numa Teifu—viewed Japan's expansion to the Philippines as part of their country's expansion to Nanyo (the Southern Seas). The underlying justification of all their plans, especially that of Yokō Tosaku, was Japan's need of the Philippines as an outlet for her "surplus population." This justification implied or was followed by expressions of hopes for the consequent development of trade with the Philippines, a country engaged in agricultural production of food and agricultural cash crops then thought of by the Japanese nationalist-activists as two of Japan's needs vis a vis their claim of a growing population and increasing industrialization. Sugiura Jūgo underscored Japan's mission of civilization and/or aiding backward areas of the world especially a neighbour—that is, the Philippines—as the main argument for Japanese expansion to the Islands. Suganuma Teifu and Fukumoto Nichinan realized the need of such help but justified it in terms of Japan's right to preventive self-defense. Of the four Japanese, only Suganuma Teifu and Fukumoto Makoto took steps towards the realization of their plans.

To make the plans of these four Japanese-activists for Japan's expansion to the Philippines significant and relevant to the development of Japanese activities in the Philippines before the last Pacific War, I would like to pose two questions: (1) Could there be a possibility of viewing twentieth century Japanese activities in the Philippines as inspired by any of the four plans for Japan's expansion to the Islands? (2) Could a link be established between the techniques used by the Japanese in founding an agricultural settlement in Davao with those suggested by Yokō Tosaku? To answer these questions, there is a need of undertaking further basic research of sources written not only in Japanese but also in other languages such as those written in English by the American Philippine administrators and perhaps those written by foreign consuls assigned to the Philippines. But even if these questions would remain unanswered, the plans of these four Japanese nationalist-activists—Yokō Tosaku, Sugiura Jūgo, Suganuma Teifu and Fukumoto Makoto—have indicated that during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, there were Japanese who thought of the possibility of Japan's expansion to the Philippines.
In January of 1827 Chao Anu, the ruler of the Lao state of Vientiane, led his armies in a rapid and unopposed march across the Khorat Plateau of Northeast Siam in a sudden attack on his suzerain, the third king of Thailand's Chakri Dynasty. Reacting to Anu's presence only in late February when the Lao vanguard reached Saraburi, three days' march from Bangkok, the Thai soon mounted a counter attack which scattered and expelled the Lao forces. The sack and complete destruction of Vientiane followed, together with a massive resettlement of Lao people on what is now the Thai side of the Mekong, and in the next few years the Thai brought all the former Vientiane territories under direct administration.

The drama of the 1827 rebellion has in many historical accounts overshadowed the important sixty-year period which preceded it and provided the conditions under which it occurred. The object of this paper is to consider this period and distinguish within it a number of elements and events which contributed to the eventual outbreak of rebellion, as well as to attempt to throw some light on a neglected period in the histories of Siam and Laos. This study is based primarily on printed Thai sources, particularly the chronicles of the three major Lao states of this period (Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champasak) and the first three reigns of the Chakri Dynasty, and several collections of Thai documents. With these relatively limited sources, only tentative conclusions may be urged, particularly as so few Lao documents for this period are available. Their main import, however, is nonetheless clear: the Vientiane rebellion had its roots in a long period of increasingly active Thai involvement in Lao affairs.

1. A good account of the Vientiane Rebellion may be found in Walter Vella, Siam Under Rama III (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1957), 80 ff.
I. The First Thai Invasion of Vientiane, 1778-1779.

The most important ingredient in the events of the 1770's in Laos was the continuing struggle between Siam and Burma, which did not diminish in intensity in the decade following the Burmese sack of Ayuthia in 1767. In order both to strengthen their own forces and to deny strength to their enemy, each side became involved in Lao affairs. The opportunities for both sides were heightened by the deep-seated hostility which existed in the relations between the Lao states themselves, a product of the dynastic schism of the first decade of the century which had resulted in the division of the Kingdom of Lan Chang, and had been aggravated further by Burmese interference, in particular, in Lao affairs. There were thus two major kingdoms with which alliances could be sought, and an alliance made with one of the two would tend to throw the other into an alliance with the opposing side.

Two other elements important in the history of this period should also be mentioned. First, continued Burmese involvement in Laos depended upon their easy access to Laos, which was possible only so long as the Burmese retained a foothold in the Chiengmai area. When the Burmese finally lost Chiengmai for the last time in 1798, their influence in Laos came to an end; and, in practice, their activities in Laos were limited from the mid-1770's. Secondly, one should note in the following paragraphs the political effects of Laos' geographical position, which in the end made its continued existence dependent on the will of its neighbours.

In preparation for the final massive attack on Ayuthia, the Burmese commander at Chiengmai attacked Luang Prabang in 1764, aided by an army from Vientiane. In addition to many horses, elephants, and supplies for war, the Burmese also carried off one of the king's younger brothers as security for the treaty they obtained, and at the same time concluded an alliance with Vientiane. The prince later escaped, and returned to Luang Prabang to be crowned as King Tiao Vongsa. This king set about, early in the seventies, to settle his score with Vientiane.

Impressed with resurgent Siam, fearful of a vengeful Luang

4. Phraya Pramuan Wichaphun, Phongsawadan muang lan chang [Chronicles of Lan Chang] (2nd.ed., Bangkok, 1941), 56-7, gives a clear account of this expedition, but dates it in 1756; while Prince Narathip Praphan, Phraratdhopongsadan phama [Royal Chronicles of Burma] (Bangkok, 1962), 11, 117-8, gives 1766. I follow here Prince Damrong's Thai rop phama, 336, which shows evidence of having sifted all the relevant sources—Lao, Burmese, and Thai.
Prabang, and aware that the Burmese, occupied with both Siam and China, could be of no assistance, King Siribunyasan of Vientiane bid for an alliance with Siam in a letter written on 6 April 1770. King Taksin of Thonburi responded favourably and in April of 1771 wrote to confirm the pact and told Siribunyasan to remember that “your enemies will be considered as our own.” Explaining that he was moving troops up to Chiangmai, he suggested that a present of 300 horses would be greatly appreciated.

In his commentary on a major document of this period, King Chulalongkorn expressed some doubt as to Taksin’s motives in this correspondence. Taksin, he thought, was not adverse to opening friendly relations with Vientiane on a basis of equality only because he intended to bring Vientiane under Thai control in due course. He had no real hopes of obtaining horses from Vientiane, and was not truly interested in adding Siribunyasan’s daughter to his household, although he suggested he would accept her. His was but a single goal: to strengthen Siam. In the course of events which followed, such a policy is well in evidence.

This correspondence was interrupted by new warfare. The Burmese, by the Kaungton Treaty of 1770, put an end to their war with China and again turned their interests to the East. Shortly thereafter, early in 1771, Luang Prabang launched its attack of revenge against Vientiane, and laid siege to the city for two months. Beleaguered in his capital, King Siribunyasan appealed, not to the Siamese, who were again on the defensive, but to the Burmese, who quickly sent 5000 troops from Chiangmai under the command of the famous general Posuphala to attack Luang Prabang from the rear. Apparently the Luang Prabang army was warned of the approach of the Burmese, for they hastily retreated home and held off the enemy for fifteen days. The outcome of the battle is not clear. While some sources state or imply that the city was taken and sacked, others indicate

5. Texts of these and succeeding letters are translated in Maha Sila Viravong, *History of Laos* (mimeo., New York, 1958), 87 ff.
6. King Chulalongkorn, *Choitmaithep khwamsongcham khong krommaluang narinthewi ... lae phrarahawilchan nai phrahat somdet phra chunlachomklao chooyuhua* [Memoirs of Princess Narinthewi, With Commentary by King Chulalongkorn] (Bangkok, 1958), 131-2.
8. Thailand, Krom Sinlapakon, comp., “Phongsawdan, muang luang phrabang [Chronicles of Luang Prabang],” in Prachum Phongsawadan [Collected Chronicles], vol. 11 (Bangkok, 1919), 41. Cited hereafter as *PMLP*.
9. Maha Sila, 89. The Luang Prabang chronicles state that Vientiane solicited aid directly from Ava; but Posuphala was commander of Burmese forces at Chiangmai, the only Burmese troops, in all probability, which could have come to Vientiane’s rescue in time. This is borne out in the annals of Chiangmai, as presented by Phraya Prachakit Korachak, *Phongsawdan yonok* [Chronicles of Yonok] (Bangkok, 1961), 472.
10. Le Boulanger, 155, 196.
that concern for their position at Chiengmai in the face of a Siamese attack forced the Burmese to retreat, leaving Luang Prabang under a negotiated peace a vassal of Burma.11

When King Siribunyasan ascended the throne of Vientiane,12 his claim was supported by two officials of the Kingdom, named Wo and Ta. These two personages came in the succeeding years to figure in the history not only of Vientiane, but also of Champasak, several present-day provincial capitals in the Thai Northeast, and Siam as well. Out of a mass of legends in nearly twenty versions of their story, the following sequence of events emerges, albeit none too clearly.

Wo and Ta, in return for their efforts on behalf of Siribunyasan’s claim to the throne, asked for the honour of being appointed to high state position, but as they were not of royal blood, Siribunyasan refused them. They then left Vientiane and went across the Mekong to Nong Bua Lamphu, near Udon in Northeast Thailand, where they founded their own independent principality. One version of the tale states that they were further offended when Siribunyasan asked for the hand of Ta’s daughter as a common concubine.13 In any event, out of their own frustrated political ambitions and Siribunyasan’s desire to eliminate his rivals, matters soon came to a head. After three years of intermittent warfare between Vientiane and Nong Bua Lamphu, Wo and Ta finally appealed to the Burmese for aid. A Burmese force was sent from Chiengmai to help them, but was intercepted en route and persuaded by Siribunyasan’s envoys to attack Nong Bua Lamphu. In a brief encounter with joint Burmese-Vientiane forces, Ta was killed and the town taken, while Wo managed to escape to Champasak with some of his followers. The Burmese forces returned to Chiengmai, carrying with them some of Siribunyasan’s children and court officials as hostages against Vien-


12. For the date of the accession of Siribunyasan, Le Boulanger gives 1760, as does History of Laos (mimeo, Bangkok, 1961), 58, 64. On the other hand, Phraya Pramuan, 36; Yim Punthayangkura, “Lamdap ratchawong kasat haeng prathet lao [Genealogical Table of the Kings of Laos],” Sinlapakon 6:3 (Sept. 1962), suppl.; and Berval, 41, give 1767. Charles Archaimbault, in an admirable study of “Histoire de Champa,” Journal Asiatique t. CCXLIX, fasc. 4 (1961), 558, indicates that the Wo-Ta tale related below could have taken place following the accession of Siribunyasan’s predecessor in 1741. I am most grateful to M. Archaimbault for his kindness in discussing this article with me, although for the judgments expressed here I alone am, of course, responsible.

tiane’s good behaviour during a projected invasion of Siam. It appears that at this time the Burmese asked Vientiane to attack Nakhon Ratchasima (Khorat) in conjunction with this invasion.\textsuperscript{14}

When Taksin attacked Chiangmai in 1774, he discovered some Lao officials among the Burmese forces and sent off a blistering protest message to Vientiane.\textsuperscript{15} Carried to Vientiane by six envoys, the letter complained that Vientiane had not lived up to the treaty with Siam, and threatened that Taksin would be compelled to attack Vientiane unless Siribunyasan sent food supplies for the current campaign against Burma, together with a Lao contingent to fight on the Thai side.

In his reply, written on 23 March 1775,\textsuperscript{16} Siribunyasan protested that he had done his best to live up to the treaty, but that he had been compelled to aid the Burmese because they held some of his children and officials as hostages. He promised to observe the treaty as fully as possible, but explained that he could do so only covertly until the hostages were returned, and asked that Siam give assistance to any of them that might escape through Siam. Siribunyasan’s reply to Taksin’s protest was accompanied by corroborating messages written by high court officials and the Supreme Patriarch of the Lao Buddhist order. Taksin’s reply, written on 31 May 1775, was more conciliatory. The threat to invade Vientiane was withdrawn, since a captured Burmese officer had corroborated Siribunyasan’s excuses; and Taksin expressed his desire—in the spirit of the treaty of 1771—to take revenge on Burma for its poor treatment of Vientiane. For such an expedition, however, Taksin stated that he needed money, elephants,

\textsuperscript{14} As Chulalongkorn, 135, indicates. The sequence of events presented here follows Chulalongkorn. The main weakness of this version of the tale is that events move too rapidly for the geographical and human elements involved. Thus, following Chulalongkorn’s version, it is but four years from the time of Wo’s flight to Champasak in 1773 to his death in 1777 following the complex series of events related below. Archaimbault’s 1741 date (p. 558), on the other hand, moves too slowly, over a space of almost forty years, and must meet the additional objection that the Burmese were in no position in 1741 to be active in Laos, as they were established only in Chiengsaen by 1741, and not in Chiangmai until early in the 1760’s (see Damrong, \textit{Thai rop phama}, 297-338, esp. pp. 331-4; and Phraya Prachakit 454-6). The alternative to these two versions is that given by Mom Ammorawongwitchit, “Tamnan muang nakhon champasak [History of Champasak],” in \textit{Collected Chronicles}, vol. 70 (Bangkok, 1941), 30-33 (hereafter cited as \textit{TMNC}), which dates Wo’s flight from Nong Bua Lamphu in 1770 or 1771. If this date is correct, the Burmese would have arrived in Vientiane owing, not to the appeals of Wo and Ta for aid, but rather to the Luang Prabang invasion of Vientiane. Since, however, the Burmese are said to have rushed back to Chiangmai following their siege of Luang Prabang (see note 11 above), even this answer to the problem is not free from doubt. All that can be stated with any certainty is that Wo was expelled from Nong Bua Lamphu by a Vientiane-Burmese force, and at this time the Burmese forces returned to Chiangmai with hostages from Vientiane.

\textsuperscript{15} Text in \textit{Maha Sila}, 91-2.

\textsuperscript{16} Text in \textit{Maha Sila}, 92.
horses, and soldiers. If Vientiane could supply these items, Taksin promised to rescue the Vientiane hostages in Ava. This message was sent with a large quantity of gifts, mostly textiles but including two rifles as well.\textsuperscript{17}

Sriribunyasan's reply to this last letter displayed a mixed reaction.\textsuperscript{18} He offered his daughter to Taksin, but stipulated that she must be sent for and escorted back to Thonburi. He also offered the Thai 500 oxcart loads of rice, but stated that Siam must fetch this as well. On the other hand, in order that he might have suitably-equipped troops for aiding the Siamese, he requested that he be sent 2000 rifles. Evidently the King of Vientiane had accepted the fact of Siamese power, but his response to Taksin's request indicates that he wished to keep their relations on an equal basis. While he must have felt constrained to accept some of Siam's demands in view of the disparity in their military power, he attempted to gain some status in his own right by marrying his daughter to Taksin, and he also required that Siam make some efforts on his behalf.

Taksin's response to this letter, written in September of 1775, was quite friendly.\textsuperscript{19} He stated that his envoys would come to Vientiane to fetch the princess and the 500 cartloads of rice, and that in addition to sending the rifles, instructors would also be sent to teach the Lao soldiers their use. He added that the Siamese army would soon be striking directly at Ava. This is, however, the last letter in this highly interesting correspondence which has been preserved. Relations were soon broken off, either due to a report from Luang Prabang that Vientiane was cooperating with the Burmese again and because the Lao did not subsequently aid in attacking the Burmese,\textsuperscript{20} or due to subsequent events which touched off the Siamese invasion of Vientiane in 1778. Both reasons are equally likely, and either is sufficient.

Before turning to the invasion of Vientiane, it is necessary to look first at the other Lao kingdoms. The annals of Luang Prabang are virtually blank for this period, save for passing mention of the inauguration of friendly relations with Siam. Le Boulanger\textsuperscript{21} states that in 1774 the King of Luang Prabang solicited Taksin's protection and proposed a defensive alliance against the Burmese. The two published Luang Prabang chronicles, however, state that Taksin wrote to the King in 1774 asking that friendly relations be established, and that a mission from Luang Prabang signed

\textsuperscript{17} Maha Sila, 95-7.
\textsuperscript{18} Maha Sila, 99.
\textsuperscript{19} Maha Sila, 99-100.
\textsuperscript{20} Maha Sila, 100.
\textsuperscript{21} Pages 155, 196-7.
a treaty of alliance in Bangkok in 1776. In assessing this new direction in Taksin's foreign policy, several factors may be pertinent. First, it may be that in resuming his correspondence with Vientiane in 1774, Taksin also took the opportunity to establish contact with Luang Prabang as part of his offensive against the Burmese strongholds in the north. On the other hand, it is also possible that King Tiao Vongsa heard of the correspondence between Taksin and Vientiane and wished to avoid complete isolation. Finally, by 1776 Taksin may have been anticipating the invasion of Vientiane that came in 1778. Unfortunately, none of these possibilities can be confirmed with the evidence at hand.

The principality of Champasak appears to have had consistent history of domestic political turmoil. Its ruler, Saiyakuman, was in constant conflict with the Uparat (or Viceroy). In 1758 the latter, Thammathewo, brought an army of supporters to attack the city, forcing Saiyakuman to flee to the village of Don Mot Daeng, near the present city of Ubon. The Uparat was prevented from pursuing the ruler only by the efforts of their mother, who managed to settle their quarrel and obtain the restoration of Saiyakuman to his duties in the city.

The major cause of the 1778 Thai invasion of the Lao lands — according to the Thai annals — lay with the troublesome Wo, who had earlier fled to Champasak. Saiyakuman established Wo and his entourage at the village of Ban Du Ban Kae. Informed of Saiyakuman's protection of the refugees, Siribunyasan prepared an army to attack the village. Concerned, no doubt, for the effects a Vientiane army might have on his own authority, Saiyakuman quickly dispatched a mission to Vientiane which secured the recall of the army and the opening of friendly relations between the Lao states. Finally, in 1777, Wo and Saiyakuman quarrelled, and the former withdrew his followers and their families to the village of Don Mot Daeng (apparently a convenient refuge) and, submitting tribute through the governor of Nakhon Ratchasima, put himself under the suzerainty of the Siamese.

King Siribunyasan of Vientiane, hearing of Wo's quarrel with Saiyakuman, sent an army against Don Mot Daeng. Wo's appeals for help from Champasak and Nakhon Ratchasima were not answered in time, and he was captured and executed by the Vientiane force. His son, Thao Kham, and several other officials es-

22. PMLP, 44-5; Damrong-PMLP, 254.
23. TMNC, 29-30.
24. Chulalongkorn, 135. Toem, I, 143-4; gives 1771, following TMNC, 32.
25. TMNC, 32.
Toem rightly points out that Taksin would hardly have gone to war over such a minor personage as Wo. His invasion of Vientiane was rather another step to be taken towards the strengthening of Siam; a move indirectly against the Burmese, but also, as the addition of new vassals along the eastern frontier would appear to indicate, a precaution against eventual troubles with Annam or Cambodia. Taksin had previously had pretexts for attacking Vientiane, but they had arisen at times when he was preoccupied with Burma. At this point, however, there was a temporary lull in the west, and several pretexts upon which to base an invasion of Vientiane, including perhaps the accusation of Thai Kham that the Lao were in league with the Burmese, as well as the murder of a vassal, Wo.

In November and December of 1778 the Thai armies moved out towards Vientiane. General Chakri took a force of 20,000 men overland, while his brother, General Surasi, went to Cambodia, where he raised a vassal naval force of 10,000 men and headed up the Mekong, capturing Champasak, Nakhon Phanom, and Nongkhai en route, as well as several smaller towns which were then vassals of Vientiane. The two forces joined in subduing the small towns surrounding Vientiane and laid siege to the capital for four months. They finally stormed the city, aided by a small force dispatched by Luang Prabang, and captured many members of the ruling family, the city's prized Buddha images, the Phrabang and the Emerald Buddha, and a very large number of Lao families which were later settled in the region of Saraburi, northeast of Ayuthya. King Siribunyasan, however, managed to escape to the town of Khamkoet, on the Vietnam border. Vientiane was left in charge of a prominent Vientiane general, Phraya Supho, and the Thai army returned home in April of 1779.

26. TMNC, 33. Maha Sila, 101-2, also states that Thao Kham suggested to Taksin that Vientiane was cooperating with the Burmese. Cf. also Chulalongkorn, 128.
29. For this invasion, a standard source is the Royal Autograph Edition of the Thai annals: Prince Damrong Rajanubhah, ed. Phraratchaphongsawadan chabap phraratchahatlekha (Bangkok, 1962), II, 418-23. For an incomplete account of the procuring of the naval force in Cambodia, see J. Moura, Le Royaume du Cambodge (Paris, 1883), II, 91. Other accounts of the expedition may be found in Maha Sila, 101-2; Le Boulanger, 155-6; Toem, I, 145-9; and TMNC, 33-4.
30. Which were, as the Thai sources put it, "invited" to Thonburi.
31. Maha Sila, 103.
32. The Thai annals state that there were two military expeditions in the Champasak area during this period, but give Wo as the cause of neither. In addition to the major attack on Vientiane in 1778-9, in the course of which Champasak
As a result of this invasion, both Vientiane and Champasak lost their independence and their ruling families and temporarily were governed by military commanders, although, at least in the case of Vientiane, the ruler was indigenous to the city. As for Luang Prabang, which had aided in the capture of Vientiane, it too became more closely aligned with the Siamese. Both the Luang Prabang chronicles state that Luang Prabang entered the battle at the request of General Chakri, and that subsequently Luang Prabang either “asked to be allowed to become” a vassal of Siam, or “was forced to accept Siamese suzerainty.” All three Lao kingdoms thus came under the spreading umbrella of Thai power.

II. Laos to the Accession of Chao Anu, 1780-1804

The sources which deal with the 1778 Thai invasion of Vientiane offer interesting material relating to the differing relationships holding between Bangkok and the Lao States on one hand (Vientiane, Luang Prabang, and Champasak) and between Bangkok and the northeast provinces of old Siam on the other. While these relationships are by no means clearly defined, and in practice varied greatly, certain general characteristics are readily apparent.

During the period with which this paper is concerned, the area in present-day Northeast Thailand under direct Thai adm
nistrative control greatly expanded, to cover virtually all of the Thai Northeast, except for a narrow band along the Mekong. By the end of the First Reign (1782–1809) this area included such muang (town/province) as Sisaket, Ubon, Yasothon, Roi-et, Kalasin, and Khonkaen, as well as many more towns clustered more closely around Khorat. The governors (chaomuang) of these towns were quite independent within their own jurisdictions. They did not, however, have the power to execute evildoers, to appoint higher officials within the muang, or to make war. Such decisions were referred to Khorat or Bangkok. Provinces in the Northeast were attached to various ministries and officials in Bangkok as a part of the financial support of the latter, and to them the muang had to render revenue and labour service. For such purposes, periodic censuses were made of every muang by officials from the capital. Their boundaries were set and, in this period, often shifted by Bangkok in order to create new muang in the area. A policy of the First Reign, continued by its successors, was to reward chaomuang for increases of population and territory by awarding them titles which reached as high as phraya. In general, in the sphere of administrative control, these Northeast provinces did not differ greatly from the rest of the Kingdom.

The areas of Laos that came under the suzerainty of Bangkok in the First Reign enjoyed quite a different relationship with Siam. The powers of their rulers were very much greater. They had the powers of capital punishment, of making war with Thai consent, and of independently appointing all but the four highest officials of the realm, and, as documented in the cases of Champasak and Luang Prabang, these appointments were generally made locally by a council of nobility and then submitted to Bangkok for approval. Their obligations to provide revenue and corvee labour were very much curtailed, and amounted to little more than an annual tribute of the “silver and gold trees” and providing armies in time of war. Each of the three Lao states had its own vassals and, to some extent, carried on limited independent foreign relations. In short, the Lao areas were more properly “vassals,” comparable to the Malay vassals of Bangkok, although because of the cultural affinities between Thai and Lao the relationship was more open to the close ties of royal marriages,

35. Toem, I, 496-7.
36. M. C. Sippamphansanoe Sonakun, Prawatsat thai samai krung rattanakosin yuk rack...chabap rang [Thai History in the First Part of the Bangkok Period... Draft Edition] (Bangkok, 1958), 61.
37. For this section, see Mom Ammorawongwitchit, “Phongsawadan huamuang monthon isan [Chronicles of the Provinces on Monthon Isan],” in Collected Chronicles, vol. 4 (Bangkok, 1915), 29-222, passim.
the education of Lao princes in Bangkok, and cultural and religious exchanges.

Within this framework of relations there was, during the 1780's and '90's, considerable scope for Thai diplomatic and military initiative. Rama I came to the throne of Siam fresh from the invasion of Vientiane, and throughout his reign had occasion to deal with Lao affairs. The main features of his activity were the appointments of higher officials and rulers in several of the Lao states, and several cases of military intervention.

In Champasak, Chao Saiyakuman, in the period following the Siamese invasion, was faced with a continuation of his old feud with the Uparat. The latter had died in 1767, but his influence in state affairs continued. Thao Kham Phong, a son of Phra Ta who had come to the area with Wo in 1773, had married the daughter of the late Uparat and proceeded to gather a strong following. Saiyakuman was then forced to award Thao Kham Phong an important military position in charge of a large area around present-day Ubon. Then, in 1780, the governor of Attapu, Chao O, a son of the late Uparat, together with his brother, was accused of oppressing the population under his control and was captured and executed by a force from Champasak. Hearing of this incident, Bangkok sent a royal commissioner to Champasak in 1782 who was to bring Saiyakuman and his court back to Bangkok for examination, but as Saiyakuman fell ill along the way, he was permitted to return home.

In 1791 a man popularly believed to possess magical powers gathered together a following and attacked Champasak, spurred by news of the ruler's illness. While the city was surrounded, Saiyakuman died at the age of 81 after a reign of 54 years. Informed of the incident, Siam sent a force from Khorat to subdue the rebels; but Thao Kham Phong and Thao Fai Na, the son of Wo, were able to put down the rebellion and executed the rebel leader. When the Thai forces arrived they reconstituted the local government, moved the capital north to the present Muang Kao Khan Koeng, and appointed Thao Fai Na ruler of Champasak, under the name of Chao Phra Wisaiyarat Khattiyawongsan.

38. He was the former General Chakri.
39. There is no mention of this episode in the Thai annals (see note 32 above). For this paragraph, see TMNC, 34-5.
40. TMNC, 35-6. Chao Prommathewanukroh, “Tamnan muang nakhon champasak [History of Champasak],” Collected Chronicles, vol. 70, 57-8 (cited as Phrommathewanukroh-TMNC), states that Saiyakuman died upon his return to Champasak in 1782 (see para. above), and that the Siamese were unable to choose a new ruler from among the three members of the ruling family they had removed to Bangkok. The leadership vacuum was filled, the account relates, first by the “man with magical powers,” and then by the sons of Wo and Ta, out of whom Thao Fai Na, after a visit to Bangkok, was appointed chaomuang.
Vientiane, however, was quite another matter. After the invasion of Vientiane in 1778, all the members of the royal family of the state — with the important exception of Chao Siribunyasan — were brought to Bangkok, and it was from this group of prisoners that the next three rulers of Vientiane were chosen.

Siribunyasan returned to Vientiane in 1781, and appears to have regained control over the state, although the sources do not present any clear account of how this came about. At his death in 1781, the Siamese enthroned Chao Nanthasen, son of Siribunyasan, as ruler of Vientiane, and returned the Phrabang.41

Luang Prabang, after having entered into more direct relations with Siam at the time of the invasion of Vientiane in 1778, had broken off relations with Burma. It annually sent the “silver and gold trees” to Siam, and maintained tributary relations with China.42 After a short interregnum following the death of King Tiao Vongsa, the nobles of the kingdom finally agreed in 1791 on the choice of his son, Anuruttha, to succeed him, but before enthroning him sent a mission to Bangkok to secure Siam’s approval and recognition for their nominee.43

Less than a year later,44 Chao Nanthasen reported to Bangkok that Anuruttha was conspiring with Burma against Vientiane, and shortly thereafter received authorization to attack Luang Prabang.45 The Vientiane army laid siege to the city for two weeks and was unable to penetrate the city walls. The commander of the invading forces then sent a letter to Queen Thaenkham, widow of King Suryavong, promising to make her ruler of Luang

41. Both Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia* (London, 1955), 381, and Le Boulanger, 157, state that Siribunyasan, voluntarily returned to Vientiane and submitted to Siam on learning that his children were being well-treated in Bangkok. The “Short Chronicle of Vientiane” (“Phongsawadan yo muang wiangchan,” *Collected Chronicles*, vol. 70, 183) states only that Siribunyasan returned to the city in December of 1780. The chronicles of the First Reign of the Chakri Dynasty of Siam state that Siribunyasan returned to Vientiane and killed Phraya Supho, whom the Thai had left in control, and took over the city. Officials opposed to him then reported the event to Bangkok, whereupon the Thai king appointed Nanthasen ruler of Vientiane. “Not long afterwards,” the source reports, Siribunyasan died. Chaophraya Thiphakorawong, *Phravatchaphongsawadan krung rattanakosin ratchakan thi 1* (Bangkok, 1962), 45-6. Hereafter cited as *First Reign Chronicle*.

42. Damrong-PMLP, 255, states that tribute was sent to China every five years until 1782, when the interval was changed to ten years, at an increased rate of tribute. The dates given in the Chinese sources, however, indicate that this change took place before 1760. Cf. J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,” *HJAS* 6 (1941), 166-8.

43. Maha Sila, 136; Damrong-PMLP, 256; and René de Berval, *Kingdom of Laos* (Saigon, 1959), 42.

44. Or perhaps still in 1791.

45. Both Le Boulanger, 157, 198-200; and Hall, *History*, 381, state that the attack was made on the initiative of Nanthasen because of “dynastic troubles” in Luang Prabang. The Thai sources, on the other hand, state that the attack was made for the purpose stated and that it was authorized. *First Reign Chronicle*, 182-3. Cf. also Sipphanphansanoc, 61; and Maha Sila, 110.
Prabang if she would open the gates of the city. With the aid of a friend in the city's garrison this was done, and the city fell to Vientiane. As in other cases of suspected treason, Chao Anuruttha and his family were sent to Bangkok. Evidently out of respect for Siam, however, Vientiane did not attempt to unite the two kingdoms, and only annexed the Hua Phan cantons at this time.

In 1794, a member of the Luang Prabang royal family, set to rule over the city by Vientiane, sought the release of Chao Anuruttha from prison in Siam, doing so through the good offices of China. The Chinese sent envoys to Bangkok via Hsen Wi and down the Nan River. They were granted an audience with Rama I and obtained Anuruttha's release. Orders then were sent to Vientiane that all families who had been deported from Luang Prabang in the 1792 invasion be returned to their homes, and Anuruttha and his family were sent home laden with gifts.

At about this time Chao Nanthesen of Vientiane was recalled to Bangkok. Some sources state that he lost his throne simply because he did not rule well; but most mention that he was accused of conspiring with the ruler of Nakhon Phanom to revolt against Siamese domination. Both were summoned to Bangkok for an investigation, and while in Bangkok, Chao Nanthesen died.

His brother, Chao Inthavong, was sent from Bangkok to succeed him. He was assisted by his younger brother, Chao Anuvong (or Anu), who was made Uparat. He immediately began to render his obligations to his suzerain in full. Anu was sent to command Lao contingents fighting at the side of the Thai army in 1795, 1798, 1799, and 1803. Anu distinguished himself in these campaigns, most of which were against the Burmese, and was twice commended by King Rama I. The reign of Chao Inthavong marked a high point in Thai-Vientiane relations on

46. E.g. the Uparat of Champasak at an earlier date.
47. Maha Sila, 110; Sipphanphansanoe, 61; First Reign Chronicle, 183.
48. Berval, 42.
49. PMLP, 49-50; and Damrong-PMLP, 257-8 give this story in full, with some variations. The Chinese embassy seems unlikely, especially by the route mentioned. The First Reign Chronicle states only that Anuruttha was later restored to his throne, without mentioning the circumstances.
50. The First Reign Chronicle mentions this event after discussing the restoration of Anuruttha, while the actual dates mentioned for the events would put them in reverse order. Le Boulanger states that Chao Nanthesen was recalled because of the attack on Luang Prabang, and at that time Anuruttha was restored to his throne.
51. E.g. Sipphanphansanoe, 61.
52. First Reign Chronicle, 211-12; Maha Sila, 110; and Phraya Chanthangonkham, "Phongsawadan muang nakhon phanom sangkhep [Condensed Chronicles of Nakhon Phanom]," in Collected Chronicles, vol. 70, 239.
this account, at any rate: the last two times Lao soldiers had participated in the Thai-Burmese wars were in 1765 and 1774, both times on the Burmese side. Relations appeared to be perfectly harmonious, although Le Boulanger expresses some doubt as to this conclusion:

Politically clever, [Anu] hid his true sentiments and maintained the attitude of deference to his suzerain which circumstances had imposed on him. He acquired the confidence of the Thai court, and the annals of the Thai recognized his courage and the incontestable services which he rendered to Siam for about five years. When Chao In died, he was immediately appointed as his successor.53

Vientiane, however, also continued to carry on relations with Vietnam. Some of her vassal towns had been paying equal tribute to Annam and Vientiane as long ago as 1780, and in 1790 Vientiane was attacked by a joint Vietnamese-Xieng Khouang force, which appears to have resulted in Chao Inthavong sending tribute to Annam as well.55 Vientiane forces cooperated with Gia-long against the Tay-son rebellion, and in 1798 Vietnamese officers came to Vientiane to aid the Lao army, later accompanying it on missions against rebel remnants. Vientiane sent tribute missions to Gia-long in 1801 and 1802; and upon his accession, in 1804, Chao Anu immediately notified the court at Hue.56 It appears possible, then, that Vientiane’s relations with Vietnam were nearly as close as its relations with Siam, although the Siamese sources give little such information.

Finally, in 1804, Chao Inthavong died. The King of Siam sent presents by an embassy to his cremation, and named the Uparat, Chao Anu, to succeed him.57

In summary, then, during this period Siam’s position in Laos was maintained by both diplomatic and military means. Bangkok named the rulers of Champasak (1791) and Vientiane (1781, 1794/5, and 1804), and approved the choice of a rule for Luang Prabang (1791). Siam repeatedly took measures to suppress suspected revolts in Laos, and, whether as a conscious policy or not,

53. Le Boulanger, 159. On the content of this paragraph, see also Maha Sila, 111.
55. First Reign Chronicle, 177. This attack may have been provoked by a prior attack by Vientiane on Xieng-Khouang in 1787, occasioned by the latter’s submission to Vietnam, although none of the other sources mention this. Maha Sila, 109-10. Cf. also Eugene Picanon, Le Laos Francais (Paris, 1901), 174-5.
57. First Reign Chronicle, 274.
maintained the political fragmentation of Laos. During the reign of Chao Anu of Vientiane, this was to be seriously threatened.

III. *The Reign of Chao Anu, 1804-1827*

Although his reign was to bring about the destruction of his state, Chao Anu came to the throne under most favourable auspices. He was highly respected and honoured by the Siamese for his loyal services in the Thai wars with Burma, and he received his investiture at the hands of Siam. Much of the early part of his reign was spent in expanding and beautifying his capital. He constructed a new royal palace, bridges, and religious monuments. In this aspect of his rule, Anu appears to have been acting in the best traditions of Buddhist monarchy.

In the political realm, however, Anu’s actions and policies admit of less certain interpretation. Some writers, notably Le Boulanger, have construed virtually every action of Anu from 1794 as preparation for the rebellion of 1827. It is possible that from his youth Anu harbored a grand design for restoring the Kingdom of Lan Chang, but lacking any reliable indications of Anu’s intentions, at least for the early part of his reign, his actions and policies must be taken on their face value.

Early in his reign, Anu reaffirmed the old tribute relationship between Vientiane and Annam. Tribute was regularized by a mission sent in 1804 to notify Gia-long of Anu’s accession. It was to be sent every three years, and to consist of male elephants, rhinoceros horns, ivory, and cinnamon. When the tribute for 1808 did not arrive punctually, Gia-long sent a mission demanding it, which quickly provoked the desired response. There were only three more tribute missions, in 1811–12, 1814, and 1817, and none after that.

The Luang Prabang Annals record very little for this interim period. They mention that King Anuruttha died in 1815, and that King Rama II supported the Uparat as his successor. The latter was enthroned in 1816 as Chao Mangthaturat, and was, in the following years, to show himself a devoted friend of the Thai monarchs.

Champasak, on the other hand, figures prominently in the annals of the period. In 1811 the ruler of Champasak died, and

58. To paraphrase Le Boulanger, 159.
59. Maha Sila, 111; *Short Chronicle of Vientiane*, 181-204.
60. Bui Quang Tung, 401. Cf. also Le Boulanger, 160-1 f.n.
61. Maybon, 385; Le Thanh Khoi, 336.
62. PMLP, 51.
63. TMNC, 37; Phrommathewanusukro-TMNC, 59, says 1810.
a son of the former ruler, Saiyakuman, was named to replace him, but the latter died within three days. King Rama I sent a high ranking official to his cremation. This envoy was given a precious crystal image of the Lord Buddha as a present for King Rama I, but returned to Bangkok without installing a ruler in Champasak. Finally in 1813 Chao Manoi was appointed by Siam to rule the state, with a descendant of the rival Thammathewo’s family as Uparat. Chao Manoi and his Uparat—were later involved in a dispute which was mediated by Bangkok and resulted in the jailing of the latter. Clearly Siam’s control over Champasak was stronger than that over either of the other two principalities.64

In 1819 a revolt broke out in the territory of Champasak among the Kha peoples, led by a renegade monk named Sa. Sa claimed magical powers, which he demonstrated by using a mirror to create fire. Gathering a large number of followers, he marched on Champasak. Chao Manoi put up very little resistance, and the city was quickly taken, the ruling families escaping to the region of Ubon. Troops from Ubon and Khorat quickly retook the city, but were unable to capture the monk Sa, and returned home, sending Chao Manoi to Bangkok, where he later died. Sa was finally captured by a force from Vientiane, led by Anu’s son, Yo.

The Siamese were confronted with the problem of reinstating strong rule in Champasak. Chao Manoi and his predecessors had proved themselves too weak to withstand even internal revolt. During a lengthy discussion in Bangkok over the naming of a ruler, Chao Anu urged the naming of his son to the post. Chao-phraya Chetsadabodin (later Rama III) was in favour of such an appointment, and prevailed over Prince Phithaksamontri, who argued that such an appointment would dangerously strengthen Vientiane. The Thai were forced to make the decision on the basis of political and military requirements, and so chose Yo, who, it was felt, would be strong enough—with his father’s help, if necessary—to prevent Annamese encroachment in the Mekong valley.65

Following the Champasak episode, Anu began to prepare for revolt. He instructed his son, Chao Yo, to fortify his territory66 and began a campaign to obtain at least the neutrality of Luang Prabang in the event of conflict with Siam. In 1820 he sent envoys to Chao Mangthaturat of Luang Prabang to propose the

64. Maha Sila, 144; TMNC, 37-8.
66. TMNC, 39; Le Boulanger, 161.
restoration of friendly relations between the two states and "the union of their forces against the suzerainty of the West [Siam] whose power was growing in a menacing fashion." Chao Mangthaturat refused, but in the following year Anu again sent a mission in an attempt to bribe him. This mission seems at least to have won Mangthaturat's neutrality, for he did not report the incidents to Bangkok, and over the following years maintained envoys in both Bangkok and Vientiane to keep him informed of developments.

The rulers of both Vientiane and Luang Prabang came to Bangkok for the cremation of Rama II in 1825. Mangthaturat of Luang Prabang handed over the administration of his state to senior officials and came to Bangkok bearing tribute. In a rather curious gesture, he asked the permission of King Rama III to enter a monastery to make merit in recognition of the favours which Rama I and Rama II had shown Luang Prabang. He stayed in the monastery for a year and wished to stay longer, but an epidemic broke out in Luang Prabang in 1826, and he asked to be allowed to return home. Upon his departure, King Rama III bestowed upon Mangthaturat "the five insignia of kingship" in recognition of his great loyalty to Siam. Leaving behind two of his younger sons, whom he had enrolled in the Royal Pages Corps, Mangthaturat returned to Luang Prabang.

Chao Anu also came to Bangkok for the royal cremation. His actions there show some of the seeds of the rebellion which followed his return home. First, following the cremation, some of the Lao in Anu's entourage were called up for the Thai corvee, and put to work cutting palm trees at Suphanburi. Secondly, Anu made a number of demands on Rama III, acting on the assumption that he was an important vassal of Siam and a necessary ally, particularly at a time when it appeared that Siam was threatened by British actions in Burma and Malaya and by Vietnamese pressure on Cambodia. Anu asked that the Lao dancers and artisans in the royal service be returned, but he was given

67. Le Boulanger, 201.
68. Le Boulanger, 201-2.
69. Damrong, PMLP, 261-2. The five royal insignia are the golden slippers, the royal staff or baton, the sceptre or sword, the state crown, and the fly whisk. Cf. also Toem, 154. It is possible that Chao Mangthaturat stayed in Bangkok at this time to avoid any involvement in Anu's forthcoming revolt, and returned home only when the danger of revolt appeared past—perhaps when the rumor of a British invasion had died out.
70. Maha Sila, 113; and Chaophraya Thipakhorawong, Phraratchaphongsawadan krung rattanakosin ratchakan thi 3 [Royal Chronicle of the Third Reign of the Bangkok Period] (Bangkok, 1938), 24.
71. Le Boulanger, 166; Thailand, Krom Sinlapakon, comp., Chotmaihet ruang prep khabot wiangchan [Documents Concerning the Suppression of the Vientiane Rebellion] (Bangkok, 1926), 6; and Toem, 1, 154-5.
only one singer.\textsuperscript{72} He also requested that the Lao families who had been deported from Vientiane in 1778–9 and settled in Saraburi—amounting to some ten thousand persons—be returned, but as this would leave a large depopulated area near the capital, the request was refused.\textsuperscript{73} The denial of his requests and the treatment of members of his entourage must have convinced Anu that his value to Siam was not as high as he had supposed. In addition, he may have taken offense at the favours shown to Chao Mangthathurat of Luang Prabang in response to the latter’s submissive behaviour.

Anu returned to Vientiane and began to plan his revolt. He mended his fences with Annam and appears to have relied upon Vietnamese support in the event that he should require it.\textsuperscript{74} He called together the nobles of the state and outlined his plans. He pointed out that a new and inexperienced ruler was on the throne in Siam and that the Thai armies were weak. The governor of Nakhon Ratchasima was absent, and this was the only town along the route to Bangkok that could make any show of resistance. His most convincing argument, however, consisted of a fresh rumour from Bangkok to the effect that the British were sending a naval force against Bangkok.\textsuperscript{75} Vientiane, he explained, could send an army through the Thai Northeast, using the rumour as an excuse, stating that the Lao force was going to the aid of Siam.\textsuperscript{76} He envisaged a lightning campaign for loot and captives, with its first objective the repatriation of the Lao settlers in the Saraburi region, and he did not intend to occupy Bangkok for any length of time. In late January 1827, the Lao troops began their attack from Vientiane and Champasak, the latter army under the command of Chao Yo.\textsuperscript{77}

In a letter written to Bangkok after the start of the rebellion,

\textsuperscript{72} Third Reign Chronicle, 24.
\textsuperscript{73} Cf. esp. Toem, I, 154-5.
\textsuperscript{74} Sipphanphansanoec, 63; Toem, I, 155; and VeJla, 80.
\textsuperscript{75} A letter from John Gillies to John Crawfurd, dated 2 September 1825, notes the currency of the rumor in Bangkok during the former’s stay there that year. Gillies states that the rumor was started by the Dutch, and that it caused some alarm in the Thai Government; but by the time he left Bangkok, he wrote, he had managed to discourage such reports. Thailand, Ratchabandit Sapha, trans. and comp., \textit{Khao ton ton ratchakan thi 3} [News of the Beginning of the Third Reign] (Bangkok, 1932), 5.
\textsuperscript{76} Chao Anu’s use of this rumor is shown in a curious letter he wrote King Rama III from Nakhon Ratchasima dated 26 January 1827, in which he stated that he was on his way to Bangkok with a large army to defend the city against a joint British-Burmese attack. He admitted that he was doing so without the King’s orders, knowingly risking the death penalty. Thailand, Krom Sinlapakon, comp., \textit{ChotmaiheT nakhon ratchasima} [Documents of Nakhon Ratchasima] (Bangkok, 1954), 1-3. I am grateful to Kachorn Sukabhanij for calling this letter to my attention.
\textsuperscript{77} Third Reign Chronicle, 38-9.
Chao Mangthaturat reported having received a diplomatic mission from Vientiane in 1826. The mission had brought word that the British and Burmese were attacking Bangkok, and that Vientiane was going to the aid of the Siamese and needed reinforcements from Luang Prabang. Mangthaturat stated that he had not believed the story, and had sought the counsel of his nobles in working out some stratagem to stall the Vientiane envoys. He told the latter that he would send troops, but that they would be late, and in the interval sent word by his son to Bangkok of Vientiane's intentions. Not long afterwards he received a message from the town of Nan, stating that it had been requested by Bangkok to assist in attacking Vientiane. Mangthaturat joined his small force with the Nan troops and provided supplies for the Thai army in their campaign, but his general participation in putting down the revolt was minimal. The task of pacifying the Lao states, from Champasak in the south to the Hua Phan cantons and Luang Prabang in the north, was carried out on a massive scale by the armies of Siam, which gained at this time an overwhelming predominance in Laos which lasted until the last years of the century.

**Conclusion**

Viewed within its historical context, the Vientiane rebellion comes into clearer focus as the logical consequence of growing Thai domination in Laos. While earlier Thai interference in Lao affairs had been undertaken largely as a defense against the Burmese, and seems to have been accepted by Vientiane and Luang Prabang as such, the character of Siamese control was gradually broadened and came to be supported by the full military strength of Siam. By the beginning of the 19th century, Siam began to focus her attention on her eastern frontiers, and Laos became a major scene of Thai activity.

In his attempt to resist growing Siamese encroachment in Laos, as well as to check its continued political fragmentation, Chao Anu failed, and lost both his struggles. The Kingdom of Vientiane was abolished, its population forcibly removed to Siam, and its former territories fell under the direct control of Thai provincial administration. Likewise, the Thai installed a new line

78. *Vientiane Rebellion Documents*, 64.
79. For events in Luang Prabang during this period, see *PMLP*, 52-4; and Damrong-PMLP, 262-4. The latter notes that in 1828 the Uparat of Luang Prabang was accused by the Thai of sheltering some fleeing Vientiane families, and was called to Bangkok where he soon died. Chao Suk Soem, the son of Mangthaturat who had carried the message to Bangkok concerning Ana's plans, was named to replace him. See also *Vientiane Rebellion Documents*, 64-6; and Le Boulanger, 164-70, 201-3.
of rulers at Champasak and drew that state more firmly into the administrative system of the Thai Northeast. Luang Prabang remained weak, to carry on alone the shade of old Lan Chang.

In its expansion into the Lao country, Siam overextended herself. While Laos prior to 1778 had felt the adverse effects of political disunity, the result of the 1827 rebellion was to accentuate it further. The Thai had perpetuated the existence of a weak and divided Laos as an instrument of their own-self-strengthening. But such a Laos was to prove more a liability than an asset in the years that were to follow.
THE BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN:
AN ABORTIVE ATTEMPT AT SETTLEMENT
1700 — 1707
R. Suntharalingam

Early in July 1698 the royal assent was received to an Act of Parliament which sanctioned the formation of a corporation, called the General Society, whose subscribers were vested with exclusive rights to trade in the East. The 'New' Company obtained its Royal Charter in September 1698 under the name of 'The English Company Trading to the Indies' and it was to supercede the 'Old' Company which was given a three-year grace to wind up its business. The 'Old' Company was expected to liquidate its East Indian assets, dismantle its Asian factories and recall its servants by September 1701.1

The 'New' Company was seeking profitable trading connexions in the East and immediately its attention became focused on the China trade. It was generally believed that China was a huge market, capable of absorbing large quantities of British manufactures. Moreover, China was expected to furnish a variety of goods in which the Company could profitably invest. These hopes compelled the directors of the 'New' Company to consider the establishment of permanent factories in China, and in 1699, a China Presidency was formally constituted.

The desire to develop trade with China elevated Borneo to a position of importance to the Company. A half-way station between India and China became a necessity, and Borneo, partly by virtue of its geographical position but largely on account of it being on the periphery of Dutch interest, became the obvious choice. In April 1699 Henry Watson and Captain Cotesworth were furnished with instructions to establish a factory at Banjarmasin, a mission successfully accomplished in the following year.2 It is with the fortunes of this factory that this paper is primarily concerned.

1. The dismantling of the 'Old' Company's establishments in the East, however, never took place. In 1702, discussions led to a fusion of the 'Old' and the 'New' Company and the union became operative in 1709. See Harihar Das, The Norris Embassy to Aurangzeb (1699–1702), (Calcutta, 1959), pp. 40–57.