense, had, implying that he is in effect already dead, a point reinforced by the regret of his consignment, “but now I die eternally” (5.2.4). In \textit{Faustus}, I would suggest that life, as well as the self insofar as the self inheres to what we might call \textit{life}, bears the sign of

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{OED}, s.v. \textit{precipitate}.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} I take up the significance of this scene more fully in the Faustian Politics section of this chapter.
communal dwelling. That is, in *Faustus* Marlowe pens life as a relational experience and the self as a phenomenological encounter implicated in the draw of others; neither is a solitary vocation. By Marlowe’s telling, “being oversolitary” (5.2.8) runs contrary to the human condition.

Why then all of the praise for the Renaissance individual? In answer, Julian Yates opines that it might be because

Burckhardt’s story is a good one, a heady brew of Art, Science, Genius. A fully-fledged ‘individual,’ armed with a host of new technologies, transforms the world into an object of use. For this reason his story has endured, providing Renaissance Studies with a set of terms and tropes that it has refuged as a new historicist epic of self-fashioning, a cultural-materialist tale of decentered selves, and, today, a call for ever greater attention to ‘materiality’ in the name of becoming ‘early modern.’  

Yates, I think, has the right of it. To return to Heidegger, the problem lies not with materiality but with materialist thought as instrumentalization. Using technology (*technē* as a mode of thinking) to “transform the world into an object of use,” as Yates puts it, is effectively Heidegger’s argument for how instrumental thinking affects the world by reducing everything in its purview to standing reserve. Heidegger warns that the effect of such thinking is that eventually man will turn this objectifying gaze upon himself. This is precisely Faustus’ tragedy. Individualist thinking, the narcissism of human hubris, *precipitates* Faustus’ fall in the full sense this term bears as both a theological being cast down headlong, and a Heideggerian warning:

[When] man…is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as

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Heidegger’s counsel may be read as a caution against self-fashioning and the valorization of the individual divorced from the \textit{socius}. Heidegger maintains that belief in the human ability to fashion (or self-fashion) and subsequently control the world is an illusion. Like magic it is efficacious thinking. The effect, he tells us, “gives rise in turn to one final delusion,” the illusion of the individual self: \textit{It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself}. Read in this light, Yates’ accounting of Burckhardt’s Renaissance individual as “providing Renaissance Studies with a set of terms and tropes that it has refigured as a new historicist epic of self-fashioning [and] a cultural-materialist tale of decentered selves,” might be taken as a similar warning. Such cautioning certainly bears Marlovian comportment. Marlowe, read in this way, uses Faustus to demonstrate that the self is under threat of erasure by the idea of the individual. He does so by casting the concept of the individual in tandem with early modern discourses on magic.

It is precisely as one so threatened, to borrow Heidegger’s phrase, that Faustus exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth: “All things that move between the quiet poles / Shall be at my command” (1.1.58-59). Faustus’ first action as a magician is to command none less than Mephistopheles, an exchange that reveals the delusion of grandeur Marlowe locates in thinking oneself an autonomous individual:

\begin{quote}
I charge thee to return and change thy shape. 
Thou art too ugly to attend on me. 
Go, and return an old Franciscan friar; 
That holy shape becomes a devil best. 
\textit{Exit devil} [\textit{Mephistopheles}]. 
I see there’s virtue in my heavenly words.
\end{quote}
Who would not be proficient in this art?
How pliant is this Mephistopheles,
Full of obedience and humility!
Such is the force of magic and my spells. (1.3.24-32)

Who would not be proficient in this art? This chapter takes an epigraph from this exchange. Marlowe’s answer, I would suggest, is that proficiency in this art is an illusion. Faustus’ belief in the force of his magic (“my spells”) is similarly illusive, just as the individual self is artifice.

Early modern discourse on magic forwards this argument. In his Daemonologie (1597), for example, King James reports that practitioners of magic “blindlie glorie of themselves, as if they had by their quicknes of ingine, made a conquest of Plutos dominion, and were become Emperours over the Stygian habitacles.”29 On James’ telling, which is expressive of Renaissance thought on the subject, magic is always a master/slave arrangement. Under the operation of magic there is no individuality, only fidelity (fide: troth, pledge) to the Devil as stipulated in the terms of the contract. The individual is an illusion. Conjoined to this lack of individuality is the erasure of autonomy. As Mephistopheles makes clear to Faustus, he is not free to do anything without his master’s consent: “I am servant to great Lucifer / And may not follow thee without his leave. / No more than he commands must we perform” (1.3.41-43). This is the “individualism” Faustus willingly “self-fashions” in his vocation as magician; subjectivity thus proves dubious in magical enterprise.

As if by James’ account, Marlowe pens the magician’s confusion regarding his power in a brief interchange between Faustus and Mephistopheles:

29 James VI and I, Daemonologie, in Minor Prose Works of King James VI and I, ed. James Craigie (Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1982), 7, emphasis is in original.
FAUSTUS: Did not my conjuring speeches raise thee? Speak.

MENPHISTOPHELES: That was the cause, but yet *per accidens*. (1.3.46-47)

It is not by the quickness of his ingenuity that Faustus has made conquest and dominion over hell. His individual will—"my conjuring speec[h]"—has no effective power here. Faustus’ summons is insufficient to render Lucifer or Mephistopheles his thrall. The cause of the spirit’s appearance is rather, “yet *per accidens,*” and does not arise due to the magician’s independent will.

From a Pauline perspective, selfhood and empowerment (one’s unique abilities) derive from grace and spiritual gifts that operate through communal identity and fidelity to others. In Romans 12:3-5 Paul writes:

> For I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think soberly, according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith. For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office: So we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.

Following Paul, identity is foremost communal, “many members in one body,” or as I have phrased it terms of the concept of the dividual, the self relative to the *socius*. To use Paul’s language: “every one members one of another.” Donne emphasizes this Pauline idea in *Meditation XVII*:

> The church is catholic, universal, so are all her actions; all that she does belongs to all. When she baptizes a child, that action concerns me; for that child is thereby connected to that head which is my head too, and ingrafted into that body whereof I am a member.\(^{30}\)

Unlike faith in magic with its Devil’s pledge promising power but delivering only illusion, Paul’s communal calling is one powered by grace and the divine *fiat* to serve

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others through one’s unique talents and abilities: “For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office.” Where an affiliation with magic erases identity and nullifies autonomy, as in Mephistopheles’ example above, the autonomous aspect of Pauline community is its self-governing call to serve others (its office) based precisely on the uniqueness of one’s gifts (what might be otherwise called one’s individuality):

Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us, whether prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith; Or ministry, let us wait on our ministering: or he that teacheth, on teaching; Or he that exhorteth, on exhortation: he that giveth, let him do it with simplicity; he that ruleth, with diligence; he that sheweth mercy, with cheerfulness.  

What I would stress from this Pauline perspective is that particular selfhood is not elided within the fold of communal association (e.g. the ingrafted body to which Donne attributes his membership). Although such community exists as a state of being “many members in one body,” and requires inasmuch a rethinking of the self in terms of the socius, the “individual” is not erased in this communal call in terms of one’s unique talent or ability. On the contrary, such particular selfhood is celebrated and enjoined to action for the good of others. Some are called to prophesy, others to teach, and yet still others to exhort or rule with diligence, mercy, and cheerfulness.

The problem of the individual self as it is encountered in Faustus and countermanded via Pauline thinking in the age is perhaps best conceptually understood as what Critchley terms the dividual subject. Early modern English identity, I would posit,  

31 Rom. 12:6-8.
remains at the very least conceptually dividual insofar as national identity continued to be
cast during the period in religious, and especially Pauline, terms.32

Critchley’s dividual is an “ethical subjectivity” built upon premises forwarded by
three Pauline thinkers: French Philosopher Alain Badiou, Danish theologian Knud Ejler
Løgstrup, and Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas.33 From Badiou Critchley borrows
“the idea of fidelity to the event as [both] the central ethical experience” and locus of
identity formation.34 The ethical call of the event for Critchley is then borne out through
the unfulfillable demand of the other as it is given voice by the Judeo-Christian thinking
of Lévinas and Løgstrup.35 The Pauline aspect of the dividual subject is not to be missed,
and though it is parsed only in passing through Løgstrup’s influence in Infinitely
Demanding (a connection to which I will shortly turn), Critchley’s expansion of this
concept his more recent work The Faith of the Faithless directly engages this Pauline

32 Edward Vallance, Revolutionary England and the National Covenant: State Oaths, Protestantism and the
33 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (New York: Verso,
2008), 10. Regarding the Pauline thought of Badiou, Løgstrup, and Lévinas: Badiou’s philosophy of the
self beginning in Theory of the Subject (Editions du Seuil, 1982) and expanded in Being and Event
(Editions du Seuil, 1988), takes a marked Pauline turn in St. Paul: The Foundation of Universalism
(Presses Universitaires de France, 1997). Løgstrup’s emphasis on Christian ethics as a call for service to the
other is equally Pauline. Lévinas’ correlation to Pauline thinking is situated in the recent scholarly turn to
Paul emphasizing his Judaism. Thus when Lévinas writes of “the being-Jewish of all men,” one hears a
Pauline echo in Rom. 2:28-29, “For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision,
which is outward in the flesh: But he is a Jew, which is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart,
in the spirit, and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God.” See, Emmanuel Lévinas,
“Judaism and Christianity,” in In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1994), 164.
34 Critchley, Infinitely Demanding, 10, emphasis in original.
35 Critchley frames his tripartite construction of the dividual self in as follows:

From Alain Badiou, I am going to take the idea of the committing itself in fidelity to the
universality of a demand that opens in a singular situation but which exceeds that situation. From
Knud Ejler Løgstrup, I take that idea of what he calls ‘the ethical demand’ as his emphasis on the
radical, unfulfillable and one-sided character of that demand and the asymmetry of the ethical
relation that it establishes. From Emmanuel Lévinas, I will try to show how this moment of
asymmetry that arises in the experience of the infinite demand of the other’s face defines the ethical
subject in terms of a split between itself and a exorbitant demand that it can never meet, the demand
to be infinitely responsible. (Infinitely Demanding, 40)
connection, particularly to the degree that a call or calling necessarily precedes the event of subject formation: one must be called to the event of being.\footnote{Critchley, \textit{The Faith of the Faithless}, 155-206. On the centrality of calling in the Pauline tradition see Paul’s opening addresses in Rom. 1:1-2, 1 Cor. 1:1, 2 Cor. 1:1, and Col. 1:1. Regarding the calling of all believers, see Eph. 1:4-14.}

For Paul, and early modern English dividual subjectivity, such fidelity is located in the Christ-event, Jesus’ death and resurrection with its subsequent grace descendant upon all humankind.\footnote{On the open affiliation of grace, see Gal. 3:28. This verse forms the central focus of the latter half of Chapter 4.} Even so, one must be called to Christ. Dividual subjectivity begins in answer to this call. Donne’s 1626 sermon on Matthew 9:13 is indicative of this concept as expressed in the religious lingua franca of Renaissance England: “No man is born a Christian, but call’d into that state by regeneration.”\footnote{John Donne, “A SERMON Preached to the Household at WHITE-HALL, April 30. 1626. SERMON VIII,” in \textit{XXVI SERMONS (Never before Publish’d) PREACHED BY THAT Learned and Reverend DIVINE John Donne, Doctor of Divinity, Late DEAN of the Cathedral Church of St. Pauls, London, The Third Volume}, (London: Thomas Newcomb, 1661), 115.} Regeneration, Donne’s term for the spiritual baptism of grace, is, to use Critchley’s and Badiou’s language, the new identity formed through fidelity to the event, what the Christian would refer to as being born again. The term regeneration, however, is not Donne’s alone; in the Renaissance it carries a Calvinist intonation.\footnote{See, for example John Calvin, \textit{Institutes of the Christian Religion}, trans. Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1845), 5.12.1; and Calvin’s commentary on John 1:13 in \textit{The Gospel According to St. John 1-10}, Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries, vol. 4, trans. T.H.L. Parker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995).}

In an ostensibly similar turn, the relational identity I am seeking to trace through \textit{Faustus} and in early modern English thought more broadly as dividual subjectivity has been cast in Calvinist terms as what Adrian Streete refers to as a “relational model of
early modern selfhood.” This “relational model” is, however, paradoxically isolationist. Streeter’s term describes the individual’s private and internal struggle to assess his or her status as either elect or reprobate. Like Faustus, such specifically Calvinist relational subjectivity runs the risk of being oversolitary. I would once again stress that Marlowe thinks religiously beyond the cultural impress of Calvinism. And while Faustus’ solitary ailment might well read as Marlowe’s censure of Calvinist ideology, I propose that its particular doctrinal motions are not the express target of his aim. It is the illusion of individualism itself, by my reading, upon which Faustus sets its sights. To this point, Calvinist isolationism elides the ethical nature of the call to subjectivity through the Christ-event by emphasizing the self over the communal. Put another way, this one-to-one relation between God and the solitary subject neglects the greater call of the socius via the unfulfillable demand of the other and otherwise locates the impetus of faith in the individual him- or herself relative to God. The Christ-event’s call to subjectivity nevertheless remains, to use philosophical language, an always already ethical call of the other: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

Jesus’ Great Commandment of Mark 12:31 is referred to by the Apostle James as a “royal law,” recalling the Judaic provenance of its original command in Leviticus. Embedded within this association is the injunction of Hebrew hospitality requiring care for the widow, orphan, alien, and poor—the very others that dwell near the community

40 Adrian Streeter, “‘Consummatum Est’: Calvinist Exegesis, Mimesis and Doctor Faustus,” Literature & Theology 15.2 (2001), 120.
41 See Dollimore, “Dr. Faustus: Subversion through Transgression,” in Radical Tragedy, 109-19.
42 Mk. 12:31.
43 See Jas. 2:8 and Lev. 19:18.
yet are so often excluded from its fold. ⁴⁴ To invoke Paul Marlowe, the decree of the Great Commandment is espoused in both the Roman and Galatian epistles. ⁴⁵ This call to neighbor love is precisely the unfulfillable ethical demand of the other espoused by Lévinas and Løgstrup, especially when taken in light of Jesus’ caveat during his Sermon on the Mount where the love of one’s enemies is further added to the vocational responsibilities of the regenerate. ⁴⁶

To return the call of dividual subjectivity to an early modern locus, Donne reminds those in attendance to his sermon, that, per the Christ-event, Jesus
came not *occurrere*, to meet us; but yet he came not *cogere*, to compel us, to force us, but onely *vocare*, to call us, by his Word, and Sacraments, and Ordinances, and lead us so; and that’s his errand, and purpose in coming. ⁴⁷

If Donne stresses the open aspect of the call in its capacity either to be answered or ignored though never forced, then Faustus dramatizes its condition to be rejected outright.

Commissioning Mephistopheles on a soul-selling errand, Faustus initiates his own *autopoietic* call:

> Go bear these tidings to great Lucifer:  
> Seeing Faustus hath incurred eternal death  
> By desp’rate thoughts against Jove’s deity,  
> Say he surrenders up to him his soul,  
> So he will spare him four-and-twenty years,  
> Letting him live in all voluptuousness,  
> Having thee ever to attend on me,  
> To give me whatsoever I shall ask,  
> To tell me whatsoever I demand,  
> To slay mine enemies and aid my friends,  
> And always be obedient to my will.  

(1.3.89-99, emphasis is mine)

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⁴⁴ This point is expanded in Chapter 4.
⁴⁶ See Mt. 5:43-48. Neighbor love as it is practiced through early modern understandings of hospitality and stewardship form the focus of Chapter 4.
⁴⁷ Donne, “A SERMON Preached to the Household at WHITE-HALL,” 104.
“And always be obedient to my will.” My added emphasis in the passage above is intended to highlight the individualist aspect of Faustus’ thinking. He is no dividual. His is a subjectivity centered on the I/me/mine, a selfhood unmoored from ethical constraint. And although he does not answer, Faustus nonetheless experiences the Christ-event’s dividual call. Just prior to the enactment of his soul-selling, Faustus hears the voice (call) of the Good Angel: “Oh, something soundeth in mine ears: / ‘Abjure this magic, turn to God again!’” (2.1.7-8). The call is silenced, however, by Faustus’ desire to be an individual: “The god thou servest is thine own appetite” (2.1.11), he reminds himself. Yet by his own admission, such self-will comes with a necessary caveat and subsequent affiliation nevertheless: “Wherein is fixed the love of Beelzebub” (2.1.12). Faustus thus pledges his fidelity otherwise.

David Hawkes has shown with great acumen the practice of soul-selling to be an act of self-selling. Hawkes’ is a secular argument, reading this metaphorical practice as the descriptor of a fundamental misrecognition of sign for referent and representation for reality, a flaw deeply embedded in the history of Western thought. For Hawkes the Devil is a metaphor, a cultural symbol for such an illusion. Hawkes’ point, whether through a reading of early modern or modern Faust myths, is that Westerners have become fundamentally disconnected from their selves. Marlowe’s Faustus, as Hawkes reminds, is no less disconnected from true selfhood. Indeed he dismisses “men’s souls” as “vain trifles” (1.3.63) in a passing quip to Mephistopheles. To this end one might describe Faustus’ thinking as “secular.” In his formulation of the dividual subject, Critchley

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leverages Løgstrup, a Danish theologian, to link subjectivity’s religious aspect as a communal binding of *reliagare* to a secular ethical, dividual, end.

Løgstrup derives his ethics from the unfulfillable call of the other in the Great Commandment: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself*. For Løgstrup, to be a Christian is counter to Calvinist interiority. Following Løgstrup, Christian subjectivity is an external phenomenological encounter where “an individual’s relation to God is determined wholly at the point of his relation to the neighbour.”

Critchley argues this point with secular bearing:

> to be a Christian on this view does not mean subscribing to whatever variety of more or less obscure metaphysical beliefs in the incarnation, resurrection or whatever. It means rather that one’s entire existence should be organized around the fact of the ethical demand insofar as that demand is enacted in the relation to the other person. Religion is ethics.

Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre confirm that Critchley is not alone in reading Løgstrup via secular turn. By their assessment, for Løgstrup “the ethical demand is not laid upon Christians rather than non-Christians. There is not Christian morality and secular morality. There is only human morality.”

Recent work by Renaissance scholar Brian Cummings provides compelling evidence for an understanding of “secular” and “religious” as a false and historically forced dyad. Donne would seem to agree. His famous maxim from *Meditation XVII* likewise espouses that there is only human morality:

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51 Quoted in Critchley, *Infinitely Demanding*, 54. emphasis in original.

52 Cummings, *Mortal Thoughts*. 

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No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend’s or thine own were. Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.\footnote{Donne, \textit{Meditation XVII}, 1305.}

Donne’s thinking, like Løgstrup’s, brings to mind the phenomenological aspect of dividual subjectivity. That is, for these thinkers, the self is ever bound in ethical relation to the \textit{socius}. Religion (\textit{religare}) is ethics. There is only human morality.

Mephistopheles complicates this point. Not to the degree that \textit{religare} is ethics, for Mephistopheles deeply desires communal return. As he conveys to Faustus, hell is the absence of community with God:

\begin{verbatim}
Hell hath no limits, nor is circumscribed
In one self place, for where we are is hell,
And where hell is must we ever be.
And, to conclude, when all the world dissolves,
And every creature shall be purified,
All places shall be hell that is not heaven. \footnote{Following Mephistopheles line of argument here, one might argue that hell is quite literally the individual subject, a self divorced from community represented by God.}
\end{verbatim}

Embedded within Mephistopheles’ account, silent yet no less voiced, is the admission that the presence of God \textit{is} heaven.\footnote{See Isa. 6:1-3, Rev. 7:9-12, and Rev. 11:16-17.} Mephistopheles thus complicates the argument that there is only \textit{human} morality. My point requires some space to unfold. If morality and ethics are yoked though dividual subjectivity, then it is by the phenomenological pull of the other. For Lévinas the draw of this encounter is located in the other’s face, a space “where God passes.”\footnote{This theme is taken up throughout \textit{Totality and Infinity}.} Thus to witness the face of the other is to witness the face of
God. As he writes in Totality and Infinity, “[t]he dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face.” From this perspective Lévinas conceives of what Critchley calls dividual subjectivity in terms of the face-to-face encounter, one marked by proximity

Not distance, the shortest through space, but initial directness, which extends as unimpeachable approach in the call of the face of the other, in which there appears, as an order, an inscription, a prescription, an awakening (as if it were a ‘me’), responsibility—mine for the other human being. The face of the other…is an original obligation to which I am, in the guise of me, devoted and elected, I am ordered me.

For Lévinas, subjectivity can never be individual. It is always dividual, to use Critchley’s term; there is always the call of the other implicated in the formation of the me. To return to Faustus, the presence of God’s face, or rather the lack thereof deeply pains Mephistopheles. One might recall the Psalmist when he writes, “My heart says of you, ‘Seek his face!’ Your face, Lord, I will seek.” It is thus that Mephistopheles speaks to Faustus of the phenomenological weight of being separated from God’s face:

Think’st thou that I, who saw the face of God
And tasted the eternal joys of heaven,
Am not tormented with ten thousand hells
In being deprived of everlasting bliss? (1.3.79-82)

To reiterate, it is communal return that Mephistopheles seeks, relational subjectivity. By Marlowe’s estimation it would seem that angels too are dividual subjects, formed in the ethical call of the very face of God. Following this line of thought, to willingly rebel from God, to turn from his presence, is to become individual. Should we not then be surprised

58 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78.
60 Ps. 27:8 (NIV). On God relative to the face-to-face, see also Ex. 33:11, Num. 12:6-8 and 14:4, 1 Chron. 16:11, 2 Chron. 7:14, Ps. 24:5-6 and 27:4.
when this devil, Mephistopheles, cautions Faustus against a fate he knows all-too-well?—“O Faustus, leave these frivolous demands, / Which strike terror to my fainting soul!” (1.3.83-84). Yet Faustus relentlessly continues in his “frivolous demands,” determined to be an individual. It is to the expression of such demands that I now turn attention.

CIRCULAR MOTIONS

The language of magic is the promise of control. “Lines, circles, signs, letters, and characters— / Ay, these are those that Faustus most desires” (1.1.53-54). This desire for magic, Faustus explains, is rooted in a lust for domination:

Emperors and kings
Are but obeyed in their several provinces,
Nor can they raise the wind or rend the clouds;
But his dominion that exceeds in this
Stretcheth as far as doth the mind of man.
A sound magician is a mighty god.
Here, Faustus, try thy brains to gain a deity. (1.1.59-65)

Heidegger once more provides terminology helpful in adducing the threat of such thinking. Faustus’ language is (and thus his thoughts are) instrumentalizing. In his grandiose dream of power the very environment itself is rendered standing reserve to be challenged-forth. By his admission he would “raise the wind or rend the clouds,” the heavens themselves would be at the disposal of his will, a great mass of latent power lying dormant awaiting the release of his call. Indeed on Faustus’ telling “A sound magician is a mighty god.” Yet as Heidegger reminds, such thinking is an illusion, for it

is in the posture as such a lord of the earth that Faustus will consign his selfhood to the Devil. Faustus thus effects his soul-selling, I argue, because he conceives of himself as standing reserve. [When] man...is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Though Marlowe did not have access to such Heideggerian language, he nonetheless stages this very condition, suggesting an overlap between Heidegger’s thought and the action penned by Marlowe. Borrowing Faustus’ investment in the grammar of magic, initially its “circles” (1.1.53) and later the materialist language of the Devil’s contract itself (2.1.30 ff.), the remainder of this chapter centers on Faustian discourse and the warnings Marlowe encodes in its expression.

Magic circles circumscribe exploitation. Immediately upon the conceit of magical enterprise, Faustus sends for his servant Wagner to fetch the sorcerers, his “dearest friends” (1.1.67), Valdes and Cornelius. “Their conference,” he admits after Wagner has made his exit, “will be a greater help to me / Than all my labors, plod I ne’er so fast” (1.1.70-71). From the start of his magical venture Marlowe scripts Faustus thinking in terms of standing reserve. Put simply, he views Valdes and Cornelius as what he can challenge-forth from them, in this case, the expediency of magical knowledge. This instrumentalizing gaze extends from the material to the immaterial as well. Spirits especially hold the promise of reserved power for Faustus:

How I am glutted with conceit of this!
Shall I make spirits fetch me what I please,
Resolve me of all ambiguities,
Perform what desperate enterprise I will?

I'll have them fly to India for gold,
Ransack the ocean for orient pearl,
And search all corners of the newfound world
For pleasant fruits and princely delicates.  (1.1.80-87)

Marlowe here demonstrates how instrumental thinking often turns to commodification.

Spiritual standing reserve proves no less to Faustus’ mind than the compass of all knowledge, heaven’s great commodity (“Resolve me of all ambiguities”), as well the more prosaic goods of the earth (gold, pearl, pleasant fruits and princely delicates).

As the orderer of such standing reserve, the grammar of Faustus’ magic circle challenges-forth the names of God, holy men, and angels (“Figures of every adjunct to the heavens”) in order to summon Mephistopheles into his presence:

Within this circle is Jehovah’s name,
Forward and backward anagrammatized,
The breviated names of holy saints,
Figures of every adjunct to the heavens,
And characters of signs and erring stars
By which the spirits are enforced to rise.  (1.3.8-13)

As his Latin incantation indicates, Faustus intends a specific spirit to rise: “propitiamus vos, ut appareat et surgat Mephistopheles…et per vota nostra, ipse surgat nobis dicitus Mephistopheles” (1.3.19, 22-23).  We would do well, however, to remember Mephistopheles’ “per accidens” (1.3.47).  As James confirms in his Daemonologie,

it is no power inherent in the circles, or in the holines of the names of God blasphemouslie vsed; nor in whatsoeuer rites or ceremonies at that time vsed, that either can raise any infernall spirit, or yet limitat him perforce within or without these circles. For it is he onlie, the father of all lyes, who hauing first of all prescribed that forme of doiing, feining himselfe to be commanded & restreined thereby, wil be loath to passe the boundes of these injunctiones; aswell thereby to make them glory in the impiring ouer him (as I saide before:) As likewise to

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63 Valdes and Cornelius view spirits similarly as standing reserve, see 1.1.121-50.

64 The editor’s translation reads: “we propitiate you, that Mephistopheles may appear and rise…and by our prayers, may Mephistopheles himself, invoked by us, now rise!”
make himselfe so to be trusted in these little thinges, that he may haue the the better commoditie thereafter.\textsuperscript{65}

The commodity the Devil seeks is the magician’s selfhood, that is, the soul. James’ account is corroborated by Mephistopheles’ “\textit{per accidens}”; there is no power in the magic circle, only the illusion of power. The spirits summoned feign themselves “to be commanded & restreined thereby,” when, in fact, it is the magician who is truly enthralled (in thrall). Once the Devil is “trusted in these little things,” it becomes easier to coerce the magician to sell himself by deed of gift on the promise of power, wealth, etc. The language of incantation is thus ultimately one of subjection and subjectivity; its grammatical logic encodes a tragic reversal. Though the magician believes himself to be the one in power and the spirit his subject, the reality of this exchange is quite the opposite. It is the magician who is to be used by the Devil, an object commodified for his exploitation. On this point James is quite explicit: by “better commoditie…I meane the euerlasting perdition of their soul & body.”\textsuperscript{66} Ultimately the magician becomes subject to the Devil, his personhood denied by force of writ, with the eventual (contractual) promise of the torments to which one will be subjected in hell.

The grammar of incantation thus serves as the precursive logic of the soul-selling contract. I will turn attention to Faustus’ contract momentarily. Before doing so, however, it is pressing to reiterate the focus of my argument: according to early modern thinking on the subject, magic establishes false relationships, isolates personhood from community, and always turns to exploitive use. Though Valdes speaks of Faustus’ inclusion in a would-be coterie of magical jointure—“tell me, Faustus, what shall we

\textsuperscript{65} James, \textit{Daemonologie}, 12.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
three want?” (1.1.150)—the community proves to be false. Standing reserve rules as its associative logic: “Faustus, these books, thy wit, and our experience / Shall make all nations to canonize us” (1.1.121-22, emphasis mine). Cornelius and Valdes supply the books and experience, but it is Faustus’ wit that is needed to make their power worthy of canonization. Even amongst “friends” Faustus is but another instrumental object. More to the point, Faustus may learn the art of magic from Valdes and Cornelius (a simulacrum of community), but its practice remains a solitary exercise. Marlowe writes Cornelius’ instruction in such terms: “Valdes, first let him know the words of art, / And then, all other ceremonies learned, / Faustus may try his cunning by himself” (1.2.160-62). Indeed on Valdes’ advice it is to a “solitary grove” (1.1.155) that Faustus first removes himself, in isolation, to conjure. It is as an individual, divorced from community, that Faustus raises Mephistopheles. In similar fashion, I argue, he conceives of himself as an individual. It is only as such that Faustus is capable of thinking his selfhood as an object of his possession rather than communal association, a commodified object: a soul for sale.

**FAUSTIAN POLITICS**

To understand what is at stake in Faustian politics, the selling of the self, we must first recognize the distinction between contracts and covenants. In *The English Faust Book*, Marlowe’s source text for his retelling of this myth, Faustus conflates contract with covenant:

I covenant and grant with them by these presents, that at the end of 24 years next ensuing the date of this present letter, they being expired, and I in the mean time,
during the said years, be served of them at my will, they accomplishing my desires to the full in all points as we are agreed, that then I give them full power to do with me at their pleasure, to rule, to send, fetch or carry me or mine, be it either body, soul, flesh, blood or goods, into their habitation, be it wheresoever: and hereupon, I defy God and His Christ, all the host of heaven, and all living creatures that bear the shape of God, yea all that lives; and again I say it, and it shall be so. And to the more strengthening of this writing, I have written it with mine own hand and blood, being in perfect memory, and hereupon I subscribe to it with my name and title, calling all the infernal, middle and supreme powers to witness of this my letter and subscription

John Faustus, approved in the elements, and the spiritual doctor

Though Faustus “covenant[s]” himself by this writ, he nonetheless drafts a contract. The contractual nature of the document may be ascertained by the legal formalism of its language. It is also written by one of sound mind (“being in perfect memory”) and its signature attended by witnesses (of “the infernal, middle and supreme powers”) in order to ensure its legally-binding status. By their nature contracts are ever exchanges. Yet, perhaps somewhat ironically, what Faustus will receive is rather vague according to the stipulations written by his own hand and in his own blood. By the terms of the exchange, for a twenty-four year interim Faustus will “be served of them at my will, they accomplishing my desires to the full in all points as we are agreed.” In all points as we are agreed. Within the writ itself, however, these points remain mute, or rather, moot. Though this Faustus would be “[r]esolved of all ambiguities,” to borrow Marlowe’s line, what is desired remains decidedly ambiguous. Nothing is specifically stipulated, recalling perhaps Mephistopheles quip that magic is itself “Nothing” but illusion effected to “delight [the] mind” (2.1.83). The Devil’s terms are much clearer, although, like Marlowe’s Faustus, the author of this contract is unsure of what constitutes his selfhood and thus consigns anything that might denote the self in his terms of exchange: “be it

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either body, soul, flesh, blood or goods.” Moreover, this contract indicates a hyper individualized action; in conscripting this writ Faustus rejects affiliation with the community of “all living creatures that bear the shape of God, yea all that lives.”

Covenant, unlike contract, is used to signify relationship. It is a term religious in its nature and origin. Thus Gary North writes that “[t]here can be no relationship between God and man apart from a covenant.” For scholars of religion covenant variously signifies relationship, promise or pledge, even obligation in the sense of ligature (obligare). In 1962 Alfred Jepsen raised the issue of this term’s problematic nature relative to translation. The Hebrew בְּרִית (berith), as Jepsen noted, can be confused or conflated with legal connotation (contract), especially as the term shifts between human-to-human encounters and marking a human relationship with the divine. “Wouldn’t it be truer, Jepsen argued, to describe ‘covenant’ as a ‘promise’ between persons, and the divine ‘covenant’ more specifically as a combination of ‘promise and command’ (Verheißung und Geheiß)?” Working from a semantic methodology, Ernst Kutch has argued for an understanding of berith in this sense as a “regulation” or “obligation” between the human and God, yet Petrus Gräbe has criticized this approach as misleading due to “the

70 Ibid., 4.
historical changes in the meaning of the term under consideration.”

Historicist approach to covenant is thus warranted.

In early modern England covenant was a descriptor of national identity. England’s “covenanted relationship with God” expressed an understanding of the nation’s temporal and economic success in accordance with “the faithfulness of the people in keeping their covenant,” which Edward Vallance’s work has defined through actions as varied as “defending the gospel, praying, fasting, [and] supporting good ministers and their co-religionists abroad.” In a Pauline turn, English identity relative to national covenant is dividual in its expression. Put otherwise, covenanted identity, at least in its theological and theoretical formulation (if not its on-the-ground practice), is selfhood in action toward others (whether through prayer, fasting, providing financial support, etc). Historians, however, have also linked the theological discussion of covenants in the period to legal changes in forms of land ownership and the emergence of what we recognize today as the Market. Even so, Vallance counters that such “economic analogies” are equally defensible in terms of generic convention, indicative of “godly ministers’ preference for a ‘plain style’ of preaching, using comparisons that would be familiar to an unlearned audience.”

73 Ibid., 9.
74 Vallance, Revolutionary England and the National Covenant.
75 Ibid., 1.
77 Vallance, Revolutionary England and the National Covenant, 1. The expression of a spiritual economics in early modern English thought is the focus of my fourth chapter.
For the purposes of this argument, I follow two complementary definitions of covenant, one offered by Alan Mittleman, the other by Gräbe. From Mittleman I borrow an understanding of covenant as a “theological-moral-political framework” in order to emphasize its civic aspect.\textsuperscript{78} I use Gräbe to recall covenant’s relational comportment, translating berith as a “comprehensive term for a fellowship enabling relationship.”\textsuperscript{79} Marlowe writes the Devil’s contract in opposition to covenantal thinking; it disables relationships. It is also a maneuver of political theology, one that effectively scripts citizenship (and thus civic identity) through adherence to the letter of the law, an action which creates a false community premised on exchange at best and exploitation at worst. This is an extended way of saying that in Faustus Marlowe dramatizes the tragedy of conceptualizing identity relative to contracts rather than covenants.

To reiterate my central claim, Faustus’ legalism may be read as his tragic flaw. That is, his belief in the power of the material contract supersedes his belief in the subjectivity offered by covenant through repentance (religare), a central theme in the play. The distinction between contracts and covenants might be thought of respectively in terms of nomos and pneuma. On this point Paul Marlowe once more proves a helpful interlocutor.

In the sense of early modern theological thought, strict adherence to the law bears a Jewish cast. Such is the action of a Pharisee.\textsuperscript{80} A reading of this sort understands the Decalogue as God’s Old Testament law (legalism, nomos) superseded by Christ’s New Testament covenant of grace (pneuma), and it does so by way of a Hellenized reading of


\textsuperscript{79} Gräbe, \textit{New Covenant, New Community}, 12.

\textsuperscript{80} Catholicism was similarly derided for its legalism.
Paul. Yet it is as a Pharisee that Paul reminds the readers of his Roman Epistle, both Christian and Jew alike, that the law is not abrogated but established by faith. Such faith is espoused in Romans 13:8-10,

Owe no man any thing, but to love one another: for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.

This Pauline call for love as fulfillment of the law is a specific type of love, *agape*, the self-sacrificing and neighbor-servicing care *of* and *for* the other. *Agape* is dividual identity in practice. Renaissance scholars working in an Agambenian strain read such action as a messianic call that is Jewish in its inflection yet readily discernible by and applicable to the thoughts and actions of early modern English Christians. The Decalogue in this Jewish cast bears the aspect of *pneuma* rather than *nomos*. It is a site of *religare*, of communal binding and identity formation. Spinoza writes that “what is formed at Sinai is a congregation (*edah*) of the children of Israel: an assembly, a gathering, a company, a multitude.” Identity is thus given at Sinai through covenant, as a relational community (the people of Israel), not through legalistic adherence.

Read in his Jewish-Christian historical context, Paul’s distinction between “the law of the Spirit of Life” (*pneuma*) and “the law of sin and death” (*nomos*) in Romans

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81 Rom. 3:31.
82 The concept of *agape*, particularly in its political-theological application, forms a through-line across this dissertation. It forms a central part of my argument in Chapter 4.
83 See n.22.
84 On this see Ex. 6:7. The Decalogue is recorded in Ex. 20 and Deut. 5. For the covenantal aspect of God’s relation (*religare*) to his people, see Gen. 17:7 and Ex. 19:5-6.
8:2-3 nullifies a legalistic reading of the Decalogue. Following this reading of Paul, the Law did not inaugurate sin and death (as opposed to the life-giving grace of the Gospel’s new covenant), it became the marker thereof when man invested himself in the materiality of the law—put in Pauline terms, its letter over its spirit.\(^\text{86}\) If, as one scholar puts it, the covenant motif in scripture, especially in its Pauline operation, addresses the “ultimate crisis of human experience,” then Marlowe dramatizes this very crisis in his tragical history.\(^\text{87}\) It is Faustus’ unwavering belief in the letter of the law—its expression as contract over its relational carriage as covenant—that drafts a death sentence in Marlowe’s Wittenberg. This is why Faustus cannot repent; he understands his subjectivity relative to instrumental thinking. By his own discernment, Faustus is the subject underwritten by legal contract.

Luke Wilson has argued that the early modern understanding of magic is useful as a productive metaphor to subvert the notion of what a contract represents.\(^\text{88}\) Put into biblical expression, contracts are a materialist form (idol) used to replace covenantal relation.\(^\text{89}\) Adela Cortina has mapped this aspect in Renaissance thought through the biblical idiom of Genesis and the political philosophy of Hobbes’ *Leviathan* (1651). Cortina’s intertextual reading illuminates my previous point that contracts disable

\(^{\text{86}}\) Agamben engages with this aspect of the Law in an epigraph to *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) citing Rom. 7:10. This passage and its Agambenian reading is taken up in Chapter 2.


covenantal relationships by establishing false communities built upon either exchange or exploitation. Cortina writes,

In view of the problem posed by the book of *Genesis*, in view of the problem of violence flooding the world through men’s malice, the parable of the *Leviathan* says that the most intelligent solution, the one that modern States governed by rule of law have adopted and should fortify, consists in sealing a contract, because men are irremediably selfish individuals, led by a rapacious instinct. Only their fear of losing life and wealth gets under way their reason, which is when all is said and done a calculating reason, and advises them through calculation to sign a self-interested contract with any others who are equally interested for their own sakes, and to form a political community.⁹⁰

By this reading, selfishness and self-interest—“fear of losing life and wealth”—give rise to political contract. It is the equal interest of each individual party that binds them together in contractual enterprise, an act of “calculating reason,” to use Cortina’s phrase. The subject defining event under contractual polity, at least by this understanding, is the preservation of the self in the face of the other (in spite of the other). Here the individual replaces the dividual through the written express of law; mutual self-interest (exchange) dictates political operation. Marlowe intensifies this aspect of self-interest in the form of the Devil’s contract, highlighting exploitation as the extreme end of contractual polity.

Where God communes through covenants the Devil deals in contracts. Marlowe’s dramatization emphasizes the materialist form of contractual exchange. At the close of 1.3, for example, Faustus believes an oral contract sufficient to bind him to the Devil. However, in 2.1 Mephistopheles’ makes his master’s contractual requirements clear: “But, Faustus, thou must bequeath [your soul] solemnly / and write a deed of gift with thine own blood, / For that security craves great Lucifer” (2.1.34-36). *For that security craves great Lucifer*. In this exchange of services for goods (Faustus’ soul) the Devil

requires surety of written consent. He would have guarantee of payment. Yet once again Faustus’ misunderstands the material necessity of the Devil’s contract, mistaking oath for binding documentation: “I cut mine arm, and with my proper blood / Assure my soul to be great Lucifer’s” (2.1.53-54). And, once more, Mephistopheles stresses the need for legal consent: “But, Faustus, thou must / Write it in a manner of a deed of gift” (2.1.58-59). The Devil, like Faustus, is a legalist. I will return to Faustus’ legalism in my closing remarks regarding the theme of repentance in the play. At present the soul-selling contract requires further attention.

That Faustus’ blood congeals in an act of natural rebellion should give us pause. On Lowell Gallagher’s impressive reading, “the staged appearance of Faustus’s blood supplies an intuition of the materiality of ethics.”\(^91\) The materialist ethics Gallagher traces through the flow of Faustus’ blood follows messianic thinking through the philosophy of St. Paul, Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and Agamben. Indeed it is upon Agamben’s translation of the Heracletian fragment “ethos anthropo daimon” that Gallagher premises his argument for such a materialist ethics. Agamben’s translation reads, “Ethos, the habitual dwelling place of man, is that which lacerates and divides.”\(^92\) The blood at the font of Faustus’ self-inflicted laceration forms an ethical imperative on Gallagher’s explanation. Yet from a Pauline precedent it is laceration and its flow that brings community rather than division: “But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far away


have been brought near through the blood of Christ.” Might not Marlowe be similarly thinking with Paul in his Faustian tragedy?

For Heidegger, tragedy renders ethics more discernible than political philosophy. Faustus, I would argue, bears this weight of ethical instruction.

Heidegger’s translation of the same fragment from Heraclitus renders the aspect of relational dwelling (yashab, proximal nearness) inherent to Paul’s address:

The saying of Heraclitus (Fragment 119) goes: ἔθος ἄνθρωποι δαίμον. This is usually translated, ‘A man’s character is his daimon.’ This translation thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one. Ἐθος means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which man dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to man’s essence, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear. The abode of man contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to man in his essence. According to Heraclitus’s phrase this is daimón, the god. The fragment says: Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of a god.

Heidegger locates ethics in dwelling, specifically in nearness to the divine. If, following Gallagher, we are to read a materialist ethics in Faustus it is in this aspect of proximal nearness. In Marlowe’s play religare is ethics. That Faustus rejects the communal association of a covenant for contractual exploitation (by the Devil no less), is indeed his tragic gesture. In the process thereof he reduces his selfhood to a state of commodification; he is an object for sale, an individual commodity. Faustus’ is a misapprehension to be sure. Hawkes has shown that in early modern thought “objectified subjectivity” is synonymous with “idolatry.” And it is in this way that he poses a necessary question: “What happens, ethically speaking, in our minds or souls when we

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94 Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 256: “The tragedies of Sophocles—provided such a comparison is permissible—preserve the ἔθος in their sagas more primordially than Aristotle’s lectures on ‘ethics.’”
95 Ibid.
96 Hawkes, “Faust Among the Witches,” ¶3.
are so ‘blinded’ as to mistake a sign for a referent, an image for reality?”  

One answer to this question is offered by Faustian example: we pledge fidelity to contracts rather than covenants.

Perhaps this is why Marlowe stages the Devil’s contract as hyperbolically material. He does so by way of dramatic triptych. First is the extended writing of the contract, drawn out through the coagulative pause of Faustus’ blood, and its completion with his subversive “Consummatum est” (2.1.73). This is followed by an intermediary “show” (2.1.81) effected by Mephistopheles “to delight his mind” (2.1.83)—for at this point he is on the verge of repentance prompted by the pneumatic appearance of “Homo, fuge” on his forearm (2.1.75-80). In the third and final scene of this dramatic frame Faustus is reaffirmed in his action and delivers over the contract, effectively sealing the deal:

FAUSTUS: Here, Mephistopheles, receive this scroll,  
A deed of gift of body and of soul—  
But yet conditionally that thou perform  
All articles prescribed between us both.

MEPHISTOPHELES: Faustus, I swear by hell and Lucifer  
To effect all promises between us made. (2.1.88-93)

As with any contract, the document is premised on exchange (“But yet conditionally…”). What is more, by the end of his twenty-four year term Faustus will understand that the terms of the contract are exploitative by design. His soul is paid for in the currency of illusion—unanswered questions, mute images of celebrity (Alexander, his paramour, Helen), and parlor tricks conjured for pleasure of royalty. At this moment, however,

97 Ibid., ¶33.
Faustus remains unaware and committed to the action of his newly-penned deed. As if to emphasize this aspect Marlowe has Faustus read the dictates of the writ on stage in full.

Kristen Pool’s thoughts on the staging of this material merit repeating at length:

The bond contains little, if anything, that the audience doesn’t already know; the purpose of reading the contract (probably with a large scroll as a stage prop) is to underscore its material presence. The document functions, of course, both as the inscription of an abstract contract and as the material record of a transaction between Faustus and the devil, but at this moment the bond’s evidentiary qualities take precedence. Here, form trumps content, as the play insistently draws our attention to the document’s materiality.\(^99\)

Its materiality, tragically, comes at the cost of a *consummatum est*. Pompa Banerjee reads this biblical allusion as an act of Faustian self-consumption.\(^100\) Faustus’ self is indeed consumed by contractual conscription, at least insofar as his misapprehension guides action. Such is the price of Faustus’ fervent belief in his autonomy. The play’s theology, its *religare*, however, argues otherwise.

**REPENTANCE**

*Faustus* is ultimately a play about repentance. Marlowe’s tragic character poses the play’s central question in soliloquy at the opening of the soul-selling scene: “Faustus, must thou needs be damned, / And canst thou be saved” (2.1.1-2). Across its multiple acts (and actions) Faustus is repeatedly told that he can repent, and even concedes to do so on

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\(^99\) Ibid., 44-45.

\(^100\) Pompa Banerjee, “I, Mephastophilis: Self, Other, and Demonic Parody in Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus*,” *Christianity and Literature* 42.2 (1993), 237.
three occasions during the play’s course. Yet he does not repent. Materialist thinking bars such action.

By definition *repentance* is a mode of thought. In the Greek *koine* of the New Testament repentance is signified by three terms, the verbs *metamelomai* and *metanoeo*, as well as the cognate noun *metanoia*. Whether as a verb or noun, repentance denotes a change of mind; it is a rethinking, a paradigmatic shift in thought which precipitates a subsequent shift in action—moral, ethical, political, and relational. Donne’s 1626 sermon on Matthew attests to its early modern understanding in similar terms:

> He that cannot define Repentance, he that cannot spell it, may have it; and he that hath written whole books, great Volumes of it, may be without it. In one word, (one word will not do it, but in two words) it is *Aversio*, and *Conversio*; it is a turning from our sins, and a returning to God.

Donne dramatizes repentance in its turns as open to all, even the most seemingly unworthy (“he that cannot spell it”). In its early modern association repentance is a return to community, a rejection of narcissistic self-interest. Repentance also acknowledges the covenantal aspect of createdness as described by biblical scholar Michael Horton:

> We were not just created and then given a covenant; we were created as covenant creatures—partners not in deity, to be sure, but in the drama that is about to unfold in history.

Marlowe pens such an apprehension in the following exchange between Faustus and Mephistopheles:

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101 Both the Good Angel and Old man remind Faustus that he may always repent and return to God. Faustus begins to repent twice after signing the contract in 2.3 prior to its delivery into Mephistopheles’ hands. He also consigns to repent after speaking with the Old Man in Act Five.


104 This communal call in Renaissance thinking forms the through-line of my discussion of *Timon of Athens* in Chapter 4.

FAUSTUS: When I behold the heavens, then I repent
And curse thee, wicked Mephistopheles,
Because thou hast deprived me of those joys.

MEPHISTOPHELES: Why, Faustus,
Think’st thou heaven is such a glorious thing?
I tell thee, ’tis not half so fair as thou
Or any man that breathes on earth.

FAUSTUS: How provest thou that?

MEPHISTOPHELES: It was made for man; therefore is man more excellent.

FAUSTUS: If it were made for man, ’twas made for me.
I will renounce this magic and repent. (2.3.1-11)

Indeed, when Mephistopheles will not tell Faustus “who made the world” (2.3.36) in an act of homo fuge Faustus once again announces metanoiaic intent:

MEPHISTOPHELES: Think thou on hell, Faustus, for thou art damned.

FAUSTUS: Think, Faustus, upon God, that made the world. (2.3.72-73)

Ultimately, however, Faustus consigns himself to instrumental thinking. His very body and soul come to be understood as a singular object for sale, under contract legally-binding and irrevocable. In fact, upon pain of death (a devilish threat raised in response to his protest of repentance) Faustus’ drafts another deed of gift to Lucifer (5.1.69-74).

Like magic, the Devil’s contract is an illusion. Its legalism is designed to distract a subject from covenantal return. Donne preaches the open invitation of such return through the repetition of Matthew 9:13 as a sermon proof text: I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance. Faustus, not unlike Paul, views himself as chief among sinners: “Faustus’ offense can ne’er be pardoned / The serpent that tempted Eve

106 John Donne, “A SERMON Preached to the Household at WHITE-HALL.”
may be saved, but not Faustus” (5.2.15-16). Although some thirty years distance
separates Donne’s sermon from Faustus’ first performance, Marlowe nevertheless
reminds his audiences of the openness of the covenantal call, bearing witness to this early
modern understanding of repentance as a return: “Yet, Faustus, call on God” (5.2.27).
The weight of legalism and contractual exchange, however, prove too great for Faustus.
His is ever an error in thinking. In a final admission to his only friends, Faustus resigns to
the belief that he is an irrevocably commodified subject and thus consigns himself to hell
as the object of contractual purchase: “I writ them a bill with mine own / blood. The date
expired, the time will come, and he will / fetch me” (5.2.40-42). In an alternate
Renaissance turn, Donne levies similar economic language for the purpose of covenantal
return (re-ligature): “The Market is open till the bell ring; till thy last bell ring the Church
is open, grace is to be had there.” Repentance is religare, as Donne’s Meditation XVII
has already shown; it is to become once more “ingrafted into that body whereof I am a
member.”

In an ever-deferred, uncompleted and yet would-be final action, Faustus affirms,
“I’ll burn my books” (5.2.120). Yet his rejection of materialist thinking comes too late. It
is never enacted. His metanoia remains in the future tense: I will burn my books.
Similarly, the material artifact (idol) of the contract and its power could be cast aside, its
false promise revoked by covenantal return. Yet, Faustus, call on God. Yet he does not.

107 1 Tim. 1:15.
108 John Donne, “A sermon of valediction at my going into Germany, at Lincolns-Inne, April 18. 1619,” in
Donne at Sermons: A Christian Existential World, ed. Gale H. Carrithers, Jr. (Albany: State University of
Faustus’ confession recalls an instance of atemporal echo in a similar admission from Prospero:

But this rough magic
I here abjure; […]
I’ll break my staff,
Bury it certain fathoms in the earth,
And deeper than did ever plummet sound
I’ll drown my book. (5.1.50-51, 54-57)\textsuperscript{109}

Yet unlike Prospero, whose end signals the promise of communal return, Faustus’ fate is one of isolation and torment. The promise of Milan’s proximity is a stark contrast to the alienation of hell, the very absence of relationality.\textsuperscript{110} My aim in this chapter has been to suggest \textit{The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus} as Marlowe’s dramatization of the dire effects and affects contractual and instrumental thinking have on the world and wider human relationships. From this early modern perspective, \textit{Faustus} enacts the tragic consequences of failing to recognize the human condition as shared creaturely estate and covenantal relation. Read in this way, Marlowe’s is a \textit{metanoiaic} text, a dramatic encounter that may be approached as an invitation for thinking life, politics, and the way the two inhere, otherwise. The chapters that follow take up three of Shakespeare’s later plays as similar opportunities for such rethinking.


\textsuperscript{110} See n.54.
Only within a biopolitical horizon will it be possible to decide whether the categories whose opposition founded modern politics (right / left, private / public, absolutism / democracy, etc.)—and which have been steadily dissolving, to the point of entering today into a real zone of indistinction—will have to be abandoned, or will, instead, eventually regain the meaning they lost in that very horizon.

—Giorgio Agamben

also they have power over our bodies…and we are in great distress.

—Nehemiah 9:37b

Grace is grace, despite of all controversy.

—Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, 1.2.24

Speaking of the scriptural reference made in Measure for Measure’s title, Grace Ioppolo has remarked that, “[a]t the very least, Shakespeare’s reconsideration of St. Matthew’s maxim to ‘judge not, that ye be judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged, and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again,’ demands that Christianity prove its relevance to early modern England.” This chapter seeks to locate such relevance at the intersection of biopolitics and grace. Biopolitics may be loosely defined as the ways in and through which life in its varied meanings becomes entangled in polity. I use grace in its early modern Reformed theological context as God’s unmerited favor descended upon mankind. In its political-theological operation

1 I have chosen the American Standard Version here for its translation of the Hebrew mashal as “power,” in order to emphasize the connection with biopower examined in this chapter. Mashal may be similarly translated as “dominion” or “rule,” as in the KJV and NIV respectively. All biblical citations here follow the King James Version unless otherwise noted.


3 Grace Ioppolo, introduction to Measure for Measure, by William Shakespeare (New York: Norton, 2010), xv. The titular reference is to Mt. 7:1-2; see also Lk. 6:38, “give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again.”
grace can further be said to initiate a bios-politics, a particular course of action (bios) through which one chooses to live one’s life among others. My discussion of biopolitics takes its cue largely from the work of Giorgio Agamben, particularly his influential monograph *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, as well as political theory from Aristotle and Saint Paul. In doing so, this chapter explores the political potentials opened by grace as they are traced across the Jewish and Christian scriptural registers in Shakespeare’s Vienna. In its Hebraic context, grace (hen, favor) often stages a face-to-face encounter with God, which subsequently carries an ethico-moral imperative toward others. Luke and Paul ascribe grace (charis, favor) two further aspects in the Christian tradition following the Greek koine of the first-century Church. For Luke this favor is often associated with power, or in an Agambenian register, potentiality. For Paul, the favor of grace comes in the form of a calling, a vocation (bios), what Agamben terms form-of-life.

Following the thread of political theology, this chapter weaves in the flows between biopolitical thought and political-theological thinking, with particular consideration given to the degree that the latter instructs the former in the fabric of *Measure for Measure*. My argument is that grace functions in Shakespeare’s Vienna as a paradigm for biopolitics. I will map this paradigm by suggesting that Shakespeare scripts Judeo-Christian eudaimonism as political-theological agapeism in *Measure for Measure*. Such a reading stages an ethics based on agapeic love. My terms here will be treated

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more fully as my argument progresses, yet some initial explanation is helpful.

Eudaimonia refers to the Greek philosophical desire to achieve a life well lived; I use the term both in its well-known Aristotelian sense and its pre-Socratic idiom as spiritual favor. In its theological aspect, a scriptural eudaimonism is inaugurated by St. Paul and emphasized as the practice of agapeism in the Reformed thinking of Martin Luther. Following this genealogy of eudaimonia, theological eudaimonism, a life well lived in the religious sense understood by many post-Reformation early moderns, is achieved through the practice of agape, love of the neighbor prompted by the divine fiat Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.⁶ As I will show, within the Reformed tradition prevalent in the Renaissance, the practice of agape ought to be attendant in one’s life subsequent to the free receipt of grace.⁷ These connections will be parsed in due course; at present my aim is to establish the connection between eudaimonism as theological agapeism and grace. That is, agapeism as the active living of the good life by one who believes him- or herself to be saved by grace. To be clear, I am not advocating a materialist grace, but rather a material and indeed political-theological response to grace through the spiritually mandated practice of agape as a faith at work in physical action for the other.⁸ Paul Cefalu has argued that “a better way to explain the ethical work performed by early

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⁷ On the Pauline connection between the operation of grace and the Great Commandment of the Gospels, see Gal. 5:4 and 5:14. I take up Luther’s adducing of this point later in the chapter.

modern literature is to say that it offers ad hoc, context-sensitive guidelines for moral behavior rather than universalizable rules of conduct.”

I would offer political-theological agapeism funded by grace as one such ad hoc, context-sensitive guideline for moral behavior forwarded by *Measure for Measure*.

In terms of political theology, grace is often placed in opposition to law. For scholar of religion Vincent Lloyd this forced dichotomy reveals the problem of supersessionist logic. “Reducing the richness of theological tradition to two vague gestures,” he warns, “leads directly into the trap of discarding Law in favor of Grace.” Such would certainly seem to be the case at the close of *Measure for Measure* with the restoration of the Duke’s gracious authority in Vienna over the strict legalism of Angelo’s religious zeal. Yet Lloyd’s critique goes further, defining grace as “modes of redemption,” contrary to law as “modes of living and acting” with the caveat whether one chooses to live “religiously or politically.” Shakespeare’s Vienna tests whether such divisive choice is necessary. Quite to the contrary, in this particular Vienna, to live politically in a positive ethical sense is to live religiously. The problem with grace,

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10 Agamben’s epigraph in this chapter signals his critique of binary thinking as well. From an Agambenian perspective the “zone of indistinction” created in the wake of modern political binaries (right/left, private/public, absolutism/democracy, etc.) is a form of supersessionism; the binary ultimately collapses as one side eventually exerts its force over and in turn effectively replaces the other. See *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 4. On the problem of supersessionist logic as it relates to contemporary literary theory and criticism see David Hawkes, “Against Materialism in Literary Theory,” in *The Return of Theory in Early Modern English Studies: Tarrying with the Subjunctive*, eds. Paul Cefalu and Bryan Reynolds (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 237-57. “Against Materialism” was also published electronically as an invitation for an open conversation on the theme of “New Idealism?” for the ejournal *Early Modern Culture* (issue 9, 2012), where it generated rather heated critical debate. Respondents to Hawkes’ essay include Michael Booth, Adam Bryx and Bryan Reynolds, William Flesch, Christopher Kendrick, John Sutton and Evelyn B. Tribble, and Gabriel Egan. The ejournal can be accessed here http://emc.eserver.org/1-9/issue9.html.


12 Ibid.
following Lloyd’s argument, is the problem of lived action. For Lloyd, political theology in practice must promote law (modes of living and acting) not resign itself to grace (the passive acceptance of redemption), whose effective end, he argues, reveals itself to be nothing less than the sovereign exception. In place of grace, Lloyd advocates “a political theology…without Christian presuppositions.” Yet Lloyd’s intervention presupposes a Christianity that is necessarily supersessionist.

Neither Scripture nor Shakespeare subscribe to this logic. Following Protestant theology, as the very incarnation of grace Jesus acknowledges his purpose in Matthew 5:17 not as a destruction of the law but its fulfillment, despite the period’s dispersed antinomian opinion otherwise. In this Matthean sense, grace is a way of living law in ethical relation; grace as such does not replace law but rather becomes its enactment through praxis: the caring of and for others. Such action, though expressed in Matthew, gets its marching orders under Pauline theology in direct opposition to antinomian dissent. Luther affirms as much: “after [Paul] has rejected the works of the law, so that it sounds as though he would abolish the law by faith; ‘Nay,’ he says, ‘we establish the law by faith,’ that is we fulfill it by faith.” For Luther, to live by faith is to live under grace. As a mode of living and acting, grace thus performs Lloyd’s very definition of law. In an early modern turn, Shakespeare’s resistance to supersessionist logic has been recently

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13 On this see Lloyd, introduction, 1-26.
14 Ibid., 12.
15 Mt. 5:17 reads, “Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill.” For a survey of early modern English antinomianism see, Gertrude Huehns, Antinomianism in English History, with Special Reference to the Period 1640-1660 (London: Cresset Press, 1951). On the antinomian critique of Puritan legalism, see David Como, Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism and the Emergence of an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil War England (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
16 Martin Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” in Works of Martin Luther, Volume VI (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1930), 450.
demonstrated by Julia Reinhard Lupton, whose work on the role of Whitsun and whitpot in *The Winter’s Tale* explores Pentecost in its rich Judeo-Christian heritage. As Lupton has shown through the confluences between Shavuot and Pentecost, both in the early Church and early modern England, Christian supersessionism need not exist and indeed exhibited pockets of active resistance in Shakespeare’s age.\(^{17}\) Similarly, Jonathan Gil Harris has argued brilliantly for the palimpsestic nature of life represented in both Shakespeare’s plays and by the environs of early modern England, suggesting continued dialogue between Christianity and its Jewish past rather than the one’s erosion of the other.\(^{18}\)

Although I am not arguing that *Measure for Measure* is exclusively or even predominantly a biopolitical play, I do want to suggest that Shakespeare’s Vienna tests the potential of grace as a means of mediating between the human and its others, whether zoological (human, animal), environmental, or object-oriented in relation.\(^{19}\) The first section of the chapter begins by establishing *Measure for Measure* within the context of political theology and biopolitical thinking, while arguing for literature’s meditative capacity to bring an ethically concerned politics to the fore. Section two turns attention to the play proper by suggesting *eudaimonia*, the Greek concept of the good life, as *Measure for Measure*’s chief political concern, especially in its early modern register as

\(^{17}\) Julia Reinhard Lupton, “Whitsun and Whitpot in *The Winter’s Tale*” (Unpublished paper, University of California, Irvine, 2014). I wish to thank the author for sharing her pre-published work and for our extended discussions on this subject.


\(^{19}\) In the spirit of grace, I must acknowledge my debt to Lupton, whose work has served as a rhetorical model for my phrasing here. With regard to grace’s political potentiality, this chapter focuses primarily on the function of grace in human to human relations. However, it serves as the foundation for the arguments in chapters Three and Four, which speak at length about gracious living in terms of posthuman encounters and stewardship, the care of and for people, animals, nature, and things.
agapeism operant under the banner of grace. Agamben’s thinking is introduced here as a methodology to think life along its Greek vectors and to assess the way Shakespeare’s Vienna stages the biopolitical concerns voiced in *Homo Sacer*, particularly the fate of the body under the law where personhood is reduced to material (and manageable) objectivity. The chapter concludes by arguing for a biopolitics of grace in terms of its relational enactments. Here grace is cast in Agambenian vernacular as both “form-of-life” and “potentiality,” and is offered as a hermeneutic lens to both re-read and ameliorate the marriages that form the play’s concluding action and which have long since garnered much of its critical censure.

**POLITICS, SHAKESPEARE, AND MEASURE FOR MEASURE**

*Political Theology*

From the Duke’s opening lines, “Of government the properties to unfold” (1.1.3) in Act One, Scene One, *Measure for Measure* expresses its concern with measuring governmental action. In a generic turn, Ervene Gulley has argued for the play as legal theater, highlighting both the theatrical nature of law in human affairs and *Measure for Measure* as “a mediation on the nature of law itself,” going so far as to cast Angelo and

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Escalus as “legal dramatists.” Yet the play’s arguably most enduring generic affiliation is that proposed by nineteenth century critic F.S. Boas: the problem play. For Boas, the problem of locating Measure for Measure within a fixed category is its inherent resistance to capture by a single genre: how is it to be distinguished from its compounded associations with comedy, tragedy, and history? For twenty- and twenty-first century scholars the generic problem of and with Measure for Measure remains similarly vexed, although the contest is situated in decidedly polarized interpretations with regard to religion. Should the play be read as a wholly secular critique of politics on Shakespeare’s part, particularly to the degree that its marriages function as a political tool for patriarchal hegemony? Or, based on its overt religious rhetoric, does the play advocate an assessment of the period’s intrinsic political theology?

As the only Shakespeare play with a direct Biblical allusion in its title, Measure for Measure suggests, or at the very least grants, a reading in light of scriptural intertexts. The titular “measure,” as already noted, is taken from the Gospel of Matthew. This overt Biblical reference, coupled with the plays internal New Testament glosses, lead G. Wilson Knight to his now infamous argument that Measure for Measure must be read in

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21 Ervene Gulley, “‘Dressed in a little brief authority’: Law as Theater in Measure for Measure,” in Law and Literature Perspectives, ed. Bruce L. Rockwood (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 68 and 58 respectively.

22 On this see Martz, “‘Of government,’” regarding two 1990’s editions of Measure for Measure edited by Brian Gibbons and N.W. Bawcutt, which position the play generically as a tragicomedy in order to skirt the problems raised when reading the play as “religious allegory, parable, or morality play,” 211.


24 See n.3.
light of the Gospels, with the play functioning as a parable of love as ethics. The critical backlash against Knight’s reading and others of its kind has been prolific. To read the play as a parable in the sense Knight intends is to force an allegorical interpretation on the text to the degree that, as R. M. Frye has criticized, such heavy-handed allegorization “translates Shakespeare out of dramatic and into theological terms.” Writing some thirty years later, Brian Vickers has censured those prone to allegorical (mis)reading like Knight on the grounds that allegory is forced hermeneutic, operating on a text from without and not being constructed from within. And while this is certainly a warranted critique, it should be noted that secular critical ideologies are no less forced. Vickers’ attack on religious readings of Shakespeare’s plays, as Julia Brett has shown, renders transparent his own ideological bias. Vickers’ criticism, while leveled at Christian readings of Othello, Lear, and Coriolanus, “makes no mention of Measure for Measure, a play so obviously dominated by Christian imagery that,” as Brett reminds us, “the omission is…worth pursuing.”

A similar trend can be seen in recent scholarly editions of Measure for Measure that editorially strip the play of its Biblical aspects. The effect of such editorialization is


28 Brett, “‘Grace is grace,’” 190.
to display both law and politics denuded of religious overtones.\textsuperscript{29} Yet doing so, as Brett has argued, is to enact a hermeneutic “error in the opposite kind.”\textsuperscript{30} If Carl Schmitt’s oft-cited dictum is correct and “[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts,” and Deborah Shuger affirmed in her assessment of \textit{Measure for Measure} as “a sustained meditation on its own political moment,” then to remove political theology from the play’s interpretive ambit is certainly such an error.\textsuperscript{31}

“To choose to read \textit{Measure for Measure} outside the universe of Christian theological discourse,” Brett maintains and I am inclined to agree, “is to misread it indeed.”\textsuperscript{32} However, before this play can be read in terms of its examination of political theology it is first necessary to understand \textit{Measure for Measure} within the context of its more general concern with early modern law.

\textsuperscript{29} See, Giorgio Agamben, \textit{Nudities}, trans. David Kishik (Stanford: University of California Press, 2011), for a discussion of the flaw in such thinking. Extending my denuding metaphor, Agamben reminds that nakedness in Western thought is to always already encounter human nakedness before God, 57-87. For the editions cited, see Martz, “‘Of government,’” n.27.

\textsuperscript{30} Brett, “‘Grace is grace,’” 191.

\textsuperscript{31} Carl Schmitt, \textit{Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty}, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 36; Shuger, \textit{Political Theologies in Shakespeare’s England}, 1. Shuger’s argument locates \textit{Measure for Measure}’s “own political moment” as James’s accession specifically and the Reformation and its aftermath more broadly, establishing the play as being deeply invested political and religio-political commentary.

\textsuperscript{32} Brett, “‘Grace is grace,’” 191. Robin H. Wells accentuates this point: “before we read the play against the grain, it’s as well to be aware of which way the grain is running in the first place,” 86, see “Recovering Shakespeare’s Humanism: Self-Knowledge and Social Justice in \textit{Measure for Measure},” in \textit{Renaissance Refractions}, eds. Boika Sokolova and Evgenia Pancheva (Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press, 2001).
Research has shown that early modern English fascination with the law experienced rapid growth during the Tudor and early Jacobean periods.\textsuperscript{33} The recent collection \textit{Shakespeare and the Law} writes that “[t]he passion of Elizabethans for law is impressive compared even to present-day American litigiousness, one estimate suggesting that toward the end of Queen Elizabeth’s reign an English population of around 4 million persons was involved in 1 million actions per year.”\textsuperscript{34} This burgeoning legal interest, however, was often tempered with a healthy dose of skepticism worked out on the public theater stages. Much of this comports with Jean-Paul Pittion’s contention that during this period “[t]he stage became a public space, perhaps the only legitimate one at the time, where the values which the Law claimed to enshrine and with the Courts sought to enforce, were challenged and made the subject of a public negotiation, by means of dramatised fictions about justice.”\textsuperscript{35} By tracing one specific generic trajectory, the moot, the fictional dramatization of Shakespeare’s Vienna finds a generative politico-critical locus in this dramatic form unique to the legal system.

Boas’s categorization of \textit{Measure for Measure} as a problem play demonstrates its resistance to generic capture. And while I do not wish to suggest the play as being restricted to any singular genre, \textit{Measure for Measure} may nevertheless be read in light of certain generic conventions. To wit, Karen Cunningham has argued convincingly for


\textsuperscript{34} Bradin Cormack, Martha C. Nussbaum, and Richard Strier, eds., \textit{Shakespeare and the Law} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 3. For recent critical interest on Shakespeare’s relation to law and legal studies, see n.6 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{35} Pittion, “Writing the Law,” 59.
the play working within the legal genre of mooting.\textsuperscript{36} A \textit{moot} is a theoretical dramatic enactment where law students assume the role of either prosecution or defense in an imagined case.\textsuperscript{37} As a pedagogical exercise, the moot is designed to challenge law students to explore the nuances opened by the archive of court cases and extant laws while demonstrating each budding lawyer’s wit and argumentative acumen. To read \textit{Measure for Measure} as a moot is not only to encounter the play within its political entanglements but also to engage it as a legal thinking-with, as a thought experiment designed not to resolve complex issues but to explore them. Thinking-with \textit{Measure for Measure} as a moot calls for a consideration of its strident legalism in light of the play’s larger ethical concern. If politics is to be conceived as an ethical enterprise, how or when is it ethically viable to demand the law’s full measure, especially within a biopolitical arena heavily invested in the management of life even unto death?

As a generic form, the moot further exhibits connections to political theology.\textsuperscript{38} According to Cunningham, “[o]ne oft-repeated, classic case can offer a partial glimpse of the England imagined by moots”\textsuperscript{39}; this case is none other than an early modern juridically constructed inheritance dispute between Jacob and Esau. Here the moot’s juridico-political entanglements take on an aspect of theology if only in their connection

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{37} It should also be noted that “moot” has another more generally known meaning as a kind of Anglo-Saxon court. However, for the purposes of this chapter, my interest centers on the dramatic nature of the moot as it was practiced in early modern law colleges, especially as such legal dramatization finds expression in the works of Shakespeare. In a more recent pedagogical turn, the tradition of connecting Shakespeare’s plays and thinking to the practice of mooting was the focus of the Shakespeare Moot Court at McGill University from 2002-2007.

\textsuperscript{38} Perhaps a better term here would be \textit{legal theology}, although I hesitate to use such a term due to its connotative suggestion of canon law. Even the example given, the Biblical case of Jacob and Esau, is considered within the moot is thought in terms of civil rather than ecclesiastical law.

\textsuperscript{39} Cunningham, “Opening Doubts,” 319.
\end{footnotesize}
to Biblical narrative as a formative intertext in the Western philosophical-legal-political thinking affected by the moot itself. With its Biblically allusive title, *Measure for Measure* stages its moot in similar political-theological fashion.

While moots enjoyed academic tenure from the medieval period through the sixteenth-century, by the early seventeenth-century they began to fall out of favor with political authority in England.\(^{40}\) In their open interrogation and theoretical exploration of the multiple possibilities posed by the law, moots came to be seen during this time to effectively “cloud rather than shed light on legal principles.”\(^{41}\) Famous among moots critics is none less than Francis Bacon, himself no stranger to the law as a resident of the Inns. Chief among Bacon’s concern for the practice of mooting was its capability to “open doubts upon the law.”\(^{42}\) With an eye toward ethical return in politico-legal action, I take up the moot’s generic capacity to open and subsequently cast doubt upon the law in *Measure for Measure* as well as the wider sphere of Western politics within whose orbit it is necessarily drawn. Building upon the theoretical agency moots open onto such politico-legal doubts, I also turn to Agamben’s thinking to help direct the line of questioning.

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\(^{40}\) Ibid., 328.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.

The problem with the law in Vienna is its laxity. As the Duke readily confesses to Friar Thomas in Act One, Scene Four, for fourteen years he has allowed “evil deeds [to] have their permissive pass / And not the punishment” (1.4.38-39). The effect of this legal leniency is nothing less than the decline of morality within the city: “liberty plucks justice by the nose; / … / and quite athwart / Goes all decorum” (1.4.28-31). Anyone familiar with the play may easily decipher the Duke’s euphemistic language. These “evil deeds” and the “decorum” gone “athwart” are thinly veiled code for sexual immorality. Pompey, for example, Measure’s resident bawd, is effectively a synecdoche for prostitution and its social ills. Claudio and Juliet suffer “the morality of imprisonment” (1.3.18), as Lucio remarks, for an act of consensual intimacy within the bounds of betrothal. And Claudio further attests that although Juliet “is fast my wife” (1.3.31), his offence before the law is deemed “Lechery” (1.3.23). In fact, the only criminals we witness in the play not imprisoned or interrogated for reasons of a sexual nature are Barnardine and Ragozine, a drunk and a pirate.

As critics have repeatedly shown, the overarching politico-legal attention in Shakespeare’s Vienna is directed toward sexuality, yet I would suggest it is more pointedly a concern for eudaimonistic living. The Duke wants nothing more than for his
citizens to live a good life, as witnessed by his multiple pardons in the final scene, an analysis I take up in the course of this chapter. Angelo’s politics are no less guided by the imperative of good living, even if he would have all of Vienna’s citizens live as saints.\(^45\) What I would make clear, however, is that Shakespeare’s political-theological thinking on the subject of *eudaimonia*, while guided by early modern scriptural imperative as I will show, is equally invested in a critique of Puritan legalism.\(^46\) That is, the Duke’s and Angelo’s understanding of what constitutes the living of the good life, even as both are directed by scriptural course, prove radically divergent in their operation. My point here is that the idea of the *good life* directs the course of political action in *Measure for Measure*.

According to Agamben, Western political tradition finds one of its fundamental *topoi* in Aristotle’s *Politics*. Thus Agamben explains in this oft-cited passage:

> when Aristotle defined the end of the perfect community in a passage that was to become canonical for the political tradition of the West (1252b, 30), he did so precisely by opposing the simple fact of living (*to zēn*) to politically qualified life (*to eu zēn*): *ginomenē men oyn tou zēn heneken, ousa de tou eu zēn*, “born with regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life.”\(^47\)

The problem with politically qualified life, per Agamben, is that it is poised in opposition to the simple fact of living. The larger project of his *Homo Sacer* series has been to bring

\(^{45}\) See Julia Reinhard Lupton, *Citizen Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), on “the particular conceptual convergence—between the saint and the citizen, or more broadly, between a theology of exceptionalism and a politics of the norm—as it manifests in Shakespeare’s plays,” 21.


\(^{47}\) Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 2, emphasis in original.
to the fore the problematics that arise in such binary thinking. Inevitably, he concludes, one pole of the dyad is subsumed within the other; in this case, the simple fact of living becomes the focus of politics at the expense of concern for living with regard to the good life. As we shall see, this is the very predicament Claudio finds himself in before Angelo’s enactment of the law by its letter; the presence of Claudio’s physical body, the simple fact of his being alive, stands as an affront to Angelo’s legalism. For now, however, I wish to parse Aristotle’s concept of politically qualified life (to eu zên) as existing with regard to the good life.

Put simply, the Greek eu zên is synonymous with eudaimonia. In Aristotelian terms, eudaimonia may be translated as “doing well” or “living well,” as exemplified in the Nicomachean Ethics. This regard for doing or living well is marked by active verbs. Thus, as one critic has suggested, within the context of Aristotle’s ethics specifically and Greek philosophical thought more broadly, “[e]udaimonia primarily characterizes lives or

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49 On this in brief, see Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7.

50 Regarding the Nicomachean Ethics, L.H.G. Greenwood writes: “Phronesis may be defined as the intellectual arete that leads to knowledge of the good things to do as means to the great end of man which is eu zên or eupraxia or eudaimonia,” Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, Book Six: With Essays, Notes, and Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 44. With reference to eudaimonia in the thinking of Socrates and Plato, C.D.C. Reeve notes that “Eu zên (living well) and eudaimonia are coextensive,” citing the Republic 353e10-354a4, Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato’s Apology of Socrates (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 126, n.23.

life-activities, rather than states of mind or feeling.” That is, *eudaimonia*, like Lloyd’s differentiation of *law* in opposition to *grace*, is a mode of living or acting. It is a way of life, indeed a way of living with regard to the good life. Thus from an Aristotelian precedent, it is not the fact that one merely lives, but rather *how* one chooses to live that should define the aim of politics. In order to better assess the progressive nature of Shakespeare’s political thinking on this front in *Measure for Measure*, it is helpful to first attend to the limits of Aristotelian eudaimonism developed in the play before turning to its scriptural supplement in the form of agapeic political-theology under Vincentio’s gracious actions.

We witness the Aristotelian eudaimonistic imperative as a central concern in *Measure for Measure* through Escalus’s exchange with Pompey:

**ESCALUS:** Pompey, you are partly a bawd, Pompey, howsoever you color it in being a tapster. Are you not? Come, tell me true; it shall be the better for you.

**POMPEY:** Truly, sir, I am a poor fellow that would live.

**ESCALUS:** How would you live, Pompey? By being a bawd? What do you think of the trade, Pompey? Is it a lawful trade?

**POMPEY:** If the law would allow it, sir.

**ESCALUS:** But the law will not allow it, Pompey, nor it shall not be allowed in Vienna.

**POMPEY:** Does your worship mean to geld and splay all the youth of the city?

**ESCALUS:** No, Pompey.

**POMPEY:** Truly, sir, in my poor opinion, they will to’t then. If your worship will take order for the drabs and the knaves, you need not to fear the bawds. (2.1.201-215)

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53 For the exchange between Escalus, Elbow, and Pompey see 2.1.41-176.
As an officer of the state, Escalus’s primary concern for Pompey is the way he chooses to live his life. In his defense, Pompey argues that he is but a “poor fellow that would live,” and yet it is the quality of his life choices, here marked by his vocation as a bawd, that raise concern. Put simply, Pompey’s life is measured by Escalus (and thus political agency) by the degree to which he fails to live a life toward the good. In this legal dialogue, Escalus’s prosecution and Pompey’s defense both correlate a man’s livelihood with his life; in eudaimonistic terms the two appear synonymous, or at the very least akin. Within this register, it is perhaps not surprising that eudaimonia may be translated as “human flourishing” or “fulfilling life.” Pompey’s livelihood as a bawd, an unlawful trade, to paraphrase Escalus, works in quite the opposite direction. To the degree that prostitution exhibits productivity in Vienna, the outgrowths of such living conditions are illegitimate children and venereal disease. Lucio’s quick-witted dialogue with the two gentlemen in Mistress Overdone’s house testifies to the threat of disease ever present in the minds, and often on the bodies, of those who frequent such establishments. And as he admits to the disguised Duke, Lucio himself once got a prostitute with child. The class distinction between Lucio and Pompey, however, reveals the limitations of Aristotelian ethics relative to eudaimonia. As a noble, Lucio has the leisure time (and privilege) to attend to a life of the mind and thus the philosophical pursuit of the good

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54 I take up the connection between vocation and eudaimonia in the final section of the chapter by way of the Apostle Paul, for whom grace is a vocational calling. The degree that Paul’s ministry advocates gracious living, grace as a vocation in the sense of the way one makes their livelihood (here used within the wider connotation of “human flourishing” through the living of a “fulfilling life,” one that is truly worth living based on a higher ethico-moral standard) provides a space to consider grace as eudaimonia.

55 On this see Act One, Scene Two.

56 For Lucio’s confession to the Duke disguised as a Friar, 4.3.161-64. On Lucio’s punishment for his actions by the Duke, 5.1.505-18.
life. Pompey, as a proletarian, does not. His working class status (even if not his choice of profession) estranges him from such pursuits in the Aristotelian polis. Following the *Nicomachean Ethics*, there is no political remedy for Pompey’s ill-chosen form-of-life in terms of eudaimonistic pursuit. Yet under scriptural precedent, grace, which enacts its own eudaimonism in the form of agape, is available to even the chiefest of sinners,\(^{57}\) and thus offers a viable workaround to this ethical elision in Aristotelian politics. As Lucio is wont to affirm, “Grace is grace, despite of all controversy” (1.2.24). Although some critics have found the play’s investment in sexuality troubling, when the primary political concern in *Measure for Measure* is approached as an early modern inclination toward a scripturally invested eudaimonia, its dilation upon sexuality becomes less a reflection of patriarchal hegemony enforced through state-sanctioned marriage and more a concern for each citizen’s quality of life.

Pompey is quite right, however, the city’s youth cannot all be gelded and splayed. Sexuality remains a political focus within the state of Vienna, one that is resolved through Act Five’s multiple marriages. While the political institution of marriage at the play’s conclusion has garnered much critical censure,\(^{58}\) I would like to pose an alternate reading. At the close of the chapter I will turn attention to marriage in relation to grace; here, however, I return to Aristotle’s political *topoi* relative to marriage. In the *Politics*,

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\(^{57}\) On this Pauline theological point, see 1 Tm. 1:15.

Aristotle argues that for humans the polis is “the final and perfect association,” it is the sphere in which one may attain eudaimonistic living.\(^{59}\) This leads the political philosopher to the teleological conclusion that “man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis.”\(^{60}\) If Aristotle is correct, then an instructional caveat may be found in his \textit{Ethics}: “a man by his nature is even more meant for marriage than he is for political association, in proportion, as the family is earlier and more necessary than the polis.”\(^{61}\) If marriage—whether as political institution, sacrament, or covenant—inaugurates a space for eudaimonistic living and dwelling (within the \textit{polis} and \textit{oikos} respectively), then the unions between Angelo and Mariana, Claudio and Juliet, the Duke and Isabella, and even Lucio and his unnamed prostitute, need not be understood as a ducal act of heteronormative supremacy. They may instead be seen as a political gesture working toward the achievement of \textit{eudaimonia} as it follows a scriptural course understood by Shakespeare and his contemporaries.

Scriptural eudaimonism may seem to be an oxymoron at first glance. Indeed the noted British analytical philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe has famously argued against a Judeo-Christian basis for ethical philosophy, advocating instead for a return to Aristotelian eudaimonism as a ground for moral enterprise.\(^{62}\) Yet within its wider Greek context, \textit{eudaimonia} is ever a spiritual if not a scriptural encounter. Etymologically, \textit{eudaimonia} is a combination of the prefix \textit{eu} (well, good) and the noun \textit{daimon} (spirit). Thus at the level of literal translation \textit{eudaimonia} concerns itself with the goodness of the


\(^{60}\) Ibid, 1253a, 5.

\(^{61}\) \textit{Ethics} I, c. vii. §6, quoted in Barker, \textit{The Politics of Aristotle}, 5, n.4.

spirit, or as in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the wellness of the soul. For the pre-Socratics,

[...]n colloquial terms, to be *eudaimon* was to be lucky, for in a world fraught with constant upheaval, uncertainty, and privation, to have a good spirit working on one’s behalf was the ultimate mark of good fortune. Even more it was a mark of divine favour, for the gods, it was believed, worked through the *daimones*, emissaries and conductors of their will.  

Following the etymological genealogy of the pre-Socratic tradition, *eudaimonia* is akin to scriptural grace, having the favor of the gods, or in a monotheistic turn, the favor (Hebrew, *hen*; Greek, *charis*) of God. Regarding Christian eudaimonism specifically, various “positions have been held by different historical figures on this issue ranging from the view that Christianity and the Greek moral systems are mutually supportive (Origen, St. Augustine) via mutual compatibility without explicit support (possibly Luther) to outright conflict (Scotus, Ockham).”

In the pages that follow I will turn to Luther to explore the potentiality (“possibly Luther”) of a scriptural eudaimonism operative in Shakespeare’s Vienna. As Cefalu has argued, within the Reformed tradition, “[f]aith, of course, should express itself as an affective turn toward God, but Reformed theology suggests that it most efficaciously expresses itself vertically through horizontal love, that is, through the route of outward service. Luther’s well-known mantra to this effect is ‘faith active in love.’”  

Following this Lutheran paradigm the good life is expressed in faith through the active love of one’s

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neighbor, or in the political-theological terminology of my argument, agapeic eudaimonism.

To reiterate my theoretical grounds for an understanding of scriptural eudaimonism available to Shakespeare and scripted in Measure for Measure, I refer to philosopher and theologian J.P. Moreland who has located a shared eudaimonistic enterprise among Plato, Aristotle, the Church Fathers and medieval theologians, as well as Moses, Solomon, and Jesus. Moreland’s point is reinforced by Brendan Cook who writes in his recent monograph Pursuing Eudaimonia of the shared “classical philosophical and theological pursuit of human development.” Moreover, Cook argues, this once-shared pursuit “has largely given way to reason’s modern autonomous and instrumental form.” In my pursuit of Shakespeare’s eudaimonic investment in his Viennese politics, I now turn to a specific problem of instrumental form within its polity: the body as form-of-life.

Qualified Life

Following Cunningham, I have positioned Measure for Measure as a moot in the generic sense of using dramatic roleplay as a theoretical space to question the law and its practices. In this light we have already witnessed the play’s concern for sexual licentiousness in terms of eudaimonia and its capture. That is, I have suggested that

68 Ibid.
Measure’s dilation upon sexual mores might be read in terms of the political concern for citizens living with regard to the good life. Yet the political anxiety invested specifically in Claudio’s sexual transgression, which forms the through-line of its plot, further places Measure for Measure within the sphere of biopolitics.

Foucault’s *History of Sexuality, Volume 1* has traced the emergence of biopolitics to the seventeenth-century and its “anatomo-politics of the human body.” For Foucault, this shift in political focus directed its attention to

the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population.

From this Foucauldian perspective it should come as no surprise that Measure for Measure reflects a cultural concern for the regulation of sexuality, especially its capacity to generate new citizens through the process of birth.

Claudio’s predicament, however, goes beyond his culpability in fathering a child out of wedlock. It is the political management of his life, particularly his body and what it represents qua life, which drives the political questioning in the play posed by the Duke and Angelo, its two oppositional interlocutors. The reading I am suggesting takes up this interrogation of life by way of the lexical work established by Agamben.

Agamben is perhaps most famous for turning critical attention to “life” in its Greek vectors, following Aristotle, as *bios* and *zoē*. The former is the term used to refer to politically qualified life, “the form or way of living proper to an individual or group,”

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70 Ibid.
the later denotes life in its most bare biological instantiation, life in “the simple fact of living.”

As politically qualified life, *eudaimonia* may be viewed as a type of *bios*, and thus our political queries with *Measure for Measure* thus far have been ever biopolitical in nature. At this juncture, however, I would turn attention from *bios* to *zoē*. Agamben frequently uses *zoē* interchangeably with the term “bare life,” often in connection to the Roman legal figure *homo sacer* (sacred man), the person “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed.” Adam Kotsko, one of Agamben’s translators, has described this term and its implications well:

* homo sacer *…far from indicating that human life has exceptional and unconditional value, actually refers to a form of human life that has been deprived of all legal protection. And instead of marveling at how much our concept of the sacredness of human life has changed, he [Agamben] argues that the old meaning still stands: the state that respects the sacredness of human life is actually a machine that threatens to turn every one of us into a defenseless *homo sacer*.74

In his critique of *homo sacer* as a central concept of Western biopolitics, Agamben theorizes *zoē* otherwise as pure potentiality. I attend to potentiality as Agamben describes it in my gesture toward considering a biopolitics of grace operant in *Measure for Measure* in this chapter’s final movement. What I would stress here in relation to *zoē* is its further political-theological carriage. In the koine of New Testament Greek *zoē* is spiritual form-of-life;75 it is the good life of spiritual comportment.

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72 Insofar as *eudaimonia* marks a particular way of living, and *pace* Aristotle a politically qualified way of living, *eudaimonia* is effectively a type of *bios*. It is one “form or way of living proper to an individual or group,” to use Agamben’s definition.

73 Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 8, emphasis in original.


75 All of Jesus’ references to *life* in the Gospel accounts use *zoē*.
It is important to note that in *Measure for Measure* there is always a religious valence to political decision. Although the titular allusion frames this mode of engagement, Isabella’s plea on her brother’s behalf openly invokes Matthew 7:1-2 in the spirit it is intended:

How would you be
If He, which is the top of judgment, should
but judge you as you are? O, think on that,
And mercy then will breathe within your lips,
Like man new made. (2.2.79-83)

Tacit in Isabella’s appeal is the agapeic fiat to love one’s neighbor as oneself. Her argument in such terms is effectively: *have mercy on him as God has shown you mercy through grace*. In theological terms, Isabella’s intercession may be read as a messianic warning. I use “messianic” here not in the eschatological sense of waiting for a future savior, but as an utterance of censure by Jesus as messiah, one akin to the Johannine account of Jesus’ instruction regarding sin and casting stones. Yet like the generation rebuked by the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel whose words are echoed by Jesus in Matthew’s testament, Angelo has ears to hear but does not hear. Like Isabella, Angelo too can cite the same scripture, although he does so with a Puritanical eye: “When I, that censure him do offend, / Let mine own judgment pattern out my death, / And nothing come in partial” (2.1.29-31). Thus Shakespeare demonstrates in Angelo’s “And nothing come in partial” an apprehension of law stripped of its humanity. It is in this way he is

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76 See John 8:7.
77 On this see Jeremiah 5:21, Ezekiel 12:2, and Matthew 13:5.
able to answer Isabella’s request for Claudio’s release in a manner that removes human agency from the juridical act: “It is the law, not I, condemn your brother” (2.2.84).

Luther’s provides Renaissance political-theological counterpoint to Angelo’s Puritan adherence to the law. In his commentary on Romans Luther writes, “[t]he little word, ‘law,’ you must not take here in human fashion, as a teaching about what works are to be done or not done. That is the way it is with human laws—the law is fulfilled by works, even though there is no heart in them.” By Luther’s reasoning law is ever a heart condition, one enlivened by grace and demonstrated in faith through *agape*. In contrast, Angelo would have law after “human fashion,” to borrow Luther’s phrase, though he dresses his legalism in priestly vestment. Shakespeare scripts Isabella’s censure on this point in a similar metaphor of fashion: “But man, proud man / Dressed in a little brief authority, / [is] Most ignorant of what he’s most assured” (2.2.125-27). Angelo fundamentally and tragically misunderstands the scriptural intent of law. Despite his Puritanism, Angelo’s legal strictness is ironically an act of works righteousness believing the law to be fulfilled only through an absolute adherence to its letter. Yet in the legal zone of his Vienna, Shakespeare suggests the spirit of the law to be a condition of the heart through Isabella’s appeal (2.2.79-83) to Angelo’s authority in ducal proxy. Luther’s exegesis comports with this period understanding: “But god judges according to what is at the bottom of the heart, and for this reason, His law makes its demands on the inmost heart and cannot be satisfied with works, but rather punishes works that are done otherwise than from the bottom of the heart, as hypocrisy and lies.” Upon this

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78 Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” 447.
79 Ibid., 447-48.
accounting legal absolutism is dressed in little brief, and indeed hollow, authority. That is, such action is not authorized by the spirit of the law.

Angelo’s legalism does not and indeed cannot consider Biblical clemency. To quote Luther, it is a law of hypocrisy and lies. Despite his outward concern for the qualified manner in which Viennese citizens ought to live their lives, Angelo’s political rigidity against Claudio prefigures *habeas corpus* insofar as the law must have its body. Thus Claudio is presented in the public streets as if in open court:

CLAUDIO: Fellow, why dost thou show me thus to th’world?  
Bear me to prison, where I am committed.

PROVOST: I do it not in evil disposition,  
But from Lord Angelo by special charge.  

This corollary becomes clear when Claudio’s public showing is read in tandem with the writ of *habeas corpus*:

We command that you have before us to show, at Westminster, that body X, by whatsoever name he may be called therein, which is held in your custody, as it is said, as well as the cause of the arrest and the detention.\(^{80}\)

Both instances express concern for the body’s showing and bear witness to the theatrical nature of the writ. Court could not convene without the physical presence of the defendant’s body, and as the work of Beverly Malmo has shown, the summons of *habeas corpus* effectively schedules a performance event. “The law and the body come together,” she reminds us, “on a given day, in a given court, pursuant to the king’s command to the sheriff.”\(^{81}\) By the Provost’s admission to Claudio, he does not “show” the defendant’s body out of “evil disposition / But from Lord Angelo by special charge”

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\(^{80}\) I have used Agamben’s translation here; see *Homo Sacer*, 124.

\(^{81}\) Beverly Malmo, “Beheading the Dead: Rites of Habeas Corpus in Shakespeare’s *Measure for Measure*,” *New Formations* 35 (1998), 139.
In exposing Claudio’s body thus, Angelo effectively summons the man under *habeas corpus* with all its performative charge. “More urgently,” Malmo emphasizes, “without the presence of the defendant’s body there could be no display of sovereign power.”82 What is staged is thus the very authority of the state itself.

Angelo understands the proof of such authority to be a legalism evoking fear. He would “not make a scarecrow of the law, / Setting it up to fear the birds of prey, / And let it keep one shape till custom make it / Their perch, and not their terror” (2.1.1-4). The subject, or rather *object*, of discussion here is Claudio. And as with Isabella, Escalus’s attempt to dissuade Angelo’s decree by evoking Matthew 7:1-2 falls on deaf ears.83 The state will not make exception, but rather example of Claudio. As one condemned, Claudio fully understands his function as a political object in this course:

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this new governor
Awakes me all the enrollèd penalties
Which have, like unscoured armour, hung by th’wall
So long that nineteen zodaics have gone round
And none of them been worn, and, for a name,
Now puts the drowsy and neglected act
Freshly on me. ’Tis surely for a name. (1.3.49-55)
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In his report to Isabella that Angelo’s first act of ducal authority is to leverage the “rigor of the statue” (1.5.67) to make her brother “an example” (1.5.68), Lucio further demonstrates Claudio’s political objectification as common understanding.

Angelo’s unwillingness to grant exception effectively misses the true performative potential of *habeas corpus* which resides in the monarch’s sovereign ability to enact clemency. As one scholar has put it, “[a]ble to pardon in the face of guilt, the king stood above the law. He thus wanted and needed the body of the accused to

82 Ibid.
83 See 2.1.8-16.
demonstrate his status above and beyond statute.”

The monarch’s position above and beyond statute is what Agamben refers to as the sovereign ban. Following Schmitt, the sovereign ban marks the ruler’s ability to decide upon the exception, yet it is Agamben’s etymological work that mines the term for more subtle potential. Tracing “ban” across its usage in Romance languages he finds the term a paradox meaning both “at the mercy of” and “out of free will,” making it capable of signifying “both the insignia of sovereignty…and expulsion from the community.” Vincentio performs this sovereign ability as an act of grace via agapeism at the play’s close, effectively bringing those once-expulsed back into the communal fold. To opposite ends, Angelo understands the sovereign ability as ever an act of expulsion. In their divergent roles of state authority, the Duke and Angelo thus enact the paradox of the ban as Agamben has described it.

Shakespeare foreshadows this sovereign split in Act One, Scene One. As the Duke transfers his authority to Angelo he offers these parting thoughts: “In our remove be thou at full ourself. / Mortality and mercy in Vienna / Live in thy tongue and heart” (1.1.43–45). Implicit in the Duke’s speech is the enactment of clemency (grace), even though he suspects Angelo incapable of granting it. Taking up this division, we find the Duke delivering mercy in Vienna—even unto Angelo. He further pardons the unrepentant Barnardine in Act Five: “Thou’rt condemned, / But for those earthly faults, I quit them all, / And pray thee take this mercy to provide / For better times to come” (5.1.478–81).

Barnardine is then handed over to Friar Peter for advisement, presumably on how to live

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84 Malmo, “Beheading the Dead,” 139.
85 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 110-11.
86 See Act One, Scene Four. The Duke admits to Friar Thomas that he has instated Angelo for his very legalism because he does not want to be deemed a tyrant himself (ll.35-43). Yet he also admits that Angelo’s investiture is a test of whether absolute law can be put into effect by human fallibility (ll.48-54).
a better life. This fatherly tutelage comports with an eye toward scriptural eudaimonia, one achievable through the dispensation of grace which makes available to the proletarian Barnardine, like Pompey, the possibility of eudaimonic living from which he is excluded under Aristotle’s political program.

Where the Duke delivers mercy, Angelo delivers mortality. Escalus’s plea on Claudio’s behalf meets an unsympathetic rejoinder: “You may not extenuate his offense / … / Sir, he must die” (1.2.27, 31). The only clemency Claudio receives under Angelo’s reign is, to use Agamben’s phrase, to be “at the mercy of” his state. Just as the Duke’s sovereign ban effects mercy, under the peril of Angelo’s sovereign ban Claudio is effectively reduced to zoē. In this instance what is witnessed is “not bios, the qualified life of the citizen, but zoē—the bare, anonymous life that is as such taken into the sovereign ban.”87

If Claudio is the example by which we are to measure the intersection of the body and the law in Shakespeare’s Vienna, then such measurement must be taken twice: under the authority of Angelo as well as attendant to Vincentio’s ducal return. Subordinate to Angelo, corpus has become the new subject of politics.88 Angelo’s state establishes its authority through bodily example brought forward by the full force of scriptural legalism. Yet Shakespeare scripts the immanent failure of the Puritan turn in Angelo’s would-be politics (Paulitics) by offering a voice of political-theological resistance through Isabella’s scripturally-inflected defense on her brother’s behalf:

    ISABELLA: Must he needs die?
    ANGELO: Maiden, no remedy.

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87 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 124.
88 On this political paradigm, see Agamben, Homo Sacer, 124.
ISABELLA: Yes: I do think that you might pardon him,  
And neither heaven nor man grieve at the mercy.

ANGELO: I will not do’t.

ISABELLA: But you can if you would?

ANGELO: Look what I will not, that I cannot do.

ISABELLA: But might you do’t, and do the world no wrong,  
If so your heart were touched with that remorse  
as mine is to him?

ANGELO: He’s sentenced, ’tis too late.  (2.2.51-61)

Though Isabella’s plea voices the spirit of the law over its letter, Angelo remains deaf to  
such instruction. She, like Luther, reminds Angelo that the law under grace is a condition  
of the heart (‘If so your heart were touched”), and that the letter of the law finds its  
fulfillment in its spirit, which

also hath made us able ministers of the new testament; not of the letter, but of the  
spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.89 Do we then make void the  
law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law.90

Luther explains this Pauline distinction between the law’s spirit and its letter in what  
might well be read as a similar indictment of Angelo’s legalism: “[Paul] himself explains  
that to mean that to be without the law is not the same thing as to have no laws and be  
able to do as one pleases; but we are under the law when, without grace, we occupy  
ourselves in the work of the law.”91 Unfortunately for Claudio, Angelo will not extend  
grace. Instead it is his body that has been chosen to bear, or rather bare, the law’s effect.  
The treatment of his body in this manner as pure zoē, to use Agamben’s terminology,

89 2 Cor. 3:6.  
90 Rom. 3:31.  
91 Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” 457.
further exposes the negative core of such politics. Just as *corpus* bears an etymological relation to *corpse*, so too this particular strain of biopolitics, Angelo’s preoccupation with “the work of the law” with its praxis centered ever on the physical body (the site of the law’s literal inscription under political action), reveals itself to be essentially thanatopolitics, the management of death rather than life.

It is no accident that Agamben locates Romans 7:10 at the fore of his description of the West’s biopolitical (and tacitly thanatopolitical) project. The Apostle Paul’s words serve as one of three epigraphs to *Homo Sacer* following Savingy and Hobbes:

\[Euretē moi hē entolē hē eis zōēn, autē eis thanaton.\]

And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death.\textsuperscript{92}

Exegetes agree that the commandment to which this address opens is in reference to the Decalogue.\textsuperscript{93} The Apostle’s point, however, is not to lay blame upon nor dispel the law. Luther provides early modern illumination of this point:

Therefore St. Paul here concludes that law, rightly understood and thoroughly comprehended, does nothing more than remind us of our sin, and slay us by it, and make us liable to eternal wrath; and all this is taught and experienced by our conscience, when it is really smitten by the law. Therefore a man must have something else than the law, and more than the law, to make him righteous and save him. But they that do not rightly understand the law are blind; they go ahead, in their works, not knowing what the law demands, viz. a willing and happy heart.\textsuperscript{94}


\textsuperscript{94} Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” 458.
Angelo is one that does not “rightly understand the law,” as Luther puts it. What’s more, by Luther’s description Angelo’s legalism might well be called an act of works righteousness. In this political-theological turn the accurate measure of the law, what Luther describes as the law “rightly understood and thoroughly comprehended,” is grace in action; that is, *agape*, evident in the law’s demand for “a willing and happy heart.”

Just as scholarship from the last quarter century forward has brought attention to Paul’s Jewishness, the Hebraic aspect to his thinking should be equally acknowledged. Where Christian readings such as Luther’s emphasize grace in agapeic action, Jewish scholarship reads the law in terms of its emphasis on community. That is, the work of the law in its Hebraic spirit is an act of inclusion rather than exclusion, to reiterate Agamben’s well-known phrasing. According to Spinoza, the Decalogue marks the formation of Israel as a congregation (*edah*) at Sinai. By this account the life given through the law is one of communal attachment and relation, especially insofar as *edah* is “linked to another Hebrew word meaning ‘witness’ and ‘testimony,’ imply[ing] a social and linguistic moment of responsiveness to and responsibility for others, juridical without necessarily requiring the mediation of a judge.”

In a different vein, Emmanuel Lévinas

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has argued for a life-giving aspect inherent to Mosaic Law in the fiat “Thou Shalt Not Kill,” whereby the face of God is forever witnessed in the face of the other.

Paul’s comment, if we are to read it as a critique in the manner Agamben’s epigraph suggests, especially when attended by its full scriptural measure in both Jewish and Christian tradition, must be considered in light of his position as a man embodying both religious traditions. It is from this vantage that the Apostle is able to speak of the law within a Judeo-Christian confluence where the death brought by law is the product of Israel’s own desire to establish its righteousness through law rather than community with God. Put in secular terms, it is when man looks to himself to define righteousness through law that the law becomes an implement of death rather than life. Such is certainly the case if we are to take Angelo as an example of polity in this form.

In order to recover from such political maneuvering, the Duke Vincentio, not unlike Agamben, would turn attention away from zoē as bare life and toward its potential otherwise. For it is on his Viennese political stage through the character Vincentio that Shakespeare drafts a polity built upon communal regard for scriptural eudaimonia. As Lupton reminds us, from an Agambenian perspective there exists an “enduring attraction to zoē…to life as what subsists as pure potentiality.” For Agamben this pure potentiality can only be realized by what he terms “form-of-life,” the manner in which one chooses or refuses to live.

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97 This point recurs throughout Lévinas’ work but is explained succinctly in his essay “From Ethics to Exegesis,” in In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 109-13.

98 On this point see Keener, Romans, 91. For the Christian referent in Paul’s comment as I have glossed it here, see Romans 9:30-32 and 10:3.

99 Lupton, Thinking With Shakespeare, 6.
As we have seen, from the Duke’s opening lines, “Of government the properties to unfold” (1.1.3), *Measure for Measure* invests itself in the discussion of political action. And as I have suggested, this political action is ever measured against the practice of *eudaimonia*. The Duke says as much in his public dialogue with Angelo regarding his choice for investiture as head of state: “Angelo: / There is a kind of character in thy life / That to th’observer doth thy history / Fully unfold” (1.1.26-29). This “character” to which the Duke alludes is the manner Angelo lives his life (“thy history”), and despite the Puritan form-of-life witnessed by “th’observer” in this account it is nonetheless guided by a scripturally inflected (mis)understanding of what constitutes a life well lived. The Duke’s eudaimonistic regard is no less scriptural yet also bears no outward factional dogmatism:

> Heaven doth with us as we with torches do,  
> Not light them for ourselves, for if our virtues  
> Did not go forth from us, ’twere all alike  
> As if we had them not. Spirits are not finely touched  
> But to fine issues, nor nature never lends  
> The smallest scruple of her excellence  
> But, like a thrifty goddess, she determines  
> Herself the glory of a creditor,

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100 See n.24.


102 For an ecumenical reading of the Duke’s political theology as neither Catholic nor Protestant, but rather as a representation “of a specific religious transaction or *process*,” see Cefalu, “The Ethics of Pardoning,” 114.
Unlike Angelo, the Duke is no Puritan. Rather than deferring to a particular sectarian cast, his speech instead elicits a textual (re)turn; in this case, to the Gospels and the Parable of Light:

Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid. Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick; and it giveth light unto all that are in the house. Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.103

What are we to make of such a reference? If we are to take Knight at his word, then the play must also be read as a parable. Yet Knight’s rigid allegorization is no less a form of hermeneutic legalism than Angelo’s Puritanical reading of the law, a mistake clearly eschewed by Measure itself. Knight, however, is correct in that this play must be read alongside its scriptural intertexts. I would suggest that the Duke recalls this specific Biblical allusion because of its concern for bios, particularly to the degree that bios may guide civic life within the polis: “Ye are the light of the world / Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven” (bios), “A city that is set on an hill” (polis). In this light, the Duke uses this parable, this scriptural instance, as a mechanism to correlate the relationship of form-of-life to politics and citizenship, or put another way, to position form-of-life in relation to political reform. I would thus amend Knight’s thesis and those of its ilk by suggesting that from its opening scene forward Measure for Measure indeed operates within a political sphere that is concomitantly scriptural, one that highlights a necessarily relational aspect of good government, yet one that does not require allegorical reading.

103 Matthew 5:14-16; see also Luke 8:16 and Mark 4:21.
Rather, *Measure* demonstrates the potential boons and ills of divergent strains of politics in praxis.

The Duke speaks to this relational aspect of good government at the close of his initial exchange with Angelo. Just prior to his exit from the Ducal Palace and ostensible remove from the polis, he charges Angelo “to enforce or qualify the laws / As to your soul seems good” (1.1.65-66). This precept makes two points. First, the enforcement of the law may be qualified. Second, this qualification of the law is to be gauged by the soul in accordance with what it deems good. By invoking the soul and/in its accordance with the good, the confluences of Greek philosophical and political thought and Judeo-Christian thinking are carried together by a shared political current in its flow toward a eudaimonistic end. Angelo, however, does not follow the Duke’s injunction. Thus as a political thought experiment (moot), *Measure for Measure* considers and ultimately passes judgment on absolutist law. If Angelo’s reign is to serve as the example of law followed to its strict enforcement without consideration of the extenuating circumstances unique to each transgression, the result is both tyranny and hypocrisy. By denying any human-to-human relational aspect to the law (“It is the law, not I, condemn your brother”), Angelo effectively instantiates a law incapable of justice. Instead, it metes only death. Just so, the irony of Angelo’s response to this ducal direction should not be missed: “The heavens give safety to your purposes” (1.1.73). I now turn to the potential of these purposes.
The Duke’s vocation turns specifically to the critique of governmental operation once he is clothed the habit of a friar. “My business in this state,” he makes publicly explicit, “Made me a looker-on here in Vienna, / Where I have seen corruption boil and bubble / Till it o’errun the stew; laws for all faults, / But faults so countenanced that the strong statutes / Stand like the forfeits in a barber’s shop, / As much in mock as mark” (5.1.313-19). Here of course the Duke is censuring Angelo for his hypocrisy in condemning Claudio to death for the very crime he is guilty of himself, a point this friar knows all too well.104 Yet this public admonition goes further. Like his fellow Viennese citizens, Angelo’s life choices have taken a turn for the worse. No longer living toward the good, but rather masking the secret sins he would conceal through Claudio’s murder, Angelo’s civic duty—his bios—is marred by poor life choices.105 And like Pompey his trade effectively shifts from bawd to hangman.106 This public remonstration as a friar, I would suggest, may thus be read as an extension of his belief that form-of-life is the only agent capable of true political reform. By the Duke’s example, the political implication of Measure for Measure is that a biopolitics concerned only with the management of bare life will always be ineffective. Rather, it is a bios-politics that is necessary, one that recognizes the potential for human good within the way a life is lived that must be the guiding biopolitical principle.

104 It is Vincentio, guised as a friar, who orchestrates the tryst turned bed trick between Angelo and Isabella/Mariana which forms the plotline of Act Four, Scene One.
105 Angelo admits his culpability both privately and publicly in his soliloquy at the close of Act Four, Scene Four, see particularly 4.4.26-30.
106 On Angelo as bawd see Act Two, Scene Four where he is willing to exchange Claudio’s life for the currency of Isabella’s maidenhead. On Pompey’s vocational shift from bawd to hangman see 4.2.13-14.
Like the Duke, Agamben’s work acknowledges the scriptural aspects of form-of-life as a potential recovery from Western biopolitical practices. This can perhaps be seen best in his most recent monograph *The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life*, which turns its attention toward Franciscan monasticism and the form-of-life exhibited there. Yet as one critic has noted, “Agamben is able to carry out a transvaluation of biopolitics only in the guise of a bio-theo-politics.”107 In what remains of this chapter I would follow a similar transvaluation under the guise of grace, particularly within the register of its potentiality.

However, before I can speak of grace with this designation it is necessary to understand what is at stake in the term potentiality. It has been described variously as possibility, power, ethics, and action. In Western political thought the concept of potentiality is derived from Aristotle’s distinction between *dynamis* and *energia*, potentiality and act.108 Taking up this distinction, for Agamben the central import of potentiality is its ability to both do and not do. Such an understanding recalls the Duke’s imperative that the law may (and by implication must) be qualified: it has the potential to either do or not do as the soul deems fit. Following Agamben, potentiality is nothing less than form-of-life itself; it is how one chooses to live their life.109 Moreover, form-of-life in this cast marks life’s open “possibilities” which constitute its “power”—indeed the

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108 This is a key point for Agamben; see *Homo Sacer*, 44-48.

very power and possibility of political resistance. For Agamben this power is located at the nexus of action and inaction, yet is affected best in its not-doing. Thus his exemplar is Melville’s Bartleby, the scribe who prefers not to write. We find a similar act of overt political resistance in Barnardine who, like Bartleby, will not let his person be used by political authority, and who thus “will not consent to die this day” (4.3.48). As Agamben reminds, “[t]hese figures push the aporia of sovereignty to the limit but still do not completely free themselves from its ban.” However, as we have witnessed in the distinction between the Duke’s and Angelo’s respective sovereign bans, this aporia can be a locus for enacting a non-destructive biopolitics (the Duke) or casting doubt upon the law (Angelo).

Potentiality also carries with it a politico-ethical imperative. In The Coming Community, Agamben yokes ethics to potentiality while also suggesting potentiality as “the most proper mode of human existence.” And in Means Without End this mode of existence or form-of-life is parsed following Aristotle’s Politics (1278b) as being immediately constituted “as political life.” Thus potentiality as political life is political

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110 Ibid.
111 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 48.
113 Agamben, Means Without End, 3. Compare Agamben:

“That is why human beings—as beings of power who can do or not do, succeed or fail, lose themselves or find themselves—are the only beings for whom happiness is always at stake in their living, the only beings whose life is irremediably and painfully assigned to happiness. But this immediately constitutes the form-of-life as political life.

with Aristotle, Politics, 1278b, in Barker, 111:

‘man is an animal impelled by his nature to live in a polis.’ A natural impulse is this one reason men desire to live a social life even when they stand in no need of mutual succour; but they are also drawn together by a common interest, in proportion as each attains a share in good life. The good life is the chief end, both for the community as a whole and for each of us individually. But men also come together, and form and maintain political associations, merely for the sake of life;
life as ethics. Yet this ethics may become occluded if we are to take as our example either
Melville’s Bartleby or Measure’s Barnardine. In their preferring not to, whether to write
or to be hanged, their potentiality is effectively an act of self-satisfying individualism.
Rather than demonstrate the eudaimonistic potential of form-of-life, such inaction
suggests an ethics of narcissism, one befitting a biopolitics which, like Narcissus, cannot
see past the reflection (the reification) of the body itself.

Yet as Lupton has shown, Agamben’s thinking may be enabled by Hannah
Arendt’s. Where Agamben witnesses the greatest potentiality through inaction, Arendt
locates our greatest human potential through shared action and in relation to and with
others.114 For Arendt, the power enabled through potentiality traced by following its
etymological root in Aristotle’s *dynamis* is one of communal action toward the good.
Thus, According to Arendt:

> Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where
> words are not empty and deeds are not brutal, where words are not used to veil
> intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy
> but to establish relations and create new realities.115

Such potentiality enacts civic world building with eudaimonistic intent. Under this
paradigm, relations are established and new realities created with a mindful and active
civic duty toward a shared good life.

Moreover, where Agamben explores this term’s etymological potential in its
Italian *potenza* (ability), Arendt tests similar potential across her native German *Macht*,

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114 See *Thinking With Shakespeare*, 5.
which she is quick to point out is derived “from mögen and möglich, not from machen.”\footnote{Ibid. For Agamben see Homo Sacer, 45.} It is within this vernacular operation that we find counterpoint to Bartleby and Barnardine’s inaction: mögen, to want to, would like to, to wish to, may (as invitation to do something).\footnote{Collins German Unabridged Dictionary, 8th Edition (London: Harper Collins, 2013), s.v. “mögen.” In its transitive and intransitive forms as gemacht, mögen expresses the same inclination: trans, to want, to desire, to wish for; intrans, to be willing to.} With regard to individual inaction, Arendt’s thinking also gives pause to consider a further differentiation between strength and power. “While strength is the natural quality of an individual seen in isolation,” she tells us, “power springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse.”\footnote{Arendt, The Human Condition, 200.} Thus to conceive of potentiality in its Arendtian strain is to witness the difference between individual strength (which is fleeting) and power (which can only be achieved through shared community).

It is this communal, relational aspect of potentiality that I wish to (mögen) traverse for the remainder of this chapter, particularly where form-of-life as eudaimonia works together under the operation of grace for common human good.

Eudaimonia Redux

Matthew 7:1-2 has been a recurrent intertext throughout this discussion of Measure for Measure. Ioppolo’s earlier remarks cast the play’s titular allusion as a “reconsideration of St. Matthew’s maxim” on Shakespeare’s part.\footnote{See n.3.} I would like to offer one such reconsideration here, that the injunction in this Matthean account is not only a
warning against inhumane politics but also a paradigm for the political practice of grace. The play’s trial (moot) of Angelo’s political actions throughout its course, as well as the Duke’s remediation of the state along overtly scriptural lines at its close, make possible such a reading. By this accounting grace is the *bios*, the political form-of-life one must take in order to achieve *eudaimonia* in Shakespeare’s Vienna. Ethical biopolitics in this Viennese sphere is similarly rendered a biopolitics of grace. Such a reading necessarily requires space to unfold.

To speak of *eudaimonia* in this way is to move beyond its denotation within the strict purview of Greek philosophy as I have already suggested. That is, I wish to chart a specific type of good life whose course is given compass and direction through the daily living of the Judeo-Christian concept of grace as expressed in Shakespeare’s unique Viennese politics. In this way we are able to speak of a *bios* of grace, grace as a specific form-of-life.

*Grace*

That the concept of grace is central to *Measure for Measure* there can be no doubt. The word occurs no fewer than twenty-three times in the play, often in terms of respect (e.g. “your grace”), yet nearly half of its uses “carr[y] a theological meaning or overtone.”\(^{120}\) The play’s relation to grace, however, is at times occluded by its other legal-political-theological themes of law, justice, and mercy.\(^{121}\) Following a comparable

\(^{120}\) Martz, “‘Of Government,’” 213.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., 212-13. The term “law” is repeated twenty-five times in the play, “justice” no fewer than twenty-six times, and “mercy” sixteen times, which although less than the invocations of law or justice cited here, occurs in *Measure for Measure* “more frequently than in any other work by Shakespeare,” 213.
hermeneutic line, David Bevington has recently suggested equity as a similar viable theme, yet as the earlier work of Joel Levin contests and I am inclined to agree, “[a]s a matter of law” the political actions in the play “fail technically, and as a matter of equity they fail for immorality.”

What then are we to make of grace and its association with polity in *Measure for Measure*?

The nature and distribution of grace is presented as a subject of inquiry from the play’s opening, hence this chapter’s epigraph: “Grace is grace, despite of all controversy” (1.2.24). Even in the mouth of Lucio this comment retains its resonance of truth. Controversial though it may be and especially in a political register, grace ever is grace—and despite its tautologous ring, Lucio’s point holds. This is perhaps best understood through definitional comparison to mercy, a term often rendered synonymous (though incorrectly) with grace. From a theological perspective, grace is understood to be undeserving where mercy is an act of “compassion to the miserable.”

What remains elided in this theological definition of grace, however, are its wider character and scope. When attention is given to the undeserving characteristic of grace its form is missed. Political (or sovereign) power is not the proper focus of grace. Instead, as demonstrated by its valences across both the Tanakh and New Testament, grace marks a relational way of living where focus is shifted to community rather than sovereign authority, whether

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123 Regarding the importance of Lucio’s remark within the context of interpreting *Measure for Measure* see Brett, “‘Grace is grace.’” On the nature and distribution of grace in relation to our understanding of the play see Cefalu, “The Ethics of Pardoning,” 112.

divine or human in its cast. ¹²⁵ I will parse this point more fully after mercy is first given its due.

When compared to grace in this register, mercy signals a divergent operation. While it is true that divine mercy is reflective of God’s beneficence, in its human-to-human enactment mercy tends to shift attention to sovereign authority in a specific actualization of state power: the act of granting mercy. As a singular action, mercy works in the opposite direction of grace by effectively operating as a synecdoche for the sovereign ban. To borrow Arendt’s phrasing, mercy thus becomes the operative sign of political strength where grace opens a space to consider the power afforded by ethical and relational living-with others for greater communal good.

The relationship between law and grace, particularly in its communal register first occurs in the Judeo-Christian tradition when Moses receives the Decalogue on Mount Sinai.¹²⁶ It is only because Moses finds favor (hen, grace) with God that he is called to the summit to receive the law. Yet more importantly, as Emmanuel Lévinas would have us remember, this fiat marks a direct face-to-face relation with the divine, one that signals not only sovereign authority but, perhaps more importantly, the communal and relational aspect of such grace. It is in this context that Exodus 33:11 is able to report God speaking with Moses not as sovereign to subject but “as a man speaketh unto his friend.” This divine-human interaction is further carried out in the human-to-human operation of the law through a correlative face-to-face intimacy. For example, it is at God’s behest in Exodus 19:7 that Moses gathers the people of Israel and “la[ys] before their faces all

¹²⁵ I here use Tanakh to retain the specifically Jewish locus of what is commonly cast as the Christian Old Testament.

¹²⁶ I here use communal in its denotative sense as both a marker of community and of conversation, particularly intimate face-to-face conversation.
these words which the Lord commanded him.” As this Tanakhic example suggests, law and grace are intimately bound to one another, indeed to the point of being one and the same. Lévinas helps to elucidate this point.

For Lévinas the face of the other is where the human witnesses the face of God. He finds this an especial case in the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” which he reads as an injunction for “the care of one being for another being, into non-in-difference of one toward the other.”¹²⁷ This relational care of and for others is nothing less than grace as bios operating under the direction of the law. Moreover, from this vantage grace/law is only enacted—it is only lived—through the ethical treatment of others. Thus, to use Lévinas’s bold phrasing, “[e]thics is the spiritual optics.”¹²⁸ To see with such ethical vision is to live one’s life with an eye ever toward the good of others. *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*

Similar optical recognition can be found in grace as it operates through its New Testament vectors. In the Lukean accounts, for example, there is “a strong association between grace and power,” particularly the power to make another’s life better.¹²⁹ Thus in 4:33 it is the power of grace that enables the casting out of demons or in 6:8 the healing of a man’s withered hand. However, the concept of grace in the New Testament remains largely Pauline.¹³⁰ This is perhaps best witnessed in Romans 15:15-16 where the Apostle positions grace as a vocational calling to witness to those beyond the pale, the Gentiles. In this instance grace operates as bios (vocation) yet with an explicit politico-

¹²⁷ Lévinas, “From Ethics to Exegesis,” 110, emphasis in original.
¹³⁰ Ibid.
ethical imperative to bring the Gospel to the Gentiles, or to put it terms correlative to
*Measure for Measure*, to offer grace to the citizens of Vienna—even unto the likes of Pompey, Lucio, and Angelo, who may certainly be deemed unworthy of its receipt.

Within this New Testament paradigm, recent scholarship from Mika Ojakangas has repeatedly shown the origins of what has come to be termed “biopolitics” in Pauline theology.\(^{131}\) According to Ojakangas, “early Christian ideas and practices of the pastorate were not a prelude to what Foucault calls bio-power and governmentality, but marked a rupture in the history of governmental ideas and practices which originate in the Graeco-Roman world and continue into early modern Europe thanks to the revitalization of the classical heritage.”\(^{132}\) I would argue that such a rupture in early modern English politics is staged in Shakespeare’s Vienna through Vincentio’s actions in *Measure for Measure*, first as a friar and later as the Duke, both of whom embody a decidedly Pauline cast through their actions.\(^{133}\) This political disruption and its doubtful cast upon the law is perhaps not surprising given that Pauline ethics, and thus Pauline biopolitics, is built upon the pastoral principle of grace as form-of-life.\(^{134}\) That is, the vocation of pastor is a *bios* of grace, one lived out through the love (*agape*) and care (*cura*) of and for others.\(^{135}\)

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\(^{132}\) Ojakangas, “Enigmatic Origins,” 2.

\(^{133}\) On the influence of Paul’s thinking in Shakespeare’s works, see Lupton, “Citizen Paul,” in *Citizen Saints*, 19-48, and “Paul Shakespeare,” in *Thinking with Shakespeare*, 219-46.

\(^{134}\) Arne De Boever has offered counterpoint to this position, arguing that rather than offer a site of resistance to what Foucault called biopolitics, Paul’s writings serve as the origins of modern biopolitical power through the institution of Christian pastoral power as Foucault surmised; see, “Bio-Paulitics,” *Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory* 11.1 (2010): 35-51.

\(^{135}\) See Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue.”
To be a pastor is to be etymologically connected to the vocation of a shepherd, especially in its verb tense *shepherding* (to pastor), itself a *bios*, the care of and for one’s flock.\(^{136}\) In terms of political theology, *Measure for Measure* witnesses shepherds who are often remiss in the duties entrusted to them. Angelo, for example, has no love (*agape*) for his subjects and certainly demonstrates no care (*cura*) for Claudio’s predicament. At the play’s opening Vincentio’s political pastor ing (his political posturing) is equally lax.\(^{137}\) Yet a surprising turn occurs once he sheds the robe of state for that of the clergy. As a friar the Duke embodies this pastoral aspect, giving deep investment to the courses of life his citizens lead. We have witnessed this already in his concern for Barnardine. Act Three, Scene One finds this friar similarly voicing his concern for Isabella and her future course of action. Moreover, Claudio’s *bios* is not only the plot’s recurrent narrative, but as the Duke *cum* pastor it affects Vincentio with an urgency that spans the entirety of the fourth act. Each of these examples serve as reminders that along this vocational course the Duke demonstrates a polity marked by a living-with rather than the management-of those under his charge.

Biopolitical polity concerned with management-of has already been shown in its operation to be the management of death rather than life. Similarly, the Biblical reference in the play’s title may be read as an injunction against levying death over life in politico-legal action. Ghosting behind the aspect of death in Matthew 7:1-2, however, is also the promise of life. Implicit in Jesus’ remarks is a call to live life differently, to follow a new course of life based on his teachings. This call to new life is to be the vocation, the form-of-life, for all believers in Christ under Paul’s theology and it should be noted that grace

\(^{136}\) *OED*, s.v. “pastor.”

\(^{137}\) The Duke admits his culpability in this at 1.4.26-31.
under this design is dependent upon spiritual baptism, the effective sign of such new life.\textsuperscript{138} The Apostle makes this point explicit in Romans 6:3-8, but I would draw particular attention to v.8 and its emphasis that to be baptized in this way is to engage in a continual living-with relationship (Greek \textit{syzēsomen}). Incumbent upon the recipient who is saved by grace is the charge to live a gracious life toward others. As Luther writes, the outward expression of received grace is agapeic living:

\begin{quote}
Hence a man is ready and glad, without compulsion, to do good to everyone, to serve everyone, to suffer everything, in \textit{love} and praise to God, who has shown him this grace; and thus it is impossible to separate works from faith, quite as impossible as to separate heat and light from fires.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

It is important to recognize that for Luther, and indeed the political-theological paradigm I am seeking to trace in \textit{Measure for Measure}, works do not effect faith. That is, there is no \textit{this for that} exchange understood between God and man. Rather, the vertical receipt of grace moves outward, horizontally, in agapeic human-to-human exchanges. Faith in this sense is phenomenological encounter, experienced, to use Luther’s analogy, like heat and light from fire.

Whether in secular or scriptural terms, there is perhaps no better example of relational living-with than marriage. For critics, the multiple marriages that close \textit{Measure for Measure}’s politico-legal investment tends to ring hollow and resonate as an empty and unsatisfying gesture. To invoke Boas’s generic description, these marriages are often what critical readers find most problematic in the play. In this light, marriage as a political solution/resolution can certainly be read as Shakespeare’s capitulation to patriarchal authority or heteronormative hegemony, etc. Critics of this vein find it deeply

\textsuperscript{138} On the connection between grace and baptism see Peter C. Meilaender, “Marriage and the Law: Politics and Theology in \textit{Measure for Measure},” \textit{Perspectives on Political Science} 41.4 (2012), 199.
\textsuperscript{139} Luther, “Preface to the Epistle to the Romans,” 452, emphasis is mine.
unsatisfying, for example, that Isabella’s vehement demand for justice—“giv[e] me justice, justice, justice, justice!” (5.1.26)—is met *graciously* through marriage.\(^{140}\) I would like to offer a different reading, one that understands this conclusion upon marriage as necessary given the eudaimonistic political program running in the play from its start. Such a reading, however, requires a return to the argument with which this chapter opened: to read this particular play outside of the context of its Biblical intertexts and to ignore their precedent in *Measure*’s political concerns is to do the play an interpretative injustice.

To take but one example, what might we make of Isabella’s imminent marriage to the Duke? For Barbara Tovey, their union is a marriage of opposites with the one complementing the other in its yoking of wisdom (Duke) with the law (Isabella).\(^{141}\) While such a reading gestures toward the relational nature of grace I have been advocating, it also retains an overt allegorical cast. In an altogether different reading, Lupton has called *Measure for Measure* a “Corinthian commentar[y] on marriage, liberty, and the law,”\(^{142}\) and in her turn to Corinth returns critical attention to gracious living, for in Pauline theology marriage, liberty, and the law each operate under the banner of grace.

Paul devotes the majority of his discussion of marriage to chapter seven of his first epistle to the Church in Corinth. 1 Corinthians 7 may be divided, not unlike a play, into a three-act plot structure: the first act on marriage (vv. 1-16), the second on vocational calling (vv. 17-24), and the third once again returning attention to marriage

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\(^{140}\) Regarding critical discontent on this issue see Brett, “‘Grace is grace,’” 205-06.


\(^{142}\) Lupton, *Thinking With Shakespeare,* 219.
(vv. 25-40). “Paul’s thoughts on marriage, which he presents as both a symbol of cosmic hierarchy and a promise of social equality,” Lupton argues, “are key to the civil and civic dynamics of Measure for Measure.” If we take into account the three-act plot structure I have outlined in 1 Corinthians 7, then embedded within (and indeed at the center of) this larger narrative of marriage is form-of-life itself, specifically the injunction to abide in God (v. 24) by serving one another in His name (vv. 21-22). This Pauline promise of social equality, I would argue, achieves its civil and civic dynamics in the play under the operative sign of grace and the relational living—with effected through Measure’s concluding marriages. Thus the Duke’s remarks to Isabella at the close of Act Five might as well be addressed to the whole of Shakespeare’s Vienna and most certainly those assembled on the stage to be wed:

Your friar is now your prince. As I was then
Advertising and holy to your business,
Not changing heart with habit, I am still
Attorneyed at your service. (5.1.378-81)

In a similar political-theological gesture, the Hebrew prophet Micah tells a legal narrative between God and Israel that correlates justice with eudaimonia. As both Israel’s prosecuting and defense attorney, not unlike Vienna’s Duke, Micah tells the people that God has already shown them what is “good” (towb). The Hebrew towb can


144 Lupton, Citizen Saints, 13.

145 The central placement of vocational calling within 1 Cor. 7 can be more clearly seen if the verses are divided into three stanzas comprised of 16 lines on marriage, 8 lines on vocation, and 16 concluding lines on marriage, thus 16 | 8 | 16.

operate as an adjective, verb, and noun. In its adjectival form, towb denotes that which is pleasant, agreeable, or good, yet also what is good in the sense of being ethical and right. Psalm 133:1 uses the adjectival form to mark a dwelling together in and for the doing of good. Towb’s verb form enacts the doing of what is pleasing in the eyes of God, actions enfolded in its noun form as that which is morally good. It is thus the Hebrew towb shares association with the Greek eudaimonia. And as the prophet reminds the people, this good life is a dwelling-with, a relational polity achieved only through just actions, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God.

Under Biblical precedent, whether that of the Tanakh or New Testament, each of these actions is achieved by living graciously in society with others as you have been shown grace (favor: Hebrew hen, Greek charis) by God. It is in this way that Jesus, when asked by a lawyer what the greatest commandment of the law is, responds in turn: firstly, to love (agape) God with the entirety of your being, and secondly to “love (agape) thy neighbour as thyself.” Jesus’ binary response does not divide life along the lines of bios and zoē, excluding the one from the other as in Graeco-Roman polity, but rather conjoins its two halves with the caveat that “the second is like unto” (homoios) the first; each form-of-life is thus of the same substance because both operate under the same fiat of grace.

In an overt political turn, Lévinas has rendered this relationship thusly: “The passing of God, of whom I can speak only by reference to this aid or this grace, is

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148 Micah 6:8.

149 Matthew 22:39. This account is given in three of the Gospels: Matthew 22:36-40, Mark 12:28-31, and Luke 10:25-27. In the Matthean and Lukean narratives the man who poses the question to Jesus is identified as a lawyer; The testimony of Mark identifies him as a scribe.
This civic reverting of the subject—or as I have been suggesting, this remediation of the biopolitical subject—into a member of society, whether Barnardine, Angelo, or Claudio, is achieved in this play in varying degrees as one is willing to consign himself or herself to live graciously with others. Writing of *Measure for Measure* as a political intertext for its own time, Deborah Shuger once remarked that “[e]arly modern political writings are profoundly and pervasively concerned with what should be.”¹⁵¹ I have traced one such “what should be” in this chapter: the potential of a *bios*-politics over biopolitics, a statecraft that rejects the (mis)management of people as pure Aristotelian *zoe* in favor of a political-theological *eudaimonia* achieved through the practice of grace. To approach grace as *bios*, I have argued, is to more clearly discern the political theology at work in Shakespeare’s Vienna.

THREE

Post/Human Biopolitics: The Winter’s Tale

Where a fully secularised, anti-religious humanism might claim that human beings can only realise themselves independently of a religious framework, Shakespeare, by intensifying the existential significance of religion, give us cause to wonder whether the secular self is a freedom or restriction. He gives us cause to question which way of living might be a more or less authentic expression of what it is to be human.
—Andy Mousley

The post/human is that which both confounds but also holds up to scrutiny the terms on which the quintessentially human will be conceived.
—Elaine Graham

You speak a language that I understand not.
My life stands in the level of your dreams
—Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, 3.2.77-78

This chapter begins in medias res, in the middle of things. I will argue that in The Winter’s Tale Shakespeare drafts a political world deeply invested in the life of things—animals, environments, objects, and especially women (things par excellence for Leontes)—as well as the political spaces they occupy. This association with the political aspect of things comports with what sociologist of science Bruno Latour has envisioned as a Parliament of Things, an open forum where

The imbroglios and networks that had no place now have the whole place to themselves. They are the ones that have to be represented; it is around them that the Parliament of Things gathers henceforth. ‘It was the stone rejected by the builders that became the keystone.’

Latour’s “imbroglios and networks” could well be recast in Sicilia’s troubled (and troubling) political sphere as women, children, animals (cows, sheep, horses), environments (gardens, ponds), and objects (statues). As Latour maintains, “[t]hey are

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the ones that *have to be represented*”; my italicization here draws attention, I hope, to the sense of urgency and critical necessity in Latour’s call. Shakespeare grants such representation, I contend, in the political environs of Sicilia and Bohemia.

Latour finalizes the construction of his Parliament by way of a building allusion in scripture, one that recalls Jesus as the Messiah in his own thingly comportment: *It was the stone rejected by the builders that became the keystone.* As Andy Mousley’s epigraph and my use of Latour’s politico-scriptural invocation suggest, this chapter charts a religious Shakespeare, or to be more specific, a political Shakespeare who thinks religiously. I use *religion* in its etymological sense as the Latin *religare*, a site of communal binding and union, a bearing taken up recently by political theorist Simon Critchley who sees in religion’s “strongest articulation…possible forms of collectivity [and] commonality.” It is thus in a religious register that I will build my argument. The resurrected Christ as the keystone of Latour’s parliamentary construction, for example, finds a specific localization in *The Winter’s Tale* through another lithic imaginary of resurrection, Hermione-as-statue and the political restructuring, the *religare*, Shakespeare poses for our consideration through the feminine. We would do well to remember that

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2 Mark 12:10 alludes to Psalm 118:22, “The stone the builders rejected has become the cornerstone” (NIV).

3 Simon Critchley, interview with Beatrice Marovich, “Simon Critchley, Atheist Religious Thinker on Utopia & the Fiction of Faith,” *Religion Dispatches*, August 20, 2012, http://religiondispatches.org/simon-critchley-atheist-religious-thinker-on-utopia-the-fiction-of-faith/. Critchley develops this point more fully in *The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology* (New York: Verso, 2012). Giorgio Agamben traces the etymology of *religion* as well, yet arrives at a divergent conclusion: “The term *religio* does not derive, as an insipid and incorrect etymology would have it, from *religare* (that which binds and unites the human and the divine). It comes from *relegere*, which indicates the stance of scrupulousness and attention that must be adopted in relations with the gods, the uneasy hesitation (the ‘rereading [*rileggere*]’) before forms—and formulae—that must be observed in order to respect the separation between the sacred and the profane,” *Profanations*, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 74-75. In Renaissance literature broadly and Shakespeare studies specifically, Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton have also traced the connection between *religion as religare* and its theoretical implications; see, “Sovereigns, Citizens, and Saints: Political Theology and Renaissance Literature,” *Religion and Literature* 38.3 (2006): 3.
only the feminine is granted new life at the play’s close. Where Hermione and Perdita may be read as sites of new political possibilities (more on this in due course), Mamillius and Antigonus remain resolutely dead.

This chapter unfolds from the premise that in *The Winter’s Tale* Shakespeare attempts to think the politics of life differently by tracing life’s confluences in its wider cast as creaturely (human and animal), environmental, and object-oriented, which is to say life in its posthuman turns. The *posthuman* is both a contested term and a site of contestation. As Cary Wolfe expresses in his recent monograph *What is Posthumanism?*, this term “generates different and even irreconcilable definitions,” though often signaling a movement beyond the limits of human biological finitude. As a site of contestation, theorists of the posthuman turn attention to the study of animals, the environment, and new materialisms (e.g. Object Oriented Ontologies, Speculative Realism, and Actor Network Theory) in an attempt to de-center the false ontological security imposed by the familiar dyads subject/object, self/other, man/animal, human/non-human, etc. The posthuman’s de-anthropocentrizing gesture is an attempt to displace the Western conception of the human that has far too long been fabricated as white, male, and heteronormative. To quote Levi Bryant, a posthumanist ontology is one in which “humans are no longer monarchs of being, but are instead *among* beings, *entangled* in beings, and *implicated* in other beings.”

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4 Cary Wolfe, *What is Posthumanism?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xi.

5 A historical overview of the term can be found in Wolfe’s introduction ‘What is Posthumanism?’, xi-xxxiv. For excellent examples of these varied modes of posthuman theories in practice, see the themed inaugural themed double issue of *Postmedieval: A Journal of Medieval and Cultural Studies* 1.1/2 (2010), ‘When Did We Become Post/Human?’, eds. Eileen Joy and Craig Dionne. The posthuman in relation to Shakespeare studies has recently been explored in the collection *Posthumanist Shakespeares*, eds. Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus (New York: Palgrave, 2012).

Elaine Graham, working at the intersection of theory and theology, maps a similar posthuman genealogy by positing the *post/human*. Graham’s post/human utilizes the slash as a visual marker, a semiotic reminder of the human’s situatedness with its posts, ever beside and living alongside them, never as a dyadic either/or.\(^7\) Judeo-Christian theology broadly and its Pauline iteration specifically is similarly post/human in its express desire to move beyond human self-centeredness and narcissism. Put another way, at the purely textual level both Judaism and Christianity are religious formulations whose theologies firmly position the other over the self (and thus post- the human), even if they may have historically failed to do so in practice. In Renaissance studies such a Pauline post/humanism can be found in Barbara Lewalski’s *Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century English Lyric*; more to the express point of this chapter, Maurice Hunt reminds that in Lewalski’s *Poetics* we find “that the Judeo-Christian archetype capable of being traced in *The Winter’s Tale* was likely construed in Shakespeare’s time as a Pauline…paradigm.”\(^8\) This paradigm is grace, freely given from above, but totemic and totalizing in its call for a selfless comportment toward and care for the other. As St. Paul writes in his letter to the Ephesians, “For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God.”\(^9\) In his Galatian epistle Paul makes clear that a faith demonstrative of this grace will yield to the calling of the other. In this way Paul’s theology may be read as one of service and self-sacrifice, indeed it is a calling to “love [and] serve one another. For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt

\(^7\) Elaine L. Graham, *Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and Others in Popular Culture* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002). On the theological connections to the post/human, see 221-34.


\(^9\) Eph. 2:8 (KJV).
love thy neighbor as thyself.”\textsuperscript{10} Within the Pauline tradition this faith exercised in grace through love is love of a specific kind, \textit{agape}, the self-sacrificing love Jesus showed to the world through his ministry, death, and resurrection. It is the \textit{agape} of the Christ-event.

Ken Jackson has argued convincingly for a Pauline Shakespeare as the writer of \textit{The Winter’s Tale}.\textsuperscript{11} Similarly, I propose that it is a Pauline Shakespeare whose political thinking in the spheres of Sicily (court) and Bohemia (pastoral) suggests a desire to bypass the mis- and micro-management of life mobilized by biopolitics. There is no shortage of contemporary political thought critiquing such biopolitical maneuverings. For example, one might look to the works of Foucault, Agamben, Eric Santner, or Roberto Esposito to name but a few.\textsuperscript{12} I would suggest that in \textit{The Winter’s Tale} Shakespeare does so by way of Judeo-Christian thinking, particularly in its Pauline cast via the character of Paulina, as a religio-political paradigm (\textit{religare}) centered on the Christ-event, that is, the resurrection, with its subsequent outpouring of the Holy Spirit and grace to all humankind. Grace Tiffany reads such Pauline grace as a recurrent theme in

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{10} Gal. 5:13b-14 (KJV). The Christian imperative to “love thy neighbor as thyself,” Jesus’ so-called Great Commandment, is found in three of the four synoptic gospels: Mt. 22:36-40, Mk. 12:30-31, and Lk. 10:27. There Jesus himself recalls the Hebrew Scriptures, Deut. 6:5 (\textit{love the lord your God}) and Lev. 19:18 (\textit{love thy neighbor as thyself}), demonstrating what I have termed the Judeo-Christian post/human turn to conceive of the self as always in a service relation with the Other and thus post-ing the all-too-human inclination toward self-serving narcissism.


\end{footnotesize}
Shakespeare’s late plays, including *The Winter’s Tale*, likely arising “from a personal late-life interest [by Shakespeare] in the possibilities of ultimate forgiveness.”\(^{13}\) For Tiffany, the force of Pauline grace as it is dramatized by Shakespeare has the power to “forgiv[e] human mistakes [and] nullify their fatal potential.”\(^{14}\)

*The Winter’s Tale*, perhaps even more so than *Hamlet*, discloses a Shakespeare concerned with the complexities of being and becoming, of humanity’s fatal potential and its possible suspensions. Indeed *The Winter’s Tale* bears witness to a Shakespeare who gives deference to becoming and its political potentiality. In the previous chapter I traced the genealogy of such potentiality through the thinking of Aristotle, Agamben, and Arendt. I do so here via the post/human as a biopolitical swerve that follows the vectors marked out by St. Paul, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In Galatians 3:28 Paul makes a proclamation that has become the locus for his radical politicization by contemporary continental philosophers: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.”\(^{15}\) The erasure or at the very least suspension of ethnic (Jew/Greek), legal and biopolitical (bond/free), as well as biological (male/female) distinctions in St. Paul’s address forms the nexus of my engagement with Paul, Paulina, and the Pauline Shakespeare of *The Winter’s Tale*.\(^{16}\)


\(^{14}\) Ibid., 421.

\(^{15}\) In order to establish an early modern intertextuality between Shakespeare’s Pauline thinking and *The Winter’s Tale*, a Jacobean play, I have here cited the KJV. However, its translation of the Greek is flawed and will be addressed more fully later in this chapter. On Paul and Gal. 3:28 as they are taken up by contemporary continental philosophy, particularly by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, see *St. Paul among the Philosophers*, ed. John D. Caputo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009). Badiou provides a book-length treatment of Paul and Gal. 3:28 in relation to the Christ-event and its political potential in *St. Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

From Deleuze and Guattari I borrow the concept of becoming, a theoretical premise that privileges immanence over transcendence and action over ideation. Becoming is a lived, moving, active force, as opposed to the ontological stasis of being (e.g. being as object).

Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming occurs in what they term the plane of immanence, a space of horizontal expansion rather than the limit-enforcing structure of vertical hierarchy. For Deleuze and Guattari becoming is also necessarily feminine; as one scholar has phrased it, becoming posits “a line of flight that passes through and beyond binary distinctions that define and confine our lives.”¹⁷ These binary distinctions arise, according to Deleuze and Guattari, from a Western mindset that is always already male in its orientation. Thus for Deleuze and Guattari there can be no becoming-male because “man, the rational, white, adult male” is the fixed point of ontological certitude their project seeks to disrupt.¹⁸ Becoming-woman and becoming-girl, in contrast, are what Deleuze and Guattari term nodes of becoming (origin points, starting locations) that unfold in trajectories imbued with the potential to disrupt and displace the project of Western hegemony and its patriarchal phallogocentrism.

Patty Sotirin writes, “[b]ecoming explodes the ideas about what we are and what we can be beyond the categories that seem to contain us.”¹⁹ In this sense becomings are a type of post/humanism, and following their trajectories, this chapter’s post/human encounters in The Winter’s Tale are encoded in the Deleuzian sense of opening possibilities by and as the feminine (becoming-woman and becoming-girl) in opposition

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to the violently misogynistic polities operant under Leontes’ and Polixenes’ patriarchal authority.²⁰

In what follows, I begin by charting patriarchy’s biopolitical misogyny through the varied ontologies Shakespeare develops through animal, environmental, and object-oriented tropes in *The Winter’s Tale*, each of which, I argue, maintains a feminine cast. Following this political trajectory, the chapter dilates from the intersection between Paul, Deleuze and Guattari, by locating Galatians 3:28 as a Deleuzian plane of immanence and hermeneutical key for both St. Paul and the restorative politics Shakespeare leaves open through Paulina, Hermione, and Perdita. I close by considering the resurrection theme at *The Winter’s Tale*’s own closing, both Perdita’s return from supposed death and Hermione’s from statuary quiescence, to suggest a Pauline Shakespeare whose religious thinking (*religare*) centers on a political paradigm shift to the potentiality of the feminine and its plurality over the masculine (patriarchal) tendency to reduce everything in its purview to objectified use.

ALIEN PHENOMENOLOGIES

In *Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing*, Ian Bogost outlines what he proposes as a practical mode of object-oriented theory in praxis. Bogost writes, “[a]s philosophers, our job is to amplify the black noise of objects to make the resonant frequencies of the stuffs inside them hum in credibly satisfying ways. Our job is to write

²⁰ I say “Deleuzian becomings” as the theorization of *becoming* is attributed to Deleuze and occurs throughout his individually authored work, even though it is first given expression in his co-authored writings with Guattari.
the speculative fictions of their processes…I call this practice alien phenomenology.”21 Shakespeare, I would suggest, is such a philosopher. The critical field of Shakespeare Studies alone is, to use Bogost’s turn of phrase, a testament to his ability to make the resonant frequencies of the stuffs inside his objects hum in credibly satisfying ways. And indeed Shakespeare does so by writing masterful speculative fictions.

I would like to consider here two speculative fictions in particular, one Shakespearean, the other biopolitical. Shakespeare populates The Winter’s Tale with a proliferation of female objects through the character of Hermione, whether cast in stone, as animal, or environmental loci. These speculative fictions, while suggestive of a radical political re-writing as I will argue, arise from the very cultural narrative they seek to resist, patriarchy and its inevitable metastasization, misogyny. In The History of Sexuality, Vol. I Michel Foucault traced the genealogy of biopolitics in the West to an origin in the seventeenth-century and the development of two distinct yet convergent systems of power over life, or what he calls biopower. Foucault describes the first as an “anatomo-politics of the human body” which took as its conceptual symbol the body-as-machine and subsequently “its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, [and] its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls.”22 The political exigency to increase both the body’s usefulness and docility while at the same time managing its


integration into a larger system of economic controls is readily discernible in the female body’s status as a commodified object of exchange by and between men in the Renaissance marriage market. \(^ {23} \) Leontes, for example, has the newly-born Perdita cast out because “No father own[s] it,” a crime he admits “is indeed / More criminal in thee [Hermione] than it” (3.2.86-87).

What Foucault discloses as “a biopolitics of the population,” however, more directly renders the patriarchal desire, indeed its requisite, to control the female body and in particular a woman’s sexuality. \(^ {24} \) As Foucault defines it, a biopolitics of the population “focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.” \(^ {25} \) Following Foucault, the “species body” is thus precariously tethered to female biology and desire. Put another way, this centralized focus on the “species body” is localized in female sexuality (propagation) as well as a woman’s unique and singular ability to sustain life through both gestation and nutritive provision after a child’s birth in the form of milk, without which an infant would die (births and mortality). In terms of polity, level of health, life expectancy, and longevity mean little for patriarchy if one cannot secure future lineage in the form of legitimate offspring. Such is patriarchy’s narrative, its speculative fiction.


\(^ {24} \) Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 139, emphasis in original.

\(^ {25} \) Ibid.
This is Leontes’ predicament at the impassioned opening of *The Winter’s Tale*. Believing his wife unchaste, the charge of adultery is simultaneously one of treason: “There is a plot against my life, my crown” (2.1.49). Thus female sexuality reveals its potential to dissolve the very continuation of the state; treason (in deed) indeed.  To be clear, there has been no threat upon Leontes’ physical body, real or imagined. Though he plotted regicide with an unwilling Camillo to poison Polixenes, Leontes’ charge admits no trespass against his own physical person. Instead Camillo and Polixenes’ crime is, according to Leontes’ narrative, one of complicity in his emasculation through the social stigma of a horny wife and his bearing a cuckold’s horns, leaving “Camillo and Polixenes [to] / Laugh at me, [and] make their pastime at my sorrow” (2.3.23-24). In *Much Ado About Nothing*, Benedick remarks that Beatrice “speaks poniards, and every word stabs” (2.1.216). The social stigma of laughter stabs equally so for Leontes. The plot against his life, then, is one against the futurity of his name and the legacy of his crown. His invective readily attests as much equating life with crown in metonymic exchange: “There is a plot against my life, my crown” (2.1.49).

Taking up the quill *cum* sword, Shakespeare drives this point home through his psychologization of the young Mamillius. On Leontes’ report, Mamillius

Conceiving the dishonour of his mother
He straight declined, drooped, took it deeply,
Fastened and fixed the shame on himself;
Threw off his spirit, his appetite, his sleep,
And downright languished. (2.3.13-17)

Here, it is Leontes’ poniard words that will strike unto death. In an ostensible turn Leontes implicates his unchaste wife in their son’s languishment. Yet in a Freudian turn

the king’s report might also be read as an act of projection, one that retains its misogynist
cast even as it unseats his patrilineal security. That is, by Leontes’ testimony (projection)
it is only upon realizing (“Conceiving”) his mother’s “dishonour” that Mamillius begins
to languish, suggesting in this Freudian register the son takes upon himself his mother’s
(false) guilt, even to the point of death.27 In a very real way Leontes is correct in that
there is a plot against his life in the form of his patriarchal lineage in Mamillius, a plot he
himself drafts and signs into execution.

Believing his wife unfaithful in her current pregnancy, the king begins to doubt
the paternity of his only son and heir. “[H]e does bear some signs of me,” Leontes
declams to Hermione, “yet you / Have too much blood in him” (2.1.58-59). As my
emphasis shows, Leontes is willing to consider his son’s legitimacy (“he does bear some
signs of me”) only to allow this truth to be occluded by adulterous fantasy (“yet you /
Have too much blood in him”). As Jean Howard reminds, it is the unknowability of the
biological origins of his children—plural—that drives both Leontes’ fantasies and the
misogynistic vitriol of his attacks against a chaste Hermione.28 Much Ado stages a similar
exchange of topic though not intent. Nonetheless, this dialogue makes clear the concern
for paternal legitimacy in the period:

DON PEDRO: I think this is your daughter.

LEONATO: Her mother hath many times told me so.

BENEDICK: Were you in doubt, sir, that you asked her?

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27 In her introduction to The Winter’s Tale, Jean Howard reminds of the etymological association in
Mamillius’ name to lactation and breastfeeding, further placing the young prince and the future of Sicily’s
patriarchy itself in the sphere of feminine power. See, Jean E. Howard, introduction to The Winter’s Tale,

28 Ibid., 194.
LEONATO: Signor Benedick, no, for then were you a child.

DON PEDRO: You have it full, Benedick. (1.1.84-88)

What is said in jest and witty sport in Much Ado, Benedick’s off-color quip answered “full” by Leonato’s pithy return, resonates in The Winter’s Tale in the key of anxiety and open hostility. Indeed, with Polixenes fled, it is with full misogynistic furor that Leontes turns on his wife: “Let him be / Until a time may serve. For present vengeance, / Take it on her” (2.3.21-23).

Near the end of Act I, Leontes’ speculations about Hermione’s supposed indiscretions take a marked phenomenological turn:

Ha’ not you seen, Camillo—
But that’s past doubt; you have, or your eye-glass
Is thicker than a cuckold’s horn—or heard—
For, to a vision so apparent, rumor
Cannot be mute—or thought—for cogitation
Resides not in that man that does not think—
My wife is slippery? If thou wilt confess—
Or else be impudently negative
To have nor eyes, nor ears, nor thought (1.2.267-77, emphasis mine)

Although his wife’s transgression is wholly imagined, Leontes’ false vision (both in sight and cogitation) bears full phenomenological weight. His narrative to Camillo is one of lived experientiality through sight, sound, and thought—and although he does not come close to touching the truth, he would have Polixenes taste poison all the same. Under Leontes’ traducement Hermione’s personhood is further altered to the status of a thing:

O, thou thing,
Which I’ll not call a creature of thy place
Lest barbarism, making me the precedent,
Should like language use to all degrees,
And mannerly distinction leave out
Betwixt prince and beggar. (2.1.84-89)
In his rage Leontes revokes both Hermione’s creaturely estate and social standing. She is neither queen nor lady (“a creature of thy place”), nor may even be attributed a baseline human comportment of “mannerly distingishment…Lest barbarism” becomes “precedent”; his dignity and social status would be yoked to her own if Hermione were granted her once-occupied place as such a creature, a lady and the queen both deserving respect. Instead, Leontes’ humanity is separated from Hermione’s non-humanness. Alienated and alone under her king’s pronouncement, she is translated into object-orientation: O, thou thing. Such is patriarchal prerogative.

While this chapter focuses primarily on the human qua object, turning especially to Hermione-as-statue in the conclusion, I would be remiss if I did not discuss Leontes’ other alien phenomenologies. Perceiving Hermione’s believed transgression as a threat to himself and the state, the king writes a series of anthropocentric fictions in an attempt to preserve his own “ontological hygiene,” a term I borrow from Graham.29 These stories, tragically, distance Leontes from his wife and son who are cast therein as things (cows, horses, gardens, ponds) both alien and alienating to him.

Of Animals and Environments

In The Accommodated Animal Laurie Shannon has shown early modern culture to be “less provincially human than ours.”30 Under Leontes’ rule however, Sicily appears to be a cultural outlier on this point. Animals only become his concern in fictions of marital


infidelity and social collapse, and in these events he is not the least accommodating. Turning attention to *The Winter’s Tale*, Paul Yachnin reads “sheep all the way down,” especially in “the second half of the play (with all of those sheep just off-stage).”31 For Yachnin, “the entire dramatic action, the psychology of the characters, and the themes of the play are well explained in terms of the animality of human beings.”32 I tend to agree. Yet where sheep populate the environs of Bohemia, in Sicily its cows all the way down. That is, as Leontes conceives of his political, social, and masculine decline he does so through a cuckoldry imagined in bovine, not ovine terms. Consider the following passage:

LEONTES: Mamillius, 
Art thou my boy?

MAMILLIUS: Ay, my good lord.

LEONTES: I’fecks, 
Why, that’s my bawcock. What? Hast smutched thy nose?
They say it is a copy out of mine. Come, captain, 
We must be neat—not neat, but cleanly, captain. 
And yet the steer, the heifer, and the calf 
Are all called neat. (1.2.120-27)

The exchange begins directly enough, with Mamillius likely unaware of his father’s paternal doubts. What any onlooker might observe as a moment of filial doting, turns with one turn of phrase to anxious speculation: “We must be neat—not neat, but cleanly, captain.” At the touch of his son’s nose—a nose he admits is regarded in the realm as a copy of his own—Leontes’ begins to construct the metaphor of their mutual demise. “Neat” is a pun meaning both “clean” and “cattle with horns,” an association Leontes

32 Ibid.
makes apparent in the lines that follow: “And yet the steer, the heifer, and the calf / Are all called neat.” At this point the king’s wandering eye usurps his wandering mind’s narrative:

LEONTES: —Still virginalling
Upon his palm?—How now, you wanton calf—
Art thou my calf? (1.2.126-28)

Now, turning from Mamillius to Hermione and Polixenes just in view, he sees (or thinks he sees) the two playing (“virginalling”) at each other’s palms. Leontes’ pun here is on the virginal, a musical instrument played on the lap, as well as “virginalling’s” obvious association with chastity. Though Leontes openly accuses his wife of adultery at this point (“How now, you wanton calf”), Mamillius seems to be unaware of the situation unfolding before him and answers his father’s question—“Art thou my calf?”—thusly:

MAMILLIUS: Yes, if you will, my lord.

LEONTES: Thou want’st a rough pash and the shoots I have,
To be full like me. Yet they say we are
Almost alike as eggs. Women say so,
That will say anything. (1.2.129-33)

The son’s response is met by his father’s rejoinder, and yet the exchange (compounded by Leontes’ distracted asides) leaves one wondering exactly to whom his question is addressed. Mamillius’ response, “Yes, if you will, my lord,” demonstrates a son’s complicity in his father’s animal imaginary. And indeed this has all transpired through Leontes’ will. At this point Hermione has (un)willingly become a “wanton calf”; so too, Mamillius has been scripted both as a boy unbreeched and a calf that as-yet “want’st a rough pash and the shoots” Leontes believes himself now to wear. Here Leontes’ attempt at ongological hygiene has failed. Rather than preserve the human/animal dyad he has

33 Winter’s Tale, 206 n.4.
worked so hard to construct, his humanness as victim to his wife’s animal lust, Leontes ultimately becomes conscripted within his own narrative. He too believes himself made animal by Hermione’s actions. And even though neither Mamillius nor Leontes yet bear a cuckold’s horns, this father, mother, and son, this king, queen, and prince are all variously undone by Leontes’ animal fiction.

The repertoire of misogynist fancy in the Sicilian state is not limited to animals. Environmental imaginings prove equally threatening. Leontes channels the feminine association with bodies of water, for example, into an ecology of infidelity. Alone with his thoughts, the king imagines his whole kingdom has gone as awry as his household:

> There have been,  
> Or I am much deceived, cuckolds ere now,  
> And many a man there is, even at this present,  
> Now, while I speak this, holds his wife by th’arm,  
> That little thinks she has been sluiced in’s absence,  
> And his pond fished by his next neighbour, by  
> Sir Smile, his neighbour.  

(1.2.191-97)

In this imaginary the adulterous vagina is both sluice, a trough or channel for giving direction to water, and pond. Fantasizing his wife giving direction to another man’s flows does nothing to help Leontes’ volatile mental state. Indeed the anxiety and sarcastic anger embedded in his feigned “pond fished by his next neighbour” recalls a modern water preserve whose fragile ecosystem has been violated by unlawful sport. Sir Smile has been fishing without license and for Leontes there is no catch and release. Neither is Bohemia alien to such allegorizing. Polixenes uses a fishing metaphor when he worries Florizel is courting a poor shepherd’s daughter: “I fear, / the angle that plucks our son thither” (4.2.39-40).

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34 Ibid., 208 n.7.
The terrestrial proves equally adulterous as the aquatic for Leontes. At her husband’s request, Hermione agrees to entertain Polixenes in the garden: “If you would seek us, / We are yours i’th’ garden. Shall’s attend you there?” (1.2.178-79). He does attend them, but only by cognitive dissonance. Giving line to another fishing metaphor, the king admits that he would trap his wife and best friend: “I am angling now, / Though you perceive me not how I give line” (1.2.181-82). His line (of sight) in turn soon finds horticultural allusion. Following his libel against the imagined neighbor Sir Smile, Leontes muses,

Nay, there’s comfort in’t,
While other men have gates, and those gates opened,
As mine against their will. Should all despair
That have revolted wives, the tenth of mankind
Would hang themselves. (1.2.197-201).

It is the garden gate that is here transgressed, and as Leontes admits, though gardens have gates they prove “No barricado for a belly” (1.2.205).

Renaissance gardens were widely thought of as erotic spaces in the period. The Italian humanist Pietro Bembo illustrates this point in Gil Asolani, “Let sleep lie behind the curtains of our beds [while we] go into the Garden” (1.4). Amy Tigner remarks that “[f]or Bembo…beds are reserved for sleep, but the garden provides a larger world of sensuality.” In Leontes’ fancy this larger world of sensuality is nothing short of a “tenth of mankind” (1.2.200). In her work with early modern gardens, Tigner writes that “[n]ot

35 Amy L. Tigner, “The Winter’s Tale: Gardens and the Marvels of Transformation,” English Literary Renaissance 36 (2006): 114-34. The garden was also a general symbol for the harmonious marriage of nature and culture during the Renaissance. Under Leontes’ tending, however, the garden ceases to figure as a trope for proper female sexuality and serves rather as a metaphorical locus for wanton and lascivious play.


only was the garden a common site for an adulterous rendezvous in literature, but the
garden itself was also often coded as the female body,” citing as examples Boccacio’s
*Decameron* and Chaucer’s *The Merchant’s Tale.*\(^{38}\) This is certainly the case for Leontes,
who readily conceives of a garden whose gate remains open at the wife’s will and not her
husband’s. It is the threat of conception, in fact, that fertilizes the ground of Leontes’
anxiety. As Tigner puts it, “[i]n *The Winter’s Tale* the garden represents bodies of the
Queen and her daughter, the bodies that produce future rulers and therefore affect the
health and well-being of the state itself.”\(^{39}\) Thus we arrive once again at Foucault’s
biopolitics of the population, although by way of animal and ecological object-others.

*The Feminine Thing*

Mark Breitenberg has argued that patriarchy unavoidably though often
unwittingly produces a masculinity that is anxious.\(^{40}\) Leontes’ anxiety has shown itself to
be as such with his masculine angst manifested as imagined animal and environmental
others. Yet those alien things both foreign and frightening to Leontes’ world and its
system of power are ever and always feminine in their associations. The cuckold, for
instance, while not a female object *per se* derives his identity instead as an object of the
feminine. Put simply, when a man possesses horns, or rather, is possessed by horns (as if
they are some demonic other), he is marked (in)visibly as the object of his wife’s
adultery. Thus to be a cuckold is to be caught up within a matrix of female transgression

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 117.
\(^{39}\) Ibid., 115.
and male dispossession: to possess horns is to be dispossessed of one’s masculinity. In order to defend himself from such a hostile takeover, the man must deploy active countermeasures. Language works well. In *The Winter’s Tale* the language of patriarchy, which is always already one of Leontes’ misogyny, displays its power through a rhetoric of reification. I use *reify* here in the sense of its Latin root *res* (thing), to make into a thing.

In a very real sense Leontes’ words *do things*, to borrow a phrase from J.L. Austin. Or rather, they *make things*: the female *qua* thing, to be exact. For example, while talking privately with Camillo, his trusted advisor, Leontes concludes his calumny against Hermione thusly,

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My wife’s a hobby-horse, deserves a name
As rank as any flax-wench that puts to
Before her troth-plight. Say’t, and justify’t. (1.2.278-80)
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By both saying and justifying “it,” Leontes renders his chaste wife an *it* as well: she *is* a “hobby-horse.” This *it* is special in its behavior as both animal (horse) and object (toy). That is, although ostensibly a child’s plaything, this particular hobby-horse bears a foal. And like the inheritance of original sin, in the political sphere of Sicilia reification is an inheritable trait, one that passes as if through the genome from one female to the next: *it* begets *it*.

Perdita’s first entry onto the political stage is as an “it.” Presenting the child to her resistant father, not even Paulina seems to be able to escape Leontes’ linguistic expectations: “Here ’tis—[your wife] commends it to your blessing” (2.3.67). In an act of both outrage and political distancing Leontes orders Antigonus to remove Paulina and

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“the bastard” (2.3.74, 2.3.76) from his sight: “Take’t up, I say. Give’t to thy crone” (2.3.77). Rather than offer benediction or words of joy, Lenontes’ first utterances to his daughter are a fourfold defamation; she is twice a “bastard” and twice an “it.”

Perdita’s reification is calcified through repetition. As if by trial, the first litany of “its” comes in Leontes’ response to Antigonus’ plea for her young life:

Shall I live on, to see this bastard kneel
And call me father? Better burn it now
Than curse it then. But be it. Let it live. (2.3.155-57)

Though Leontes concedes to Antigonus to let the baby girl live, he does so with a caveat:

We enjoin thee,
As thou art liegeman to us, that thou carry
This female bastard hence, and that thou bear it
To some remote and desert place, quite out
Of our dominions; and that there thou leave it,
Without more mercy, to it own protection
And favour of the clime. As by strange fortune
It came to us, I do in justice charge thee,
On thy soul’s peril and thy body’s torture,
That thou commend it strangely to some place
Where chance may nurse or end it. Take it up. (2.3.173-83)

In both accountings I have italicized the repeated instances of reification in Leontes’ sustained condemnation. Perdita is rendered “it” eleven times by her father in this exchange alone.

By way of comparison, Mamillius is referred to by their father in a series of loving epithets: “this gentleman” (1.2.162), “young prince” (1.2.165), “my boy” (1.2.156), and “this squire” (1.2.173). The masculine, at least in Shakespeare’s Sicily, seems to recognize and respect only itself (Leontes recognizes his son), consigning both its feminine half (Hermione) and its feminine offspring (Perdita) to the politically oppressive and alienating status of object-orientation. Yet it is on the shores of Bohemia
that Shakespeare would remind us that all human life, both male and female, bears some thingly aspect. Meeting his son, who has just reported Antigonus’ now-infamous pursuit by a bear, the Old Shepherd remarks, “Thou metst with things dying, I / with things new-born” (3.3.104-05). If the pastoral may be read as a restorative to the vices of city and court, then it is worth noting that who is met, or rather what are met, on Bohemia’s pastoral grounds are things newly dead and newly born.

Standing Trial

In his book Statues Michel Serres traces “thing” through its etymological relations to German and Latinate words for cause (causa, cosa, chose, Ding). In doing so, Serres observes that “things tend to be admitted to reality only by legal tribunals and assemblies—as if reality were a human fabrication.” By now it perhaps comes as no surprise that Hermione stands trial as a thing. Upon being accused she responds to her husband, “You speak a language that I understand not. / My life stands in the level of your dreams” (3.2.77-78). Hermione’s response corroborates Serres’ findings: her political reality as a thing is comprised entirely of human fabrication, one man’s fabrication to be exact. Though at this point in the play Hermione is not yet a statue, we might consider her predicament (as well as Leontes’) by way of Serres’ Statues. As Steve

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43 Ibid. Serres’ Statues has not yet been published in English, though an edition is forthcoming in February 2015 (New York: Bloomsbury Academic). As such, I have relied here on translations by Cohen and Steven Connor.
Connor has put it, “[f]or Serres, to be a subject in the world is primarily to be subject to the world. If the subject is that which can be distinguished from objects, it is therefore that which lies under that which lies before it, holds itself back: attentive, concentrated, humble, silent. Subject. This word retains the trace of an act of humility. The subject subjects itself to the dominion of that which forms and loses it. Yes, kills it. Only the object exists and I am nothing: it lies before me and I disappear beneath it.”

Despite the fact that Leontes has made his subject (and queen, and wife) an object, he nonetheless remains yoked to her object-status. It is as if the Biblical “one flesh” of marriage fails to dissolve even as personhood is calcified into objectivity. In terms of subject/object relation, Leontes’ plight before Hermione is that of the cuckold. Following Serres, it is indeed the case that “[t]he subject subjects itself to the dominion of that which forms and loses it.” That is, Leontes, believing himself now a cuckold, is thus a subject to the very object of his contempt, Hermione. In patriarchal terms, male systems of power are ever susceptible to disappearance beneath the feminine. This is the source of Leontes’ anxious masculinity. To whit, I have rendered below Serres’ concluding point as it may dialogue with The Winter’s Tale. Leontes’ rejoinder to Serres is in the play a reaction to Camillo’s suggestion that surely nothing has transpired between Hermione and Polixenes:

SERRES: Only the object exists and I am nothing: it lies before me and I disappear beneath it.\textsuperscript{45}

LEONTES: Is this nothing?
Why then the world and all that’s in’t is nothing,
The covering sky is nothing, Bohemia nothing,
My wife is nothing, nor nothing have these nothings
If this be nothing. (1.2.294-98)

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
Read alongside Serres, Leontes, and indeed the whole world with him, dissolves into nothing if it is true that Hermione is guilty of infidelity. Leontes is merely being objective—and by objectifying Hermione has flipped his entire political world topsy-turvy. This vexing concern for nothing, or as I will suggest, the female no-thing with its potential to dissolve masculine power structures, finds both locution and location in the discourse of early modern witch trials.

Drawing upon the *Malleus Maleficarum* (1487), Reginald Scot’s *The Discoverie of Witchcraft* (1584) relates one young man’s unfortunate encounter with a witch. The story is simple in its plot. A young man finds himself impotent and blames a witch. His impotency is far gone. In early modern clinical terms this account reports of his pubic region that “nothing could be seene or felt but his plaine body.” Despite the young man’s accusations otherwise, the witch denies any wrongdoing and admits that she cannot return his “instruments of venerie.” Not liking her response, the young man strangles her with a towel until she yields, and near the point of death cries out, “Let me go, and I will help thee.” Scot finishes his story thusly:

> And whilst he was loosing the towel, she put hir hand in his codpiece, and touched the place; saieng; Now has thou thy desire: and even at that instant he felt himself restored.

Laurence Publicover reads Scot’s witch narrative as a testimony of the young man’s inability to gain an erection. It reads to me as something more than an anxiety about erectile dysfunction. The account seems to suggest, rather, that the young woman has (the

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47 See n.45.
young man believes) rendered him not sexually dysfunctional but asexual. His “plaine body” becomes like that of an anatomically unthreatening Ken doll. Further, the young woman’s dismissal that she is unable “to return” (Publicover’s words) the young man’s “instruments of venerie,” implies their loss rather than malfunction.

By my reading, this narrative is both an example of vicious misogyny (strangulation by towel) and the ability (potentiality) of the feminine to activate or dispel and displace male power systems: *she put hir hand in his codpiece, and touched the place...and even at that instant he felt himself restored.* Leontes’ repeated nothings find their selfsame lack in the “nothing” that “could be seene or felt” on the strange asexual groin of the young man’s “plaine body.” Deleuze would call the witch’s power to restore, dispel, or displace the young man’s phallus a *deterritorialization.* A deterritorialization is a shedding of and moving beyond presumed power structures. It is the phallus and not the penis that is both under threat of erasure and that which holds the promise of restoration in Scot’s account. Power is at stake. The same is true in Sicily.

At multiple times in *The Winter’s Tale* charges of witchcraft surface. Hermione and Perdita, for example, both find themselves threatened with the stake. Before capitulating to Antigonus, Leontes orders both mother and child consigned to a witch’s fate: “Hence with it, and together with the dam / Commit them to the fire” (2.3.95-96). Thus from her entry into Sicily’s political sphere Perdita is associated with a disruptive power. This power also holds sway in Bohemia, threatening to upend social order there as well. Believing his son, “a sceptre’s heir” (4.4.407), betrothed to “a sheep-hook” (4.4.408), Polixenes first accuses Perdita of witchcraft, “And thou, fresh piece / Of excellent witchcraft” (4.4.410-11), before matching Leontes in misogynistic fervor: “I
will devise a death as cruel for thee / As thou art tender to’t” (4.4.428-29). Paulina too is charged with dark arts. Her reward for bringing Leontes his rightfully-born child is to be inveighed against as a witch: “Out! / A mankind witch! Hence with her, out o’door—” (2.3.68-69). An editorial gloss is helpful here; “mankind” means manlike. 48 Paulina is thus manlike in her disruptive agency. Taking up the door Leontes offers as a threshold for her exit, I would enter instead into a conversation that approaches Paulina in her “mankind” comportment as the Apostle Paul.

PAULITICS

Julia Reinhard Lupton writes of Shakespeare’s “potential Pauls.” 49 This is St. Paul as he is encountered in the allusive matrix of Shakespeare’s thinking, a Paul that is variously Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and philosophical. 50 Shakespeare’s Paul is protean, and yet to follow his shifting forms is to consider “the key themes and parameters through which we can both encounter and account for the exegetical dimensions of Shakespearean dramaturgy.” 51 What I hope to trace in my Pauline accounting of The Winter’s Tale is a Paul whose politics champion the radical otherness of life at the margins. The alterior are welcome at his table. This is a Paul who speaks for life in its wider key through a politics of lived compassion for all others, a compassion anchored in resurrection, grace, and love. The Paul of The Winter’s Tale is a Paul of potentiality.

48 See The Winter’s Tale, 223.
50 Ibid., 219.
51 Ibid., 220.
For Critchley St. Paul’s potentiality always bears the spirit of reform.\textsuperscript{52} Following Critchley, “[t]he return to Paul is the attempt, and this is Heidegger’s word, at the destruction (\emph{Destruktion}) or dismantling of a deadening tradition in the name of a proclamation of life.”\textsuperscript{53} We might think of Paulina’s proclamation to those witnessing Hermione’s statue and awaiting its (re)animation: “It is required / You do awake your faith” (5.3.94-95). This is followed by a second proclamation to Hermione, “Descend. Be stone no more. / … / Dear life redeems you” (5.3.99, 103). In these proclamations the deadly tradition of patriarchy’s fundamental dyads subject/object, male/female, and husband/wife begin to dismantle as static life becomes resurrected. I take this point up at length at the conclusion of this chapter. At present I would connect Pauline reform to its centralizing verse in Galatians 3:28—“There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”\textsuperscript{54} This passage has been heralded as “The Magna Carta of Humanity” and “the most socially explosive statement in the New Testament.”\textsuperscript{55} Galatians 3:28 is also arguably the key to understanding all of Pauline theology.

\textsuperscript{52} Critchley, \textit{Faith of the Faithless}, 155.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 156.
\textsuperscript{54} NIV translation.
Randall Martin has suggested Paulina as a kind of hermeneutical key for Shakespeare’s Pauline thinking. Paulina-as-cipher, he argues, “has the potential to illuminate the interpretative significance of other Shakespearean allusions to Paul.”

The correlation between Paul and Paulina is well documented by scholars. Building on this ground, I would pose that both Paulina and a Pauline Shakespeare must be similarly understood by way of St. Paul’s own cipher in Galatians 3:28. As Daniel Boyarin writes,

Viewing Paul through the lens of Galatians, and especially through Galatians 3:28-29, the baptismal declaration of the new humanity of no difference, constructs a particular Pauline object, a different Paul from the one constructed by reading Paul through 1 Corinthians, Romans, or 1 Thessalonians.

It is important to recognize that “the baptismal declaration of the new humanity of no difference” to which Boyarin refers is a baptism of the spirit by grace. Thus Paul writes in 1 Corinthians 12:13a, “For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free.”

I have followed Boyarin’s

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57 Julia Reinhard Lupton reads this correlation “through the typological motifs of Leontes’ law corrected by Pauline grace and faith,” see Afterlives of the Saints: Hagiography, Typology, and Renaissance Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 176-77. For Grace Tiffany, “Paulina is indeed Pauline in her bracing admonitions to Leontes to remain virtuous, repentant, and chaste (5.1.12-84), invoking Paul’s epistolary exhortations of the early Christian churches (“But fornication, & all uncleanness…, let it not be once named among you”; “Housbands, love your wives” [Eph. 5:3, 25]),” see “Calvinist Grace,” 428. Huston Diehl argues that Shakespeare explores his interest in mingling genres, myths, and religious thinking through Paulina who represents, for Shakespeare, Paul’s own hybridity as “both a Roman citizen and a Jew who converted to Christianity,” see Huston Diehl, “‘Does not the stone rebuke me?': The Pauline Rebuke and Paulina’s Lawful Magic in The Winter’s Tale,” in Shakespeare and the Cultures of Performance, eds. Paul Yachnin and Patricia Badir (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 70. An additional bibliography on this subject can be found in Hunt, “Syncretistic Religion,” n.55.


59 Emphasis in original; on baptismal differentiation relative to Paul, see Acts 19:1-7.
methodology of reading Paul through Galatians 3:28-29. To better elucidate his point, Boyarin provides a “simple and dramatic example,” one fitting, I think, to Shakespeare’s own dramatic use of Paul and which I here submit to the same purpose:

Traditionally, Philemon has been read as a support for the institution of slavery, as a return of Onesimus to his former slave status, taking the moment in 1 Corinthians 7 where Paul tells slaves that they need not be free in order to be saved as determinative. If, however, we read Galatians 3:29 as our constant, with its declaration that there is no slave and free in Christ, then Philemon reads entirely differently, not as a commandment of Onesimus back into slavery but as a deft effort to pressure Philemon to free Onesimus. Tough texts are not infinitely indeterminate, neither do they dictate ineluctably only one possible interpretation, and the interpreter must take, therefore, moral responsibility for her readings.60

The onus of such responsibility, I would argue, begins with proper translation.

Luther, for example, gets it wrong. His translation of Galatians 3:28-29 reads, “There is neither Jew nor Grecian, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female…for in Christ Jesus all states…are nothing.”61 Paul’s concluding couplet in v.28 reads in the original Greek ouk eni arsen kai thēly, “neither is there male and female.” Paul distinguishes his final pairing from the preceding two by way of conjunction, kai (and), rather than disjunction, oude (nor). The Geneva Bible (1599) and King James (1611) also translate the final couplet “male nor female.” Paul’s original non-disjunctive final pairing is significant in that it marks a common humanity that is elided by the nor in Luther, the Geneva, and KJV translations, which, whether intentional or accidental, establish an opposition between the sexes.

When read through the historical matrix of scripture, Paul’s use of the conjunction kai to yoke male to female in shared humanity has the potential to undermine patriarchy.

60 Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 5.
61 Martin Luther, Commentarie...upon Gallathians, fols 176r-v., cited in Diehl, “‘Does not the stone rebuke me?’”, 76.
In the field of Biblical studies, for example, R.W. Hove has convincingly argued Paul’s *arsen kai thēly*, male and female, “to be a deliberate reference to Genesis 1:27, where God created mankind ‘male and female’ prior to the fall, and this was good.”

Jack Cottrell reads the *kai* of Galatians in connection to laws concerning inheritance according to Deuteronomic Code. Under this system only free Jewish males inherited land left by their fathers. According to Paul in Galatians 3:29 this paradigm is suspended as the Abrahamic dispensation has become fulfilled in Christ: “And if ye be Christ’s, then are ye Abraham’s seed, and heirs according to the promise.” Similarly, in Galatians 4:7 Paul proclaims that all those who are saved by the grace of Jesus’ resurrection are co-heirs with Christ to the divine inheritance of eternal life. Verse 7 echoes the cipher of 3:28, “So you are no longer a slave, but God’s child; and since you are his child, God has made you also an heir.”

Ceasing to figure inheritance from father to son and recognizing it instead through grace open to an equilateral co-humanity (male and female), patriarchy would likely fall within the span of a few generations.

Such readings of Galatians are certainly not without their critics. The Church Fathers including Ignatius of Antioch, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Hippolytus,

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64 Deut. 21:15-17.

65 Emphasis is mine.

66 Boyarin’s reservations on this point are helpful: “While Paul’s impulse toward the founding of a non-differentiated, non-hierarchical humanity was laudable in my opinion, many of its effects in terms of actual lives were not. In terms of ethnicity, his system required that all human cultural specificities—first and foremost, that of the Jews—be eradicated, whether or not the people in question were willing. Moreover, since of course, there is no such thing as cultural unspecificity, merging all into people into one common culture means ultimately (as it has meant in the history of European cultural imperialism) merging all people into the dominant culture. In terms of gender, for Paul (as indeed, for nearly everyone until now), autonomy and something like true equality for women were bought at the expense of sexuality and
Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom, as well as Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, for example, variously read Galatians 3:28 in the context of salvation and yet none of these “major teachers in the history of the church thought Galatians 3:28 abolished the male-female role distinction.”67 My point is not that Paul abolishes gender roles in Galatians so much as he puts pressure on binary distinctions themselves. Following Boyarin, I choose a reading of Paul “that makes him a passionate striver for human liberation and equality.”68

_Deleuzian Becoming_

My reading of Paul, and thus the Pauline in _The Winter’s Tale_, is enabled by the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari. These are not such strange bedfellows, though they may seem otherwise. As Em McAvan puts it, “Deleuze provides us neither with a master key for religion nor an outside from which to critique, instead he provides an occasion for transmutation, for becoming—the becoming-Deleuzian of religion and the becoming-religious of Deleuze.”69 Scholarly volumes on Deleuze and religion certainly suggest as much.70 Bryan Reynolds’ work has shown both Shakespeare and the early modern period

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68 Boyarin, _A Radical Jew_, 9.


to similarly comportment with Deleuze’s thinking. My argument, though admittedly anachronistic, is that Galatians 3:28 as it is developed in both Paul and Shakespeare in *The Winter’s Tale* unfolds as a Deleuzian becoming-woman.

The cartography of becoming begins, necessarily, with the concept of *immanence*. Immanence is the plane upon which becomings unfold. As Sotirin explains, “Deleuze’s philosophy is often called a philosophy of immanence because it is concerned with what a life can do, what a body can do when we think in terms of becomings, multiplicities, lines and intensities rather than essential forms, predetermined subjects, structured functions or transcendent values.” There is neither Jew nor Gentile, slave nor free, neither is there male and female. Becomings are possibilites, potentialites. Becoming-woman is a rupture of what Deleuze and Guattari call a *molar entity*, “the woman as defined by her form, endowed with organs and functions and assigned as a subject.” Put another way, the molar woman is the woman as she is formed under the biopolitics of patriarchal hegemony and misogynistic threat.

Becoming-woman is a counter-theorem to this formulation. As defined by Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-woman is “not imitating or assuming the female form, but emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman, create the molecular woman.” Put simply, becoming-woman, the molecular woman, is

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74 Ibid.
an unfolding of the potentiality of the feminine. It is a methodology for disrupting and displacing the masculine, dyadic, phallogocentric subject/object relations that undergird Western thinking, social construction, and politics. *There is neither Jew nor Gentile, slave nor free, neither is there male and female.*

Like alternative readings of Galatians, Deleuzian becomings are not without their criticism. The most common indictment by feminist critics is that becoming-woman is always already a male ideation (indeed one theorized by a privileged white adult male) and thus traps real women in the molar rubric of male domination. “At the same time,” Sotirin writes, “becoming-woman has energized feminist thinking and activism in the work of Rosi Braidotti, Claire Colebrook, Moira Gatens, Camilla Griggers, Elizabeth Grosz, Tamsin Lorraime, Dorothea Olkowski, and others.”

I end my discussion of becomings here by returning to the site of their origins, the plane of immanence:

Deleuze and Guattari refer to this plane as a Body without Organs, a BwO: a body that is not organized in accord with biological functions, organic forms, or cultural-historical values. Rather, a BwO deconstructs these seemingly inviolable arrangements, deterritorializing particles, intensities, energies in molecular lines of flows, thresholds and becomings.

*There is neither Jew nor Gentile, slave nor free, neither is there male and female.*

Galatians 3:28, my Pauline constant, resonates in the key of Deleuze. I wish to posit another religious association. In theological terms, a BwO is not unlike the body of Christ. The one is fueled by desire (for Deleuze a BwO is a desiring machine), the other sustained by agape, the desire to love thy neighbor as thyself. I refer not to the Eucharist, but the body of believers saved by grace and the baptism of the spirit through Christ’s

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75 Sotirin, “Becoming-woman,” 104.
76 Ibid., 101-02.
resurrection. Following this Pauline-Deleuzian line of flight, I wish to suggest that
Shakespeare deconstructs the seemingly inviolable arrangements of patriarchal structure
in The Winter’s Tale through the resurrection of Hermione-as-statue and the return of
Perdita from supposed death. It is to these resurrections that I now would direct attention.

POLITICAL RESURRECTION

Much has been written about the theme of resurrection in The Winter’s Tale. By
the play’s conclusion two physical resurrections have occurred. Perdita, believed dead
some sixteen years, is found to be alive and well in Bohemia, raised to think herself the
Old Shepherd’s daughter. Hermione’s resurrection is a scene of theatrical awe for
characters and audiences alike, as a seeming-statue is given movement, breath, and voice.
Hunt argues that “[o]f all of Shakespeare’s plays, The Winter’s Tale uncharacteristically
keeps the audience in the same state of ignorance endured by the onstage characters.”

Hermione’s resurrection is staged as follows:

’Tis time. Descend. Be stone no more. Approach.
Strike all that look upon with marvel. Come,
I’ll fill your grave up. Stir. Nay, come away.
Bequeath to death your numbness, for from him
Dear life redeems you.  
(5.3.99-103)


Adam Max Cohen reads this resurrection as “profoundly Christian,” allegorizing Paulina as a type of Christ exchanging her body for Hermione’s “in a sacrificial act” recalling Christ’s death and atonement for mankind’s sins (“Come, / I’ll fill your grave up…Dear life redeems you”). 79 For Richard Wilson it is Hermione who arises from her grave Christ-like, offering redemption to The Winter’s Tale’s fallen world. 80 Opinions vary. Within a religious framework, particularly that of Pauline theology, resurrection symbolizes a new life in Christ, the opportunity to live a life renewed in the service of others. Thinking politically, resurrection represents the possibility for new political associations and new opportunities for engaging life within the political sphere.

Resurrection, however, is not always linked to positive transformation in the early modern period. As Elizabeth Williamson has shown, “Shakespeare’s play closely resembles other Jacobean resurrection plays…all of which revolve around mistreated women.” 81 Plays of this type include Thomas Heywood’s How a Man May Choose a Good Wife from a Bad (1602), The Second Maiden’s Tragedy (1611), and John Webster’s The Duchess of Malfi (1614). 82 The early modern trope of the moving statue is derived from the tale of Pygmalion in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. This is a troubling text for its female characters. “Narratives of rape and misogyny frame the figure of the animated statue,” as Lynn Enterline reminds us. 83 Indeed, in the Ovidian story, “Pygmalion’s

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82 Ibid.
rejection of women…is based on a misogynistic disdain for the entire sex.”

The Winter’s Tale is no My Fair Lady, and Leontes is no Rex Harrison nor Hermione an Audrey Hepburn. If The Winter’s Tale is indeed “the period’s most famous version of Pygmalion” as Sarah Annes Brown maintains, then Shakespeare’s appropriation of Ovid retains some of the original’s rough cast. Enterline contends that Shakespeare’s evocation is “a story that self-consciously proposes a close yet opaque alliance between aesthetics and misogyny.” By this reading, one aesthetic of Hermione-as-statue is that of a woman frozen in time for sixteen years, fixed by a misogynistically-induced isolationism.

Statuary Thinking

In his introduction to Inhuman Nature, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen provides an alternate aesthetic approach to Enterline’s “opaque alliance between aesthetics and misogyny.” Cohen renders the relationships between the human and stone through the statuary example of Rodin’s sculpture Le Penseur. Cohen’s is a powerful image of masculine anthropocentrism and its instability. It bears repeating at length:

Auguste Rodin’s iconic bronze sculpture Le Penseur [The Thinker] seems an entire world: a body stripped bare and arched into a self-contained emblem for Philosophy, a human figure curved almost into the globe itself. Its muscular autonomy suggests the inward vectors of contemplation, the privacy of cognition—as well as their unthought gendering (Rodin’s Thinker offers an

85 Ibid., 146-47.
86 Enterline, “You speak a language,” 19.
ostentatiously male body). But what of that which supports philosophy’s introspection, the boulder that affords foundation? Without the stone (sometimes fashioned of bronze, sometimes of granite), the numerous castings of this statue would lack support, would tumble into indignity.\footnote{Ibid.}

Just as The Thinker would “tumble into indignity” without the support of its stone, Leontes unwittingly erects his own precarious monument to thinking. “If I mistake / In those foundations which I build upon,” he tells Hermione, “The centre is not big enough to bear / A schoolboy’s top” (2.1.102-05). Leontes’ association is apt. Though he is unaware, the center of the statue he has built in the form of his wife cannot bear even the shift of “A schoolboy’s top” (there is simply no wiggle room), and so, like Humpty Dumpty, it must topple to the ground. Thus we might conceive of Hermione’s descent from her plinth as a movement away from misogynist capture.

Cohen continues:

Stone, for example, enables movement and violence, extends cognition, and invites world-building. Calculus, the study that makes possible chemistry and engineering, is a Latin word that means “small stone,” a counter that glides along an abacus, the means by which we outsource our reckonings to pebbles and string. “Calculus” is in turn intimately related to the support of body and dwelling, calcium, the mineral that enables flesh to swim, to fly, to run. This same substance under subterranean pressure yields limestone and marble, matter for courts and temples. Always supported by objects, substances, and ecologies, the human is never uncompanioned.\footnote{Cohen, introduction.}

Stone as “matter for courts and temples” returns the conversation once more to the religious and the political, and to their shared connectivity. It is also to the uncompanioned that Leontes directs his attention only moments after Hermione has been resurrected into Sicilian society. Polixenes and Leontes, for example, sanction in accord the “troth-plight” (5.3.152) between Florizel and Perdita, an act forecasting the union of

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}
their kingdoms in future harmony. The old are to be similarly yoked in marriage as
Leontes further promises the widowed Paulina to his off-again, on-again advisor Camillo.

Taking up the theme of reunion as a re-union of and in marriage, Tiffany reads
Leontes as a changed man at the play’s close. By her account, “Leones’ redemption is
evidenced in his time-nurtured (and rewarded) wish not for a controllable and objectified
statue of a wife but for a living woman.” Such a reading comports with St. Paul’s
instructions for how husbands are to treat their wives under the new covenant of grace. In
1 Corinthians Paul counsels believers to “Let the husband render unto the wife due
benevolence: and likewise also the wife unto the husband.” This is a “one flesh” of
mutual respect. In his epistle to the Ephesians Paul further connects a husband’s actions
in marriage to the Christ-event itself: “Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also
loved (ēgapēsen) the church, and gave himself for it.” Christ’s love for the church is
agape, the selfless and self-sacrificing care for the other. If we are to read the truth of
intent by action, then Leontes’ love for Hermione throughout the play, even by its close,
suggests an inclination more toward self-preservation than self-sacrifice.

Publicover argues that Hermione’s so-called resurrection is an “un-supernatural”
and decisively political action. By his telling, Hermione’s absence and sudden re-
emergence into the Sicilian polity after sixteen years “dangerously psychologises that
absence; it registers the possibility that the queen has not, and perhaps cannot, forgive the

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91 1 Cor. 7:3.
92 Eph. 5:25.
king for his past crimes.” Publicover may have the right of it. Hermione’s speech would seem to corroborate:

I,
Knowing by Paulia that the oracle
Gave hope thou wast in being, have preserved
Myself to see the issue. (5.3.126-29)

There is no mention here of a wife’s desire to be reconciled to her husband. There is also no sense of queenly duty to an unjust king. Rather, Hermione’s re-emergence into the social and political sphere in Sicily (she is once again the queen) is activated by a mother’s affection for her daughter. For Shakespeare, I would suggest, this affect has the political potentiality to disrupt patriarchy’s power.

Judy Schavrien, for example, argues that *The Winter’s Tale* displays a Shakespeare who “envision[s] a rebalancing of hyper-masculine internal and external life by way of the Feminine, both youthful and mature.” I tend to agree. Hermione’s final speech act begins as one of benediction over her daughter (“You gods, look down, / And from your sacred vials pour your graces / Upon my daughter’s head,” 5.3.122-24) and continues only as the address of one female to another. She never speaks to Leontes. Neither does he once speak to her directly after she has proved to be a living woman and not a mute statue. Perhaps, then, Leontes’ own speech act that would instate the marriages expected at a comedy’s close should give us pause for suspicion. Publicover has suggested that Leontes “is trying to deflect our attention from the still-strained relations between himself and his wife.” By this reading these terminal marriages (in

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94 Ibid., emphasis in original.
terms of plot and plotting) are “an awkward attempt [by Leontes] to assert authority—both over his subjects and over the play’s generic structure.”  

It is important to remember, however, that these marriages are never realized. *The Winter’s Tale*’s conclusion remains open ended, suggesting, I would argue, the potential for its politics (Paulitics) to be as well. Though Paulina is promised to Camillo, their imminent marriage can never fully interrupt the flow of its world’s present biopolitical course. To return momentarily to Foucault, Paulina’s body, now in its winter, is well past childbearing years and is thus shut off from a physical renewal of a biopolitical futurity (of the feminine) through her offspring. The physical body alone cannot a new politics make. However, the Mediterranean setting of *The Winter’s Tale* and its Pauline associations should not be overlooked. Martin contends that Shakespeare uses the character of Paulina to analogize “the assumptions of first-century women in Corinth, Ephesus, and other Mediterranean centers of cross-cultural spirituality.” In so doing, Martin continues, “Paulina and Hermione reconnect the regenerative powers of the female body to spiritual (re-)creation in the physical world through the kinetic energy and affective performativity of their stage action.” Throughout the play Leontes yields to Paulina’s—and only Paulina’s—“affectivive performativity.” At her direction he both mourns the loss of his son, wife, and daughter, and pledges never to remarry unless Paulina approves the match. Shakespeare even closes the action of his play with a final deferral by Leontes: “Good Paulina, / Lead us from hence” (5.3.152-53).

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97 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
Shakespeare also affords the opportunity to consider an alternate political future through his young lovers Perdita and Florizel. Like Paulina and Camillo they too are promised to marry at *The Winter’s Tale*’s end. Yet their promise of marriage precedes any authorization by patriarchal authority (a source of much trouble in the Bohemian pasturelands). Florizel and Perdita’s is a choice to marry they have made for themselves, answering perhaps Paul’s charge in 1 Corinthians 7, “Let the husband render unto the wife due benevolence: and likewise also the wife unto the husband.” Deleuze might call their unsanctioned betrothal a deterritorialization, one that is, perhaps, self-sacrificing in its nature. Florizel’s willingness to sacrifice his “self” *qua* prince, to exchange highborn status for low, suggests the New Testament’s central (political) inversion of the master becoming the servant, and might thus be read as a gesture in this direction.

*The Recuperative Feminine*

Political futures vary. At the close of *The Winter’s Tale* Shakespeare leaves open a potential politics through what Deleuze and Guattari term *becoming-girl*. Why girl? As Deleuze and Guattari put it

Girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce *n* molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to the human dualism machines they cross right through.\(^{100}\)

In short, girls possess a powerful pre-sexual and thus pre-political line of flight. Shakespeare anticipates such a line of flight as he scripts Polixenes and Leontes’ youth as just such a world. Upon Polixenes’ report, he and Leontes

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\(^{100}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 277.
were as twinned lambs that did frisk i’th’ sun,
And bleat the one at th’other. What we changed
Was innocence for innocence. We knew not
The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dreamed
That any did. Had we pursued that life,
And our weak spirits ne’er been higher reared
With stronger blood, we should have answered heaven
Boldly, ‘Not guilty’, the imposition cleared
Hereditary ours. (1.2.69-77)

By this account it is only through sexual awareness (differentiation) that man falls into politics. In the asexual remembrance of the pastoral of his shared youth with Leontes “as twinned lambs,” Polixenes admits there was no economy of exploitation. Rather, only “innocence for innocence” was exchanged. Polixenes is Augustinian in his memory; the fall into sin (“the imposition…Hereditary ours”) arrives through an awakened sexual desire (“our weak spirits ne’er been higher reared / With stronger blood”).

Following a more misogynist reading of Augustine, Polixenes blames women for both his and Leontes’ fall:

HERMIONE: By this we gather
You have tripped since.

POLIXENES: O my most sacred lady,
Temptations have since then been born to’s; for
In those unfledged days was my wife a girl.
Your precious self had then not crossed the eyes
Of my young playfellow.

HERMIONE: Grace to boot!
Of this make no conclusion, lest you say
Your queen and I are devils. (1.2.78-87)

Despite his endearing, “most sacred lady,” Polixenes never answers Hermione’s charge of being called “devil.” Polixenes, it would seem, is tacitly in agreement. What surprises more, perhaps, is that Leontes fondly remembers the becoming-girl of his youth as well:

methoughts I did recoil
Twenty-three years, and saw myself unbreeched,
In my green velvet coat; my dagger muzzled,
Lest it should bite its master, and so prove,
As ornament oft does, too dangerous.  (1.2.156-60)

Not only is this a fond remembrance, it is an open censure of the very patriarchal system with its phallogocentrism (“my dagger”) that, un-muzzled during the play’s course, has indeed turned to bite its master.

From these exchanges we might conclude that, in The Winter’s Tale, the fall into sin is concurrent with the fall into politics. Princes become kings only when they are sexually awakened by their respective queens. Yet with this sexual desire comes “[t]he doctrine of ill-doing,” to quote Polixenes, a doctrine both he and Leontes have shown to be decidedly misogynist. If this correlation holds, then becoming-girl offers a restorative from this political fall, as Polixenes and Leontes’ same childhood narratives suggest. It should therefore come as no surprise when Shakespeare concludes his play by reintroducing Perdita, a literal example of becoming-girl, into Sicilian polity in the play’s final scene.

Becoming-girl’s power, as Deleuze and Guattari theorize it, is love. “[K]nowing how to love,” they argue, is the “immanent end of becoming.” Following a Pauline line of flight (Paulitics), the immanent end of becoming is to live actively in loving service to all others without the political boundaries of Jew, Greek, slave, free, male, and female. Becoming, following Paul, is to follow not a theology of words but of action (immanence), and the operative action is always love (agape). Critchley has been quoted as saying love is “the most extraordinary fiction,” what he calls a supreme fiction, “a

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101 Ibid., 280.
fiction that we know to be a fiction…but in which we nonetheless believe.”

Chritchley’s thoughts on love as a fiction are telling:

I think we’re confused about love, and we don’t know what the concept means anymore. Love isn’t a contract. Love isn’t an exchange of favors. Love isn’t, you know, “you do this and I’ll do that.” The two formulations that I use in [The Faith of the Faithless] are sort of muddled together: to love is to give what one does not have, and receive that over which one has no power…To love is to orientate oneself toward something much more radical. But it also implies a giving up of one’s power.

This may well be read as a secular excursus on agape. Under such love, subject/object distinctions dissolve: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. I have already suggested that we consider Perdita and Florizel’s love as one premised on agape. So, is love a fiction? I’m not sure it really matters. “Fiction is something that needs to be accepted,” Critchley maintains, “[t]he question is, then, how might we manipulate the fictionality of political experience, in order to do something else?” Shakespeare, I would argue, pens such a fiction in The Winter’s Tale, both speculative and supreme, one that remains open to political possibility.

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102 Simon Critchley, interview with Beatrice Marovich, n.p, emphasis is mine.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
FOUR

Thinking Hospitably with *Timon of Athens*: Toward an Ethics of Stewardship

Use hospitality one to another without grudging. As every man hath received the gift, even so minister the same to one another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God.

—1 Peter 4:9-10¹

You do mistake my love.
I gave it freely ever, and there’s none
Can truly say he gives if he receives.
If our betters play at that game, we must not dare
To imitate them.

—Shakespeare, *Timon of Athens*, 1.2.8-12

All too often, to think about hospitality is to become affronted by the inhospitable.² According to Marx’s famous reading, inhospitality in *Timon of Athens* is brought into effect by gold, what he defines as “the alienated ability of mankind” and what Timon rebukes as humanity’s “common whore…that puts odds / Among the rout of nations” (4.3.43-44).³ Recent productions channel such Marxist anxieties: the National Theatre’s 2012 production, for example, has been hailed as “a parable of the crisis of the modern business elite”; across the pond, 2013 promotional material by the Philadelphia Artists’ Collective describes *Timon* as an “uncomfortably timely depiction of personal struggle amidst financial meltdown”; and a review of American Shakespeare Center’s 2014 staging reports that “[t]he play has been given more airing in the past few years

¹ All Bible citations follow the King James Version unless otherwise noted. For the sake of textual consistency with other early modern English texts cited herein, Hebrew Bible references use the KJV Old Testament translations. All references to New Testament Greek cite Eberhard Nestle, *Greek New Testament with Critical Apparatus* (London: British and Foreign Bible Society, 1904) unless otherwise noted.

² I am grateful for the participants in the SAA 2013 seminar on “Shakespeare and Hospitality,” where this line of thought was initially brought to my attention.

because of its resonance in a time of paper-wealthy men overextending themselves and creating bank crises and economic turmoil for the rest of us.4 I would suggest, however, that these anxieties in both their contemporary and early modern stagings go deeper than Marxism and our own fiscal anxiety alone can gloss. As G. Wilson Knight writes, *Timon of Athens* “is far more than an economic extravaganza.”5 If it is not the specter of the Market, then what in *Timon* do we continue to find so haunting?

Derrida turns to Shakespeare to create a word, *hauntology*, and like *Hamlet’s* Ghost (or Marx’s specter), I would propose there is a spirit which haunts *Timon*.6 This spirit, I suggest, is a pneumatological call for hospitality in its biblical sense, which is at once material and also, we might think along Lévinasian lines here, a spiritually-invoked action *in* and *through* which God comes to mind.7 Theologian Amos Yong writes that true hospitality is a material practice underwritten by spiritual (pneumatological) precedent.8 From a theological perspective, the material care for another’s physical well being (food, drink, clothing, shelter, etc) is rooted in the spiritual mandate to *love thy

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5 G. Wilson Knight, “*Timon of Athens* and its Dramatic Descendants,” in *Shakespeare and Religion: Essays of Forty Years* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967), 220. While it is not my intent to elide Marxist associations with *Timon*, the aim of this chapter is to move beyond a wholly economic reading of the play and to direct attention instead to the religious nuances Shakespeare encodes in the practice of hospitality within and without Timon’s Athens.


7 For Lévinas any ethical act is born from the divine injunction to place the other over the self and in doing so the face of God is witnessed in the face of the other, thus bringing God to mind. See, *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 168.

neighbor as thyself. This neighbor love is the practice of agape, the self-denying biblical concern for the other. Between roughly the 1580s and 1630s there was a revival in the understanding of Christian charity as agape in early modern England; concomitant was the discussion in sermons and conduct literature regarding the degree to which agape’s practice (or, indeed, its deficit) inhered to the cultural understanding of both stewardship and hospitality.\textsuperscript{9} This emphasis on agape will be taken up in due course, for now suffice it to say that Shakespeare and his contemporaries understood well this comportment of hospitality. To read Timon, I argue, is thus to experience hospitality’s failure as a material practice alone and to witness the inhospitality of the wholly material. In Timon Shakespeare treats both hospitality’s imminent death and its possible (immanent) resurrection through acts of stewardship funded by agape.

Religion’s echo intentionally resonates in my pneumatic language. And although it may seem “odd perhaps to consider Timon of Athens a religious play,” as Julia Lupton reminds, “the word religion recurs three times in Timon, more than in any other play by Shakespeare.”\textsuperscript{10} Working within the genealogy of Shakespeare’s religious allusions, Thomas Carter’s influential work on the subject of Shakespeare and the Bible finds no less than 35 references in Timon, indicating a deep scriptural archive underwriting this play.\textsuperscript{11} In a similar vein, both Knight and James Bulman have called attention to the


\textsuperscript{10} Julia Reinhard Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 144. When thought in terms of Biblical numerology, religion’s triple repetition may carry further significance.

\textsuperscript{11} Thomas Carter, Shakespeare and Holy Scripture with the Version He Used (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1905), 444-49. In his recent monograph The Bible in Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 144-49. In his recent monograph The Bible in Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University
play’s likeness to a parable. I would propose, however, that Shakespeare approaches Timon not as parable or allegory but rather as paradigm, one which resonates in the key of hospitality across the Hebrew and Christian Bibles in what has been called Timon’s “greekjew world,” or what historian of religion Daniel Boyarin describes as the “Hellenistic Jewish cultural koine” of the Mediterranean in the first-century Near East.

By paradigm, I mean a model of lived practice. The paradigm of hospitality I will be tracking across Shakespeare’s Athens and its outer wilds (i.e. agape in praxis) does, however, draw deeply upon two specific parables. When Shakespeare introduces Timon onto his stage he does so through direct allusion to the Parable of the Five Talents, a story espousing a biblical understanding of stewardship. Similarly, in his self-sacrificing care of and for Timon, Flavius, the play’s exemplary steward, enacts the model of hospitality recounted in the Parable of the Good Samaritan. Both of these parables, in turn, comport as agape in their call for lived practice. Taking up this paradigm, Shakespeare seems to ask his audiences both then and now, through this particular Athens and the actions of these particular Athenians, to consider the very real possibility of hospitality as stewardship.

Timon of Athens lends itself especially to dilation upon stewardship. Twelve of the twenty references to the term steward in Shakespeare’s oeuvre recur in Timon, more
than in any other play. In its Hebrew and Greek usages, biblical stewardship concerns itself with the care of and for others, reaching well beyond the term’s modern understanding as financial, property, and estate management. This biblical idiom gives emphasis to care, and it is indeed the case that Shakespeare gives great care to the idea of stewardship in Timon, both as a concept and its practice as a form of hospitality.

My argument is concerned not with tracking typologies but with disclosing models of behavior. The figure of Abraham offers one such through-line connecting the Hebrew and Christian in Timon’s greekjew milieu of the in/hospitable. Ken Jackson’s brilliant reading, for example, turns to the Abrahamic (Isaac’s near sacrifice and Timon’s desire for a pure gift) by way of Derrida in order to parse the play’s problematic hospitality as it arises from a flawed system of gift-exchange. For Derrida, hospitality defined through any act of gift giving is impossible because such an act is always already caught up within an inescapable system of exchange that both expects and demands reciprocity. In Derridean terms, “there is no gift in gift exchange; there is only exchange.” The gift according to Derrida is thus both impossible and the impossible since there can never be an act of gift giving that does not presuppose exchange.

Jackson’s exploration of the impossible gift in Timon offers a nuanced understanding of hospitality relative to exchange while also seeking to push “down through” the Market sensibilities often perceived as underwriting Christian theology. Yet the emphasis of such an argument, however illuminating, remains largely focused on the system of


16 Ibid., 36, emphasis in original.
exchange itself. Working within a similar biblical ambit, this chapter attempts to shift attention away from reading Timon in terms of an economic model in order to attend to Shakespeare’s representation of relational dwelling and its failures within the oikos. And while it is true that oikos serves as the root for our modern (and early modern) economic, in order to move beyond this economic circuit of thinking I here use the term in a phenomenological sense of lived and shared proximity to and existence with others.

The terms I wish to use—dwelling, oikos, hospitality as stewardship—can be defined properly only in the process, but some prefatory discussion is helpful. I use dwelling in its Heideggerian sense and as the Hebraic yashab. This is a neighborly nearness; it is the state of being in proximal relationship to and with others. Dwelling is a lived nearness with the express desire to secure an other’s care, safety, and flourishing.17 In what follows I use the term oikos in a tertiary strain to mark the space for dwelling as person, home, and wider community. The degree to which oikos denotes “home” or even “community” likely needs no further gloss at this juncture. However, the person as oikos is a concept that requires more explanation. I use the term here in the sense of dwelling, or rather in-dwelling, as in the in-dwelling of the spirit—the Greek pneuma and its Hebrew counterpart ruach—the divine life force of biblical tradition that animates humans exclusively and is distinguished from soul (nephesh), the aspect the human shares with the animal in their collective creaturely estate.18 I have already defined biblical stewardship as the relational care of and for others. It is also a form of giving like

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18 For the correlation between pneuma, ruach, and nephesh, see Strong’s.
tithing, but with a caveat: stewardship is a giving back of what is not truly one’s own to begin with, but rather of what one has been given by God. Biblical stewardship enters Western thought through the Genesis narrative, which reports mankind’s first vocation and vocative calling as the caring of and for all creaturely life.\footnote{On the vocative call in Genesis, see 1:26-28 per mankind’s rule/dominion (radah) as benevolent stewardship over the creatures of the earth, and 2:15 per the divine injunction to cultivate (abad) and care (shamar) for Eden/earth. Julia Lupton and Laurie Shannon write of creaturely life in Shakespeare relative to biblical tradition, see Lupton, \textit{Thinking with Shakespeare}, 131-59, and Shannon, \textit{The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopoli ty in Shakespearean Locales} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 29-81. On vocative calling in the Pauline tradition see Paul’s opening addresses in Rom. 1:1-2, 1 Cor. 1:1, 2 Cor. 1:1, and Col. 1:1. Regarding the calling of all believers, see Eph. 1:4-14. Simon Critchley advances the ethico-political importance of vocative calling in his recent monograph, \textit{The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology} (London: Verso, 2012).} Genesis also narrates stewardship’s first encounter with the inhospitable. The story of Cain and Abel tells both the first acts of tithing and murder, yoking the two together in a correlation to which \textit{Timon} returns at its conclusion with Alcibiades’ acceptance of a tenth of Athenian lives in lieu of full scale invasion (5.5.31-35, 54-58). Cain’s query to God—“Am I my brother’s keeper?”—is answered time and again across the Hebrew and Christian Bibles: \textit{Yes you are.}\footnote{Gen. 4:9.}

My reading of \textit{Timon} seeks to shift critical attention away from gift exchange, biblical or otherwise, in order to better attend to hospitality in its vocation as stewardship, a paradigm that offers not only an alternative economics but one that also better services the alterior, a term of philosophical shorthand used to designate the other in his or her alienating exteriority or estate as a lower class of being (subaltern).\footnote{The alterior’s aspect of exteriority is taken from Lévinas, see \textit{Alterity and Transcendence}, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak parses the alterior in terms of class and subaltern status in her essay “Who Claims Alterity?” in \textit{Remaking History}, eds. Barbara Kruger and Phil Mariani (Seattle: Bay Press, 1989), 269-92.} My alterior motives—that is, my concern with an ethics of and for the other—follows \textit{Timon}’s
necessarily spiritual tack to the degree that within this particular Athenian locale
Shakespeare gives us pause to consider hospitality beyond a wholly material register; that
is, beyond a system of inescapable exchange and the aporia of Derrida’s impossible gift.

In order to do so my close reading of the play must necessarily be deferred. Such
an argument requires a foundation established in the historical understanding of
hospitality and stewardship in early modern England. Following such archival work, I
turn attention to *Timon* relative to its parable allusions as a paradigm for lived action, first
by reading Timon in the context of the parable of Five Talents. I conclude by turning to
Flavius in conjunction with the parable of the Good Samaritan and its call for hospitality
as an other-servicing dwelling-with.

**OIKOS-PNEUMATICS**

Felicity Heal has uncovered a vast archive of early modern English hospitality
literature written between the 1580s and 1630s. On Heal’s report this body of literature
is not exclusive to one particular genre but rather extends itself through the broader aegis
of “writing addressed to social problems.” Sermons and conduct literature figure
prominently in this discussion as one might expect, yet I would suggest that Shakespeare
is equally invested in such social commentary in *Timon of Athens* which takes up the
social problem of hospitality in its material practice divorced from spiritual foundation.

English recognition of hospitality’s pneumatic base in the period is demonstrated by

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22 For a brief yet thorough analysis of this topic, see Heal, “The Idea of Hospitality.” She provides a book-
length treatment of early modern English hospitality in *Hospitality in Early Modern England* (Oxford:

Heal’s archival work which attests that “for most authors revealed religion, and especially the New Testament, provided the fundamental injunctions enjoining a householder to be hospitable,” often citing Matthew 25:35-36, Romans 12:13, and Hebrews 13:2 as hospitality’s spiritual loci. In early modern England, however, it was also true that hospitality’s basis was not always limited to scriptural foundation alone. Although “scripture provided the most powerful spur to hospitable behaviour,” as Heal reminds, the Greek and Latinate thinking of Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca each “provided analyses of generous behaviour that were peculiarly pertinent to the host.”

Despite arguments in favor of remembering the Renaissance as the rise of secularism (both within England and without), the English voice and cultural weight in the period given to hospitality’s spiritual imperative remains worthy of further address.

Timon, believed to be written between 1604-06 and printed in the First Folio of 1623, correlates with Heal’s archival “chorus of lamentation” drafted to address the perceived decline in the proper practice of hospitality in early modern England.

Whether by scriptural or secular precedent, it was a commonly held opinion that nobility especially and gentility as well were called to be good hosts. Thus Clement Ellis writes typologically of the Englishman’s estate in The Gentile Sinner; or, England’s Brave Gentlemen (1660) that the nobleman or gentry is expected to keep “Hospitality his

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24 Ibid., 72.
25 Ibid., 73. On Greek and Roman sources as bases for early modern English treatises on hospitality, see Heal’s n.30.
26 One example of the Renaissance secular turn I am describing here can be found in Jonathan Dollimore’s influential work Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and His Contemporaries (New York: Palgrave, 1984, 1989, 2004).
Housekeeper, Providence his Steward, Charity his Treasurer.”

Ellis’ typological associations encode the pneumatological understanding of hospitality in the period that I will be tracing through Shakespeare’s Athens.

Hospitality as housekeeper marks the domestic arts of household management. Yet when the *oikos* is considered as a site of domesticity (home) as well as of selfhood relative to the in-dwelling of the spirit, the practice of hospitality bears a decidedly spiritual aspect, which is to say that a spiritually underwritten hospitality is a practice of immanence requiring the lived action of service to and for others: proper housekeeping in deed. The steward in Ellis’ typology is providence, a term signifying both prudence and the prudent management of one’s resources (actions befitting a steward), as well as a scriptural bearing in the Pauline sense of God’s grace given providentially to guide the course and direction of a believer’s life. Charity, which I will show in what follows to be the Christian practice of *agape*, a self-sacrificing and other-servicing love, is that which funds the treasury of Ellis’ typology of hospitality.

In order to map such a pneumatically charged understanding of hospitality in *Timon* it is helpful to consider contemporary arguments for hospitality’s decline. To put it simply, the cultural ideation of hospitality underwent a shift from a spiritual to a secular base during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For Heal the occasion of writing on hospitality’s traditional values at this time reveals in the authors an existential crisis of sorts. That is, these writers, she argues, seem “acutely aware” that they are living through a historic moment, a period of epochal transit marked by “immediate economic

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difficulties and by the shifting social attitudes of the elite.”

Clergyman Thomas Adams maps the shifting social attitudes of the elite along the trajectory of their coin. Rather than practicing a scripturally ordained hospitality where one’s wealth is used in the service of others, Adams’ inveighs against his countrymen, “But where is your Hospitality after all this? you can tell me; nay I can tell you. Bestowed amongst Silk-men, Mercers; yea, vpon Taylers, Players, Harlots; and other insatiable beggers of the same ranke.”

David Hawkes has also argued that the denouement of hospitality in seventeenth century England follows the flow of coin. Where Adams finds prodigal spending as the cause for hospitality’s demise, Hawkes suggests that the immediate economic difficulties and shifting social attitudes of the elite signaled by Heal can be traced to enclosure in the Jacobean period. Under the process of enclosure vast country holdings were sold for ready money, moving the landed gentry into smaller (albeit well provisioned) urban homes compared to their once-sprawling estates. As the gentry downsized to well-appointed city accommodations, this same process of enclosure transformed the peasantry into the proletariat. “Deprived of the means of subsistence,” Hawkes writes, “landless peasants were forced to sell their labor power, to exchange their time for cash, to translate their lives into the form of financial representation.”

By Hawkes’ Marxian reading this materialist shift and Market ideology signaled nothing less than the death of

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30 Thomas Adams, *The happines of the church, or, A description of those spirituall perogatiues vtherewith Christ hath endowed her considered in some contemplations vpon part of the 12 chapter of the Hebrewes: together with certain other mediations and discourses vpon other portions of Holy Scriptures, the titles whereof immediately precede the booke: being the summe of diuerse sermons preached in S. Gregories London* (London: Printed by G.P., 1619), 229.

hospitality. Dr. Johnson opines, was practicable only “in an uncommercial country...But in a commercial country, a busy country, time becomes precious, and therefore hospitality is not so much valued.” Yet I would suggest that Shakespeare’s Athens is no less busy than his (or Johnson’s) contemporary London. The ready hospitality of Timon’s first two acts is marked by Ventidius’ release from prison on Timon’s surety, a sumptuous multi-course banquet, lavish entertainments, and the conferring of jewels by the host to his guests, all of which present audiences with a very busy Timon and an urgent sense of hospitality.

Much of my reading of hospitality as stewardship in Timon turns on the character of Flavius, his steward, thus a brief explanation of the estate steward’s role in early modern England is helpful. In the more modern sense of stewardship as an economic vocation, the steward’s primary role was the management of his Lord’s estate. In this comportment the steward was effectively an ambassador, “serving as his master’s voice, as well as his eyes and ears,” whether speaking on the Lord’s behalf to tenants, craftsmen, nobles, lawyers, or magistrates. The steward’s vocation required him to be equally adept at navigating social interactions among the lower and upper classes alike with the full weight of his master’s authority. It is in this capacity that D.R. Hainsworth has described the steward as “a ‘mediator’ in the anthropological sense of the word.”

32 For more on this point see Hawkes, The Culture of Usury in Early Modern England, 95-114.
35 Ibid.
And while it is true that the steward was tasked with meeting all expenses of estate income, including the taking in of “rents, fines and dues and transmitting that money to London,” this role, even in its ostensibly secular turn, continued to bear the carriage of spiritual charge. As a role more broadly understood, the steward in early modern England was a vocation unique in its capacity to demonstrate flow between traditional oikos in the form of the estate steward and stewardship in its biblical association as the vocational calling of all humankind.

Shakespeare contrasts the poor steward in Timon with proper stewardship in Flavius, whom Timon in his misanthropic spiral singles out as humanity’s “one honest man” (4.3.489). I will turn to close readings of Timon and Flavius relative to this position in due course. First, however, it is necessary to recognize the degree to which stewardship was understood in the period to be the vocational calling of humanity irrespective of class distinction. Under this paradigm whether hightborn or low all were called to the service of others. It is in this vein that critics have suggested Flavius’ singular honesty signaled by Timon’s “one honest man” as flowing from a biblical paradigm of stewardship. Maurice Hunt, for example, sees the character of Flavius as Shakespeare’s attempt “to recapture an ideal image of the steward,” one who “comes closest to expressing a cardinal principle of Christianity.” This is a Shakespeare seeking to return hospitality to its biblical dwelling. The cardinal principle of Christianity to which Hunt refers is charity, as witnessed by 1 Peter 4:8: “And above all things have

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36 Ibid., 34.
37 In his identification as a singular honest man, Flavius recalls the Antedeluvian Enoch and his great-grandson Noah, men set apart for their righteousness in a wicked world.
38 Maurice Hunt, “Qualifying the Good Steward of Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens,” English Studies 82.6 (2001): 513.
fervent charity among yourselves: for charity shall cover the multitude of sins.”

This chapter opens with a rejoining Petrine passage (1 Peter 4:9-10) which yokes hospitality to stewardship. We see charity given its cardinal direction, to borrow Hunt’s phrasing, in the marginal notes for these verses in the Geneva Bible, long considered to be the scriptural text used by Shakespeare:

Of all the duties of charity, he [God] commendeth one, namely, which was at that time most necessary, to wit, hospitality, which he will have to be voluntary and most courteous and bountiful. He showeth the use of charity, to wit, that every man bestow that gift which he hath received to the profit of his neighbor. A reason, because that what gift soever we have we have received it of God upon this condition, to be his disposers and stewards.

Per the Geneva’s annotations biblical stewardship is understood as the management of funds from on high as gifts entrusted by God whose expenditure is expected to profit one’s neighbor. In its original Greek, what the KJV translates twice as charity in v.8 is literally love (agapēn and agapē respectively), thus positioning hospitality as stewardship and operant under the banner of agape.

Slavoj Žižek offers his own definition of Pauline agape as “a self-suppressing duty to love neighbours and care for them, as hard work, as something to be accomplished through the strenuous effort of fighting and inhibiting one’s spontaneous

39 Emphasis is mine.


41 Nestle, Greek New Testament.
‘pathological’ inclinations.”42 Although Žižek’s framing of *agape* is designed to be somewhat critical of its theological intent (Žižek would redefine this love instead as “the modest dispensing of spontaneous goodness”), it nonetheless exemplifies the immanent imperative in this biblical calling.43 That is, *agape* in its scriptural charge *is* work; it is an injunction to lived action (immanence), to charitable work that indeed proves hard as it requires the deferral of innate human pathological narcissism manifested throughout history as a concern for the self over the other.44

Swedish theologian Anders Nygren exemplifies well the understanding of *agape* as a vocational calling. Following Nygren,

Such a love as this cannot be shown by man towards God, since man’s love for God at its best is never more than a response to God’s prior love for man. But man can show such a love towards his fellow-men.45

Nygren argues that this recognition of *agape* in its carriage among mankind experienced a cultural resurgence during the early modern period. By Nygren’s account the Reformation witnessed a paradigmatic return to *agape*, one previously unacknowledged across human history since the days of the first century Church.46 More importantly, perhaps, Nygren’s explanation of *agape* comports this mode of love as active human-to-human praxis rather than inert theorization.

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42 Slavoj Žižek, *The Fragile Absolute: or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?* (New York: Verso, 2000), 100, emphasis in the original.
43 Ibid.
44 I use “pathological” here in its theological comportment of original sin.
The scriptural precedent of \textit{agape} is perhaps best defined in the biblical command to \textquote{love thy neighbour as thyself.}\footnote{Mt. 22:39; Mk. 12:31; Lk. 10:27. For a postmodern philosophical and theological discussion of the imperative to love one\’s neighbor, see Slavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard, \textit{The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).} The neighbor love of the Great Commandment, which summarizes both the Law and the Prophets, is an injunction to practice \textit{agape} without discrimination: \textquote{Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you…For if ye love them that love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans do the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the Gentiles do the same?}\footnote{Mt. 5:43-44, 46-47 (ASV). On the Great Commandment in relation to the Law and the Prophets, see Mt. 22:40.} Scholars of religion have found in Jesus\’ injunction to love one\’s enemies a call not only to neighbor love but for human-to-human care (charity as \textit{agape}) as well as the erasure of the distinctions \textit{neighbor} and \textit{enemy} in favor of recognizing the shared humanness and humanity of our common creaturely estate.\footnote{On this see Robert Banks, \textit{Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and Robert W. Funk, et al., \textit{The Five Gospels: What Did Jesus Really Say?} (New York: Macmillan, 1993).}

As Anna Wierzbicka writes,

\begin{quote}
It is against this background, I think, that Jesus\’ teaching on loving one\’s enemies should be explicated: everyone, and, consequently, even one\’s enemies, are to be seen as one\’s neighbors, and so one\’s enemies, too, are to be treated just as the Old Testament taught that one\’s neighbors were to be treated. In one word, they are to be treated with \textit{agape}, that is, roughly speaking, \textquote{love.}\footnote{Anna Wierzbicka, \textit{What did Jesus Mean? Explaining the Sermon on the Mount and the Parables in Simple and Universal Human Concepts} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 116.}
\end{quote}

This love is nothing short of hospitality funded by \textit{agape}, a premise central to the parables of the Five Talents and Good Samaritan, particularly as they conscripted by Shakespeare in the drafting of his Athens and its outer environs.

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In *Timon*’s domestic sphere Shakespeare would seem to take up an advocacy for the praxis of *agape* demonstrated most readily by Timon’s failures and Flavius’ actions, that is, through their respective acts of stewardship. It is to these characterizations that the remaining two sections of my argument direct their attention. Here I would stress that such theological understanding of stewardship was common in Renaissance England. As Hainsworth reminds, “[s]tewardship was not a vague concept in the early modern period as it tends to be today.”

Yet it is the scholar and Jacobean Biblical translator John Bois who perhaps best encapsulates the early modern English theological understanding of stewardship I have been tracing:

> All of vs then are stewards, and disposers of some goods of God: Clergie men are stewards of Gods house, which is the Church; all Magistrates are stewards of the common house, which is the weale publike; Masters are stewards of their own priuate houses; al men are stewards and clerks of the priuie closet of their conscience. There is none so mighty that is greater or so meane that is lesse than a steward to the King of Kings.

In Bois’ formulation one finds an understanding of stewardship’s alternate economics as *oikos-pneumatics*. This is a spiritual economy under whose management are the overlapping *oikoi* of the individual, home, community or state.

I would tarry with biblical stewardship for but a few moments longer before turning attention to *Timon* proper. The New Testament Greek for steward, *oikonomos*, captures the vocation’s economic and spiritual aspects in a manner English cannot. In its Greek transliteration the vocation of steward (*oikonomos*) bears obvious etymological correlation with the *oikos*. As a spiritual employment it should be noted that the steward

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51 Hainsworth, *Stewards, Lords, and People*, 1.
was generally a freedman, that is, a slave released from forced legal servitude. From a Pauline theological position, then, the steward is one who is freed from the slavery of sin and (as) forced legal servitude; or, one might say that the steward is employed under the auspices of Grace rather than Law. From this scriptural vantage, as Bois confirms, all who are saved by grace are thus stewards and therefore called to extend hospitality (agape) to others. As Yong puts it, “because Christian hospitality proceeds from the magnanimous hospitality of God, it is founded on the incarnational and pentecostal logic of abundance rather than that of human economies of exchange and scarcity.”

Yong’s description of Christian hospitality charts what I have termed as the practice of oikos-pneumatics, an alternate economics funded by agape that takes as its management the care and well-being of others. I here use the term funded in the sense of the Latin fundus, as a building ground or site of foundation. Agape in its comportment as hospitality has been recently taken up by Caron Gentry who argues that hospitality in its acknowledgement of “the deep responsibility the self has for others” is, in effect, agape. As a contemporary of Shakespeare’s, Thomas Adams demonstrates this understanding of agape in the call for his parishioners (and readers of his sermon) to “Walke in Loue” by enacting hospitality. As Adams enjoins,

He [St. Paul] doth not say, talke of it, but walke in it. This precept is for course, not discourse. Loue sittes at the doore of many mens lips, but hath no dwelling in the heart. We may say truely of that charitie; it is not at home.

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54 On Paul’s thinking regarding the Law’s relation to Grace, see Romans 7.
55 Yong, Hospitality and the Other, 118.
56 Caron E. Gentry, Offering Hospitality: Questioning Christian Approaches to War (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 8. For Gentry’s extended discussion of hospitality as agape, see 49-62.
57 Adams, The happiness of the church, 131-32.
It is at this juncture that I would now turn attention to *Timon of Athens* and the stewardship Shakespeare scripts therein by testing the mettle of Athenian hospitality through the degree to which Timon and Flavius “Walke” in such “Loue.”

**(IM)MATERIAL HOSPITALITY**

While *Timon* certainly lends itself to Marxian interpretation, what is perhaps more striking is that Marx’s own engagement with the play concludes not with a critique of monetized objectification but arrives rather at the juncture of love and alienation:

Assume *man* to be *man* and his relationship to the world to be a human one: then you can exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc…If you love without evoking love in return—that is, if your loving as loving does not produce reciprocal love; if through a *living expression* of yourself as a loving person you do not make yourself a *loved person*, then your love is impotent—a misfortune.58

The failure of love is arguably *Timon*’s misfortune, yet Marx’s formulation ever places love and its impotency within an inescapable system of exchange. Shakespeare, I would propose, invites us through his Athenian tragedy to consider the possibility of an alternate economics (*oikos*-pneumatics) whose currency is love and whose concern is its proper management.

Even if one subscribes to the paradigm of hospitality as gift-exchange, it nevertheless remains that Shakespeare writes of Timon’s giving in a decidedly biblical mode. His first appearance on stage is in conversation with Ventidius’ messenger who pleads on his master’s behalf for Timon to pay the noble’s five talent debt. As if to signal

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exchange, the messenger responds to Timon’s pledge of surety, “Your lordship ever
binds him” (1.1.106). Yet Timon’s rejoinder confirms no as-yet expectation of
reciprocity; in fact, it speaks of quite the opposite. In a Torahic gesture reminiscent of the
call to care for widows, orphans, the lame and poor, 59 Timon enjoins the messenger:

   Commend me to him. I will send his ransom;
   And, being enfranchised, bid him come to me.
   'Tis not enough to help the feeble up,
   But to support him after. (1.1.107-10)

The koine of Timon’s response recalls both the Hebraic yashab and Christian
stewardship. Despite its initial fiscal gesture in paying the ransom, Timon’s express
concern is to “support” his enfeebled friend. Relative to yashab we might consider such
support as a spiritual-architectural propping up, a “support” for dwelling intimated by
Timon’s desire conveyed to the messenger, “bid him come to me.” By his own account,
proximity (yashab) is at the center of Timon’s action. True to the Hellenistic Jewish
composite of Shakespeare’s Athens, Timon’s response also marks an act of Christian
stewardship, dispensing the wealth in his charge (whose Hellenized koine and material
coin are equally funded by agape) for the good of others, in this case Ventidius’ release
from bondage.

   The specific monetary amount owed by Ventidius overtly recalls the Parable of
the Five Talents. 60 The story tells of a master who before going on a journey divides his

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59 Examples of Torahic injunction to help those less fortunate are found most expressively in Leviticus and Deuteronomy; see, Lev. 25:25, 25:35, 25:39; Deut. 10:18, 15:7, 15:11.

60 For the full scriptural account of this parable, see Mt. 25:14-30. Grace argues that Timon is a play with allusive connections to Jesus’ parables concerning talents, particularly the Matthean parable of the hidden
talent and the two Lukean parables of talents (“the lord who feasts the poor at his banquet and that of
the unjust steward who wastes his master’s goods”), see Grace Tiffany, “Shakespeare’s Parables,” Reformation
16 (2011): 154. Due to the specific sum stipulated as Ventidius’ bond, I have elected instead to focus my
attention on the Parable of the Five Talents.
wealth among three servants, “every man according to his several ability.”61 Upon the master’s return the first and second servants have doubled the value of that with which they were entrusted. Hearing of their gain the master famously replies: “Well done, thou good and faithful servant: thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things.”62 Unlike his peers, the third servant digs a hole in the earth and hides his money in an act that reverses Timon’s digging in the wilderness outside Athens’ walls. When the master questions the final servant and learns that he has not cultivated his investment, the servant is stripped of his status and the parable delivers its warning: “For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.”63

As a paradigm for lived action, there is much in this parable that bears exegesis, both in terms of scriptural intent and Shakespeare’s development thereof in Timon’s Athens. First is the matter of Ventidius’ five talent debt and its subsequent payment by Timon; this sum in its original historical context is exorbitant. A talent in the Greco-Roman world of the first century A.D. was the measurement of roughly twenty years’ wages for a common laborer.64 Whether in its Shakespearean or scriptural purview such wealth is staggering. The payment of a five talent debt accounts to approximately one hundred years’ wages, a sum well beyond the scope of even an abundant life’s full earned income; taking into account the servant’s ability in the parable’s to double his five talent trust the aggregate is even more impressive.

61 Mt. 25:1; the talent allotments are as follows: the first servant receives five talents, the second two talents, and the third one talent.
62 Mt. 25:21, 23.
63 Mt. 25:29.
Biblical scholar Arland Hultgren has suggested that Jesus casts his parable as the management of such near otherworldly wealth in order to convey the duty and risk involved in spiritually funded stewardship. The first two servants who double the value of the talents entrusted to them by their master do so specifically by engaging in business. These two “good and faithful” servants yield return on their master’s deposit only by risking the loss of the respective talents entrusted to them and through the hard work of those talents’ cultivation. Returning to the original Greek of the parable, Hultgren confirms “[t]hat the two may have simply made wise investments is ruled out by what is said to the third slave at 25:27.” Thus the parable’s fiduciary fecundity demonstrates its achievement not by matter of investment but manner of work, an aspect recalling the labor incumbent to Žižek’s definition of agape. Such work requires risk, a hazard the third servant is unwilling to take (hence his action of burying his apportioned talent until the master’s return). In the parable’s Shakespearean expression there is similarly no sense of work but merely ready (albeit dwindling) money relative to Timon. In effect, Timon might as well have buried his wealth in the ground; the negative return on investment is essentially the same. As a paradigm of lived action, Timon also enacts no true sense of stewardship in its Christian vocation but rather demonstrates prodigality, a point to which I will shortly return. First, however, it is necessary to understand the non-monetary aspect of talent in order to weigh the measure of the parable’s full meaning in scripture and Shakespeare.

65 Ibid., 275.
66 Ibid. For further discussion on this point, see Hultgren, nn. 11-12.
67 Ibid.; v.27 reads, “Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I should have received mine own with usury.”
An interesting shift occurred in the etymological genealogy of *talent* between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. By the *OED*’s account, the term came to signify mental endowment or natural ability (i.e. a person’s “talents”), a meaning derived, we are told, “[f]rom the parable of the talents.”\(^68\) Thus to cultivate one’s talents is to work to enhance the God-given endowments and abilities apportioned to “every man according to his several ability.”\(^69\) Although such a change in thinking relative to *talent* first occurred in Lydgate’s *Minor Poems* (ca. 1430), this historical shift in denotation flourished between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as witnessed by its use in William Bonde’s *Pylgrimage of Perfection* (1526), John Dee’s letters (1574), Thomas Heywood’s *Fayre Mayde of the Exchange* (1607), and John Collier’s *Miscellany upon Moral Subjects* (1695), to name but a few.\(^70\)

With its double repetition of “Well done, thou good and faithful servant” and its caution against poor management, the parable of talents speaks directly of stewardship. Jesus’ point is pneumatic, exhibiting concern for spiritual return on (God’s) investment; that is, the development of one’s “talents” for an invested return in the lives of others. The message of the parable is therefore not to increase monetary wealth but the number of lives touched by the Gospel’s good news.\(^71\) It expresses concern for the stewardship of people. The Parable of the Five Talents concerns the use of one’s “talents” for the growth of the Church *through* the giving of one’s life (one’s special abilities or talents) to others.

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\(^68\) *OED*, s.v. “talent.” The reference to the parable of talents is specific to the Matthean story of the Five Talents, “Matt. xxv. 14-30, etc,” rather than the Lukean parables similarly concerned with talents.

\(^69\) Mt. 25:1.

\(^70\) *OED*, s.v. “talent.”

\(^71\) See Mk. 16:15, echoing Ps. 22:27.
out of the economic (oiko-pneumatic) inheritance funded by and through agape per the injunction given in the Great Commandment: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*

Shakespeare intimately connects Timon with the Five Talents by bookending his character with allusions to this parable. Timon’s first entry onto the stage in Act One is a direct scriptural gesture through his payment of a five talent debt (ostensibly an act of neighbor love). His latter connection is a matter of lexical historiography: reminiscent of the third servant’s poor banking methods, Timon finds a wealth of buried “talents” (a mark of unfaithful service) in the Athenian wilds of Act Four. Unlike the ethics of the parable, however, Timon’s management of his talents yields an inverse of return. Rather than the ostensible neighbor love of Timon philanthropos, Act Three culminates with his tragic spiral into misanthropy and complete distain for the entire human race, duly noted by his terse declamation, “Heceforth hated be / Of Timon man and all humanity” (3.7.96-97) and the even more emphatic, “I am Misanthropos, and hate mankind” (4.3.52).

Despite this tragic shift, however, Timon’s initial actions on the stage (and page) nevertheless bear the carriage of seemingly genuine charity. We should remember that his first two actions are to pay for Ventidius’ release from prison and to raise his servingman Lucilius to equal marriageable (i.e. economic) weight with the Old Athenian’s daughter. Scholars, however, remain divided on this point. Reading Timon’s actions with a more cynical eye, Grace Tiffany has argued that “Timon’s apparent

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72 On the aspect of the Parable of the Five Talents as the giving of one’s life qua talents, see Ronald E. Vallet, *Stepping Stones of the Steward: A Faith Journey Through Jesus’ Parables* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 75.

73 On the burial of money for safekeeping as a common practice in the time of Jesus, see Hultgren, *The Parables of Jesus*, 275.

74 See 1.1. These two exchanges follow on the heels of one another; as Ventidius’ messenger leaves with Timon’s surety of bond, the Old Athenian comes forward with his complaint.
magnanimity” is nothing but “an investment without collateral, an ancient Ponzi scheme.” L.C. Knights maintains that “it is not moral truth we recognize but self-indulgence in easy emotion” in Timon’s generous gestures. Yet the initial exchange between Timon and Ventidius in 1.2 suggests otherwise.

Ventidius’ first words report an inclination toward repayment. “I do return those talents,” he tells Timon, “Doubled with thanks and service, from whose help / I derived liberty” (1.2.5-7). In parable-echoing language Ventidius would double the return of Timon’s five talent trust. Shakespeare, however, offers a clever caveat in Ventidius’ elocution: what is doubled is not the monetary sum but rather “thanks and service” for his “derived liberty,” bringing to mind the aspect of the steward as oikonomos, one released from bondage under the law. As if speaking the same language of stewardship, Timon, it would seem, interprets his answer and its action as that of dutiful hospitality, rejecting Ventidius’ offer of remuneration:

O, by no means,
Honest Ventidius. You do mistake my love.
I gave it freely ever, and there’s none
Can truly say he gives if he receives.
If our betters play at that game, we must not dare
To imitate them. (1.2.7-12)

Unfortunately, Timon will indeed imitate those betters who play at the game of reciprocity (equal or greater return on investment). By the close of Act Two he dispatches servants “severally” to Lucius, Lucullus, and Sempronius requesting a return of fifty talents from each (2.2.181-87), and to the Athenian Senators he sues for an excessive one thousand talents (2.2.190-93). This desire (need) for reciprocal return or its excess serves

Tiffany, “Shakespeare’s Parables,” 156.

as a measure of Timon’s poor and indeed conflicted understanding of stewardship. At this moment, however, his account to Ventidius directs attention to mistaken “love.” I would posit that here Timon implicitly calls to mind *agape* as a hospitality of relational dwelling in “support” of a friend in need.

When next Timon acknowledges to those gathered around his table that “We are born to do benefits” (1.2.95), he tacitly invokes our recurrent passage in 1 Peter, “Use hospitality one to another without grudging. As every man hath received the gift, even so minister the same to one another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God.” According to Jackson, “No character pushes down through Christianity in its desire for the ‘other and…utterly other’ in a way Timon does, forcing us to consider where that response and responsibility to ‘give’ comes from.”

For Lévinas, the desire for the other espoused in the Gospels is “already read” in the prophet Isaiah. I would suggest that Timon’s responsibility to give comes from the nuanced distinction in the period between Christian and secular liberality, the former funded by *agape* and the latter by the desire for reciprocity.

The Renaissance idea of inner beauty manifested by outward appearance extended to the conceptualization of liberal hospitality. “The idea of an indissoluble link between gentility and household generosity,” Heal writes, “was here reinforced by an argument that liberality was the particular prerogative of gentlemen and one of the most visible manifestations of true, that is inner, nobility.” For Shakespeare’s contemporary audience, then, it would likely be expected that Timon manifest his nobility through

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77 Jackson, “‘One Wish,’” 37.
liberal action. In its secular turn, however, such liberal generosity was reserved only for peers or near social equals. That is, liberal hosts expected return on their expenditure. Shakespeare offers a glimpse of such opinion in a passing remark between two Lords concerning Timon’s coveted (if unwise) hospitality:

    Plutus the god of gold
    Is but his steward; no meed but he repays
    Sevenfold above itself; no gift to him
    But breeds the giver a return exceeding
    All use of quittance.  (1.2.275-79)

It is thus that Timon’s magnanimity was understood by his peers. To extend hospitality to Timon is to expect to receive “a return exceeding / All use of quittance.” His good graces on such summation prove a wise investment, one guaranteeing a return “Sevenfold above itself.”

Counterpoised to such secular understanding of liberality was its Christian practice of freely giving to those in need, with an emphasis given to persons of lower social status. In Neav Boke of Spirituall Physick for Dyuerse Diseases of the Nobilitie and Gentlemen of Englande (1555), William Turner argued that English hospitality suffered a “dropsye,” a socio-spiritual disease in the form of secular liberality. On this same point Adams writes his own parable over a half century later concerning English hospitality’s demise:

    A great man had curiously engrauen at the gate of his Pallace, the image of Bountie, or Hospitalitie. The needie Trauellers with ioy spying it, approach thither in hopefull expectation of succour. But still silence or an emptie Eccho answers all their cries and knockes: for hospitality may stand at the gate, but there is none in the house. One among the rest (his hungry trust thus often abused) resolues to plucke downe the Image. With these words; If there be neither meate nor drinke in the house, what needs there a Signe? Great Portals in the Countrey, and coloured Posts in the Cittie, promise the poore Beggar liberall reliefe; but they are
Humbly but Images…For Charitie is not at home: onely the shadow without…giues faire and fruitlesse hopes.\textsuperscript{80}

On Adams’ account it is the poor and disenfranchised, the “needie Trauellers” of this world, who desperately need receipt of liberal hospitality, not well-apportioned gentlemen and nobles who cannot know the “faire and fruitlesse hopes” suffered by those unfortunates whose “cries and knockes” remain unanswered without their doors. Hospitality as secular liberality is thus, following Adams, an act of idolatry, a mere “Image” of true (Christian) hospitality, its “emptie Eccho.” As with Adams, for Turner the onus of hospitality falls especially upon the nobility since they have been graced with the burdensome gift of great wealth and the subsequent responsibility to steward it wisely.\textsuperscript{81} It is from this perspective that I would read Timon’s misplaced hospitality in order to better understand its failure.

The grand hospitality of Timon’s initial banquet scene opens as guests rise in ceremony at Timon’s entry into the hall. Yet in a gesture that seems at first a gentle reproof, he waives them off:

\begin{verse}
Ceremony was but devised at first
To set a gloss on faint deeds, hollow welcomes,
Recanting goodness, sorry ere ’tis shown;
But where there is true friendship, there needs none.
Pray sit. More welcome are ye to my fortunes
Than my fortunes to me. \textsuperscript{(1.2.14-19)}
\end{verse}

Here Timon reads his guests’ collective act of reciprocal hospitality, showing deference to the host through “Ceremony,” as a “hollow welcome.” While it is true that Timon does not do so in censure but graciousness (his point is that true friendship needs no such

\textsuperscript{80} Adams, \textit{The happiness of the church}, 132.

\textsuperscript{81} Turner’s opinion is intimated in his title alone. However, this aspect of his argument is taken up more fully in my discussion of prodigality.
pomp), his comment nonetheless calls attention to the dissembling nature of their (no doubt social and socialized) response whose intent Shakespeare pens as a desire “To set a gloss on faint deeds.”

Tragically, at this point in his own narrative Timon does not realize he is caught up within such a false economy of hospitality. He will realize all but too late that his own hospitality has been coveted and abused by hollow “trencher-friends” who prove themselves to be naught but “detested parasites” and “Courteous destroyers” (3.7.88, 86, 87) of his goodwill. The gathered nobles are clever actors at table and further dissemble by way of an entreaty that continues to “gloss” their “faint deeds”:

Might we but have that happiness, my lord, that you would use our hearts, whereby we might express some part of our zeal, we should think ourselves for ever perfect. (1.2.80-83, emphasis is mine)

This is the very secular liberality censured by Turner. As my italicization shows, the nobles’ intention is self-gratification not hospitality’s comportment as service to the other understood in the period. In a Hamlet-esque turn, their speech act is seeming hospitality only. The voiced desire to give something of themselves to and to be used by Timon reveals instead an expectation of return—even if only by payment in self-aggrandizement (“we should think ourselves for / ever perfect”). That is, they do what custom among peers dictates: you offer to return the hospitality you have received, even if only as an empty rhetorical flourish designed to maintain social appearances.

Timon’s response to their entreaty, however, begins to show the cracks in the foundation of his hospitality. “O, no doubt, my good friends, but the gods themselves / have provided that I shall have much help from you / How had you been my friends else?” (1.2.84-86). Perhaps subconsciously, Timon here admits that he indeed harbors
some expectation of reciprocity ("the gods themselves / have provided that I shall have much help from you"). His interrogative quip, "How had you been my friends else," no doubt voiced cheerfully and with good-humored charm, further suggests such assumption of use. The term friend recurs four times in this extended speech alone, suggesting its urgency for Timon. Indeed his earlier espousal that "We are born to do benefits," continues with the admission, "and / what better or properer can we call our own than the riches of / our friends?" (1.2.95-97). These friends are of course themselves rich as nearly all well-moneyed men, the poet and painter notwithstanding. Embedded in Timon’s generous speech is thus potential gold to be mined should occasion arise. It is important to note that the poor, homeless, or otherwise abject are not those shown welcome at Timon’s table, despite the intent purported otherwise in his hospitable speech to Ventidius’ messenger ("’Tis not enough to help the feeble up, / But to support him after," 1.1.109-10). Rather, those “feeble” gathered to benefit from Timon’s hospitality are those who can return the favor—even if they ultimately fail to do so.

It was widely recognized in the period that opposition or hindrances to hospitality as Christian liberality existed in two common forms. As Turner phrases it, “lyberalitie is set betwene .ii. vices, yt is, prodigalitie & couetusnes.” Such opinion is confirmed by the unnamed author I.M. whose treatise A Health to the Gentlemanly Profession of Servingman (1598) follows a similar cultural-medical frame with regard to the declining health of English hospitality as Turner’s Nevv Booke of Spirituall Physik:

According to thy abilitie mainteyne Hospitalitie: for that is the harbourer of two hopes, prayse and prayers: yet let Liberalitie be the Linke to light thee, lest

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82 cf. 1.2.84-100.

Covetousnes might corrupt, or Prodigalitie procure penurie. In Medio concistet virtus [sic], every meane betwixt two extreames is a vertue: so is liberalitie, betwixt avarice and prodigalitie, being placed: this mean in al musicke yeelds a most heavenly harmonie.\textsuperscript{84}

The mean that yields harmony for Turner resonates as discord in Timon where the preservation of means (available resources, money) trumps hospitable action for everyone but an unwise Timon. The treatise also equates covetousness with avarice, a transaction concomitant with the behavior of Shakespeare’s Athenian nobles in their refusal to remit Timon any form of financial aid. Lucullus perhaps voices such accounting best: “this is no time to lend money, / especially upon bare friendship without security” (3.1.37-38).

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the understanding of true Christian hospitality (liberality) was driven by alterior motives: the poor were given priority. Thomas Tusser’s Five Hundred Points of Good Husbandrie (1557) confirms as much in verse:

\begin{quote}
Of all other dooings house keeping is cheefe, 
for daily it helpt the poore with releefe; 
The neighbour, the stranger, and all that have neede, 
which causeth thy dooings the better to speede.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

By the close of Act Three Timon is one in such need. Penniless and misanthropic, like Lear he soon finds himself bare and unaccommodated, alone at the mercy of the Athenian wild. As if failing to heed the Gentlemanly Profession’s warning, it is thus for Timon that prodigality procures penury. Apemantus therefore rightfully asks, “Thou giv’st so long,


Timon, I fear me thou wilt / give away thyself in paper shortly. What needs these feasts, / pompoms, and vainglories?” (1.2.238-40). The cynic’s concern is confirmed by the steward:

   His promises fly so beyond his state
   That what he speaks is all in debt, he owes
   For every word. He is so kind that he now
   Pay interest for’t.       (1.2.192-95)

It is not covetousness nor avarice, but prodigality that is the cause of Timon’s demise.

   Flavius discerns what Timon does not. In Act Two, with creditors enclosing, the steward pulls his master aside in a moment of intimate reproach so that he may help Timon understand the gravity of his situation:

   ‘Heavens,’ have I said, ‘the bounty of this lord!
   How many prodigal bits have slaves and peasants
   This night englutted! Who is not Timon’s?
   What heart, head, sword, force, means, but is Lord Timon’s?
   Great Timon, noble, worthy, royal Timon!
   Ah, when the means are gone that buy this praise,
   The breath is gone whereof this praise is made.       (2.2.159-65)

On Flavius’ report, Timon gluts himself on hollow praises even as his “friends” engulf themselves on his bounty. Shakespeare references *bounty* seven times in relation to Timon throughout the play’s course, suggesting its import. Flavius’ gesture to the heavens, even if only in exclamation (or perhaps invocation), advances a divine eye toward Timon’s bounty. For Flavius, this bounty is that which has been entrusted to Timon by the gods, or by God in *Timon*’s greekjew parlance. Yet for those of wider Athens, Timon’s bounty is reducible to the plea of the prostitutes Phrynia and Timandra:

   “More counsel with more money, bounteous Timon” (4.3.166). Here *bounty* denotes a commodified object, what Heidegger calls *standing reserve*, something’s capacity to dispense—in Timon’s case, his ontological status by his fellow Athenians as nothing but a gold dispensary. What Timon sees in himself as philanthropic (“I could deal kingdoms
to my friends, / And ne’er be weary,” 1.2.215-16, Flavius reports as “prodigal bits”

Taking up the charge of prodigal, Rolf Soellner accuses Timon of being “one cause of a societal crisis in Athens,” on the grounds that “his prodigality supports the corruption and Hobbesian values of the city.”

During the period such charges of societal crisis were posed vehemently by conduct literature such as Turner’s Spirituall Physick.

By Turner’s indictment,

Thys co~monly vsed liberalite in Engelande nowe, is no true liberalite, but rather prodigalitie, for it is quyte contrarie both to ye liberalitie that God describeth and appointeth, and also vnto it that all wyse naturall men haue written of, and haue co~maunded their disciples to occupye. Almighty god in the lviii. cha. of Esay speaketh vnto all Emperores, kynges, dukes, erles, lorde, knyghtes, gentlemen and al other ryche men Frange esurienti panem tuunt. &c. breake thy bread vnto him that is hungry, and brynge into thy house poore & wanderyng me~, or wayfaring me~, or straungers that haue no houses, into thy house, & when as thou shalt se a naked man couer hym, and despyse not thy fleshe. This co~maundement of God, is co~monly broken in occupyenge of lyberalitie. For the poore men haue not the breade broken, nor the herborles are lodged.

Turner’s jeremiad admits a material aspect to hospitality (food, drink, shelter, and clothing) but maintains that such apportioning should come from spiritual precedent. The prophet Isaiah is invoked to remind the elite classes (“all Emperores, kynges, dukes, erles, lorde, knyghtes, gentlemen and al other ryche men”) of their overriding vocation as God’s stewards on this matter. Yet “[t] his co~maundement of God,” Turner inveighs, “is co~monly broken in occupyenge of lyberalitie”—that is, in the practice of secular liberality. Such is Timon’s hospitality despite what seems to be his good intentions otherwise. The poor and homeless (“poore & wanderyng me~, or wayfaring me~, or straungers that haue no houses”) occupy the center of Turner’s argument. Yet we see no

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87 Turner, A nevv booke of spirituall physik, 67-68.
poor in *Timon* except for the servants discharged after the fall of Timon’s estate, the two prostitutes accompanying Alcibiades (to whom he shows open contempt), and the eponymous character himself in the play’s final two acts.

As I have already suggested, it is only rich nobles who receive Timon’s hospitality, or rather, his *prodigality*. Moreover, it is from these same noble “friends” that his prodigality expects reciprocity. It is thus that Timon speaks to Flavius of his financial crisis as a type of blessing, “for by these / Shall I try friends” (2.2.177-78). Such trial is the reciprocity expected of hospitality as secular liberality. In a Heideggerian turn that follows his Athenian peers’ objectifying gaze of standing reserve, Timon confesses to Flavius that he is “proud” his “occasions” have fallen to such a state that he has “Found time to use” Lucius, Lucullus, and Sempronius “toward a supply of money” (2.2.185-86). With creditors at the doors even Ventidius is expected to repay the five talents of a debt now reinstated. Flavius is thus dispatched to Ventidius with the following charge:

Greet him from me.  
Bid him suppose some good necessity  
Touches his friend, which craves to be remembered  
With those five talents. (2.2.220-23)

Once more Shakespeare associates Timon with the Parable of the Five Talents. It would seem, however, that he has here forgotten his own argument for a hospitality funded by *agape* (“you do mistake my love…”) in his initial dialogue with Ventidius. Perhaps such is the nature of prodigality.

John Donne parses the prodigal distinction in the period from a bearing inverse to that which I have thus far mapped, yet retains the same didactic intent. In a 1620 sermon Donne writes,
When we shall come to our *Redde rationem villicationis*, to give an account of our Stewardship, when we shall not measure our inheritance by Acres, but all heaven shall be ours, and we shall follow the Lamb, wheresoever he goes, when our estate, and term shall not be limited by years, and lives, but, as we shall be in the presence of the *Ancient of dayes*, so our dayes shall be so far equall to his, as that they shall be without end; Then will our great Merchants, great practisers, great purchasers, great Contracters, find another language, another style, then they have been accustom’d to, here. There no man shall be call’d a prodigall, but onely the Covetous man; Onely he that hath been too diligent a keeper, shall appear to have been an unthrift.

Donne’s teaching signals a movement in lexicon from a market to spiritual definition of prodigality, from economics to *oikos-pneumatics*. On Donne’s account the true prodigal is the person who withholds their talents from the practice of biblical stewardship. It is thus in a prophetic tone he warns such hospitality will show itself “before the presence of the *Ancient of dayes*” to be not stewardship but covetousness. Thus Donne’s call for England’s “great” men (merchants, practicers, purchasers, and contractors) to “find another language” is an entreaty for the practice of love’s language as *agape*, the offering of hospitality to the alien, alterior, homeless, and poor. In short, to the very character embodied by Timon during the play’s closing acts: the near-dweller though wholly other.

**DWELLING-WITH**

*Timon* is a play concerned with dwelling, the relational proximity of lived hospitable nearness. However, it is as *misanthropos* that Timon delivers a final instruction to his steward: “thou shalt build from men” (4.3.5128). This injunction recalls the Decalogue’s own “Thou shalt,” which Lévinas has described as spaces where

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“[a]lterity becomes proximity.”\textsuperscript{89} That is, in the “Thou shalt” Lévinas locates an ordinance of the other:

It is an original obligation to which I am, in the guise of me, devoted and elected, I am ordered me. “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” or “Thou shalt love thy neighbor, that is what thyself is.”\textsuperscript{90}

Heidegger finds a similar correlation between self/other at the level of neighborliness in his native German \textit{bauen}, to build. For Heidegger, there exists in \textit{bauen} a “covert trace,” a lost etymological residue, of \textit{Nachbar}, the neighbor.\textsuperscript{91} As he puts it: “The \textit{Nachbar} is the \textit{Nachgebahr}, the near-dweller, he who dwells nearby.”\textsuperscript{92} Per Heidegger’s genealogy, also in-dwelling within \textit{bauen} is the verb \textit{to be}:

\textit{Bauen} originally means to dwell. Where the word \textit{bauen} still speaks in its original sense it also says how far the essence of dwelling reaches. That is, \textit{bauen}, \textit{buan}, \textit{bhu}, \textit{beo} are our word \textit{bin} in the versions: ich \textit{bin}, I am, du \textit{bist}, you are, the imperative form \textit{bis}, be. What then does \textit{ich bin} mean? The old word \textit{bauen}, to which the \textit{bin} belongs, answers: ich \textit{bin}, du \textit{bist} mean I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans \textit{are} on the earth, is \textit{buan}, dwelling.\textsuperscript{93}

Dwelling pace Heidegger is an ontological status; to live authentically is to dwell.

Contrary to Timon, it is to build (\textit{bauen}) in nearness to others.

Flavius understands well this comportment of dwelling. On this point Jowett’s reading of \textit{Timon}’s steward bears repeating in full:

he distributes his last money to the servants under his authority, reserving only what he intends to give to Timon. This does not greatly enrich the servants because they money is so little, and the script is written so that the servants


\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., emphasis in original.

\textsuperscript{91} Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” 348-49.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 349.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., emphasis in original.
express no gratitude beyond the communal embrace shared by giver and receivers alike.\textsuperscript{94}

Jowett’s description aptly demonstrates Flavius building in nearness to others. What is built is the “communal embrace,” a commune of shared relationality which is simultaneously a religious encounter in its aspect as \textit{religare}, a site of communal binding and union. For A.D. Nuttall it is not religious action but \textit{telos} that is observed in this exchange: “The Steward, even amid the ruin of the house, must go on dispensing money because his identity is invested in his office: his \textit{esse} is to dispense.”\textsuperscript{95} If Flavius is “pathologically loyal,” to further borrow Nuttall’s phrasing, then it is to his vocation as a in its imitation of the life of Christ as a steward. That is, to emend Nuttall’s reading, it is precisely because his identity is invested in his office as steward that Flavius gives himself fully (his \textit{esse}) to the practice of \textit{agape}. Hunt reads Flavius in this fashion: “This self-sacrificial spirit [\textit{agape}], however, seems to live more fully in the steward Flavius, an impression encapsulated for a later age as a Christian truth: ‘For the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many’ (Mark 10:45).”\textsuperscript{96} It is in answer to the call “not to be served but to serve” that both Jesus and Flavius demonstrate dwelling’s pneumatic aspect.

Heidegger constructs his dwelling through a framework he describes as \textit{the fourfold}. Its elements—earth and sky, divinities and mortals—are conjoined in a matrix of interdependence. For Heidegger proper dwelling retains an aspect beyond creaturely/material estate, thus the inclusion of a supra/supernatural (or “pneumatic”)

\textsuperscript{94} Jowett, \textit{The Life of Timon of Athens}, 81.
\textsuperscript{96} Hunt, “Qualifying the Good Steward of Shakespeare’s \textit{Timon of Athens},” 513.
component (and comportment) in the divinities. This fourfold further comports with the biblical paradigm of stewardship in its vocational calling to “cherish,” “protect,” “preserve,” and “care for” those with which one dwells—whether human, animal, environmental, or thing.⁹⁷

In Genesis humankind made in God’s image is given responsibility (Hebrew radah) to care for all of creation.⁹⁸ While radah is variously translated in what may seem ostensibly negative, as in “to have dominion over” (KJV) or “to rule” (ASB), it need not be exploitative. Like Hiedegger’s bauen, radah too tasks the behavior of stewardship. As one scholar has noted, “radah, meaning to tread down,” is often translated as dominion, suggesting the domination of the earth (and its inhabitants) in all of the negative connotations such a term can leverage.⁹⁹ Yet one must also remember that “Israel’s king had covenantal responsibilities to care for those over whom he ruled.”¹⁰⁰ Per divine requisite the same king was thus called to perform acts of hospitality to neighbor and stranger alike, a reminder espoused in the New Testament epistle to the Hebrews, “Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.”¹⁰¹ Following scriptural precedent, dominion therefore does not mean to exploit or destroy but to exercise care and responsibility for God’s domain, particularly in the interest of the

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⁹⁷ Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” 349. Regarding those with whom humans dwell, see 352: “When we speak of mortals, we are already thinking of the other three along with them, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four” (human and animal); “Mortals dwell in that they save the earth” (environmental); “dwelling itself is always a staying with things. Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things” (thing).


¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Hebrews 13:2.
poor and marginalized.”102 Moreover, Genesis 2:15 speaks to an understanding of radah as stewardship cum dwelling for it is here that God places mankind on the earth “to cultivate” (abad) and “to keep” (shamar).103 As with stewardship, abad means “to serve” and further “implies respect and even reverence.”104 It is with such reverence that Flavius approaches his former master in the wilderness outside Athens.

As misanthropos there is arguably none more alterior within or without Athens than Timon, and yet Flavius would serve him with genuine care:

That which I show, heaven knows, is merely love,
Duty and zeal to your unmatchèd mind,
Care of your food and living; and, believe it,
My most honoured lord,
For any benefit that points to me,
Either in hope or present, I’d exchange
For this one wish: that you had power and wealth
To requite me by making rich yourself. (4.3.507-14)

The steward’s care flows from a love that “heaven knows,” one of “Duty and zeal,” thus it is a love of conscious and willful moral choice.105 In short: agape. Flavius’ “one wish,” though qualified as exchange, does not concern itself with the transaction of wealth as gold but relational proximity; it is a wish that Timon would be rich in dwelling, the shared nearness of a genuine love for the other. Implicit in Timon’s rejoining, “Thou singly honest man, / Here, take”—at which point the stage directions report “[He gives FLAVIUS gold]” (4.3.515-16)—is an echo of the Parable of the Talents. One all but hears

102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., 21. Variousy, abad may translated as “to work” or “take care”; shamar, also as “care.”
104 Ibid.
105 The story of Lazarus being raised from the dead distinguishes the love that “heaven knows” from the love mankind understands. Each report of love spoken by Jesus or about him by his disciples uses a form of agape, whereas the accounts of Jesus’ love by all others in the narrative use forms of phileo, friendship love. See Jn. 11.
Timon speak to his once-steward, “Well done my good and faithful servant.” And like the good stewards of the parable, Flavius is entrusted with more (here, gold and the injunction to build away from men) because he has proven himself a wise caretaker. Flavuis’ response to Timon’s outpouring of wealth—“O, let me stay / And comfort you, my master” (4.3.525-26)—discloses a desire for relational dwelling, even as Timon vocalizes his disdain for all human contact.

There is perhaps no greater biblical paradigm of stewardship qua dwelling than the story of the Good Samaritan. In the world of first century Palestine, when baited by a lawyer on the question of neighbor-love—“And who is my neighbour?”—Jesus answers with this well-known parable. By its account it is not the outwardly religious (the priest or the Levite) who offers hospitality to the person in need. It is the foreigner, the stranger, the alien, the alterior. For Jewish culture at that time there was perhaps no race more alterior than the Samaritan. Yet the narrative tells that it is the Samaritan who shows “compassion” for his fellow man by dressing his wounds with wine and oil, expensive commodities in those days. He then establishes this unknown man at an inn for which he pays all expenses.

As with the parable of the Five Talents, the Good Samaritan requires exegetical unfolding in order to fully ascertain its scriptural intent and subsequent development by Shakespeare in his Athenian ambit. Exegesis from the Church Fathers through the early modern period tended to allegorize this parable following the model set forth by

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106 Mt. 25:21.

107 Lk. 10:29. The full parable is told from Lk. 10:30-37.
Augustine. From this hermeneutic paradigm, the wounded man in need of care is Adam, Jerusalem the heavenly city, Jericho symbolizes mortality, the good Samaritan is Christ, and so on. Reformation theologians tended to adopt Luther’s disdain for allegorization (he famously derided Origen’s allegorizing as being “worth less than dirt”) and yet Luther himself nonetheless allegorized the parable in terms of his prevailing interest in *sola fide*. Calvin, however, is unique among the Reformers in that his reading of the Good Samaritan rejects the hitherto prevailing Christological interpretation. Instead, in his *A Harmony of the Gospels* (1555) Calvin reads the Good Samaritan as a paradigm of hospitality in human-to-human praxis. Upon Calvin’s explication Jesus’ impress in the parable is “to show that neighbourliness which obliges us to do our duty by each other is not restricted to friends and relations, but open to the whole human race.” Calvin’s reading coincides with Jesus’ erasure of the neighbor/enemy dyad in his Sermon on the Mount. Such openness, however, to use Calvin’s word, proves risky business.

Like the parable of the Five Talents, the Good Samaritan’s association with risk is connected to a cultural understanding of its message. The priest and Levite in the story, for example, are perhaps not as incredulous as they might first seem. Vallet reads the

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108 For an overview of this exegetical model as it was developed by Origen, the Scholastics, and Reformation theologians, see Robert H. Stein, *An Introduction to the Parables of Jesus* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981), 45-49.


110 On these points see Stein, *An Introduction to the Parables of Jesus*, 49. For Luther’s critique of Origen and allegorization more broadly, see Stein, 155, n.23.

111 Ibid.

parable as a narrative about taking risks for the sake of others. In this context he reminds contemporary readers and exegetes alike that both the priest and Levite faced the risk of being unclean for an extended period of time, more if the body they touched was dead, lessened if they came into proximal relation with an unclean person. In either case these religious men faced social ostracism prescribed by the law, even if only for a short time, a risk they are unwilling to hazard. Yet in the world of first century Palestine the Samaritan faced no less risk than the priest or Levite, as Sylvia Keesmaat contextualizes:

It is important to remember that Samaritans also followed Torah, and so the same risk of defilement from touching a dead body was present for this Samaritan as well—with such ritual “uncleanness” extending also to his animals and merchandise. Furthermore, he risked retaliation from the man’s family. For in situations of violence, where revenge was commonly taken, an enemy (even one who helps) could easily become the object of a family’s revenge. In addition, the robbers might still have been lurking around the place watching for other travelers. A Samaritan, who probably had more than one animal and some merchandise, was a prime target. Thus the risk of violence was high for the Samaritan.

What differentiates the Samaritan from the holy men in the narrative is his willingness to act in agape, in concern for the other, in loving hospitality to the poor, despite the risks involved. Like the Samaritan, Flavius risks no less in carrying gold into the Athenian wilderness to aid Timon. He too is a prime target for bandits, though not from those on the Jericho road but the highwaymen who canvass Athens’ woods. Echoing the risks of the priest, Levite, and Samaritan alike, Flavius chances not only loss of wealth and

113 Vallet, Stepping Stones of the Steward, 103-04.
material possessions, but the possibility of becoming like Timon a social pariah, guilty by association. Even so, Flavius would tend to Timon’s needs following the paradigm of Christian liberality set forth in parable.

The Samaritan’s actions conjoin material hospitality to the pneumatic call to care for others. The parable’s Greek is also telling. The “compassion” by which the Samaritan is moved is from the verb *splagchnizomai*, meaning “to be moved in one’s inward parts.”

A 1578 sermon by John Stockwood confirms that such an understanding of the Greek was recognized in Shakespeare’s time. Describing the *splagchnizomai* experienced by the Samaritan, Stockwood reminds his fellow Englishmen,

> The Lorde worke in vs bowels of compassion…euery one according to the portio~ that God hath bestowed vpon vs, maye indeede féele and be touched inwardlye, wyth the miseries of the néedie, and in consideration of the same, gyue muche almes to all the people.

Whether one reads Jesus’ parable or Stockwood’s exegetical gloss, the Samaritan’s actions provide witness of hospitality as visceral care not fiscal remove. Flavius’ would-be care for Timon is of this order. That is, Flavius “indeede féele[s]” and is “touched inwardlye, wyth the miseries of the néedie” he witnesses in Timon’s unaccommodated estate outside Athens’ walls. He would even hazard the full extent of his wealth (a would-be giving of “muche almes”) to Timon in his desire to fund the man with what remains of his own dwindling gold, coin that, admittedly, the misanthrope readily rejects.

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116 For the Greek see Nestle, *Greek New Testament*; definition is from Strong’s, s.v. “splagchnizomai.”

117 John Stockwood, *A sermon preached at Paules Crosse on Barthelmew day, being the 24. of August, 1578 Wherein, besides many other profitable matters meete for all Christians to follovw, is a large prooved, that is the part of those that are fathers, householders, and scholemaisters, to instruct all those vnder their gouernement, in the vword and knowvledge of the Lorde* (London: Printed by Henry Bynneman, 1578), 113.
I concede that there is no direct allusion to the Good Samaritan in *Timon*, like that of the Five Talents. Yet I would argue that the paradigm it enacts enters Shakespeare’s text not directly from the Bible, but rather through the switch points of *Timon*’s dwelling. Stitched within the Good Samaritan’s tapestry is the thread of *agape*. Likewise, Timon as *oikos*, as a space of dwelling, whether within Athenian city limits or removed to its outer wilds, presents an example of the person as a site for the practice of hospitality as stewardship in both its failures and potentiality as dwelling. In Apemantus, for example, Shakespeare demonstrates hospitality’s failure as dwelling. By his own account the cynic visits Timon near his cave-turned-home with the express admission “To vex thee” (4.3.237) even as he offers to “mend” Timon’s “feast” (4.3.284) of a freshly uncovered root, an ostensible act of hospitality in the offering of food to the poor. Apemantus’ hospitality, however, shows itself to be further distasteful, as a medlar—“There’s a / medlar for thee; eat it” (4.3.303–04)—is a rotten pear. Penning Apemantus’ inverse in the character of Flavius, Shakespeare scripts dwelling’s potential as hospitality. Flavius’ is a hospitality premised on *agape*, an economics of care rather than exchange. Like the Samaritan, he expects no return on his investment, desiring instead only genuine and self-sacrificial concern for the other person’s well being. While it is true that Apemantus never actively nor vocally seeks wealth in the form of gold, the cynic’s desired coin nonetheless takes the form of *Schadenfreude*. Flavius, in contrast, seeks no remuneration. Thus it is in the person of Timon, or rather at the site of Timon’s person,

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118 Carter suggests Lk. 10:34 is glossed in Timon’s desire to aid Ventidius at 1.1.9-10. See, *Shakespeare and Holy Scripture*, 445.

119 In a similar theorization, contemporary German philosopher and cultural scientist Peter Sloterdijk posits personhood through the concept of spheres and the spherical-relational nature of personhood, placing humans in orbit with one another by sharing coincident (e)motions. See, *Spheres, Volume I: Bubbles, Microsphereology*, trans. Wieland Hoban (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011).
that Shakespeare offers two divergent modes of hospitality for our reflection, the one of exploitation, the other of dwelling as care.

“What is the state of dwelling in our precarious age?”¹²⁰ Heidegger poses this question as he concludes his contemplation of proximal living. In answer he offers the following: we “must ever learn to dwell,” which can only be accomplished if we learn to “think for the sake of dwelling.”¹²¹ By this he means to think for the sake of relational nearness and the care of and for others.¹²² Timon, I’ve suggested, offers a space to ruminate upon hospitality as stewardship and its Shakespearean renditions as one such thinking for the sake of dwelling. Not unlike Heidegger’s fourfold, my argument has worked in the key of pneumatics. In Spiritual Shakespeares, Ewan Fernie has sought to distinguish (to distance) the spiritual, which precedes revelation, from the religious, which is bound to scripture and covenant. I have not done so; my Timon investigates a spirit that remains invested in the religious. The play’s Athens and its exteriors exhibit an understanding of religion as religare, a communal binding together through shared proximity (dwelling) and care (agape) for one another. By Fernie’s definition, spirituality precedes religion and may well take place outside it. Spirituality is an experience of truth, but it is concerned with the truth not of this world but of a world that has not yet and perhaps will never come to be. Spirituality is a mode of opposition to what is.¹²³ To the degree that spirituality is a mode of opposition to what is, Shakespeare offers in Timon what I have suggested as a pneumatico-ethical form of hospitality in its

¹²¹ Ibid., emphasis in original.
¹²² Heidegger’s fourfold extends this dwelling as care to both human and non-human others, extending the philosophical scope of stewardship to the cultivation of the environment, animals, and objects (things) as well.
dispensation as stewardship. The spiritually entruthed world Fernie envisions that has not yet come and perhaps will never come to be is messianic in its gesture, encoding a desire which, if unfulfilled, harbors the potential for despair on the order of Timon’s misanthropy. This spiritual yet non-religious messianism, however, cuts itself off from the equipment for living developed in positive religion, in the form of prayers, precepts and parables that help guide our care for one another.

Yet in *Timon*, Shakespeare offers a glimpse of the messianic in its thinking for the sake of dwelling. Through a false or poetic etymology, Timon’s name shares a phonemic association with time.\textsuperscript{124} Indeed, his tragedy may well be that he does not steward well in the time that he is given, a concern archived across the literature on hospitality in the age of Shakespeare. Thinking for the sake of dwelling witnesses a similar gesture in Giorgio Agamben’s *The Time That Remains* as the philosopher turns his hermeneutic eye toward the Apostle Paul’s delineation of “*ho nyn kairos*” in his letter to the Romans.\textsuperscript{125} Agamben translates this phrase as “time of the now,” signaling not a messianic time of the future, a waiting on the horizon of tomorrow, but a messianic time now, today, in one’s present moment—an enactment of the what-could-be-tomorrow today.\textsuperscript{126} This *ho nyn kairos* is nothing short of the contemporary practice of a hospitality funded by *agape*. Such call to action in early modern England is espoused in Adams’ *The Happiness of the Church* (1619) whose exhortation supports the Pauline *ho nyn kairos* in action as *agape* with the teaching of the St. John:

\textsuperscript{124} Frank Kermode traces the etymology of Timon’s name in “*Timon of Athens,*” in *Shakespeare’s Language* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), 238.

\textsuperscript{125} Rom. 11:15.

According to Adams the Englishman’s fault in hospitality is his dearth of agape, his failure to “walke in loue.” Following Adams, ho nyn kairos must be enacted by active (immanent) stewardship today: “The starued soule delights not to heare Charitie, but to feele it.” Like the Good Samaritan one must choose tangible action over empty intent, “bread of the Buttery” over “bread of the Sanctuary.”

Shakespeare’s Athens, like the parable of the Good Samaritan, affords the opportunity to think hospitably in the key of stewardship. Both then and now. It is a space of ho nyn kairos. In its wider registers, hospitality as stewardship is a challenge to reverse Timon’s tragic epitaph:

‘Here lie I, Timon, who alive
All living men did hate.
Pass by and curse thy fill, but pass
And stay not here thy gait.’

(5.5.75-78)


As an ethical practice, stewardship is a challenge to dwell rather than pass by. If we take up the call to think for the sake of dwelling, then we must ask ourselves with whom we could and should dwell, rather than continue to pass by unaffected.
CONCLUSION

Rethinking life with the Age of Shakespeare

[T]here is no such thing as a man who, solely of himself, is only man.
—Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”

I inaugurate my closing remarks by returning to the Heideggerian thread stitched across my argument. I do so initially by way of the American cultural critic, author, and poet Wendell Berry. At the millennial turn Berry observed that life had lost its meaning. For Berry this erosion of significance, one that is still with us well into the twenty-first century, is the effect of a decline in language:

The problem, as it appears to me, is that we are using the wrong language. The language we use to speak of the world and its creatures, including ourselves, has gained a certain analytical power…but has lost much of its power to designate what is being analyzed or to convey any respect for care or affection or devotion toward it. As a result we have a lot of genuinely concerned people calling upon us to ‘save’ a world which their language simultaneously reduces to an assemblage of perfectly featureless and dispirited ‘ecosystems,’ ‘organisms,’ ‘environments,’ ‘mechanisms,’ and the like. It is impossible to prefigure the salvation of the world in the same language by which the world has been dismembered and defaced.¹

Berry’s argument is reminiscent of Heidegger. One is reminded of the philosopher’s pronouncement in his “Letter on Humanism” that “[l]anguage is the house of Being” and, more expressly, that “[i]n its home man dwells.”² Elsewhere in the same essay Heidegger describes language as “the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself.”³ As if invoking Heidegger’s fourfold, Berry insists that life is holy, it is a miracle, an admixture of human, non-human, and divine. “To think otherwise,” he writes, “is to enslave life, and to

¹ Wendell Berry, Life is a Miracle: An Essay Against Modern Superstition (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 2000), 8, emphasis is in the original.
³ Ibid., 230.
make, not humanity, but a few humans its predictably inept masters.”

Berry might as well have been writing of Western biopolitics. In the brief pages that remain I would like to rethink life through the language of Heidegger’s philosophy and Pauline messianism and with “the Age of Shakespeare.”

HEIDEGGERIAN SHAKESPEARE

My tarrying with the early modern period began with Heideggerian *destruktion*. This project’s argumentative target, like Heidegger’s, has been instrumental thinking. And like Heidegger I have sought recourse from this particular strain of materialist thinking in *poiesis*, the creative arts, particularly Shakespeare’s drama. Heidegger closes his essay “The Question Concerning Technology” with an emphatic and indeed prophetic valuation of the creative arts as humanity’s life-reorienting and life-saving *techne*. Following his lexical genealogy *poiesis is techne*, especially in its express as poetry which Heidegger argues as being the fundamental technology of humankind. Conceived in this way, art becomes the salvific technology (*techne*) by which to rethink life, and by such estimation there is no higher art than poetry. Hence the philosopher’s well-known observation, “poetically man dwells.”

By Heidegger’s definition the *poietic* is a mode of revealing that brings truth to presencing. The truth it reveals is an understanding of life as a miracle of interconnectivity, to borrow Berry’s term, the associational pull of the fourfold as it links

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4 Berry, *Life is a Miracle*, 9.

human, non-human, and divine in existential co-relation. Poetry is dwelling together. To think poetically in this aspect is religious practice, poetry as religare. It is the re-ligature, the ob-ligature and obligation of the human condition that binds us to our neighbors and our shared environments through a common creaturely association with the divine. Heidegger turns religious in this sense during his last recorded interview when he concludes that

> Philosophy will not be able to bring about a direct change of the present state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all merely human mediations and endeavours. Only a god can still save us. I think the only possibility of salvation left to us is to prepare readiness, through thinking and poetry.\(^6\)

In a Hamlet-esque gesture the philosopher tells us “the readiness is all.” For Heidegger such readiness is prepared most readily in the poetry of Hölderlin. For my project, and arguably the West more broadly, such readiness is prepared by attending to Shakespeare.\(^7\)

The poiesis of Shakespeare’s dramatic art, as I have attempted to show through my readings of Measure for Measure, The Winter’s Tale, and Timon of Athens, both scripts and stages life’s existential encounters with the full force of shared ethical relation. In a way Heidegger never fully theorized, drama is perhaps a more poietic form of poetry itself, due in no small part to its players. Drama is poetry in action, enlivened and embodied through performance. To follow Heidegger in an ontological turn, theater is

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\(^7\) Shakespeare impress on the West is perhaps best celebrated by Harold Bloom in Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998). My remarks, however, are not intended as an act of bardolatry (I tend to be an iconoclast), but rather to address the cultural capital and deep resonance the figure of “Shakespeare” holds for Western thought, literature, identity-formation, and so on. The bibliography on such criticism is expansive. Marjorie Garber offers a representative introduction relative to the modern West and its reciprocal ties to Shakespeare by arguing that “Shakespeare makes modern culture and modern culture makes Shakespeare.” See, Shakespeare and Modern Culture (New York: Anchor Books, 2009).
living poetry. As Hannah Arendt once remarked, it is also “the political art par excellence.”

8 Not so much because of its political-theoretical quality, but because “it is the only art whose sole subject is man in his relationship to others.”

9 I read Heidegger’s call to prepare readiness through poietic attendance similarly as an act of relational dwelling, a lived drama of sorts. It is also messianic in its gesture as a waiting for the presencing of the divine.

Shakespeare is no less messianic. Yet rather than waiting on a future-oriented soteriology of divine presencing, as perhaps suggested by Heidegger, Shakespeare dramatizes messianic time as lived immanent action in the now, the inspired care for others enacted today. *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.* To read the messianic in Shakespeare, Julia Reinhard Lupton writes, is to move “beyond historicism by taking literature as a mode of discourse that hosts urgencies that remain ethical and political, but not in a strictly contextual sense; and concern theology, but not in a strictly religious or confessional sense.”

10 My engagements with *Measure for Measure, The Winter’s Tale,* and *Timon of Athens* have attempted such readings.

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9 Ibid.

10 Julia Reinhard Lupton, “Hospitality and Historicism: The Winter’s Tale and the Affordances of Messianism” (Unpublished paper, University of California, Irvine, 2013), 5. I once more wish to thank the author for sharing her pre-published work with me and for fostering generative dialogue throughout the dissertation process.
Each chapter in its own way has positioned Shakespearean locales and characters as instances of messianic encounter in the sense of Giorgio Agamben’s *ho nyn kairos*. The theme of Pauline messianic time (*ho nyn kairos*) as it is expressed through Agamben’s philosophical filter has already been glossed in each of its individual occurrences, yet nonetheless prompts some description here. Romans 11:5, this concept’s referential verse in scripture, reads: “Even so then *at this present time (ho nyn kairos)* also there is a remnant according to the election of grace.”\(^{11}\) The context for this chapter of Paul’s epistle concerns community, specifically the incorporation or exclusion of Jews from Gentiles, or the sacred from the secular (to cast the net more widely), under the covenant of grace. Paul writes that the community of grace is open to all humanity (see vv.25-32). It is thus in *The Time That Remains* that Agamben intuits in the Greek *ho nyn karios* a Pauline emphasis for urgent and necessary action.\(^{12}\) Grace, as I have argued in chapters One and Two, is a mode of political encounter. Read theologically, it requires the lived action of neighbor love *today*. Read from a secular perspective, it is the political charter of the dividual subject, the ethical call to live in community for and with others *now*. In chapters Three and Four I have read the messianic in the other-servicing Shakespearean politics of feminine becoming and the early modern call for hospitality’s practice as stewardship in its urgent contemporary need, then and now.

\(^{11}\) KJV, emphasis is mine.

\(^{12}\) See Chapter 1, n.22.
It is necessary to return to Berry’s concern for language. *Messianic* was not a term familiar to early modern vocabulary. As a word foreign to Shakespeare and his contemporaries the messianic

thus already pushes us beyond historicism towards philosophical, political-theological, and phenomenological conversations that locate Shakespearean drama in a signifying order composed of both earlier and later frames of reference that do not bear directly, in the manner of a context, on his immediate vocabularies or habits of action.\(^{13}\)

These philosophical, political-theological, and phenomenological conversations continue to resonate through our present-day thinkings with “the Age of Shakespeare.” This dissertation has been an attempt to think *life* otherwise than biopower in these very modes of expression. In doing so it has been necessarily atemporal, both historicist in its archival approach and presentist in its desire to propose a way of thinking beyond biopolitical instrumentalism. And as I reflect on the textual possibilities that have been opened up for me through messianic readings of Marlowe, Shakespeare, and the like, I cannot help but wonder what alternate political possibilities (realities) these works will continue to unfold. Their challenge remains to live life ethically oriented toward others, to dwell in neighborly proximity. Would that we all might accept such a challenge today—each in our respective, and collective, time that remains.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 8.
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