Title IX and the Big Time:
Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1950-1992

by

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ABSTRACT

This project presents an institutional history of women’s intercollegiate athletics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC). By looking to the individual campus, one learns about the ways in which administrators, coaches, faculty, and students understood the educational value of college sports. The UNC women’s program began in the 1950s as extramural play and quickly transformed into big-time college sports. By the early 1980s, the women experienced the same tension between academics and athletics at the heart of intercollegiate athletics as the men. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), colleges, the media, and most Americans strongly associated the Big Time with the revenue-producing sports of football and men’s basketball. In Chapel Hill and across America, however, all sports teams, men’s and women’s, revenue and non-revenue, felt the effects of the increased professionalization and commercialization of the collegiate athletic enterprise. The history of women’s intercollegiate athletics provides a new window into exploring the benefits and challenges of big-time sports in higher education.

Frances Burns Hogan, Director of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women, and her colleagues worked hard to expand sporting opportunities for women. They helped create the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women, which provided governance and began hosting national championships in 1971. They collaborated with university administrators and athletic officials to implement Title IX compliance during the 1970s. Hogan and many directors eagerly joined men’s athletic conferences to commence regular season play, and by the 1980s, supported the move to the NCAA. Providing the
best competitive experiences for Carolina female student-athletes motivated Hogan’s decisions.

Frances Hogan and women’s directors nationwide determined the nature of women’s intercollegiate athletics. Hogan and her colleagues debated whether women’s sports should be inclusive and participatory or competitive and elitist. They struggled over the tension between the drive to expand women’s sporting opportunities and the desire to maintain educational priorities. They grappled with men in the athletic department who resisted their efforts to gain publicity, access to better facilities, adequate operational support, and the legitimacy enjoyed by men’s teams. By 1985, Hogan’s tireless efforts created the premier women’s athletic program in the Southeast.
To Michael,

My favorite Tar Heel,

Thank you for your unconditional love and support.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing is hard. Writing a dissertation is hard; and writing this dissertation felt like running an ultra-marathon. Like an ultra, this undertaking required a large and enthusiastic support crew. I am forever grateful to my coaches and team for their assistance in the completion of this project.

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I am very fortunate to have had two of the best college coaches in the country. At UNC, Michael Whittlesey, who taught at least one class every semester, reinforced my belief in the importance of coaches as educators and members of the broader university community. At ASU, Louie Quintana shared Coach Whit’s respect for academic priorities, making sure my training and racing never detracted from my ambitions as a historian. Thank you, Coach Whit and Louie, for preparing me to win a national championship for Arizona State. My favorite experience as a Sun Devil was when we earned the school’s first-ever Pac 10 championship, and hearing associate athletic director Don Bocchi cheer on the “cavalry” during the 5,000 meters when we clinched the title.

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Frances, thank you for giving me your story. I hope I have done it justice.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>THE WOMEN’S ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: CREATING AN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAM, 1950-1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>WORKING FOR A MOVEMENT: THE ASSOCIATION FOR</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS FOR WOMEN, 1971-1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>LEAVING THE MOVEMENT: THE ATLANTIC COAST CONFERENCE</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AND THE NCAA, 1975-1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>EXPANDING ATHLETIC OPPORTUNITY FOR</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAROLINA WOMEN, 1972-1980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>RESISTANCE TO TITLE IX, 1976-1988</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>JOINING THE BIG TIME?: WOMEN IN THE PROFESSIONALIZED,</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMMERCIALIZED ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT, 1974-1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>BALANCING ACADEMICS AND ATHLETICS</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IN THE BIG TIME, 1973-1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CONCLUSION: REFORM AND SCANDAL IN CHAPEL HILL</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

This project presents an institutional history of women’s intercollegiate athletics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC). By looking to the individual campus, we learn about the ways in which administrators, coaches, faculty, and students understood the educational value of college sports. The UNC women’s program began in the 1950s as extramural play and quickly transformed into big-time college sports. By the early 1980s, the women experienced the same tension between academics and athletics at the heart of intercollegiate athletics as the men. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), colleges, the media, and most Americans strongly associated the Big Time with the revenue-producing sports of football and men’s basketball. In Chapel Hill and across America, however, all sports teams, men’s and women’s, revenue and non-revenue, felt the effects of the increased professionalization and commercialization of the collegiate athletic enterprise. The history of women’s intercollegiate athletics provides a new window into exploring the benefits and challenges of big-time sports in higher education.

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Frances Hogan and women’s directors nationwide determined the nature of women’s intercollegiate athletics. Hogan and her colleagues debated whether women’s sports should be inclusive and participatory or competitive and elitist. They struggled over the tension between the drive to expand women’s sporting opportunities and the desire to maintain education priorities. They grappled with men in the athletic department who resisted their efforts to gain publicity, access to better facilities, adequate operational support, and the legitimacy enjoyed by men’s teams. By 1985, Hogan’s tireless efforts created the premier women’s athletic program in the Southeast.

Men’s intercollegiate athletics enjoyed a longer history and greater support; therefore, when expanding opportunities for women, women’s administrators sought to gain the many benefits the men enjoyed. At the same time, however, the problems of men’s college sports troubled many women’s leaders, who worked to create a different philosophy within the AIAW which emphasized academic priorities, sports which served the student-athlete, and less focus on the business of the program. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which granted equal educational opportunity to women, revolutionized college women’s sports participation. Sporting women gained confidence to demand better competitive experiences, and institutions expanded women’s programs to comply with the law. An unintended consequence of Title IX, however, was that administrators on individual campuses preferred a single athletic department with a single governance structure, rather than separate programs and governing structures for men and
women. University executives and athletic administrators’ interpretations of compliance with Title IX helped bring the end to an alternative model of collegiate sports and accelerated the transition from the AIAW to the NCAA.

The Department of Athletics records of the University of North Carolina reveal two more unanticipated consequences of Title IX in addition to the preference for a single athletic department and governance structure. The second relates to the health and status of men’s non-revenue sports. Coaches and athletes of men’s non-revenue teams often have viewed Title IX as a threat to their existence. When their programs have been cut by athletic departments, they have blamed Title IX. Some athletic department officials have taken advantage of this widespread belief, stating that compliance with Title IX forced the elimination of men’s non-revenue sports teams. The reality, however, has been that administrators have refused to make any cuts to football and men’s basketball budgets.

At UNC, the opposite occurred; Title IX worked to protect and increase the budgets of men’s non-revenue sports. Athletic Directors Homer Rice, William Cobey, and John Swofford decided to demonstrate compliance with the law by comparing opportunities and finances between women’s and men’s non-revenue sports. They committed the university to an expansive non-revenue program, benefiting both women’s and men’s non-revenue sports. Therefore, Title IX protected men’s non-revenue sports from elimination, because the school needed them to demonstrate compliance with the law. Even as the importance of revenue generation increased during the 1970s and 1980s, men’s non-revenue teams became relieved of the burden to raise money, in large
part thanks to Title IX and the way athletic directors at Carolina chose to prove compliance.

The third unintended consequence of Title IX concerns the growth of the Big Time. The University of North Carolina committed to one of the largest programs of non-revenue sports in the country, fielding 13 women’s and 11 men’s teams. An expansive non-revenue program required a significant financial commitment, and the athletic department structured its budget to depend on football and men’s basketball revenue to fund the rest of the program. Since Carolina committed to a large non-revenue program because of Title IX, the burden on football and men’s basketball to make money heightened. The need for more and more revenue increased pressure on the two sports to win, which worked to intensify the school’s focus on the elements of the Big Time. Title IX did not cause this situation; the way administrators chose to finance intercollegiate athletics accelerated the growth of the Big Time at Carolina.

The decades in which women’s sports experienced radical change also represented a turbulent time in men’s intercollegiate athletics. During the 1970s, the NCAA sued in an attempt to prevent athletics’ inclusion in Title IX, watched the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) lose control of Olympic sports and worried for its own future as an amateur organization, and fought against an antitrust suit brought by big-time athletic programs which accused the association of acting as a monopoly in its control of television contracts. In the 1980s, major scandals weakened the authority of the NCAA. Most Americans believed college sports had spun out of control, and university
executives feared the extent of cheating in athletics threatened the integrity of higher education.

Despite these challenges questioning the educational purpose of college sports, the business of the Big Time continued to grow. In Chapel Hill, this growth was evident in new facilities construction, the growing power of the booster club, the intensifying pressure placed on the revenue-producing sports of football and men’s basketball, and the increasing importance placed on winning. The athletic department operating budget expanded nearly fourfold during the 1980s. Winning teams earned more money, and coaches would do whatever they could to find the top high school talent.

With the growth of the business of intercollegiate athletics came the lowering of academic standards for athletes. The experience of the student-athlete became further removed from the general college student experience. Athletes earned special admit slots rather than having to meet the academic requirements for admission. They worked with athletic academic counselors and tutors, and attended study hall in the Athletic Academic Support Center. They lived and ate their meals with other athletes, in reserved dorm rooms and dining halls.

The inclusion of women’s programs into the big-time college sports enterprise worked to ease the pressure on athletic administrators to institute major changes in response to scandal and calls for reform. Female student-athletes performed better in the classroom, helping to bring educational legitimacy to the Big Time. After Title IX required schools to provide fuller support of women’s programs, athletic officials celebrated their full and expansive program of non-revenue sports. Calling attention to
this large non-revenue program worked to decrease attention to the potential exploitation of football and men’s basketball athletes. At the same time, administrators could justify the importance of revenue generation in football and basketball because those sports had to fund the rest of the broad program. In Chapel Hill, the program included 13 men’s and 13 women’s intercollegiate sports, and represented one of the best total athletic programs in the country.

This project draws from two areas of scholarship: big-time college sports and women’s college sports. It provides a new contribution to both fields by telling the story of the Big Time and reform through women’s intercollegiate athletics. It also offers a new approach by focusing on an individual institution to illustrate in depth the themes of the national story.

Sociologists, economists, and journalists have produced the bulk of the academic literature on big-time college sports. Three recent publications, Ronald Smith’s *Pay for Play: A History of Big-Time College Athletic Reform* (2011), Michael Oriard’s *Bowled Over: Big-Time College Football from the Sixties to the BCS* (2009), and Charles T. Clotfelter’s *Big-Time Sports in American Universities* (2011) have established a master narrative that follows the NCAA policy history, the history of reform organizations, and the creation of the commercial, professional college sports entertainment enterprise. The result of thirty years of research, historian Ronald Smith’s *Pay for Play* is the best comprehensive history of the Big Time. Former NCAA Executive Director Walter
Byers’s *Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes* (1995) is the most surprising contribution to the field. That Byers would publish a work condemning what he had helped to create gives his arguments power and legitimacy. Murray Sperber’s *Beer and Circus: How Big-Time College Sports is Crippling Undergraduate Education* (2000) demonstrates the ways in which college sports have helped turn college campuses into entertainment enterprises rather than beacons of higher learning and rigorous study.

Other works contributing to the field are Patricia Adler’s *Backboards and Blackboards: College Athletics and Role Engulfment* (1991); James Duderstadt’s *Intercollegiate Athletics and the American University: A University President’s Perspective* (2000); John Gerdy’s *Air Ball: American Education’s Failed Experiment with Elite Athletics* (2006); Allen Sack’s *Counterfeit Amateurs: An Athlete’s Journey Through the Sixties to the Age of Academic Capitalism* (2008) and *College Athletes for Hire: The Evolution and Legacy of the NCAA’s Amateur Myth* (1998), co-authored with Ellen Staurowsky; James Shulman and William Bowen’s *The Game of Life: College Sports and Educational Values* (2001); Murray Sperber’s *College Sports, Inc.: The Athletic Department Vs. The University* (1990); Rick Telander’s *The Hundred-Yard Lie: The Corruption of College Football and What We Can Do to Stop It* (1989); John Thelin’s *Games Colleges Play: Scandal and Reform in Intercollegiate Athletics* (1994); Mark Yost’s *Varsity Green: A Behind the Scenes Look at Culture and Corruption in College Athletics* (2010); and Andrew Zimbalist’s *Unpaid Professionals: Commercialism and Conflict in Big-Time College Sports* (1999).
Some studies, such as Smith’s *Pay for Play*, Sack and Staurowsky’s *College Athletes for Hire*, and Shulman and Bowen’s *The Game of Life* attend to female student-athletes in their analysis of college sports. For the most part, however, women are seen as outside the Big Time and only nominally affected. Title IX is presented as another challenge the NCAA overcame. Much like the NCAA policies and conference and member-institution business decisions they cover, studies of the Big Time focus on football and men’s basketball.

The Big Time is the professionalization and commercialization of intercollegiate athletics among the top 100 or so NCAA Division I programs. Some scholars argue college sports have always prioritized commercial interests over academics; others place the origins in the 1920s. Most locate the escalation of the Big Time in the 1950s with the beginning of Walter Byers’s tenure as executive director of the NCAA. All scholars agree, however, that the problems of the Big Time exacerbated in the 1970s and 1980s.

In the last three decades of the twentieth century, the focus on revenue generation through ticket sales, concessions, private donations, radio and television contracts, and later, commercial sponsorships, held so much power that business interests influenced educational policy. In order to maximize revenue, teams had to win. Ticket sales, private donations, and television opportunities would decrease if football teams did not win as many games as expected. The pressure to win influenced athletic departments to fire coaches of losing or underperforming teams. A football or men’s basketball coach whose job security depended on the team’s performance on the gridiron rather than in the classroom would do everything in his ability to attract top athletic talent to his school.
The university assisted the coach in the effort to recruit and retain talented athletes so teams could win. Schools built bigger and better training and competition facilities, paid star coaches higher and higher salaries, and provided special admission slots for academically-challenged star athletes who then benefited from academic support services reserved for student-athletes while at the university.

Big-time college sports programs enjoyed large administrative staffs, star football and basketball coaches bringing in million-dollar salaries, “blue chip” recruits representing the very best talent coming out of high school, and gigantic athletic stadiums and arenas to attract large fan bases and grow booster clubs. The money involved in the bowl game industry grew as well. In later years, big-time programs, either individually or as members of a conference, signed billion-dollar television contracts and corporate sponsorships. Although big-time sports professionalized and commercialized intercollegiate athletics, all of the organizations involved in the Big Time remained defined as educational. Athletic departments, conferences, the NCAA, and even bowl game organizations were educational and, therefore, enjoyed tax-exempt status. Student-athletes were still amateurs, despite the dramatic increase in revenue brought in by the schools thanks to their performances on the field.

Studies sponsored by educational and nonprofit organizations to reform college sports began in 1929 with The Carnegie Foundation for the Study of the Advancement of Teaching’s *American College Athletics*. Sixty years later, the Knight Foundation commissioned a study of comparable effort to the Carnegie publication, resulting in three publications entitled, *Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New Model for*
Intercollegiate Athletics (1991), A Solid Start: A Report on Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics (1992), and A New Beginning for a New Century: Intercollegiate Athletics in the United States (1993). The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics continues to publish new research approximately every ten years. The American Council on Education publishes research findings and submits legislative proposals to the NCAA. The faculty reform organization, the Drake Group, represents the most radical non-profit organization attempting to reform intercollegiate athletics. Reform groups seek to restore academic and athletic balance by offering proposals that would de-emphasize the business of college sports and reassert educational principles.

The field of women’s college sports history has been dominated by Title IX and the effort to expand sporting opportunities for women. Legal scholars, sociologists, journalists, and women’s athletic administrators have provided some of the best histories of Title IX. Linda Jean Carpenter and R. Vivian Acosta’s Title IX (1995) remains the standard, and Deborah Brake’s Getting in the Game: Title IX and the Women’s Sports Revolution (2010) is the best legal history. Other works on Title IX include Karen Blumenthal’s Let Me Play: The Story of Title IX, The Law That Changed the Future of Girls in America (2005), Nancy Hogshead-Makar and Andrew Zimbalist’s edited volume, Equal Play: Title IX and Social Change (2007), Cynthia Pemberton’s More Than a Game: One Woman's Fight for Gender Equity in Sport (2002), and Susan Ware’s Title IX: A Brief History with Documents (2007).

A history of Title IX in intercollegiate athletics requires one to analyze the AIAW, and most authors have asserted a view that the folding of the AIAW was a
tragedy. Brian Porto’s *A New Season: Using Title IX to Reform College Sports* (2003) and Welch Suggs’s *A Place on the Team: The Triumph and Tragedy of Title IX* (2005) argue that the women’s model of intercollegiate athletics could have reformed men’s sports and returned educational balance to the system. Ying Wushanley, author of *Playing Nice and Losing: The Struggle for Control of Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics, 1960-2000* (2004), argues differently. He provides a more objective view of the organization and points out many of its failings, as well as the greater power of the NCAA. He also demonstrates that many women’s administrators did not share the sex-separatist philosophy of the AIAW.

Histories and critical approaches to women’s sports proved helpful to this project. They include Susan Cahn’s *Coming on Strong: Gender and Sexuality in Twentieth Century Women’s Sport* (1994) and *Women and Sports in the United States: A Documentary Reader* (2007), co-authored with Jean O’Reilly; Collette Dowling’s *The Frailty Myth: Redefining the Physical Potential of Women and Girls* (2000); Sarah Fields’s *Female Gladiators: Gender, Law, and Contact Sport in America* (2004); Eileen McDonagh and Laura Pappano’s *Playing with the Boys: Why Separate is Not Equal in Sports* (2007); and Michael Messner’s *Out of Play: Critical Essays on Gender and Sport* (2007) and *Taking the Field: Women, Men, and Sports* (2002).

History of Women’s Basketball (2005), dedicate much space to the history of women’s intercollegiate athletics in the state.

The research for this project relied almost entirely upon UNC’s women’s intercollegiate athletics records, contained in the University Archives in Wilson Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The vast majority of these approximately 17,500 items had been collected and preserved by Frances Hogan. Hogan served as both subject and research assistant for this project. She must have wanted this story to be told; she diligently catalogued and filed every memorandum, publication, handbook, brochure, organizational mailing, and letter that crossed her desk during her forty years at the university. She even cut out and taped to paper hundreds of newspaper articles related to women’s sports and her program specifically.

The records include organizational correspondence of The Educational Foundation, Inc., the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, and the Atlantic Coast Conference. The papers of the university’s Faculty Athletic Council, Affirmative Action Committee, and Title IX Committee also proved very beneficial. Team annual reports, correspondence between coaches and administrators, and brochures and photographs provided a sense of the teams’ well-being and performance on the field. The collection which helped this project the most were the documents shared among university administrators and athletics officials, including memoranda, reports, budgets, and objectives.
Mary Jo Festle conducted extended interviews with Frances Hogan in 1991 and shared the recordings and transcripts with the Southern Oral History Project at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Hogan’s responses and stories provided much color to this history.

The next step in this project will involve conducting oral interviews to focus on the female student-athlete experience in Chapel Hill during the 1970s and 1980s. An oral history of student-athlete experiences will provide a nice complement to this institutional, administrative history.

Although the chapters are organized chronologically, and with each new chapter building upon the last, they also may stand independently. Chapter 1 tells the story of the Women’s Athletic Association, the student-controlled recreation program for women looking for an extracurricular activity. The WAA’s intramural and club/extramural programs divided participatory play and competitive athletics. This separation reflected the national trend among WAAs across the country, demonstrating a tension in women’s physical education between inclusiveness and elitist competition. Extramural programming during the 1950s and 1960s laid the foundation for the women’s intercollegiate athletics program at the University of North Carolina, established in 1971.

Chapters 2 and 3 explore the ways in which administrators and coaches navigated the struggle for control over women’s athletics between the AIAW and the NCAA. At UNC, Hogan and her colleagues embraced the opportunity to participate in the AIAW,
and felt emboldened by the passage of Title IX. The North Carolina state and Southern regional offices of the AIAW, however, differed from the national AIAW in that rules limiting competitive structures were even more restrictive, frustrating Hogan and her coaches. Hogan’s attachment to the AIAW weakened by the late 1970s. She cared less about the philosophical positions of the AIAW and more about access to better competitive opportunities. She agreed with university executives and athletic officials that a single governance structure would serve the school better to provide comparable athletic opportunities for men and women. Participation in the Atlantic Coast Conference, the men’s conference, opened Carolina women to embrace the change to the NCAA.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide the history of Title IX in Chapel Hill. UNC administrators asserted the school’s commitment to developing the school’s intercollegiate athletics program for women beyond the baseline guidelines established by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The athletic department wanted to have “the best women’s program around.” Carolina’s teams were barely competitive with other programs in the state in the early 1970s; by the end of the decade, teams consistently ranked in the top 25 nationally. A philosophy of expanding women’s sporting opportunities, however, differed from a position of compliance with the law. As Title IX became restricted to require far less than gender equity in sport, the school’s commitment also weakened. Hogan and her coaches faced constant challenges and frustrations; they struggled regularly against athletic officials to gain access to facilities, adequate funding, and consistent publicity.
Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate the ways in which the Big Time affected both male and female student-athletes. Chapter 6 outlines the structures of the business of the Big Time in Chapel Hill. As Carolina expanded women’s sporting opportunities, the easiest way to develop the program was to mirror what the men enjoyed, like longer competitive schedules traveling greater distances to play the best teams, more publicity and televised games, expansive recruiting efforts to gain the best national and international talent, and world-class facilities. The construction of the Student Activities Center in the early 1980s provides a window into the big time and the “athletic industrial complex.” As men’s teams moved into bigger and better facilities, women’s teams inherited their old arenas and fields. Women wanted to win, just like the men, but developing the program like the men brought the same challenges to protecting educational priorities and academic integrity.

Chapter 7 explores more deeply the ways in which business priorities began to displace educational values at UNC. A comparison of “special admit slots” for athletes and those required by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrates that Carolina cared more about gaining athletic talent than providing educational opportunity to the state’s underserved African Americans and Native Americans. That an increasing number of black athletes entered the institution in the 1970s and 1980s amplified the issue. Student-athletes became segregated from the rest of the university. They lived and ate meals with other student-athletes in Ehringhaus Hall, clustered in majors, and studied together at their own academic support center. Faculty worried about the amount of time student-athletes devoted to sports.
By the end of the 1980s, Carolina women’s athletics still lagged far behind the men’s programs in funding, support, publicity, and salaries for administrators and coaches; yet their teams’ success on the field turned the program into one of the most popular in the country. Although football and men’s basketball have been the focus of both the athletic department’s business interests and also reformers’ efforts, all student-athletes have been affected by the professionalization and commercialization of big-time college sports.
Competitive intercollegiate athletics for women existed at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill before the school officially established its program in 1971 as a charter member of the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women. Intramural play with fellow Carolina students and extramural competition against teams from other schools thrived during the 1950s and 1960s, yet official histories published by the university and presented on the school’s websites note that an athletics program for women began in 1971.¹ Students controlled the recreational athletics program, named the Women’s Athletic Association (WAA), with assistance from faculty advisors in the Department of Physical Education for Women. The program offered both intramural tournaments, which took place in each sport once or twice a year, and club teams, which practiced two or three times per week for multiple months or year-round. The intramurals targeted all students and WAA officers held the goal of full participation by female students. The clubs, also open to all students, attracted dedicated athletes interested in playing consistently and developing their skills. Club teams also played against local schools a handful of times each year; these intercollegiate competitions made up the extramural side of the program.

From the very beginning, the WAA’s intramural and club/extramural programs divided participatory play and competitive athletics. The student-run WAA held as its
goal universal female participation in intramurals and performance-based clubs. The students who played, and the physical education instructors who coached, on the extramural club teams possessed a different set of goals: to develop athletic, teamwork, and leadership skills, and ultimately, to win. This separation reflected a national trend among WAAs across the country, demonstrating a tension in women’s physical education between inclusiveness and elitist competition. Collegiate women, both students and faculty, particularly those at coed universities, debated the purpose of college and physical activity for female students. The purpose of sport was much clearer for college men. The values and skills gained through sport, like competitive drive and the goal of winning, served an integral role in the curriculum and the development of the next generation of business leaders. Although controversial and tiny compared to men’s intercollegiate athletics, the extramural program during the 1950s and 1960s laid the foundation for women’s intercollegiate athletics launched nationwide in 1971.

Women did not attend the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in significant numbers until after World War II. Founded in 1789, UNC existed as a men’s college for the first century of its existence, and continued to serve primarily male students into the 1960s. In 1898, Sallie Walker Stockard became the first woman to earn a degree from the university, one hundred years after it first opened its doors. In the first decade of the twentieth century, women on campus established a University Women’s Club, as well as their own honors committee and student council, because all existing organizations on campus were male-only. The UNC system had a women’s college, The Woman’s College of the University of North Carolina, in Greensboro; therefore, North
Carolinians felt the state’s premier university did not need to serve many women. Chapel Hill restricted female enrollment to junior and senior transfers who could prove they lived with “family or caretakers.” First-year female students who majored in pre-medicine were first admitted in 1925, when the university opened its first all-female dormitory, Spencer Hall, despite protests from male students. Female students continued to make up a very small percentage of the student body in the state’s landmark public institution until the late 1960s. In 1962, the last year before Trustees approved the admittance of female students regardless of residency or major, 1900 Carolina women represented twenty-three percent of the student body.

Recreational opportunities for women on campus became formalized in the 1930s, a decade in which women worked to expand sporting opportunities. Female students established the Women’s Athletic Association (WAA) of the University of North Carolina in 1934, at a time when leisure and physical activity increased in value among the middle and upper classes and became part of higher education curricula. In 1935 the university established the men’s Physical Education Department and named Oliver K. Cornwell chair. Two years later, UNC reorganized to create a combined Department of Physical Education and Athletics for men, and named the Athletic Director, Robert A. Fetzer, director of the combined program. Cornwell continued to serve as chair of the Physical Education side of the program. The Department of Athletics had existed for twenty years prior to the establishment of Physical Education on campus, and came into being largely in reaction to the efforts of students to organize
competitive play with each other and eventually against other students from nearby campuses.

Like the WAA that would come later, male students originally controlled both the intramural and extramural components of the program; however, they soon lost authority to first the faculty and later, professionals. Faculty quickly became involved, creating an advisory committee to establish order and control by the early 1880s. The school’s first official competition took place in 1884 when the UNC baseball team played Bingham Military School. Carolina played in the state’s first football game against Trinity College (later renamed Duke University) in 1888. Women played the very first intercollegiate basketball game in the state, when Elizabeth and Presbyterian colleges played in Charlotte in 1907.\(^6\) Professional coaches and staff took over intercollegiate athletics from the faculty by 1915. The Department of Athletics administration included the Athletic Director and Business Manager, and later, after World War II, the Sports Publicity Director. Funds came from student fees and ticket sales, until the Educational Foundation was established in 1938 to organize fundraising efforts, contribute to facilities, and, officially after 1956, provide athletic scholarships.\(^7\) Men’s intramurals remained student-controlled, with a Director of Intramurals providing assistance from the Intramural Office, housed in Woollen Gym and the Department of Physical Education. Unlike the male side of the program, physical education and competitive athletics for women at Carolina were not clearly separated.

Also unlike the men’s athletics program, female students led the WAA and all of its activities, although the organization could have never existed without female physical
educators who provided critical structure, organization, and support. The Department of Physical Education for Women expanded after World War II, with the hiring of a number of new faculty members in 1946, including Frances Hogan, a South Carolinian who had just completed her Master’s degree at the University of Iowa, and Ruth Fink, who chaired the Women’s P.E. Department through the 1960s. Hogan accepted her position without even interviewing for the job. Her father played baseball for Bill Fetzer, brother of Athletic Director Robert Fetzer, at Davidson College. Her brother, Dick, played basketball at Carolina, although Fetzer wanted him to run track instead. Dick told Robert Fetzer that his sister was finishing her degree at Iowa, among the most prestigious Master’s programs in physical education for women, and Fetzer offered Hogan the job without a glance at a résumé or even knowing if she had successfully completed her degree. In addition to their teaching responsibilities, Hogan and other physical educators coached teams and gave lessons, scheduled use of facilities, refereed games, and provided critical guidance to the WAA Council in its decision-making. They did not earn any additional income outside of their salaries as P.E. faculty. Many coached multiple sports and volunteered their time as referees during games for other sports.

Although female students established the WAA in 1934, the organization did not begin to offer regular activities and keep formal records until the 1950-51 academic year. Presented in its 1951-52 Handbook mailed to all incoming students before they arrived on campus in September, the WAA stated its purpose, “To develop qualities of
leadership, to promote interest in women’s athletics, and to provide opportunities for participation in various recreational activities is the three-fold purpose of the Women’s Athletic Association.”

All female students, approximately 800 in the 1950s, were automatically members of the WAA, which worked “to sponsor an interesting, stimulating, and active program that coeds will enjoy” and to promote lifelong physical activity. To attract more women to its activities, the WAA promised “wholesome competition” and “lasting friendships.” Other than the faculty advisors who volunteered their time, the WAA was entirely student-run. The WAA presidency carried the most responsibility; other Council positions included the vice president, who organized special events; the secretary, who took and distributed notes from council meetings; dormitory and sorority representatives, in charge of advertising clubs and intramurals and sharing information with their residents; the awards chair, who tabulated points, kept records of intramural winners, and presided over end-of-year awards; and, later, the publicity chair, in charge of organizing advertising efforts, providing the school yearbook, the Yackety Yack, with information, and submitting pieces for publication to the school newspaper, the Daily Tar Heel. The organization did not have a treasurer, Hogan explained years later, “because there was no money.”

The WAA offered an expansive intramurals program in the early 1950s: tennis, field hockey, golf, and volleyball during the fall quarter; table tennis, basketball, badminton, and shuffleboard during the winter; and swimming, softball, archery, tennis, and golf in the spring. That Carolina, a school for middle and upper class white women in the 1950s, offered both “beautiful” sports and “manly” sports to its coeds is somewhat
surprising. Mid-century ideas about class and race influenced which sports were deemed
masculine or feminine and determined appropriate rules, uniforms, and equipment. Team
sports like basketball and softball, and sports which encouraged feats of strength and
power, like volleyball and track and field, were taboo for privileged white women. Susan
Cahn writes that team sports were deemed inappropriate because they involved “groups
of women playing passionately and intimately together… [and] physical contact among
women; [team sports] were associated with working-class women whom the dominant
culture historically defined as unwomanly.” Participation in team sports made women
mannish, sexually inappropriate, and vulnerable to lesbianism. Skill, especially athletic
skill, Susan Cayleff argues, held a masculine connotation as the American public engaged
in a debate surrounding “competing philosophies of acceptable sports for women” and
“competing concepts of acceptable athletic womanhood.” Carolina sporting women
participated in these discussions.

Poems included in the 1951-52 WAA Handbook highlighted, yet softened, the
distinction between beautiful and aggressive sports, making them more palatable to
incoming female students, many of whom sought husbands in addition to degrees in
Chapel Hill (or at least their parents encouraged this pursuit of the “M.R.S. degree”). On
tennis, “A ‘love’ game we all can play; As we exercise this pleasant way; So get your
racket and ‘horn right in’; Our tennis classes will help you win!” Tennis, a beautiful
sport, was easy to emphasize as a positive experience for women and their physical
development. On volleyball, “On the volleyball court you get into form; Smashing blows
across the net; It’s fun to play and it’s good to learn; We’ll meet you there—you bet!”
Volleyball involved twisting, diving, jumping, smashing, and, as a power sport, the rippling of muscles deemed unattractive. By emphasizing the shaping of a woman’s form, the volleyball poem sought to downplay the game’s unattractiveness and play up its role in creating a pleasing female figure. Swimming, another acceptable sport for women in the 1950s, was easy to advertise. “Come get in the swim with our bathing beauties; At Water Carnival you’ll see some cuties. At this nice clean sport you never get bigger; For it guarantees you that mermaid figure.” Not only could women envision themselves as beautiful mermaids, they also could meet attractive men by participating in swimming at Carolina.

The poetry blurring the distinction between beautiful and manly sports continued throughout the 1950s as a strategy to highlight the appeal of beautiful sports while at the same time making manly sports more palatable and therefore permissible to play. At the 1959 awards picnic, a Carolina coed recited, “When I came to Carolina my nose was crooked, deformed, and such a pity; I broke it in intramural basketball and now I’m oh so pretty.” This poem acknowledged the physicality of basketball, yet turned a fearful broken nose into a positive because the girl in the poem became more attractive. Another poem shared at the awards picnic suggested that participation in the WAA would help female students find men: “When I came to Carolina I didn’t even date; Until I went to the Co-Rec Carnival and met my mate.” This poem reversed the stereotype that sporting women were uninterested or did not have the time to meet available bachelors. The layered meanings of WAA poems asserted themes attractive to many Carolina coeds in the 1950s, looking for romance as they improved their figures and earned their degrees.
In its attempt to appeal to all Carolina coeds, the WAA offered two types of activities, intramurals, the “inclusive” recreational side of the program, and clubs, the “competitive” athletic side of the program. Clubs required a more regular commitment than the intramural tournaments, with weekly practices and competition against local schools. Female students who wished to get some exercise, make some friends, and develop their figures could play intramural sports. Female athletes with better abilities who wished to develop their skills and compete against other talented, serious women could participate in intramurals and compete in clubs. The clubs offered in 1951-52 included (field) hockey, splash (swimming), basketball, badminton, and folk dance. The badminton club was co-recreational and offered to men and women “enjoyable evenings of play,” and the folk dance club, also co-recreational, was led by foreign students who taught the dances of their home countries. The splash club, which required try-outs because of its popularity, was not competitive, but focused on form and beauty. Carolina “mermaids” would perfect their “swimming strokes, rhythm, and smoothness” in preparation for a “Spring Pageant” to show off their figures and skills.

Women involved in the competitive side of the program, which was considerably smaller, revealed its controversial nature as they both provided opportunity and simultaneously worked to downplay its competitiveness. Only two clubs were available to women in 1951-52, likely because Frances Hogan was not involved in the WAA that year and coached multiple club teams most years. The hockey and basketball clubs competed against other schools’ club teams. The field hockey team played Guilford, Duke, and Elon in 1950 and planned to play more teams during the 1951 season, and the
basketball team played games with local schools in scheduled events and Sports Days, which involved tournaments hosted by one school and participated in by multiple teams.

In North Carolina by the 1950s, the term “Sports Days” had replaced “Play Days” (or “playdays”) in the women’s vocabulary. Play Days deemphasized competition between schools, with physical educators in charge often splitting up women from the participating colleges to create mixed teams in order to downplay competition and highlight cooperation and fun. Sports Days involved club teams representing their schools, with competitive athletes who wanted to win. They were still sportsmanlike and ladylike, but they had no problem defeating their opponents from other schools. The women concluded every club event and Sports Day with food, drink, and socializing, valuing friendship over rivalry.

To increase participation, the WAA offered social special events: co-recreational intramurals organized with the (men’s) Intramural Office, the WAA Fall Orientation Picnic, and the Spring Awards Picnic. The 1951-52 Handbook advertised, “Several times during the year the W.A.A. and the intramurals department sponsor co-recreational sports nights featuring volleyball, table tennis, darts, badminton, skish, and various table games.”18 The WAA and Intramural Office paired women’s organizations (dorms, sororities, and majors) with men’s organizations (dorms, fraternities, and majors) to create the teams. The ultimate co-recreational event was the Co-Recreational Carnival, an evening of relays, carnival games, and sports that proved most popular of all WAA events every year. The Spring Awards Picnic closed the year for the WAA in a celebratory manner. Points accumulated by women’s organizations contributed to the
competition for two All-Sports Cups, awarded at the event. Although all organizations played together, the points competition was separated with dormitories competing for one cup and sororities competing for another cup.\textsuperscript{19}

The student volunteers of the WAA struggled to convince students to participate, and not all events proved successful. For a few years beginning in 1952, the WAA Council hosted a Play Day in conjunction with Fall Orientation. WAA officers decided to scrap the idea because female students did not want to get sweaty the day before the first day of classes and preferred socializing with male students. Hosting a big logistical event at the beginning of the school year proved difficult for WAA officers who also were getting adjusted to the new semester. In the first Play Day, WAA officers made the mistake of offering tire rolling and pie eating, two off-putting events for new Carolina coeds looking to make a good first impression. Other events demonstrated the playful, carnival-like atmosphere of a traditional play day: “hoopla toothpicks and lifesavers” involved passing lifesavers down a line of teammates with toothpicks held in each woman’s mouth; in “tissue paper race,” women used a spoon to walk a piece of tissue paper back and forth, exchanging it between teammates; and “cracker crumbs” required each woman to eat a cracker and whistle in successive order down the line of teammates. During an hour-long lunch break, participants in the Fall Orientation Play Day could go for a swim in the pool, and after lunch, new coeds could continue to swim or try out many of the sports offered: ping pong, shuffleboard, tennis, volleyball, or anything else if they requested it.\textsuperscript{20}
Despite changes to the program in 1953, the Fall Orientation WAA Picnic and Play Day continued to struggle. Carolyn Johnson, one of the more organized and productive WAA presidents, questioned attendees about their experiences, wrote a summary of the event, and presented her concluding comments to the WAA Council.

The play day occurred too late in the week, when everybody was worn out by the activities of the [orientation] program, and many had other plans for the weekend. Considering these elements and the fact that there were conflicting activities, such as the Yack photos going on that morning, there was a good crowd present. We had planned on about 250 girls, however, and only approximately 100 came, consequently there was much food leftover. The girls who came to the play day, however, seemed to have a good time. The relays were enjoyed, also the swimming. The sports activities planned for after lunch were not too successful. Some, however, played ping pong and shuffleboard until about 3:00. At least 30 girls went in swimming. Altogether, the play day was successful, I believe, and a good idea for future years, worked over and improved, of course.21

Johnson recommended the play day occur during the beginning of Orientation rather than at the end, but that suggestion might have led to decreased turnout, because the WAA would not have had as much time to advertise the event and new students likely would have been more concerned about settling into their new living spaces, registering for classes, and taking placement exams. The WAA Council scrapped the orientation play day by 1955.

The successes and struggles of the organization ebbed and flowed depending on its leadership from year to year. With Carolyn Johnson as president and Frances Hogan back in her advisory role, the WAA grew as an organization in the 1953-54 academic year. Johnson’s passion for developing the WAA showed in her professionalism and
organization, and Hogan proved an eager accomplice in helping Johnson achieve her ambitious goals. While the structure of the organization and its communication with female students remained largely the same, Johnson and Hogan did more to grow the competitive side, the club sports, of the WAA’s offerings. Two new clubs, coached by Hogan, included tennis and golf, sports that would play an important role in UNC women’s athletics’ early history.

While Johnson committed to expand the competitive side of the WAA, she also valued the organization’s inclusive purpose. In her welcome letter to “Carolina coeds,” Johnson continued the format created by her predecessors that emphasized the inclusiveness of the organization. In the previous year, 1952, President Betsy Norwood wrote, “So you’re not Patty Berg or a lady Babe Ruth, we still want you,” and explained that all female students were already members of the WAA. Johnson carried on in a similar vein, “You may not be a Maureen Connelly or a Babe Zaharias; we still want to see you down at the Gym!” This strategy was clever because women who did not feel they were athletic would feel included and become more apt to participate. Women who did want to be the next Connelly or Zaharias would be inspired to prove they were. In 1951, President Faye Culpepper appealed to women’s sense of gender disparities when she wrote in her welcome letter, “Although we don’t get the headline streamers the boys do, and are temporarily seated on Saturdays, seeing them do their ‘stuff’—coeds, too, have a varied program of athletics, including almost every sport from basketball to ping pong.” Like her predecessors, Johnson’s goal was 100 percent participation, and her organizational skills helped the WAA for many years to come. Johnson’s many
recommendations to the Council throughout the year, like budget increases and better mailing campaigns, helped to strengthen the organization in future years.25

Carolyn Johnson worked hard to make the WAA a professional organization with expansive programs, and wanted her fellow students to take the organization and its programs seriously. She held more frequent WAA Council meetings, distributed meeting minutes to council members; communicated through memoranda to her sports chairmen, WAA representatives in the dorms and sorority houses, and intramural managers; and checked frequently to ensure representatives had hung posters to advertise upcoming tournaments or club tryouts. She set in writing the duties of the WAA officials so that those in the future could run a more efficient organization. She sought to reduce the number of forfeitures in intramural tournaments, perhaps her biggest annoyance. In all forms of advertisement of upcoming tournaments, Johnson made sure to include the following warning:

Do not enter the name of any person who does not sincerely intend to participate. THIS WASTES VALUABLE TIME OF THE PLANNERS AND OPPONENTS SCHEDULED TO PLAY THAT INDIVIDUAL. IT ALSO TIES UP COURT SPACE WHICH COULD BE USED OTHERWISE, HAD NOT A MATCH WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL HAD TO BE SCHEDULED [emphasis in the original].26

No shows hurt both the students who had planned to play and the organization’s effectiveness. Johnson worked to ensure her organization’s programs ran smoothly; she wanted Carolina students to enjoy their opportunity to play.

Even as Johnson and Hogan grew the club side of the WAA, intramurals and co-recreational activities continued to make up the majority of the organization’s efforts and member participation. Most female students sought social activities with a fitness
component more than strenuous athletic play. The most popular event across campus in the 1950s and 1960s was the Co-Recreational Sports Carnival, co-sponsored by the WAA and the Men’s Intramural Office. The first Co-Rec Carnival took place in 1947 in Woollen Gymnasium, the men’s physical education and recreational gym, and by the late 1950s, more than 400 students participated annually.27 Men’s and women’s organizations signed up early, and waited in eager anticipation of the master list of pairings. Matched men’s and women’s organizations met well in advance of the Carnival to select their events and individuals for participation. WAA officers organized carnival games, Men’s Intramural Officers organized mixed relays, and P.E. majors and staff organized the other sports competitions and volunteered as officials for the evening of fun and games. Organizers reminded all participants, “It is the responsibility of the men’s organization to arrange to escort the members of the women’s organization with whom they are teamed to and from the gymnasium.”28 The Carnival was as much a date night as it was a recreation night.

The Carnival’s mixed sports events demonstrate the WAA’s effort to discourage male show-offs and increase female participation. In the 1950s, female volleyball servers were permitted the assistance of one hit to get the ball over the net to begin play. This rule was eliminated by the early 1960s, reflecting increased skill or an effort not to belittle the women. During all years of the Carnival, two male teammates were not allowed to hit the ball back-to-back, and a female was required to volley the ball before a team could hit the ball to their competitors on the other side of the net.29 Other sports
included basketball foul shooting, archery, shuffleboard, tetherball (women)/box hockey (men), mixed table tennis, and bait casting (men only).

If coeds did not want to play sports, they could play carnival games. In 1953, the games, envisioned and constructed by students, included “pyramid candle bowling,” “discus throw” using paper plates, “musical bingo,” miniature golf, “bell ring,” which involved the throwing of balls through hoops while trying not to ring a bell suspended in the middle of the hoop; and, a North Carolina special, the “Walter Raleigh Relay,” in which “boys lay out cardboard squares and girls step on them in a race to the finish line.” To many coeds, the carnival games proved attractive, because male competitors could show off and win for their female teammates.

Just as popular as the carnival games for their flirtatious nature, the mixed relays involved teams of “four boys and four girls” participating in silly events dreamed up by the Carnival committee. In 1953 the relay events included the “Baton Relay,” which involved the passing of a towel baton; the “Up and Down Relay,” in which participants would dribble a basketball, roll the ball under the teams legs, and have teammates crouch down so that they could straddle and run over them; the “Tire Rolling Relay”; and, finally, the “Honeymoon Special,” in which only teams who had won a previous race were eligible to compete and consisted of a running relay, with boys escorting girls, and putting on and taking off all of the sports equipment contained in a bag. The mixed relays concluded the hormonally-driven social evening, and the men escorted the women home.
Carolina students learned how much they enjoyed co-recreational sports at the Carnival, which motivated many students to sign up for additional co-recreational sports throughout the year. Co-rec volleyball was the most popular of the co-rec sports at Carolina; other sports included badminton, table tennis, archery, and swimming, which WAA officials soon eliminated. While volleyball, badminton, table tennis, and archery tournaments followed rules that largely resembled the sports traditionally, co-recreational swimming adopted the carnival-esque nature of other co-recreational events on campus. Perhaps because it involved bodies on display, co-rec swimming closely resembled a social event with prospects for dates. The events, competed in by teams of “four boys and four girls,” consisted of cork harvest, disrobe relay, ball relay, tandem relay (back), inner tube race, candle relay, balloon relay, and the only event that resembled actual competitive swimming, the medley swimming relay. Co-recreational swimming might have been eliminated because co-recreational sports outside of the Carnival were competitive and attracted students who wished to play competitive sports. Volleyball, the most popular co-recreational sport involved highly skilled play, with teams made up of some of the best athletes on campus. Although competitive, the sport was still inclusive and highly popular with large participation rates.

Co-rec sports served multi-layered purposes; women could let go and become more aggressive because of the safe space created by the presence of men. Their sexuality was far less likely to be questioned. Nationally, physical education leaders and WAA students espoused the benefits of co-recreational play. Student Daisy Morikami of Winona State College wrote in a national publication that co-rec play provided a “much
broader, more educational, and stimulating program for our college students.” She continued, “Getting acquainted with the fellows is one definite advantage” and “having the male gender co-operating in activities creates a lasting interest and foundation of all sports.”

Professor Ellen Kelly of Illinois State Normal University proselytized, “The family that plays (and prays) together stays together. Future mothers and fathers often need help in appreciating the potentialities of the opposite sex in leisure time activities.” In her effort to encourage more co-rec play, Kelly also played upon the fear of lesbian athletes, although she used more subtle language:

Some (not all) college women who are the most enthusiastic supporters of the college athletic program are precisely the ones who are least interested in and least able to enjoy social contacts with men. It is probably representatives of this group which will vote against co-recreation. Yet it is this group which needs it particularly. It is also this group which sometimes makes the more co-educationally minded women on campus hesitate to join in and enjoy the many fine programs.

While the world of sport did provide a (somewhat) safe space for gay women, at the same time, sporting women were often suspected of lesbianism, understood to be a mental disorder in the 1950s and 1960s. Physical education leaders attempting to grow their recreational programs struggled against these perceptions and fears. This social context helps to explain why co-recreational sports, where women played (and were assumed to be flirting) with men, enjoyed more popularity than women’s intramurals and especially women’s club teams during this era.

The small number of women who participated on club teams enjoyed playing with others who shared their passion to develop skills and compete to win. Still, the most popular club sport in the early 1950s was the Splash Club, the antithesis of competitive
athletics. Early WAA Handbooks described the Splash Club as more of a theatrical production, “Every Monday night the Carolina mermaids take to the pool to work on swimming strokes, rhythm, and smoothness—all in preparation for the big Splash Club pageant in the Spring.”35 “Manhattan Merry Go Round,” the 1953 pageant, consisted of choreographed swim routines set to music performed in groups of two to eight.36 The pageant largely resembled synchronized swimming, although the name was never used.

In her 1954 welcome letter, WAA President Peggy Keith advertised the Splash Club as the featured event of the organization, writing,

We especially want to tell you about our ‘Splash Club.’ ‘Splash Club’ is one of the most active W.A.A. clubs on campus. This spring we gave a big pageant about our ‘Carolina Calendar.’ We’re planning another show for next year and we’d love for you to help us with it. Parties are in the offering too, with Woman’s College and Duke clubs and with the U.N.C. men’s swimming team. We want you to come on down to the pool so we can get to know each other and can swim together. If you like swimming, knowing the basic strokes is quite enough. We’ll teach you the few ballet strokes and formations in no time at all. Or maybe you’ll have something to teach us! What we really need is your enthusiasm and interest. Try-outs will be held soon after school starts. Come on out and swim with us!37

More Carolina women in the early 1950s were attracted to the Splash Club, the only club with tryouts and cuts, more than the other competitive athletic clubs because it was artistic more than athletic, and because it provided social status. Women showed off their bodies during the actual programming of the club, and members got to meet eligible bachelors when they attended a party with the men’s swim team.

Although the women’s intramural sport program was the largest responsibility of the WAA, leaders could never get female students as excited about intramurals as the
popular co-recreational intramurals and Co-Rec Carnival. Men’s intramurals at Carolina, however, were incredibly popular in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the men’s program structure was not any larger, participation numbers far exceeded women’s numbers. Nearly 6400 male students, who represented a much larger percentage of the student body at more than 75 percent through the late 1960s, participated in intramural sports. Intramural team sports for men included: “tag football, volleyball, basketball, ‘grail mural basketball,’ and handball”; and for individuals: “cake race, track, wrestling, swimming, all-campus handball, all-campus squash, and the Rod and Gun Field Meet.” Signaling the importance placed on male students’ physical activity, in 1962-63, the Men’s Intramural Office and the Men’s Residence Council, led by students Garry Geed and Robert W. Spearman, successfully lobbied for and implemented a program to pay men’s intramural managers, the male equivalent of the WAA dorm and sorority representatives. Frustrated WAA council members, struggling to get WAA representatives and intramural chairs to run their programs well, failed to gain a payment structure like the men.

The men’s intramural program enjoyed healthy funding because educational leaders valued athletic participation and physical activity for men. Athletic participation taught values of citizenship, like hard work, discipline, and teamwork, and helped to create future leaders of the state. Geed and Spearman understood the value system and preached the gospel of athletic participation when they successfully earned funding from Carolina’s administration. They suggested that young men needed a physical outlet when they spent their days studying, reasoning that “good intramural programs are often
associated with low damage rates and better studying conditions in each dorm. A good athletic program provides an opportunity to ‘blow off steam’ during the day. The result is less restlessness and horse play at night.” Playing games brought young men together and improved spirit, creating “greater cohesion and enthusiasm in residence hall living” and providing “new acquaintances and friendships.” Finally, they asserted the ancient value that a sound body complements a sound mind: “Students are happier and more productive in their academic work and day-to-day life” when they participate in intramurals. Geed and Spearman concluded,

Ideally, the University hopes to foster a climate in which each individual is encouraged to embark upon an educational quest in which he develops his intellectual and moral character to the greatest possible extent. Students must be encouraged to grapple with new ideas and challenges. To meet these challenges a positive attitude is all-important… the active group life promoted by a good intramural program is particularly important.42

These arguments worked for male students seeking to expand their intramurals program. These values, however, did not carry over to the women’s program. Industriousness and competitiveness were values understood to be necessary for young men to become the next business leaders of the state; women attended UNC to pursue careers related to social services, “caring professions,” like nursing, secretarial work, and teaching. The values involved in “learning to win” for the men’s program simply did not translate seamlessly to the women’s program.43

While the men’s intramural program enjoyed considerable funding for programming and salaries for intramural managers and competition officials, the Women’s Athletic Association at Carolina, like other women’s programs on campus, received little financial support. Out of the student government’s total budget of
$161,148.84 in 1963-64, the Women’s Residence Council received $459.00, the Carolina Women’s Council received $505.00, and the Women’s Athletic Association received $120.00. For comparison, the Men’s Glee Club received $1520.00 and the Senior Class of 1964 enjoyed $520.00 to put on celebratory special events. Even the Amateur Radio Club’s annual allocation exceeded that of the WAA, at $146.00.44 The $120.00 the WAA received from the student government represented its only funding source. Physical education faculty members who served as advisors and officials for intramural play did not receive any additional salaries, whereas the director of the men’s intramural program was a salaried position. P.E. faculty who coached club teams, organized and hosted intercollegiate competition, and traveled with their club teams to compete against other schools also did not receive any additional compensation.

The lack of administrative support reflected broader social trends; most female students also did not value sports participation. Increasing the participation rates in the WAA’s intramural program for female students represented a constant struggle for the Council, especially dorm and sorority representatives. In the 1950s, the problem was structural and simple; there were not enough female students living on campus and embedded in campus culture to field many teams. Although still restricted by limited housing, the number of first year female students living on campus increased during the 1960s, and participation numbers grew. Undergraduate students living on campus enjoyed more free time to become involved in extracurricular activities, and the WAA benefited. Still, some intramurals were less popular than others, and dorm and sorority representatives struggled to sign up women eager, or at least willing, to play. Dorm
representatives especially struggled, because almost all female students in the 1950s and 1960s belonged to sororities and held stronger affiliation with their sisters than with fellow dorm residents.\textsuperscript{45} They began to sign up women unlikely to follow through on the commitment.

No shows created frequent problems for intramural sports chairs attempting to run successful tournaments, even threatening the integrity of some events and their continued existence. A woman who failed to show up to play in an individual tournament, or a team in team competition, hurt not only the WAA and intramural sports chair, but even more so the athlete or team which showed up to play and could not. In the 1954 intramural golf tournament, with Hogan the faculty member in charge, no shows dominated and nearly ruined the event. In the opening round of 32, 15 women failed to show; two women no-showed in both of the second and third rounds; and even in the final round of four, one golfer was absent and forfeited.\textsuperscript{46} Students in 1958 failed at an even higher rate; only one woman did not forfeit in the 1958 tournament.\textsuperscript{47} WAA officers needed to make major changes if they wanted tournaments to run more smoothly and so that those who wanted to play got to enjoy the experience without fearing that they might not get to play at all. Faculty advisor Frances Hogan recommended, “Have a qualifying round before the tournament begins, so that they may be placed in flights.” She believed that “this would also create more interest in the tournament and eliminate the people who are not truly interested.”\textsuperscript{48} Hogan, always about improving the quality of competition, reasoned that having a qualifying round would remove the weak or
uninterested students who had signed up and would also encourage the better athletes to participate because they would understand that the quality of play would be better.

Students were not the only problem; dorm and sorority representatives keen on winning awards signed up women, sometimes without their knowledge. The WAA Council continually reminded representatives to only sign up students who wanted to play and demonstrated in some way that they would follow through with their participation. Eventually, the WAA Council introduced disincentives and the rate of forfeiture decreased dramatically. In 1963, WAA officers amended the point system for end of year awards so that an organization which entered participants that failed to show lost points. For each individual who did not play in an individual sport tournament, an organization lost three points, and for a team entered which failed to show up to a team competition, an organization lost six points. No shows became rare occurrences after 1963 thanks to the WAA Council’s introduction of disincentives to the points system. Representatives did a better job of vetting entrants and stopped entering women to fluff the numbers because they valued end-of-year awards.

Those women eager to participate found intramurals invigorating and liberating. Considering the university did not permit women to wear “shorts or slacks” on campus until 1967, athletics served as the only public space in which women could wear more revealing attire without reprimand because it provided a homosocial sphere. When sports took place on courts, the WAA and Physical Education Department required female students to wear tennis shoes. Until 1963 women had to wear “their whites” and a rental gym suit could fulfill this requirement. Intramural events were often shortened
versions of the regular game, allowing busy students to play a quick match and return to their studies. All tournaments were single elimination, except for basketball, the most popular intramural sport. The basketball intramural chairman split the teams into four or five leagues, and the teams competed in league play for the first few weeks. The teams accumulating the most wins in each league went on to play in a single elimination tournament to determine the overall champion.

The second most popular intramural sport with regard to participation numbers was swimming; however swimming was most popular among spectators, attracting large crowds eager to view female bodies. At first, participants in form events would be scored on their strokes, rhythm, and smoothness, subjective categories of analysis. In 1958 the WAA transformed the event’s purpose, expanding the number of speed events, with the goal of winning races. Previously, women who wanted to test their speed and race each other only could participate in relays. Also that year, the annual WAA Swim Meet enjoyed even greater popularity among both participants and spectators, thanks to publicity in the Daily Tar Heel, the school’s student paper. By 1968 the WAA eliminated form events altogether, and the meet included only speed individual and relay events.

In May of each year, to conclude its intramural and club programs, the WAA hosted a Spring Awards Picnic to honor intramural championship teams, the dorm and sorority which won their respective All-Sports Cups, and, in later years, most valuable club team members, outstanding WAA representatives, and outstanding seniors. Dorm and sorority representatives placed much value on these awards and worked hard to tally
their organizations’ points throughout the year, and sports chairs also presided over the points in their intramural tournaments, reporting them to the Awards Chair.\textsuperscript{58}

Dormitories cared more about winning while sororities viewed the WAA as one of many social opportunities. The dormitory which won the All-Sports Cup almost always earned far more points than the winning sorority; all organizations competed together throughout the year and the WAA only separated out the points competition. Teams made up of students sharing a major also competed; for example, nursing majors competing on the “Nurses” team almost always finished high in the basketball and volleyball tournaments. The Nurses were never a factor in the All-Sports Cup competition, however, because their classes conflicted with club participation, which contributed significant points, and individual sports tournaments, which counted for a large proportion of the overall points available.

Demonstrating the increasing divide between the two purposes of the program, the WAA offered both competitive and participatory awards. In 1968, new awards for outstanding club members celebrated competitive skill and talent. To balance out the competitive awards, the Council created a new award to honor the inclusive nature of WAA and the members who might not have been the best athletes, yet still participated and loved WAA events. First given in 1972 to Chris Nevins, who inspired the award, the WAA presented it “to the participant who has not won an individual event and who may not be one of the more highly skilled participants, but is most enthusiastic and continually tries to improve her own and her team’s skills.”\textsuperscript{59} The awards for outstanding club
members and the Chris Nevins Award represented the two sides of the WAA program which the organization balanced well, the competitive side and the inclusive side.

The recreational programs organized by female students were not unique to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Female students at a significant number of colleges across the United States organized Women’s Athletic Associations or Women’s Recreational Associations during the first half of the twentieth century. The Athletic and Recreational Federation of College Women (ARFCW), a national organization made of the Women’s Athletic Associations (WAAs) and Women’s Recreational Associations (WRAs) on college campuses across the United States, was a body for the students and run primarily by the students. A national Secretary-Treasurer and Faculty Advisory Committee assisted the students in their programming and communication, but the students controlled the ARFCW. The organization’s stated purpose was: “To further athletic interests and activities for girls and women according to the highest and soundest standards of sports and recreation. The Federation strives to increase consciousness of its purpose during and after college.”

Founded in 1917 by twenty-three schools led by the WAA of the University of Wisconsin, the organization grew to nearly 300 schools across 48 states by 1950. The ARFCW provided a mechanism for interested female students to become official delegates and attend national conferences on sports and recreation, like the National Conferences on Intramurals, an opportunity they likely would not have had without the legitimacy of national organizational affiliation.
ARFCW also worked alongside and strengthened other organizations promoting college women’s sports and recreation. These alliances and working partnerships led to the creation of the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), the body which organized national championships for women beginning in 1971; and, although the AIAW would dislike the comparison, existed like a female version of the NCAA for eleven years. The women who gathered for the Conference on Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (CIAW) in 1967 to create the AIAW represented ARFCW; the Division of Girls’ and Women’s Sports (DGWS); the American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation (AAHPER); and the National Association of Physical Education for College Women (NAPECW). 62 The ARFCW built its reputation on its affiliation with the DGWS and based its standards upon those of the DGWS. 63

These national organization alliances created the space for physical educators to take more control of student-run programs. National coordination began to replace local control. Female physical educators who belonged to the NAPECW often served as faculty advisors to WAAs and WRAs on their campuses. The ARFCW-DGWS partnership strengthened with its reorganization in 1963, when ARFCW moved into DGWS offices in Washington, D.C., gained a full-time consultant provided by DGWS to coordinate ARFCW out of the national office, and earned standing committee status with the DGWS.64 A full-time paid employee proved far more beneficial and productive than the previous volunteer Secretary-Treasurer who collected dues and facilitated the publication of the national newsletter. Barbara Sprayberry became the first ARFCW consultant, and her duties were established as follows: “coordinates the work of the
Federation, maintains the historic records, keeps membership and officer lists up to date, assists member associations with individual problems, collects dues, is responsible for the printing of publications and other appropriate materials, and informs members on the latest ideas, news, and trends in sports and recreation. Sprayberry was a competent, proactive employee for the ARFCW, demonstrated in a letter she sent to UNC Faculty Advisor Hogan and WAA President Karen Nelson in 1964, in which she expressed her hope that they would attend the Southern District Convention in Jacksonville, Florida in February so that she could meet individually with them to discuss ideas and issues.

The strengthening of its relationship with DGWS increased ARFCW’s legitimacy, because DGWS was a division of AAHPER, a department of the National Education Association. Students seeking ARFCW membership designed their WAA or WRA constitutions based on the ARFCW constitution’s language and abided by DGWS rules and regulations in each intramural and club sport offered. In order to share national news, ideas, and trends in sports and recreation, the ARFCW published SPORTLIGHT, a newsletter in which members contributed much of the content and the national office provided organizational notes. ARFCW celebrated SPORTLIGHT as a “method of exchanging ideas,” encouraged association representatives to submit articles for publication, and recruited “guest authors such as W.A.A. and W.R.A. sponsors, recreation specialists and sport experts” to contribute to the newsletter, published four times a year.

Although UNC established its WAA in 1934, the school probably did not join ARFCW in an official capacity until 1950. The University of North Carolina likely sent
unofficial delegates to the 1947 national conference which took place in North Carolina, and created its constitution and paid its dues, requirements for membership, to gain official status in the 1950-51 school year. The UNC WAA possessed a document from the ARFCW North Carolina Conference which asked a series of questions to assist students and faculty advisors in creating a viable WAA program. This document influenced the structure of the WAA’s organization, and the ARFCW’s constitution provided the framework for the WAA’s first constitution, adopted in 1951. The WAA constitution adopted much of the language of the ARFCW constitution, a practice favored by the ARFCW because it provided consistency across the association.

The North Carolina ARFCW was a vibrant state organization with members engaging most frequently at the state level. This phenomenon did not fit the national story; most state organizations were weak and rarely met before the 1960s. National conferences and regional conferences took place on alternating years, and North Carolina’s state meetings occurred annually. In North Carolina, host schools of the annual conference served as the state’s president school for the year, in charge of coordinating the conference, recruiting new member institutions, and organizing sports days to be hosted by other schools in the state during the academic year. In 1963-64, UNC Chapel Hill served as the state’s president school, while the newly named and now co-educational University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG), formerly The Woman’s College of the University of North Carolina, served as the national president school, hosting the national ARFCW convention the previous spring.
In 1963, the North Carolina ARFCW enjoyed a number of dedicated female leaders, particularly in Greensboro and at Appalachian State College, and mobilized to take on more organizational responsibilities, with strong national and state presidencies. Fifty miles west of Chapel Hill down Interstate 40, Alice Park served as student president of the ARFCW and president of the UNCG WAA from 1963 through 1965. Park organized a successful national conference in Greensboro, inspiring WAAs nationwide to strengthen their programs. While UNCG served as the national president school and hosted the national conference for the second time in school history, UNCCH became president of the state for the first time. Karen Nelson’s NCARFCW and UNCCH WAA presidencies, assisted by Frances Hogan’s advisory role, proved critical as Nelson and Hogan used their positions to grow the state’s competitive athletics for women.

UNCCH Senior Karen Nelson worked tirelessly to make sure the annual convention would be a success. From the Office of Admissions she obtained a list of all the colleges in the state with female students and sent NCARFCW materials to recruit new members to join the organization and attend the conference. Of the fifty-two schools with female students in the state, sixteen schools sent official and unofficial delegates to the state convention. Of the sixteen attending schools, thirteen held ARFCW membership and three did not; another four schools with membership planned to attend but failed to appear.

North Carolina’s recreational leaders had much to discuss at the annual convention in Chapel Hill on Friday, November 22, 1963, and delegates struggled to discuss everything on the agenda. A single-day convention proved too short to fit in
business matters, philosophical discussions, program organization, and socializing. Moreover, word reached the convention in the early afternoon that President John F. Kennedy had been shot, unraveling attendees like most Americans that day. The program was rushed, yet packed with useful information and accomplishments. Physical Education Department Chair Dr. O.K. Cornwell spoke briefly and introduced morning keynote speaker Dr. Harold D. Meyer, Professor of Sociology and Chair of Intramural Curriculum at UNCCH. It was not unusual for women’s sports and recreation organizations to invited male professionals to speak at their events; male physical educators and recreation leaders increased female organizations’ legitimacy and enhanced their power. Meyer was legislative chairman of the American Recreation Society and had previously served as president of that organization. Delegates met in their respective state regions to organize the year’s Sports Days while the Advisory Board of the NCARFCW held its annual meeting. The gathering also included a convention-wide vote on proposed state constitutional amendments, the report of the 1963 national convention, the election of officers, and announcements regarding programming.

Convention attendees also fit in some time for recreational fun after the serious part of the convention was mostly over. While the new and old advisory boards met, the rest of the attendees were free to swim in Bowman-Gray Pool or play badminton or volleyball in the Women’s Gym. The entire convention—meetings and recreational activities—took place in the Women’s Gym. Nelson recommended in advance that attendees wear clothing suitable for meetings, sports activities, and the final event, the
convention banquet, which took place in Lenoir Hall, one of the school’s main dining facilities. In addition to entertainment provided by male undergraduate students, the main event of the banquet featured a motivational speech by Estelle Lawson Page, a UNCCH graduate, national golf champion, and member of the North Carolina Sports Hall of Fame.  

The North Carolina convention strengthened the extramurals and competitive opportunities in the state. The Eastern and Central Regions of the NCARFCW held productive meetings, focusing on their Sports Days and extramural programs so that their female students could enjoy more frequent and better quality matches against other schools. The Western Region, hurt by the absence of Appalachian State, a traditionally strong program in the state organization, did not have enough members present to hold a meeting. Central Region delegates favored inclusion to separation, and recommended having “three to five schools be in charge of a sports day featuring a different sport, and that the entire NCARFCW be invited.” This new model would greatly increase the number of competitive sporting opportunities offered in the state. Different schools throughout the year would host a sporting event featuring just one sport that day. This meant that a woman who enjoyed multiple sports did not have to choose one to play on Sports Day; she could play tennis on Tennis Day, golf on Golf Day, basketball on Basketball Day, and so on. Furthermore, the quality of the Sports Day would be improved because the organizers could focus their time and energy on hosting one sports competition well; in addition, participation would increase because more women could play when multiple Sports Days would be offered instead of a single Sports Day.
Perhaps some participants in the Central Region meeting had read in *SPORTLIGHT* about a similar development in the Milwaukee area a few years earlier when a coordinating board of seven schools, organized by the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, organized “playdays planned for every month at a different school.”

The Eastern Region also worked to increase participation in competitive athletics in the state, but took a different approach from the Central Region. Delegates present decided to have one sports day in the spring and one in the fall, at two different “hostess schools,” limited to schools within the region. Rather than working to increase participation among schools already members of the ARFCW and expanding to include schools outside of their region, like in the Central Region’s model, the Eastern Region would try to increase participation from schools that previously had not attended and were not ARFCW members. With more girls participating from schools which had never been involved in extramurals, Eastern Region representatives decided that teams would be mixed instead of made up of school teams competing against each other. They asserted that their approach to split up schools would be best “because an important function of the event is the exchange of ideas and personalities among the schools.”

The women meeting in Chapel Hill formed optimistic plans but often failed to follow through. The success of the Regional Sports Days was tenuous, as the Advisory Board noted, “Many of the elected host schools for the official sports days fail to hold it.” UNC Greensboro and Queens College, elected as Sports Day Chair and Alternate for the Central Region, failed to take on their duties. Agricultural and Technical College, a historically black college in Greensboro, took on the role of Sports Day Chair. A&T
successfully enacted the new Sports Day program established at the convention, selecting three schools to host different Sports Days in the months of March, April, and May in 1964. Frances Hogan alerted A&T that UNCCH would host the Tennis Day on April 25.79 Despite some hiccups, the 1963 North Carolina Convention demonstrated that the structure supporting women’s sporting opportunities was strengthening, giving female athletes more chances to play against the best competitors in the state. Female physical educators who volunteered their time to strengthen the NCARFCW sometimes failed to follow through, but they laid the foundation to grow intercollegiate sporting opportunities for female North Carolinians.

As physical educators continued to develop the state structure of competition, student leaders worked to improve internal organization. Like her predecessor Carolyn Johnson from five years earlier, Karen Nelson worked hard to leave the WAA in much better shape than the program she inherited. She penned a “President’s Report and Recommendations” to end her tenure in 1964, and future officers adopted a number of her suggestions.80 She encouraged future presidents to be involved as a member with “every club, intramural event, or activity” offered by the WAA. She recommended that the organization adopt paid positions, and the first to earn money should be the dorm and sorority representatives, because these were the hardest women to motivate to take on an active role in promoting WAA events and reminding women to sign up, and to show up and play when they signed up. Nelson must have known about the men’s intramural
managers and officials who enjoyed payment for their participation. Despite her suggestions, female students and P.E. faculty contributing to the functioning of the women’s intramural program continued to earn nothing and volunteered their time. UNC administrators did not see the same value in women’s recreation as they found in the men’s program. Karen Nelson also pushed back against increased faculty involvement, wishing to see students take on more ownership of the club sports side of the WAA program. She wrote, “Some effort should be made to put the clubs under more student control, so that the advisor for the club doesn’t have so much to worry about.”

Over the previous decade, faculty advisors had taken more control of the club sports under their guard. Hogan did the most to create a competitive team for serious athletes. She recruited tennis club members from the student body, coordinated practice, reserved court space, organized competitions with other schools, and hosted the annual Tennis Day each spring, a tournament that grew to include more than ten participating schools each year. Although she was not paid anything above her P.E. faculty salary to coach the tennis club and organize events, she enjoyed her responsibilities and would not have preferred student leaders to run the club in her place. Although Hogan might have complained in private about her full plate of responsibilities, she most certainly enjoyed her tennis club responsibilities, and more than her intramural sports responsibilities.

While Nelson might have been making her recommendation with the faculty advisors’ interests in mind, she also might have been leveraging to return more control to students as the role of faculty advisors in the club sports side of the WAA had increased significantly over time. Nelson recommended that the WAA elect chairmen for the
different clubs, a position that had not existed previously, and suggested that they could: “come to Council meetings..., have them notify the publicity director or the DTH directly..., make the preference charts of the girls’ interests available to the chairman.” These were recommendations that Hogan likely would have agreed with and appreciated. Another of Nelson’s recommendations, Hogan definitely would have liked, “Have the clubs make their own publicity posters or see the publicity director about getting some printed.” Virtually all leaders in women’s sports wished more could be done to publicize their sporting events to potential participants, spectators, and supporters.

North Carolina schools, particularly the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, remained rather consistent in the expansion of competitive opportunities for women without controversy or challenges to a philosophy of competitive athletics. Other states, however, struggled with debates about whether to prioritize inclusive play or elitist competition. In the summer of 1958 Carolyn Keller, the editor of the ARFCW publication SPORTLIGHT, wrote to WAA members around the country, asking them to contribute statements on their position regarding competitive athletics for the next issue. Keller was not shy to share her opinion and perhaps sway the arguments made by student contributors: “One can take a definite stand, and then use the association’s competition policy in defense of or argument against your position. Certainly, many organizations have a problem with physical education majors dominating the program. Again, this is a subject deserving criticism.”

UNC did not share this “problem” of physical education majors, nor did Carolina have any issue with competitive balance across teams. No dorm or sorority dominated
any sport or the overall points competition at any time during the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, the school simply did not have enough physical education majors to create their own team and dominate play. Some P.E. majors participated on club and intramural teams, but the most talented athletes across all sports often majored in subjects other than physical education at UNC. When a team won tournament games by large margins, the WAA celebrated their achievement rather than worried about it.¹⁸⁴ UNC students and WAA officers valued competitiveness and inclusiveness, and did not find them to be mutually exclusive.

Unlike UNC, other WAAs around the country did have issues with competitive teams, and the topic suggestion by SPORTLIGHT editor Keller proved timely. Keller published a piece by Linda Tapp of Oklahoma State University which described the problem her WAA confronted and how they solved it: “We faced this problem of physical education majors dominating the regular program last year. Our intramural council discussed it ‘pro’ and ‘con,’ and decided to make the following rule: only fifty per-cent of the team membership may be physical education majors.”¹⁸⁵ Other schools solved their issues of P.E. majors dominating play by restricting even further the number allowed on a team. Joan Fagerburg of MacMurray College wrote that her WAA restricted the number to four; Donna Gies of the University of Nebraska, where the problem was particularly evident in the sport of softball, shared that her school limited the number to three. Elinor Ely of Ohio University, which also restricted P.E. majors on each team, wrote about the importance of spreading majors out: “Having majors on a team is an asset in many ways. The majors create enthusiasm and have more knowledge
of the rules and proper procedures. In this way games goes more quickly, more smoothly, and more enjoyably. I feel that there should not be a separation…it would be defeating many of the major purposes of recreational activities.”86 Spreading out the majors meant spreading out the talent. To many leaders in physical education, inclusiveness and mass participation mattered more than competitive success and the values of winning associated with men’s sports.

Not all student contributors agreed with the position asserted by the SPORTLIGHT editor, who represented the position of the ARFCW. They were eager to provide competitive opportunities for those who desired them. Sally Ayer of Colorado State College wrote in to express a value system shared by the WAA of the University of North Carolina:

On the campus at Colorado State College in Greeley, we have divided our intramural program into two separate divisions. One division is called ‘A League’ and consists of physical education majors, minors, graduate students, and faculty members. The other division, ‘B League’ is comprised of sorority, dormitory, and independent teams. By dividing our intramural program in this manner, we feel we have made it a stronger and more enjoyable program because girls of more nearly equal skill can play in the same league. This not only allows more girls to participate in our program, but it also gives the girls with higher ability a chance to play with and against more experienced players.87

Providing elite competition for talented athletes grew in value on an increasing number of campuses. Revealing institutional bias, the ARFCW newsletter published Ayer’s contribution separately from the section debating what to do with overly competitive P.E. majors. Instead, this letter appeared in a section entitled, “Problem Page.” The tension between inclusive play and elitist competition increased over the next two decades.
While the national organization wished to influence member WAAs to prioritize inclusivity over competitiveness, state organizations and their members held enough autonomy to stray from national positions. During the fall of 1958, the Woman’s College of the University of North Carolina in Greensboro served as the president school, and following the national lead, its WAA decided upon “Competition among College Women” as the theme for the annual convention held on its campus on November 21 and 22. The women in North Carolina took their conversation in an entirely different, and positive, direction. Their discussion of competition involved how they could introduce more competitive opportunities for elite athletes in their state. Chapel Hill women in particular emphasized the values of competition. UNC faculty and students led a panel discussion entitled “The Role of the W.R.A. in Sponsoring Competitive Sports.”

Frances Hogan headed the effort to increase opportunities on the Carolina campus. Reflecting on the conflict within women’s physical education over competition, Hogan expressed her frustrations with the ARFCW and the DGWS. She remembered that they fought anything that was highly competitive, and “the highly skilled girl really suffered back then.” In a 1991 interview with Mary Jo Festle, Hogan related a story to illustrate her point:

I can remember that there was a student at Winthrop College—that's where I went for my undergraduate work—and her name was Godbold. She was a terrific athlete. That was an all-female institution back then, and the student body thought so much of that girl that they raised the money and sent her to the Olympics. She won several gold medals, but at that point in time, see, the school couldn't send her, and it was unheard of for a female to do stuff like that. But the student body backed her up and she went.
At the time, DGWS rules prohibited a university from funding a female athlete’s travel to competition over 50 miles away, so her classmates came up with the money themselves. This experience stayed with Hogan, and at the 1958 state convention, UNC positioned itself to become a leader in the movement to expand competitive opportunities in the state.

Although Hogan and others worked to grow the extramurals program, UNC women lagged behind their competitors at other schools in the state in the early years. Schools like UNC Greensboro, Appalachian State, and Meredith represented the early powerhouses in the state. With a smaller female student body than many colleges, Carolina had a smaller pool of potential athletes from which to draw. Despite this challenge, Hogan developed her athletes into some of the best competitors in the state and region. Her tennis athletes made up the best teams in the early years of Carolina women’s sports history.

The Carolina extramurals program was very limited and the school did not take the program seriously in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite institutional resistance, women created the foundation for a true intercollegiate athletic program. Club teams traveled to compete against other college teams at least as early as 1950, with the field hockey and basketball teams playing only a few games each year. In 1954, the hockey club played games with Duke and Meredith and tried (but failed) to schedule competitions with Woman’s College, High Point, and Salem College. Securing field space for an
intercollegiate game at home often proved challenging. Forty years later, Frances Hogan recalled a story to illustrate this issue. She was serving as field hockey club coach and obtained permission from the varsity baseball coach to play a game against Meredith College in the outfield. Hogan remembered:

We'd been maybe five minutes into the game when the band came out. They just started their practice right out in the middle of our game and marched right through. The Meredith team had to go home and we never finished that game. That is the way it was back then. We had to fight for every little thing.91

Even the marching band held priority status over the club field hockey team. Conflicts with the band occurred with increasing frequency, until Hogan had enough and determined to end the feuding victorious:

And so one day I was fed up with it and I said, ‘All right.’ And I told the girls to hit the ball directly in the middle of the band formation. I told everybody to chase the ball. I said, ‘Goal keeper and all. Everybody chase it.’ Instruments went everywhere and we made our point. It's just been a battle to practice.92

Hogan described reserving space in Kenan Stadium for archery, softball, or field hockey practice, gathering all of the equipment at the Women’s Gym, and lugging it across campus and up the hill to the stadium, only to find the gates locked and the team unable to practice.

The space reserved for women, the Women’s Gym, proved far inferior to other facilities on campus, creating further problems. In their own space, at least the basketball and volleyball clubs did not need to worry about interruptions. The space was so small that basketball and volleyball players often crashed into the walls during play. Hogan recalled:

The teams struggled. I mean, you'd have your opponents come in for basketball and ‘Oh, no. We've got to play in this box again?’ The other schools called the
Women's Gym ‘the box,’ and that's about what it was. The women's gym was not official regulation size for volleyball or basketball.\textsuperscript{93}

In later years, Carolina could not host state and regional tournaments because the court was not regulation size and did not adhere to DGWS, and later, AIAW, rules. Space for spectators in the Women’s Gym was tight, but the Carolina women did attract some interested and interesting fans in the early years. Hogan recalled that Frank McGuire, the first UNC men’s basketball coach to lead his team to a national championship in 1957, made frequent appearances, either in the stands or peering through a window. He came to watch the talented Katherine Bolton, a player he claimed could have been a successful contributor to his men’s national championship team.\textsuperscript{94}

The tennis club, with Hogan as advisor and coach, had the most expansive program and competitive team, although the women struggled with the same issues the other sports faced with regard to securing practice and competition space. Hogan remembered:

> Even after my tennis club became more of a team than a club, and we were practicing every day, it was a hassle. I had to use the worst tennis courts on campus. And even then I could hardly use them because the boys would come in the gates and sit around just waiting to get them. So, finally I bought chains and every afternoon when I went out there, I'd chain up every gate, and when we finished practice, I'd unlock them. That was the way I had to do.\textsuperscript{95}

Hogan worked hard to ensure her tennis players practice time; she dedicated herself to their improvement. Mary Lou Jones, chairman of the tennis club in 1954, wrote that the club, with a membership of 15 and 10-12 regulars, met all year long, and “the advisor gave individual help to those who felt that they needed it.”\textsuperscript{96} Jones noted in her end-of-year report that one way to successfully schedule more games with other schools could be
to work with the men’s varsity team, so that they knew when the men would be out of town and could invite women’s teams to come play. She also wished UNC would host an “elimination type tournament” to end the season. Although it took a few years, Hogan made sure to turn a large tennis invitational tournament into a reality.

An event in 1954 motivated students and faculty to develop sporting opportunities, although it was UNC’s failure to field teams which served as inspiration. UNC took part in its first ARFCW Sports Day, held at Wake Forest College on April 10. Tournaments included softball, badminton, tennis, and golf, and other participating schools were Atlantic Christian College, Duke, East Carolina College, Meredith, and Wake Forest. Carolina struggled to bring participants for the Sports Day, the only school failing to field softball and golf teams, as well as singles and doubles teams in badminton. Only Hogan’s tennis players participated in the Wake Forest Sports Day. Student Mary Cook had been appointed by the UNC WAA to recruit students for the Sports Day, and she made recommendations to the WAA Council after the unsuccessful event. She suggested that more be done to recruit club participants because they would be more attracted to a sports day program of competition. She recommended that club teams schedule more frequent games and more publicity efforts should be made to recruit more students to join club teams.97

Cook’s recommendations inspired the WAA Council instituted a publicity chair, to take ownership of all promotional efforts including the recruitment of participants, the dissemination of information regarding intramural tournaments and club meetings and games, and the reporting of results to the Daily Tar Heel. The organization had its first
WAA Reporter in 1954, with the sole responsibility of submitting content to the student newspaper, an unreliable mechanism for sharing critical information with WAA members. In her evaluation of the role, the first WAA Reporter determined, “This method was ineffective as the articles did not appear in The Tar Heel on intended dates. At times they were not published at all.”

Faculty members could only do so much in their roles as sports club advisors, and without the help of the *Daily Tar Heel*, students had to do the majority of the work to grow the extramurals program and to recruit participants for Sports Days.

Hogan’s desire to build a strong intercollegiate program also included hosting national competition. She successfully lobbied both the school and the national Tripartite Committee on Golf to allow UNC to host the 15th Annual Women’s Collegiate Golf Tournament, held on Finley Golf Course, June 5-10, 1959. Hogan worked hard to grow interest among Carolina women so that UNC could have participants in a national tournament for the first time. She arranged for free buses to transport students from the Women’s Gym to the Finley Golf Course twice a week for the entire school year, and grew the Intramural Golf Tournament to 30 participants, the largest field yet. She even organized a speaking event and clinic with two famous professional golfers, Beverly Hanson and Joyce Ziske, to be held on May 12, three weeks before the start of the national tournament.

Not only was the national collegiate golf tournament a success, Hogan’s longer lasting accomplishment was the establishment of the UNC Tennis Day, an invitational tournament which began with statewide competition and expanded to include the region.
The first Tennis Day took place in the spring of 1958, with Atlantic Christian, Duke, Elon, Meredith, Peace College, and UNC competing. The following year, the competition grew from six to eight schools, with Duke, Woman’s College, East Carolina, Meredith, Catawba College, Peace, Salem, and UNC. An additional two schools, Greensboro College and Elon wished to play, but could not attend. The Daily Tar Heel covered the tournament to advertise it to potential spectators and to report the final results. WAA officials, like the publicity chair, wrote the prose for the school paper:

“From the interest and skill shown in the Tennis Day of last year a talented field is expected to provide some great tennis and thrilling moments in this gathering of the best college women tennis players in this section of the country.”

Tennis players and faculty advisors across North Carolina’s colleges knew each other well and enjoyed their friendships. After Tennis Day, Woman’s College players wrote to Hogan to express their gratitude for being able to play in a high-quality, large tournament. The players wrote, “We want you to know how much we enjoyed being included in your Tennis Day at U.N.C…. Every experience like this, in tennis, makes the sport just that much richer, in many ways.”

They also revealed their (friendly) competitive side: “Very soon we hope you and your team can come to Duke. Just set the date and let us know, and do try to bring Marion Eells this time.” Eells, still enrolled at UNC, had won the Tennis Day singles tournament the previous year, and the Woman’s College team was eager to play against her.

At the seventh annual Tennis Day in 1964, Hogan succeeded in growing the tournament to eleven schools, with Sacred Heart Junior College and Western Carolina
College competing for the first time; Appalachian State Teachers College had also joined the tournament in 1961, with immediate success winning the doubles tournament two years in a row. The *Daily Tar Heel* did its part to increase spectatorship, at least among male students interested in ogling female students in their tennis whites. An article entitled “Hey Boys! Girls Will Play Tennis Here Saturday,” likely grabbed the attention of male undergraduates. They likely were pleased when it rained on the women dressed in all white on the courts, who worked hard to keep the courts dry. Guilford and Campbell Colleges joined the 11th Annual UNC Tennis Day in 1968. Hogan succeeded in recruiting more North Carolina schools to her event, increasing enthusiasm for women’s tennis in the state, which enjoyed a number of nationally ranked players by the end of the 1960s. Hogan went above and beyond to make the experience of Tennis Day enjoyable for all who participated. She communicated often with tennis clubs leading up to the tournament, and after the event, wrote to each school asking if the women might be interested in purchasing portrait and action shot photographs from the tournament.

Tennis player Laura DuPont became the first UNC female athlete to travel to a national collegiate tournament, but her trip did not come without its fair share of struggles. DuPont, the 1968 UNC Tennis Day runner-up as a freshman at UNCG, transferred to Chapel Hill in her junior year. Hogan believed she was the most talented female athlete at Carolina during her tenure, which ended in 1985. Hogan described the various challenges, including funding the trip and obtaining tennis outfits since UNC had no official uniforms for women:
It was called the USTA Women's Collegiate Tennis Tournament. Laura was an exceptionally good player, and I knew she had a chance to win. The P.E. Department could not finance Laura's trip to the nationals, held at the University of New Mexico. I made up my mind to go to [Athletic Director] Homer Rice. I didn't know him at all…. But he said, ‘Well, is she any good?’ And I said, ‘Well, I think she can win.’ ‘Well, I think we can arrange it.’ So, I thought, ‘Gosh, that was pretty easy.’ So, in a meek way I said, ‘Well, Mr. Rice, do you think I can go with her?’ ‘I think we can arrange that.’ And that was all that was said and I went. So, of course back then, the women had always watched every penny. I still do that. Anyway, Laura and I went, and she did win the whole thing. And when they announced her the winner, and I knew the struggle we had been through, I had tears rolling down my face. I even got a man who came through here selling equipment to send some tennis dresses for Laura to use. I wanted her to look really nice. So anyway, Laura was given some outfits. And she won the whole thing.\textsuperscript{108}

Hogan was very proud of her athlete and could not wait to return to campus to help DuPont enjoy the celebration of the school’s first female national champion. They did not return to Chapel Hill heroes, however. The men’s Physical Education Department was furious that Hogan had gone over their heads, appealing to Homer Rice to permit their travel to the tournament. They failed to release statements to the press when Hogan requested assistance while still on the road. Hogan and DuPont refused to allow male physical educators to ruin their victory. They knew she had achieved something special, winning the first national championship for women in school history. Reflecting twenty years later, Hogan remembered DuPont as a game changer, “She was the first female student athlete to have her portrait hanging in Carmichael. It was a struggle to get her picture in Carmichael. Now there are many female athletes on the walls in Carmichael.”\textsuperscript{109}

Carolina clubs in addition to tennis participated in more extramural competitions throughout the 1960s. In 1963, the Splash Club traveled out of state to Spartanburg,
South Carolina to compete in a synchronized swimming competition hosted by Converse College. Seven schools competed and Carolina finished in the middle of the competition. Also that year, Frances Hogan accepted an invitation from Judith Newton of St. Andrews Presbyterian College to have home-and-home competitions annually for their basketball clubs.

Hogan’s tennis club received the most invitations to play against in-state rivals and in out-of-state tournaments in the South and Mid-Atlantic regions. Tennis was the most popular sport among college women in the South in the 1960s, and, similar to Hogan’s efforts with Tennis Day, a number of physical educators passionate about tennis worked to establish annual regional tournaments, inviting large numbers of schools. In 1964 Ann E. Lankford of Florida State University (a women’s college until 1947) organized the First Annual Women’s Collegiate Invitational Tennis Championships, a tournament which grew in participants and stature throughout the decade. Also that year, Nanellen Lane of Mississippi State College for Women invited Hogan and her team to the 3rd Annual Southern Collegiate Tennis Tournament. Lane did what she could to relieve the financial burden for interested schools in order to increase participation: “It is our hope that every southern state will be represented and every college will support this popular sport and tournament. Lodging will be furnished free to all coaches and players.” Penny Wev of the Mary Baldwin College Recreation Association offered similar benefits of free housing and meals to women who entered her school’s Middle Atlantic Women’s Collegiate Tennis Championships to be held May 7-9, 1964.
Although they certainly had many options for out-of-state large tennis tournaments, the WAA simply did not have the resources to enter UNC students because the university would not fund them. Hogan would have had to accompany her players on her own time and dime while still managing her regular responsibilities as a faculty member and the WAA advisor. The WAA could not even supply free lunches to the women it hosted for its annual tennis tournament. The regional tournaments of the early 1960s, which were USLTA and DGWS sanctioned and qualified players for the National Collegiate Championships, certainly appealed to Hogan and her players. She was frustrated these opportunities existed and yet she could not provide them to her athletes because of institutional restrictions. Although Hogan had to decline the larger regional tournaments of 1964, she did take her team to its first out-of-state tournament, hosted by Converse College in South Carolina in early April.114

Faculty advisors did not simply coach and watch tennis games; they also played their sports together. After the tournament, Sally Brevick, the faculty advisor at Converse College, wrote to Hogan, revealing their friendship in sport: “Congratulations on winning our tournament- and I certainly did like Susan and Elizabeth…. I’ll be up soon—probably a couple of weeks. I’ve had ‘tennis elbow’ three times since last summer, but am playing again now, and hope we can get in a few games.”115 The faculty women who volunteered their time to grow extramural competition for college women in the 1950s and 1960s dedicated innumerable hours to their mission; in rare but cherished moments they got to enjoy themselves on the courts and fields, too.
The growing extramural, regional, and national tournaments inspired women’s athletic leaders to establish a national governing body and championships system. In 1971, the University of North Carolina became a charter member of the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), a membership association of colleges interested in establishing a system of sports competition for college women. The new association sparked the organizational separation of intramurals and extramurals on the Chapel Hill campus. The WAA reorganized as the Women’s Intramural Association (WIA), while Hogan and other physical education faculty members established the Women’s Intercollegiate Sports program. At first, both the WIA and the intercollegiate program were run out of the Physical Education Department. Women who played on an intercollegiate team no longer could participate in intramurals in that sport, where they used to dominate, but could play intramurals in different sports. Physical education faculty members coached the teams, although the position was still voluntary and unpaid until 1974 when coaches began earning a standard salary of $1000.00 per sport. A typical day for Hogan and other P.E. faculty who coached intercollegiate teams involved teaching from 8:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m., advising students for the General College until 4:00 or 4:30, and then rushing to team practice and coaching until after dark. Many women, like Hogan, had families with young children. Committing oneself to the cause of developing intercollegiate athletics for women certainly involved many sacrifices.

Competitive opportunities in the first year of the intercollegiate program still proved sparse as athletics leaders worked to establish the structure of the new system. For example, the field hockey team, coached by Beth Ross, played only two games and
held a record of 1-0-1 in the fall of 1971. Their sole victory came in an exhibition game against UNC P.E. majors, and they tied Duke, at Duke, in their only true intercollegiate game with a score of 1-1. Rain cancelled the only other scheduled game, in Greenville with East Carolina College. Nineteen women made up the roster; and with fifteen sophomores and juniors on the team, players were optimistic they would be even better the following year.

Field hockey athletes received bare minimum support for their team; yet this did not deter their enthusiasm and desire to play. The team budget of $13.92 got them to Durham and back and paid for the game’s official. Athletes wore rental gym suits because they could not afford uniforms. They practiced and played on an intramural field that was not regulation size. In her end of season report, Ross wrote, “The girls really want a team for 1972 season. Most of this year’s members are returning and have already asked if there will be a team next year. They practiced hard. I would suggest practicing at least three days per week, but 4 or 5 would be much better.”

The transition from WAA extramurals affiliated with the ARFCW to intercollegiate athletics under the AIAW provided the structure to expand competitive opportunities and happened rather quickly. Ross recommended a schedule of ten games the following year and already had been in communication with East Carolina, Longwood (VA), UNCG, High Point, Catawba, Duke, Winthrop, Appalachian, Converse, and Meredith, scheduling games for the next season.

The intramural program offerings for women in the early 1970s remained largely the same, although the organizational structure changed. The new name, the Women’s
Intramural Association, signaled two major changes—a move in 1973 into the intramural office in Woollen Gym, shared with the men, and its first paid employee who presided over the WIA and held the title Assistant Director of Intramural Activities. The men’s intramural employee’s title was Director of Intramural Activities. The WIA program would enjoy better resources and larger programs after moving into the greater Intramural Department. Maxine Francis, the newly appointed Assistant Director, shared her enthusiasm with resident advisors and dorm and sorority presidents, “With this move we can provide the women on our campus with a bigger, better, and more efficient program—So let’s GO!”

What would change everything, for both intramurals and intercollegiate athletics, was Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, although many schools did not begin to comply with the law until 1975 after policy interpretations and regulations had been published by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Like physical education classes, intramurals could no longer be segregated by gender, although contact sports were reserved for men only. A separate intramural program for women, and, therefore, the WAA/WIA, ceased to exist at the University of North Carolina during the 1976-77 academic year. Only intercollegiate athletics could remain segregated by gender after Title IX.

Most official histories of women’s intercollegiate athletics begin in the 1970s with the AIAW and Title IX. The NCAA often suggests that intercollegiate competition for women began in 1981-82 when it commenced championships for women. The extramurals program at Carolina and other colleges across the country in the 1950s and
1960s proves that intercollegiate competition for women existed decades before the AIAW or Title IX. Hogan and other faculty advisors worked too hard in their voluntary roles for their efforts to go unappreciated. Talented female athletes born before the Title IX era practiced hard and played hard; their only fault was that they were born before they could enjoy better structures and legal protections. They wanted to win just as badly as scholarship athletes in the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond. Neglecting the history of the WAAs nationwide is a disservice to these early collegiate athletes and coaches.

Intercollegiate athletics for women at the University of North Carolina experienced incredible, sweeping changes during the 1970s. Women’s programs grew from volunteer club sports to intercollegiate teams run by professionals by the end of the decade. The transformation in men’s intercollegiate athletics which took approximately seventy-five years happened in less than ten for the women.\footnote{Formalizing intercollegiate athletics for women meant that women’s sports could no longer exist in their own world, without interference from other groups on campus. Play between colleges moved from student-controlled to faculty-controlled rather quickly, and after the passage of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, which mandated equal educational opportunity for women, college administrators reorganized athletic departments to operate men’s and women’s intercollegiate athletics in a combined program.}

The women who administered intercollegiate athletics at the state, regional, and national level took on defensive postures almost immediately after formalizing a governing body and structure in the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW). In addition to fulfilling its mission by governing, providing leadership, and conducting championship play, the new association spent considerable amounts of time justifying its existence and developing a philosophy of intercollegiate athletics different from the men’s model, and necessarily so, if the organization was to continue to survive.
An intercollegiate sports body by and for women served as the voice for women’s sports nationally and worked to protect female student-athletes’ and coaches’ rights from political and institutional attack.

The club system of play between schools continued to progress in the late 1960s, and a shift occurred, signaling a change from student-controlled athletics and recreation to faculty-controlled intercollegiate competition. In 1967, national leaders in the Athletic and Recreational Federation of College Women (ARFCW) and the Division of Girls and Women’s Sports (DGWS) met to form the Conference on Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (CIAW). They worked for more than three years to develop a system of intercollegiate competition for college women and in 1971 launched the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), which regulated play and organized national championships for women. Although the Tripartite Committee and individual sport governing bodies like the United States Lawn Tennis Association had organized national championships for college women since the 1940s, an organization made of and directed by member institution representatives was new.

The most important level of AIAW development occurred at the state level, because women’s club teams played the majority of their games and matches against in-state rivals. State associations of the DGWS and the ARFCW worked to organize a formal system of intercollegiate competition. The North Carolina DGWS held annual state conventions and in 1968 created the positions of “State Sports Chairmen” who would “coordinate state activities which cover any aspect of the sport or activity with the exception of the training of officials” during their two-year terms in office.² The Sports
Chairs would report to the State DGWS Chair, who served as the leader in the state and the intermediary between the National DGWS Chair and the state membership. Meanwhile, the club team advisors of the member institutions belonging to the North Carolina ARFCW met and established guidelines for schools to follow as they created intercollegiate programs to replace the club system. Since ARFCW worked out of DGWS, the faculty advisors in North Carolina built from DGWS policies and procedures already in place. The advisors of the NCARFCW also limited travel distances, length of schedules, and the number of games played per season.³

At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the “Intercollegiate Program” launched in 1971 when the university became charter members of the national AIAW, Southern Region II, and the North Carolina AIAW. Dr. Raye Holt, Director of Physical Education for Women, ran the program and reported to Dr. Carl Blyth, Chair of Physical Education. Dr. Blyth supported the development of intercollegiate competition for women, and obtained funds from the Athletic Department so that the program could have a healthier pool of resources than what physical education and the Women’s Athletic Association could contribute. Field hockey, volleyball, tennis, gymnastics, basketball, fencing, and swimming made up the original seven intercollegiate sports offered by UNC for women in 1971, and golf was added in 1973.⁴ Instructors in the women’s physical education department coached the teams, with the exception of fencing, coached by Dr. Ron Miller, a faculty member in men’s physical education who coached both the men’s and women’s teams.
Although officially intercollegiate athletics, the women’s program remained primarily a physical education organization and was treated as such by the university and its athletic department. Women’s athletics existed on a totally different, inferior plane to big-time college football and serious men’s athletic teams. The Intercollegiate Program operated out of the Women’s Gym, and remained largely independent from the Athletic Department; however, whenever the program received an Athletic Department directive, the women were obliged to follow. Since the Athletic Department provided the funding for the women’s program, its officials enjoyed budgetary power. Holt and the coaches of women’s teams interacted most frequently with Blyth, and did not report to or cross paths with Athletic Director Homer Rice.

The North Carolina Association of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (NCAIAW) played the most important role in influencing what intercollegiate competition for women would look like in the state during the 1970s. Administrators and coaches participated in the AIAW the most at the state level. The NCAIAW’s stated purpose was to “encourage, promote and aid in expanding intercollegiate programs for women in the colleges and universities of North Carolina.” The organization would do so by the following means:

- facilitating and coordinating the scheduling of games, matches, and meets;
- establishing and maintaining desirable standards for all intercollegiate events (to abide with current DGWS, AIAW, and NCAIAW standards);
- providing opportunities for women’s intercollegiate varsity competition at the state level;
- encouraging state representation at the regional and national events when appropriate;
- providing an avenue of communication between the governing body...
and members of the organization; determining dates and sites for state
tournaments upon recommendations made to the NCAIAW; settling disputes if
and when they arise concerning eligibility and other matters pertaining to
athletics; stimulating the development of quality leadership among persons
responsible for women’s intercollegiate athletics; coordinating and expanding the
officiating services within the state; encouraging excellence in performance of
participants in women’s intercollegiate athletics.5

Faculty-controlled governance removed the many inadequacies of the previous student-
run NCARFCW. With standardized rules and a framework for competition in place, an
army of volunteers prepared to launch intercollegiate athletic programs throughout the
state.

Faculty control with centralized authority provided the structure necessary to
expand competitive opportunities for women in North Carolina. Organized competition
began to replace inclusive and less-structured play as the network of coaches across the
state strengthened relationships and scheduled more events. Unlike the student-run
NCARFCW, the NCAIAW had an Executive Board and Council made up of physical
education faculty, who were also directors of intercollegiate programs and coaches of
teams. The faculty advisors of the NCARFCW made up the new leadership, filling the
positions of president, (past-president), secretary, and treasurer. The State Chair of the
DGWS made the fifth seat on the Executive Board. The Executive Council included the
Executive Board, plus the Sports Chairs who presided over intercollegiate competition.
The DGWS Sports Chairs became the NCAIAW Sports Chairs, demonstrating the
blended nature of the NCAIAW, made up of DGWS and NCARFCW educational
leaders. The NCAIAW fielded open events, closed collegiate events, invitational
tournaments, and state tournaments.
Although competitive athletics represented the bulk of the program, leaders in the NCAIAW did not wish to eliminate entirely the playful and social events attractive to many women in the state. In its first few years, NCAIAW continued the ARFCW’s tradition of “sports days” and “playdays,” the former referring to “events for individuals or teams from the same institution in which their identity with that institution is maintained” and the latter, “events for individuals or teams from institutions in which their identity with that institution is not maintained.”6 A number of North Carolina women sought to weaken the growing competitive impulses and promote inclusive and unstructured play for all. They even standardized the club sport era’s post-game socials hosted by the home institution by writing into their constitution: “institutions are encouraged to provide opportunities for players to meet on an informal basis following a scheduled athletic contest.”7 Not only could host institutions show off their Southern hospitality and proper manners, the women involved in organizing the event could gain reassurance that sports participation could still be playful and for fun.

Leaders in men’s athletics did not need to make extra efforts to downplay the drive to win among their young men and saw the women’s philosophical approach as foreign. When men’s athletic administrators began to oversee women’s intercollegiate program budgets, they did not understand the women’s social customs. In October 1974, the Business Office in the UNC Athletic Department informed Hogan that women’s teams could no longer provide treats after competition. The memo read, “Coaches are not to use budget money for picnics or feeding visiting teams.”8 It continued, “Candy bars, cokes, crackers, etc. are to be purchased by team players and not provided from the
budget of the sport. It is permissible to provide cokes or some suitable drink for the home team and the visiting team provided this is the usual treatment demonstrated at other schools.” Practices that had been in place for decades quickly became eliminated once the athletic department oversaw the women’s program.

As physical educators moved to formalize competitive play, they obsessed over establishing a philosophy of intercollegiate competition for women and developing policies and procedures. Educational leaders in North Carolina wished to ensure that intercollegiate programs were conducted for “the good of the players” rather than the desires of the coaches or schools. They believed strongly that intercollegiate competition must continue to exist within the educational priorities of the university. The NCAIAW developed statements on leadership, finance, travel, health and safety, scheduling, and eligibility to “serve as guides for the conduct of intercollegiate competition.”

Leadership represented the most crucial issue, and the NCAIAW’s statement reflected its membership’s training in physical education: “The qualified leader meets the standard set by the profession through an understanding of the place and purpose of sports in education, the growth and development of children and youth, the effects of exercise on the human organism, first aid and accident prevention, understanding of specific skills, and sound coaching methods.” Physical educators should be the leaders in women’s intercollegiate athletics because they had been trained in these skills and values, unlike professional coaches and administrators.

The NCAIAW women emphasized their fitness to direct women’s programs and sought to protect their control. Coaches and administrators should treat intercollegiate
athletics as one of the educational programs offered by the university, and its home “should be under the supervision of the physical education department.” Furthermore, the intercollegiate program should be operated for, and by, women. The NCAIAW recommended that women coach teams and women officiate intercollegiate games. Only on rare occasions should men be involved in women’s sports: “The use of men’s officials is acceptable under exceptional circumstances provided they meet the qualifications set for proper officiating of women’s sports.” If a man coached a women’s team, NCAIAW required that “a woman, approved by the physical education department, shall supervise and chaperone the participants during practice, games, and travel.”12 A male coach was never to be alone with female students on his team.

The NCAIAW declared its difference from, and, therefore, superiority to, male college sporting organizations. In this regard, NCAIAW fell in line with the national AIAW’s amateur code and philosophy on scholarships, which distinguished the women’s from the men’s amateur model. Participants had to have amateur status, defined by NCAIAW as “has not received and does not receive money, other than expenses…only from her own school to pay for housing, meals, and transportation” during competition. Quoting the DGWS and AIAW’s Philosophy and Standards Handbook, NCAIAW reminded its members, “There shall be no scholarships, financial awards, or financial assistance designated for women participants in intercollegiate sports competition.”13 Female physical educational leaders believed that grant-in-aid based on athletic ability compromised the educational purpose of the university and the intercollegiate program; in addition, “pay for play” corrupted the pristine virtues associated with amateur athletics.
The NCAIAW, from its first year, was an organization as much for small colleges as it was for major universities. Small liberal arts colleges, junior colleges, and women’s two-year institutions held the same status as the state’s major universities and played the same quality of competitive schedules. Many fielded more competitive teams than the state’s landmark university because they enjoyed larger female student bodies from which to locate athletic talent. Charter active members of the NCAIAW, in addition to UNC Chapel Hill, included Appalachian State University, Catawba College, Chowan College, East Carolina University, High Point College, Mars Hill College, Meredith College, Peace College, Pembroke State University, St. Mary’s College, UNC Greensboro, and Wake Forest University. Duke, Elon, North Carolina Central, St. Andrew’s, and Western Carolina joined during the first year and sent delegates to the inaugural NCAIAW General Session, held at Piney Lake on April 23, 1972. The leadership typically came from small schools as well; the first executive board consisted of President Betty Westmoreland of Western Carolina and Secretary Nora Lynn Finch of Peace College. Jan Watson of Appalachian State served as the Southern Region II Representative to the AIAW, the highest office at the regional level, and served on the executive council of the national organization. Watson would be a powerful leader at the state, regional, and national level throughout the decade, playing a critical role in ensuring the state deemphasized competition by slowing intercollegiate program expansion.

The first general session meeting of the NCAIAW demonstrated the different priorities of the diversity of schools in the state, although the NCAIAW attempted to
standardize competition for all members. Many early debates had nothing to do with UNC’s program, goals, and issues. Some women’s colleges in the state included both high school and college student-athletes, and the organization struggled to determine whether high school athletes should be eligible to compete on college varsity teams. They ultimately determined that high school athletes would be eligible during regular season play, but not post-season state, regional, or national tournaments. Another topic of discussion concerned a group insurance policy for member schools, in which “each school could pay a blanket fee for a group policy.” This issue applied to small schools and not larger institutions like UNCCH, which already held insurance through the athletic department. A review of Dr. Raye Holt’s notes from the Piney Lake meeting demonstrates that her concerns pertained solely to making contacts and scheduling games with fellow attendees and the rules of play decided upon in each of the sports. She also reported to her coaches that she was able to secure the state basketball tournament the following March, 1973.

The experiences of small and large schools diverged significantly, demonstrated in a letter from Leotus Morrison, the Region II representative to its state associations and members, a position that became eliminated after 1972. Morrison, of Virginia’s Madison College, wrote to Region II members to express her gratitude that they “searched the budget diligently and found money to join AIAW. This reflects a real concern and the Association appreciates your efforts.” She continued that she “heard through the grapevine” that more members would be joining next year, and she understood how hard it was to muster up enough resources. In 1971-72 the state fee in North Carolina for full,
active membership was $20.00; Region II membership, $5.00, and national AIAW membership, $50.00. Although Holt and others at UNC counted every penny, these association membership fees were not as much of a burden as they were to other schools, and they certainly were not a deterrent to join.

State associations enjoyed autonomy in the daily operations of sports programs; however, they received philosophical and structural direction from national leaders. The nine regions of the AIAW served as the bridge between state associations and the national AIAW, and most leaders involved in intercollegiate programs learned about national events, rule changes, philosophical positions, and crises from their Region II representatives, who served on the national AIAW Executive Council. Southern Region II, which included Virginia, North and South Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky, became more meaningful to women working on their institutions’ campuses after the first few years of limited regional and national play. In its first years, the region’s primary purpose was to serve as a liaison between the national association, which provided governance and leadership, and the state associations, which did most of the grunt work, organizing regular season competition and growing membership.

The region also hosted championships that served as qualifying tournaments for the AIAW national championships. At first, the only regional championships took place in basketball, volleyball, and gymnastics; the region added new championships after three or more states had teams participating in the sport. The region added tennis championships in the 1974-75 academic year, and field hockey championships in 1975-76. If no regional championship took place and the AIAW held national championships,
the region would either select an already-existing tournament to serve as the qualifying event or name the team to serve as regional qualifier to the national tournament. Later, individual sports like swimming would qualify individuals based on time performance during the course of the season. Region II, like the NCAIAW, included far more small colleges than large universities. By 1980, of the 128 Region II member institutions, 106 were small colleges and only 22 were major universities.¹⁹

Cost represented the greatest inhibitor to participation in regional championships. Many small colleges simply could not afford to participate, leaving the playing of regional tournaments to larger institutions which could scrape together more resources. Many Region II members ended their seasons with their state tournaments, and at one point Region II even considering making participation mandatory to increase the number of schools in the regional tournaments. Since the Region could not compensate teams traveling to regional tournaments, it lacked the power to require state champions and runners-up to enter. Executive Council members hoped that gate receipts and t-shirt sales, and in later years, television broadcasting contracts, could provide some revenue so that Region II officers could attend championships.²⁰ Eventually, Region II defrayed some of the costs of host institutions and traveling teams, like the national AIAW was able to do later in the 1970s. The budget of Southern Region II in 1974-75 was a paltry $1665.00. Nearly half the income came from membership dues, with the remaining sources including a $50.00 allowance from the national office, and another $900.00 from regional championship profits (shared 50/50 with host institutions) and fundraising efforts.²¹
The women who built the AIAW never anticipated that female students might want something other than the sporting opportunities in the structure they created. A consequence of the new federal legislation to provide equal educational opportunity for women was that female student-athletes would desire the support and system enjoyed by the men. The AIAW scholarship policy became an early target. Region II Representative Jan Watson of Appalachian State broke the biggest news of her term to the membership on April 2, 1973, when she distributed a memorandum from an AIAW special committee to member institutions. The AIAW and DGWS executive boards authorized the special committee to revise the *AIAW Rules and Regulations* as well as the DGWS Scholarship Statement in reaction to a lawsuit against AIAW, DGWS, the American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation (AAHPER), and the National Education Association (NEA), which continued to serve as the mother organization to the AAHPER, DGWS, and AIAW.22

The case, *Kellmeyer, et al. v. NEA, et al.*, challenged the AIAW scholarship policy with the argument that Title IX required institutions to provide equal educational opportunity. If male student-athletes could earn financial aid based on athletic ability, and intercollegiate athletics was defined as an educational program, then female student-athletes should have the right to earn similar athletic scholarships, and the AIAW policy denying that opportunity violated the new law.23 The AIAW special committee reluctantly recommended a revision to the organization’s scholarship policy, allowing member institutions to grant athletic scholarships. *Kellmeyer* served as a preview of future pressures to conform to the male collegiate sports model.
The AIAW leadership could not simply institute changes to the scholarship code. As a membership organization, AIAW institution representatives had to vote to approve action to change the rules and regulations, including the scholarship statement. The women treaded carefully, for they continued to disagree with financial aid in theory, yet now had to implement financial aid policies. First, regarding the DGWS Scholarship Statement, the membership voted that it “be modified to reflect that the prevention of possible abuses in the awarding of athletic scholarships to women can be accomplished more appropriately by the strict regulation of such programs than by outright prohibition of such forms of financial assistance.” Second, the membership approved that “a committee be formed to promulgate rules to regulate the awarding and receipt of athletic scholarships.” The carefully selected language of the motions demonstrates the reluctance of AIAW and DGWS to adopt financial aid based on athletic ability. The women saw themselves as taking the moral high road after the lawsuit forced the organizations to allow member institutions to award athletic scholarships. Leaders believed they must continue to protect women from “possible abuses.” This philosophy of “maternalistic protection” sought to differentiate the athletic programs run by women in physical education from the professional athletic departments and full-time administrators and coaches who exploited young men for glory and financial gain.

Those very same leaders in men’s collegiate athletics, however, held up amateurism as their ideology of paternalistic protection. In 1956, member institutions of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) voted to adopt financial aid based on athletic ability after decades of debate, expressing many of the same concerns as the
women in the early 1970s. Athletics scholarships had been understood as corrupting, “pay for play,” and in violation of amateur principles during the NCAA’s first fifty years of existence. Athletes received assistance to pay for school through a variety of means before the scholarship era: payments from local boosters and prominent alumni, summer jobs facilitated by local businessmen who either gave the young men legitimate work or provided them with checks for limited or no work performed, or campus jobs during the school year. Eventually, because some schools could rely on boosters more than others, the member institutions of the NCAA preferred a system of subsidization that could be regulated, and settled upon grants-in-aid awarded based on athletic ability, as long as the granting institution’s standard academic requirements for admission were also met. For decades, scholarships based on athletic ability had been considered a violation of the NCAA’s amateur code, much like the rules the AIAW had attempted to institute in its first years. The men made room for scholarships in their philosophy of amateurism, an idea that proved to be increasingly flexible as the business side of big-time college sports grew throughout the next sixty years.\textsuperscript{25}

Rather than admit defeat to the men’s scholarship model, the AIAW and DGWS used the opportunity of \textit{Kellmeyer} to scold the NCAA and reassert the organizations’ commitment to integrity and an alternative model of collegiate sport. The revised scholarship statement emphasized that although the organization would adopt athletic grants-in-aid to provide equal opportunities to women as men, this did not mean it would fall in line with NCAA policies and philosophies:

The DGWS reaffirms its concern that the provision of scholarships or other financial assistance specifically designated for athletes may create a potential for
abuses which could prove detrimental to the development of quality programs of athletics. Specifically, the DGWS deplores the evils of pressure recruiting and performer exploitation which frequently accompany the administration of financial aid for athletes.  

The lecture did not stop there. The statement continued with the following guidelines for programs offering financial aid. First, “the enrichment of the life of the participant should be the focus and the reason for athletic programs.” College students participated in sport to develop both mind and body, and to learn important life skills through play. Next, “Adequate funding for a comprehensive athletic program should receive priority over the money assigned for financial aid. A comprehensive athletic program provides adequate funding for (a) a variety of competitive sports which will serve the needs of many students; (b) travel, using licensed carriers and with appropriate food and lodging; (c) rated officials; (d) well trained coaches; (e) equipment and facilities which are safe and aid performance.” Acknowledging limited resources, budget allocations for women’s sports needed to focus on providing competitive experiences for the maximum possible number of girls, even after the introduction of athletic scholarships. Third, “The potential contribution of the ‘educated’ citizen to society rather than the contribution of the student to the college offering the scholarship should be the motive for financial aid.” Coaches had to prioritize the needs and goals of the student over the desire to find the top talent to create the best team. Continuing in this vein, “Staff time and effort should be devoted to the comprehensive program rather than to recruiting.” Next, the AIAW hoped its model would direct the motivations of students to understand their education mattered more than playing on good team with ample resources: “Students should be free to choose the institution on the basis of curriculum
and program rather than on the amount of financial aid offered.” When allotting financial aid, schools needed to treat all sports equally and not provide most of its resources to one team to make it great. Finally, and again emphasizing the proper motivation of players, the AIAW declared, “students should be encouraged to participate in the athletic program for reasons other than financial aid.” Each of these points served as a jab at NCAA leaders and male collegiate athletic administrators and coaches who emphasized winning and used financial aid to lure top talent in order to increase the school’s likelihood of producing winning teams.

AIAW leaders had not expected legal challenges to their structure of intercollegiate athletics from female student-athletes who desired what male athletes on their campuses enjoyed. When they adopted financial aid, they refused to see the action as falling in line with the men’s collegiate model. They believed so strongly in the superiority of their model, they assumed college presidents and educational leaders would agree. The conclusion to the revised scholarship statement suggested the men’s model was not infallible and could be removed and replaced with the women’s model:

Since financial aid programs for athletes in the past have resulted in conditions where abuses frequently outweigh benefits, initiation of such programs should be approached with caution. Colleges which are not currently providing financial aid for athletes are encouraged to adhere to their current philosophy and, in fact, some colleges may choose to discontinue all financial assistance aid programs for athletes.

Whether AIAW leaders actually believed men’s athletic departments might consider abandoning their system in favor of the women’s is unlikely. They did, however, succeed in mobilizing their membership to believe in the importance of an independent collegiate sports model for women.
The AIAW’s new regulations for the awarding of financial aid, effective for the 1973-74 academic year, however, undermined the argument that AIAW’s policies differed from the NCAA’s because the women’s organization cared more about the welfare and education of its student-athletes. The AIAW’s financial aid regulations fell more in line with NCAA policies than required. The most glaring example is that the AIAW followed a new NCAA rule, passed at its annual convention in January and taking effect in the same year, that member institutions could award only one-year renewable grants-in-aid.29 When the NCAA first adopted scholarships based on athletic ability in 1956, the only awards schools could provide were four-year grants-in-aid. Four-year grants were more palatable to educational leaders concerned that athletic scholarships might move institutions too far away from their academic missions and threatened to place intercollegiate athletics beyond the acceptable bounds of amateurism. These feelings did not last long. In 1967 a new rule allowed coaches to remove an athlete from the team and not renew the athlete’s grant-in-aid at their discretion. Previously only students failing to meet the school’s academic requirements could be removed from the team, because they would be ineligible to continue as enrolled students. By 1973 enough time had passed and the connection between four-year grants and amateurism had become adequately loosened for the voting body of the NCAA to declare one-year renewable grants-in-aid not only legal but the only type of athletic scholarship a school could offer a prospect.30 The AIAW and DGWS’s original statement and philosophical position on scholarships based on athletic ability, which created the organization’s legal trouble, declared athletic grant-in-aid to be in violation of amateurism as well as a threat
to the welfare of student-athletes because coaches would place more emphasis on recruiting, another problematic area according to the AIAW. Why the AIAW did not adopt four-year grant-in-aid based on educational principles is unclear, however, member institutions’ financial restrictions likely played a big role in the decision to adopt one-year renewable grant-in-aid.

Unlike the AIAW’s regulations on financial aid, recruitment rules remained much more stringent than those of the NCAA. The regulations came with another AIAW warning and opportunity to indirectly underscore the problems of the NCAA’s big-time college sports: “Recruitment practices may be contrary to educational objectives in that they impose undesirable pressures on prospective students and may result in unwise expenditure of money and of staff time.”31 Coaches, administrators, and staff could not initiate contact with a recruit, her family, or coach by phone or letter; approach a prospect at an off-campus location; provide any financial relief, housing, or meals for a prospect if she visited the campus; or compensate a recruiter if she traveled to perform a “talent assessment” of a potential recruit. A school could not even grant a coach “release time” if she wished to travel a considerable distance to view a high school athletic competition, and while that coach attended a high school event, she was prohibited from “soliciting names of prospective student-athletes” from “high school coaches, players, or other personnel.”32 The AIAW sought to keep its coaches members of the physical education faculty and prevent them from becoming full-time, professional coaches, fearing that women’s programs would follow the transition which had taken place in men’s collegiate athletics as the amount of money and time spent on recruiting increased. This
philosophical stance became difficult to defend, however, as member institutions struggled to figure out how to comply with Title IX, the law which spurred *Kellmeyer* in the first place.

The *Kellmeyer* lawsuit and the AIAW’s reluctant adoption of financial aid demonstrate the complexities introduced by Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 for the women’s organization. While the law certainly strengthened claims to equal athletic opportunity in American schools, and accelerated the growth and support for intercollegiate athletics for women, it also made the effort by AIAW leaders to keep programs separate from men’s athletic departments and autonomous in women’s physical education more difficult. Before President Richard Nixon signed Title IX into law on June 23, 1972, physical education faculty had worked for five years to organize a structure for governance and championships for women’s intercollegiate athletics. AIAW member institutions already had participated in their first year of regular season competition and national championships. The leaders of the AIAW never could have anticipated the ways in which equal educational opportunity would become defined as schools began to comply with the law. Title IX required athletic departments to compare men’s and women’s programs, creating pressure on institutions to adopt policies and practices for women’s athletics mirroring those already in place in the larger, long-established men’s athletic programs. Most of the time, pressure to comply with Title IX assisted AIAW leaders in their mission to expand opportunities for female student-athletes in intercollegiate athletics. At the same time, however, as some schools strengthened their commitment to equal athletic opportunity for women, the divergent
structures of the AIAW and the NCAA made less sense to well-intended university administrators and athletic officials looking to provide for the women what the men already enjoyed.

The policing of amateurism became even more important with the introduction of athletic scholarships in the AIAW. When the NCAA adopted financial aid based on athletic ability, the organization needed to create an enforcement mechanism to make sure institutions stayed within the boundaries of its amateur code and scholarship rules. In a similar vein, with the forced adoption of athletic scholarships, the AIAW established Ethics and Eligibility Committees (also known as E&E Committees) at the national, regional, and state levels to regulate member institutions as they competed for prospects and provided benefits to student-athletes. The AIAW urged member institutions to self-report and to inform other institutions of possible violations before contacting the E&E Committee so that they could handle the reporting procedure themselves. The organization also asked directors of women’s programs to report to state and regional committees rather than the national E&E chair; if the national chair needed to be contacted the regional chair should do so. In Region II, the E&E Committee was composed of a chair who served a three-year term and representatives from each of the five Region II states.33 Calla Raynor of Duke University served first as NCAIAW E&E Chair and later Region II Chair during the AIAW’s golden years, 1975-79. UNC’s Frances Hogan considered her a friend and competent leader in the state.34
The NCAIAW Ethics and Eligibility Committee enforced the more stringent rules of the NCAIAW instead of national and regional policies. The state’s rules that proved most limiting to student-athletes and their coaches restricted the length of the regular season, which included a mandatory three-week practice period, to fourteen weeks; set the maximum number of games, regardless of sport, to fourteen; and set official start and end dates for each sport season. This policy frustrated UNC’s Frances Hogan from its beginning. Reflecting on the eve of retirement in 1985, Hogan wrote, “NCAIAW rules placed North Carolina colleges and universities at a disadvantage when it came time to compete in AIAW Regional and National Championships. NC schools lacked the number of competitive experiences that schools outside our state were receiving.” The restrictive rules made sense to physical educators at smaller colleges in the state, where female students were more likely to play multiple sports and physical educators enjoyed more autonomy. For women like Hogan at larger universities whose student-athletes held ambitions of regional and national championships, however, the rules limiting competitive opportunities represented a major frustration.

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill reported its first violation to the NCAIAW Ethics and Eligibility Committee in 1974. A member of the UNC women’s basketball team, Lucy Lowder, reported to P.E. Chair Dr. Carl Blyth and physical education faculty member Barbara Yarborough that her team, coached by Director of the Intercollegiate Program Dr. Raye Holt and Sue Cannon, an instructor at nearby Durham Academy, began practice before the legal start date set by the NCAIAW, on October 22 instead of November 12. Lowder also accused the head coach of favoritism, a
relationship with one of the players that “stimulated speculation and much discussion,” and bullying of the less-preferred athletes. Blyth and Yarborough, following the NCAIAW’s policy of self-reporting, informed the E&E committee of the accusations. The committee agreed to investigate the potential length of season violation, and determined the personal conduct issues a matter to be handled by UNC and Blyth, should he desire. Holt and Cannon were informed of the alleged violation and accepted a hearing in Greensboro to plead their case. With all actors present, the committee, chaired that year by Judy Clarke of Appalachian State, found the coaches guilty, and placed the team on probation. The team could play games in the upcoming 1974-75 season, but were barred from the NCAIAW State Tournament. The story did not end there, however, because at UNC, women’s athletics no longer existed in isolation and university administrators and men’s athletic officials disagreed with the NCAIAW’s decision.

Signaling that UNC took its women’s athletics program seriously, Chancellor Ferebee Taylor and Athletic Director Homer Rice became involved, believing that their positions could help the basketball team have its penalty removed. Chancellor Taylor wrote to the NCAIAW E&E Committee, requesting another hearing so that Rice could appeal the decision. Taylor explained that Rice would speak on behalf of student-athlete welfare and request a reduction in penalty, specifically reinstatement to participate in the NCAIAW State Tournament. Clarke responded five months later, denied the request for appeal, and restated the penalty. Taylor wrote again, this time expressing concern over the delay in her response and NCAIAW procedures, and questioning how the organization could have no appeals process. In his letter, he also pointed out that the
NCAIAW had not distributed a press release about the penalty and asked if UNC should do so.\textsuperscript{40}

The chancellor, used to the long-established NCAA, viewed the women’s organization with skepticism. Taylor was indirectly telling Clarke that the NCAIAW was not a professional organization and she and her colleagues did not know what they were doing. Rather than explicitly state that, however, he wrote in a way that hinted at what the NCAIAW should be doing. Taylor closed the second letter by questioning NCAIAW policies that treated athletic departments that self report and make structural changes, and those that do not, in the same way. After all, he reasoned, UNC removed the guilty parties and hired a new women’s basketball coach and promoted a new director to run the program. Clarke responded to Taylor’s second correspondence, relating that the committee held firm, denying Rice the opportunity to speak before the Committee and determining the case closed. They did take some of Taylor’s advice, however, publishing a press release on UNC’s violation, probation, and penalty.\textsuperscript{41} Even the weight of the head of the premier university in the state, the Chancellor of UNCH, could not gain an audience with the E&E Committee for his athletic director, because the NCAIAW did not see men’s athletic directors as having the authority to interact with the governing body of women’s intercollegiate athletics.

Although frustrated with the NCAIAW’s actions, UNC still took the violation seriously. Rice promoted Frances Hogan to director and hired Dr. Angela Lumpkin as head basketball coach to take Holt’s place. Cannon was also replaced. UNC may have taken its frustrations out on the female student-athlete who reported the team. On
November 7, 1974, Lucy Lowder wrote to Hogan “concerning my having not received an award” for her participation on the team. She continued, “It seems to be totally a personal matter… I served as team captain…practiced for and competed in every game…. I feel I received unjust punishment for the incident which occurred after the finals of the State Tournament…. (I was made the scapegoat for the entire incident.)”

Lowder appealed to Hogan, the new director, and the advisory committee for her award to be restored, explaining it “does mean a great deal to me and which I feel I deserved.” The basketball award was symbolic, an honor and in name only; therefore, it seems that the committee easily could have given Lowder the award. Instead, the Advisory Council, made of female coaches and student-athletes, punished Lowder for her role in the program’s probation and penalty. Hogan wrote to Lowder, “After two Advisory Council meetings it was decided to deny the appeal for a reversal of the decision concerning your basketball award. I regret having to inform you of this decision.”

Hogan used careful language; she did not state her opinion on the matter. Her regret is “having to inform” Lowder but not necessarily the decision. In her first months on the job, Hogan already demonstrated the professionalism of a successful college administrator.

Hogan understood her role to serve her student-athletes in the best way possible. Although she shared Taylor and Rice’s frustrations with the NCAIAW, she also held strong reservations about the men’s intercollegiate model. Rather than become preoccupied with philosophical differences, her motivation remained constant, to help her athletes play their sports. She knew that true athletes were competitive and therefore wanted to practice a lot to become better and win more. Hogan felt for Lowder, but she
did not understand why a student would report a program for practicing longer than permitted. The UNC basketball probation of 1974-75 demonstrates the broader rift between intercollegiate athletics and physical education and their conflicting philosophies of competition, with the former valuing winning and the latter, playful participation. Although some physical education leaders in North Carolina, like Jan Watson, understood only the AIAW philosophy to be educational, other women in the state, like Frances Hogan, agreed with their male athletic counterparts that the desire to win, and the hard work it required, were also educational in the college environment.

When Frances Hogan accepted the position as the first Director of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women, in 1974, she made a commitment to run the program professionally, to work with administrators to grow and improve the program, and to follow all governing organizational rules, even when she disagreed with them. Oftentimes, the AIAW’s inefficient bureaucracy made her job difficult. In the summer of 1974, Chancellor Ferebee Taylor and Athletic Director Homer Rice decided to move forward with the awarding of athletic grants-in-aid in 1974-75, selecting tennis player Camey Timberlake as the first recipient. Although the university was ready to begin distributing grants-in-aid, the AIAW was not. Hogan did not receive the AIAW policies and procedures pertaining to awarding scholarships and financial aid until August 24, giving her only a few weeks before the start of the semester. She learned from those
documents that she needed to acquire and submit an official AIAW form before the aid could be awarded.

Bureaucratic delays often resulted because AIAW officers were volunteers and also busy running their own athletic programs. Hogan wrote to Elaine Michaelis, the national E&E Chair who worked at Brigham Young University, asking where to secure appropriate AIAW forms for submitting information on women receiving scholarships. On September 13, 1974, she wrote a second letter to Michaelis, who replied that she should inquire for them from the national office. Only in mid-December did the forms arrive, when students and staff had departed for vacation. In January 1975, Hogan filled out the scholarship form “as it would have been for the beginning of the school year,” reimbursed Timberlake for the fall semester and provided her with tuition, fees, room, and board for the spring semester. 45 Repeated correspondence asking for missing forms and publications represented the most common form of Hogan’s communication with the national AIAW during her eight years as director under the women’s governing body.

The officers of the AIAW were well aware of the organization’s bureaucratic failings, and made efforts to improve its efficacy at the 1975 Delegate Assembly. As the only collegiate sporting institution for women, the organization held the largest membership in the nation; the sheer size of the organization and diversity within created more complications. Hogan reported from the meeting that the current membership in 1974-75 included 592 active, 17 associate, and 10 affiliate members. Region II enjoyed 71 active and 3 associate memberships. 46 For comparison, the UNC men’s organization
for regular season competition, the Atlantic Coast Conference, included only seven schools.

At the Delegate Assembly in Houston, Lee Morrison, of Madison College and Region II, was president of the AIAW and gave a lengthy report about new initiatives to address the organization’s issues. Morrison admitted the problem of “turnover in personnel on staff in Washington” and “that the real operational problem of AIAW is insufficient staff for the many endeavors being tackled by AIAW.” She reported that “legal counsel has been obtained” and introduced “Miss Margot Polivy from Washington, DC, who is a former P.E. major, a sports enthusiast and vitally interested in the rights of women.” Morrison announced the creation of a number of new committees including a Coaches Council, Awards Committee, International Committee, “one to study the restructure of the entire organization,” the “Committee on Liaison Relationships with other organizations to consider mutual problems and possible joint projects,” and a task force to “increase the legal assistance fund.” She shared that the membership committee successfully gained an agreement from the Kodak Company “to re-activate the [AIAW] Newsletter this year.” The newsletter would prove helpful in reminding members of policies and providing updates on new regulations as they went into effect.

In Houston, voting representatives approved new legislation submitted by the national E&E committee to address issues created by the adoption of financial aid. Once money entered women’s college sports, competition for top talent intensified. The most significant rule change involved transfer students and represented an attempt to eliminate the potential evils of recruitment. The assembly approved E&E Chair Elaine Michaelis’s
motion that “a student athlete transferring from another institution of higher learning who has not completed the program at that institution is not eligible for financial aid for athletes until she has completed at least one year of acceptable progress.” This policy served as a strong deterrent to student-athletes who wished to move from university to university seeking money or the most competitive teams. It also helped coaches avoid the temptation to recruit other institutions’ star athletes who might have desired a better athletic environment. The list of rules regulating the actions of transfer students eventually grew to the size of the regulations restricting the recruitment of prospective high school student-athletes. The preoccupation with transfer students represented a reaction to growing separation in the quality of athletic competition between small and large colleges. AIAW would address this divide at the 1976 assembly.

At the national and regional organizational level, women feared that the male athletic establishment sought to destroy the AIAW and deemphasize women’s intercollegiate athletics. The hottest topic at the 1975 AIAW Delegate Assembly involved concerns about male collegiate sporting institutions becoming involved in women’s intercollegiate athletics in order to weaken sporting opportunities. Both national associations, including the NCAA, National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), and National Junior College Athletic Association (NJCAA), and regional associations, namely, athletic conferences, began to explore women’s governance and championships in 1974-75. These efforts were largely in response to Title IX, because the regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) would become effective on June 3, 1975 with President Gerald Ford’s signature (although schools would have until 1978 to be in full compliance for athletics).  

Frances Hogan shared with her UNC coaches a document entitled “AIAW Denounces NCAA Action,” revealing the biggest concern of the assembly. The AIAW statement opened with a strong condemnation of the NCAA:

AIAW views with grave concern this proposal of NCAA to commence a pilot program of intercollegiate championships for women. AIAW, the intercollegiate governing body for women’s athletics, considers the NCAA proposal an attempt by a men’s organization to thwart efforts by and for women to formulate and implement their own programs. That the NCAA has taken this action under the guise of a federal law intended to expand opportunities for women cannot hide the fact that NCAA’s action is nothing more than athletic piracy.

AIAW officers felt betrayed when they learned of the NCAA pilot program. The women had initiated contact with the NCAA and other male sports organizations in order to help standardize rules and regulations to make the job of member institutions’ administrators easier as they attempted to manage both programs and comply with Title IX. The report to AIAW members provided background on the controversy for Hogan and her coaches:

[In early 1974, AIAW’s] Carol Gordon met with an NCAA sub-committee on women’s athletics…and in October, the executive officers and our lawyer met with the sub-committee of NCAA in Chicago. We discussed the problems on local campuses stemming from dual membership in associations with different regulations and we discussed NCAA’s concerns with Title IX. Our major purpose in meeting was to recommend that NCAA and AIAW establish two joint committees. The function of one would be to study both the NCAA and AIAW structures and make recommendations concerning possible alternative joint structures or an alliance structure.

AIAW learned that rather than establish joint committees, with AIAW leaders having a place at the table, the NCAA moved to establish its own committee to explore a possible
women’s program and to continue to meet with the AIAW as necessary. AIAW assured its membership that the organization would continue to fight to make “the point clear that in any projected relationships, women must be involved equally at the policy making levels.” This commitment to include women in governance would become the fundamental AIAW demand as the organization attempted to influence future women’s intercollegiate athletics policy.

Communications with the NAIA proved more collegial than with the NCAA, while actions taken by some men’s athletic conferences and the NJCAA concerned AIAW leaders. In 1975, the NAIA cooperated with AIAW and encouraged its member institutions to join the women’s organization in their efforts to provide equal opportunity for women and comply with the law. Concerning conferences and the NJCAA, Margot Polivy, AIAW’s legal counsel, reported:

In the meanwhile, several athletic conferences have been feeling out the possibilities of providing conference level competition and the NJCAA is sponsoring three national championships for their women this year. The developments in conferences concern me for I believe most of these efforts stem from a lack of understanding of the roles our regions play as a type of conference. I’m sure Title IX is the catalyst in these developments but Title IX does not dictate that each association provide opportunity but only that the local college assure equal opportunity for participation.54

Male administrators who began to oversee women’s athletic programs after their schools’ CEOs reorganized their athletic department structures to comply with Title IX found many AIAW policies to be foreign. By the end of the decade, the NCAA reported, seventy-five percent of NCAA member institutions “administer both men’s and women’s varsity intercollegiate athletics under a single administrative and policy structure.”55 Male athletic officials were familiar with two forms of organizational membership; the
first in a national governing body which conducted national championships and the
second in an athletic conference which governed regular season play and also instituted
rules and regulations that could differ slightly from national policy as long as they proved
more strict.56 The AIAW system of regional and state associations which conducted
regular season play represented an alternative structure that easily could have been as
effective as the male structure, but for some administrators, regions organized by state
seemed inferior to the men’s tighter conference structure which better aligned teams of
similar size and competitive ability. In most situations, two structures created more
difficulty, because schools attempting to comply with Title IX could do so more easily if
male and female organizations, championships, and rules and regulations were parallel.
By 1980, seventeen conferences within the NCAA offered championships and regular
season play for women.57 Conference officials could help member institutions more
easily comply with Title IX if conference rules and regulations could apply to both men
and women.

At the very same time that Title IX empowered women in intercollegiate athletics
to demand more from their universities, the law also worked to weaken the argument for
separate and distinctive governing bodies for each gender. The AIAW was not doomed
to fail, but university administrators could more easily envision fitting women’s teams
into the male structure and its governing body, the NCAA. The AIAW structure proved
most ineffective to larger schools with big-time sports programs which could provide
greater sporting opportunities for female athletes, and felt pressured to increase resources for women after Title IX. Member institutions of the Atlantic Coast Conference, including the University of North Carolina, explored commencing women’s regular season play and championships in 1976. That same year, AIAW attempted to appease both small colleges, which struggled to compete with schools enjoying more resources to attract better talent, and large colleges, which became increasingly attracted to alternative governing structures to provide more competitive opportunities for their female athletes. In addition, small colleges fielded only a small number of total sports, while female students at large schools enjoyed more sports participation opportunities. A survey of AIAW membership in 1975-76, with 598 schools reporting, found that schools with less than 3000 female students offered an average of 5.1 sports, while schools with more than 3000 students averaged 7.1 sports teams.\(^{58}\)

UNC Chapel Hill enjoyed one of the most expansive programs in the country and committed to increasing opportunities and resources for women. The school was outgrowing the AIAW, and especially the NCAIAW, structure. Carolina had added cross country, indoor and outdoor track and field, and softball, bringing its total number of sports teams offered to women to twelve, well above the national average.\(^{59}\) The following year, UNC also provided financial aid in all twelve sports, again setting the institution far apart from the average AIAW member institution.\(^{60}\) UNC struggled to find regular season opponents in less popular sports in the state, like field hockey; its student-athletes’ needs were only met at the regional and national levels. The AIAW did host national championships in all sports offered at UNC with the exception of fencing, but
regular season competition mattered much more to athletes who wished to play long and fulfilling seasons.\textsuperscript{61}

AIAW adopted a divisional structure to attempt to meet its diverse memberships’ needs, but the organization always seemed to be playing catch-up, and following the NCAA’s lead. At the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Annual AIAW Delegates Assembly in Scottsdale, Arizona in January, 1976, voting members considered a proposal to reorganize competition into three groupings—junior colleges/community colleges, small schools, and large schools. Mary Roland Griffin, of Winthrop College in South Carolina, had taken over as Region II Representative from Jan Watson and reported to member institutions on the organization’s restructuring. The small college class was restricted to schools with female student enrollment no larger than 3000 students. The large college class included the largest and most competitive programs. A school with less than 3000 female students could compete in the large college division, if so desired.\textsuperscript{62}

At the same time the AIAW adopted a divisional structure mirroring the NCAA, the organization continued to assert an identity superior to the men. The delegates voted in another structural change involving AIAW’s philosophical position that it existed to serve student-athletes. As part of the reorganizing effort, new legislation creating the position of Student-Athlete Representative to the Executive Board who held speaking and voting powers.\textsuperscript{63} While the small school/large school division represented a response to the increasing pressures from members and male sports organizations, the addition of student representation served as another way for AIAW to demonstrate it did a better job serving student-athlete interests than male collegiate sports associations and especially
the NCAA. The inclusion of student voices in the governance structure also represented a return to AIAW’s roots in the student-run ARFCW.

In later years, AIAW would employ the inclusion of student-athletes in its governance structure as one of the reasons the NCAA should not conduct championships for women, because the women’s organization protected student-athlete welfare and served its student-athletes better by listening to their needs. In reality, however, student participation proved symbolic more than substantive and never fully trickled down from the national association to regional and state associations, or to member institutions. Region II elected its first student representative three years later, and only had two, Debi Kinzel, in 1979-80, and Anita Green, in 1980-81. No student representatives attended the 1981 Region II Delegate Assembly; “therefore, no election for a new student representative could occur.” NCAIAW never managed to appoint a single student representative. The addition of student-athlete representatives served a publicity function more than anything as the organization fought to retain control of women’s intercollegiate athletics.

Calling attention to student representation as a valuable quality which differentiated the AIAW, existing to serve its student-athletes, from the NCAA, which the AIAW deemed a corrupted institution determined to run college sports as a professional enterprise, represented only one arm of a multi-pronged strategy to prove the superiority of the AIAW to the NCAA. Other components of the AIAW publicity campaign highlighted its limitations on financial aid and recruiting and denounced the employment of full-time professional coaches, focused on recruiting and winning, rather
than physical educators who coached part-time. The AIAW’s time and resources devoted to this defensive posture increased dramatically after the organization hired Margot Polivy as legal counsel.\textsuperscript{66} The AIAW saw the NCAA as the enemy threatening the very existence of women’s intercollegiate athletics.

The AIAW failed to meet its member institutions’ needs, especially those of large universities, because defending the organization’s interests monopolized the time and resources of the national staff of mostly volunteers. On many college campuses throughout the country, the women who administered and coached for their universities felt their attachment to the AIAW weaken. They had embraced the opportunity to participate in the AIAW, and felt emboldened by the passage of Title IX. At the same time, they needed to work with male administrators and athletic department officials in order to best serve their female student-athletes. They believed in the AIAW and its mission, but they cared less about its philosophical positions and more about access to better intercollegiate athletic opportunities, which often came by working with male administrators and athletic officials.

At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, these experiences opened Frances Hogan and other athletic leaders to a future not necessarily bound to a women’s-only governing body. The North Carolina state branch of the AIAW differed from the national AIAW and other state branches, passing more restrictive rules to limit competitive structures for female student-athletes. Frustrated by the North Carolina AIAW and open to alternative governing structures, by the late 1970s, Frances Hogan preferred the formerly men’s-only Atlantic Coast Conference and National Collegiate
Athletic Association to the AIAW. At the institutional level, she believed a single governance structure would best serve UNC student-athletes. As the school fully complied with Title IX, a single structure would be better equipped to provide equal athletic opportunity to female student-athletes. At the regional and national level, the ACC and NCAA had the infrastructure necessary to provide championships for women comparable to those already enjoyed by the men.
Female athletic administrators on large college campuses became frustrated with the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women by 1975, but did not trust the National Collegiate Athletic Association. As their relationships with male administrators on their home campuses, and later, in men’s athletic conferences, strengthened, a possible move to male sporting organizations became more palatable. If women’s sporting opportunities continued to expand and female administrators and coaches were guaranteed a place at the decision-making table, female leaders at big-time universities became willing to leave the AIAW for the NCAA. They hoped the male sports establishment would take them in as equals and treaded cautiously.

Frances Hogan of the University of North Carolina had one foot in each of two different worlds, a challenging position, but one she performed very well. In the summer of 1974-75, Chancellor Ferebee Taylor reorganized the women’s intercollegiate program, placing it more fully in the Department of Athletics. Hogan was named “Director of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women,” and instead of working with Dr. Carl Blyth, Chair of Physical Education, she reported to the Athletic Director, who reported to the Chancellor. In this role, however, she also reported to the North Carolina AIAW and Region II, which sought to interact only with her as the leader of her school’s intercollegiate program, and in a secondary capacity, the physical education department.
UNC moved its women’s program away from the AIAW’s desired model with its reorganization of intercollegiate athletics. This structural change opened Hogan to the possibility of single governance for men and women. Her positive working relationship with male colleagues also loosened her commitment to the AIAW.

Beginning in 1974, the NCAA pursued a dual strategy to handle what its leaders, including Executive Director Walter Byers, deemed to be a crisis created by women’s entry into the previously all-male bastion of college sports. After losing the battle to have athletics exempt from Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, they fought to protect their most important asset, college football. Byers, football coaches, administrators, and politicians feared that Title IX would ruin the big-time sport of football, because they believed money for football would be taken away to support women’s programs. The first part of the NCAA’s strategy focused on preserving the status quo and ensuring Title IX would not create powerful women’s sporting institutions which would hurt men’s big-time sports. Byers and his staff worked with a series of politicians who repeatedly tried, and failed, to gain exemptions for “revenue-producing” sports so that football and men’s basketball programs did not have to be included when schools determined how to comply with the law.\(^1\) In another attempt to have athletics exempt from the law, they also sued HEW in 1976. Finally, they put pressure on HEW to weaken its guidelines and policy interpretations so that the law, if it did apply to athletics, would be limited.\(^2\)

The second part of the NCAA’s strategy represented its back-up plan if the first strategy did not work: to begin championships for women so that the organization could
control the reach of women’s intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA Council, led by President John A. Fuzak of Michigan State University, initiated this plan in 1975. Byers embarked on a publicity campaign to assist the effort. In an interview with Nancy Scannell of the *Washington Post*, Byers asserted, “Women’s sports, like men’s sports before them, should begin at the club level to determine if there is sustained interest before they are financed at the varsity level.”

His complete ignorance of the twenty-plus years of the women’s extramural club system is telling. He continued that the women “should be accorded the financing to the level of their interest” and that “there should be a demonstration of sustained interest to prove it is not a fad.” Byers’ main concern was money; that the financing of women’s varsity teams would reduce the resources for men’s teams. With the argument that the women should follow the same path as the men, with club status at first and varsity status later, he could make an argument to keep women’s programs small without having to mention financial concerns.

The NCAA Council utilized Title IX, ironically, the very law it was fighting in the courts, HEW, and Congress, to justify its commencement of championships for women. In a “Special Report on Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics,” the Council asserted,

> The members of the NCAA now are being required by law to provide comparable opportunities for participation in intercollegiate athletic programs for women. While the argument may be made that it is legally possible to provide those programs through separate but equal facilities and staff, economy will probably dictate that there be a minimum duplication of personnel and facilities. Furthermore, administrative necessity and the need for equitable eligibility requirements will require coordination and similarity not only at the institutional level but also on a national level. Integrated or coordinated programs at the national level cannot be achieved if separate men’s and women’s national organizations are left to accomplish it through anticipated bilateral agreements.
If a men’s governing body already existed and the law required schools to provide equal athletic opportunity, then there was no longer a need for the AIAW. The structure already in place, the NCAA, should be granted the right to oversee both men’s and women’s programs. The Council appealed to both the principle of equal opportunity and pragmatic economic necessity to convince its member institutions that the NCAA was the proper home of women’s intercollegiate athletics.

AIAW and its parent, the American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation (AAHPER), interpreted the NCAA Council’s report as an assault on women’s athletics and the AIAW’s very existence, and went into crisis mode. The AAHPER Executive Committee and its president, Roger Wiley, responded first. After citing the ninety-year history of AAHPER’s involvement in women’s athletics and the NCAA’s sixty-nine year existence as an organization solely for men, AAHPER condemned the NCAA’s attempt to gain control as undemocratic. Wiley wrote,

The Special Report announcing it is now ready to provide ‘services’ for all women student-athletes is a mockery of democratic procedures. The ‘consent of the governed’ is essential to any reorganization of collegiate sport. NCAA claims of alleged interest in ‘institutional control,’ sensitivity to the legal mandates regarding women, and alleged concern about the opportunity for women athletes are meaningless when those to be governed are rendered powerless with vague promises of ‘contemplated’ participation at some nebulous to-be-determined time.5

AIAW picked up where AAHPER left off, pointing out the hypocrisy of the NCAA. The AIAW Executive Board argued it was inappropriate to act without consultation and to fight against Title IX while simultaneously starting a women’s program when one already existed. The board also condemned the NCAA’s utilization of misinformation to convince member institutions that Title IX would require a single governing structure.
This signaled that the NCAA’s move was more about “control, power, and money” than opportunity for female athletes. While the NCAA, AAHPER, and AIAW battled at the national level, individual institutions had to figure out how to proceed as they attempted to comply with Title IX.

In Chapel Hill, Frances Hogan wanted to gain an understanding of how her coaches felt about potential NCAA championships. She distributed the three organization’s reports as well as her own comments on the situation, and asked for their reactions to the NCAA Report. Hogan’s comments demonstrate her pragmatism, by grounding her opinion in the law, as well as her optimism, because of her tireless effort to expand opportunity coupled with her willingness to work with whichever organization was in charge to achieve that goal. She also understood that the most important decisions were made at the institutional level, not necessarily at the national level. Fortunately for Hogan, she worked with university administrators and athletic department officials supportive of the women’s program. She reasoned that under the AIAW, women’s programs were already inferior in quality to the men and if the NCAA took over women’s governance and championships, they would continue to hold “second class status in a male dominated governance organization.” Hogan believed in the progressive nature of history, however; even though women’s athletics at the present would be inferior to men’s with regard to resources and community support, eventually women’s programs would be as popular and successful, and would enjoy the same support as the men’s. She grounded this optimism in her belief that “the final ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment will undoubtedly have a significant impact upon the organizational
configuration which finally emerges.” Although the American people failed to assist Hogan’s vision, she still believed female athletic opportunities would continue to improve, regardless of governing body. Volleyball and softball coach Beth Miller and basketball coach Angela Lumpkin did not share Hogan’s middle-ground approach. Both women did not trust the NCAA action and recommended women’s programs remain under the AIAW. Hogan shared women’s program opinions with Athletic Director Homer Rice, and because coaches were not unanimously supportive of the NCAA, the institution adopted a “wait and see” approach.

The AIAW Executive Board lobbied the faculty athletic representatives and athletic directors of NCAA institutions, urging them to vote against the adoption of women’s championships at the 1976 NCAA Convention. To beef up their arguments, the AIAW’s legal counsel Margot Polivy published a series of documents to challenge the NCAA’s claims to rightful ownership. AIAW President Laurie Mabry expressed her organization’s “commitment to a policy of cooperation and continuing dialogue with other sports governing groups” and “opposition to power struggles which are too frequently counter-productive to the interests of the students for whom the programs should exist.” Ultimately, delegates at the 1976 NCAA Convention never voted on the issue, because the NCAA Council decided to table its plan. The NCAA continued its Committee on Women’s Athletics, however, and refused to create a joint committee with the AIAW to open up a line of communication, angering the AIAW Executive Board.
Although the AIAW survived its first challenge by the NCAA, the organization continued to suffer from poor leadership and bureaucratic inefficiencies. AIAW rules continued to be more restrictive than those of the NCAA, and they changed every year, causing confusion for coaches. Making matters worse, coaches rarely knew which rules were currently in effect because the AIAW Handbook never shipped on time, sometimes arriving after the completion of the fall semester when it should have arrived in June. More importantly, some of the rules passed with the idea that they protected student-athletes had the opposite effect and did not place the interests of student-athletes first.

Basketball coach Dr. Angela Lumpkin, hired to replace Dr. Raye Holt in 1974, struggled to balance her teaching load in physical education and her responsibilities as head basketball coach. She also was expected to have a firm understanding of all of the rules and regulations of the AIAW, no matter how fluid. Hogan, in her role as director of the program, passed along all AIAW updates to her coaches, and she trusted that the coaches would learn and abide by all rules. Hogan had to balance multiple roles as well; although Chancellor Taylor appointed her Director of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women, she continued to have her teaching and advising responsibilities, in physical education and the General College, respectively.

Hogan and her coaches were still faculty members first and coaches second, and their salaries reflected these priorities. In 1974 the director and coaches earned separate, additional payments for their athletic responsibilities for the first time; $1000.00 for coaches and $3000.00 for the director. Meanwhile, coaches of men’s teams were full-time professionals, with the exceptions of the fencing and lacrosse coaches who also
taught physical education classes. Lumpkin did her best, but committed multiple violations as basketball coach. Her actions were unintentional; she was performing her job and trying to give women opportunities to play college basketball. Intent, however, did not matter to the NCAIAW, Region II, and national AIAW Ethics and Eligibility Committees.

Frances Hogan put personal feelings aside and abided by organizational rules because she took her position and the authority of the governing body seriously. She learned of Dr. Lumpkin’s first violation and, on April 2, 1976, wrote to the NCAIAW E&E Committee to self-report the recruiting violations. She copied her superiors, Chancellor Ferebee Taylor and new Athletic Director Bill Cobey, as well as Lumpkin on the letter. Hogan explained, “On March 30, it was brought to my attention that seven prospective student athletes were given the opportunity to demonstrate their basketball skill, on our campus, in the presence of Dr. Angela Lumpkin, women’s basketball coach.” She went on to list the prospects’ names, and explained that she “called Dr. Lumpkin immediately and referred her to ‘Recruitment of Student-Athletes’ in the 1975-76 AIAW Handbook, page 43.” Hogan quoted the handbook: “It is permissible to host prospective student-athletes on college campuses in order to observe their sport skill if invitations to these schools are announced, open auditions issued to high schools rather than to individual students.” Hogan explained to the committee that she believed Lumpkin did not fully understand the rule. She assured the E&E Committee that “Dr. Lumpkin has been instructed to cease all further recruiting efforts with the seven students until this matter is resolved by your Committee.”
The decision of the Ethics committee was uneventful, perhaps because Hogan demonstrated to the committee that she handled the issue effectively. The NCAIAW reprimanded the women’s basketball program at UNC-CH, but Calla Raynor, Chair of the NCAIAW E&E Committee, wrote that the committee “feels a more severe penalty is not in order at this time due to the unintentional violation of the recruiting rules.”\(^\text{16}\) The committee recommended that Lumpkin “study the AIAW and NCAIAW rules and regulations” and closed with praise for Hogan, declaring “The NCAIAW Ethics Committee commends you for your integrity in bringing this matter to our attention.”\(^\text{17}\) This treatment certainly contrasted with the way the E&E committee dealt with Dr. Holt only two years prior, demonstrating the group’s faith in Hogan as director and Lumpkin as coach.

Dr. Angela Lumpkin’s first violation came as a result of her negligence and could be fixed easily by reviewing AIAW rules more regularly and carefully. These efforts, however, never could have prevented her second violation, one with the potential to be considered more egregious by the E&E committee. On September 9, 1976, Lumpkin wrote to Joan Hult, Chair of the AIAW E&E Committee and faculty member at the University of Maryland, about Rosanne McGlade, a freshman on her basketball team who enrolled that fall semester as a scholarship student-athlete. Lumpkin already knew McGlade played the previous two years on an amateur team in France, but just had learned that McGlade also played for an American college, on scholarship, before her stint abroad. AIAW rules prevented transfer students from earning financial aid based on
athletic ability for one full year at their new institution, but if the new institution did not know that the student was a transfer should the school still be penalized?

Rather than throw her student-athlete under the bus, Lumpkin appealed to Hult’s reasonableness and also constructed an argument that McGlade actually was not a transfer student. She wrote:

Roseanne enrolled at UNC with the understanding that she would be a freshman and would thereby be allowed to gain an education based on her more mature opinion of academics. While at Glassboro State College she was not interested in college work, and so her grades were poor. She dropped out of college, based on her own decision, and was not recruited until two years later when she had decided to go to college. Basketball, through a partial grant-in-aid, has allowed her the opportunity to get the education she now values. Therefore, to deny her this assistance would not be equitable to her on the basis of these facts, I believe.18

Lumpkin hoped that she could take away one year of McGlade’s eligibility by considering her a sophomore on the team, and the issue would be done. She emphasized that McGlade demonstrated new maturity with her decision to return to college, explaining that her experience in France inspired her to take her education seriously. She was now motivated to “gain a sound college education, with a probable major in French, and to play college basketball.” Lumpkin argued that the scholarship from UNC would give this newly enlightened young woman a second chance at her education.

Despite Lumpkin’s appeal to broader educational ideals, Hult was unmoved. Hult bypassed Lumpkin to inform her superior, Hogan, of the violation and suggested that Hogan reprimand the basketball coach, as this was already her second violation in a short period of time. Hogan agreed and took immediate action, writing to Bill Cobey, Roseanne McGlade, and Angela Lumpkin to take care of the matter. In her letter to the
new athletic director, she explained the violation and included new information she learned from Richard Baddour, the admissions officer who oversaw student-athlete admissions and financial aid awards. Baddour claimed he “was not aware that Roseanne had attended college elsewhere, and if he had known, Roseanne would not have been admitted to the University.”19 Hogan explained to Cobey that Hult had asked for a detailed list of Lumpkin’s recruiting of McGlade, to demonstrate the opportunities Lumpkin had to learn that McGlade was actually a transfer student. She concluded, “Every effort is being made to comply with AIAW instructions and regulations. I sincerely regret that this violation of AIAW policies has occurred.”

Hogan disagreed with this AIAW policy, but dutifully followed it anyway. She had been trying to liberalize transfer rules for years, submitting motions to the Region II representative for consideration at the AIAW Delegate Assembly.20 None of these motions passed, including one to make transfer students immediately eligible for financial aid. She put her personal feelings on the matter aside and abided by AIAW rules. Her letter to McGlade demonstrates her belief that McGlade was at fault for not reporting her previous collegiate experience, even though Hogan personally felt she should be eligible for financial aid. Hogan wrote:

On your application for admission to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, you failed to indicate that you had attended Glassboro State College for one semester. Because of this attendance of one semester at another institution, the AIAW has ruled that you are considered a transfer student, and therefore you are ineligible to receive financial aid for one year. I have recommended to the University’s Scholarship Committee that your athletic scholarship be terminated immediately, and that the University be reimbursed in the amount of $1061.00 which has been awarded to you thus far this semester.21
Hogan knew it might be hard for McGlade to pay back the money, but she created the situation and therefore had to bear the consequences.

Even though coaches of women’s teams at UNC were not full-time professional coaches, their director and the university held them to professional standards. Hogan wrote to Lumpkin explaining the seriousness of the situation, that she would be reprimanded, and that her actions reflected poorly on the entire institution. She reminded Lumpkin that she had addressed these issues in their most recent coaches’ meeting. Hogan concluded that lack of knowledge was not enough and that Lumpkin had to be more proactive in seeking out information: “In the future, the following guidelines should be strictly adhered to; the eligibility of a prospective student athlete should be clearly defined before the student is admitted to the University; if questions should arise pertaining to any AIAW regulation, I want you to set up an appointment with me to discuss the matter before any action is taken.”22 Lumpkin could have been more diligent in requesting information about McGlade’s past.

Although administrators like Hogan followed AIAW rules with which they disagreed, this practice would not be sustainable in the long run. Like the Roseanne McGlade situation, four more cases demonstrated the rigidity of AIAW rules, which prioritized order and standardization over the best interests of student-athletes. Each case involved a moment in which a UNC coach believed the AIAW could make exceptions for special cases while leaving the rules intact. Fortunately, in two of the four, the AIAW agreed. By 1978, the organization finally demonstrated increased flexibility, and unlike with the Roseanne McGlade situation, E&E committees proved more willing to bend the
rules for the sake of the student-athlete. In the first two cases, however, UNC still had to follow the strict interpretation of AIAW rules. One involved financial aid for a first-year student who earned a small scholarship from her high school. The AIAW Ethics and Eligibility Committee held firm, and volleyball player Susan Strahl had to decline the award from her high school.\(^{23}\) The largest financial aid award acceptable to AIAW included tuition, fees, room, and board, but did not match the full cost of attendance. Strahl needed the extra money from the award, and AIAW rigidity denied her that comfort.

In the second, regarding financial aid for an international student, the failure of the AIAW to act without any sense of urgency forced UNC to abide by AIAW rules. Sally Ann Lewis, a tennis player from Rhodesia, had played for her Cape Town University’s club team and had not received financial assistance from the school for playing on the team. UNC tennis coach Kitty Harrison hoped the E&E committee would allow her to receive financial aid even though she was a transfer student because the club system outside of the United States was not as competitive, her previous institution was outside the AIAW, and the international student’s economic burden. She appealed to the committee’s interest in providing opportunity, writing: “Because Rhodesian Exchange Control regulations prohibit Mr. Lewis’ disbursement of all costs necessary for Sally Ann to attend a university in America, there is no possibility of her attending UNC without some financial assistance.”\(^{24}\) The committee simply failed to respond to Kitty Harrison, forcing UNC to follow AIAW rules strictly and abandon the effort to get Lewis into
school. Hogan wrote to her colleague at Duke, Calla Raynor, Chair of the Region II E&E Committee at the time, expressing her frustrations:

> Kitty decided not to go through with the appeal concerning Sally Ann Lewis. There simply is not enough time to go through all the channels and procedures and get something definite decided in time for her to make her own arrangements for getting here for the Spring 1978 semester. You know how slow AIAW is! We called Joan [Hult] and explained our decision to drop the matter.25

Administrators and coaches needed the AIAW to respond quickly to inquiries regarding prospective student-athletes, but AIAW did not have the resources to address important matters expeditiously. When the opportunity for a female athlete was denied due to AIAW bureaucratic inefficiency, coaches and administrators became frustrated.

The AIAW did not always fail to grant athlete eligibility in exceptional circumstances, and UNC coaches finally received the approval they desired to provide athletic opportunities for student-athletes. The two cases in which the AIAW deemed UNC athletes eligible involved two fourth-year students who were graduating a semester early and a transfer student who had played for her former university’s men’s junior varsity team. Bonnie Bell and Mary Alice Abdalla played golf and volleyball, respectively, two fall sports. Both students had completed the majority of their coursework in just three years, and were enrolled in only 6 credit hours in the fall, the last semester of their senior year. AIAW rules mandated that student-athletes had to be enrolled in 12 hours in order to be eligible, and Hogan requested that AIAW provide an exception and declare Bell and Abdalla eligible for their last season of competition. Fran Koenig of Central Michigan University, the new national E&E chair, agreed and the women were cleared for competition.26
The second case demonstrates the first time a coach’s appeal to greater principles actually worked to influence the AIAW Ethics and Eligibility Committee to declare an athlete eligible when a strict interpretation of the *Handbook* would result otherwise. Whereas Angela Lumpkin failed to move the committee when she appealed to higher educational ideals in 1976, Anson Dorrance, a male coach, nonetheless, emerged victorious when he appealed to the principle of equal opportunity for women. The student-athlete, Laurie Gregg, played on the junior varsity men’s soccer team for the two years she was enrolled at Lehigh University. Gregg transferred to Harvard, where she was a three-sport athlete, playing basketball and lacrosse in addition to soccer. In her fourth year, Gregg transferred to UNC. Dorrance wrote to E&E Chair Arlene Gorton of Brown University requesting that the committee grant Gregg two years of eligibility to play for UNC instead of one.

Dorrance’s letter contained arguments the E&E Committee simply could not ignore. He reasoned that Gregg’s participation at Lehigh should not be considered a full program of intercollegiate athletics. The team only played six games and hardly ever practiced, whereas his Carolina women’s soccer teams played seasons of 26 and 23 games in the two years Gregg attended Lehigh. Then Dorrance swung for the fences, appealing to Gorton’s commitment to equal opportunity for women:

The fact that she was a woman on a men’s team (and the only woman) did not give her a real opportunity to participate in the program. The recent women’s athletic revolution occurred as a redressing of this very fallacy. Women, although allowed to try out and participate on some men’s teams, were not actually being given a chance. The rationale for establishing separate women’s athletic teams was forced by this lack of real opportunity with the men. Surely, we cannot hold Laurie’s Lehigh experience as a real athletic opportunity. To do so would question why we ever fought for separate women’s events to begin with.
all, the reason she transferred to Harvard in part was to get the kind of athletic experience she was missing at Lehigh—regular practice sessions, a real schedule, and an equal opportunity. Women’s soccer is only just beginning at the collegiate level, but in its short history it is already having a significant impact. The women’s national final, for example, outdrew the men’s final. We had 10,000 people for the tournament (just under 5,000 for the final). Laurie Gregg is one of the sport’s pioneers and has poured herself into the development of her game. At Harvard she was among the first group of women’s soccer All-Americans. The irony of pioneering a sport is that you rarely get to experience the benefits you were responsible for bringing about.27

Dorrance boldly concluded that Gregg should be granted two years to play at UNC, arguing, “There is no one who has worked harder for this privilege.” Gregg’s mistreatment on a men’s team, her contributions to the “women’s athletic revolution,” and her position as a “pioneer” of women’s soccer earned her the right to two full years on a top collegiate team, Dorrance argued, and Gorton and the E&E committee agreed.

While the AIAW had improved some of its bureaucratic inefficiencies, for many administrators and coaches at large universities, the organization was still failing in its mission to provide opportunities for competitive female athletes. At the national level, the organization continued to declare itself philosophically different and superior to male sporting organizations. At the same time, however, it struggled to codify a body of rules which worked smoothly at the regional and state levels, and, most importantly, for member institutions whose men’s programs engaged in big-time sports in Division I of the NCAA. In 1978, members of the AIAW faced a crisis: either the organization would allow representatives from larger institutions to transform the organization to better serve their interests, or the organization would remain the same, but continue to serve only
small colleges because the large schools would walk out and work with the NCAA to begin offering women’s championships. The January 1978 Delegates Assembly in Atlanta was the AIAW’s moment of truth. Would the organization sacrifice some of its most important principles for the sake of maintaining its position as the only organization for intercollegiate athletics for women and the largest intercollegiate athletic body in the country? Or would AIAW stick to its vision and allow its most prestigious universities to leave?28

Financial aid based on athletic ability continued to cause the greatest controversy among AIAW membership, as the leadership’s principles clashed with the reality of Title IX compliance. At the 1977 Delegates Assembly, voting representatives passed new legislation that would go into effect at the beginning of the 1978-79 school year limiting financial aid to only tuition and fees. Since 1974, when the Kellmeyer suit forced AIAW to allow financial aid based on athletic ability, the organization adopted a scholarship model similar to the NCAA, permitting schools to offer tuition, fees, room, and board.29

The reduction in financial aid passed by the assembly in 1977 revealed the idealism continuing to influence decision making. The resolution even included a statement that the body was hopeful that men’s sporting organizations would follow AIAW’s lead and reduce their scholarship limitations as well, in an effort to deemphasize intercollegiate athletics and step away from big-time college sports.30

Unsurprisingly, the NCAA and other male organizations did not follow suit; however, the impending legislation had a different and unintended effect—it caused male athletic directors to become involved. UNC Athletic Director Bill Cobey wrote to
Margot Polivy two months before the 1978 Delegates Assembly to express his concerns
over the new legislation which would put member institutions like UNC at risk of legal
action. Cobey asked Polivy for assistance, writing, “We have heard that the AIAW has
received legal opinion that the new scholarship legislation can be legally upheld in the
courts. If this is true, would you please send me a copy of this legal opinion.” Polivy
had been in communication with the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the division of HEW
responsible for Title IX enforcement, regarding a case concerning Ball State University.
Although Polivy’s inquiries regarding the case had been out of opposition to Ball State’s
decision to reduce financial aid offered to women in 1976, because the AIAW position
had changed, she now used the OCR’s statements to support the AIAW position.

This was not the first time Polivy had stretched interpretations of legal rulings to
fit her organization’s interests; this practice frequently caused more problems than fixes.
In communications with Martin Gerry and Peter Libassi of the OCR, Polivy received the
following policy clarification, which applied to only the Ball State situation, but she now
understood could be standardized organization-wide. The OCR policy clarification
stated:

Where a recipient has allocated athletic scholarship funds for male and female
athletes consistent with paragraphs 86.37(c) and 86.41 of the regulation, it may
choose to make allocations of different dollar amounts to male and female
students as long as the overall effect of such awards does not have a negative
impact on participation in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics by members
of one sex or on their participation in any other program of the recipient’s
federally assisted education program or activity.

Ultimately, whether or not the OCR would uphold an AIAW policy which
institutionalized unequal scholarship amounts for women and men did not matter.
Member institutions which provided “full rides” to male student-athletes could not afford to risk potential class-action lawsuits. The directors of women’s programs at major universities also did not care about the legalities of smaller scholarship amounts for women, because to them, the policy ran counterintuitive to their fundamental purpose on campus: to provide the best opportunities for female athletes. How would they explain to their student-athletes that they could not earn the same scholarship amounts as the men?

Encouraged by the support of their male campus superiors, female athletic directors descended upon the Atlanta meeting in 1978 ready to fight for change, and if they lost, they would leave the AIAW with the support of their institutions. They successfully enacted dramatic legislative revisions. Pat Moore of the *Greensboro Daily News* traveled to Atlanta to cover the action. She interviewed a number of administrators and coaches who confirmed they had the approval of their institutions to leave the AIAW if the organization did not overturn the scholarship reduction. Moore quoted one delegate who stated:

> To say that the AIAW is starting to come of age is an accurate evaluation. We came to Atlanta not knowing if the association would even be intact by the end of the week. Instead the women carried out their meetings with assurance, authority and a real sense of unity. I was worried that the NCAA would try to lure many of the schools away if the AIAW meeting was a mishandled, badly run affair. But it wasn’t. The women came informed and knowledgeable of issues. They knew how they wanted to vote. President Judith Holland (UCLA) ran the meetings beautifully. If any one thing came out of this delegate assembly it was the definite commitment of the women to the AIAW.  

Holland’s timely presidency proved essential to the effort to keep AIAW together. The women’s athletic director at a major sports university with membership in the Pac 8 Conference understood the pressures facing larger schools with bigger men’s athletic
programs. Her leadership also helped the organization restructure to better serve the interests of all of its greatly diverse colleges and universities.

Not only did the delegates at the January 1978 meeting vote to overturn the scholarship reduction passed the previous year, they took advantage of the moment to bring structural change to the AIAW. Representatives of large institutions made up a minority of AIAW membership, but small college representatives voted alongside them in order to keep the AIAW together. The second important legislation passed by the Delegate Assembly concerned the establishment of another divisional restructuring to better serve the diversity of the organization’s membership. Although AIAW already divided competition in large and small school divisions at the regional and national level in its most popular sports, the new divisional structure would provide increased autonomy to the schools with more resources to institute rules changes to better serve their athletes. Finally, the delegates voted to allow schools to compensate coaches who traveled off campus to recruit prospects.34

The AIAW had fought unforgivingly to prevent any type of support for expanded recruiting efforts, deemed a corrupting practice that would lead to the professionalization of coaches and exploitation of athletes. Too many coaches and administrators, however, determined the policy which prohibited such coaches’ reimbursements unfair. Moore quoted one coach who reasoned, “Women coaches are still fighting for decent salaries. To have to take out of your own pocket traveling expenses is too much to ask of the coach. Besides, at our school, the football coaching staff’s recruiting budget is larger
than our entire women’s athletic budget.”35 Gone were the days in which women’s sports existed in an isolated bubble.

The AIAW’s leadership, which in past years was disproportionately made of representatives from small schools, could no longer expect to follow its own philosophy and rules for women, without consideration of men’s athletic organizations. This represented an unintended consequence of Title IX; female physical education leaders lost the ability to create the intercollegiate athletic program they desired. The law required schools to provide equal athletic opportunity for women, a policy AIAW women supported. But when schools, particularly large schools with big-time sports programs for men, reorganized their athletic departments to include their women’s programs, administrators—both male and female—sought to change the AIAW to better fit their needs or leave the AIAW for a different governing body.

Membership in athletic conferences opened many administrators and coaches of women’s teams to the possibility of an alternative sports structure. The AIAW Executive Board perceived conference membership as a threat, and requested information from schools belonging to conferences which hosted championships for both men and women. Donna Lopiano, AIAW president-elect, spoke at the Region II Delegate Assembly in 1980 and warned attendees that the greatest danger was “involvement with the personal institution rather than the large program of the AIAW.”36 Women like Hogan who had good working relationships with university administrators and athletic officials did not relate to this sentiment. Furthermore, conference membership provided female athletes and coaches access to a higher level of sports programming never before experienced.
Conference championships proved superior to regional championships in many ways: the league paid for team travel, games were televised thanks to already-existing television contracts, and interest in women’s sports increased because general fans of men’s college sports could more easily support women’s teams competing in a familiar and prided organization. Women’s athletic programs gained legitimacy when they participated in the same conference structure as their respective men’s programs.

Leaders in the Atlantic Coast Conference worked with female administrators to begin hosting championships and organizing regular season competition in 1977-78. Male coaches of combined men’s and women’s programs most vocally preferred ACC championships, because the combined programs were individual sports in which AIAW regional championships mattered less. Swim coach Frank Comfort elected not to take his women’s team to the inaugural Region II championships for swimming and diving in 1979 at Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia because the meet held no purpose. Individual swimmers gained entry to the AIAW nationals based on time performance throughout the course of the entire season, and the regional meet served no qualifying purpose other than a last opportunity to hit a fast enough time. Before making his decision, Comfort wrote to Hogan to list the reasons and gain her approval to remain home from the regional meet, “Mrs. Hogan, I have no desire to attend this as we are coming off ACC’s (at Clemson) the week before, thus it is a total duplication of efforts. This meet is not required for our attendance at AIAW’s. What do you think? It is not
budgeted either.” Traveling out of state cost time, money, and effort, and Hogan agreed that the team could stay home the weekend of the regional meet in preparation for nationals.

Frances Hogan’s participation in Atlantic Coast Conference meetings loosened her commitment to the AIAW, both its competition structure and ideological positions. Women’s athletic directors and program athletic directors of the seven schools of the ACC met on March 18, 1977 to create the new structure. They named Hogan Chair of the Liaison Committee of Women’s Athletic Directors to the ACC. When AIAW and ACC policies conflicted, Hogan and her colleagues deemed the AIAW the organization at fault and causing headaches. A major organizational issue involved the University of Maryland. The Terrapins did not belong to Region II, inhibiting the ACC’s attempt to organize regular season competition because AIAW rules limited play to schools within the same region. Rather than abandon league play or not include Maryland, ACC schools belonging to Region II attempted, yet failed, to have the entire state of Maryland moved from Region I-b to Region II. In addition, the rules restricting NCAIAW members’ competitive opportunities because their schedules could include no more than fourteen regular season games meant ACC regular season play could never happen, if North Carolina schools also wanted to participate in AIAW championships. Again, rather than give up on ACC participation, delegates representing North Carolina’s ACC schools went to their next NCAIAW assembly determined to overturn the state association’s more stringent competition rules. With the power of ACC play behind them, this time they succeeded.
Conference play more than anything rallied athletic departments behind their women’s teams. Large institutions like North Carolina now regularly played schools of similar size and competitive potential, unlike under the NCAIAW when the Tar Heels played small colleges more frequently. Coaches of men’s sports understood and respected conference play. Sports information directors were more likely to cover women’s teams, and fans were more likely to support them, when they played other big-time institutions. As ACC Women’s Committee Chairman Gene Corrigan, director of athletics at Virginia, stated in a press release announcing the commencement of ACC play for women, “We hope to create the same interest and enthusiasm in our women’s programs that is currently enjoyed by the men’s teams.” This support from male administrators and coaches for women’s intercollegiate athletics impressed women like Hogan.

The women’s athletic directors learned quickly, however, that they would not be fully integrated into the ACC structure like the men’s athletic directors. Their lack of involvement in decision making affecting women’s schedules and championships frustrated Hogan and her ACC colleagues. In April, 1978, they wrote collectively to Commissioner Robert C. James providing recommendations to increase their participation in ACC policymaking for women. They urged Commissioner James to set up annual meetings of ACC women’s athletic directors with both men’s athletic directors and ACC officials, and they requested that he appoint a female athletic director to the Conference Committee on Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics. These recommendations were reasonable, and yet, still rejected by the commissioner. True women’s involvement
in combined governance would remain a major concern as athletic departments, conferences, and national bodies merged men’s and women’s programs. Although Hogan held reservations about the men’s athletic model and continued to support the AIAW, participation in the ACC opened her to the possibility of transitioning to the NCAA governance and championship structure should the opportunity arise again.

The opportunity to switch national governing bodies came quickly, as the NCAA’s plan of championships for women really never went away. In May 1979, Frances Hogan first learned of the second attempt by the NCAA to commence championships for women. This time she heard the news not from the national AIAW, but on her own campus from her boss, Athletic Director Bill Cobey. Signaling the urgency of the news, Cobey wrote to Hogan from the ACC spring meeting. Cobey shared, “We learned today that the University of Maryland will probably propose that the NCAA start sponsoring women’s championships.” No women were present at the ACC meeting at Myrtle Beach when this decision was made. Just after Commissioner James had declined the ACC women’s athletic directors’ request to meet annually with men’s athletic directors, the ACC organized a special meeting of male and female athletic officials during the summer of 1979 to discuss the move from AIAW to NCAA. Of the eight institutions represented (Georgia Tech joined the conference that year), seven voted “in favor of the concept of one national organization.” The University of North Carolina had four officials present: Athletic Director Bill Cobey, Women’s Athletic Director Frances Hogan, and Assistant Athletic Directors John Swofford and Bob Savod.
Hogan held considerable reservations about the NCAA in 1979, but she had to work with her team to support her institution’s vote. She kept her true feelings to herself and received input from the coaches of her women’s teams. Reflecting on the ACC meetings over a decade later, Hogan remembered:

Most of the schools wanted one set of rules to go by; one of everything to go by. And even though I thought some of the AIAW rules were better than some of the NCAA, this university and the chancellor and the athletic director all went in that direction as most schools did…. The last two years of AIAW, we all knew that we were going NCAA. There were coaches who wanted to stay with the AIAW and some wanted NCAA.\textsuperscript{45}

Coaches did not split cleanly along gender lines, with the six male coaches championing the move to NCAA and six female coaches supporting the AIAW.\textsuperscript{46} Anson Dorrance, who coached both the men’s and women’s soccer teams in 1979 and 1980, preferred the AIAW. Some female coaches believed the NCAA would make a better home because their teams would receive more publicity.\textsuperscript{47} Ultimately, Hogan understood her and her coaches’ opinions would not affect the ultimate outcome, but that did not stop her from learning as much as she could.

Hogan adopted a careful approach, and created a “Why/Why Not” list that she kept in her desk at work. She updated the list each time she had a new reason to leave for the NCAA or to stay with the AIAW. Although her institution was now in favor of NCAA championships for women, and she supported that decision, her list revealed her true feelings about what was best for women’s intercollegiate athletics. The document included twenty-five reasons to stay in the AIAW and only three reasons to switch to the NCAA. According to Hogan, the NCAA would provide “greater exposure,” allow the institution to maintain “autonomy in determining the best thing for its women’s
athletics,” and give “reimbursement of championship travel and per diem expenses for women’s teams.” These were not small benefits, but things she and her colleagues had been pushing for over the last decade.

Hogan’s reasons to stay in the AIAW were more philosophical than operational, but some revealed her concern that the NCAA might be taking control of women’s athletics in order to de-emphasize them. Items on her list included “women’s athletics and development are in a different stage of growth than men’s,” “difference in philosophies,” “women, by having their own organization, can work to avoid making the mistakes that men have made,” “will bring about the demise of one of the strongest voices speaking on behalf of women in sport,” and “does not advance development of women’s athletics.” Hogan’s number one reason to remain in the AIAW stated that the NCAA had been the “leading vocal foe of Title IX for more than seven years.” After all, the first strategy pursued by the NCAA was to have athletics, or at least revenue-producing sports, exempt from Title IX. Although both efforts failed, the NCAA’s publicity campaign influenced HEW and individual institutions to treat revenue and non-revenue sports differently. Furthermore, the NCAA’s effort broadened the definition of “comparable” so that institutions could allocate far less resources to women’s programs than men’s, as long as they could demonstrate that opportunities continued to expand. The NCAA committed to its back-up plan to take over governance of women’s intercollegiate athletics.
Delegates to the NCAA annual convention in January 1980 voted to commence championships for women in 1981-82, and the AIAW unleashed a huge campaign to help its membership convince their home institutions of the necessity to continue two separate governing structures for men’s and women’s athletics. Hogan agreed with many AIAW arguments, but trusted her university and the men with whom she worked to continue to expand opportunities for women, regardless of which organization provided governance and conducted championships. At first the AIAW was willing to work with the NCAA to create a single structure for men’s and women’s athletics as long as the NCAA agreed to explore alternatives in “an atmosphere of mutual organizational respect and cooperation,” provide “equal opportunity for female student-athletes,” assure “equal decision-making authority for women,” and guarantee “student-athlete rights.”

The AIAW clung to arguments of superiority as proof of the necessity to keep a separate women’s governing body. Leaders continued to point to student-athlete welfare as one element of the women’s model the men did not share. The organization also distinguished its approach based on fiscal prudence and an educational model of sport from the NCAA’s big-time programs with out-of-control spending and academic scandals. The Executive Board argued the NCAA would benefit from reorganization with the AIAW to create a new system, because it would provide the men’s organization the opportunity to correct many of its problems:

Up until now men’s collegiate athletic governance organizations have emphasized either highly commercialized or low visibility programs. AIAW seeks to establish a highly competitive and visible program for women which is both student-oriented and economically prudent. If successful, it may provide the answer to some of the fundamental problems that have plagued men’s athletics.
The Executive Board asserted that if the NCAA was unwilling to form a joint structure which truly incorporated women’s athletic leaders and principles, then separate governing bodies for men and women must continue. Hogan’s experience with ACC leaders unwilling to create a place for women in decision making influenced her agreement with the AIAW Executive Board’s arguments.

Bill Cobey and Frances Hogan learned as much as they could about the NCAA plan and the AIAW opposition, and worked closely to formulate the university’s position on the future of women’s athletics. While Hogan regularly received AIAW publications throughout 1980, she also received regular communication from Bill Cobey, who asked her opinions on NCAA proposals and ACC positions. The NCAA spent the year formulating the shape of its championships and governance structure for women, naming Ruth Berkey Director of Women’s Championships. A final governance plan would be adopted at the 1981 NCAA Convention.

Cobey agreed with Hogan’s apprehensions that the NCAA might not do enough to provide for women’s championships. He updated new Chancellor Christopher Fordham on their shared opinion that a number of present concerns needed addressing:

(1) that the NCAA move carefully and thoughtfully in this direction in order to fully protect the best interests of women’s student athletes; (2) that the NCAA offer a full complement of national championships in order to fully accommodate the aspirations of individual women athletes and teams. This would be especially important if the AIAW denied participation opportunities for institutions participating in NCAA women’s championships; and (3) that the scheduling criteria of 85 percent for Division I members may be too restrictive initially.

Ultimately, the UNC position came down to a belief in the value of a single governance structure. Cobey explained to Chancellor Fordham, “Frances Hogan, our
Director of Women’s Athletics, and I feel that eventually we need one governing organization for both men’s and women’s athletics.” They agreed that while the AIAW had been a great organization to begin and grow women’s intercollegiate athletics, “we believe it is not in the long range interest of our institution to be affiliated with separate organizations for men’s and women’s athletics.” Cobey and Hogan trusted the NCAA to listen to its membership and improve its inclusion of women in governance. Cobey related to the chancellor that they concluded, “The NCAA is best equipped to offer the organizational support services needed for major college athletic competition. I believe that the NCAA is capable and will fully integrate women into their power structure.”

Cobey and Hogan were mostly right; the NCAA hosted two meetings in the summer of 1980 in Denver and Pittsburgh and encouraged its member institutions to send their women’s athletic directors to provide input on the structure of women’s championships in the NCAA.

Whereas AIAW leaders saw the regional meetings as an opportunity to discredit the NCAA, many women’s athletic directors, who agreed with their male colleagues’ preference for a single governance structure, saw the meetings as a chance to make the NCAA beneficial for female student-athletes, coaches, and administrators. These meetings also served as a catalyst for a new organization of women in intercollegiate athletics, formed by women open to a future other than the AIAW.

In Denver and Pittsburgh, NCAA representatives listened, and adopted some, but not all of the women’s recommendations. The most important modification of the NCAA plan was to allow schools to continue to follow AIAW rules and elect, sport by sport, to
compete in either NCAA or AIAW championships. These policies gave coaches and administrators the flexibility to transition more slowly to NCAA rules and to select which championship structure best fit their team and athlete needs. The NCAA Council rejected, however, the suggestion that member institutions be allowed two votes at meetings, arguing that “permitting dual or split votes would undermine the concept of institutional responsibility” and would violate the “one member, one vote principle.”55 They agreed to include administrators of women’s athletic programs in all NCAA mailings, expand TV contracts and films produced by NCAA Productions to include women’s championships, and provide a proportionate number of postgraduate scholarships to female and male students.

In a major victory which gained many women’s athletic directors’ support for the NCAA, the regional meetings succeeded in bringing more women into the governance structure of the NCAA. The new plan created quotas for the minimum number of women required to serve on a significant number of committees. The NCAA would expand the size of various NCAA committees and “guarantee” women seats on the NCAA Council, the Steering Committees for each division, and at-large voting representatives.56 Hogan attended the regional meeting in Pittsburgh, entering the meeting skeptical of the NCAA governance plan, and emerging “feeling that significant progress had been made.”57 After the Pittsburgh meeting, Hogan met with John Swofford, who had just begun his tenure as athletic director replacing Bill Cobey; Jennifer Alley, head coach of women’s basketball; and Dr. Beth Miller, Business Manager and volleyball coach.58 The group concluded that revisions from the regional meetings improved the NCAA governance
plan to the point that “in the long run” it represented “the healthiest situation for the
development of women’s athletics.”

At the meetings in Denver and Pittsburgh, female athletic directors looking for an alternative to the AIAW took the first steps toward forming a new body to serve female athletic leaders’ interests. Members of the National Association of College Directors of Athletics (NACDA) recruited other women open to NCAA governance to meet separately from the general body which included AIAW supporters. These women formed what they later would name the Council of Collegiate Women Athletics Administrators (CCWAA). The CCWAA provided women’s athletic leaders an alternative space to the AIAW to develop leadership and philosophy as they came to the realization that NCAA championships would be the new, and eventually, only, system.

The body included three types of female administrators: critics of the AIAW, pragmatic women who supported the AIAW but concluded its days were numbered, and former AIAW leaders who were open to involvement in the new NCAA structure. Founding President Barbara Hedges described CCWAA as an organization “established with the hope that a comfortable forum for open and honest discussion of the problems inherent in Intercollegiate Athletics would prove to be a refreshing and rewarding investment.” Frances Hogan joined the CCWAA as one of its first official members. The organization proved to be a powerful intermediary during the 1981-82 academic year when both the AIAW and NCAA hosted championships for women. It served the women who administered programs on their campuses rather than the national governing
bodies, and helped them navigate how to best provide for their female student-athletes
during a turbulent and transitional period in women’s intercollegiate athletics.

Atlantic Coast Conference schools operated as a bloc when voting representatives
at the January 1981 NCAA Convention determined the nature of women’s governance
and championships, commencing that fall. They wanted to ensure women a strong role in
NCAA governance and knew their women’s teams would eventually join the NCAA.
For the 1981-82 academic year, however, the ACC decided all women’s teams would
follow AIAW rules. Then, as a group, ACC women’s programs would “shift from
AIAW rules to NCAA rules after August 1, 1982.” The rationale behind the decision
came from ACC member institutions’ commitment to provide the best competitive
opportunities for student-athletes. The NCAA would not host championships in all of the
sports offered by the AIAW in its inaugural year; therefore, the AIAW would continue to
provide the broadest program of opportunities for women.

Hogan and other women encouraged the ACC to tread carefully and transition to
NCAA governance slowly. She wrote to Swofford on the eve of the 1981 ACC spring
meeting that “maintaining dual membership in both AIAW and NCAA… would give us a
year to gradually work into NCAA with more understanding of the NCAA rules and
policies governing women’s championships, and a better understanding of the financial
implications.” The male athletic directors listened, and at the annual meeting they
voted to allow schools to select, sport by sport, which teams would compete in NCAA or
AIAW national championships for the 1981-82 academic year. At the ACC fall
meeting in December 1981, ACC schools voted to adopt NCAA rules for the 1982-83
school year, binding them to play in only NCAA championships. Other conferences and individual institutions followed the same path.

The commencement of NCAA championships was enough to bring about the end of the AIAW, and word spread that the AIAW would fold before the end of the 1981-82 academic year. In a last-ditch effort to save its organization, on February 26, 1982, the AIAW filed for a temporary injunction with the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. The request was denied, and because of the ruling, AIAW announced it would suspend AIAW rules as of March 1, 1982. The organization did not have the funds to follow through with its remaining spring championships, and schools that wished participated in NCAA championships instead. NCAA President James Frank and Secretary-Treasurer John L. Toner, with authority granted by the NCAA Council, determined that institutions which had declared AIAW rules for the 1981-82 “must comply with those AIAW rules, including recruiting regulations…through the remainder of the 1981-82 academic year.” Then all schools were to comply with NCAA rules for 1982-83. The transition from AIAW to NCAA rules and championships proceeded smoothly at the University of North Carolina and other schools of the Atlantic Coast Conference. The end of the AIAW was not a tragedy for student-athletes, coaches, or administrators at the major universities in the region or the state of North Carolina.

Athletes, coaches, and administrators at smaller colleges in the state, however, experienced the end of the AIAW with sadness and fear for the future of their athletic programs. Although their schools theoretically should have continued support for women’s athletics because of Title IX, by the early 1980s the Department of Education
under President Ronald Reagan as well as the Supreme Court had dramatically weakened the law so that many schools slowed down or even stopped compliance, particularly in intercollegiate athletics.\textsuperscript{68} Smaller schools, like Appalachian State, Elon, East Carolina, Meredith College, and UNC-Greensboro, which had thrived under the ARFCW and the early years of AIAW, did not belong to conferences that shared the commitment of the ACC to provide robust women’s programs and supported the move to the NCAA. While the needs of female student-athletes at the state’s major universities would be met after 1982, the future was less clear at smaller colleges.

The NCAIAW and Region II of the AIAW folded after the AIAW suspended its rules and championships. Female physical education leaders in North Carolina had worked for decades to create and grow intercollegiate competition for women, and found themselves without an organizational home in 1982. Some of these women, like Jan Watson of Appalachian State University, still clung to the older philosophy of women’s sports participation that emphasized play and inclusive participation, and de-emphasized competition, the importance of winning, and the big-time sports of men’s programs.

Watson and Hogan enjoyed an interesting and strained relationship over the previous thirty years. Watson had been an early regional and national leader in the AIAW and represented the force behind many of the restrictive competition rules at the state level which bothered Hogan. The two women, however, shared a passion for expanding women’s intercollegiate opportunities in the state, and the demise of the AIAW, interpreted as tragic by Watson, marked the end of their long history as well.\textsuperscript{69} In their final communication, Watson wrote to Hogan to see how she would like leftover
NCAIAW and Region II monies to be spent. Watson wanted to start a scholarship fund for female students majoring in physical education, to be administered through the North Carolina division of AAHPERD. Appalachian State during the 1970s and early 1980s allowed Watson and her staff autonomy in the operation of the school’s women’s intercollegiate program, allowing them to remain in physical education. Watson still viewed the NCAIAW as primarily serving women in physical education. Hogan responded that UNC-CH would like the remaining money “to be divided and returned to the member institutions.” She opposed the scholarship, because “it is athletic money and not physical education.” If the scholarship idea passed, Hogan continued, she was “not in favor of having it awarded to a female physical education major, nor awarded through AAHPERD.” Ultimately, the NCAIAW membership decided to establish a scholarship fund, without the caveat that the recipient be a physical education major. The interaction between Watson and Hogan was reflective of the divide between physical education and competitive intercollegiate athletics that finally fractured with the folding of the AIAW in 1982.

The decision of what to do with NCAIAW and Region II money represented the final time Frances Hogan interacted with physical educators and physical education institutions in the state. In 1978, she became a full-time athletics administrator, and in 1980 her position moved into the athletic department more fully when her title was renamed Associate Athletic Director. She was very proud of her professional accomplishments, becoming the first female athletic director at the state’s premier university. She belonged to the CCWAA, a national association of women’s athletic
administration professionals, not NAPECW, the National Association for Physical Educators of College Women. Hogan got her start in physical education; she taught P.E. classes for more than thirty years, finally giving up her teaching load in 1978. She liked physical education, and she liked the AIAW. But women’s intercollegiate athletics outgrew its original home, and Hogan embraced the opportunity to provide the best possible competitive experiences for female students, and their coaches, that she could. The best place to do this was in the athletic department, and eventually, within the ACC and the NCAA. Hogan was a professional athletic administrator, working in a professional athletic department.

Frances Hogan never pledged undying allegiance to the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women. Her number one priority was to provide for her female student-athletes, which gave her an openness to explore alternative organizational structures. This position was assisted by UNC administrators and athletic officials who supported the expansion of athletic opportunities for women. Hogan always remained respectful of the current governing body’s leadership, rules, and regulations, but she never committed herself to a vision of intercollegiate athletics for women within the philosophical bounds of physical education. Professional coaches and administrators were not evil, but preferred; and competitive big-time sports programs, as long as they remained educational, represented a positive and desirable goal.
While the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) battled over the future of college sports and the role women’s athletics would play, university administrators and athletic officials on the campuses of individual institutions had to determine how they would comply with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and expand athletic opportunities for women. At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, leaders celebrated the school’s history of expansion which preceded the law. Carolina would continue its commitment to women’s sports regardless of Title IX, they declared, suggesting that the school’s commitment to equal opportunity in athletics went beyond the bare minimum required by the law. They took pride in their unique stance and sought to distinguish the university from others which resisted women in sport. The philosophy of the athletic department held that Carolina wanted to have “the best women’s program around.”¹ By the end of the 1970s, UNC enjoyed the most expansive women’s program in the South; however, as Title IX became restricted to require far less than gender equity in sport, the school’s commitment also weakened.

Leaders in women’s college athletics had been struggling for this support for decades. Those on progressive campuses enjoyed a new commitment from university administrators to grow women’s sports programs and were eager to get to work. When Frances Hogan became the first Director of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women at the
University of North Carolina in the summer of 1974, her priorities involved establishing the most expansive program for women in the state and region, ensuring her coaches and staff full support to develop competitive teams and win, and providing for her female student-athletes during their four years of intercollegiate play with the understanding that it represented the high point of their athletic lives. Hogan, entering her twenty-ninth year at the university and with her own two children in their twenties, balanced three professional roles and served on numerous committees. In addition to her new administrative role, she continued to teach physical education and advise undergraduates in the General College, but she handed over the reins of the varsity women’s tennis program to a new coach, Kitty Harrison.

The timing of Hogan’s promotion coincided with UNC’s commitment to expanding opportunities for women before the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) published its final regulations for institutions of higher education to comply with Title IX in 1975. HEW and the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the division of HEW in charge of Title IX, had been holding hearings and receiving feedback from school officials and the public on its proposed regulations, which generated much controversy within the college athletic establishment. After HEW published its final regulations, schools would have three years to expand opportunity for women with the expectation of full compliance by the summer of 1978. In the meantime, individuals could file Title IX complaints with the OCR if their institutions failed to make satisfactory changes to current policies alleged to create sex discrimination.
The southern regional HEW hearings on Title IX took place in Atlanta on July 22, 1974 and provided a window into the confusion spawned by the draft regulations for those resistant to the idea of equal educational opportunity in sports and who viewed athletics as a zero sum game. The draft regulations’ opening general statement employed language very similar to the original law:

No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any physical education or athletic program operated by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any physical education or athletic program separately on such basis; provided, however, that a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill.²

The draft regulations erased the possibility that athletics might evade the reach of Title IX because athletic departments did not receive direct federal aid; the athletic department, as part of the larger college or university, fell under the umbrella of Title IX compliance. HEW had asserted a broad interpretation of Title IX.

The federal government required schools to provide and support recreational and athletic opportunities for both genders. The draft regulations required a recipient to determine student interest on an annual basis in order to meet female students’ athletic needs, and to “make affirmative efforts” to inform the “members of a sex for which athletic opportunities previously have been limited” of those opportunities and to “improve and expand” participation experiences. Members of both sexes should have equal access to athletic organizations, and if a recipient established separate teams, “the provision of necessary equipment or supplies” could not be distributed in a discriminatory manner.³ The first 95 percent of the draft regulations indicated that
schools had to provide athletic opportunity to men and women on a 1:1 basis; however, a final sentence on expenditures served as a source of confusion for supporters and defenders of Title IX alike: “Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require equal aggregate expenditures for athletics for members of each sex.” Members of the athletic establishment interpreted the statement to mean that they could treat men’s and women’s sports differently, and therefore, the components of the draft regulations were contradictory.

In Atlanta, legal counsel for HEW Gwendolyn Gregory’s comments encouraged supporters of girls’ and women’s sports and frustrated skeptics. She clarified exactly what the draft regulations meant, particularly the provision that equal aggregate expenditures were not required. Male athletic officials demonstrated their goal to provide differential opportunities for the sexes through the nature of their questions. When asked if schools could devote more time and resources on certain sports based on the “level of support for the team, the amount of revenue that is brought in, and the level of student support,” Gregory explained the intent of the expenditures statement. She responded, “The regulation does not deal with revenue nor with expenditures except…there will be no equal aggregate expenditures required. What we’re asking for is equal opportunity…. We’re not going to be looking at the books—i.e. where the money is coming from.”

Gregory received another question regarding special treatment, “Let’s say the men’s basketball team brought in a million dollars a year. Would that, in your view, provide justification for providing them with additional funds to travel first-class, as opposed, let’s say, to the women’s team bringing in no revenue and having little public support?”
In response, Gregory reiterated that HEW was concerned with equality of opportunity and not the source of the money distributed for the provision of equal participation opportunities, stating, “No. If the university is supporting, from whatever funds, wherever they get the funds is their business, and if they are supporting men to a certain level they’re going to have to serve the women at the same level. Same thing applies to the Biology Department. If they get private foundation funds, they cannot administer funds discriminatorily.”

Detractors could not accept that their schools would have to allocate more resources for women’s athletics because they could not envision their communities rallying around sporting women. Later on during the hearing, Gregory was asked a third time if men and women could be provisioned differently, “If you have a men’s basketball team and women’s basketball team and the men are more capable and skillful than the women, why can’t you have a different level of support there and consider the ability of participants as a reason for giving a different level of support?” For a third time, Gregory restated that HEW did not care from where the money came. In a lengthier reply, she demonstrated a deeper understanding of the college sports enterprise, challenging the belief that men’s sports were inherently superior to women’s and would always generate more interest. She continued,

We’re not getting into where the money is coming from or the expenditures. We’re looking at the opportunities. The fact that a particular team makes money, whereas maybe it didn’t 20 years ago except that a lot of money was thrown into it to make it a money maker… we’re not looking into that. We’re looking at the opportunities that are available. There’s no provision on differentiating between revenue producing and non-revenue producing [sports]…. We’re looking only at what the school is offering to the students and not at the expenditures and budget of the school.”
Gregory’s answer revealed HEW’s broader argument which frustrated athletic department officials: athletics were educational, not commercial, and therefore, the consideration of money generation or the sources of funding did not matter when it came to the provision of equal athletic opportunities for both sexes. The NCAA, individual institutions, and athletic officials worked hard to challenge this position of the government, lobbying members of Congress, filing lawsuits, and attempting to influence HEW and the White House. They argued that if women took a large amount of the athletic pie, the amount for men would decrease, harming the department’s ability to generate the revenue necessary to operate. The entire athletic enterprise would collapse if women gained entry, they insisted, and doubled down on their efforts to contract the reach of Title IX into athletics. They worked to weaken HEW’s final regulations.

University of North Carolina Chancellor Ferebee Taylor drove forward the policy changes in Chapel Hill, reorganizing the athletic department to include the women’s program and naming Hogan director in the summer of 1974. Like many chief executive officers of public universities, Taylor accepted that the final regulations would not vary significantly from the draft regulations, and held no desire to wait until 1978 to deal with the reality of Title IX. This position contrasted with that held by many athletic officials around the country, who clung to the hope that they would never have to change their departmental operations to accommodate female athletes. Taylor operated from a fundamental belief that a healthy, expansive, educational athletic program fielded both men’s and women’s teams, and he understood the opportunity to participate in school sports as a basic civil right guaranteed to members of both sexes. This position grew out
of Taylor’s broader commitment to civil and human rights, and the role of the public university to serve all of the diverse peoples of its state. In a speech on May 13, 1978, he declared, “I believe the central truth about the University at Chapel Hill is that it was built by the people of this State, it belongs to the people of this State, and it exists to serve the people of this State. And by ‘the people of this State,’ I mean all the people: men and women; whites, blacks, Indians, and others.”

Taylor’s rhetoric aligned with both the mission of the university and the position held by many of the educated elite in North Carolina who believed the state represented a liberal bastion in the South which distinguished it from other states and certainly the Deep South. Taylor, speaking specifically about Title IX, continued, “Let me add that these propositions do not derive from HEW…. Rather, they are today’s logical outgrowth and manifestation of the life and spirit and tradition of the people’s University at Chapel Hill.” This statement that the university’s actions to expand opportunities for women on campus had nothing to do with HEW or Title IX became an important trope on campus, one drawn upon time and again by university administrators and athletic officials to assert UNC’s commitment to eradicating sex discrimination and to construct an argument regarding the school’s superiority both to other institutions and federal law.

When Taylor unified men’s and women’s intercollegiate athletics under one athletic department roof, he trusted male athletic officials to work toward his goals and did not require an expansive inclusion of Hogan and coaches in departmental decision-making. He directed the athletic department and the Educational Foundation, the organization which provided the funds for athletic grant-in-aid, to award a female student
an athletic scholarship for the first time in school history. When Camey Timberlake, a tennis player from Lexington, North Carolina, accepted her grant-in-aid, UNC became the first institution in the state to award a scholarship for athletic ability to a female student.

The details of the decision to grant the scholarship to Timberlake prove how little involvement women had in early athletic department administrative decisions. When Athletic Director Homer Rice informed Frances Hogan and tennis coach Kitty Harrison that Timberlake would receive athletic grant-in-aid, neither woman had heard of her, yet both were very familiar with the junior tennis scene in North Carolina and the southern states. Timberlake was not as good as the other players on the team, which could have caused tension, but Hogan believed the women “somehow got along and worked it out.”

Regardless of the method to select the scholarship recipient, this “first” became a useful recruiting tool for Hogan and coaches of women’s teams as they competed with other state and regional schools to attract top talent to attend their university. It also supported the rhetorical theme on campus that UNC had done more than other institutions to expand opportunity for women and did so before the OCR began to enforce the Title IX regulations.

Chancellor Taylor took additional steps in the summer of 1974 to commit the university to equal opportunity for women on campus, creating a Title IX Committee and Subcommittee on Athletics. Taylor asked key university administrators and faculty to serve on the committees, tasked to investigate problem areas and make recommendations to the chancellor based on HEW’s draft regulations as the date of the final regulations
crept closer. He also required the athletic department to submit a plan for intercollegiate athletics for women for the upcoming school year. He received some pushback from Athletic Director Homer Rice and other male athletic department staff, but held firm that the department needed to begin its expanded commitment to women before the final regulations. When Rice tried to argue that the program would be better off by waiting, Taylor was unmoved. He wrote again to Rice with his original request to construct and implement an expansive program for women, effective immediately.¹¹

Ferebee Taylor’s belief in gender equity in higher education motivated his proactive nature, and his position was shared by his boss, William Friday, president of the UNC system. President Friday instructed the sixteen members of the UNC system to move in advance of the final regulations to begin investigating and making changes to comply with the inevitable law.¹² He also hired a civil rights specialist, Jeffrey H. Orleans, to work closely with the campuses, providing updates, making recommendations, and evaluating campus plans for compliance. The Title IX Committee in Chapel Hill submitted its reports to Chancellor Taylor, who, upon review, would send the committee’s findings to President Friday and Jeffrey Orleans, who would communicate with HEW about the effects of Title IX on the various Carolina campuses.¹³

Athletic Director Homer Rice resisted Chancellor Taylor’s many changes that summer because he believed an intervention by Congress, the courts, or within HEW would interpret Title IX in a way that would protect the interests of men’s intercollegiate
athletics. An economic recession that included high inflation caused great anxiety in college athletic departments concerning their operating budgets for the 1974-75 and future school years. Most athletic departments operated in the red, and most of those which managed to operate in the black struggled to do so. Inflation caused the cost of travel and other expenses to increase considerably. Michigan State University athletic director John Fuzak provided an example: “Three years ago our football team took a plane trip to play at Illinois. That trip cost $7,000. Two years later, that same trip costs $13,000. That is an example of what we are up against.”"14 Athletic officials already worried about how to increase their budgets to account for inflation; how could they increase their budgets further to fund women’s sports, too?

To help its member institutions strategize, the NCAA held an economic summit, convening 36 college presidents, faculty athletic representatives, and athletic directors, in Chapel Hill in April, 1974. Estimating that departments would have to increase budgets by 10 to 15 percent just to “maintain the status quo,” the NCAA “hoped to formulate a package of economic legislation that would mandate cost-cutting measures, thus allowing most schools to remain competitive at their current level while not seriously damaging the quality of sports.”15 While smaller schools supported institution-wide cost-cutting, larger schools with big-time sports programs resisted any changes to how they operated their programs. The big-time schools, wishing “not to reduce the level of spending in football,” recommended an alternative plan involving “a cutback in spending for non-revenue producing sports,” with some schools open to the possibility of demoting non-revenue teams from varsity to club sport status. If men’s non-revenue sports remained
varsity, suggested cost-cutting measures included abandoning scholarships, or placing travel and recruiting restrictions in those sports. These were not empty threats; for example, Tennessee Tech abolished men’s spring sport grants-in-aid in baseball, track, golf, and tennis to save approximately $100,000.\(^{16}\)

While female collegiate sport leaders in the AIAW argued that these three elements, scholarships, recruiting, and travel, threatened the educational integrity of intercollegiate athletics, NCAA members debated placing restrictions on them only during a moment of economic crisis when their football and basketball budgets became threatened. Meanwhile, leaders of small schools recommended reducing the size of the college football enterprise, suggesting there was room to reduce the 105 scholarships, and the size of travel squads, coaching staffs, and recruiting budgets. These suggestions had the effect of creating a doomsday atmosphere among big-time football’s royalty, especially when “facing demands from women seeking a much larger share of the money.”\(^{17}\)

In later years, leaders of men’s non-revenue sports often blamed Title IX and women’s sports when colleges and universities eliminated men’s non-revenue sports, like wrestling, swimming and diving, gymnastics, and tennis. Athletic officials willingly agreed that compliance with Title IX caused those sports’ elimination. A closer look at athletic department budget allocations proves otherwise, with many schools funneling upwards of 80 percent of the total athletic budget into football alone. Furthermore, the conversations among big-time sports leaders during the 1974-75 economic recession suggest that the protection of football and men’s basketball budgets threatened men’s
non-revenue sports more than women’s sports. In a great irony, the inclusion of women’s sports in the intercollegiate enterprise might have been exactly what saved men’s non-revenue sports from elimination, especially as large universities escalated the commercialization of big-time football and basketball. Most universities, including UNC, later demonstrated their compliance with Title IX by comparing women’s sports with men’s non-revenue sports, thus, protecting their very existence.

The threat of the possible entry of women into the intercollegiate athletics enterprise became a great scapegoat for athletic officials facing an economic crisis caused by large spending at the time of an economic recession. Rather than open up to a critical evaluation of current sports budgets, many defended the status quo and turned their attention toward preventing women from entry into intercollegiate athletics. For example, at the University of Arkansas, the athletic department held that women would continue to operate on a club basis, and that served the women’s interests just fine. Assistant to the athletic director Lon Farrell, speaking on behalf of athletic director and head football coach Frank Broyles, explained, “if the women could get a strong program together that could support itself, why, that’s all right with us, you know.”18 Considering the already precarious economic situation due to inflation, Farrell continued, “We operate solely on football at Arkansas. We have to carry all other sports and to be truthful, we’re having a hard time making both ends meet right now.” Yet, at the same time, the football budget had to remain the same in order for the athletic enterprise to continue to work, as Farrell explained, “Arkansas will operate on a $2.05 million sports budget, none of which is earmarked for women.”19
On the West Coast, University of Southern California football coach John McKay fought against Title IX’s reach into intercollegiate athletics by working with congressional representatives. McKay explained, “Southern Cal and all other universities will be out of business athletically. There is no way we can abide with it. We raise $800,000 a year for athletics. What they’re saying is we must raise $1.6 million…. We have told our congressmen that we would be out of business.”

UNC Athletic Director Rice, a former (and future) football coach, joined the effort to ensure football and men’s basketball would be exempt from the law. In communications with his colleagues around the country, Rice gained confidence that Title IX would have no place in intercollegiate athletics. This explained his resistance to Chancellor Taylor’s request that he develop a plan and budget for women’s intercollegiate athletics for the 1974-75 academic year.

Homer Rice balanced his responsibilities to the chancellor and to the broader community of college athletic officials when he and others in UNC’s athletic department began fielding media questions concerning compliance in 1974. Rice, Frances Hogan, and head football coach Bill Dooley made similar statements, demonstrating a unified approach, at least when dealing with the public. Rice “admitted there are going to be problems adjusting to Title IX,” but was “generally optimistic.” He expressed the department’s commitment to expanding opportunities for women, but only if football and men’s basketball remained untouched. He reasoned, “To cut the budgets of the revenue-producing sports in accordace with interpretations of Title IX would drastically hurt other non-revenue-producing sports.” Hogan shared Rice’s sentiment, stating that women opposed “getting all they can get at the expense of the men’s programs.”
Dooley stated that he saw “no threat in Title IX” but that “the University simply can’t afford to make any appreciable cutbacks in the football program.”

Athletic officials in Chapel Hill expressed a belief in the idea behind Title IX, but they would not change football and men’s basketball operations as they expanded athletic opportunities for women.

Not all athletic directors resisted the incorporation of women’s programs. Another athletic director within the UNC system shared his chancellor’s and Bill Friday’s commitment to gender equity in sport and assisted in the effort to expand women’s intercollegiate athletic programs. Just twenty-five miles east down Tobacco Road, at North Carolina State University, Chapel Hill’s most comparable athletic competitor within the UNC system of schools, Athletic Director Willis Casey committed the university to an expansive women’s program and expressed similar rhetoric as Taylor and Friday in the summer of 1974. Casey, a former college swim coach of men’s and women’s teams, saw Title IX not as a headache, but “long overdue.” He celebrated the great progress already being made in women’s intercollegiate athletics, and committed his program to continued growth even if HEW determined to exempt intercollegiate athletics. Casey viewed the law positively, providing new opportunities for his school to achieve success. In an interview with the Raleigh News & Observer, he stated, “Changes have never bothered me. Actually, I can see a lot of plusses in this whole thing. We not only want to have women’s athletics, we want to have the best teams we can.”

Casey backed up his words with action; his biggest victory came when he managed to steal basketball coach Kay Yow away from powerhouse Elon College in 1975, beginning a
North Carolina State dynasty lasting more than three decades. Years later, Frances Hogan lamented the jumpstart State got over Carolina in women’s basketball from which the Tar Heels never seemed able to recover.25

On the Chapel Hill campus, the Title IX Committee got to work, reviewing the school’s Title IX position, suggesting comments for President Friday to make to HEW, and developing “proposed guidelines and procedures for implementation to ensure our compliance with the proposed regulations.”26 Taylor reminded the committee that it must also be “ready to review and potentially revise” the guidelines and procedures with the publication of the final regulations. Taylor asked that the committee “receive expressions of student opinion…and call upon various student leaders” to see in which areas the school’s policies had been effective or ineffective in expanding opportunity for women. Taylor’s motivation was more than avoiding potential punishment from HEW; he had committed the university to providing for its female students’ needs and interests. Taylor named Susan McDonald Ehringhaus, Assistant to the Chancellor, chair of the committee. The other nine members represented a cross-section of campus and included Professor Gerald Barrett, Business Administration; Professor Joan Brannon, Institute of Government; James Cansler, Dean of Student Affairs; Frank Duffey, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences; Professor Frances Hogan, Director of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women; Barbara Kramer, Assistant to the Chancellor for Health Sciences; Professor Catherine Maley, Romance Languages; Homer Rice, Director of Athletics; and Marquis Street, Vice Chancellor for Administration. The committee moved quickly, beginning
individual reviews on August 9, holding its first meeting on August 20, and issuing suggested comments on September 5, 1974.

Most of the Title IX Committee’s comments did not deal with athletics. Ehringhaus and committee members expressed concerns that HEW might bow to the “congressional attempt to exempt private undergraduate schools” and challenged that possible exemption because “some of them are among the greatest recipients of Federal monies.” They wanted clarification on what constituted discrimination based on marital status, and whether the institution could treat married males and married females the same and treat single males and single females the same, or if marital status should not be considered at all. For example, could UNC give priority to married students with regard to employment as long as the school did not discriminate based on sex? The committee also expressed its concern that UNC’s policy of providing birth control to female students might be prohibited “since this practice may constitution sex discrimination in the strict sense of the term.” They referenced the recent Supreme Court decision in *Geduldig v. Aiello*, which determined “to exclude pregnancy as a temporary disability is not unconstitutional.” Safety concerns represented an area in which the committee wanted to know if UNC could treat female students differently. Could the school have more security measures in female dormitories than male dormitories, by continuing its curfews for female students, locked doors during the night, and the barring of male overnight visitors? Or would UNC be required to abolish these policies concerning female student security? The committee did not think to institute similar measures in the men’s dormitories in an effort to equalize.
Only the committee’s last two comments related to intercollegiate athletics, and the second issue regarding revenue sports represented a concern which would dictate policy at Carolina. First, the group asked that HEW provide more guidance concerning how the institution should go about “ascertaining student interest” and requested that “due to budgetary considerations, there must be a two-year time period for initiating new sports programs… [because] momentary fads among students must be carefully guarded against.” Finally, and most importantly, the committee argued that revenue-producing sports must be exempt from Title IX compliance. They sought special status for revenue-producing sports, expressing the common belief among schools with big-time sports programs that if Title IX affected revenue-producing sports in any way, the whole system of intercollegiate athletics would collapse. They asserted,

If universities are forced to make all women’s sports equal to men’s sports, the entire system of university athletics would be jeopardized. For example, if women’s field hockey must be equal to men’s football, it follows that support to other competitive sports for both men and women must be proportionally reduced. The revenue-producing sports, primarily football and basketball, have in the past drawn such a volume of receipts that they paid for themselves. Any profit realized is plowed back into the general athletic program budget and thus is available to support other athletic program activities.

The committee’s financial argument continued that intercollegiate athletics’ independent funding justified its special consideration, separate from the rest of the University:

If the universities are now going to be required to provide teams for women to equal the teams of revenue-producing sports, such action would have the effect of driving all sports into the red, thereby limiting athletic opportunities for students, both male and female. The Title IX regulations must recognize that athletics, distinguished from physical education and intramurals, are not funded by the University. The athletics operation must pay for itself by means of alumni gifts, scholarship drives, gate receipts, radio/television, and other means. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that Section 86.38 be carefully redrafted in order to distinguish revenue producing sports from other forms of athletics.
The committee’s suggested comments to HEW demonstrated the limits of the University of North Carolina’s commitment to gender equity in higher education. Notably, the committee failed to mention the nearly 20 percent of athletics “revenue” which came from student fees. School officials were happy to expand opportunities for women, but only to a point. Once Title IX was perceived to threaten football and men’s basketball, university officials committed to blocking the reach of the law.

National women’s organizations and media outlets presented this argument, that revenue-producing sports deserved special consideration and exemption, as anti-Title IX and a conservative attempt to undermine the law. The local story in Chapel Hill, however, demonstrates the more complicated nature of the debate over the status of revenue-producing sports. University leaders repeatedly declared UNC as fully committed to Title IX and the expansion of women’s opportunities in higher education, including athletics. The school provided the state’s most expansive program of varsity athletics, which grew to twelve sports by 1976-77. The women’s teams played schedules of comparable length and competitiveness to the men’s teams at the university. At the same time, UNC held a firm line when it came to protecting its main interests, football and men’s basketball. Athletic department decisions reflected this prioritization, even as the school committed to growing its women’s programs and complying with the law. UNC administrators did not see these two positions as contradictory or in conflict; rather, they believed they could exist simultaneously.
Athletic Director Homer Rice took on the most responsibility for defending the interests of big-time college sports. Chancellor Taylor and President Friday made no effort to stop him, suggesting their implicit support of Rice’s efforts. On October 18, 1974, Rice appealed to key university administrators and faculty for help in the effort to get Congress to act on an exemption for revenue-producing sports. He wrote,

> We are trying to encourage our Congressmen to take some action in Title IX… Health, Education and Welfare has proposed guidelines that will simply not work in intercollegiate athletics. The big danger is the cutting back of our football and basketball programs whereby the profits from these sports plus our student fees will not be enough to go around for our other sports, including the women’s program. This means these programs will be cut down and prevent us from having an overall outstanding program for all of our students.\(^{31}\)

He asked them to write to North Carolina’s members of the Senate and House to ask them “to leave our revenue-producing sports, such as football and basketball, alone so we can continue the fine programs that we now enjoy.” He concluded his letter with the reassurance that this position aligned with the school’s commitment to women’s sports: “We at UNC are advocates of a strong women’s program. We want to help the women. But if we are forced to cut back our own programs to help them, then both will suffer in the long run.”\(^{32}\)

In his lobbying effort, Rice shared his letter to United States Congressmen as an example for how his “friends” should construct their letters. He began by pointing out that athletic departments did not receive financial support from the federal government, or from the state, in the case of the University of North Carolina. He expressed his concern that people who did “not completely understand our programs” had set the guidelines, and that universities such as his had already committed to expansive athletic
programs for women. Rice wrote, “We have been trying to meet the needs of our women students before HEW proposed any Title IX regulations. In fact, we have given the women all they have asked for without any instructions to do so.” He then recommended that the schools should dictate the pace of growth, not bureaucrats without knowledge of the operations of intercollegiate athletics, “We can continue to help their program continue to develop, and in time have a very outstanding program…. The best solution is to allow each institution to work their own situation without holding back equal opportunity for the women to participate in intercollegiate athletics.” Rice concluded his letter with the recommendation that Congress return to Senator John Tower’s defeated amendment to allow football and men’s basketball to “operate without restrictions.” Although various congressmen and senators continued to propose legislation to provide an exemption for revenue-producing sports, not one bill proved successful.

Although revenue sports never earned an exemption from compliance, lobbying efforts by the interests of big-time college sports successfully weakened the law’s implementation. As schools determined how they would comply with Title IX, they learned that rarely would HEW penalize a school for failure to comply. Moreover, schools could institute athletic policies to insulate football and men’s basketball and still be in compliance, or least not be found in violation of Title IX.

The University of North Carolina developed its athletic policy to provide equal opportunity between women’s and men’s non-revenue sports, and at the same time celebrated its commitment to women’s sporting opportunities. The Report of the Title IX
Subcommittee on Athletics confirmed this position. The subcommittee, chaired by Marquis Street, included Carl Blyth, Chair of Physical Education; Hogan; Rice; Dave Garibedean, Student Representative on Intramurals; Beth Hamilton, Student Representative for Women’s Athletics; and Tom Pritchard, President of the Carolina Athletic Association. HEW required the university to “make affirmative efforts to inform students of the sex for whom athletic opportunities have been previously limited of the availability of equal opportunities for them and to provide support and training to enable them to participate in those opportunities.” The committee determined that UNC sufficiently advertised opportunities in the University catalogue, intramural handbook, *Daily Tar Heel*, and literature passed out during freshman orientation, and noted that freshman were required to take P.E. both semesters during which intercollegiate athletics opportunities were advertised and students were recruited. All varsity sports held open try-outs in which any student who was academically eligible and medically cleared could try out for a team. If students did not possess the competitive skills for intercollegiate athletics, opportunities existed to serve the interests of all students at the club and intramural levels.

The Title IX Subcommittee on Athletics declared UNC had expanded opportunity satisfactorily. The committee concluded, “Presently, no student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is denied opportunity to participate in sports at his or her competitive level.” The group pointed only one area in which equality was lacking: facilities. Woollen Gym, a pre-World War II structure, was significantly inferior to men’s facilities, and Women’s Gym even more so. They recommended that the
institution expedite the plan to build a new physical education structure to equalize facilities for men and women. The Subcommittee on Athletics focused on the quantity of opportunity, not the quality, suggesting that as long as a large number of women got to play and teams played extensive schedules, then the school was providing adequate opportunities to female students in athletics. This position remained the consistent party line at Carolina through the 1980s.

The final regulations, signed by President Gerald Ford on June 3, 1975, demonstrated that UNC’s interpretation of the law would constitute compliance because the effort to weaken Title IX’s application in athletics had succeeded. Although the regulations expanded the equal provision of equipment and supplies to include a “laundry list” of ten items, they also included the phrase “with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities, reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports” could be made.37 Congress required the final regulations to include this phrase, with the passage of the Javits Amendment, an alternative to the Tower Amendment, on July 1, 1974.38 The Javits Amendment passed because it focused on opportunity rather than revenue generation; however, supporters of the Tower Amendment, which sought an exemption for revenue-producing sports, believed the Javits Amendment could be interpreted to mean the same thing. HEW officials attempted to clarify that consideration of the “nature of particular sports” meant that a sport could be treated differently only due to the size of the roster or the cost of equipment, and not because a sport generated revenue.

Despite HEW’s efforts, athletic officials latched onto the phrase, believing revenue sports held special status and could be treated differently. They understood that,
when considering compliance, schools could compare women’s and men’s non-revenue sports with respect to the “laundry list” of items “in determining whether equal opportunities are available.” The regulations required the following components of intercollegiate athletics to be comparable for men and women:

- whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes; the provision of equipment and supplies; scheduling of games and practice time; travel and per diem allowance; opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; provision of medical and training facilities and services; provision of housing and dining facilities and services; and publicity.\(^{39}\)

Universities had until the summer of 1978 to fully comply with the provisions of the final regulations, and based on the many challenges and changes thus far, administrators expected more revisions to come, and they were right.

After the publication of the final regulations, the Title IX Committee issued a final report, which determined the mechanisms UNC should adopt to implement its Title IX compliance programs. UNC named a compliance officer and support personnel, established grievance committees, set up publicity procedures, and instituted a plan to conduct annual self-evaluations. The committee also reminded the chancellor that facilities needed to be improved for female athletes.\(^{40}\) Taylor agreed with the committee and published a statement in the *University Gazette* to inform students, faculty, and staff of the school’s Title IX protocol. Taylor reminded the Carolina community of the university’s commitment “not to discriminate on the basis of sex in the educational
programs or activities which it operates” and encouraged the community to work together
toward this goal.41 He introduced Susan Ehringhaus as the institution’s compliance
officer, and urged university members to contact her with any questions. University
protocol established that aggrieved students, faculty, and staff should first work within
the department to seek a solution. If the aggrieved were not satisfied with the
department’s reaction or solution, then they should file a complaint with Ehringhaus who
would forward the complaint to the appropriate Title IX grievance committee for
students, faculty, or staff. If the aggrieved still did not feel their interests had been
adequately met, they could file a formal complaint with HEW/OCR.

The women’s intercollegiate athletics program filed a grievance almost
immediately. During a joint coaches and advisory council meeting on December 1, 1975,
the group agreed with a motion made by basketball coach Dr. Angela Lumpkin and
elected to submit to the athletic director a grievance “regarding discontent with the
present facilities being used in women’s sports.”42 Lumpkin headed a committee made
up of gymnastics athlete Terry Lodge, volleyball player Patty Michaels, and field hockey
coach Ann Gregory. The group talked to student-athletes and coaches in each sport to
learn about the problems each team faced with their practice and competition facilities.
Field hockey, fencing, gymnastics, swimming, and basketball all reported that they did
not have access to locker room facilities. Regarding practice facilities, the gymnastics
team had a safety issue, because balls and people from the adjacent courts in Woollen
Gym often interfered; the basketball team could not practice at ideal times because of the
men’s team; the swim team reported that they had been denied adequate practice time;
and the fencing team complained of inadequate space in the Tin Can. Problems with competition facilities included worn-out tennis courts and inadequate bleachers, a non-regulation court with inadequate seating for volleyball, and a desire of the gymnastics and fencing teams to hold events in Carmichael Auditorium. The women also requested a portion of Ehringhaus dormitory be set aside for female grant-in-aid student-athletes, just as the Athletic Department had done for the men.

The group of female coaches and student representatives did not receive the reaction they desired when they submitted their grievance report to Bill Cobey, who had taken over as athletic director in February, 1976.\footnote{43} Cobey responded that men’s non-revenue sports had facilities grievances as well, and both groups would be accommodated with the construction of the new physical education complex. There was no Title IX violation since the university was moving toward equal access with the new facility, and because women’s and men’s non-revenue teams both suffered from inadequate facilities.

Frances Hogan, Coach Lumpkin, and the other coaches of women’s teams should not have been surprised by Cobey’s response that their grievance did not constitute a violation of the law. At the time of their complaint, Cobey just had finished a self-evaluation of the athletic department’s compliance with Title IX. Chancellor Taylor had appointed Cobey to conduct the self-evaluation on December 17, 1975, when he was assistant athletic director; midway through the investigation, Taylor promoted him to athletic director.\footnote{44} Cobey met with athletic department officials, including Hogan, and reviewed questionnaires filled out by coaches and student-athletes of women’s teams. He
also met with Title IX Officer Ehringhaus and Jeffrey Orleans, assistant to President Friday, who oversaw Title IX compliance across the UNC system.

On February 3, 1976, Cobey shared with Hogan, in confidence, his preliminary findings, which revealed the department’s new interpretation of equal opportunity under Cobey. In this document, Hogan discovered that Cobey’s standard for compliance was not equality but “five men for every three women” when it came to allocating financial aid and operating budgets.\(^{45}\) In coaches and students’ responses to questionnaires, Cobey was made well aware of the practice and competition facilities’ inadequacies that made up the content of the group’s grievance. With regard to the basketball team’s complaint that they had to schedule practice time around the men, Cobey asserted that the men’s team deserved priority scheduling as a revenue-generating team. He was unconcerned by the lack of locker room space, because the new facility would solve the issue. He also was unmoved by the list of volleyball player injuries incurred during practices in the claustrophobically small Women’s Gym, but he agreed that effort should be made to allow the team to play its competitions in Carmichael Auditorium on a regulation-size court. The women’s basketball team gained access to Carmichael only after star player Joan Leggett broke her arm during team practice in the Women’s Gym later that year.\(^{46}\) The facilities grievance disappeared because Cobey covered the issues in the Self-Evaluation Report which determined the school to be in compliance with regard to facilities.

Although the coaches of women’s teams abandoned their effort to gain access to better practice and competition facilities, the locker room issue would be picked up by
women on campus outside of varsity athletics. The Student Grievance Committee, established in December, 1975, heard its first grievance concerning athletics in January, 1976, when physical education student Mary Wittle complained that female students did not have equal access to lockers and baskets. The committee recommended the conversion of the men’s faculty locker room to a women’s space. Nearly two years later, by the fall of 1977, nothing had been done, and students filed another grievance, this time working in concert with faculty and staff. Groups of women and their male allies filed the same grievance, which included all three interest groups, to all three committees. Their coordinated effort proved comprehensive and rigorous, and, therefore, made their grievance and the committees’ responses to it very straightforward. The students named on the grievance were Donna Fullerton, field hockey team; Sandy Moulton, graduate student and attorney; Kathy Heck, P.E. student; Kathi Kronenfeld, fencing team; Jean Heatherington, graduate student and attorney; and Betty Ausherman, field hockey team. The men who joined the student grievance “as amicus” were Burton Craige and Mike Okun, both law students.47

The three groups charged that the Departments of Physical Education and Athletics violated Title IX “by the unequal distribution of locker facilities (locker and storage baskets).”48 Their thorough documentation demonstrated practices which discouraged women on campus from using physical education and athletic facilities at all levels of competitive ability. In 1976 when Wittle first filed the grievance, not a single member of a women’s varsity team enjoyed access to locker room space. As of October 17, 1977, the group alleged, female students held 15 percent of lockers and baskets and
yet made up 55 percent of physical education students. Women students, faculty, and staff had approximately 1463 lockers and baskets, many of which were shared, while men had approximately 8200 and an additional 1500-2000 went unused. They noted that 11 of the 12 women’s varsity teams had no access to lockers or baskets, while all members of men’s teams enjoyed them: “Men’s teams have 97% (580) of the lockers set aside for OUR Intercollegiate Athletic teams while women have only 3% (18). All women’s team members pay the same athletic fee as men’s team members.” The complaint noted that no female faculty or staff who paid for recreational privilege cards had access to lockers, whereas male faculty and staff enjoyed 650 allocated spaces. Finally, and the most frustrating point of all, male spouses of female faculty enjoyed assigned lockers or baskets. Each group of the aggrieved pointed out that male spouses who gained lockers had “a more remote relationship to the University than the women students, women team members, and women faculty/staff.” The grievances charged, “The University is obligated to proceed ‘as expeditiously as possible’ to make facilities comparable…. The University has not been ‘expeditious’ regarding any interim measures…and is in violation of Title IX.”

The group suggested a viable solution to the problem, and was not satisfied with Blyth and Cobey’s desire that the women simply wait until completion of the new physical education facility, which would provide ample locker room space for both sexes. The group argued for the urgency of a temporary solution, noting that by 1980, when the new facility, Fetzer Gymnasium, was scheduled to open (it did not actually open until 1981), nearly all of the present students would have graduated. Their temporary solution
seemed obviously logical to the aggrieved because no men would lose locker space. They reasoned, “The [1976] grievance asked that the men’s faculty locker room be converted to a women’s locker room…. The men faculty would still have locker facilities available, absorbing some of the 1500-2000 unused units in the larger men’s locker room.”

Blyth and Cobey, however, still would not make temporary accommodations, refusing “to increase the present number of locker facilities for women in the meantime.” HEW’s final regulations included locker room provisions in its “laundry list” of items in which athletic opportunities had to be equalized. The group decided to file a formal complaint with HEW, and determined its conditions for withdrawal of the Title IX complaint: “prompt implementation” of the temporary plan which would provide “all females equal access (faculty, staff, students, and all teams).” The UNC complaint represented one of 870 registered with HEW in 1977. Finally, in 1978, with the July deadline for full compliance approaching, Cobey “reversed the policy enunciated in the Self-Evaluation Plan and increased the number of lockers, locker rooms, and showers available to female students.”

It took more than two years for the women to gain access to temporary locker room space, and no men lost access in the process. If university officials dragged their feet on an issue with a simple solution, what did this say about their commitment to equal athletic opportunity on campus? Cobey would point to the dramatic gains made in women’s athletics at the university, demonstrating his position that what mattered when it
came to opportunities were the number of sports and competitive events offered, not the qualitative items on HEW’s “laundry list.”

Bill Cobey shared the opinions of his predecessor, Homer Rice, who began to speak more openly against Title IX during his last months in Chapel Hill. Rice bragged that in 1975 the athletic department and Educational Foundation brought in over $3,000,000 (again not mentioning the nearly 20 percent from student fees), but asked how he was supposed to come up with $100,000 to fund the women’s program. He called Title IX “a bad piece of legislation” and “not really what the women want for themselves,” because the law forced the women’s program to progress “faster than I personally think it should go.”

Carolina was expanding its women’s athletic program, and would continue to do so regardless of Title IX, Rice argued, pointing to the long history of growth at his university. He believed that if the women’s program grew too quickly, it would be harmful, and wanted “time to slowly grow the women’s side.”

Three years later, Moyer Smith, associate athletic director, echoed Rice’s position: “Our philosophy here is that we want to have the best women’s program around. Title IX didn’t dictate this. We have chosen to direct our women to proceed with caution. It takes longer to pour concrete than it does to shovel sand. We want a strong foundation and once we get there, we’ll be there for good.”

The argument in Chapel Hill held by male athletic administrators that the women’s program should grow, but slowly and correctly, suggested that women coaches, administrators, and students needed male protection, but from what they did not specify.
Marking a break with male athletic officials, Frances Hogan and coaches of women’s teams pointed to Title IX’s important role in speeding up the process of supporting women’s athletics, and that the growth needed to be sped along. They acknowledged that Carolina’s expansive program preceded the law, but they also felt empowered to ask for more precisely because of it. Certainly, the law held national prominence, as Hogan declared, “I am sure that Title IX has helped all across the country to develop women’s athletic programs.”

Hogan continued that because the law gave women teeth in their struggle for equal athletic opportunity, “It’s the greatest single factor contributing to the growth of women’s sports.” Basketball coach Jennifer Alley attributed her team’s budget expansion to Title IX, as well as the growing number of women leaving college with plans to coach sports professionally. Student-athletes also credited the law with their opportunities to play. All-American swimmer Bonnie Brown shared, “Title IX is definitely a good thing. I wouldn’t have my scholarship without it.” Carolina women openly thanked Title IX for their sporting opportunities.

A review of Carolina’s annual operating budgets, provision of equipment and supplies, allocation of facilities, and scholarship budgets from the 1970s, confirms the women’s position and demonstrates the small nature of the initial commitment and the critical role played by Title IX in accelerating the expansion of women’s sports. The simple fact alone that Title IX forced administrators to think about the many components of equal athletic opportunity as they conducted annual reviews reveals the law’s importance.
The baseline for comparison should be the 1974-75 academic year, the first year Intercollegiate Athletics for Women was organized within the athletic department, the program had a Director, and a female student-athlete earned an athletic scholarship. The operating budget in 1974-75 increased from the $7,265 spent in 1972-73 to $25,000. Coaches earned $1,000 per sport coached, and Hogan earned $3,000 as director. Looking at an individual sport, the men’s tennis team had a budget of $20,500 while the women’s tennis budget was $3,200. Timberlake’s scholarship allotment was $2,000, the AIAW maximum, and four male tennis players enjoyed full scholarships, which were slightly larger because of NCAA rules. In 1975-76, the university added two more scholarships for women and renewed Timberlake’s, bringing the total to three. The following year, seventeen women were on five full and twelve partial scholarships. By 1978-79, 72 women earned $156,700 in scholarships, however, this was only 78 percent of what it should have been; the school’s long-range compliance plan had set a mark of $200,000 for that year. UNC did reach its goal, late by only one year, when in 1979-80, 83 women were on grant-in-aid at a cost of $202,058. In 1974-75, 120 women participated in intercollegiate athletics; by the end of the decade, 215 women played, compared to 383 men.

The amount of money allocated to women’s athletics by the end of the decade demonstrated a dramatic increase in support. UNC added five sports for women; cross country, indoor and outdoor track, and softball in 1976-77, and soccer in 1979-80. These new sports enjoyed operating budgets, coaching salaries, and scholarship funding comparable to the already-established women’s sports in only their second year. In 1978-
79, the university spent a total of $426,266 on women’s athletics, with $164,849 in operating costs, $156,700 for scholarships, and $113,417 on coaching and administrative salaries. 66 The salary figure was misleading, however, because a number of coaches of women’s teams also taught physical education classes or held an administrative position within athletics. Frances Hogan and women’s basketball coach Jennifer Alley each made $18,500; they, and their secretary Stephanie Wallace, who made considerably less, were the only full-time employees without other responsibilities on campus. 67 For comparison, Bill Cobey and men’s basketball coach Dean Smith made $35,500 and $43,000, respectively, that year. Volleyball coach Beth Miller was a full-time faculty member in physical education, her total salary for teaching and coaching was $16,400. Coaches of swimming and track and field, who presided over combined men’s and women’s teams, made $19,000 and $12,000. Coaches recruited from the local community who performed no other duties made $6,000 (tennis), $4,200 (golf), and $4,000 (field hockey and softball). The men’s tennis coach made $15,000 and the baseball coach made $14,000, both men did not hold other responsibilities in physical education or athletics. 68 Salary figures were notoriously difficult to obtain in the 1970s, because of privacy laws; even Frances Hogan had a difficult time obtaining the information and could not keep published records. Graduate student Anne Duvoisin managed to obtain these figures from University Registrar Lillian Lehman while researching gender equity in athletics in 1979.

The increase in spending on women did not change the operations and support of the men’s program in any way, disproving the idea promoted by male athletic officials.
that athletics spending represented a zero-sum game. Budget increases in operational
costs, salaries, and financial aid for women did not cause a decrease in spending on
men’s athletics, in both revenue and non-revenue sports. By the end of the decade, UNC
spent more than $3,000,000 in operations for men’s sports. The operating budget for
women’s athletics represented only five percent of the total. Men’s financial aid levels
grew each year. In 1978-79, UNC spent $589,807 on financial aid in men’s sports on
220 male student-athletes, with $314,669 going to football and men’s basketball and
$275,138 to non-revenue sports.69 The following year, the amount increased to
$697,558; this meant that the increase of $107,751 in men’s financial aid more than
doubled the increase in women’s financial aid in the same year. In Ehringhaus’s Title IX
Report of 1979-80, the reason behind the smaller amount of financial aid for women was
blamed on the women. The study declared, “Because there is a lack of available quality
student athletes capable of outstanding performance at the Division I level of
competition, all available monies have not been utilized by the coaches of our women’s
teams.”70

Athletic department policy held female athletes to the same standards as the men,
including the qualifications to earn a scholarship. Cobey required that student-athletes be
considered for aid only when they were deemed able to contribute to the team at a
national level. It did not matter than scholastic sports were still in a developmental stage
for girls in North Carolina, and that UNC required coaches to recruit out-of-state athletes
only sparingly. By not taking into consideration the historical differences for boys and
girls in scholastic sport in the state, UNC did a disservice to female North Carolinians
with athletic aspirations. The UNC financial aid position, by holding men and women to the same standard, demonstrated the school’s commitment to a philosophy of athletic excellence, but not a philosophy of growing sports participation in the state and encouraging more women to play.\(^\text{71}\)

Despite disparities between men’s and women’s funding, the growth in support of women’s athletics could not be denied. By the end of the decade assistant coaches made more than head coaches just three years earlier. Women’s teams played their home competitions in facilities comparable to the men. All student-athlete equipment was housed in the same location, after women’s equipment moved into the main “cage” in Woollen Gym, with Sarge Keller presiding.\(^\text{72}\) Female grant-in-aid student-athletes enjoyed free meals at the Ehringhaus Athletic Dining Hall, along with their male counterparts; and the school set aside a block of ten rooms in that dormitory for females on grant-in-aid (the football team enjoyed an entire wing).\(^\text{73}\) Also by the end of the decade, the number of sports offered had grown to thirteen, equal to the number of men’s sports, and male and female teams played schedules of comparable length and competitive quality, perhaps the two most important features when it came to opportunity in athletics.

What mattered to Carolina administrators was that spending, with the exception of financial aid, on women’s and men’s non-revenue sports was generally comparable. Football spending did not need to be considered when conducting a Title IX compliance review due to “the nature of the sport.” According to UNC, the “greater number of participants and the extensive and expensive equipment” required to field a team meant
that football did not need to be included in the consideration of all categories of Title IX compliance. With regard to athletics, Carolina was following the law, demonstrating the large gap between Title IX compliance and true equal athletic opportunity.
Pressure from the men’s college athletic establishment shifted the standards to demonstrate compliance with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 further away from true equal athletic opportunity during the late 1970s and 1980s. Athletic departments removed revenue sports from compliance consideration and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare changed its policies to meet universities’ needs. Schools set up Title IX compliance standards so that spending and opportunities between women’s and men’s non-revenue sports were generally comparable. Sports should be treated differently from other units on campus, athletic directors argued, because of football and men’s basketball’s unique ability to generate revenue.

At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Athletic Director Bill Cobey became increasingly resistant to what he perceived to be federal intrusion into how he wanted to run the athletic department. He created a structure to demonstrate equal athletic opportunity, but allowed individuals to vary greatly their commitment to women’s sports in practice. Cobey and other athletic officials believed the individual campus should control how quickly or cautiously the women’s program should grow. They celebrated the many mechanisms and great effort the school had committed to its development. Throughout the 1980s, UNC fielded one of the most expansive women’s programs in the nation and teams continued to win.
Carolina prided itself as a leader in expanding opportunities for women in sports; determining the relative truth of the position warrants a comparison with other colleges and universities around the nation. Like UNC, most schools benefited from evaluating their progress from a historical perspective rather than performing an analysis tracing the movement toward true gender equality in sports. They celebrated the dramatic gains female student-athletes at their universities enjoyed. Some committed more resources and support than others, and the size of the men’s program mattered when determining comparable opportunities.

The Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women advocated for universities to do more and shared information with its membership to assist female administrators in their attempts to gain fuller support. In 1979, the AIAW published a “Title IX Compliance Fact Sheet,” demonstrating most schools, despite improvements, had a long way to go toward providing equal athletic opportunity. In a poll of its nearly 900 members, AIAW researchers calculated that female students represented 51 percent of the collective student body, yet enjoyed an intercollegiate athletics participation rate of only 30 percent.¹ On average, female student-athletes received 21 percent of scholarship dollars, 14 percent of operating budget monies, 19 percent of coaching salaries and wages, and 16 percent of total budget dollars.

These statistics suggested that despite all the rhetoric, UNC failed to support women’s athletics to the same level as other schools in a number of areas. The only categories in which the University of North Carolina bettered the average were scholarship and total budget dollars. Carolina outperformed the vast majority of AIAW
schools, however, if the research team only considered spending on women’s programs and did not compare men’s and women’s spending. UNC fell below the average in some spending categories because its men’s program formed one of the sixty or so largest big-time sports programs in the country. AIAW junior colleges and small colleges with men’s NCAA Division III status spent considerably less on men’s athletics, and therefore, their spending totals on women’s and men’s sports were more equitable with less effort.

A review of premier universities with big-time college sports programs shows that Carolina’s commitment to its women’s program rested somewhere in the middle. These schools, despite the economic recession, increased their spending on men’s athletics at a greater rate than they did for women’s athletics. In 1979, the New York Times published a report exploring “Revenues and Expenses of Intercollegiate Athletic Programs,” reviewing athletics spending in NCAA Division I schools. Division I football schools successfully responded to “inflationary effects and uncontrollable price increases,” raising more money than ever. Covering the Times report for a women’s coaching magazine, Candace Lyle Hogan wrote,

Men’s athletic budgets in Division I schools have received an average boost of $424,000 since 1973 which is more than one and a half times bigger than the average current women’s total budget of $176,000. The average men’s budget has risen from $1,232,000 in 1973-74 to $1,656,000 in this school year. The increase alone in men’s budgets has been more than 50 percent greater than the total currently funding women in NCAA Division I schools.²

Although Division I schools increased their spending on men’s sports more than women’s sports, the gains for female athletes were still remarkable, with many programs enjoying a tenfold increase in spending by the end of the decade. Some schools
expanded their budgets more quickly. For example, the University of California-Los Angeles tripled its already substantial women’s budget in 1974, bringing it from $60,000 to $180,000, with a planned increase to $450,000 by 1979. The University of Wisconsin-Madison’s eleven women’s sports enjoyed a total budget of $118,000 in 1975. In the biggest commitment to women’s college sports before the final regulations, the University of Minnesota increased its 1973-74 budget by almost nine times, allocating $250,000 for 1974-75. Just as important, the Golden Gophers created an independent women’s athletic department of equal administrative status to the men’s athletic department on campus. Minnesota women also enjoyed their own, separate scholarship fund when women’s athletic director Belmar Gunderson and program director Eloise Jaeger created the Patty Berg Women’s Intercollegiate Athletic Fund, named for a former star athlete, “to provide women students with the opportunities to develop their athletic talents and compete on a basis comparable to those given men.” At the end of the decade, the University of Texas made a similar commitment to women’s sports. By 1981, Donna Lopiano’s independent women’s athletic department enjoyed a $1.5 million operating budget for seven sports with seven full-time coaches and five assistants. Seventy female student-athletes enjoyed full scholarships amounting to $315,000. The Longhorns and Golden Gophers enjoyed the two best-supported women’s sports programs in the country.

Women athletes received stronger pushback on a number of campuses than they did in Chapel Hill. In addition to the University of Arkansas (see Chapter 4), the University of Michigan experienced a large amount of resistance to expanding support...
for its women’s program. The Wolverines ranked dead last when seven members of the
Big Ten Conference agreed to share athletic department budgets with the magazine
womenSports. Although the school’s men’s budget of $5,000,000 was second only to
The Ohio State University, at $5,700,000, Michigan only provided $180,000 to women’s
sports in 1976-77. Ohio State’s women’s budget of $300,000 was second in the
conference to Minnesota, which increased its budget to $400,000, a conference and
nation high. The University of Iowa allocated the highest percentage of its total budget to
women, at 11.11 percent; Michigan had both the smallest dollar amount and percentage
of total budget, at a scant 3.47 percent.

Not only was Michigan’s funding the lowest in the conference, the male athletic
establishment resisted additional benefits to women which symbolized achievement.
When the UM Board in Control of Intercollegiate Athletics ruled women were “eligible
for the famed ‘M’ Award for competitive varsity sports,” William M. Mazer, Jr.,
president of the alumni “M Club,” despaired that the prized maize-colored block “M”
would become “worthless.” Beloved football coach Bo Schembechler declared the
awarding of the letter to women would “minimize the value of the ‘M’ in the eyes of not
only our players, but also in the eyes of the public who places such a high value on it.”
The self-proclaimed “leaders and best” had no interest in developing a top women’s
program to match its men’s.

Although spending increases at the schools committed to women’s sports looked
like they came from male administrators’ decisions, women’s athletic directors and
coaches, who for years complained only amongst themselves about the lack of support,
felt empowered after Title IX to demand more from their universities’ athletic departments. Leaders in women’s sports on university campuses gained confidence and assertiveness, thanks to the feminist movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The women’s athletic revolution developed out of the feminist movement, when organizations like the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL) began including sport in research and advocacy efforts. Billie Jean King’s Women’s Sports Foundation and magazine *womenSports* also helped to create synergy among feminist and athletic organizations.

Women on university campuses existed at the intersection of women’s sports and feminist activism. Celeste Ulrich, a professor at UNC Greensboro summarized the awakening in women’s sports in an interview with *The Chronicle of Higher Education*:

> The feminist movement’s research was really the turning point. ‘Hey, don’t forget sports.’ Those of us who had been in physical education for 25 years or so remember saying all along the way to male coaches, ‘Don’t make us beg. Be fair.’ There was agitation for more equality under the surface but assertiveness was only valued with male coaches. The idea that ‘nice ladies don’t rock the boat’ was something many women in college athletics accepted for many years. Women in physical education have borne a greater burden than other women because of their association with a masculine area. Their own personal sex patterns were always under question, so women played it cool. Because they didn’t feel comfortable, they didn’t rock the boat.¹¹

Ulrich continued, “Both women student-athletes and physical educators are more comfortable with themselves. My colleagues in other fields now act like it is okay for a girl to want to be an athlete. People are seeing that women can do things that deal with strength and endurance.”¹²

Director of Women’s Athletics Frances Hogan had been content for years working on her own to provide sports for women, and had feared asking former athletic director Homer Rice for anything.¹³ Reflecting in 1991, she described the change in
consciousness during the 1970s: “Students and coaches just didn't know any better…. I mean, they just were so accustomed to being treated that way or having such poor facilities that it just didn't seem to matter. And then once they had a little taste of it….”

The new Title IX legislation and the feminist movement emboldened women’s college sports leaders to demand equal athletic opportunity.

The University of North Carolina, like many schools, continued to comply only with the components of the regulations it deemed necessary, confident HEW would not investigate or penalize the school for lack of compliance. By 1978, when schools should have been in full compliance, most neglected to provide equal opportunity in a number of the categories listed in HEW’s “laundry list,” even if the schools only were held to the lower bar of making women’s and men’s non-revenue sports comparable. Title IX officer Susan Ehringhaus determined that UNC met the first four requirements: accommodating interests and abilities, provisioning equipment and supplies, scheduling games and practices, and allocating travel and per diem allowances. Ehringhaus noted that, on the whole, equipment, supplies, and travel were mostly comparable, but only among the non-revenue sports. Coaches’ preferences created the slight variance across non-revenue teams, because coaches held the authority to determine their own budgets.

In a UNC self-evaluation she wrote,

It should be recognized at the onset that since each coach designs his/her own budget, priorities are often placed in different areas. A good example of this is that the Men’s Tennis Coach allots more money to equipment rather than travel and the Women’s Tennis Coach allots more money to travel rather than equipment. This is partially because the quality of our women’s tennis team warrants further travel to ensure good competition.
Ehringhaus acknowledged that this “may cause some areas to appear unequal,” but, she declared, “It is our belief that in considering all factors, we are generally equal” in most areas.

Ehringhaus supported the school’s position that only women’s and men’s non-revenue sports deserved comparison and that football and men’s basketball demanded special treatment. She justified Carolina’s spending more on travel and per diem for football and men’s basketball, stating that the teams were “nationally competitive, revenue-producing sports with keen recruiting competition.” She noted that these teams flew to games when other teams would drive to the same location, and that they also spent more money per capita on food and lodging. Ehringhaus suggested that Carolina did not make these decisions deliberately, but were “competitively required” to spend more on football and men’s basketball to “help attract quality athletes.”

In order to maximize revenue in these sports, Carolina had to win, and in order to win, the teams had to recruit and obtain the top talent in the country. Therefore, the athletic department did not decide to spend more on those sports, it had to, if the school wanted to continue to support its expansive program of men’s and women’s sports.

The ways in which Ehringhaus demonstrated compliance with items on HEW’s “laundry list” required creativity and a wide variety of rationalizations. UNC was in full compliance with only two items on the list: medical and training facilities, and housing and dining facilities. The AIAW overturned its rule prohibiting academic tutoring in 1978, and the university made academic study halls and tutoring opportunities equal for male and female student-athletes. Salary discrepancies continued; coaches of men’s
non-revenue teams made on average $1500 more than coaches of women’s teams. Ehringhaus could declare them “generally equal,” however, because “rates of compensation” could vary based on “contract conditions, nature of coaching duties, working conditions, and other terms of employment.” Finally, the school was in compliance with regard to publicity, because the Sports Information Office handled “media services and statistics” for all sports, and performed “public relations for all athletic teams regardless of sex.” This last component of the “laundry list” demonstrates that a school could determine its compliance based on the structure it had created. The structure was set up to provide equal services, but the actual practice was strongly dependent on the individuals employed in that division of the athletic department.

The handling of the publicity of women’s sports by the Sports Information Office at the University of North Carolina demonstrates how a school could be determined in compliance with regard to a provision while failing miserably in practice. The athletic department set up the structure of the office to cover men and women, and revenue and non-revenue teams, equally. At least one sports information representative was supposed to attend every home game, to take notes and photographs. Representatives traveled with the football and men’s basketball team, and were “on call to receive phoned-in reports of all [other] away events.” The office was supposed to notify all local and regional media including newspapers, radio stations, and television stations, as well as national wire services and selected national media outlets “to ensure that coverage and publicity reach the widest area possible.” Sports information also was responsible for the “compilation,
design, and printing of team brochures which serve the dual purpose of being a recruitment aid and media guide.” Finally, the office served an archival role, storing “records on team performances,” publications, and photographs for each sport.”

Rick Brewer, the Sports Information Director, encouraged his staff to perform its duties when it came to revenue sports, fulfill most responsibilities for men’s non-revenue sports, and cover women’s sports half-heartedly. In her assessment of Brewer’s actions, Anne Duvoisin, a graduate student who published a study of gender equity, concluded, Brewer “avowedly discriminates” on the basis of sex and revenue production. She found that Brewer sent press releases about women’s sports to only a short list of 50 newspapers within the state when he was supposed to send them to local, regional, and national outlets. He also neglected to send releases to the hometown newspapers of athletes even though he had been directed by Cobey to do so. In an interview with Duvoisin, Brewer explained that widespread release was only justified when spectator interest already existed, which was only the case for revenue-producing sports. Non-revenue producing sports, Brewer continued, “must build at the local level,” until they develop an audience “to justify spending the mailing releases” to outlets on the regional and national lists. Brewer either failed to realize media attention helped to grow fan support, unlikely, considering his profession, or he purposefully sought to stymie growing interest in Carolina women’s athletics.

Not only did Brewer fail to distribute news stories and results to a wide array of media outlets, he also neglected to keep records on women’s sports. In her review of the Sports Information Office, Duvoisin found that file cabinets took up an entire room. The
contents of these file cabinets included histories of teams, statistics, press releases, articles and other publications, photographs, and team brochures; and women’s sports took up “the front quarter of one bottom drawer.”

Thanks to Brewer’s poor recordkeeping, UNC women’s teams lost a great opportunity for national coverage, when two *Newsweek* reporters traveled across the southern states, visiting universities to write about their women’s athletic teams. On August 25, 1977, they dropped by Brewer’s office and, “unable to procure either pictures or information,” determined to leave Chapel Hill and not include UNC in their story.

The Sports Information Office also failed to print adequate brochures for women’s teams. Brochures needed to be ready at the beginning of the season so that teams could use them to inform students, family, and friends of their schedules and to distribute to local businesses to attract more spectators. The brochures, however, never arrived before the second half of the semester, rendering them close to useless. They often included inaccurate information, typos, and design flaws. Hogan asked Athletic Director Bill Cobey to intervene; however, he was unconcerned because, to him, this did not represent a Title IX violation. Cobey wrote to Hogan that the problems she listed were shared by men’s non-revenue sports. Women’s and men’s non-revenue sports were receiving the same, poor treatment; therefore Carolina did not need to worry about improvement. Cobey related that “Rick Brewer insists that there is no easy solution to this problem;” however, his explanation involved timing. Brewer explained to Cobey that printing always had to be delayed until the start of a season because he needed to obtain a team photograph; had the office kept photographs on file, they could have...
commenced publication long before the start of the season. Cobey also supported Brewer’s inability to review all brochures before they left for the printers, because his main responsibility rested with football and men’s basketball due to their “tremendous need to produce large amounts of revenue.”

While Brewer’s lack of quality women’s publicity met Cobey’s expectations, his mishandling of a “Women’s Sports Recruiting Book” revealed his obliviousness to Carolina women’s sporting goals. Brewer’s actions demonstrated that he either sought to annoy Hogan and women’s coaches, worked proactively to harm women’s sports at Carolina, or held absolutely no understanding of the quality of UNC women’s teams. The third possibility would have required that he never attended a women’s sporting event, which could not have been the case; Brewer most likely acted maliciously, either toward Hogan and coaches or against the entire program.

Hogan explained to Brewer that the booklet’s purpose was to “attract outstanding women athletes to the university in order to create and maintain superior intercollegiate teams.” She emphasized its importance to Brewer; since AIAW rules heavily restricted recruiting, the booklet would serve as a recruiting tool to send to prospective student-athletes and, in the case of out-of-state students, would likely serve as the prospects’ only view of the university and its teams. With its inclusion of glossy color photographs, the UNC booklet would be the first of its kind and give the school a great recruiting advantage. Brewer constructed the booklet, which Hogan requested include photographs of facilities, action shots of athletes, descriptions of teams and their histories, and general information about the university and its academic programs. Brewer and his staff sent
the finished product off to the printer in Greensboro without asking Hogan to perform a final check and give her approval.

The Women’s Sports Book created by the Sports Information Office looked as if the feminist movement and the women’s athletic revolution never reached Chapel Hill. Duvoisin’s reaction was one of horror: “Most of the photographs display perky coeds holding hands with their boyfriends, sunbathing, socializing, and otherwise relaxing, while only a few poorly posed shots document the existence of a women’s athletic program at UNC.” Hogan complained to Brewer,

I would have preferred much more action shots of girls from each of our twelve sports in lieu of some of the general shots of social life, etc. here. Pictures of Bill Cobey or some other ‘permanent’ athletic personnel could have also been included to give the brochure a more specific approach to athletics. It seems that two-thirds of the booklet concerns something other than women’s athletics at Carolina.

The portion of the book that did cover athletics devoted most of its space to men. The history of athletics section described the “fine tradition in men’s athletics” and the accolades of past men’s stars; Hogan, understandably, had preferred “space devoted to other outstanding women athletes.” No photographs showed the facilities, except, strangely, duplicate images of one hole on Finley Golf Course. Moreover, the book failed to perform its recruiting purpose effectively because it did not include the names of coaches or contact information for a prospective student-athlete to reach out.

Brewer stood behind the book, even after receiving Hogan’s critique. He wrote, “Some of your personal criticisms are very valid. There are others about which I am not so sure. However, everyone sees things in a different way. I will be very anxious in the next year to hear what high school girls think about the book.” His comments
suggested he believed high school girls would find the content attractive, that female student-athletes would prefer to go to college to enjoy the social life and meet a future husband rather than dedicate themselves to competitive athletics.

The Women’s Sports Book symbolized the difference between structural and qualitative equality. The Sports Information Office spent a lot of money in the creation of the booklet; the content of the booklet, however, worked against the women’s interests. Duvoisin took a survey of coaches and not one planned to send the booklet to recruits, because they were “interested in attracting rather than offending” them. Duvoisin understood the booklet to be an example of sex discrimination because of the stereotypes it displayed. She asserted, “The book assumes that the woman athlete is not serious about her sport, and chooses a college or university on the basis of the party life it has to offer her, rather on the basis of its sport and academic programs.”\(^{31}\) Despite considerable criticisms from Hogan and coaches, Cobey did not take issue with the recruiting book. Brewer’s actions demonstrated that some male athletic officials’ efforts intended to help women’s sports could set them back.

Although the poor quality of the Women’s Sports Book and delayed printing of brochures failed to strike Bill Cobey as problems, he did take issue with the lack of records in the Sports Information Office. After the *Newsweek* incident, Frances Hogan wrote to Cobey that the failure of the office to keep women’s records was unacceptable, and Cobey agreed. He understood Hogan’s “concern and embarrassment over the lack of pictures of Women’s Athletics,” and had associate athletic director Moyer Smith meet with Brewer to make sure he began taking more photographs of female athletes during
their competitive events. Cobey shared Hogan’s letter with Brewer, and Brewer wrote
to her, first claiming ignorance, then providing an interesting explanation for their
absence. He wrote, “I was quite surprised to receive a copy of your August 26
memorandum to Bill Cobey. I was quite surprised because that was the first time I had heard anything about a NEWSWEEK story.” He continued,

I would like to point out that we do have some pictures of women’s teams. However, all of the good ones are in Greensboro where we are printing the most extensive women’s recruiting book that has ever been published. It is the most extensive simply because it is the only one that has ever been published by any school in America.

Brewer created quite the conundrum for himself with this statement; Hogan learned he had misled her to think that the photos were absent because of their inclusion in the recruiting booklet. Later, the published Women’s Sport Book revealed that no action shots existed in the Sports Information Office. Brewer did not stop there. While he “admit[ted] we do not have a sensational picture file on women’s athletics,” he pointed out, “by the same token, we do not have a sensational picture file on any men’s non-revenue sport.” Rick Brewer directed the Sports Information Office to serve football and men’s basketball, any additional sports coverage was an afterthought.

The athletic department structured the office to serve all publicity needs, male and female, revenue and non-revenue, equally, and Title IX required comparable publicity measures. The Title IX Committee determined that UNC complied in the realm of publicity because university policy did not discriminate based on sex or revenue generation. Meanwhile, Bill Cobey and Rick Brewer believed the Sports Information Office could under-support both women’s and men’s non-revenue sports, and that this
also complied with Title IX. Brewer’s letter to Hogan revealed another difference between structural equality and the way it was practiced by sports information. He wrote,

We don’t have a lot of action pictures because quite honestly I have no real use for them. I certainly hope you do not fault the Sports Information Office for the fact that there are so few photographers at women’s events…. I also wish there were more writers at these events. But I cannot make people cover non-revenue sports.  

The Sports Information Office’s policy dictated that a representative attend and cover every home contest played by every Tar Heel team. Here, Brewer revealed the reality that his office did not cover women’s and men’s non-revenue teams to the extent that the school officially reported.

Rick Brewer might not have acted as a maverick, defying departmental policy at his own will; he likely had been receiving direction from Bill Cobey. A comparison with the new Sports Promotions initiative in the athletic department demonstrates that the revenue/non-revenue distinction as well as the neglect of women’s sports came from above. When Cobey hired Bob Savod in 1976 to sell out Kenan Stadium and promote basketball games in Charlotte and Greensboro, he directed the new associate athletic director for promotions to focus his efforts exclusively on football and men’s basketball. Savod’s responsibilities also included “advertising on television, radio and in newspapers; preparing film clips for television; and otherwise promoting athletic teams in order to generate revenue.” When Savod asked permission to allocate some of his efforts and funds to promote women’s basketball and selected non-revenue sports, Cobey denied his request.
Savod took the initiative to promote women’s and men’s non-revenue sports on his own. Without Cobey’s directive, he embarked on a number of projects. He had hoped to create a recruiting film to promote Carolina women’s athletics. He worked in promotional announcements during half time of home football and basketball games and helped schedule coaches to appear on the radio during men’s basketball games. He also responded to requests for help with efforts that should have been the responsibility of Rick Brewer. Savod helped Hogan create a women’s sports calendar for the 1978-79 academic year, gaining the support of local businesses to “use advertising on the calendar as a means of funding the printing of it.” Comparing the actions of Rick Brewer and Bob Savod, Bill Cobey instructed the two publicity and promotions heads to focus almost exclusively on revenue-producing sports. As long as resources were not diverted, Savod demonstrated that one could serve the interests of women’s and non-revenue sports on one’s own effort.

Locker room and publicity inequalities aside, Carolina remained a leader in women’s sports, particularly in the southern states. A consideration of the premier state universities within Southern Region II of the AIAW supports UNC’s position as a leader, but as one of a group of schools with a shared mission of expanding sporting opportunities for women. The University of Virginia, the University of Kentucky, and the University of Tennessee serve as points of comparison. Of the three, UVA was
closest to UNC, with similar academic standards and also the same athletic conference affiliation in the Atlantic Coast Conference.\textsuperscript{42}

In some respects, Virginia provided better support than Carolina, even though the school offered a smaller overall program for women. While UVA’s Title IX committee, chaired by Derek A. Newton, declared that its policy was “to build an athletic program for women comparable in every respect to the athletic program for men with the exception of intercollegiate football and basketball,” women could participate only in five varsity sports in 1976-77.\textsuperscript{43} UVA added four sports by the end of the decade to bring its total to nine.\textsuperscript{44} The committee explained the school was behind in the number of sport offerings because “UVA did not offer admission to women in the College of Arts and Sciences until 1970.”\textsuperscript{45}

Although by the end of the decade UVA’s offered four less sports than UNC, the Cavaliers took steps to ensure that the quality of the women’s sporting experience generally resembled that of male student-athletes. Financial aid policies at UVA were superior to UNC, largely because the athletic department did not have as much control. The committee explained that the Virginia Student Aid Foundation held a “policy of providing financial aid without regard to sex,” and “is taking a strong stand in support of an outstanding sports program at the University.”\textsuperscript{46} Not only did Virginia offer more full scholarships in sports like women’s tennis than Carolina, the school also provided larger operating budgets in all sports except basketball. While UNC could claim a more expansive program of sports offerings, UVA’s smaller program enjoyed more resources and support.
The University of Kentucky’s women’s program lagged far behind UNC during the early 1970s, but once the university committed to its women’s intercollegiate athletic program, it immediately dedicated far more resources. Kentucky offered only club sports for women, with participation resembling a “hobby” and players “expected to pay all of their personal expenses,” as late as 1974, when the school finally promoted women’s sports to varsity intercollegiate athletics that summer. Like UVA, UK offered a smaller program of varsity sports for women, but supported them more fully than UNC. The operating budget totaled more than $100,000 in the first year, and grew more than fourfold by 1977. Wildcat female-athletes began earning scholarships only in 1976-77, but the school budgeted a remarkable $200,000 for 1977-78.

By 1979, UK aspired to develop a women’s basketball team as competitive nationally as its men’s team, and grew the program in a way which revealed how some AIAW rules worked to slow down efforts to expand opportunity. The school committed the largest recruiting budget for women’s basketball in both the Southeastern Conference (SEC) and Southern Region II of the AIAW. Kentucky established funds for recruiting in defiance of AIAW rules, but in compliance with HEW’s interpretation of Title IX. Women’s athletic director Sue Feamster saw class discrimination in the AIAW rule against recruiting which attempted to protect women. She asserted, “The next step has to be paid visits. Without that, we discriminate against the poor and middle class students who need to see us so they can make up their minds.” Feamster continued, “Because little scouting is done, videotapes are a main source of finding talent,” but students who attended high schools without video equipment had to rely on the hope that a coach
would visit and perform a talent assessment in person. Kentucky committed significant money to women’s basketball, including $12,000 for recruiting, with the belief that the sport could become a significant revenue generator like the men’s team.

The University of Tennessee also sought to establish a powerhouse, revenue-generating women’s basketball team and felt AIAW policies harmed the effort. Tennessee women’s athletic director Gloria Ray shared Sue Feamster’s frustration with AIAW recruiting rules, although her university did not openly violate them like Kentucky. Ray explained, “I find the rule discriminatory. Students with little money are at a disadvantage…. Once we identify talent, we can make contact, but the student without money doesn’t get a chance to see and assess us. A really good brochure may be all she sees, and that troubles me. She may not like the school or the coach when she gets here.”

Gloria Ray’s concerns demonstrated her belief that athletic programs existed to serve the student-athlete and her needs, not the other way around. Many a basketball player for Rene Portland’s Penn State Nittany Lions team would have benefited from more interaction with the coach and the current team prior to making a commitment to the university, to learn about Portland’s persecution of gay athletes and athletes who supported their gay friends. Ray’s efforts at the University of Tennessee centered on the Lady Vols basketball team, led by Pat Summit, who coached the team for 38 years beginning in 1974. Like Feamster, Ray worked to turn her women’s basketball program into a revenue generator, by supporting the team, growing local fan interest, and signing television contracts to share her team with the nation. Lady Vol basketball games
attracted regular crowds of more than 5,000, with featured games reaching nearly 10,000 spectators by the end of the decade.

The University of Tennessee women’s program followed a trajectory similar to that experienced in Chapel Hill, with a ten-fold increase in budget in the three year period from 1974 to 1977. Funding for operating budgets and financial aid started very small and grew dramatically, reaching $189,000 in 1977-78, spread across only five sports offered for women. Like UVA and UK, the smaller program of women’s teams meant that each sport enjoyed greater funding. Tennessee teams traveled out of state more frequently than others in search of better competition, and the Lady Vol basketball, volleyball, and track and field teams consistently finished among the top in national standings. Unlike the other three schools, the University of Tennessee enjoyed expansive athletic facilities and lacked the friction between coaches of men’s and women’s teams vying for practice and competition space.

Although the four state universities made dramatic efforts to expand their women’s programs, they pursued different paths to achieve their goals. UNC and UVA appeared to be in better positions in the long run than UK and UT. The SEC schools heavily depended on general university funds to jumpstart their women’s programs, whereas UNC and UVA adjusted athletic department budgets to accommodate the women. Male athletic officials at Kentucky and Tennessee refused to share football and basketball revenues with women’s sports. Taking a large portion of money away from other educational programs would cause future problems on both campuses. The organization of Kentucky and Tennessee’s athletic programs contributed to their athletic
departments’ resistance to sharing funds. Both school’s women’s programs existed “outside the older and existing structure” of the men’s athletic department, with Kentucky housed within the recreation program and Tennessee in its own space, the Division of Women’s Athletics, with the women’s athletic director reporting to the Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs.\textsuperscript{54}

Despite these differences in funding and organization, the four public universities proved they saw the three-year period from the publication of the Title IX regulations to the time of compliance in 1978 not as a waiting period, but a time to make rapid adjustments. Each school moved “toward programs of national prominence,” concluded Jack Blanton, who worked for the Vice President of the University of Tennessee and performed a comparative analysis in 1977.\textsuperscript{55} Each university’s budget grew to $200,000 by 1977 or 1978, and each program enjoyed paid coaches, athletic directors, trainers, sports publicists, and secretarial assistants. All four schools fielded competitive teams, and scheduled more competition regionally and nationally. The timing of expansion at each school, according to Blanton, proved that “Title IX is a stimulus for this movement.” UNC Athletic Director Bill Cobey would have disagreed with this assessment.

Much like Homer Rice, as Bill Cobey neared the end of his tenure as athletic director, he began to share his true feelings about Title IX and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under President Jimmy Carter.\textsuperscript{56} Cobey did not have a problem
with the legislation, per se, but the government officials charged with interpreting and enforcing it. In an interview with the *Fayetteville Times*, Cobey explained,

> The problem comes when you have the bureaucracy in Washington writing all these rules and guidelines that become restrictive and dictatorial in telling us what to do. The advance in women’s athletics is one of the best things in a long time. But we don’t need the federal government telling us how to do it. The people who wrote the rules and regulations have no experience in intercollegiate athletics.\(^{57}\)

He believed that intercollegiate athletics, although part of the university, was different, and should be granted more autonomy than the traditional academic disciplines on campus. Cobey continued, “You could say that intercollegiate athletic administrators feel that HEW has had unfair and unnecessary involvement in women’s athletics. We feel we should have the right to develop our own programs in response to our own needs and desires.”

Cobey’s opinion fell in line with the NCAA position that the government needed to step back and “let women’s programs evolve naturally,” a variation on southern interpretations of *Brown v. Board*’s “with all deliberate speed.”\(^{58}\) Demonstrating the school’s refusal to make cuts in football scholarships, salaries, recruiting, or travel budgets, he declared they were faced with three options: drop all sports, drop all non-revenue men’s sports, or find new sources of revenue and provide full programs for men and women. Cobey’s concluding comments suggested his anger sparked by government involvement in college sports: “Our priorities are screwed up in this country. The economy is messed up like it is and [yet] we can afford to send out all these bureaucrats to investigate Title IX. It’s absolutely ridiculous, unwarranted and unfair. It’s just incredible. There certainly are greater problems.”\(^{59}\)
Bill Cobey had been sharpening his critique of federal government incompetence and unwanted intrusion because he was preparing to resign from athletic director to run for lieutenant governor in North Carolina on the Republican ticket. While he lost that first campaign, he later served one term in the United States Congress. Today Cobey is Chair of the North Carolina State Board of Education, appointed in 2013 by Republican Governor Pat McCrory.60

New HEW guidelines reinforced Cobey’s anger concerning perceived government overreach, and he influenced UNC’s official position. Just as university administrators breathed a sigh of relief that they could prove compliance with the Title IX regulations when they became active in the summer of 1978, HEW released new guidelines for intercollegiate athletics. The proposed policy interpretations of 1978 opened another commentary period, with final interpretations to come the following year. NCAA, AIAW, and athletic conference lawyers got to work trying to understand what the new interpretations would require and developing strategies for the impending fight.

Male athletic officials found two components most troubling: first, the proposed interpretations would not provide special status for football, despite early press reports suggesting otherwise; and second, the interpretations introduced a new “equal per capita expenditure test.”61 The new test would require schools to take each gender’s allocated operating budget, divide by the number of participants, and make sure the amounts spent per male and female student-athlete were generally comparable. NCAA President J. Neils Thompson argued to member institution leadership that the proposed interpretations represented “a major departure from the terms of the existing regulation…. Until now
HEW has vigorously maintained that no expenditure test of any kind would be applied in determining whether equality of opportunity is being provided. Previous HEW Secretaries Caspar Weinberger and David Mathews and their staffs always stated that schools would not have to prove equal aggregate expenditures. Under new Secretary Joseph Califano, however, HEW reversed the former policy; equal per capita expenditures were the same thing as equal aggregate expenditures—they simply required an additional mathematical step.

The University of North Carolina’s Title IX Committee held a special meeting to review the new guidelines and make recommendations to HEW during the commentary period. The committee listened to Bill Cobey’s argument that the federal government had illegally intruded into the realm of intercollegiate athletics, and sought help from the Southeastern Legal Foundation in the preparation of its statement. The university’s official comments, sent to OCR Director David Tatel, represented a hardened stance and declared, “The position of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare is without authority to regulate intercollegiate athletics under Title IX.” The committee based its argument “not only upon relevant legislative history and judicial interpretation but also upon the clear language used by Congress in the statutes in question.” The university took greatest issue with the equal per capita spending requirement, pointing out the contradiction with the 1975 regulations, and arguing that all of the hard work performed by the school in the effort to provide “equal athletic opportunity” now was rendered meaningless.
UNC was happy to expand opportunities for women, as long as revenue sports held special status and existed outside the calculations for compliance. The committee declared its commitment to female athletes: “The University’s position is motivated neither by a desire to discriminate against females in athletics, nor by a belief that females are being discriminated against in its athletic program. The increased interest on the part of female students in athletic programs in recent years is welcomed and has been developed, encouraged, and responded to by this institution.” The committee continued, however, women’s sports only should be considered alongside men’s non-revenue sports, and the measure of equal expenditures was irrational and potentially illegal:

Even if forced to adhere to some form of equal per capita compliance standard, it is highly inappropriate that revenue-producing sports be included in the calculation. Revenue-producing sports are not in any way comparable to non-revenue producing sports for purposes of assessing equal athletic opportunity. To the extent dollar-for-dollar comparisons of opportunities in athletics for men and women are meaningful at all, they clearly lose all significance when inflated by the revenues of men’s football and basketball. At a minimum, revenue from men’s football should be excluded.64

The committee concluded, “HEW has failed…to work in good faith to achieve voluntary compliance with Title IX” and “the proposed policy interpretation imposes an impermissible affirmative action requirement.” School officials hoped that other NCAA member institutions would put enough pressure on HEW to eliminate the expenditure provision. Various interest groups submitted over 700 comments in response to the proposed policy interpretations.65

Lobbying by UNC and other big-time sports interests successfully weakened HEW’s position. New leadership replaced the equal per capita expenditures provision with a softer test for compliance. The commentary period influenced the department to
make a significant revision when new Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris issued the final policy interpretation in December, 1979. Proportional spending on scholarships, benefits and opportunities, and accommodation of interests and abilities replaced the equal per capita expenditures requirement. The new interpretation introduced an important mechanism for colleges to determine compliance, what later came to be called the “three-pronged test.” Schools had to meet one of three requirements; first, they could provide opportunities in numbers proportionate to the make-up of the student body; second, they could demonstrate “a history and continuing practice of program expansion…responsive to the developing interest and abilities” of women; or third, they could prove “the interests and abilities” of female students “have been fully and effectively accommodated.”

In Chapel Hill, the Title IX Committee and the athletic department celebrated the softer compliance standard. With regard to the three-prong test, Carolina could easily demonstrate the second requirement by pointing to its history and continuing commitment to expanding its women’s program. Susan Ehringhaus also believed that the school already could demonstrate proportional spending and would not have to make major changes to current operations. In a letter to Jeffrey Orleans, assistant to President Bill Friday, Ehringhaus detailed women’s scholarship aid and demonstrated compliance. Carolina’s compliance could be only temporary, however, because of the three-prong test.

Carolina would be unable to fulfill one of the requirements of the three-prong test soon, because Cobey had set a participation standard of “five men for every three
women” when he conducted the school’s Title IX self-evaluation in early 1976, after the release of the final regulations. This standard made Carolina vulnerable to violate the new policy interpretation, because the school’s participation rate did not reflect the overall make-up of the student body. Female students represented 49 percent of the student body in 1979-80, and were expected to become the majority the following year. One of the ironies of the first prong of the test was that women soon made up the majority of students on college campuses, meaning that compliance required athletic departments to field more female than male student-athletes. The percentage of Carolina women continued to grow well beyond the 50 percent mark during the 1980s, reaching 60 percent by 1987.67

Carolina’s reliance on Cobey’s 5:3 standard for participation complied with the law, but only for the moment. Moreover, the school failed to meet that lower bar when it came to spending on scholarships. Ehringhaus wrote to Orleans that the $202,058 spread among 83 women was generally proportionate to the $697,558 for 223 male athletes.68 Two hundred and fifteen female student-athletes made up 35.9 percent of the total 598 student-athletes on campus. Although the school’s participation numbers nearly reached Cobey’s standard of 37.5 percent (five men for every three women), scholarships for women represented only 28.5 percent of the total amount, falling below both Cobey’s standard and far below that set by the new policy interpretation. Since the university already had reached Cobey’s mark in its scholarship provision, and that mark fell far below the first prong of the test, in order to comply with the second prong, Carolina
would have to abandon the five men for every three women standard so the school could demonstrate continued growth in the women’s program.

Cobey’s departure in the summer of 1980 helped the school move beyond his compliance efforts that fell far below equal athletic opportunity. New athletic director John Swofford took a more careful and diplomatic approach when asked his opinion of Title IX after being promoted from assistant athletic director to replace Cobey. Swofford stated, “Our approach at UNC has been positive toward women’s athletics. I feel a program should reflect on the university, and this university is more than 50 percent female. I hope the women’s program will continue to grow. Not because of Title IX, but because it is the right thing to do.”69 Part of the reason he could hold a more tempered position was that after President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, it became clear that the Department of Education would not enforce the law within the realm of intercollegiate athletics. This left athletic directors in a position in which they could praise the intent of Title IX without worrying about football and men’s basketball.

The 1980s represented a decade of reduced federal pressure to expand sporting opportunities for women. Reagan’s Education Secretary Terrel H. Bell led the effort to weaken enforcement of Title IX in athletics, signaling to colleges that they no longer needed to make substantive effort to prove compliance. Bell announced in April 1981 that as long as an institution “proposes the implementation of corrective action within ‘a reasonable amount of time,’ the department will find the school in compliance.”70
language again harkened the “all deliberate speed” provision of Brown v. Bell, which had been so easily ignored in southern states. Before Bell took over in January, the Education Department was supposed to release the results of eight investigations; seven were tabled. The results of the investigation of the University of Akron found “inequities in athletic financial aid, coaching assignments, facilities, and recruitment programs,” however, Secretary Bell announced the school was in compliance with Title IX because it had a “plan to correct any deficiencies.” 71 In 1982, over 150 complaints had been filed with the OCR in intercollegiate athletics; all resulted in the finding that the school was in compliance. Under Bell, athletic departments learned, “no school will be found in violation of the law.”

Bell also directed the Department of Education not to defend the state in Title IX lawsuits. The Women’s Equity Action League exposed that the Department attempted to remove itself from a case brought by Grove City College, a private school which did not receive any direct federal aid, and, therefore, argued that it should be immune from government intrusion and not have to comply with Title IX. WEAL reported that the Justice Department intervened and “prevented Education from withdrawing the case.” 72 The arguments made by the Education Department were so weak that the three-judge panel relied heavily on amicus briefs from the National Women’s Law Center, rather than the government’s arguments, in the case. They ruled that Title IX applied to all programs of the college. Another big sign in 1982 that the Department of Education would no longer perform its law enforcement role came when it failed to appeal a federal district judge who ruled that “the Department of Education had no authority to investigate
athletic programs at the University of Richmond.” WEAL concluded that “the decision not to challenge the ruling reflects clearly the government’s intention to interpret Title IX much more narrowly in the future.”

The Supreme Court also assisted in the weakening of Title IX, when it agreed to hear Grove City College v. Bell. On February 28, 1984, the court upheld the decision against Grove City College, with the argument that student federal financial aid bound the school to comply with the law. In what has been called an example of “judicial activism,” however, the court went much further, stating that only the financial aid and admissions offices on the campus needed to comply. The court narrowed the application of Title IX significantly, just as the Reagan administration had hoped. Intercollegiate athletics no longer needed to comply with Title IX because athletic departments did not receive federal aid, and the Department of Education immediately began dropping complaints of sex discrimination in athletics.

The timing of the Grove City College decision, an Olympic year during the Cold War, created an interesting phenomenon in Congress, where House representatives passed a bill to overturn the decision with an overwhelming majority. Deborah Brake, a Title IX expert and lawyer, describes, “Members of Congress practically bumped elbows with one another in their rush to the floor to proclaim their allegiance to the goal of equal opportunity for girls and women in sports.” House Resolution 5490 had 63 sponsors, and passed the House with a vote of 375 to 32. Events proceeded quite differently in the Senate, however, where North Carolina Republican Jesse Helms exerted his power to effectively kill Senate Bill 2568. The bill sat with the Labor and Human Resources
Committee, where chair Senator Orrin Hatch postponed its presentation to the Senate five times. Helms was not a member of committee, but convinced both Hatch and rookie North Carolina Senator John East to stall the bill.\textsuperscript{79} The bill sought to restore Title IX to the way it already had been enforced prior to the \textit{Grove City College} decision; however, Helms led an effort to make it seem as if the new legislation would create new, more expansive laws.

While national women’s groups fought for the Civil Rights Bill of 1984, women’s athletics leaders in North Carolina appealed to their state representatives, to no avail. Senator John East replied to a letter from Nora Lynn Finch, assistant athletic director at North Carolina State University, to tell her that her interpretation of the law was wrong. While he admitted the writers of the bill claimed that it did not go beyond the scope of the law prior to the court’s decision, East declared it “far broader” than “simply reversing the Supreme Court’s decision.”\textsuperscript{80} He continued, “I am opposed to S.B. 2568 because it attempts to expand federal regulatory powers into virtually every organized aspect of American life.”

Senator Jesse Helms responded to Finch in a similar vein, however, he revealed a deeper reason behind the opposition—the Reagan administration. He began by stating that he also believed in “equal opportunities for women in collegiate athletics,” however:

This bill would give the federal government, through several agencies and bureaucracies, the authority to require disruptive affirmative action plans and other unreasonable programs at all levels of state and local government as well as colleges and private enterprises. Moreover, its enactment would pave the way for more control over the lives of American citizens by federal judges.\textsuperscript{81}
Helms revealed to Finch, “President Reagan has voiced his opposition to the current bill, and both Education Secretary T.H. Bell and Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds have testified against it in Congress.”

The Reagan administration, pleased with what many considered judicial overreach, rallied its troops in the Senate to ensure no legislation would restore Title IX to its pre-Grove City College power. Brake reports that “some White House staffer during the Reagan administration openly referred to Title IX as ‘a lesbian’s Bill of Rights.’”82 Four years later, on March 22, 1988, Congress finally succeeded, passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act over Reagan’s veto, “to restore the broad scope of coverage” and the “broad, institution-wide application…as previously administered.”83 Intercollegiate athletics again fell within the jurisdiction of Title IX, as did all departments and programs of college and university campuses.

Before the Civil Rights Restoration Act, many schools slowed their compliance plans of expanding opportunities in women’s athletics. The University of North Carolina under Athletic Director John Swofford, however, continued its commitment to grow women’s sports, but the broader context of the reduced power of Title IX did influence athletic department philosophy. By the mid-1980s, the rhetoric shifted in Chapel Hill from one of supporting an expansive women’s program to an expansive non-revenue program. Women’s and men’s non-revenue sports became classified together, and
administrators spoke of the inherent good in a diverse and highly competitive collection of non-revenue sports.

Swofford, marking an important break with his predecessors, credited Title IX with “speeding up the commitment”; however, the department’s philosophical change allowed UNC to celebrate non-revenue sports while at the same time treat them differently from revenue sports. Carolina could commit to athletic excellence on the field of play, but in a way that allowed the university to support women’s sports on an equal basis with men’s non-revenue sports. Equal athletic opportunity did not mean equal opportunities between the two genders, but equal opportunity on a sport-by-sport basis. The only hitch came with the possibility of comparing men’s and women’s basketball; a departmental reorganization helped the school avoid this problem. In 1985, when Frances Hogan retired, Swofford promoted Dr. Beth Miller, who had taken over as assistant athletic director for business for Swofford in 1980, to take her place. Miller’s new title, however, was not Associate Athletic Director for Women’s Athletics, as Hogan’s title had been for her last five years, but Associate Athletic Director for Non-Revenue Sports. The reorganizational split by revenue/non-revenue instead of gender reflected a consensus among both athletic administrators and coaches. Women’s soccer coach Anson Dorrance explained, “The priority sports that support us should get the bulk. They pay for it all. We’re luxury sports here.” Hogan agreed, “The department certainly is committed to excellence. We have cooperation and the budgets are all good.”

Despite the reorganization by revenue and non-revenue sports, fans and critics could not help but compare the support for the men’s football and basketball teams to that
of women’s teams. Carolina student and Daily Tar Heel contributor Kurt Rosenberg wrote an article on October 8, 1984, chastising his fellow Tar Heels for not supporting the women’s basketball team and other women’s teams. He pointed out that “Johnny Carolina” would “brag about the UNC women’s soccer team that has won three straight national titles or the sixth-ranked field hockey team” just as he would about the football and basketball teams’ accolades, “even though he has never seen them play and probably never will.” Rosenberg interviewed women’s basketball coach Jennifer Alley, who stated, “I sometimes smile when someone says they’re a Carolina fan. They’re not. They’re a Carolina football fan, or a Carolina (men’s) basketball fan. People will walk a mile in the sleet or cold to watch the men play, but if it’s drizzling, or they can’t find a parking place in front of the gym, they won’t come to our games.” She continued, “I look at Carmichael Auditorium and I see 10,000 people at the men’s games. To think that we can’t pull a tenth of those people back for our games to support the Carolina women’s basketball team…” Soccer coach Dorrance estimated “that 40 or 50 students watch his team, which has won 40 of its last 41 games, when it plays at home.”

Rosenberg argued against “cultural forces” which presented an idea of women’s sports as boring; the successful Carolina women’s teams, he pointed out, certainly were not. By appealing to pride in athletic excellence, Rosenberg hoped to encourage more students to support Tar Heel women’s teams. He pointed out that in 1983-84, “seven of North Carolina’s 13 women’s varsity teams finished their seasons ranked in the top 20 nationally, four in the top 10.” The teams’ success came from dedication and hard work, and female athletes deserved the same level of fan support as the men.
The effects of Title IX on Carolina women’s teams’ performances were enormous and almost immediate. UNC committed to an expansive program of sports with long and competitive schedules; the other components of equality, like publicity, locker room space, and travel and per diem budgets, mattered less to the overall performance success of the program. In the fall of 1974, the tennis and golf teams went undefeated, and the volleyball team enjoyed its best record yet, finishing 17-5. The development of the field hockey team best demonstrates the importance of Title IX in Chapel Hill. After “suffer[ing] its first year of regular competition with a 3-7-2 record” in 1973, the team improved by leaps and bounds. By the end of the 1970s, the team had won four consecutive NCAIAW championships and finished at the top of the Southern Region II AIAW championships. During the 1980s the team consistently won ACC championships, ranked in the top ten nationally, and advanced to the latter rounds of the NCAA tournament. In 1989, UNC won its first national championship, only sixteen years after the team “suffered its first year.” Since Head Coach and Olympian Karen Shelton took over in 1981, UNC field hockey has won eighteen ACC championships and six NCAA titles, the most recent in 2009.

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill celebrated its successful women’s teams, as well as its commitment to Title IX. Administrators were happy to comply with the law, as long as the football and men’s basketball teams were left out of the equation. The belief that any reduction in spending on football or men’s basketball would hurt the programs’ ability to generate revenue was taken as an absolute truth, but
was misguided. After all, the women’s teams demonstrated that success on the field of play was not dependent upon spending.

An unintended consequence of Title IX was that it reinforced a dependence upon football and men’s basketball to raise more and more revenue to support the expansive non-revenue program offered by the university. Since athletic officials refused to deemphasize football or make cuts in any way, Title IX contributed to the accelerated commercialization of football and men’s basketball, as well as the exploitation of football and basketball athletes, because it became even more important that teams won and brought in money. Although men’s non-revenue coaches, athletes, and supporters often despised Title IX for a perceived reduction in their resources, the law actually worked to protect those sports from elimination or demotion to club status. The economic recession of the mid-1970s demonstrated that athletic departments were willing to make dramatic cuts to non-revenue sports before they would touch spending on football and basketball. At schools like Carolina, men’s non-revenue sports needed to be healthily supported because they were compared to women’s sports for Title IX compliance. A broad, expansive non-revenue program of men’s and women’s sports became an important and valued component of Carolina athletics.

Carolina coaches and female student-athletes were determined to excel on the field, and UNC became the most successful all-around women’s program in the South by the 1980s. The value placed on winning, coupled with the desire to achieve equal athletic opportunity, however, created a problem for Hogan and coaches of women’s teams. Rather than take the best from both the men’s and women’s college sports models,
universities would not make any changes to the operation of the men’s college sports enterprise, and instead incorporated women’s sports into the men’s athletic department. As UNC expanded its women’s program to function increasingly like the men’s, female student-athletes began to face the same issues male student-athletes confronted: difficulty balancing academic and athletic demands, anxiety over the possible loss of athletic grant-in-aid, and potentially harming one’s body for the good of the team. At a great sports university like the University of North Carolina, Title IX and the pursuit of equal athletic opportunity inevitably meant gaining access to the platform of the Big Time, with all of its benefits and liabilities.
Chapter 6: Joining the Big Time?: Women in the Professionalized, Commercialized Athletic Department, 1974-1992

The University of North Carolina, like most colleges, merged the administration of its men’s and women’s sports programs to simplify compliance with Title IX. The law requiring equal educational opportunity for women created unanticipated consequences for intercollegiate athletics. First, at Carolina, administrators’ commitment to an expansive women’s sports program worked to improve the health and status of men’s non-revenue sports. Coaches and athletes of men’s non-revenue teams often have viewed Title IX as a threat to their existence. When their programs have been cut by athletic departments, they have blamed Title IX. Some athletic department officials have taken advantage of this widespread belief, stating that compliance with Title IX forced the elimination of men’s non-revenue sports teams. The reality, however, has been that administrators have refused to make any cuts to football and men’s basketball budgets.

At UNC, the opposite occurred; Title IX worked to increase the budgets of men’s non-revenue sports. Athletic Directors Homer Rice, William Cobey, and John Swofford decided to demonstrate compliance with the law by comparing opportunities and finances between women’s and men’s non-revenue sports. They committed the university to an expansive non-revenue program, benefiting both women’s and men’s non-revenue sports. Therefore, Title IX protected men’s non-revenue sports from elimination, because the school needed them to demonstrate compliance with the law. Even as the importance of
revenue generation increased during the 1970s and 1980s, men’s non-revenue teams became relieved of the burden to raise money, in large part thanks to Title IX and the way athletic directors at Carolina chose to prove compliance.

UNC committed to one of the largest programs of non-revenue sports in the country, fielding 13 women’s and 11 men’s teams. An expansive non-revenue program required a significant financial commitment, and the athletic department structured its budget to depend on football and men’s basketball revenue to fund the rest of the program. Since Carolina committed to a large non-revenue program because of Title IX, the burden on football and men’s basketball to make money heightened. The need for more and more revenue increased pressure on the two sports to win, which worked to intensify the school’s focus on the elements of the Big Time.

Title IX did not cause the Big Time; the way administrators chose to finance intercollegiate athletics accelerated its growth at Carolina and other big-time colleges in Division I of the National Collegiate Athletic Association. The commitment to an expansive non-revenue program justified the athletic director’s decision to run the department as a business rather than an academic unit on campus. The department’s dependency on revenue generation by football and men’s basketball became balanced by the non-revenue teams, which aligned more closely with an educational model of sport. The vast majority of non-revenue athletes earned their degrees and pursued careers related to their majors. While football and men’s programs looked increasingly professional and athletes’ academic credentials and performance became suspect, schools could point to the tennis, golf, soccer, or cross country teams to support the argument that
college sports benefited the athletes, who excelled on the field and in the classroom. Colleges also could celebrate the great efforts they had made to expand sporting opportunities for women. Athletic departments depended upon football and men’s basketball to win and generate money to support the rest of the program’s teams. They also needed, just as badly, non-revenue teams to hold up the educational purpose of college sports. Title IX and expansive sports programs shielded football and men’s basketball teams from criticism and substantive reform as graduation rates fell, academic scandals became more frequent, and the commercial focus of the college sports enterprise increased.

Across the country, women’s programs did not receive equal resources, but the structure in which men’s and women’s program operated was virtually the same. After the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) folded, women’s programs at schools in which the men competed in the National Collegiate Athletic Association joined the new NCAA women’s structure. Competing in Division I of the NCAA and the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), the University of North Carolina women’s athletics program gained better resources for travel to national championships, increased promotional and publicity efforts, and earned the legitimacy which came from competing in the same association and conference structures as the men.

The NCAA, affiliated conferences, and institutional athletic departments operated as businesses much more than the AIAW and its regional and state organizations. The focus on revenue generation through ticket sales, concessions, private donations, radio and television contracts, and later, commercial sponsorships, held so much power that
business interests influenced educational policy. In order to maximize revenue, teams had to win. Ticket sales, private donations, and television opportunities would decrease if football teams did not win as many games as expected. The pressure to win influenced athletic departments to fire coaches of losing or underperforming teams. A football or men’s basketball coach whose job security depended on the team’s performance on the gridiron rather than in the classroom would do everything in his ability to attract top athletic talent to his school. The university assisted the coach in the effort to recruit and retain talented athletes so teams could win. Schools built bigger and better training and competition facilities, paid star coaches higher and higher salaries, and provided special admission slots for academically-challenged star athletes who then benefited from academic support services reserved for student-athletes.

Scholars and athletic officials alike call this approach to intercollegiate athletics “the Big Time,” and understand it escalated dramatically after the 1970s. Big-time college sports programs enjoyed large administrative staffs, star football and basketball coaches of top 25 teams (or teams which held the goal of consistently performing in the top 25), “blue chip” recruits representing the very best talent coming out of high school, gigantic athletic stadiums and arenas to attract large fan bases, and booster clubs for morale, and more importantly, large donations. The money involved in the bowl game industry grew for big-time programs as well. In later years, big-time programs, either individually or as members of a conference, signed billion-dollar television contracts and corporate sponsorships. Although big-time sports professionalized and commercialized intercollegiate athletics, all of the organizations involved in the Big Time remained
defined as educational. Athletic departments, athletic conferences, the NCAA, and even bowl game organizations were educational and, therefore, enjoyed tax-exempt status.

The incorporation of women’s teams into the athletic department worked to justify the intensified focus on revenue-generating sports. University executives had set up big-time programs in a way which required football and men’s basketball teams to hold the responsibility of funding the rest of the athletic department’s teams. These schools adopted expansive non-revenue sports teams for women and men to comply with Title IX, which pressured the revenue-generators to bring in even more money. Women’s programs benefited from increased resources, but also experienced the pressures of the Big Time. Most women’s administrators and coaches did not fight against this development, but embraced it as an opportunity for more exposure and part of the greater effort to expand sporting opportunities for girls and women. Women’s coaches felt increased pressure to win, and student-athletes found it challenging to balance academic and athletic responsibilities as women’s intercollegiate athletics developed professionally and commercially.

Although the Big Time exacerbated the tension between academics and athletics at the heart of intercollegiate athletics from the 1970s onward, leaders in higher education and a large segment of the general public understood the problem as early as the 1920s. Henry Pritchett, president of The Carnegie Foundation for the Study of the Advancement of Teaching, commissioned a study headed by Dr. Howard Savage that took more than three years of research and resulted in the publishing of “Bulletin 23: American College Athletics,” a 300-plus page report documenting the problems of college sports, primarily
football. The Carnegie Report asserted two fundamental problems: “the commercialization of intercollegiate competition on the athletic field and a negligent attitude toward the educational opportunity for which the American college exists.”¹ In the preface to the report, Pritchett declared,

> The compromises that have to be made to keep such students in the college and to pass them through to a degree give an air of insincerity to the whole university-college regime. We cannot serve any cause—scholarship, science, business, salesmanship, organized athletics—through the university. The need today is to re-examine our educational regime with the determination to attain in greater measure the simplicity, sincerity, and thoroughness that is the life blood of a true university in any country at any age.²

Although the report mainly targeted the subsidization of athletes (or illicit forms of funding before the scholarship era), Savage and his researchers found many more problems. Components of the commercialism bemoaned by the report included highly paid coaches, “mammoth stadia,” and “games played in cities far from the college campus for the sake of bigger profits.” The report also criticized “the growing power of coaches over players’ lives so that they have opportunity to exhibit little more initiative than a chessman.”³

The Carnegie Report of 1929 marked the first time in which the American public understood the problems inherent in big-time college sports. The report also resulted in the first of many major reform initiatives, attempting to restore educational integrity to intercollegiate athletics and to rein in the business of the Big Time. In response to the Carnegie Report’s findings, UNC System President Frank Porter Graham attempted to pass a reform platform in the Southern Conference, with plans to take it nationwide. Students and alumni, however, enjoyed college football and basketball and did not want...
the system to change. Despite widespread popular opposition, the Southern Conference passed the Graham Plan in 1936. Meanwhile, the nearby Southeastern Conference became the first to openly allow financial aid based on athletic ability. Although the Southern Conference committed to the prohibition of athletic scholarships, the conference overturned the other planks of the platform, including bans on recruiting and payments to coaches from individuals outside the university.4

The Graham Plan’s failure to reform intercollegiate athletics was repeated when the NCAA passed and then overturned the Sanity Code, another reform effort, in 1950. Although faculty athletic representatives attended NCAA conventions and often served as the institutional voting representative, athletic directors and their conference commissioners influenced policy by sponsoring legislation and enjoying a large say in their institution’s vote. At big-time universities, football coaches often served as athletic directors, which further undermined the NCAA’s ability to institute legitimate reform. Every time educational leaders and university chief executive officers attempted to scale back college sports, they found themselves in the same position as President Graham in the 1930s. Therefore, while reform initiatives sometimes enacted changes to strengthen the academic purpose of intercollegiate athletics; they never impeded the continual professional and commercial development of big-time college sports.

The NCAA instituted enforcement mechanisms in an attempt to keep college sports amateur in the 1950s, after the failed Sanity Code and under the leadership of Executive Director Walter Byers. The organization operated on the principle of self-reporting and self-punishment; however, the association also began to punish schools for
rules violations. The University of Kentucky men’s basketball team became the first program to receive strict punishment when the NCAA found Adolph Rupp’s program guilty of shaving points, allocating illegal cash payments, and working with a bookmaker. The association barred the Wildcats from the 1952-53 championship tournament, and pressure from Byers on other schools to cancel games with the team forced UK to cancel the entire season. The commercial and professional growth of the athletic department forced extra effort to keep the student-athlete experience amateur.

Events at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in the 1970s demonstrated the school was part of the Big Time. In the summer of 1978, Athletic Director Bill Cobey strengthened the professional structure of the Carolina athletic department, developing a new mission statement to direct goals and priorities, and creating a departmental hierarchy. The number one goal placed athletics within the broader educational goals of the university, “To create a competitive environment which is conducive to the positive growth and total development of our student-athletes.” The second goal, however, dealt with increasing student attendance and school spirit, but in a more subtle way, “To maximize the participation by students in activities related to intercollegiate athletics.” By this, Cobey meant the participation of students as spectators at UNC sporting events. While the entertainment function of higher education grew in value during the last third of the twentieth century, faculty and administrators likely preferred students to spend their free time studying, partaking in their own educational
extra-curricular activities, or attending the many lectures and cultural events offered in Chapel Hill and the broader Raleigh-Durham area.\textsuperscript{8}

Cobey and his staff, however, understood that pulling students into the Carolina fandom family would help them create future boosters who would continue to support the teams. Another goal underlined the belief that the athletic department was a place in which everyone was on the same team. Cobey encouraged supportive, optimistic cheerleaders and discouraged dissenting, critical thinkers. Carolina administrators and coaches had to “bleed Carolina blue” and get on board with all departmental initiatives. Cobey asserted the department would possess “a strong sense of unity and positive outlook to the future within our department.”\textsuperscript{9}

Other departmental goals demonstrated Cobey’s vision of creating and maintaining the best athletic program in the region. The school needed to build the best facilities in order to create winning teams. State-of-the-art facilities attracted both top recruits and the best coaches in the country, who helped teams win. This never-ending arms race among schools to build bigger and better facilities has been termed “the athletic industrial complex,” and represents a major feature of the Big Time.\textsuperscript{10} Cobey asserted his department would “provide the best facilities in the ACC and the state of North Carolina by continually building new facilities and renovating old facilities.” This philosophy does not contain the value of fiscal prudence. Money spent on facilities improvements was money well spent because it helped teams win, which would bring in more money. Two years later, new athletic director John Swofford expressed the same commitment to continually building bigger and better facilities. His stated priorities concerning facilities
included the declaration, “We must continually progress. There is no such thing as standing still—we are either progressing or we are falling behind.”

The hierarchy chart of the athletic department demonstrated the growth of the professional athletic department, which managed an annual budget of more than $4 million by the late 1970s. This number grew to $15 million in only a decade. The unit began with only an athletic director and business manager in 1915. The professional staff had grown to more than 20 full-time administrators and more than 40 coaches. The Director of Athletics sat at the top of the department, was advised by the Athletic Council, and reported to the Chancellor, who was advised by the Faculty Committee on Athletics. Directly below the Athletic Director were an Associate Athletic Director, three Assistant Athletic Directors, the Director of Women’s Athletics, the head football coach, the head men’s basketball coach, and the head coaches of other men’s teams. The head coaches of women’s teams reported to the women’s athletic director. The Athletic Fitness Director, Academic Counselor, and Sports Information Director reported to the Associate Athletic Director. The Ticket Manager, Supervisor of Athletic Facilities and the Golf Course, Supervisor of Equipment and Events, and Manager of the Dining Hall reported to assistant athletic directors. The Executive Vice President of The Educational Foundation, the fundraising arm of the department, also reported to the athletic director, as well as the executive committee of The Educational Foundation. Assistant football and men’s basketball coaches reported to their head coaches, and were on the same plane on the chart as women’s head coaches. As Cobey instituted more structures to professionalize and commercialize the athletic department,
the unit looked less like an academic department on campus and its educational purpose became less clear.

Women’s administrators found new opportunities, but also quickly learned the tension between academic and athletic priorities worsened in the Big Time. Leaders in women’s sports believed strongly in their mission to expand sporting opportunities for girls and women, and took advantage of any form of increased exposure. NCAA rules regarding amateurism opened the eyes of women’s coaches to how different two educational models of intercollegiate athletics could be. The rule that student-athletes’ names and pictures could not be used to advertise commercial products or services ran counter to this philosophy of promoting women’s athletics.16 Women’s coaches and administrators also learned from NCAA rules prohibiting such practices that institutions and their friends and benefactors had created many ways to lure prospects to campus or to supplement star athletes’ income while competing for the college. NCAA amateur rules prohibited student-athletes from accepting jobs with no work performed, jobs paid at a higher rate than the going wages, or gifts and other benefits from friends of the university, like the use of a car or a flight home for a relative’s funeral. This booster system simply did not exist for female student-athletes, because the network of “good old boys” focused their efforts primarily on football, and to a lesser extent, men’s basketball.

In Chapel Hill, Director of Women’s Athletics Frances Hogan and her staff knew more about these booster clubs than their colleagues on other campuses because the booster club raised the money for the entire athletic grant-in-aid program at the University of North Carolina. The Educational Foundation, Inc. and its executive vice
president, solicited donations from alumni and friends of Carolina as well as local businesses to create a healthy, robust scholarship fund. In addition to the knowledge that they helped young men and women earn their degrees, donors earned membership in the Rams Club. Depending on their contributions and status with the club, they enjoyed many perquisites, like season tickets to football and men’s basketball, parking passes, club seats, travel on charter flights to away games, and more. The Educational Foundation sought to gain the membership of North Carolina’s wealthiest residents. The club appealed to these individuals, whose donations to the educational organization were tax-free. They also enjoyed the status of sitting in the best seats in Kenan Stadium to watch the Tar Heel football team take the gridiron and in Carmichael Arena to watch Dean Smith’s nationally-ranked teams.

The Educational Foundation, Inc. was a large undertaking with a full-time, professional staff. Associate Athletic Director Moyer Smith served as assistant director and the liaison between the booster club and the athletic department. Ernie Williamson, longtime executive director, presided over the two-million-dollar scholarship fund and developed relationships with important donors. The latter responsibility dominated his time. Donors seemed to constantly write or appear in Williamson’s office with ideas for marketing the team or requests for various perquisites. George E. Moseley of West Point, Georgia and WestPoint Pepperell served as associate legal counsel to Williamson and The Educational Foundation. Moseley believed he could help promote the university by displaying and selling merchandise with the Tar Heels logo and sent Williamson wall-decoration rugs “showing the N/C insignia.” He asked that Williamson display the rug
“wherever you believe the most traffic can view it. If we can make some early sales, I will have an artist from our Carpet and Rug Division insert the diagram of the Tarheels in the bottom right-hand corner.” In Moseley’s case, like most other business owners working with the school, the rugs would likely benefit Moseley’s company more than the university, because Moseley would be generating the revenue from the carpet sales. Moseley continued, “You also mentioned some local concerns which might desire these rugs from you at a slight discount in order to sell them in local stores…. I hope like the devil we can sell some of these rugs. For the price, I don’t believe Carolina fans can purchase a more attractive display.”

Men like Moseley sought status as well as a commercial relationship with the Tar Heels, and Rams Club membership provided both. Some boosters saw membership in The Educational Foundation solely as their means to access better seats or chartered trips to away games. Nearly every letter received by The Educational Foundation asked for a favor; donors believed they were owed something for their contributions and did not feel they were simply making a charitable donation. Some parents of children applying to the university would stop by Williamson’s office, with the hope that their membership in the Rams Club would help their child’s chances of admission. High school student Gerald Moran wrote, “I appreciate very much the time you gave me and my father when we stopped into your office last Friday…. Hopeful, I am that I will receive a favorable response from the Admissions Office as I am anxious to attend Chapel Hill and earn my degree in Business Administration.”

Kenton McCartney of Winston-Salem wrote to complain about what he felt were poor seats for the UNC-Wake game at Wake Forest. McCartney sent the
tickets back to Williamson, requesting better seats or a refund, and Williamson sent the refund. Many members of the Rams Club felt that they had purchased entitlements more than they had contributed to an educational fund.

Some donors to The Educational Foundation believed they were recruiters, and wanted to help coaches find the best talent so teams could win. Winning teams provided boosters bragging rights with their coworkers and business connections. Sometimes Williamson asked for assistance; most of the time boosters acted on their own accord. They saw themselves as scouts, locating and evaluating potential recruits for the university. Dr. Coyte R. Minges of Rocky Mount wrote to Williamson, “We have I think a pretty good prospect on Rocky Mount Senior High and is interested in going to Carolina. He is J.B. Warren and is a line backer on defense and a guard on offense. Although slightly hurt now, he has played outstanding in the last few games. He makes pretty good grades, too.”

Boosters, foundation employees, and athletic staff understood the Rams Club as an organization involved in men’s sports. All three groups reinforced this mindset. Although the organization fully funded the grant-in-aid program for female student-athletes after the university adopted it in 1974, the many other purposes and services related solely to football and men’s basketball, and occasionally, men’s non-revenue sports. The additional benefits Williamson provided rarely extended to female students, and when they did, the beneficiaries were daughters of prominent club members. Williamson contacted undergraduate admissions to see if some “gals who want UNC” could get help in gaining admission to the school. He wrote that the “outstanding,
“pretty gals” would not exist “unless they come to Carolina.” Outside of athletic grants-in-aid, the foundation was more likely to help daughters of boosters than female student-athletes.

Although the name of the organization implied that all donations contributed to scholarships for student-athletes, Williamson recognized that donors would be more likely to contribute if they believed their funds also supported popular coaches and staff. When soliciting new donors, Williamson would write, “In my opinion, we are blessed with three of the top athletic people in America in Homer Rice, Dean Smith, and Bill Dooley. Your support will keep these men here.” Nationally-renowned basketball coach Smith had built a dynasty program, and Dooley held great football credentials. Williamson understood prominent men around the state would feel good, and might give more, if they believed they were contributing to these men’s greatness. His statement was not misleading; The Educational Foundation was not solely a scholarship fund. When athletic department officials determined they needed new facilities, the staff of The Educational Foundation got to work soliciting funds and providing attractive donor benefits packages for contributors. Having the best facilities helped the coaches recruit the best players, making the team more likely to win and the beloved coach more likely to stay.

The Educational Foundation played a crucial role in the Tar Heels’ success, which required continual expansion and ever-increasing resources. Booster clubs helped grow the professional side of college sports at the expense of the educational side. Teams had to win to keep donations coming in; losing teams made it harder to justify support.
Public universities depended on private donations because state legislatures would not fund athletic teams and university trustees would not always divert general funds and student fees intended for educational purposes toward athletic ends. Ernie Williamson’s standard recruitment letter demonstrated the absence of public financial support for athletics in North Carolina, “Being a State University, we must receive our funds from alumni and friends.” The dependency on donor contributions intensified the athletic department’s emphasis on winning.

The official objectives of the athletic department demonstrated the increased pressure on teams to win. Bill Cobey shared his objectives, both short-term and long-range, with his coaching staff each year. In 1979, his short-term objectives prioritized winning; the first nine items all related to success on the field. He wished to “capture the Carmichael Cup,” have a “winning football season,” and win the ACC football and basketball championships as well as at least three additional ACC championships. The football team should earn an invitation to a bowl game and win it. He wanted all teams to finish at least fourth place in ACC competition. Finally, at least one Carolina team should win a national championship. Two of the remaining seven short-term objectives dealt with psychology and motivation programs for athletes and staff, and the final five all related to fundraising and facilities-building. In the long-term, he envisioned at least seven ACC and two national titles per year.
Cobey’s objectives demonstrated the role money played in the displacement of educational purposes by winning in the Big Time. The effect was cyclical; winning teams brought in more money, more money helped more teams win, which brought in more money. The Big Time demanded that athletic departments continually expand their resources and efforts. Athletic officials and coaches’ priorities moved the role of playing sports further away from serving student-athletes.

Cobey led a departmental initiative to improve the school’s athletic facilities, requiring money on top of the operational and scholarship needs of the program. The state of North Carolina did fund athletics projects; the legislature, however, refused to provide resources for the Big Time. The North Carolina General Assembly agreed to build a new facility for men’s basketball when the university requested a larger space than that provided by Woollen Gymnasium. Carmichael Auditorium, which the state built as an annex to Woollen Gym, opened in 1965 and seated approximately 8,000 people. Critics deemed the small space “obsolete before it housed its first game.” Renovations in the mid-1970s brought the seating capacity to 10,000, which still failed both the many fans who wished to see games in person and Dean Smith and his assistant coaches vying for top recruits.

Bill Cobey committed the university to building a new arena in 1979, calling it the department’s “top priority” and “the most ambitious undertaking ever for the athletic department.” Cobey envisioned the new facility to seat at least 18,000 people, which later grew to 22,000, at the cost of at least $25 million, soon increased to at least $30 million. In an interview in 1980, after resigning from office but before finishing out the
school year, Cobey emphasized the importance of donor contributions because the state would finance none of the construction. He reported that “one businessman has already pledged $1 million” and shared his optimism that Tar Heel fans would step up to make the building a reality.

Hogan and women’s coaches looked forward to the new athletic complex, optimistic their athletes would enjoy the same access as the men. Depending on the audience, the athletic department either suggested the new project was for the men’s basketball team or declared it would support all Carolina students, through many forms of extracurricular activities and entertainment events. A fact sheet mailed to students, alumni, and boosters advertised that the new facility, named the Student Activities Center, would include an Olympic-size pool with a diving well large enough for one- and three-meter competition, and the arena, which would house much more than basketball games. Plans included “indoor sports and recreational events such as volleyball, tennis, track, and gymnastics meets,” as well as boxing events, intramural competitions, “big name entertainment and outstanding cultural events,” and “political conventions, educational forums, and large meetings of all kinds.” Carmichael Auditorium would no longer serve an athletic purpose, replacing the much smaller Memorial Hall as a new, “high-quality auditorium to accommodate major theatrical road shows, concerts, major addresses, student convocations, conventions and meetings.” Bowman-Gray Pool would no longer be monopolized by varsity team practice, returning the facility to “serve instructional and recreational” needs. The mailing continued, “Most of all, the new Center will provide more opportunities for the University’s alumni and friends to return
to the campus and will keep more people than ever in active contact with the University.”
This appealed to local residents and UNC alumni, who understood the university to be
providing educational and entertainment opportunities to the greater Carolina community.
University administrators and athletic officials read this differently, however; the center
would attract alumni to keep coming back to Carolina, strengthening their connection and
pride, and increasing the likelihood that they would become lifelong donors to the
university.

Despite the many programs and activities the center would serve, the university
clearly saw the fundraising effort and final product as providing for Carolina men’s
basketball. The University of Kentucky’s new Rupp Arena which held 23,000 fans was
the primary motivator of the new facility, according to Ernie Williamson. The Wildcats
represented one of the Tar Heels’ main competitors in the recruiting game in the South.
Carolina needed to build a state-of-the-art facility in order to stay competitive with
Kentucky and ahead of other big-time schools in the region and nation. Having “one of
the most outstanding indoor facilities in the country,” the fundraising committee asserted,
“would enhance the attractiveness of the Carolina athletic program to potential
students.” The school would be able to continue to expand its athletic facilities and
services to compete with other schools vying for top talent because the “increased seating
capacity will increase athletic department revenues.” The committee reasoned, “This is
important if our University is to continue to have the extensive and high quality
intercollegiate athletic program that we now have.” By stirring up anxieties that the great
Carolina basketball program might not last forever, the committee appealed to fans who
loved the feeling they experienced when Dean Smith’s teams won games. By extension, the fans were winners, too, and they wanted to continue feeling that way.

Not only would the larger facility attract top talent, it would better serve the Carolina community, who wished to see games in person to experience the excitement. The fundraising committee pointed out that every men’s home game for the last fifteen years sold out, implying that many more fans could be accommodated in a larger space. The mailing stated, “The only individuals who have an opportunity to see Carolina home games (and only a small percentage of these groups) are students, faculty, staff and contributors to The Educational Foundation. The increased number of seats will allow more people than ever to attend Carolina games and will be helpful in attracting regional and national sporting events.” More seats, of course, would also bring in more revenue.

Although the fundraising committee, The Educational Foundation, and the university suggested the new facility would serve male and female intercollegiate athletes and the general student body, Hogan and coaches in the women’s program had earned the right to be skeptical. In 1982, when the athletic department held a special ceremony to begin construction on the new site, no one from the women’s program was invited, providing a preview of who the facility would really serve. Hogan, who had become increasingly unable to speak her mind in correspondence, wrote to John Swofford,

I would like closer attention given to include our women’s athletics staff on functions that concern the athletic department. Too often we have been overlooked, and not notified of or invited to attend functions that were of importance and interest to those of us employed with the UNC Athletic Department. One such instance specifically was the recent groundbreaking ceremony and functions surrounding this most important day for Carolina Athletics. No one in women’s gym was advised of this or included in the ceremony.”
She continued, “Oversights such as this are very embarrassing, and certainly do not contribute to good morale for those involved in these mistakes.”

Hogan had reported to four different men while running the women’s program; Carl Blyth, Homer Rice, Bill Cobey, and now John Swofford, who replaced Cobey in the summer of 1980. Closing in on her fortieth year serving the university and its students, Hogan retained her professionalism, but had gained considerable confidence and assertiveness when dealing with superiors. She closed her memo to Swofford, “Our location in Women’s Gym continues to alienate our staff here from ‘the athletic family’ and certainly contributes to a feeling of not being included on athletic functions. I would welcome any suggestions you might have to change this situation.”

The university built the center to serve primarily the interests of men’s basketball, but women’s teams benefited from the larger resources of the Big Time. Although the offices of the women’s program remained in the inferior and isolated Women’s Gym, nearly every team enjoyed training and competition facility improvements during the early 1980s. The university improved Fetzer Field, Finley Fields, the Astro-Turf Field, the Tin Can, and indoor and outdoor tennis facilities, in addition to Kenan Stadium, where the football team played. While coaches might have been frustrated by the amount of attention and resources football and men’s basketball received, they could not deny that their teams enjoyed considerable improvements as well.

The Student Activities Center never hosted the variety of athletic competitions and student recreational and intramural events athletic officials claimed. The 300,000-square-foot arena, christened the Dean E. Smith Center in January 1986, served the men’s
basketball team, reflected in its name. Women’s and men’s non-revenue teams inherited the men’s old facility, Carmichael Auditorium, which was never converted into a “high-quality auditorium” for major theatrical and special lecture events. The swimming facility, named the Maurice J. Koury Natatorium, included the pool, offices, and locker room facilities for the men’s and women’s intercollegiate teams. Koury served as president of The Educational Foundation during the fundraising campaign and construction of the facility. He was president of Carolina Hosiery Mills and served on numerous UNC boards and committees, including the Board of Trustees. Hargrove “Skipper” Bowles, a prominent state Democratic politician, businessman, and fundraiser for public education, chaired the fundraising effort on behalf of The Educational Foundation and the university. His team raised more than $34 million, all in private donations from 2,362 individuals. The new street leading down the hill to the Dean Smith Center and Koury Natatorium was named Skipper Bowles Drive. Most facilities funded by private donations are dedicated to the primary donor who earned naming rights from his or her large contribution. At UNC, the university named the new facilities and street after their coach, and the two men who dedicated the most time and energy to the project.

Unlike a publicly supported project, the fundraising committee had to spend as much time demonstrating to donors what they would receive in return as they spent financing and planning. Donors to the Student Activities Center enjoyed generous perquisites for their contributions, and the committee carefully set the benefit levels to maximize the money raised without giving away so much that they would cause
problems for the athletic department. Even so, boosters represented the largest group when the committee determined the seating distribution in the new basketball arena. Of the 21,520 available seats, 9,030 would go to boosters, 8,207 to students, and 4,238 to faculty and staff. In addition, boosters received the most comfortable seats with the best viewing locations in the stadium. Rams Club members enjoyed the 1,744 “arm seats” in the lower bowl and the 1,440 seats with arm rests in the lower ring of the upper arena. The allocation of seats to the various groups of spectators made the arena look more like a professional than a school sporting event.

Donors enjoyed financial, entertainment, and status benefits from contributing to the Student Activities Center. First, when filing taxes, they could write off money contributed to “The Educational Foundation Building Fund”; many wrote large checks at the end of the year to reduce tax burdens. All of the benefits related to viewing the men’s basketball team in the new arena. Businessmen, community leaders, and regular citizens could take pride in sitting in spaces reserved for the largest supporters of Carolina basketball. They came to see the team and be seen, and many took advantage of the opportunity to network and establish connections. The committee determined the baseline amount “to guarantee a seating allocation” at $5,000. Donors at the $10,000 level earned four seats, and those at both the $5,000 and $10,000 level held the rights to their seats for twenty-five years, at which time they enjoyed first right of refusal. Those contributing $25,000 or more enjoyed box seats, which would remain in the family forever, and access to the “Donors Room,” which included a coat room and provided “occasional meals.” All donors giving over $5,000 enjoyed a plaque on their seats.
“unless the donor objects,” “commemorative gifts,” and conveniently-located parking spaces. In order to retain the rights to their seats each year, all these major contributors had to do was renew their current level of Rams Club membership. Many understood this facility was as much for them as it was for the men’s basketball team; after all, they had purchased the right to believe so.

When colleges depended upon boosters to fund athletics facilities projects, they became indebted to those donors to improve their viewing experience and cater to their needs. They also became required to take boosters’ suggestions seriously. Major donors did not act like team owners, but the perquisites they enjoyed began to look similar to those of large supporters of professional sports teams. A game in Carmichael Arena, even one played by Michael Jordan, Sam Perkins, and James Worthy and coached by Dean Smith, looked amateurish and small time compared to later games in the “Dean Dome,” with its lavish accommodations.

Donors’ sense of entitlement also included the belief that the teams needed to win. They contributed significant money to the program, and that program better field winning teams so the donors could bask in reflected glory. Athletic officials and coaches felt this pressure to win, because they depended heavily on financial contributions. Student-athletes were not immune. Reflecting in 1991, Hogan stated, “One of the biggest changes and differences is the pressure on the coach. I don't care what you say, there's pressure on the athlete too.”39 The Carolina women’s program shared this experience,
especially after the adoption of grants-in-aid, the merging of the programs under one athletic department structure, and the transition to NCAA rules and championships.

Although Carolina developed its big-time structure for football and men’s basketball, the university held similar performance standards for men’s non-revenue and women’s teams. Coaches of women’s teams often expressed anxiety in annual reports about their job security when their teams experienced an off year, or when they felt their program was underfunded compared to other teams. New volleyball coach Joe Sagula made the argument that Carolina had to spend more on the team if it was to remain competitive. He wrote,

> It is necessary to examine ways to upgrade this program (scholarships, assistant coaches, etc.) in order to maintain the traditional competitive level for UNC. Many conference schools have upgraded their programs. In order just to sustain a competitive level within the conference, and to gradually improve in order to compete on the regional and national level as we do with all of our non-revenue sports, some changes must occur. Volleyball would like to add to the traditions of excellence and success on the regional, conference, and national levels as all UNC sports can be proud.\(^40\)

For years, softball coach Donna Papa worried that she would lose her job coaching the school’s underfunded, mediocre team. She continually asked for facilities upgrades and increased funding for recruiting, scholarships, and team travel.\(^41\)

Other coaches became inspired to turn their programs into revenue-generators. Anson Dorrance, coach of the women’s soccer team which won one AIAW and seven NCAA national titles in the 1980s, believed his successful program could generate revenue. Jennifer Alley, and later, Sylvia Hatchell, worked hard to make the Carolina women’s basketball program a revenue-producing team as well. Hatchell even gained her own television program, the “Sylvia Hatchell Basketball Show,” which aired eleven
episodes in its inaugural season. Frances Hogan committed to their goals, placing them in her annual list of objectives for women’s intercollegiate athletics. Neither team managed to earn enough money to cover its own expenses, but continued to strive for the goal.

Frances Hogan accepted that revenue-generating sports should receive the most resources, and expressed her gratitude that the popularity of the football and men’s basketball teams benefited the entire athletic program. When filling out Title IX compliance forms, she stood behind UNC’s argument that opportunities between women’s sports and men’s non-revenue sports should be the basis of comparison, rather than including the men’s program as a whole. She wrote, “Since the revenue producing sports generate the money for operating expenses for the non-revenue producing sports, it is understandable that the promotion of these two revenue producing sports (men’s football and basketball) would have to be greater than the promotion of other sports in the intercollegiate program.” Revenue-generating sports deserved more resources because they funded the rest of the athletic program. As the money in big-time sports increased, women’s teams also benefited from increased spending. At the same time, Hogan disagreed with the amount of resources funneled into intercollegiate athletics. After her retirement, she expressed her true feelings, “I often ask myself, how do you justify that much money for so few student athletes…. I think we are putting too much emphasis on athletics, not only here at the University, but in general all over the country.”
Major changes at the national level created a system in which the top NCAA programs could generate even more revenue during the 1970s and 1980s. At the 1976 NCAA Convention, the top 61 football programs within Division I failed to obtain the passage of new legislation granting their schools more autonomy and power. At a meeting in Chicago in preparation for the convention, the group created a steering committee and determined to meet again after the convention should their attempt at reorganization fail. The group met again in Denver to plan “the future creation of a so-called College Football Association,” reported UNC Chair of the Faculty Athletic Committee Gerald A. Barrett. In Denver, reviewing the steering committee’s report, the group “agreed that there is a need to create a vehicle which can bring together major football interests and enable such a group to discuss and consider problems of mutual interest and concern.” The CFA would “reside within the framework of the NCAA, and provide the leadership to adequately respond to our concerns.” They established an organizing committee, with representation spread among the major conferences and independents fielding the country’s best football teams.

ACC Commissioner Robert C. James, who served on the organizing committee, supported the CFA and encouraged conference members to join and support the organization. James envisioned the ACC schools would take a back seat to the other conferences behind the effort, particularly the Southeastern Conference and the Big Eight Conference. He wrote to ACC faculty athletic representatives and athletic directors, “One of the most meaningful activities of such an association would be the bringing together of institutions with similar problems and an opportunity to fully and factually
review the methods of overcoming them.” He continued, “Since these institutions represent those with whom we compete, I would recommend that our association with this group, whereby we could advance our philosophies and dispute those which we oppose, would be far more desirable than non-participation.”

The CFA’s Articles of Association listed its objectives, which demonstrated the group’s true purpose: increasing football revenues while maintaining academic standards. The organization would serve “institutions with similar football philosophies and programs.” It committed to demonstrate that “involvement in a high quality intercollegiate football program is consistent with the highest academic values and traditions to which all member institutions are committed.” The CFA would also “maintain the high quality of intercollegiate football so that it continues to merit public support, recognizing that in many schools football receipts provide the revenues needed to support comprehensive athletic programs.” As the group sought to increase revenues, its membership acknowledged that criticisms might be raised by faculty, university executives, and the public. Another stated objective declared, “To engender a continuing respect for intercollegiate football from our faculties, student bodies and alumni, as well as from the media and the general public.” In order to gain this respect, the CFA had to serve its student-athletes and committed “To continue efforts to eliminate any abuses attributed to intercollegiate football, particularly those which exploit or appear to exploit the student-athlete.” Finally, although the group formed in response to the failure of the NCAA to further subdivide, it would not leave the NCAA and form an independent association. Instead, the group would “operate within the structure of the NCAA,
recognizing the importance of a unifying national athletic organization for all intercollegiate sports.\textsuperscript{52}

The CFA forced the reclassification of the NCAA, with the creation of Division I-A in 1978; however, the CFA did not disband because the group focused on a new project: challenging the NCAA football television policy, in which only the national association could enter in contractual agreements with broadcasting networks. Members believed they could generate more revenue by negotiating their own television contracts. They also disliked the current system in which CFA members brought in the money collected and distributed by the NCAA. While the organization’s first major initiative attempted and failed to introduce major academic reform to the NCAA, its battle over the control of college football television defined the organization’s legacy. The CFA joined a lawsuit filed by the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association, which sought to end what they perceived as the NCAA’s monopoly of college football television. They argued the NCAA violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act because the NCAA limited the number of games televised and therefore the amount of revenue schools could generate.\textsuperscript{53}

Women’s programs benefited greatly from NCAA television policies. The NCAA negotiated contracts with CBS, ABC, and the fledgling cable outlet, the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) to air non-revenue sports championships. In 1982-83, 13 NCAA women’s championships were televised, on a live or tape-delay basis.\textsuperscript{54} Division I basketball, gymnastics, and swimming and diving championships aired on CBS, Division I track and field aired on ABC, and ESPN showed
championships in Division I field hockey, softball, volleyball, and tennis; Division II basketball, swimming and diving, track and field, and gymnastics; and Division III basketball. Six of the thirteen championships were combined events with the men. The NCAA renewed all contracts for 1983-84, and added Division I indoor track and field as well. Football television contracts, however, involved far more money than non-revenue sports contracts, and institutions battled for larger allocations from the NCAA.

Under the leadership of Commissioner James, the Atlantic Coast Conference officially expressed its opposition to the NCAA football television policy. In a letter to all Division I member institutions, the ACC issued a group statement, “In recent years the Atlantic Coast Conference has become increasingly concerned with many aspects of the NCAA football television program.” ACC institutions disagreed with “a trend within recent TV Committees to promote a television aristocracy by relaxing basic appearance rules as a concession to the purchasing network’s acceptance of unattractive games required by specialized television rules.” Swofford, while UNC’s assistant athletic director, served on the ACC television committee and headed a study of the monies received by Division I institutions from 1970 to 1976. The ACC committee’s financial analysis found that the NCAA football television committee failed to enact its “Purpose of the Plan,” stated in Article I of the football television plan. The committee took to task “specifically that portion which states ‘to spread Football Television participation among as many colleges as practicable.’” This provision had “not been reasonably met unless one considers numbers only and disregards equity of financial return.”
The ACC position differed from the CFA position, however, because while the CFA sought to open college football television to the free market, the ACC wished the NCAA would allocate games and disperse revenue more broadly. The ACC study revealed that ten institutions received thirty percent of the revenue during the six year period and that twenty institutions received fifty-two percent. Not one ACC school made the top twenty list. The ACC quoted the October 1, 1971 *NCAA News* to illustrate how NCAA statements and policies differed. The NCAA publication declared, “Substantive changes were generally inclined to present the purchaser of the rights with options to televise additional games—thus, spreading appearances and income among football-playing colleges and offering the public more attractive games.” The ACC study proved that the games televised and revenue generated did not match the NCAA’s stated objectives.

ACC schools saw the money generated from television contracts and wanted more, and at a time of high anxiety about revenue creation. The group declared,

> For us to assume the necessity of reminding Division I members of the significance of the Football Television Plan to their intercollegiate athletic programs would indeed be ridiculous. The financial plight of intercollegiate athletics at the member institutions of this division is generally the same for all—most assuredly, the overriding problem confronting us at this period of time.

The group was referring to two major factors which caused additional pressure to increase revenue in the 1970s. Title IX required athletic departments, unwilling to cut football and men’s basketball budgets, to generate more revenue in order to comply with the law. The economic recession and resultant inflation also forced schools to find new
sources of income in order to maintain men’s teams’ budgets and expand the women’s program.

The ACC wished to see the NCAA make decisions on which games to televise with the goal of “providing a fairer opportunity for members of this division to appear on the series” rather than “increase[ing] the dollar volume of the contract.” ACC schools had far less games televised than Big Ten, Southeastern Conference, and Big Eight schools. From 1970-76, the average ACC school earned $565,662 annually; whereas the Big Eight average was $1,204,474, the Big Ten was $1,090,027, and the SEC was $1,312,333. Independent Notre Dame earned $3,109,098 across the seven-year period. Furthermore, on the list of the top twenty earners, in addition to a number of independents, at least one school from every major conference was represented, except for the Atlantic Coast Conference. While the SEC and Big Eight conferences sought to negotiate their own contracts, the ACC wanted what other conferences enjoyed with the NCAA policy.

The University of North Carolina position supported the NCAA while maintaining membership in the CFA to see what the organization planned. Influencing the school’s position, Swofford, now athletic director, sought to reform the NCAA from within. He served on the NCAA Football Television Committee and believed the unified television plan ultimately benefited all colleges. He attended an NCAA special convention in the fall of 1981 to help in the reorganization of the television committee, which was announced at the 1982 NCAA Convention in Houston. At the convention, the football television legislation passed, continuing to give the NCAA official control of
a national football television policy. Swofford reassured football coach Dick Crum that
the policy was in Carolina’s best interests. He wrote, “This will assure that the
ABC/CBS contract stay in effect for the 1982-86 period. It does not move control to the
individual divisions, however, and with the reduced size of Division IA, this should allow
for a more workable situation.” Swofford continued to work to improve the NCAA
football television plan while the CFA lawsuit continued.

John Swofford became chair of the NCAA Football Television Committee for the
1983-84 academic year, and he sought to prove to the CFA that the NCAA model was
preferable to a free market. In a memo to Division I institutions and conference
commissioners, he wrote, “the fractionalization of the TV audience among a variety of
channels and entertainment offerings” would result in declining ratings, and therefore,
less power to negotiate contracts and less television money for all schools. Ratings for
all sports viewing were already in decline, “from a high of 11.3 in 1980 and a four-year
(1979-82) average of 9.8 to 7.9 in 1983.” Despite these challenges, the NCAA television
plan was successful. Swofford reported to the NCAA Council, “The 1983 figures
enhance college football’s position as the second most popular sport series on TV. The
NCAA college football series ranked second four of the five years of 1979-83 and… has
strengthened its position of being second only to professional football.” Not only did
the regular season contests attract strong viewership ratings, so did bowl games.
Swofford continued, “In analyzing the status of various championship series, as
compared to regular, in-season series, college football bowl games (those contests carried
by one of the three major networks) consistently have finished third behind the
championship playoffs of professional football and major league baseball for the same five years.”

The NCAA hoped Swofford could convince CFA members to abandon their lawsuit. NCAA President John L. Toner, head football coach and athletic director at the University of Connecticut, also attempted to sway the CFA that all schools benefited from the plan. He wrote, “The adoption and implementations of NCAA football television plans over many years have had the purpose of preserving the sport of college football against the perceived harm to the sport by unlimited and uncontrolled football television.” Swofford and Toner worried that football fans would stop buying tickets to games and would be overwhelmed by too many options, if the NCAA did not control the number of games televised each year. They were concerned about the “perceived harm” to the sport, not to the student-athletes who played for the schools fighting over the financial rewards.

In *N.C.A.A. v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma*, the Supreme Court agreed with Oklahoma, Georgia, and the CFA and upheld the decision that the NCAA violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; this decision has played a central role in the dramatic increase in college football television money ever since. The court ruled with the CFA schools for a number of reasons including consumer (i.e., television viewer) rights, and that the NCAA restraints did not enhance competition, as Swofford and Toner attempted to argue. Justice John Paul Stevens agreed with the lower court, writing, “The District Court's well-supported finding that many more games would be televised in a free market than under the NCAA plan, is a compelling demonstration that the plan's
controls do not serve any legitimate procompetitive purpose.” More importantly, the court rejected the NCAA’s argument that it protected amateur athletic teams. Justice Stevens continued,

The television plan is not even arguably tailored to serve such an interest. It does not regulate the amount of money that any college may spend on its football program or the way the colleges may use their football program revenues, but simply imposes a restriction on one source of revenue that is more important to some colleges than to others.

The players on the teams might have been amateur athletes, but the NCAA’s television plan “restrained prices and outputs” and held “a significant potential for anticompetitive effects.” The court’s comment on amateurism signaled that schools could earn as much as they would like by televising their amateur athletic contests.

As the amount of money available in college football increased, the Big Time grew even bigger. Facilities grew bigger and better, television and commercial contracts soared, football and men’s basketball coaches’ salaries escalated, and the recruiting competition for top talent intensified. Winning mattered more than ever, and schools became increasingly open to overlooking academic ability for highly-talented players who could help their teams win. In less than ten years the NCAA lost its lawsuits to prevent Title IX from being applied to athletics and to protect its television interests. By the mid-1980s, big-time universities fielded expansive men’s and women’s athletic programs and football’s power was stronger than ever. As a revenue-generator within higher education, the interests of college football influenced the nature of intercollegiate
athletics, and, indeed, higher education in general. The balancing act of big-time college sports, participating in commercial, professional athletics while maintaining educational values, became more difficult as money increasingly dictated policy.

Women’s teams benefited from the Big Time, with access to better facilities and more resources for travel, recruiting, and operations. Balancing academics and athletics, however, became increasingly challenging for all teams. The athletic department’s emphasis on winning influenced coaches to practice longer hours, play longer schedules, and hold higher expectations for their student-athletes. Student-athletes, who naturally wanted to win, often prioritized athletic over academic goals. They also needed to please their coaches if they wanted to retain their scholarships. While NCAA, conference, and member-institution decisions were made with football and men’s basketball in mind, their policies affected all student-athletes. When the NCAA membership voted to abandon minimum academic standards, big-time schools moved even further away from their educational missions.
As institutions expanded women’s sporting opportunities, the easiest way to develop the program was to mirror what the men enjoyed, like longer competitive schedules traveling greater distances to play the best teams, more publicity and televised games, expansive recruiting efforts to gain the best national and international talent, and world-class facilities. Women wanted to win, just like the men, but developing the program like the men brought the same challenges to protecting educational priorities and academic integrity. After the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) folded, women’s programs had until August 1, 1985 to come into full compliance with National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules and regulations. Many administrators and coaches were optimistic that NCAA governance and championships would provide even greater mechanisms for advancing women’s sporting opportunities. They were eager to participate in the Big Time.

Balancing academics and athletics represented the greatest challenge student-athletes faced in big-time college sports programs. Many student-athletes had grown up with parents, coaches, and teachers encouraging them to sacrifice everything to become the best in their sport. The local celebrity status many high school students experienced when they became athletic stars reinforced this mindset. The college recruiting process also reinforced the feeling that one possessed a special gift that the university would be fortunate to have. Athletic departments and coaches dependent upon winning pressured
student-athletes to focus an increasing amount of time on their athletic responsibilities, which threatened the academic performance of the athlete as well as the educational purpose of intercollegiate athletics.

NCAA legislative changes made this balancing act even harder to perform. The voting membership passed a series of rules which increased the power of coaches over athletes, removed educational protections, and reinforced that athletic performance mattered more than academic success. In 1968 and 1972, freshmen became eligible to compete immediately, first in non-revenue and then revenue sports. Freshman ineligibility allowed first-year college students to adjust to college and its more rigorous academic workload before they also had to worry about their performance on varsity teams. In 1969, a coach gained the authority to dismiss an athlete for failure to comply with team rules. Coaches interpreted this rule to mean they had the power to remove an athlete from their team for reasons as basic as personality conflict. If a coach felt an athlete was underperforming on the field, if an athlete became injured, or if the coach wanted to free up a scholarship for a star recruit, he could kick the athlete off the team. Four years later, member institutions voted to eliminate the four-year scholarship, replacing it with one-year renewable grant-in-aid. This rule, combined with the previous one, forced athletes to do everything they could to appease their coaches. A student-athlete could find out his scholarship had not been renewed and would no longer be able to afford to attend college if he did not do as the coach requested. The relationship between coach and athlete looked more like employer-employee than teacher-student by 1973.
Higher education became an increasingly diverse place after World War II, with the GI Bill and other initiatives to make college accessible for those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also required colleges and universities to open their doors to minority students. Not only did the makeup of student bodies undergo a dramatic transformation, college athletic teams diversified as coaches began to recruit more African American, Latino, and Pacific Islander athletes. Coaches broadened their search for the best talent and the revenue-producing sports of football and men’s basketball, as well as non-revenue track and field, sported increasingly diverse teams. Women of color participated on all intercollegiate teams as well, especially in the sports of basketball and track and field.

College sports scholar Michael Oriard understands the NCAA rules changes of the 1960s and 1970s as responding directly to the demographic changes on college teams. Young black and brown athletes often became involved in the social movements of the period, joining activist groups on campus and resisting the authority of their older, white coaches. Rather than encouraging these young men’s political engagement, many coaches looked for ways to force these young athletes to “get with the program” or remove them from the team.¹

Rule changes with the potential to make participation in intercollegiate athletics look less like an educational experience increased the need for the NCAA and member institutions to emphasize college sports as amateur. The association increased its enforcement of amateur policies because of the business growth of intercollegiate athletics. As athletic departments became increasing commercialized and
professionalized, the educational purpose could become compromised or at least harder to see. Emphasizing the amateur ideal in college sports became the most important way the NCAA and member institutions’ athletic departments could advertise their model of sport as educational. The NCAA’s amateur sports model became an important justification to retain college’s sports educational, tax-exempt status.\(^2\)

At the University of North Carolina, Athletic Directors Bill Cobey and later John Swofford helped their programs adjust to the Big Time and new NCAA rules. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women Frances Hogan helped women’s teams learn the practices of the men’s program during this time of professional, commercial, and legislative change. As a southern school, UNC coaches began to recruit African American athletes in larger numbers only in the 1970s, and especially in the revenue-producing sports of football and men’s basketball. Frances Hogan, however, was almost entirely silent on the subject of race. Her University of North Carolina records hardly ever mention the race of female athletes or efforts to increase diversity. She once filled out an AIAW survey on race in the early 1970s. She served as the department’s Equal Employment Opportunity Officer for a time, and in one review, stated that the diversity of the program was acceptable because one coach was of “Oriental” descent.\(^3\) That was the extent of her records on the subject of race in women’s intercollegiate athletics.

Hogan provided a vague response when Mary Jo Festle inquired about the racial make-up of the women’s program. In an interview in 1991, Festle asked when African American women began competing on Carolina teams. Hogan responded, “I really don't know. I guess it would be in basketball, but I cannot remember whether we had any. I
think when Jennifer Alley came, really, is when we started getting more blacks.” She continued,

We have had one or two in gymnastics, we've had one or two in volleyball. We've had a lot in track. We've had a lot of them in basketball, but I don't believe I've seen any in softball. There could be now. I don't know. And I haven't seen any in golf or swimming or tennis. But I have seen them in gymnastics. I haven't seen any in field hockey.

Hogan grew up in South Carolina in the 1920s and 1930s, and after a brief stint in Iowa during graduate school, lived in Chapel Hill for the rest of her life. This southern upbringing and life experience likely played a role in her lack of interest in black women’s athletics.

When women’s programs joined the NCAA, women’s coaches and directors had to become familiar with the association’s many policies regarding the amateurism of participants. While the AIAW had a code for student-athletes to comply with amateur principles, the NCAA held far more extensive rules regulating the amateur status of prospective and current student-athletes. Each fall at the beginning of the school year, the NCAA required all participants to read a pile of documents and sign the “National Collegiate Athletic Association Student-Athlete Statement” to confirm their eligibility to compete in good academic and amateur standing. The documents summarized NCAA rules as set forth in the most recent NCAA Manual and Constitution. After reading or listening to a presentation, freshman, transfer, and returning student-athletes signed to certify that “to the best of my knowledge I am eligible for athletic participation under these regulations and I was not recruited contrary to NCAA regulations by my institution or any representative of its athletic interests and I am not aware of any violations of
NCAA regulations involving me and my institution.\textsuperscript{6} Student-athletes also signed that they “understand that…I may jeopardize my eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics by falsely or erroneously signing the certification statement.” The athletic director and head coach also signed the form, which the home institution retained for a full calendar year after the “student-athlete’s eligibility for intercollegiate athletics under NCAA legislation is exhausted.”

A student-athlete quickly learned the NCAA cared far more about her amateur status than academic standing. On the twenty-five item list on the “Rules and Regulations Form Sheet,” twenty-three actions would ruin a college student’s amateur status, like accepting pay or the promise of pay, entering into an agreement to play professionally, trying out for a professional team, agreeing to representation by an individual or group interested in marketing the student’s athletic ability, and receiving compensation for the use of the student’s name or image in the advertisement of a commercial product.\textsuperscript{7} Other actions the NCAA prohibited less clearly related to the student’s amateur status, or at least why the action should make them ineligible. If a high school senior played in an all-star game “not certified in accordance with NCAA legislation” or played in more than two all-star games with NCAA certification, the athlete would no longer be eligible for intercollegiate athletics. A student-athlete could also lose eligibility for playing in “an organized competition” or summer league not approved by the NCAA. The only situation in which an athlete could compete for an amateur, “outside team” was during the Olympic Games. Only two of the twenty-five items dealt with academics, and they appeared far down on the list. An athlete would be
declared ineligible if she participated in intercollegiate athletics “while not in good academic standing or while not maintaining satisfactory progress toward a degree” or “while not enrolled in a minimum full-time program of studies.”

The NCAA forms also served to regulate the actions of member institutions during the recruitment process and to make sure schools did not provide their athletes with extra benefits while enrolled. Student-athletes confirmed that they never “received or realized from the institution or any representative of its athletic interests any special arrangements or extra benefits for the student or the student’s relatives or friends,” “received awards or similar mementos prohibited or in excess of those permitted,” or “realized expenses (excluding permissible expenses for athletic competition) from the institution or any representative of its athletic interests to travel for any personal purpose.” While completing their paperwork, student-athletes read an additional list of twenty-six items naming actions their schools were prohibited from taking during the recruiting process and their tenure on the school’s athletic team. When the papers were signed, student-athletes confirmed their amateur status and eligibility to compete.

The NCAA model of amateurism had always been unique. Nowhere else in the world did higher education generate revenue through sport. NCAA Bylaws state the “Principle of Amateurism”:

Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental, and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.
Students played sports not as a vocation, but an avocation, “a minor occupation” or “calling.” Coaches instructed students like other faculty members, and earned salaries for their teaching skills. Schools could enter contractual arrangements with corporate, radio, and television sponsors in order to fund the system which provided these unique educational experiences for student-athletes.

Amateur sporting philosophy developed in the 1860s in the United States, influenced heavily by British and French models. The amateur ideal emerged in opposition to the professional contests of working-class participants that increased in popularity after the Civil War. Higher education, with its elite origins and philosophy of paternalistic protection, became a natural place for amateur sport to develop. In *Amateurism in Sport*, British philosopher Lincoln Allison writes, “Amateurism may be variously considered to be about doing things for the love of them, doing them without reward or material gain or doing them unprofessionally. It is a development of the idea of the *amateur*, a French word primarily indicating action or consumption arising from taste rather than instrumental self-interest.”

Historian Steven Pope writes, “Nineteenth century amateurism was an ‘invented tradition’ created to draw class lines against the masses and to develop a new bourgeois leisure lifestyle as a badge of middle and upper class identity.” Elite young men learned the values of the “gentleman amateur,” which included “esprit de corps, self-control, dignity, tireless effort, fair play, and discipline.”

Nineteenth-century notions of amateurism created the tension “between the criteria of payment and the idea of loving or liking an activity (and doing it because you love it or like it),” writes Allison. The amateur must retain his innocence; financial
incentives taint and corrupt. Allison’s definition demonstrates the centrality of this purity: “a human activity is amateur in so far as it is chosen in order to enrich experience and that choice is not coerced by economic or social forces.”15 After all, he explains, “The concept of amateurism is the product of a society… which aspires in varying degrees to the conflicting models of commercialism and professionalism. It is thus a reaction, an ‘other,’ or at least a critical complement to the main forces of society.”16 As higher education democratized, and the business of intercollegiate athletics grew, the NCAA and member institutions adapted amateur codes to emphasize the educational purpose of sporting activities.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the NCAA and member institutions heightened their efforts to police amateurism because of major changes taking place in the United States and globally. The largest amateur organization in the world, the Olympic movement, began to move away from amateurism in 1973 at a meeting in Varna, Bulgaria. The “apostle of amateurism,” Avery Brundage, had just ended his reign as International Olympic Committee (IOC) president, and leaders embarked on a major transformation of the Olympic Games. Western countries advocated for change because their teams struggled to compete against communist and socialist countries with state-sponsored Olympic development programs. Athletes wanted to be able to make a living playing their sports because the quality of competition had improved to the point in which training for the Games had required the labor of a full-time job. Olympic Congresses in Varna (1973) and Baden-Baden (1981) dealt the final blow to the amateur ideal. For the first time in Olympic governance, the athletes themselves played a leading
role in the meetings and voiced their foremost concern to be the end of amateurism. The IOC allowed International Sports Federations to make decisions on professional participation, and the gradual phasing of amateurism out of the Olympic Charter began.\textsuperscript{17} The Congress in Baden-Baden, Germany also paved the way for the creation of the IOC Athletes' Commission, recognizing the permanent place of athlete participation in IOC decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{18} With the Olympic Movement’s abandonment of the amateur ideal, the NCAA’s collegiate sports model represented the largest remaining amateur sporting institution in the world.

The context of athlete discontent which instigated change at the international level also transformed the Olympic Movement in the United States when Congress became involved in amateur sports. NCAA leadership watched closely and perceived a very real threat that the organization also might lose control of collegiate athletics because the legislative branch of the federal government held the power to regulate sports. In 1978, Congress passed the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, which stripped the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) of its authority over the American Olympic Movement and created the United States Olympic Committee and new national governing bodies for each sport.\textsuperscript{19} If Congress could intervene to take away the AAU’s control, the legislative body could take similar action with the NCAA if enough members believed the commercial interests of athletic departments had displaced the educational purpose of intercollegiate athletics. Congress also could remove the tax-exempt status the association and member institutions enjoyed. The NCAA’s enforcement of amateurism
and the educational purpose of intercollegiate athletics had become more important than ever.

Administrators and coaches of women’s programs transitioned to the NCAA during this time when the association and member institutions reaffirmed amateur principles while committing to business growth. The association and affiliated conferences encouraged women’s athletic officials to learn about NCAA rules and regulations from the men in their departments. As member institutions in the Atlantic Coast Conference transitioned to NCAA rules in the summer of 1982, the conference reminded women’s administrators that men’s programs “should serve as a model for women’s athletic programs.” Women’s administrators and coaches also could attend one of four regional meetings in the summer of 1982 to learn more about NCAA rules and regulations as their programs transitioned. Ruth Berkey, assistant executive director and director of women’s championships, oversaw the meetings and mailed helpful information to Primary Women’s Administrators (PWAs), the association’s official name for women’s athletic directors.

In addition to championship and grant-in-aid information, the majority of documents explained recruiting policies, eligibility and transfer rules, and NCAA amateurism. The AIAW’s many rules restricting recruitment helped coaches of women’s teams, many of whom were part-time, spend less time finding top talent and more time coaching and teaching physical education classes. Whereas AIAW leaders saw
recruitment as corrupting its notions of amateurism and opening the door to professionalism, NCAA leaders attempted to control the practice they perceived as inevitable. Athletic departments employed more coaches of men’s teams in full-time positions, and coaches who had time to recruit would work hard to create the best teams. Their schools incentivized them to do so, because better recruits made better teams, which meant coaches could keep their jobs.

For coaches of combined men’s and women’s teams, the move to NCAA rules simplified their professional lives; for coaches of women’s teams, they learned they needed to take on more responsibilities if they wanted to remain competitive. Underemployed, underpaid coaches of underfunded teams could learn about men’s recruiting practices, but could not fully adopt them. Many coaches of women’s teams remained employed part-time by the athletic department, and women’s operating budgets continued to represent only a fraction of men’s team budgets. Recruiting began to take up much more time. After the completion of the high school student’s junior year, coaches could begin making contacts by telephone and also in person. A coach could visit a prospect up to six times, if three of the contacts took place with permission at the prospect’s school.22 If the school did not provide the coach with a car, or if a coach needed to recruit out of state to remain competitive, in sports like field hockey and fast-pitch softball, she would need to decide how badly she wanted a recruit or appeal to the department for better funding.23

NCAA recruiting rules forced coaches of Carolina women’s teams to devote much more time to recruiting, if they wanted to remain competitive and stay employed.
Those who did not have the time or resources requested more support. UNC head basketball coach Jennifer Alley reported to Hogan that full-time assistant coach Mike Peckham traveled on 28 recruiting trips during the 1984-85 academic year, while part-time assistant coach Carol Almond performed 9 home visits and Alley did just one.24 Alley and Peckham, as full-time employees, made an easier transition to men’s coaches’ practices. New part-time head volleyball coach Peg Bradley-Doppes, however, struggled to find the time for recruiting. Like many part-time coaches of women’s teams, Bradley-Doppes also taught physical education classes. In her end-of-year report to Hogan, she requested the school reduce her teaching load, because “at this time it is very difficult to recruit because of class load responsibilities.”25 Coaches who could not spend adequate time on recruiting feared they could lose their jobs. If they did not recruit, they would lose the battles for top prospects to other schools, and would end up with less talented teams more likely to lose. Winning mattered in the men’s athletic model, and as the men’s and women’s program administration aligned, women’s coaches found they were evaluated increasingly based on the standards of the men’s program.

Carolina sports with the potential to generate revenue adapted more quickly to the men’s model and enjoyed more support from the athletic department in their effort. When Sylvia Hatchell replaced Jennifer Alley as head basketball coach in 1986, she established a number of new policies to further professionalize her coaching staff.26 She obtained a “recruiting car” for her assistant coach, held press conferences after every home game, and organized a supporting booster club for the team. In her end-of-year report, she requested a press hospitality room, “a definite Athletic Department
commitment to Cheerleader and Pep Band support in all post-season competition,” and a “block of good seats at men’s games for coaches, recruits, and players.” Anson Dorrance, coach of the best soccer program in the country, gained a new building alongside Fetzer Field to house coaches’ offices and locker rooms, obtained a full-time assistant coach, conducted numerous television interviews to discuss his successful teams, and traveled out of state for the vast majority of the team’s away games.

While some successful teams enjoyed fuller support, other winning teams still struggled with the athletic department for access to facilities, larger operational budgets, and more grants-in-aid. The field hockey team’s battles with the marching band for practice space, tracing back to the early 1970s, continued in 1986. Head coach Karen Shelton, an Olympic gold medalist as a player and the coach of teams that regularly finished in the top ten nationally, became frustrated by departmental neglect. For three years in a row, she requested that the department reschedule the marching band practice location and time. She wrote,

> It remains a firm recommendation that an alternate facility be secured for the Tar Heel Marching Band. Currently the Field Hockey team must practice on T-TH at 7:30-10:00 PM due to conflicts with band practice. It is not necessary for the band to use the astro turf, just convenient. I find that the FH practice time on these days are not conducive to optimum performance in the classroom for our student-athletes. In addition, I feel this can lead to a potentially dangerous situation to these young women as they walk home so late at night. Please consider addressing this matter before someone is injured.

Shelton made her arguments based on the education and safety of her players; as a non-revenue team with no potential to become a revenue generator, the team’s request was unsuccessful.
Softball coach Donna Papa had a similar experience and shared Shelton’s frustrations. She complained that her team received the least amount of funding among all Carolina teams, “with the possible exception of fencing.” Papa wrote in her end-of-year report that it was “very difficult to be successful or achieve goals in my career and my program here at UNC within these confining parameters.” With only three total scholarships and an operating budget of less than $10,000, Papa expressed concern that her team was “falling very far behind other South Region schools and nationally.” She argued her job was “going to become increasingly more difficult to compete and be competitive at this level.” Coaches who wanted to keep their jobs needed to demonstrate to their superiors that their teams were winning; when teams lost, no matter their inadequate funding or inability to generate revenue, coaches lost their jobs.

Coaches of women’s teams also learned that NCAA policies regarding academic standards for admission and financial aid were much softer than those of the AIAW. The AIAW had required student-athletes represent the greater student body; student-athletes had to meet the same admissions requirements set by the school’s board of trustees as other students. In order to qualify for financial aid, student-athletes under NCAA rules only needed to obtain a “special admit” from the admissions office. Women’s coaches found they no longer had to find student-athletes who could compete academically with the average Carolina student; they could recruit based on athletic talent alone and work with the admissions office to have the student accepted to the university.
In Chapel Hill, while Frances Hogan and women’s coaches adapted to NCAA admissions and academic policies, they found institutional procedures in flux. In the fall of 1981, new Chancellor Christopher C. Fordham commissioned a special committee and requested a study of student-athlete academics to address perceived problem areas and make recommendations. An expanded academic support center also launched for the 1981-82 academic year. In a letter to head coaches, the center’s director, Paul Hoolahan, emphasized the importance of the effort:

As we enjoy more success in our overall program, it is increasingly important that we continue to pay careful and strict attention to academic affairs. We can never overemphasize the need to be vigilant in monitoring our student athletes’ academic progress. The academic integrity of our program must continue to be our number one priority.

The department acted with an increased sense of urgency because of an academic scandal which took place at another state university in the region.

At the University of Georgia, remedial English teacher Jan Kemp sued the university after her contract was not renewed for the 1982-83 academic year, claiming that her attempt to bring attention to the preferential treatment of student-athletes led to her dismissal. Kemp became the first “whistleblower” in college sports, detailing how she had been instructed to ask professors to change grades and reporting that the vice president for Academic Affairs promoted nine failing football players from remedial to regular curriculum to maintain their eligibility. Kemp also secretly recorded the head of the remedial program, who stated, “These kids would not be here if it were not for their utility to the institution. They are used as a kind of raw material.” Kemp won the lawsuit, and one year later the university declared 23 football and men’s basketball
players academically ineligible. Georgia’s academic structure for athletes was representative of universities with big-time programs, and mirrored the system in place in Chapel Hill. If a scandal erupted at a nearby public university, Chapel Hill had the potential for similar problems, too.36

Chancellor Fordham’s special committee looked at admissions, registration procedures, academic performance, administrative processes, and academic support structures. In the admissions of student-athletes, the committee found three areas of potential problem. First, some student-athletes had been admitted without official high school transcripts on file. Second, a subcommittee specifically designated for athletics, chaired by Dick Baddour, suggested special treatment and admissions procedures for student-athletes not reflective of the general student body. This practice also created the “possibility of non-admission of a signed athlete” because a coach could assume the subcommittee would admit a star recruit and offer a scholarship with a letter of intent before the subcommittee made its final decision.37 Third, the committee found that the number of spaces allocated for the “exceptional category” had increased considerably in recent years. The admissions office always had made exceptions for “noncompetitive students,” if they possessed a special talent, came from an established family, or exhibited unique and desirable traits. The committee’s expressed concern, however, that admitting too many noncompetitive students would create problems because a higher percentage might become academically ineligible. The group recommended changes in all three areas to make the admission of student-athletes more reflective of the general student body.
With regard to registration procedures, the committee discovered two areas in which student-athletes received preferred treatment and extra effort to keep them in good standing. Incoming freshman enjoyed “favored treatment” and gained entry to desired classes more frequently than regular students. The committee also found a disproportionately high percentage of athletes enrolled in “90 series courses” and that many had come close to losing academic eligibility. This was worrisome, because it appeared athletic officials had engineered this solution and worked with selected professors who would create independent study classes to help inflate struggling athletes’ grades. 38

The committee found differences in the academic performance of student-athletes when compared with the general student body, and male athletes compared with female athletes. Student-athletes tended to declare certain majors more than others and had a lower graduation rate than their peers. Popular majors included Recreation; Radio, Television, and Motion Pictures (RTVMP); Business Administration; and Industrial Relations. 39 Male athletes tended to cluster in these majors more than female athletes; however, female athletes tended to group in these majors more than the general student body. Male athletes also graduated less frequently than female athletes. The committee reviewed graduation data for grant-in-aid men’s non-revenue and women’s sports, as well as the men’s basketball team. A review of the men’s basketball team from 1970-76 revealed a graduation rate lower than the student body. 40 Of the 40 basketball players enrolled, only 24, or 60 percent graduated from Carolina. While one student transferred, those in the remaining group were either academically ineligible (9) or left school by
“personal withdrawal” (6). Even if the transfer student and those who left on their own volition ended up graduating from a different school, the 22.5 percent of basketball players who ended up academically ineligible represented a serious problem. The percentage of men’s non-revenue scholarship athletes who ended up academically ineligible during the same time period mirrored the rate of basketball players. Of the 287 total scholarship recipients, 63, or 22 percent, left school academically ineligible. Female scholarship athletes rarely struggled academically; of the 116 women who earned athletic grants-in-aid in the 1970s, only 4 became academically ineligible, a rate of 3.5 percent. The academic performance problems existent in the men’s program had not appeared in the women’s program with the introduction of athletic scholarships. As the women’s program transitioned to NCAA rules and regulations, Hogan and her coaches needed to be aware of potential academic problems.

The committee disliked that the school conducted eligibility reviews on an annual basis, wishing to see them done every semester. One practice was applauded by the committee; student-athletes in poor academic standing could only restore their eligibility by taking classes at UNC and could not transfer hours in from another institution. Administrative processes and academic support structures had fewer issues; however, the committee recommended better coordination with academic counselors in Arts and Sciences and the General College. Academic counselors in athletics should not make final decisions on recommended classes. They also disliked the way in which some coaches interacted with the professors of athletes enrolled in their classes.
To conclude the report, the committee expressed concerns about the school’s academic policies for athletes and suggested the issues described had the potential to create public relations problems. The group recommended the Faculty Council on Athletics take more responsibility for the admission and education of student-athletes. What Jan Kemp exposed in Athens, Georgia should never happen in Chapel Hill.

In response to the large number of academically ineligible student-athletes, the athletic department expanded its study hall program, originally created for football, to serve all student-athletes beginning in the 1981-82 academic year. The department hired an additional academic counselor, Charles Waddell, to work with athletes not on the football team. Waddell also took over the responsibility from head coaches to contact professors concerning underperforming student-athletes. Hoolahan wrote to head coaches, “Please be aware that many members of the faculty have mixed feelings about being contacted by coaches checking the progress of their athletes. Some professors regard this as an intrusion and possibly a violation of student academic confidentiality.” He reassured coaches that professors would view Waddell’s intervention “as a function of his job.”

Athletic officials also wanted to control who student-athletes sought for academic help. In another memo to head coaches, Hoolahan wrote,

I urge you to be extremely cautious about your GIA [grant-in-aid] athletes using tutors outside the study hall program. In particular, I am talking about people who approach your athletes offering their services free of charge. We have had particularly disturbing problems develop as a result of tutorial arrangements being made between student-athletes and questionable individuals.
The athletic department provided academic support services, including tutoring and study hall, in order to eliminate the possibility of cheating. Athletic officials did realize that academic cheating could occur within its structured program, however, they perceived the threat from overzealous coaches rather than academic tutors and support staff. Hoolahan warned coaches to tread cautiously when dealing with academic support staff and faculty advisors:

I would urge you to be extremely careful in your dealings with faculty advisers. We have been fortunate to have established good relations with several of these people. We do not want to jeopardize these relationships by placing any of these people in a compromising situation. We are duty bound as representatives of this University to follow to the letter of the law the policy and procedures set forth by the administration.47

The experience of the Carolina student-athlete looked significantly different from that of a regular student by the 1980s. Athletes lived and ate meals with other student-athletes in Ehringhaus Hall, clustered in majors, and studied together at their own academic support center. The Athletic Department Study Hall primarily served struggling student-athletes; however, the program now encouraged all student-athletes to visit the center regularly. Students earning less than a 2.0 grade point average had mandatory study hall, and other students were pushed to study there and seek additional services, which included “instructional programs; academic advisement; counseling; vocational and career planning and active monitoring of academic records and grades.”48

The solution at Carolina to possible academic fraud was to separate out student-athletes from the general student body, and to have counselors on the athletic department payroll provide academic services.
The athletic department established other policies to decrease academic ineligibility. Student-athletes were encouraged to take “one less course than the normal load” during the semester in which their sport was in season.49 A departmental manual on academics noted, “It is particularly advisable for entering freshmen athletes with marginal academic achievement or ability (with respect to other UNC-CH freshmen) to take four courses plus required physical education.” Another extra measure taken for Carolina student-athletes involved an additional meeting during orientation to go over the school’s honor code for those on grant-in-aid. In a special eligibility meet, history professor Willis Brooks and English professor George Lensing spoke to freshmen and transfers about the honor code, representing the second time incoming student-athletes heard about its importance.50

Preliminary results of the expanded support services suggested that the programs worked to improve student-athlete academic success. Mid-term GPAs for students who attended study hall in the fall of 1981 improved. Only one group’s average remained below 2.00, the two seniors on the women’s volleyball team.51 On the whole, women’s teams continued to excel in the classroom, which did not go unnoticed. Journalism professor and faculty athletic committee member Carol Reuss congratulated Hogan on the large number of female student-athletes who made the Dean’s List each semester, which required a minimum of a 3.0 GPA. Reuss wrote, “I just read [Faculty Athletic Representative] Ben Wilcox’s report to the Faculty Council and am impressed with what I read. I must comment, too, that like Avis, women athletes must be trying hard – they surpassed by far the record of the men athletes.”52 Although women’s teams performed
well in the classroom, the Faculty Athletic Council continued to hold concerns about the educational integrity of UNC’s intercollegiate athletics program.

The Faculty Athletic Council placed the blame with the structure of intercollegiate athletics rather than with academically unprepared or struggling student-athletes. The group organized a panel discussion on academics in college sports. John Swofford, faculty athletic representative Ben Wilcox, Title IX officer Susan Ehringhaus, and “two other professors” fielded questions from the audience. Hogan reported to her head coaches that students and citizens who attended the event wanted to learn more about what structures the school would put in place to allow student-athletes more time to devote to their education. She relayed, “Among the questions, those that drew the most concern centered around the number of contests in a sport’s season; the classes being missed because of practices and unofficial scrimmage type games; passing student-athletes in a course when they miss weeks of classes, etc.” Public awareness of the struggle student-athletes faced to balance academic and athletic responsibilities had grown.

Hogan urged her coaches to remember to place students’ academics before the team. She wrote, “I think that you should, as coaches, make every effort to think of the student-athletes as STUDENTS first – as I feel you already do.” She took advantage of the opportunity to “re-emphasize some points” about how to better attend to academic concerns. First and foremost, Hogan asserted, “Be aware and show interest of your student’s academic progress – keep up with their academic records, and schedule conferences with those students on your team who are doing poorly in the classroom.
Recognize students that are doing well.” Coaches who saw themselves as educators and felt the academic success of their athletes to be one of their primary responsibilities would make it easier for them to perform well in the classroom. She also advised coaches to turn in away game travel lists to deans as soon as possible, recommend study hall to struggling students, and always be familiar with current academic requirements to maintain eligibility. Hogan encouraged coaches to set a higher standard than the minimum eligibility requirements because they “did not suggest acceptable academic performance, but rather the absolute minimum levels.”

In response to growing criticism that student-athletes traveled too much, played too many games, and missed too many classes, the university instituted new policies. Hogan related four steps that had been taken to reduce the amount of time student-athletes had to miss class, and encouraged coaches to follow the new policies closely. Schedules had to be approved by Hogan before they became official, and Hogan would determine if teams spent too much time on the road. Away games could only be scheduled with teams east of the Mississippi River. If a coach wanted to play a western school, the new non-revenue sports administrative committee would have to grant approval. No longer could contests take place during exams, unless they were ACC or NCAA championship events. Finally, student-athletes could only miss class for regular season competition; the department would stop excusing athletes for practice or scrimmages.

To assert more control over athletics, the school now required that coaches document in their annual reports the number of classes missed, the time and length of
practices, the length of the regular season, and the number of competitive events
scheduled per week. In 1983-84, the field hockey team practiced for at least 2 hours, 6
days per week, for 17 weeks, and played 20 games. The softball team practiced for 30
weeks, often at least 5 days per week, for a minimum of 2 hours, and played 40 games. Both teams also met with an athletic performance coach in the weight room 2-3 days per
week. That year, members of the women’s track and field team missed up to 11 days of
class. Even with the new regulations in place, the amount of time student-athletes spent
practicing and competing and the number of missed class days remained high.

In the fall of 1983 the academic support center issued a new mission statement to
reassure faculty and the public that the structure in place at UNC assisted student-athletes
in their effort to achieve on the field and in the classroom. The statement began:

It is our goal to develop confidence and a positive attitude toward academic
achievement in the student-athletes we serve. We can best hope to achieve this
goal through our efforts to encourage excellence and self-confidence in each
individual’s performance. Our aim is to effectively challenge individuals to strive
toward reaching their full potential now as a student and in the future as an
individual. It is our responsibility to establish a solid foundation of skills for each
individual necessary to achieve success on the University level. Confidence
comes from a sincere belief in one’s own abilities: before we can establish
confidence, we must instill in the individual the belief that they can achieve.

In reaction to the recent academic scandals in intercollegiate athletics, the statement
emphasized that tutors were teachers, and would never perform the work of student-
athletes:

The tutor’s role is to serve as a teaching-resource person. Tutors should take an
active role in directing students in examination preparation, study skills, and
organization of time and materials for study. Tutors do not perform work for
student-athletes. The student-athlete is responsible for completing his own
assignments and readings. In assisting students with revisions of papers, tutors
should be very conscious of not ‘rewriting’ sentences which may be awkward.
Students who have problems with syntax, agreement, grammar, punctuation, etc., should receive instruction to help eliminate future errors.

The statement concluded by emphasizing the importance the center placed on academic integrity and the honor of the university: “The credibility of our academic program in the eyes of the University rests upon the manner in which the tutors carry out their responsibilities. The principles of honesty and integrity are the basis on which we must serve in assisting any student-athlete.” Carolina took steps to ensure its athletic program remained educational. By separating the academic support for student-athletes from the general student body, however, student-athlete experiences remained significantly different from the regular student’s higher education experience.

The University of North Carolina’s admissions policies had been under scrutiny for another reason in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The state had failed to establish an adequate affirmative action policy, and critics noted the growing number of academically-underperforming African American athletes admitted while academically-achieving African American students failed to gain entry. On February 16, 1970 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the same department responsible for Title IX, informed North Carolina and nine other states that they had been determined not in compliance with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The law required schools to establish mechanisms to increase minority employment and diversify the student body. Eight months later the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP filed suit against HEW in the United States District Court in Washington, D.C., alleging that HEW had failed to begin
enforcement proceedings established by the Civil Rights Act against the ten states.\textsuperscript{63} Federal judge John A. Pratt agreed with the NAACP, but upon appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals no longer required HEW to start the proceedings. Instead, the court required the states to establish acceptable desegregation plans, with an enforcement deadline set for June 1, 1974.\textsuperscript{64} The following years saw North Carolina plans submitted and rejected by HEW, accepted by HEW but successfully contested in court by the NAACP, and rejected again by HEW. As of July 17, 1983, the UNC Affirmative Action Committee continued to revise its plan for the school to establish compliance.\textsuperscript{65}

While the state struggled to establish an acceptable desegregation plan, UNC’s Faculty Advisory Committee, which reported to the chancellor, considered a scathing criticism by H. Bentley Renwick, assistant dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. Renwick charged that the university held loose admissions standards for athletes while it rejected qualified African American applicants. Renwick published an article in \textit{The Chapel Hill Newspaper} and as a member of the school’s Committee on the Status of Minorities and the Disadvantaged, submitted a resolution to Chancellor Taylor in September, 1978. Renwick criticized the university’s creation of special admissions slots that were not used for African Americans and questioned the school’s commitment to increase black undergraduate enrollment. Taylor responded on November 2, 1978 that the Faculty Advisory Committee, chaired by Professor Charles Long, would “investigate the current situation regarding the admission policy of the University and the more general problems of the admissions process and administration.”\textsuperscript{66}
The committee included in its final report the history of the school’s efforts to increase minority enrollment, which began in 1968. The Faculty Council commissioned an ad hoc committee, chaired by Dickson Phillips, Dean of the Law School, “to study what was being done to recruit black students and to make the University a desirable environment for their education; and to make recommendations on policies and actions… to increase black enrollment and to serve black students better.” The committee found in 1968 the school had 107 undergraduate, 148 graduate, and 6 professional students in the schools of law and medicine. They had difficulty tabulating their numbers because the university did not keep official statistics on student demographics. They determined, however, that black students made up “less than 1.5 percent of the total enrollment in Chapel Hill.” This contrasted with the 24 percent of African Americans living in the state in 1968. The Phillips committee concluded that “no special admission policies favorable to Negroes” existed at the undergraduate or graduate level at UNC. In an attempt to rationalize the lack of effort to increase minority enrollment, the committee noted, “The University should take into account the open-door policy of the public community colleges, which admit all high school graduates regardless of their achievement level and provide remedial programs as needed.” As part of the broader state network of colleges and junior colleges, the committee argued, Chapel Hill did not need to make as much effort as other schools with softer academic standards. The Phillips committee did suggest some changes in policy, recommending the Office of Admissions and the Office of Student Aid each hire an African American specialist to recruit and assist African Americans who might be interested in attending the university.
Based on the Phillips committee’s recommendations, UNC increased funding for African American students throughout the 1970s. In 1972-73, the school administered more than $2 million in federal funds, with black students receiving 25 percent, while representing only 4.5 percent of the student body. In 1975, the state appropriated funds for the “Minority Presence Scholarship Program,” and in 1977-78, black students received funding from the James M. Johnston Awards Program and 13 black students earned the prestigious Morehead Scholarship. Twenty black students received Pogue scholarships, the School of Dentistry provided free tuition for all black North Carolina residents, and funding programs were established to increase enrollment in graduate and professional schools.69

In response to the Phillips committee report, the Faculty Council also recommended the school grant admission to a group of African American students who met the Board of Trustees baseline standards for admission but were not competitive compared to the general student body. For the 1970-71 academic year, Carolina began an “experiment with a ‘high-risk’ probationary admissions program,” admitting “50 non-competitive but eligible” black students who met the requirements of a minimum SAT score of 800 and 1.6 predicted grade point average (PGA).70 Two years later, the Board of Trustees increased this number to 200, where it remained until 1978. The chancellor’s advisory committee found that “about half of the in-state black applicants admitted fall in the category of special admissions.” The committee recommended that no in-state black applicant be “denied admission without review by the Undergraduate Admissions Committee.”
While scholarship numbers for black students improved over the ten-year period, they paled in comparison to the number of scholarships available to Carolina student-athletes. By 1977-78, The Educational Foundation awarded more than $2 million in athletic grants-in-aid. The school also had done more to admit noncompetitive, ineligible athletes than noncompetitive, eligible black students during the 1970s. The Board of Trustees, in response to new ACC and NCAA policies which allowed schools to make exceptions to the 1.6 college PGA or 2.0 high school GPA, enacted the following policy:

Applicants who do not satisfy the objective criteria of a PGA of 1.6 and/or SAT scores of 800 but who possess special aptitudes and talents may be granted admission on a selective basis. Each such admission must be reviewed and recommended by the Admissions Committee before the applicant may be assured of his acceptance.\(^{71}\)

UNC admitted 53 in-state and 44 out-of-state students under the new “special aptitude or talent” provision in 1974 and 1975. Of the in-state students, 23 percent were white athletes, 30 percent were black athletes, and 47 percent were regular black students. Only one out-of-state student, a white musician, was not an athlete; 23 were white athletes and 20 were black athletes. Chancellor Taylor ruled after the admissions of 1974 and 1975 that “race was not to be counted as a ‘special aptitude or talent,’” and the school stopped admitting ineligible black students with the provision.\(^{72}\) These students needed to be athletes in order to gain admission.

The “special aptitude or talent” of an athlete who did not meet the Board of Trustees’ requirements for admission proved more valuable to the university than increasing the enrollment of black students on campus. The percentage of black student-athletes within the black student population was disproportionately higher than white
athletes within the white population. UNC valued black athletes more than black students. The language employed to describe the two categories of admission also signaled the school’s reluctance to admit black students. Noncompetitive eligible black students were admitted on an “experimental, high-risk, probationary” basis; noncompetitive ineligible athletes possessed a “special talent or aptitude” and were simply granted admission.

On June 12, 1979, the Faculty Advisory Committee responded to Dean Renwick’s accusations, declaring that the school had taken considerable measures to increase black enrollment. While only 107 undergraduate black students attended the university in 1968, 946 attended in 1978, and the school admitted 410 in-state and 25 out-of-state freshman undergraduates that year. The committee stated its satisfaction with this level of expansion. The group also disagreed with Renwick that the special admission slots used for athletes should be employed to admit more black students. The committee asserted:

Dean Renwick argues that if the U is committed to the increase of black enrollment, then the profile of the least qualified student among those admitted under the category of ‘special talent’ (especially athletes) should be taken as a definition of minimal qualification and should be used as a basis for the admission of any black student with the same or better credentials….This Committee does not accept Dean Renwick’s interpretation of minimal qualification.73

Although the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare expressed concerns with the state of North Carolina’s desegregation plan, the Faculty Advisory Committee at the University of North Carolina believed the school had implemented sufficient policies to increase black enrollment.
When compared with the liberal admissions policies of athletes, however, the committee believed the university demonstrated it could do much more to increase the number of black students on campus. The report stated,

For whatever reason, the University has committed itself to excellence in its competitive athletic programs. Once this commitment was made, the University was able to find the right rubrics, criteria, monies, etc., to carry out this goal in a manner which, if not consistent with, is at least satisfying to its image and prestige as a distinguished University. Nothing so singularly effective has emerged from the language of commitment regarding the increase of black students in the University.  

While acknowledging that funding for athletics came largely from private sources and ticket sales, the committee asserted, “Still, it would appear that a very strong commitment to the admission of larger numbers of blacks to the University should result in a greater allocation of funds to that end that has so far not been the case.”

Renwick’s attempt to increase black enrollment resulted in a different outcome; he exposed the overuse of “special talent” slots for ineligible student-athletes. The Faculty Advisory Committee had been unaware and did not approve of the university’s “use of the ‘special talent’ provision primarily as a device for admitting athletes with dubious academic qualifications.” The report continued,

The Committee questions whether such admissions are consistent with the aims and goals of this University; in any case, criteria for admissions defined by the controversial issue of the admission of athletes should not and cannot become the norm for the admission of any other body of students to this U. The entire matter of special admissions for a wide variety of special talents deserves further study.

Chancellor Taylor listened to the Faculty Advisory Committee, ordering the athletic department to limit the number of special admits.
In the 1970s the athletic department had strengthened its relationship with some members of the Office of Undergraduate Admissions. Associate Athletic Director Moyer Smith and Assistant Athletic Director John Swofford worked closely with Richard “Dick” Baddour in the admissions office to increase the number of student-athletes admitted under the “special talent” provision. Over the two-year period in 1974 and 1975, 71 athletes had been admitted this way, and in 1976, 38 ineligible athletes gained admission. Not all admissions officers agreed with the policy, and that year the Committee on Undergraduate Admissions nearly revolted. Dean J.R. Gaskin warned Cobey,

Yesterday I saw the Committee come very close to denying admission to several of Coach Dooley’s nominees for admission. It ended up approving their admission only on condition that at once we begin jointly trying to work out a procedure for coming to effective agreement on the problem of admitting students whose records are qualitatively poor and who are finishing high school with serious subject-matter deficiencies.

One of these football athletes who gained admission scored 200 on the verbal portion of the SAT, the score one earns simply by showing up, and was deficient by two courses in both mathematics and language. The Dean of Undergraduate Admissions asked Richard Cashwell and Dick Baddour “to begin talks with you and with appropriate members of the football staff; when this group has one or more schemes for consideration.” This way Cashwell and Baddour would be better prepared to convince other members of the admissions committee that the exceptions were warranted. Gaskin assured Cobey, “I am instructed by the Committee to emphasize their will to work with you and the coaches,” and “the Committee, I am convinced, is willing to be helpful.”
The admissions committee could help academically troubled student-athletes gain entry to the university; however, they could not control whether the athletes would remain academically eligible once they entered school. From 1973 to 1978, the committee had worked with the athletic department to admit 49 ineligible football players for their “special talent.” Only 15, or 30 percent, did not become academically ineligible.

While the athletic department sought to gain admission for talented athletes with less consideration of academic credentials, faculty and admissions officers pushed back to make sure admitted athletes were representative of the broader student body. In 1981, the Committee on Undergraduate Admissions revised the school’s “Policy on the Admission of Athletes” to limit the number of special admit slots. Only 8 ineligible student-athletes could be admitted each year. The committee also restricted the number of noncompetitive eligible student-athletes to 20. Furthermore, the future existence of the program was not guaranteed. The group warned, “The graduation rate of student athletes admitted under the special exception rule of the Trustee policy will be the basis for future decisions on applicants not meeting Trustee minimum requirements… [and] the basis in which continuation of this special policy will be considered.”

UNC had entered the top 20 academic public universities in the nation by this time, and faculty, administrators, and staff were motivated to continue the school’s climb up the rankings.

Like male student-athletes, female student-athletes benefited from loosened admissions standards. This policy began in 1975 after Carolina adopted athletic grants-in-aid for women and the Atlantic Coast Conference began considering the
commencement of women’s championships. Athletic Director Bill Cobey and Undergraduate Admissions Director Richard Cashwell determined the women’s program would receive a total of 14 in-state slots and 19 out-of-state slots for noncompetitive eligible student-athletes. They allocated the slots to the sports in which the ACC was most likely to host championships: basketball, swimming, volleyball, tennis, golf, and field hockey. When the athletic department and admissions office began to admit ineligible students based on “special talent,” they allocated the spaces in three groups—football, men’s basketball, and “other,” for men’s and women’s non-revenue sports. Women’s coaches could request one of the spots, and Hogan would relay the request to the athletic director who would make the final decision. When Cobey asked Hogan for the women’s program’s requests for slots, he wrote, “Hopefully, we will not need any of these spaces, but if history repeats itself, we will.” In the competition for top athletic talent, women’s coaches were willing to admit academically questionable student-athletes, too.

Even when schools sought to institute more rigorous academic standards or limit special admissions, member institutions and conferences became forced to conform to NCAA standards. A change in NCAA admissions policies stimulated the loosening of standards in Chapel Hill; member institutions voted to drop the 1.6 PGA minimum requirement for the 1973-74 school year. For the next thirteen years, from 1973 until 1986, the NCAA held virtually no academic standards, with the combination of removing
the 1.6 rule and permitting special admits for talented athletes. The absence of standards within the NCAA caused problems for affiliated conferences attempting to establish more strenuous academic requirements. The Atlantic Coast Conference attempted to retain its 1.6 PGA and 800 SAT minimum standards after the 1.6 rule had been removed. After two Clemson football players sued the ACC, the conference conformed to the NCAA’s lower academic requirements.85

Reformers did attempt to change NCAA policies, but their efforts to raise academic standards met criticism from African American coaches and advocates for African American student-athletes. Much like Renwick’s argument that all black students should be considered for admission at Chapel Hill, some black members of the NCAA believed lower academic standards benefited black athletes and did not want the policy changed. At the 1983 NCAA Convention in San Diego, Division I member institutions passed Proposal No. 48, legislation sponsored by both the NCAA Council and the American Council on Education (ACE), the organization which represents university presidents. Schools could no longer grant exceptions for student-athletes who did not meet academic requirements for their “special talent.” Prop 48 defined a “qualifier” as “one who at the time of graduation from high school presented an accumulative minimum grade-point average of 2.000 (based on a maximum of 4.000) in a core curriculum of at least 11 academic courses,” and a minimum SAT score of 700 or ACT score of 15.86 The courses “must include three years in English, two in mathematics, two in social science and two in natural or physical science (including at least one laboratory class, if offered by the high school) as certified on the high school transcript or by official
correspondence.” The NCAA Council determined “the two additional years of academic courses required by Proposal No. 48 must be courses attempted in English, mathematics, social science, natural or physical science, foreign language, computer science or speech.”

From 1973 until 1986, when Proposal No. 48 went into effect, the NCAA held no minimum academic standards and schools admitted more black athletes than ever before. Historically black colleges and universities had been enrolling athletes for a century, but the large number of African American athletes on most other college campuses was new.87 A study by Richard Lapchick found that during the thirteen-year period, more than 20 percent of football and men’s basketball players were special admits in NCAA Division I-A schools, while special admits made up less than 3 percent of the schools’ student bodies.88 Of those athletes, more than 50 percent of the football players and 40 percent of basketball players were African Americans. Schools, including those which HEW required to desegregate to comply with the Civil Rights Act, increased diversity through athletics rather than academics.

Freshman ineligibility, an NCAA rule for more than 70 years, could have helped student-athletes who underperformed in high school adjust to college before they also had to learn how to balance academics and athletics. NCAA membership voted to eliminate freshman ineligibility, however, in 1968 for non-revenue sports and 1972 for football and basketball. Academically “high-risk” black athletes excelled in football and men’s basketball, the two sports colleges relied on for revenue generation. As the amount of potential money increased from television and commercial contracts, and the gap
between the winners and losers during the 1970s economic recession widened, many schools willingly admitted athletically talented, academically challenged African American athletes. In response to academic scandals, NCAA reformers chose not to return to freshman ineligibility and instead strengthened minimal requirements for admission, relying on standardized test scores and grade point averages.

The University of North Carolina attempted to provide a solution to the problem of low academic standards coupled with the absence of freshman ineligibility. Athletic Director John Swofford sponsored legislation for review at the 1982 NCAA Convention that would allow institutions to provide grants-in-aid to incoming freshmen for the summer before their first year on campus. Swofford believed “this would be an excellent academic situation for the young student-athlete.” Bringing in students to begin taking classes before the fall could have solved some of the problems institutions faced when underprepared student-athletes arrived on campus and struggled to balance college coursework with participation on a big-time sports team. Carolina’s effort, however, was defeated by the NCAA voting membership.

Accusations of racial discrimination immediately followed the passage of Proposal No. 48, because standardized tests had been exposed to hold racial and cultural biases which favored white students and hurt black and other minority students. In response, the NCAA introduced the “partial qualifier.” A student who met only one of the two requirements, a 2.000 GPA or a 700 SAT/15 ACT test score, could attend school on scholarship, but would have to redshirt the freshman year. In 1989, when the NCAA removed grant-in-aid for partial qualifiers with the passage of Proposal No. 42, the
opposition grew louder. Georgetown University basketball coach John Thompson and Temple University basketball coach John Chaney, the most prominent critics of the legislation, threatened to boycott the NCAA tournament. Some African American leaders, like Sociologist Harry Edwards, tennis icon Arthur Ashe, and NCAA President James Frank, however, disagreed with this argument because the bar was set so low.

The situation in Chapel Hill demonstrated the problem resided with higher education in general, not just the NCAA. University leaders valued athletic talent more than academic achievement, especially with respect to African American North Carolinians. They worked much harder to help black athletes gain admission than black students, even after federal government intervention. They also created new structures to help athletes remain academically eligible. Assisted by a national trend of grade inflation, the Carolina student-athlete could work with tutors, attend study hall, and meet with special athletic academic counselors to keep their grades up. Counselors encouraged the high-risk student-athlete to take courses with certain professors, select an easier major, or simply take general college courses as long as possible, what became known as “majoring in eligibility.”

The University of North Carolina willingly made academic sacrifices in order to win in big-time college sports. Although the faculty fought back, the athletic department, under Cobey and later Swofford, created a system to keep talented athletes academically eligible. The university needed these athletes to win so that it could continue to generate
revenue. Then athletics could improve facilities, pay top coaches more, and spend more to lure star prospects to come play for Carolina. The focus on money lowered academic standards which helped bring in more money. The Big Time threatened not only the educational purpose of intercollegiate athletics, but the very integrity of higher education. Women’s programs joined the NCAA during this time of incredible change in academic standards as well as the makeup of college sports teams. Female student-athletes, white and black, continued to perform much better in the classroom than male student-athletes, in both revenue and non-revenue sports, throughout the 1980s. They also enjoyed significantly higher graduation rates. The change from AIAW to NCAA rules, coupled with the merging of men’s and women’s program administration in most schools, however, exposed women’s teams to the same structures and practices as men’s teams. With the increased emphasis placed on winning, female coaches and athletes became tempted to prioritize athletics over academics as well.
By the end of the 1980s, big-time college sports reached a low point. More than half of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I-A institutions, 57 out of 106, “were censured, sanctioned or put on probation” during the decade. Graduation rates were abysmal; out of 100 big-time universities, 35 basketball and 14 football programs graduated less than 20 percent of their student-athletes. The greatest scandal of the era, involving the Southern Methodist University football team, included illicit payments and extra benefits, academic cheating, and drug abuse. The tentacles of the SMU scandal extended to the athletic director, university president, and even a former governor of the state of Texas. The business interests of big-time sports programs had thrown the tenuous balance between academic and athletic priorities off kilter. College sports had spun out of control.

In 1989, the Knight Foundation’s chair, James L. Knight, and many board trustees believed they needed to tackle the problem of intercollegiate athletics. The members of the organization committed to “informed and engaged communities” worried that “athletic abuses threatened the very integrity of higher education.” The trustees liked college sports; however, they wanted to return “sanity” to the system after the growth of the Big Time and the scandals of the 1980s. The public also had lost confidence in not just intercollegiate athletics, but higher education as well. Knight Foundation President Creed C. Black noted that “eight out of ten Americans questioned in a Louis Harris poll
in 1989 agreed that intercollegiate athletics had gotten out of control, that the athletics programs were being corrupted by big money, and that the many cases of serious rules violations had undermined the traditional role of universities as places where young people learn ethics and integrity. How could colleges continue to be beacons of the highest values of society if they condoned cheating in their athletics programs?

Higher education was losing grasp of its educational mission because of the power of big-time college sports. Black cited a *Time* cover story published at the time which found that not only did many student-athletes believe the schools’ promise of an education to be a “sham,” but that schools “participate in an educational travesty—a farce that devalues every degree and denigrates the mission of higher education.” Sports should not exist in their own bubble, separate from every other department on campus. The athletic department, part of the university and its many educational divisions, needed to work more closely with academic units on the campus, and its officials needed to think of themselves as educational leaders first and business operatives second. If athletic officials failed to operate from a fundamental position as educators, scandals, like those which plagued the 1980s, were more likely to occur. Athletics had become an entertainment industry with business decisions focused on the bottom line. *Time* summarized these issues, “an obsession with winning and moneymaking…is pervading the noblest ideas of both sports and education in America.”

The Knight Foundation board created the Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics on October 19, 1989 and charged it to propose a “new model of intercollegiate athletics.” William C. Friday and Father Theodore M. Hesburgh agreed to co-chair the
commission. Both men had been longtime university presidents; Friday headed the University of North Carolina system from 1956 until 1986, and Hesburgh was president of the University of Notre Dame from 1952 until 1987. They had taken pride in their institutions’ successful balancing of big-time sports and academic programs which consistently ranked among the top universities in the nation. Friday and Hesburgh believed, however, that new factors had made “the demanding task of monitoring college sports…all the more difficult.”

They named “the perception that ethical behavior in the larger society has broken down, the public’s insistence on winning local teams, and the growth of television combined with the demand for sports programming” as the three main problems. They continued, “The public appears ready to believe that many institutions achieve goals not through the honest effort but through equivocation, not by hard work and sacrifice but by hook or by crook. If the public’s perception is correct, both the educational aims of athletics and the institutions’ integrity are called into question.” After studying the problem for almost two years, Friday and Hesburgh declared, “Following decades of presidential neglect and institutional indifference, big-time college sports were ‘out of control.’”

University chief executive officers held the key to fixing intercollegiate athletics, Presidents Friday and Hesburgh believed. The Knight Commission proposed a reform agenda they called “the ‘one-plus-three’ model”: “presidential control directed toward academic integrity, financial integrity and independent certification.” Friday and Hesburgh were troubled by the displacement of educational priorities by business interests in athletic departments. They declared their fundamental interest to be “the
place of athletics on our campuses and the imperative to place the well-being of student-athletes at the forefront of our concerns.” Presidential control would restore integrity and educational priorities to intercollegiate athletics. The commission asserted, “[Our] bedrock conviction is that university presidents are the key to successful reform. They must be in charge—and be understood to be in charge—on campuses, in conferences and in the decision-making councils of the NCAA.”

On the principle of academic integrity, the commission asserted, “Cutting academic corners in order to admit athletes will not be tolerated. Student-athletes will not be admitted unless they are likely, in the judgment of academic officials, to graduate. Junior college transfers will be given no leeway in fulfilling eligibility requirements.” They recommended that institutions regularly evaluate the admissions process, academic progress, and graduation rates of student-athletes; all three areas should be similar to those of other students on campus. On the principle of financial integrity, the commission declared,

Athletic departments will not operate as independent subsidiaries of the university. All funds raised and spent for athletics will go through the university’s central financial controls and will subject to the same oversight and scrutiny…. Athletic foundations and booster clubs will not be permitted to provide support for athletic programs outside the administration’s direct control.

The commission also wished presidents to control the practice of outside funding to coaches and administrators from commercial contracts, “including shoe and equipment contracts.” Finally, the group sought to reduce the pressure on revenue-producing sports to fund the entire athletic program. They believed institutional funds should be directed
to athletic programs because the institutional oversight involved would encourage
responsible spending and would “affirm the legitimate role of athletics on campus.”

The Knight Commission wanted to restore the proper relationship between the
student-athlete and the university. The university should serve the student-athlete’s
educational, athletic, and developmental needs. No longer should the intercollegiate
athletics system use student-athletes, particularly those in football and men’s basketball,
to serve the university’s needs. They concluded,

The reforms proposed above are designed to strengthen the bonds that connect
student, sport and higher learning. Student-athletes should compete successfully
in the classroom as well as on the playing field and, insofar as possible, should be
indistinguishable from other undergraduates. All athletes—men or women,
majority or minority, in revenue-producing and non-revenue sports—should be
treated equitably.

In response to the Knight Commission report as well as legislative proposals from
the American Council on Education and a number of NCAA special committees, member
institutions of the NCAA voted to establish a Presidents’ Commission at the 1994 NCAA
Convention. The NCAA Council asserted, “An organized, national structure would
provide a means for chief executive officers to exercise more effective leadership in
maintaining the proper relationships between athletic programs and other institutional
responsibilities and programs.” At the same time, however, the council refused to
admit its organization’s policies contributed to academic and financial corruption. The
group continued, “Current NCAA rules and procedures provide necessary controls on
institutional ambitions and outside pressures. Any alterations in the present structure
should be designed to strengthen that control and the accompanying inspection
procedures, particularly at a time of increased rewards for success in athletics.” The
Presidents’ Commission did not overhaul the NCAA structure to better serve institutions’ educational missions, but the magnitude of academic scandal did decrease. With more CEO control at the national level, and a reassertion of authority at the institutional level, intercollegiate athletics experienced a return to sanity.

The Knight Commission’s primary motivation was not to reform the NCAA in a top-down manner, but for presidents to work within their institutions to change the nature of intercollegiate athletics on the individual campus and reform intercollegiate athletics from below. The structure of intercollegiate athletics on the individual campus, however, did not fundamentally change after the Knight Commission report. Admissions officers continued to help academically struggling, talented athletes gain admission, and academic specialists in the athletic department continued to assist underperforming student-athletes in maintaining their eligibility.

Equally problematic, the money in intercollegiate athletics continued to grow at an escalating rate. In 2009, twenty years after the Knight Commission began its study, the top 50 programs were spending annually more than $50 million dollars, with the top 3 programs, the University of Texas at Austin, The Ohio State University, and the University of Florida, at more than $100 million. In order to spend that much money, universities needed to raise at least that much money, and the pressure to win became stronger than ever. The reason the public may access these numbers is Title IX, and more specifically, the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act of 1994. The law requires institutions of higher education to “prepare an annual report to the Department of Education on athletic participation, staffing, and revenues and expenses, by men's and women's
teams.”¹⁸ The law also requires the department to present an annual report to Congress “on gender equity in intercollegiate athletics.”

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill athletic department took pride in its ability to keep academic and athletic responsibilities in balance as the business of the program expanded. UNC ranked twenty-first on the list of top university expenditures in 2009, spending $70 million dollars.¹⁹ By the first decade of the twenty-first century, Carolina teams continued to finish in the top 25 nationally, and the program won or placed in the top 10 of the National Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics (NACDA) Directors’ Cup nearly every year after the award’s establishment in 1993.²⁰ Student-athletes took pride in “the Carolina way,” practicing hard, competing hard, and studying hard to be the best on the field and in the classroom at one of the nation’s best public universities. Female student-athletes in particular excelled on the field and in the classroom.

This image of Carolina athletics began to fracture in 2011, when a Raleigh News & Observer reporter followed a tip provided by a North Carolina State University fan that a UNC basketball player plagiarized a short, poorly-written paper that earned him a high grade. Dan Kane spent the next four years establishing the link between the Department of African and Afro-American Studies, the athletic department, and no-show classes with papers graded by an administrative assistant to help athletes maintain their eligibility.²¹
At the same time Kane worked to expose the depths of academic fraud at UNC, civil rights historian Taylor Branch taught at the university as a visiting professor in the 2011-2012 academic year. Branch discovered that UNC coaches had instructed their athletes, many of them African American, not to take his classes. That coaches, presumed to be educators, kept their athletes from learning from a prominent civil rights scholar horrified Branch. This experience inspired him to publish “The Shame of College Sports” in The Atlantic, a book entitled The Cartel: Inside the Rise and Imminent Fall of the NCAA, and a film based on the book. The Atlantic article especially helped to bring national attention to the problems of big-time college sports. Branch also testified before a Senate Commerce Subcommittee hearing on intercollegiate athletics in the summer of 2014.

Although the university initially denied the athletic department’s involvement in the scandal, a thorough investigation exposed that student-athletes made up nearly half of the students enrolled in the fraudulent classes and athletic department officials were complicit. The Wainstein Report revealed a system created by Deborah Crowder and Julius Nyang’oro, the manager and department chair of the African and Afro-American Studies (AFAM) program, and facilitated by officials of the Academic Support Program for Student-Athletes. Academic counselors enrolled struggling student-athletes in upper division AFAM independent studies classes. Later, when the practice fell under criticism from the Faculty Council, they changed the course number for the classes to make them appear as regular lecture classes; however, classes never met and students simply turned in a paper at the end of the semester, graded by Crowder. The classes were
intended to help student-athletes retain their eligibility to play. The scandal in Chapel Hill began in 1993, the same year the Knight Foundation Commission, with former UNC President Friday as co-chair, completed its study into intercollegiate athletics.

The parallel timing of the UNC academic scandal and Knight Commission reports demonstrates that the tension between academics and athletics at the heart of intercollegiate athletics will always remain if the business of big-time college sports stays intact, no matter how many reforms are instituted. Over an 18-year period, from 1993 until 2011, more than 3,000 students took the fraudulent classes; 48 percent were student-athletes, and most were directed to take the classes by athletic academic counselors.\(^\text{24}\) Kenneth Wainstein’s investigative team reviewed 150 papers written for the class, finding the majority contained significant amounts of plagiarized material.\(^\text{25}\)

Although football and men’s basketball players made up the majority of the student-athletes enrolled in the classes, student-athletes who played other sports took the classes, too, a number of whom were female. In early 2015, former UNC women’s basketball player Rashanda McCants and former football player Devon Ramsay sued the University of North Carolina and the NCAA, accusing them of academic fraud.\(^\text{26}\) Their lawyer, Michael Hausfeld, recently won an antitrust lawsuit over the use of players’ names, images, and likenesses by the video game company EA Sports and the NCAA.\(^\text{27}\) The UNC suit represents the academic complement to the previous case’s attack on NCAA amateurism. Hausfeld is seeking class-action status; similar academic fraud, though not as extensive as that which took place at UNC, has happened on many big-time campuses.
The UNC academic scandal and the McCants-Ramsay lawsuit demonstrate the problems of big-time college sports affect student-athletes from all teams, revenue and non-revenue, male and female. Female college athletes have enjoyed the dramatic expansion in opportunity since the passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the merging of men’s and women’s programs under one athletic department roof, and the move from the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women to the NCAA. Women’s teams enjoy state-of-the-art facilities, professional coaching, travel to compete with the best teams in the nation, seemingly limitless training and competition gear, and publicized and televised events. The pressure to win, the professionalized and commercialized athletic department, and the business of college sports, however, has placed female student-athletes in the same vulnerable position, attempting to balance academic and athletic responsibilities, as male student-athletes in the Big Time.

On the eve of retirement, Frances Hogan, long-time UNC Women’s Athletic Director, had become concerned by the Big Time. She recommended the athletic department review and set limitations for the “length of schedules in each sport, number of classes missed in each sport, number of contests in each sport, length of seasons, and off-season schedules.” Hogan left the university before student-athletes began enrolling in fraudulent classes, and she died in 2009, before the scandal broke.

Frances Hogan retired from the athletic department in the summer of 1985. She had served the university for 40 years. Under her tenure, the women’s athletic program
transformed from extramural play to big-time college sports. Hogan did not leave the university without sharing her opinion of where her program needed to go after her retirement. She shared a detailed list of recommendations with Athletic Director John Swofford and the woman who would replace her, Beth Miller.\textsuperscript{29} She still demanded more seats at the decision-making table for female administrators. She wanted a greater voice for the Primary Women’s Administrator (PWA) within the Atlantic Coast Conference and the NCAA, recommending a meeting of the Faculty Athletic Representative, Athletic Director, and PWA before every ACC and NCAA meeting. She wished to see a woman hired by the ACC to be in charge of non-revenue sports, and more women serving on ACC committees. The Carmichael Cup, the competition among ACC men’s teams awarded to the best overall program, needed to include women’s teams. Hogan also continued to push the Sports Information Office to do more to publicize women’s sports, noting “women’s sports brochures need to be more comparable to the men’s” and “parents have complained.”\textsuperscript{30}

Hogan worked until her very last day on campus to provide the best athletic and academic opportunities for her female student-athletes on the campus of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Thousands of women spanning the four decades of her employment, as well as the thousands of Carolina female student-athletes ever since, have her to thank for their collegiate athletic careers.
REFERENCES

NOTES

CHAPTER 1


2 The University was also segregated until 1951, when black students first attended the medical and law schools. The four students who took summer classes at the law school were Floyd McKissick, Harvey Beech, J. Kenneth Lee, and James Robert Walker, Jr. In 1955, LeRoy Benjamin Frasier, Jr., Ralph Frasier, and John Lewis Brandons became the first African American students enrolled as first-year undergraduates. American Indians began attending UNC before African Americans; Henry Owl, Cherokee, earned a Master’s degree in 1929, although he, like other Native Americans, remained disenfranchised in the state until after World War II. Hortense McClintock, the first black faculty member, joined the School of Social Work in 1966. UNC remained almost entirely white until the early 1970s, when the Justice Department found the school to be in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See Chapter 7. L. J. Toler, “Carolina To Celebrate 50 Years of African-American Students,” Carolina News Services, http://www.unc.edu/news/archives/nov01/bsm112601.htm; and “The University of the People,” The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Spotlights, http://www.unc.edu/spotlight/the-university-of-the-people/.

3 “Women’s History @ UNC,” Southern Oral History Project.

4 “Women’s History @ UNC,” Southern Oral History Project.


In the early twentieth century, men enjoyed games in which they could prove their manliness. Football was much more popular than basketball among young men, even on “Tobacco Road.” The rules of basketball differed greatly for men and women in the first five decades of the game. The rules severely restricted women’s movement; half the team stayed on the offensive side of the court and only played offense, while the other half stayed on the defensive side and only played defense. Women defended “femininely” and respectfully, giving the offensive player plenty of room to see and pass the ball. Women could not run with the ball; they could only pass and shoot. In later decades, before the women adopted the “regular” men’s rules, players could take only two steps before they had to pick up their dribble and pass to a teammate or shoot.

7 See Chapters 6 and 7. Although some colleges’ boosters had been subsidizing athletes’ cost of attendance for years, this fundraising system could not contribute openly to scholarship dollars until 1956, when the National Collegiate Athletic Association enacted new legislation permitting four-year grant-in-aid based on athletic ability. University Archives, Collection Number 40093: Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records, 1919-1997, Finding Aid, http://www2.lib.unc.edu/mss/uars/ead/40093.html.

8 Fink earned her B.S. and M.A. degrees from The Ohio State University. WAA Handbook, 1951-1952, Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

9 Interview with Frances Hogan, May 23, 1991, and June 3, 1991. Hogan did indeed earn her M.A. from Iowa in 1946, and she attended Winthrop College in Rock Hill, South Carolina as an undergraduate, completing her B.S. in 1943. She was born in 1922, grew up in Sumter, South Carolina, and died in her home in Chapel Hill in 2009. Frances Burns Hogan was married to George Pickard Hogan for fifty-nine years; she and George had two children, Alwin and Frances.

10 WAA Handbook, 1951-1952, University Archives.


The term “M.R.S. degree” suggested the primary motivation driving women to attend college was to find a husband, not to pursue higher learning or earn a degree to embark on a career.

15 WAA Handbook, 1951-1952, University Archives.

16 Script from 1959 WAA Awards Picnic, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

17 Frances Hogan stepped away from her role as faculty advisor from the fall of 1950 through the spring of 1953 to raise her young children. Doris Hutchinson took over as faculty advisor to the WAA during Hogan’s absence. Interview with Frances Hogan, May 23, 1991, and June 3, 1991.

18 Women’s Athletic Association Handbook, 1951-52, University Archives.

19 The WAA awarded trophies, plaques, or medallions to individual and team sport intramurals champions, and presented awards to “Outstanding Seniors” and “Outstanding WAA Representatives” each year. Constitution of the Women’s Athletic Association, Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

20 Handwritten Notes from W.A.A. Meeting [about Sept 19, 1953 Play Day], Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

21 Carolyn Johnson, “Evaluation of Play Day- Saturday, Sept. 19, 1953, Women’s Orientation,” Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

22 WAA Handbook, 1952-53, Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

23 WAA Handbook, 1953-54, Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

24 WAA Handbook, 1951-52, Box 8, University Archives.

25 For example, she noted that although 313 copies of the WAA Handbook had been mailed before the start of the school year, more than previous years, another 38 new
female students still did not receive the Handbook by mail. She asked for a budget increase for the following year, noting the inadequacy of the $25.98 budget for stamps, postcards, mimeograph paper, and stencils. “Request from Women’s Physical Education Department,” Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

26 Memo to All Intramural Managers, Re: W.A.A. Announcements for Winter Quarter, Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

27 The budget had expanded to include door prizes, including “a sport shirt and an exercise kit for boys, and a record album and shirt for the girls.” “Co-Rec Relay Carnival is Great Success,” Jerry Garrison, Daily Tar Heel [1958], Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

28 University of North Carolina Intramural Department, Women’s Athletic Association: Outline of the Organization for the Annual Co-Recreational Sports Carnival, Tuesday, March 3, 1953, Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

29 The same rules applied to mixed badminton. Co-Recreational Volleyball, 1958, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

30 Suggested Carnival Games, [1953], Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

31 Sports Carnival Mixed Relay Instructions, [1953], Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

32 “Co-Rec Swimming Relays, Thursday, May 12, 1958, 7:00 P.M., Bowman Gray Pool,” Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

33 ARFCW SPORTLIGHT, Vol. 43, No. 1 (December 1958), Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

34 ARFCW SPORTLIGHT, Vol. 43, No. 1 (December 1958), University Archives.
35 Women’s Athletic Association Handbook, 1951-52, University Archives.

36 Numbers included “Park Avenue Fancy, We’ve Got Manhattan, Chinatown, Slaughter on Tenth Avenue, Radio City- The Rockettes, Madison Square- The Circus, Sophisticated Lady (solo),” and a Finale featuring all twenty-four women. Program: “Manhattan Merry Go Round”: U.N.C. Splash Club, Bowman Gray Pool, May 12, 1953, 8:00 P.M., Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

37 Women’s Athletic Association Handbook, 1954-55, Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

38 Jerry Garrison, “Better than 50% Play Intramurals at UNC,” Daily Tar Heel [1958], Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

39 Report of the Salaried Intramural Manager Program, February 10, 1964, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


42 Report of the Salaried Intramural Manager Program, February 10, 1964, Box 9, University Archives.

43 Pamela Grundy’s Learning to Win: Sports, Education, and Social Change in Twentieth-Century North Carolina explains beautifully the importance of this value system and its role in the development of athletics for men in North Carolina and the “New South.”

44 The WAA submitted the most descriptive budget request, most other organization simply requested “operational fees.” The WAA requested 145.00, with 105.00 approved in the following breakdown: “Postage, Telephone, Telegraph (10.00); Travel to Schools (20.00); ARFCW Dues (10.00); NCARFCW Dues (3.00); Delegates Registration and Fees (5.00); Orientation Carnival Booth and Open House (10.00); Miscellaneous (27.00); Dorm Posters and Publicity (0.00); Awards Program (20.00).” Fifteen dollars for publicity came out of a separate publicity budget line. A Bill to Provide the Student Government Budget for the 1963-1964 Fiscal Year, Box 9, in the Department of
Singles and doubles tennis consisted of single match play, until the semifinals and finals in which the game lengthened to the best two of three matches. Volleyball games involved two fifteen-minute halves with five minutes of rest between play, and hockey had two twelve-minute halves. Basketball games lasted a bit longer, because the clock paused with stoppage of play, and consisted of four five-minute quarters. In the early 1950s, five innings made up softball games, but by the 1960s, the WAA shortened intramural games to four innings, reflecting students’ desire for shorter play.
The program’s ten events included 25-yard races for freestyle, backstroke, breaststroke, and butterfly; a 50-yard freestyle race; two 100-yard relay races (freestyle and a medley featuring the four strokes); and the form events, in which one competitor would swim all three form events of “front crawl, back crawl, and breast stroke.”

Swimming Meet, Monday, April 1, 1968, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

1968 Awards, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Constitution of the Women’s Intramural Association of the University of North Carolina (adopted November 5, 1973), Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Athletic and Recreational Federation of College Women Brochure, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

From 1917 until 1933 the organization was named the Athletic Council of American College Women, and from 1933 until 1947 the organization’s name was the Athletic Federation of College Women. In 1947 at the national conference held in North Carolina, the organization settled on its final name, the Athletic and Recreational Federation of College Women. For the purpose of consistency, this paper will use the name ARFCW to refer to the organization, regardless of year.

DGWS was a subdivision of AAHPER and both organizations were also affiliated with the National Education Association (NEA). DGWS’s office was within the NEA offices in Washington, D.C. during the 1950s and 1960s. ARFCW SPORTLIGHT, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1963), Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Athletic and Recreational Federation of College Women Brochure, University Archives.
Every school in North Carolina belonging to the ARFCW, with the exception of UNC-Chapel Hill, named its organization “Women’s Recreational Association.” That UNC had the only “Women’s Athletic Association” was fitting, considering the school’s history of focusing on the development of competitive opportunities. Mailing List of North Carolina Schools, and Record of Attendance at NCARFCW Convention, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

ARFCW schools which attended the conference: Duke, Queens, UNCG, High Point, Peace, Mars Hill, Elon, UNCH, Atlantic Christian College, North Carolina Wesleyan, Agricultural and Technical College, Salem College, and East Carolina College. Schools without ARFCW membership which attended the conference: St. Mary’s, St. Andrew’s, and Wake Forest College. Schools with ARFCW membership which planned to attend but failed to appear: Appalachian State Teachers College, Statesville College, Sacred Heart Junior College, and Mitchell College. Record of Attendance at NCARFCW Convention, University Archives.

Delegates who attended the convention, including the banquet, paid $2.25, 50 cents for registration and $1.75 for the dinner in Lenoir Hall. NCARFCW Convention Program, November 22, 1963, UNC, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Summary Report of the Convention of the NCARFCW, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

ARFCW SPORTLIGHT, Vol. 43, No. 1 (December 1958), Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Eastern Region delegates elected East Carolina College as host school in the spring and Duke University in the fall for their 1964 Sports Days. Summary Report of the Convention of the NCARFCW, University Archives.

Summary Report of the Convention of the NCARFCW, University Archives.

Letter from WAA members of A&T College to Faculty Advisors of NCARFCW, February 20, 1964, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

President’s Report and Recommendations for the W.A.A. 1963-64, Karen Nelson, University Archives.
For example, the Alderman dormitory team absolutely dominated the 1959 intramural basketball tournament, beating Kenan dorm by 30 points and Delta Delta Delta sorority by an incredible 89 points. The team they met in the final, McIver dormitory, also won its early round games by large margins. Alderman defeated McIver by 19 points to win the tournament. The Daily Tar Heel published articles written and submitted by the WAA Publicity Officer covering the exploits of the Alderman team. With titles like “Alderman Amazons Continue to Roll,” and content like “the Alderman Amazons…smashed Tri Delt 112-23,” the WAA cheered on the talented team and celebrated in their victories. “Alderman Amazons Continue to Roll,” Daily Tar Heel (February 22, 1959); “W.A.A. Basketball,” Daily Tar Heel (March 1, 1959); and “Amazons Blast McIver 91-72 for Campus Basketball Crown,” Daily Tar Heel (March 13, 1959); Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

ARFCW SPORTLIGHT, Vol. 43, No. 1 (December 1958), University Archives.

Letter from Faye Harris, President, NCARFCW, Greensboro College, President School, to Faculty Advisers, Women’s Athletic Association, North Carolina Colleges, October 23, 1958, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

96 Tennis Club, [1954], Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
97 W.A.A. Council Meeting Minutes, March 23, 1954, and W.A.A. Council April Meeting Minutes, Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
98 WAA Reporter, 1954, Box 8, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
99 The Tripartite Committee was made up of three organizations: ARFCW, the National Association for Physical Education for College Women (NAPECW), and the National Association for Girls’ and Women’s Sport (NAGWS). Open to undergraduate women students from any college and university in the United States, the 1958 Tournament was held at Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa; other colleges which had served as host included Woman’s College of UNC, Ohio State University, Purdue University, University of Illinois, and Lake Forest College.
100 Hanson was especially accomplished, the top performer in the Ladies Professional Golf Association in 1958, with winnings of $12,639.55. “Women Golf Professionals will give Free Lessons Here Next Week,” Daily Tar Heel [1959], Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
101 Tennis Day Informational Sheet, [1959], Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
102 “Annual Women’s Tennis Day will be held this Saturday,” Daily Tar Heel [1959]; and “Co-ed Tennis Day,” Daily Tar Heel [1959], Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
Letter from Woman’s College Tennis Club to Frances Hogan, Tennis Club Advisor, April 26, 1959, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Hogan’s instructions mailed to teams before the tournament recommended that players wear tradition tennis whites. Seventh Annual Women’s Invitational Tennis Day, UNCC, April 25, 1964, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

“Hey Boys! Girls Will Play Tennis Here Saturday,” Daily Tar Heel [1964], Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Jean Evans of Queens, who won the singles tournament in 1967 and 1968, was the National Junior Tennis Tournament champion in 1963 and ranked 5th in the nation in the 16-and-under category in 1962. Laura DuPont of UNC Greensboro, the runner-up in 1968, was ranked 14th in the nation for women 18 and under. 11th Annual Invitational Tennis Day, April 27, 1968, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Frances Hogan to Miss Ruth Eddy, Department of Physical Education for Women, Duke University, May 1, 1959, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


“N.C. Mermaids Finish Third,” Daily Tar Heel [1963], Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Ann E. Lankford, Florida State University (Racquettes Sponsor and P.E. Dept) to Frances Hogan, November 21, 1963, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Nanellen Lane, Mississippi State College for Women (Columbus, MS), November 1963, Box 9, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
CHAPTER 2

1 See chapter 5.

2 Job Analysis for North Carolina State Sports Chairmen, DGWS, Revised January, 1968, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

3 Guidelines for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women in North Carolina, NCARFCW, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Constitution of the North Carolina Organization for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Constitution of the North Carolina Organization for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women, University Archives.

Constitution of the North Carolina Organization for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women, University Archives.

Memo from Frances Hogan to Coaches, October 25, 1974, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

North Carolinians refer to all forms of soda as “coke.” When you order a Coke in the state, you are then asked, “What type of coke? Pepsi, Mountain Dew, root beer, etc.”

NCAIAW Policies and Procedures, c.1971, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

NCAIAW Policies and Procedures, c.1971, University Archives.

NCAIAW Policies and Procedures, c.1971, University Archives.

NCAIAW Policies and Procedures, c.1971, University Archives.

Although no black colleges were charter members of NCAIAW or AIAW, Pembroke State University, originally named Croatan Normal School, and later UNC-Pembroke, the first and only state-supported college for Native Americans (Lumbees, to be specific), joined as an initial member in 1971. St. Mary’s College held associate membership in 1971-72; they could participate in competition with the exception of state tournaments, and they did not hold voting power at meetings. Member Institutions of NCAIAW, 1971-1972, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

North Carolina Central College (later renamed NCC University) was the first black college to join the NCAIAW and AIAW, with associate member status, in 1972.

NCAIAW General Session Minutes, April 23, 1972, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
Before the AIAW split into three divisions of competitive play, the more popular sports, like basketball and volleyball, organized two national championships, one for small schools and one for large schools. Schools that played in the small college division had to have a female student enrollment of less than 3000. Minutes of the Region II Delegate Assembly, March 28, 1980, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Active membership cost $10.00 and associate membership cost $5.00 in 1974-75. Seventy schools held active membership and three schools held associate membership that year. Southern Region II Budget (1974-75), Approved June, 1974, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


Revised DGWS Scholarship Statement, *AIAW Handbook of Policies and Operating Procedures*, 1972-73, p. 27, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Revised DGWS Scholarship Statement, University Archives.

Revised DGWS Scholarship Statement, University Archives.

New Interim Regulations, effective April 2, 1973, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

One-year renewable grants-in-aid look a lot more like employment contracts than four-year grants, because coaches could take away a scholarship based solely on athletic performance. A student-athlete could find out his scholarship had not been renewed for a wide variety of reasons beyond inadequate performance on the field including injury or illness, to make space for a star recruit coming out of high school, or simply because of a personality conflict. A student with a 4.0 GPA who excelled everywhere at the university but Saturdays on the field could find out his scholarship had not been renewed, and sometimes as late as the month before classes started in the fall. Only in 2014 did the most powerful conferences of Division I of the NCAA pass rules to ban one-year scholarships and return to four-year grant-in-aid, thanks to pressure from current and former student-athletes and especially Kain Colter, quarterback of the 2013-2014 nationally-ranked Northwestern University Wildcats. For the best brief history of the NCAA’s fluid amateurism and financial aid policies, see Allen Sack and Andrew Zimbalist, “Thoughts on Amateurism, the O’Bannon Case, and the Viability of College Sport,” The Drake Group, 2013, [http://thedrakegroup.org/2013/04/10/drake-group-report-obannon-amateurism-and-the-viability-of-college-sport/](http://thedrakegroup.org/2013/04/10/drake-group-report-obannon-amateurism-and-the-viability-of-college-sport/).

New Interim Regulations, University Archives.
32 AIAW Regulations for the Awarding of Financial Aid to Student Athletes, Fall 1974, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

33 Summary of Minutes of AIAW Region II Executive Board Meeting, June 7-9, 1974, Greensboro, NC, McGee-Hilton Inn, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


35 Frances Hogan, “1984-85,” Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

36 Letter from Barbara Yarborough to Betty Westmoreland, NCAIAW President, April 17, 1974 Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

37 Letter from Lucy Lowder to Dr. Carl Blyth, April 17, 1974, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

38 Letter from Ferebee Taylor to Judy Clarke, June 24, 1974, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

39 Letter from Judy Clarke to Ferebee Taylor, October 17, 1974, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

40 Letter from Ferebee Taylor to Judy Clarke, December 20, 1974, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

41 Letter from Judy Clarke to Ferebee Taylor, January 23, 1975, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

42 Letter from Lucy Lowder to Frances Hogan, November 7, 1974, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
For example, the Atlantic Coast Conference held stricter academic eligibility rules than other conferences in its region, including the Southern Conference, Southeastern
Conference, and the Sun Belt Conference. In addition, the group of colleges eventually known as the Ivy League were members of Division I, but voted to reject financial aid based on athletic performance, an action with diverged from national policy.

57 NCAA Memo from James Frank, January 31, 1980, University Archives.

58 Sport Participation Data, [1975-76], Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

59 In 1979 UNC added women’s soccer, bringing the total number of women’s sports to 13, the most in the state and region.

60 Southern Region II AIAW Membership Application, 1976-77, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

61 AIAW 1976-77 Schedule of National Championships, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

62 Memo to Southern Region II Voting Representatives from Mary Roland Griffin, Re: Assorted Items, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

63 The AIAW appointed Sharon King its first student-athlete Executive Board member.

64 Region II Newsletter No. 3, January 26, 1979, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

65 Minutes, Southern Region II Delegate Assembly, March 28, 1981, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

66 Ying Wushanley’s *Playing Nice and Losing: The Struggle for Control of Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics, 1960-2000* covers this issue well.

CHAPTER 3

1 Although Senator John Tower of Texas authorized the best known attempt to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title IX, other senators and congressmen submitted bills with the same goal, like James O’Hara, congressional representative from Michigan.
Margot Polivy found O’Hara’s bill to pose more of a threat than Tower’s, because it required the money earned from revenue-producing sports to be spent on the sports that earned the money first, a clever way to obtain what would amount to the roughly the same outcome as an exemption for revenue-producing sports. Some senators continued to pursue the route of a total exemption from Title IX for athletics. Senators James McClure of Idaho and Jesse Helms of North Carolina both introduced bills that failed, in 1976 and 1977, respectively. Frances Hogan, handwritten notes from a speech given by Margot Polivy, n.d., Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH, and “The Living Law,” Title IX Info, http://www.titleix.info/history/the-living-law.aspx.

2 The history of the NCAA’s fight against Title IX has been documented well. For the best and most direct account, see Walter Byers with Charles Hammer, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). Another good source is Allen L. Sack and Ellen J. Staurowsky, College Athletes for Hire: The Evolution and Legacy of the NCAA’s Amateur Myth (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).

3 Nancy Scannell, “NCAA’s Byers Proposes ‘Club Route’ for Women,” Washington Post, January 5, 1975, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

4 Special Report on Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics, NCAA Council, April 28, 1975, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

5 AAHPER Executive Committee Response to NCAA Council Report, May 12, 1975, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

6 Response of the AIAW to NCAA Report, May 1975, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

7 Chapter 4 covers the University of North Carolina’s implementation of Title IX in athletics and its leadership’s expressed commitment to expanding opportunity for women beyond the regulations and guidelines determined by HEW.

8 Frances Hogan, “Comments Regarding Special Report by the NCAA Council,” 1975, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

9 Frances Hogan, “Comments,” University Archives.
Laurie Mabry, “Possible Alternatives for Future Governance Structures,” Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Dr. Beth Miller earned $2000.00 for coaching volleyball and softball; Frances Hogan earned $4000.00 for serving as director and coaching tennis. She stopped coaching tennis in 1976. Both women’s primary employment was to teach physical education classes and advise students in the General College. Interview with Frances Hogan, May 23, 1991, and June 3, 1991 (conducted by Mary Jo Festle), Interview L-0044, Southern Oral History Program Collection (#4007), http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/playback.html?base_file=L-0044&duration=02:39:52.

Homer Rice resigned from his position as athletic director on January 20, 1976 to become athletic director and head football coach at Rice University. He later became head coach of the Cincinnati Bengals of the NFL. Chancellor Taylor promoted Bill Cobey from within the athletic department. See Chapter 4.

Memorandum from Frances Hogan to Members of the Ethics Committee of the NCAIAW, Subject: Basketball Recruiting, April 2, 1976, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Memorandum from Frances Hogan, Subject: Basketball Recruiting, University Archives.

Memorandum from Frances Hogan, Subject: Basketball Recruiting, University Archives.

Memorandum from Calla Raynor to Frances Hogan, May 3, 1976, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Memorandum from Calla Raynor to Frances Hogan, University Archives.

Letter from Angela Lumpkin, Basketball Coach, to Ms. Joan Hult, AIAW Ethics and Eligibility Committee Chairman, September 9, 1976, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Richard “Dick” Baddour transitioned from his position in admissions to the athletic department in 1986, serving as Associate Athletic Director until promoted to Athletic Director in 1997. He resigned in 2011 amidst an academic scandal which rocked the university. This scandal is covered in the concluding chapter. Letter from Frances
Hogan to Bill Cobey, Athletic Director, October 13, 1976, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

20 For example, Memo from Frances to Dr. Leotus Morrison, October 14, 1975, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

21 Letter from Frances Hogan to Roseanne McGlade, October 13, 1976, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

22 Letter from Frances Hogan to Dr. Angela Lumpkin, October 13, 1976, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

23 Player Appeal Form: Susan Strahl, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

24 Player Appeal Form: Sally Ann Lewis of Salisbury, Rhodesia, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

25 Letter from Frances Hogan to Calla Raynor, Chairperson AIAW Southern Region II Ethics and Eligibility Committee, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

26 Eligibility Status of Bonnie Bell and Mary Alice Abdalla, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

27 Player Appeal: Laurie Gregg, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

28 Total AIAW active membership in 1977 included 713 institutions, more than any college sports organization in the country. Sport Participation Data, 1976-77, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
A full scholarship in the NCAA also included books. AIAW full scholarships, although slightly less than NCAA full scholarships, still allowed universities to comply with Title IX, because the inclusion or absence of books represented a small enough difference to consider the scholarship opportunities for men and women comparable.

Mary Roland Griffin, “Latest News to Voting Reps,” April 19, 1977, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Bill Cobey, AD, to Margaret Polivy, November 15, 1977, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Martin Gerry, OCR to John Pruis, President, Ball State University, April 25, 1977, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Pat Moore, “AIAW Underwent Atlanta Surgery; Came Through with Flying Colors,” Greensboro Daily News, January 17, 1978, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

AIAW Ethics and Eligibility Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 2, February 1978, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Pat Moore, “AIAW Underwent Atlanta Surgery,” University Archives.

Frances Hogan, handwritten notes on Brochure from Second Annual Delegate Assembly, Southern Region II of the AIAW, March 28-29, 1980, Gatlinburg, TN, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Frank Comfort to Hogan, July 19, 1979, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

The seven members of the Atlantic Coast Conference in 1977 were the University of North Carolina, Duke University, North Carolina State University, Wake Forest University, the University of Virginia, the University of Maryland, and Clemson University. Four of the seven schools were in the state of North Carolina.
In 1979-80, men coached cross country, indoor and outdoor track and field (counted as two sports), gymnastics, fencing, swimming, and soccer; and women coached basketball, field hockey, golf, softball, tennis and volleyball.
51 Collection of AIAW documents, University Archives.

52 Mel Greenberg, “Berkey Picked to Head NCAA Women’s Sports,” n.d., Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

53 Memo from Bill Cobey to Dr. Clairborne Jones, Executive Assistant to the Chancellor, February 18, 1980, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

54 Memo from Bill Cobey to Dr. Clairborne Jones, University Archives.

55 Report to the NCAA Membership by the Special Committee, August 1980, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

56 Sports committees would be separated by gender, and the NCAA reasoned that quotas were not needed on these committees. Summary of Proposals, 1981 NCAA Convention and “NCAA Proposals, Consent Package; ACC,” Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

57 Letter from John Swofford to Chancellor Christopher Fordham, September 24, 1980, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


59 Letter from John Swofford to Chancellor Christopher Fordham, University Archives.

60 Today the CCWAA is the National Association of Collegiate Women Athletics Administrators (NACWAA).

61 A number of AIAW leaders belonged to CCWAA committees. From the national AIAW: Charlotte West chaired the Academic Standards Committee, Fran Koenig also served on the committee, and Judith Holland chaired the Publicity Membership
Committee. From Region II: Mikki Flowers served on the Nominating Committee and Nora Lynn Finch served on the Publicity Membership Committee. *CCWAA Quarterly Report*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (August 1981), Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

62 Barbara Hedges, “President’s Message,” *CCWAA Quarterly Report*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (August 1981), Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

63 Women’s Sports Interpretations, Atlantic Coast Conference [January 1981], Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

64 Memo from Frances Hogan to John Swofford, May 6, 1981, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

65 Memo from John Swofford to Frances Hogan, Moyer Smith, and Head Coaches of Women’s Sports, February 10, 1981, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

66 Memo from James Frank and John L. Toner to Faculty Athletic Representatives, Athletic Directors, and Primary Women’s Athletic Administrators, March 1, 1982, and Memo from John Swofford to Frances Hogan, February 15, 1982, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

67 Memo from James Frank and John L. Toner, March 1, 1982, University Archives.

68 A loosening of institutional commitment to Title IX in athletics grew dramatically in the first half of the 1980s, with the Reagan administration and the Supreme Court’s opinion in *Grove City College v. Bell*, which in a narrow reading of the law, limited compliance to only those departments on a college campus directly receiving federal financial assistance. President Jimmy Carter split up the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and created the Department of Education in 1979.


70 Letter from Frances Hogan to Jan C. Watson, Appalachian State Department of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, October 19, 1983, Box 20, in the Department of
Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

The story of the efforts made by university administrators and athletic officials to expand athletic opportunities for women is the subject of Chapters 4 and 5.

CHAPTER 4

1. Associate athletic director Moyer Smith, quoted in Rick Scoppe, “Title IX Speeds up Funding for Women’s Athletic Programs at UNC,” Daily Tar Heel, September 26, 1978, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


5. Gwendolyn Gregory, HEW Question and Answer Session, University Archives.

6. Gwendolyn Gregory, HEW Question and Answer Session, University Archives.

7. Only in 1978 did a federal judge in Kansas City throw out the NCAA’s lawsuit against HEW regarding Title IX. Memorandum from Jeffrey H. Orleans to Title IX Officers, Subject: Changes in Athletic Rules, Recent Court Developments (Memorandum No. 35), January 27, 1978, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

8. Excerpt from Ferebee Taylor Speech, May 13, 1978, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


11 Letter from Ferebee Taylor to Homer Rice, July 8, 1974, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

12 In 1971, the North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation to bring ten additional public universities into the University of North Carolina System: Appalachian State University, East Carolina University, Elizabeth City State University, Fayetteville State University, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, North Carolina Central University, the North Carolina School of the Arts (now the University of North Carolina School of the Arts), Pembroke State University (now the University of North Carolina at Pembroke), Western Carolina University, and Winston-Salem State University joined UNC-Chapel Hill, NC State, UNC-Greensboro, UNC-Charlotte, UNC-Asheville, and UNC-Wilmington to create the 16-member system. A seventeenth member, the North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics was included in 1985. “220 Years of History,” University of North Carolina: A System of Higher Learning, http://www.northcarolina.edu/?q=about-our-system/220-years-history.

13 Jane Albright, “Title IX: Will It Affect Men’s Athletics?” She, Vol. 3, No. 1 (September, 1974), Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

14 Bal Bok, “Cutbacks Looming for Athletic Programs,” Durham Morning Herald, May 16, 1975, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

15 Craig Ammerman, “College Sports Set for Radical Changes,” Associated Press, April 1974, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

16 Athletic Director and head football coach Don Wade also announced the school intended to reduce football and men’s basketball travel “by cost-conscious scheduling.” Jack Hodges, “Title IX Mandate,” The Chattanooga Times, August 20, 1977, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

17 Ammerman, “College Sports Set for Radical Changes,” University Archives.

18 Jay Searcy, “Big Colleges Are Scared—Women Athletes Want $$$,” New York Times, 1974, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

19 Searcy, “Big Colleges Are Scared,” University Archives.
20 Tom Seppy, “Women Can Anticipate Sports’ Privilege,” *Durham Morning Herald*, June 9, 1974, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

21 Albright, “Title IX: Will It Affect Men’s Athletics?” University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

22 Dooley also pointed out that the football team was open to women to try out, and “guaranteed” a position to any woman “good enough to make the team.” Albright reported that Dooley, “grinning broadly,” stated, “It’s hard for me to conceive of a woman playing football though.” Albright, “Title IX: Will It Affect Men’s Athletics?” University Archives.


26 Letter from Ferebee Taylor to Frances Hogan and committee members, August 7, 1974, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

27 Suggested Comments to HEW, Special Committee on Title IX, September 5, 1974, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

28 Suggested Comments to HEW, University Archives.

29 Suggested Comments to HEW, University Archives.

30 Suggested Comments to HEW, University Archives.

31 Memo from Homer Rice to “Friends,” October 18, 1974, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

32 Memo from Homer Rice to “Friends,” University Archives.
33 Letter from Homer Rice to U.S. Congressmen, October 18, 1974, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

34 Rice sent his letter to all of the North Carolina members of the U.S. Congress in the fall of 1974, including Senators Sam Earvin, Jr. and Jesse Helms, and Congressmen Walter B. Jones, L.H. Fountain, David N. Henderson, Ike F. Andrews, Wilmer D. Mizell, Richardson Preyer, Charles Rose, Earl B. Ruth, James G. Martin, James T. Broyhill, and Roy A. Taylor. Senator Jesse Helms would go on to play a crucial role in the effort to restrict the reach of Title IX in the early 1980s.

35 See Chapter 3.

36 Report of Title IX Subcommittee on Athletics, November 11, 1974, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


39 “Regulations on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex.”

40 Final Report of the Title IX Committee, October 2, 1975, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

41 Ferebee Taylor, “Implementation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,” University Gazette, Vol. 3, No. 19, October 17, 1975, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

42 Coaches Meeting and Advisory Council Meeting Minutes, December 1, 1975, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

43 Coaches and Students Advisory Council Meeting Minutes, March 1, 1976, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
Letter from Bill Cobey to Frances Hogan, December 17, 1975, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

William W. Cobey, Jr., Assistant Athletic Director, “Preliminary Self-Evaluation Report,” February 3, 1976, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Anne Duvoisin, “Title IX and Women’s Basketball at UNC: An Impact Analysis,” [1978], Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

The SPA employees who filed the grievance included Jennie Capparella, Biostatistics; Karen Murphy, Medical Education, attorney; Linda Phillips, Recreational Therapy; Larry Bostian, amicus, Occupational Safety; and Dan Murphy, spouse of staff, amicus. The EPA faculty members who also filed were Joy Kasson, English; Marilyn Scott-Jones, German; Carol Crumley, Anthropology; Margaret O’Connor, English; Patricia Barry, Health Administration; James Peacock, amicus, Anthropology Chair; Cecil Slome, amicus, Public Health; Robert Rodman, amicus, Linguistics; Dan Okun, amicus, Public Health; and John Kasson, amicus, History.

News Release, November 14, 1977, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

The women’s basketball team used lockers in the general P.E. locker space in Women’s Gym.  Student Grievance Committee (Title IX), November 14, 1977, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Student Grievance Committee (Title IX), November 14, 1977, University Archives.

News Release, November 14, 1977, University Archives.

The tally includes elementary and secondary schools, in addition to higher education, and complaints across entire campuses, not just athletics. By the fall of 1980, 133 complaints concerned intercollegiate athletics. Karen Ellis Arwe, “The Status of Athletics in Relation to Compliance with Title IX at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1980-81,” and Sex Discrimination Complaints, HEW, as of February 15, 1978, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
53 Duvoisin, “Title IX and Women’s Basketball at UNC,” University Archives.

54 Jane Albright, “Title IX Forces Women’s Step Up,” Daily Tar Heel, December, 1975, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

55 Albright, “Title IX Forces Women’s Step Up,” University Archives.

56 Rick Scoppe, “Title IX Speeds up Funding for Women’s Athletic Programs at UNC,” Daily Tar Heel, September 26, 1978, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

57 Jim McDonald, “Title IX: Dividing College Athletics,” Fayetteville Times, April 10, 1980, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


59 Jim McDonald, “Title IX: Dividing College Athletics,” University Archives.

60 Notes from Frances Hogan talk, Faculty Supper, February 1979, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

61 AIAW full scholarships included tuition, fees, room, and board, while NCAA scholarships also included books. Letter from Frances Hogan to Mrs. Lewis Kraft and John Conroy, Co-Chairmen, Education and Research Committee, USLTA, December 31, 1974, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

62 Coaches Meeting Minutes, August 25, 1976, in Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

63 Women Grants-in-Aid, 1978-79, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
64 Explanation for Women’s Athletics Receiving Less Money for Scholarships, 1979-80, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


66 Notes from Frances Hogan talk, University Archives.

67 In 1978 Hogan became a full-time administrator, retiring from teaching and advising. Comparative Salary Chart, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

68 Comparative Salary Chart, University Archives.

69 Men Grants-in-Aid, 1978-79, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

70 Explanation for Women’s Athletics Receiving Less Money for Scholarships, University Archives.

71 The UNC position was both economical and philosophical. The United States Olympic Trials for the marathon provides a stark contrast. Since 1984, the American governing body for track and field, now “USA Track and Field,” has held two standards for qualification for the Olympic Trials for the marathon, an A standard, in which an athlete receives travel funding for the Trials, and a B standard, which is slower and the athletes do not receive travel funding. The marathon is a notoriously fickle event, and athletes who have qualified with only the B standard have finished in the top three in the Trials to make the Olympic team. The B standard, as well as a half-marathon qualifying standard, allow more participants in the Trials. USATF has held softer B standards for the women than the men in every Olympic Trials for marathon since the women’s inaugural race in 1984. The philosophy holds that because women are relatively new to the marathon, the softer B standard allows for larger fields to grow the sport and encourage more women to run the marathon at an elite level.

72 Coaches Meeting Minutes, August 25, 1976, University Archives.
In addition, the men’s basketball team lived in Granville Towers, a housing facility the Title IX Committee deemed comparable to the rest of the university’s housing accommodations. Carolina students would take issue with the idea that the rooms in Granville Towers were comparable to regular dorm rooms. The complex had its own dining hall, and its location, on Franklin Street and apart from the rest of the dormitories on campus, gave it elevated status. Students paid more to live in Granville Towers, and the facility always had a long waitlist. Coaches Meeting Minutes, April 5, 1976, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits and Opportunities, 1979-1980, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

CHAPTER 5

1 Title IX Compliance Fact Sheet (AIAW, 1979), Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

2 Candace Lyle Hogan, “Title IX Versus Football,” Coaching: Women’s Athletics, March/April 1979, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

3 Cheryl M. Fields, “Big Gains for Women’s Sports,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, December 9, 1974, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

4 “Universities Move Toward Athletic Equality for Women,” Project on the Status and Education of Women Newsletter, November 1975, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

5 “Universities Move Toward Athletic Equality for Women,” University Archives.

6 “Universities Move Toward Athletic Equality for Women,” University Archives.

7 Jennifer Lee, “From Cheerleaders to Champions,” 1983, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
Northwestern, Purdue, and the University of Illinois declined *womenSports*’s request to share their budgets. Big Ten Budgets, 1976-77, *womenSports*, September 1977, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Big Ten Budgets, 1976-77, *womenSports*, September 1977, in Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

“Universities Move Toward Athletic Equality for Women,” University Archives.

Fields, “Big Gains for Women’s Sports,” University Archives.

Fields, “Big Gains for Women’s Sports,” University Archives.

See Chapter 1.


“Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits and Opportunities,” [1979], Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

“Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits and Opportunities,” [1979], University Archives.

Anne Duvoisin, “Title IX and Women’s Basketball at UNC: An Impact Analysis,” [1978], Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Karen Ellis Arwe, “The Status of Athletics in Relation to Compliance with Title IX at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1980-81,” in Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

“Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits and Opportunities,” [1979], University Archives.

Memorandum from Bill Cobey to Susan Ehringhaus, December 22, 1976, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

22 Arwe, “The Status of Athletics,” University Archives.

23 Duvoisin, “Title IX and Women’s Basketball at UNC,” University Archives.

24 Duvoisin, “Title IX and Women’s Basketball at UNC,” University Archives.

25 Memo from Bill Cobey to Frances Hogan, December 15, 1976, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

26 Memo from Bill Cobey to Frances Hogan, December 15, 1976, University Archives.

27 Duvoisin, “Title IX and Women’s Basketball at UNC,” University Archives.

28 Duvoisin, “Title IX and Women’s Basketball at UNC,” University Archives.

29 Memo from Frances Hogan to Rick Brewer, “Criticisms of Recruiting Brochure for Women’s Athletics,” October 20, 1977, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

30 Letter from Rick Brewer to Frances Hogan, October 21, 1977, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

31 Duvoisin, “Title IX and Women’s Basketball at UNC,” University Archives.

32 Letter from Bill Cobey to Frances Hogan, September 9, 1977, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

33 Letter from Rick Brewer to Frances Hogan, August 26, 1977, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

34 Letter from Rick Brewer to Frances Hogan, August 26, 1977, University Archives.

35 Arwe, “The Status of Athletics,” University Archives.

36 Duvoisin, “Title IX and Women’s Basketball at UNC,” University Archives.
Coaches Meeting Minutes, November 8, 1976, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Bob Savod to All Coaches, December 2, 1976, and Memo from Craig Stewart to All Women’s Sports Coaches, January 8, 1979, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Frances Hogan to Bob Savod, July 28, 1978, and Memo from Craig Stewart to Frances Hogan, November 17, 1978, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

See Chapter 4.

Southern Region II was UNC’s division of competition in the AIAW and included schools in the states of Virginia, North and South Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee. South Carolina schools had not done much to expand athletic opportunities for women in the 1970s, so the only schools considered for comparison are the University of Virginia, the University of Kentucky, and the University of Tennessee.

ACC championships for women began in 1977-78.

“Sex Discrimination in Athletic Programs at the University of Virginia,” Sub-Committee on Title IX Compliance, March 31, 1976, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Lacrosse was one of the sports played by women at UVA; Virginia was the only state in Region II that offered women’s lacrosse during the 1970s. Chart of ACC Women’s Teams, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

“Sex Discrimination in Athletic Programs at the University of Virginia,” University Archives.

“Sex Discrimination in Athletic Programs at the University of Virginia,” University Archives.

Jack C. Blanton, “The Effects of Title IX on Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics at Three State Universities,” Summer 1977, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the
48 Blanton, “The Effects of Title IX,” University Archives.

49 Feamster’s critique did not include race discrimination. Marguerite Beck-Rex and Deborah Duffy, “Heading South?: Cash Lack Trips Women’s Recruitment,” Women’s Equity Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund Newsletter, In the Running, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1979), Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

50 Beck-Rex and Duffy, “Heading South?” University Archives.

51 The documentary Training Rules includes interviews with players spanning three decades, who described Portland’s zero tolerance policy and harassment of gay, suspected-to-be gay, and gay-friendly athletes. Portland was in clear violation of Penn State’s anti-discrimination policy, yet she remained as head coach for more than thirty years, thanks in part to the protection of Joe Paterno. Training Rules, New Almaden, CA: Wolfe Video LLC, 2010.

52 Blanton, “The Effects of Title IX,” University Archives.

53 Blanton, “The Effects of Title IX,” University Archives.

54 Blanton, “The Effects of Title IX,” University Archives.

55 Blanton, “The Effects of Title IX,” University Archives.

56 The Department of Education split from HEW, which was renamed the Department of Health and Human Services, on May 4, 1980, after President Jimmy Carter signed the new department into law in October of the previous year. Bill Cobey resigned January 4, 1980, and his last day as athletic director was April 30, 1980, four days shy of the transition to the Department of Education.

57 Jim McDonald, “Title IX: Dividing College Athletics,” Fayetteville Times, April 10, 1980, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

58 McDonald, “Title IX: Dividing College Athletics,” University Archives.

59 McDonald, “Title IX: Dividing College Athletics,” University Archives.
Pat McCrory has close ties to Art Pope, who is the state of North Carolina’s version of Charles and David Koch. Pope served as McCrory’s deputy budget director before resigning last year. Many in North Carolina speculate that Art Pope hopes to become the next president of the UNC system, after the Board of Governors forced President Tom Ross to resign on January 16, 2015. The Board of Governors is not supposed to be a political organization, but many of the governors have strong Republican and Tea Party ties. Bill Cobey served one term in the United States Congress in 1985 and 1986.


“Analysis of Proposed HEW Title IX Athletics Policy Interpretation,” Squire, Sanders, and Dempsey, [1978], Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Memo from J. Neils Thompson, President, NCAA to CEOs, FARs, ADs, Subject: Proposed Interpretation of the Athletic Requirements of the Title IX Regulation, December 13, 1978, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Susan Ehringhaus to David Tatel, March 1, 1979, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Comments of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on HEW’s Proposed Policy Interpretation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, March 1, 1979, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Arwe, “The Status of Athletics,” University Archives.


Letter from Susan Ehringhaus to Jeffrey H. Orleans, Assistant to the President, January 21, 1980, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
McDonald, “Title IX: Dividing College Athletics,” University Archives.

Arwe, “The Status of Athletics,” University Archives.

Arwe, “The Status of Athletics,” University Archives.

Jeanne Atkins, “Reagan Retreat from Title IX Limits Women’s Legal Options,” WEAL Washington Report, Vol. 11, No. 5 (October/November 1982), Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Atkins, “Reagan Retreat from Title IX,” University Archives.


Susan Ware, Title IX: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007), 14.


“Fact Sheet on the Civil Rights Act of 1984,” National Coalition for Girls and Women in Education (NCGWE), Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Nora Lynn Finch, Assistant Athletic Director, N.C. State University, to Jennifer Alley, September 21, 1984, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Senator John East to Nora Lynn Finch, September 10, 1984, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
81 Letter from Senator Jesse Helms to Nora Lynn Finch, September 5, 1984, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

82 Brake, *Getting in the Game*, 72.


84 Mike Schoor, “UNC Remains Committed to Non-Revenue Sports,” *Daily Tar Heel*, October 5, 1984, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

85 In more recent years, this position was cleverly renamed Associate Athletic Director for Olympic Sports, to downplay the revenue/non-revenue distinction and the commercial interests of the department.

86 Schoor, “UNC Remains Committed to Non-Revenue Sports,” University Archives.

87 Kurt Rosenberg, “A Sad Song for UNC Women Athletes,” *Daily Tar Heel*, October 8, 1984, Box 22, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

88 Rosenberg, “A Sad Song for UNC Women Athletes,” University Archives.

89 Susan Shackleford, “Coed Sports Flourishing at Carolina,” *Durham Morning Herald*, November 24, 1974, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

90 See Chapter 1. Field Hockey Annual Report, 1972-1973, Box 16, Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.


CHAPTER 6

330

Henry Pritchett, foreword to Savage and Bentley, et al., *American College Athletics*, quoted in “College Sports Tainted by Bounties.”

Savage and Bentley, et al., *American College Athletics*, quoted in “College Sports Tainted by Bounties.”


For more on the University of Kentucky scandal, as well as contemporaneous scandals at West Point and William and Mary, see Smith, *Pay for Play*, 110-116.

For more on amateurism, see Chapter 7.

Athletic Department Goals and Hierarchy, 1978-79, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

For a great analysis of the transformation of higher education from beacons of learning to entertainment enterprises, and the role of big-time sports in the change, see Murray Sperber, *Beer and Circus: How Big-Time College Sports is Crippling Undergraduate Education* (New York: Henry Holt, 2000).

Athletic Department Goals and Hierarchy, 1978-79, University Archives.

Although many journalists and academics have used the term, Earl Smith has developed a sophisticated exploration of the athletic industrial complex. See Earl Smith, *Race, Sport and the American Dream* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2007).

Priorities for the Department of Athletics, July 1980, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Statement of Expected Revenues, 1978-79 Fiscal Year, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

331


Athletic Department Goals and Hierarchy, 1978-79, University Archives.

Women’s Sports Interpretations, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

The Educational Foundation, Inc. was the first foundation established at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1938. The foundation held as its mission “to raise for providing scholarships or grant-in-aid at the University to worthy and qualified high school students with athletic ability.” Standard letter from Mary B. Baggett, Secretary, to Harold McEntire, May 26, 1972, Box 14, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from George E. Moseley to Ernie Williamson, August 30, 1972, Box 14, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Gerald D. Moran to Ernie Williamson, November 12, 1972, Box 14, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Dr. Coyte R. Minges to Ernie Williamson, October 12, 1972, Box 14, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Memo from Ernie Williamson to Margaret Folger, n.d., Box 14, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Ernie Williamson to Lewis Mack, June 12, 1972, Box 14, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
23 Letter from Ernie Williamson to Ed McMahan, January 5, 1971, Box 14, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

24 Objectives, Bill Cobey, July 22, 1979, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

25 “Arena Too Small?,” Raleigh News and Observer, [Spring 1980], Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

26 Bob Quincy, “Central Issue: Athletic Center,” Raleigh News and Observer, n.d. [Spring 1980], Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

27 Cobey resigned to run for lieutenant governor in North Carolina on the Republican ticket. See Chapters 3 and 4.

28 The Student Activities Center, Question and Answer Sheet, Carolina Blue, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

29 “Arena Too Small?,” University Archives.

30 The Student Activities Center, Question and Answer Sheet, University Archives.

31 The Student Activities Center, Question and Answer Sheet, University Archives.

32 Memorandum from Frances Hogan to John Swofford, Re: Year End Report and Recommendations, May 12, 1982, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


36 Proposed Seating Arrangement for the Student Activities Center, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

37 Guidelines for the Perquisites of the Student Activities Center Building Fund, Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

38 List of Perquisites (The Right to Purchase Season Tickets), Box 21, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


40 Volleyball Annual Report, 1991-1992, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

41 Softball Annual Reports, 1983-84 through 1991-1992, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

42 Basketball Annual Report, 1991-1992, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

43 Women’s Intercollegiate Athletics, Objectives, 1979-80, Box 18, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

44 Frances Hogan responses to survey provided by Benjamin E. Rawlins, Assistant Affirmative Action Officer, March 18, 1981, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


46 Memo from ACC Commissioner Robert C. James to ACC Faculty Chairmen and ADs, Re: Confidential Report on Suggested NCAA Reorganization, October 23, 1975, Box 16,
in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

47 Memo from Gerald A. Barrett to Faculty Athletic Committee, August 31, 1976, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

48 Memo from Robert C. James, ACC Commissioner, to ACC Faculty Representatives and Athletic Directors, Re: Proposed College Football Association, September 20, 1976, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

49 The CFA organizing committee included Edward Czekaj, Penn State University; Wayne Duke, Big 10 Conference; Wiles Hallock, Pac 8 Conference; Carl James, Duke University; Father Edmund P. Joyce, Notre Dame; Henry T. Lowe, University of Missouri; Fred L. Miller, Arizona State University; Boyd McWhorter, Southeastern Conference; Albert Witte, University of Arkansas; and Robert C. James, Atlantic Coast Conference. Memo from Robert C. James, ACC Commissioner, to ACC Faculty Representatives and Athletic Directors, Re: Proposed College Football Association, September 20, 1976, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

50 Memo from Robert C. James, Re: Proposed College Football Association, University Archives.

51 College Football Association Articles of Association, 1976, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

52 The 61 members of the CFA included NCAA member institutions from the Atlantic Coast Conference, Big 8 Conference, Big 10 Conference, Pac 8 Conference, Southeastern Conference, Southwest Conference, and Western Athletic Conference. Independent schools with membership were Air Force, Army, Boston College, Florida State, Georgia Tech, Memphis State, University of Miami, Navy, Notre Dame, Penn State University, Pittsburgh, San Diego State, South Carolina, Syracuse, Tulane, Utah State, Virginia Tech, and West Virginia. These schools met the criteria for membership, demonstrating they had big-time football programs. At least 70 percent of the football schedule had to be against teams from the original 78 members of Division I; the football stadium had to seat at least 30,000 with an average attendance of at least 20,000; and teams had to have at least 80 grant-in-aid football players. College Football Association Articles of Association, 1976, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

54 [Untitled article about NCAA Championships for Women], NCAA News, [1983], Box
19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

55 Letter from ACC to NCAA DI Member Institutions, [Fall 1976], Box 16, in the
Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records
#40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

56 Letter from ACC to NCAA DI Member Institutions, University Archives.

57 Letter from ACC to NCAA DI Member Institutions, University Archives.

58 The top twenty schools, in order of earnings, from 1970-76 were Texas, Notre Dame,
UCLA, USC, Alabama, Ohio State, Nebraska, Penn State, Michigan, Arkansas, Georgia,
Missouri, Auburn, Oklahoma, Texas A&M, Tennessee, Army, Colorado, Stanford, and
Michigan State.

59 Athletic Council Minutes, Carolina Inn, January 27, 1982, Box 17, in the Department
of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093,
University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

60 Memo from John Swofford to Dick Crum, Re: Legislation Passed at 1982 NCAA
Convention, January 19, 1982, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library,
UNC-CH.

61 Memo from NCAA Football Television Committee to Division I Athletic Directors,
March 22, 1984, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

62 Memorandum from NCAA Football Television Committee, John Swofford, Chair, to
NCAA Council, Subject: Supplementary Report Regarding Football Television, May 3,
1984, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

63 Letter from NCAA President John L. Toner to CEOs of NCAA Football-Playing
Member Institutions, Re: Football Television, March 26, 1984, Box 20, in the
Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records
#40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


CHAPTER 7


2 A comparison with the Olympic Movement warrants consideration. The Olympic Movement began corporate financing only after amateurism had been abandoned by the IOC and professional athletes could begin to compete. Part of the Olympics’ amateur identity required that host cities incur the cost of running the Games. Commercial sponsorship was prohibited for the first eighty-eight years of the modern Olympics. The IOC revised its charter to permit corporate funding only in 1984, when no city would host the Games under the old model and Los Angeles forced the IOC to change its policy.

3 Letter from Frances Hogan to Susan Ehringhaus and Bill Cobey, [1978], Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


5 Memorandum from Walter Byers to FARs, ADs, PWAs, “Special Forms Required by NCAA Legislation,” August 6, 1981, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

6 National Collegiate Athletic Association Student-Athlete Statement, 1981-82 Academic Year, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
7 1981-82 NCAA Rules and Regulations Information Sheet, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

8 1981-82 NCAA Rules and Regulations, University Archives.

9 1981-82 NCAA Rules and Regulations, University Archives.

10 NCAA Division I Manual, 


17 For example, in 1982 the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), the International Sports Federation for athletics, or what Americans call “track and field,” abandoned the traditional definition of amateurism and permitted its athletes to earn prize monies and appearance fees, to sign sponsorship and endorsement contracts with corporations, and to receive monetary funds from private donors and public foundations. The organization changed its name to International Association of Athletics Federations, signaling the transformation. IAAF History, 


19 Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (PL 95-606), 1978, 
20 Atlantic Coast Conference Women’s Sports Interpretations, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

21 Memo from NCAA to ADs and PWAs, April 12, 1982, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

22 ACC Women’s Sports Interpretations, University Archives.

23 The state of North Carolina did not host championships in field hockey. North Carolina high school girls participated in slow-pitch, not fast-pitch, softball.

24 Basketball Annual Report, 1984-85, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

25 Volleyball Annual Report, 1985-86, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

26 Sylvia Hatchell continues to coach Carolina women’s basketball today.

27 Basketball Annual Report, 1986-87, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

28 Soccer Annual Reports, 1983-84, 1986-87, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

29 Field Hockey Annual Report, 1986-87, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

30 Softball Annual Report, 1987-88, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

31 Nelson Ferebee Taylor served as chancellor for eight years, from 1972 to 1980. He resigned in March of 1980 for health reasons after a heart attack, returning to the law school where he continued to teach as a full-time professor until 1991. Christopher C. Fordham, former dean of the School of Medicine, took over as chancellor in March and

32 Memo from Paul Hoolahan to Head Coaches, September 30, 1981, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


35 Smith, Pay for Play, 136.

36 UNC Chapel Hill had its own whistleblower in 2014, when Mary Willingham published research revealing that 60 percent of her 183 student-athletes in remedial classes performed between a fourth- and eighth-grade reading level. Since then, Willingham has appeared on Bryant Gumbel’s Real Sports program on HBO, co-authored a book with UNC historian Jay Smith, won The Drake Group’s Hutchins Award for academic integrity, and reached a settlement in her lawsuit against the university. Jenny Surane, “Mary Willingham Settles Lawsuit with UNC, Will Not Return as Employee,” The Daily Tar Heel, February 24, 2015, http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2015/02/mary-willingham-settles-lawsuit-with-unc-will-not-return-as-employee.

37 Draft Report to Chancellor Fordham, Academic Study of Student-Athletes, 1981, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

38 Draft Report to Chancellor Fordham, University Archives.

The time period was selected because students enrolled in 1976 had five years to graduate by the fall of 1981 when the committee conducted the report.


Men’s Non-Revenue Sports Graduation Data, 1970-1980, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Women’s Non-Revenue Sports Graduation Data, 1970-1980, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Draft Report to Chancellor Fordham, University Archives.

Memo from Paul Hoolahan to Head Coaches, September 30, 1981, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Hoolahan later became an associate athletic director and is now CEO of the Allstate Sugar Bowl. Memorandum from Paul J. Hoolahan to Head Coaches, Frances Hogan, and John Lotz, RE: Study Hall Program, August 28, 1981, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH, and “Allstate Sugar Bowl History and Overview,” http://www.allstatesugarbowl.org/uploads/SugarBowlHistoryandOverview.pdf.

Memo from Paul Hoolahan to Head Coaches, University Archives.

Frances Hogan, “Athletic Department Study Hall,” Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Academics, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Memo from Paul Hoolahan to Head Coaches, Frances Hogan, and John Lotz, September 30, 1981, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Academics: Grant-in-Aid, October 23, 1981, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
The ten “Adams states,” as they came to be known, were mostly, but not entirely, southern states and included Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
Affirmative Action Plan and Report of The University of NC at CH, Revised as of July, 1983, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Report of the Faculty Advisory Committee to the Chancellor of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on the Admissions Policies and Practices of the University as Such Policies and Practices Affect Minority Students, June 12, 1979, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


Report of the Faculty Advisory Committee, University Archives.

Report of the Faculty Advisory Committee, University Archives.

Report of the Faculty Advisory Committee, University Archives.

Richard “Dick” Baddour transitioned from his position in admissions to the athletic department in 1986, serving as Associate Athletic Director until promoted to Athletic Director in 1997. He resigned in 2011 amidst an academic scandal which rocked the university. This scandal is covered in the Conclusion.

Letter from Dean J.R. Gaskin, Dean to William Cobey, Director of Athletics, May 10, 1977, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.
Number of Athletic Admissions Exceptions, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

“Revised Policy on the Admission of Athletes,” Committee on Undergraduate Admissions, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

“Revised Policy on the Admission of Athletes,” University Archives.


Memo from Bill Cobey to Frances Hogan, Re: Proposed Athletic Scale and Athletic Admissions for Women, June 9, 1975, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Agreement for the Admission of Athletes for the Fall of 1976, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Letter from Bill Cobey to Frances Hogan, December 16, 1975, Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Memo from Gwendolyn Norrell, Chair, Special Committee on Women’s Interests to PWAAs, May 16, 1984, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

NCAA Council Interpretation, Proposal No. 48- Eligibility, Box 19, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Historian Ronald Smith points out that no representative from an HBCU served on the ACE committee responsible for Prop 48. Smith, Pay for Play, 139.

89 Athletic Council Minutes, January 27, 1982, Carolina Inn, Box 17, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


91 Smith, *Pay for Play*, 158.


93 Smith, *Pay for Play*, 159.


CONCLUSION


5 Black, “Introduction: Reports of the Knight Commission,” 3.


9 Letter of Transmittal from Friday and Hesburgh, 15.


11 Friday and Hesburgh, et al., Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete, 18.

12 Friday and Hesburgh, et al., Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete, 19.

13 Friday and Hesburgh, et al., Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete, 19.

14 Friday and Hesburgh, et al., Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete, 19.

15 The NCAA Presidents’ Commission would consist of 44 members—22 from Divisions I and 11 each from Divisions II and III—“with composition, conference and regional representation similar to the blueprint for the NCAA Council.” These members “would be elected by the member institutions themselves at the annual NCAA Convention.” The group “would meet twice annually, or more often if it chose to, and would be staffed and funded by the NCAA.” Letter from NCAA Council to CEOs of Active Member Institutions, November, 1983, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

16 Letter from NCAA Council to CEOs of Active Member Institutions, November, 1983, Box 20, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.


19 Clotfelter, Big-Time Sports, 18.


Kane and Stancill, “Fake-class Scheme.”


Judge Claudia Wilken’s decision has been appealed by the NCAA.

“Recommendations, May 1985, Frances Hogan,” Box 16, in the Department of Athletics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Records #40093, University Archives, Wilson Library, UNC-CH.

Longtime volleyball coach and business manager Beth Miller took over after Hogan retired. She remains in the position to this day.

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350


