At the Edge of Mandalas
The Transformation of the China's Yunnan Borderlands
in the 19th and 20th Century
by
Zhidan Duan

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Approved April 2015 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:

Stephen Mackinnon, Chair
James Rush
Hoyt Tillman

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
May 2015
ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the transformation of China's Yunnan borderlands with mainland Southeast Asia and South Asia, especially during the late 19th and the 20th century, in terms of political, social, economic and cultural changes. It moves beyond the traditional paradigm that stresses the diversity and difference of mainland Southeast Asian polities, and instead, emphasizes the similarities they shared in long-term interactions based on common religions, economic patterns, wars, intra-regional migration, and trade before the area was divided into sub-regions influenced by traditional and new imperial powers. This unique perspective provides a new approach to understanding the deep-rooted social and economic dilemmas and inequities caused by the competition of big powers in the region. Based on a careful examination of China's model, this dissertation calls the scholars’ attention to how the indigenous societies evolved in response to different alternatives for modernization provided or enforced by colonial and regional powers.

This dissertation addresses a phenomenon that occurred in China's nation building process in which a complicated local history of Yunnan that had a rich historical legacy of contributions from both Chinese migrants and indigenous ethnic minorities was replaced with one that focused only the ethnic minorities in the region, as well as their participation in a reconstructed national history. This simplified and ethicized history supports a multi-ethnic Chinese national identity that avoids the historical, political, social and cultural context of the independence of the indigenous societies, and instead, stresses their submission to Chinese authority and the unification of China.
This study also emphasizes the process through which the boundaries between China and other countries in the region are shifting to focus on issues of homeland security and geopolitical interest. Also frequent economic and cultural exchanges from all sides have diluted the previous ideological confrontations in the current era of China-centric globalization.
DEDICATION

For my Fathers, Mothers and Mentors
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td></td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE HOMOGENOUS INDIGENOUS SOCIETIES</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Native Settlers and the Newcomers</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linguistic Ties and Intra-regional Migration</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geographic Settlements, Cultural Zones and Economic Patterns of the Indigenous communities</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. THE INDIGENOUS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND ITS TRANSFORMATION</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Power Structure of the Indigenous Societies</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Militarization and the Remedies for Local Competition</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Chinese Way</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taming Local Forces</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. DEFINING THE BORDER OF THE TRADING EMPIRE: NATIONAL BOUNDARIES SHAPED BY TRADE AND WARS</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Trading Empire without Boundaries</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Roads, New Migrants and New Cities</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wars and Political Boundaries</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within the Communist Camp</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER

Trade vs. Wars, and Open vs. Isolation: Opium and Rubber Cultivation…198

Landmines: Another Type of Trauma that We Don’t Mention…………205

5. FROM A MULTICULTURAL LAND TO A REMOTE SOCIALIST

FRONTIER………………………………………………………………………214

The Soil for Multi-centralism…………………………………………………215

The Chinese Civilizing Mission………………………………………………229

The Communist Civilizing Project……………………………………………238

When the Line between Education and Propaganda Blurred………………251

6. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………265

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………276

GLOSSARY OF TERMS…………………………………………………………299
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Financial Punishment for the Violation of the Mutual Assistant Agreement</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jade Rocks Imported from Burma via Tengchong Custom</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Numbers of Chinese in Each of the Countries of Indochina</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Map of Yunnan</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Greater Mekong Area</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zones of Influence: Ceramic Kiln Lineages in Mainland Southeast Asia</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The Integration and Alienation of Different Indigenous Groups</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Smuggling Routes via the Landmine Zones in Yunnan</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Trans-Asian Railway</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map. 1. Map of Yunnan

---

1 Carto GIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University
Map. 2. The Greater Mekong Area


CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

From the 4th century B.C when some areas of Yunnan first appeared in the Chinese historical documents until now, Yunnan’s role shifted from a relatively independent area outside of China to a Chinese colony, China’s tributary, and a frontier province of China. The long and rich local history of Yunnan provides abundant resources for scholar’s engagement in the study of China’s frontier, in terms of social economic history, political development, ethnic studies, culture and religions, environmental history and many other possibilities. However, the studies of Yunnan have been limited: First of all, the quantity of the scholarship is limited. Second, the perspectives that the scholars have brought to the subjects is limited in focus. The majority of the current scholarship on Yunnan concentrates on ethnic minorities and their identities. The nature of the political economy, migration, trade, wars, and environment has only attracted a few scholars. The study of Yunnan has the danger of being over “simplified” and “ethnicized”. The same problem plagues the studies of other parts of the Chinese frontier as well. This dissertation focuses on demographical, social, cultural, political and historical context of Yunnan.

For centuries, ethnocentric Chinese scholars and explorers wrote about a backward and isolated Yunnan populated by the barbarians. Interpreted by a culturally and politically dominant group, the history of Yunnan belonged to the kind of official history that privileged dominant regional civilizations, telling stories how “a backward,
naive, and perhaps barbaric people are gradually incorporated into an advanced, superior, and more prosperous society and culture.”¹

The European explorers, missionaries and politicians were the first group of people who brought Yunnan to the international attention. A “Yunnan Myth” was created by the French and British who observed Yunnan’s important role in geopolitics, trans-regional and trans-national trade, and thus promoted as exploitation as well as a target for investment.² The Yunnan Myth pictured Yunnan as a place of “tremendous potential wealth which could be rendered actual by opening the province to European commerce.”³ Archibald Ross Colquhoun, E.C Baber, H.M Consul Gardener, F.S Bourne as well as Archibald J. Little from Britain, as well as Admiral de la Grandiere, Francis Garnier, Doudart de Lagree, Jean Dupuis and M. Emil Rocher from France promoted the Yunnan Myth in travel literature and journals from the late 1870s to the late 1880s. In 1894, Prince Heri D’ Orleans wrote to re-promote the Yunnan Myth after it was cooled down for a little while, and in the following decade, the French initiated railway building in the area.⁴ As the Yunnan myth gradually faded away because of the topological inaccessibility, Yunnan’s isolation and backwardness became magnified. As a result, Yunnan’s role in trans-national and trans-regional trade before the People’s Republic of China era has been neglected.

Western trained anthropologists, sociologists and scientists found that Yunnan was an ideal place for field work. In the first half of the twentieth century, Joseph Rock, Herold J. Wiens, Tien Ju-kang, C.P. Fitzgerald, Chen Hansheng, and other Chinese native scholars, such as Fang Guoyu, contributed to the pioneer research on Yunnan. Their studies concerned the Chinese migration, the expansion of the Chinese empire, ethnic minorities, the social and economic structure of ethnic societies, and religions. Basic paradigms for studies of Yunnan as well as the Chinese frontier were formulated, which included: sinicization, nation building, colonialism (and neo-colonialism), and modernization. Yunnan received renewed attention from western scholars when China began to open up in the late 1970s. Ethnic identification, ethnic education, ethnic tourism, and everything concerning the ethnic minorities in Yunnan became the focus of much scholarship. The Naxi people, based on their unique matrilineal society, attracted considerable attention from western anthropologists and sociologists. Besides that, studies of the Dai, Hui, Bai, Hani, Bulang and Yi people also proliferated.


When scholars engaged a broader range of topics such as migration, gender, border and trade, they applied new approaches and concepts brought from the studies of the U.S West. Guo Xiaolin compared the Yunnan frontier to a marketplace where people of “different backgrounds and from all directions congregate and interact — exchanging what one has for what one has not”. Guo believes that “amalgamation”, instead of elimination, dominated the process of cultural change. Therefore, variation is able to survive. John McKinnon and C. Patterson Giersch have discussed the geological changes and its relationship to societal transformation. “Influenced by Richard White’s seminal work on North America, Yang (Bing) creatively melds the musty ‘sinicization’
concept (assimilation to Chinese ways) with an analysis of how contact with non-Chinese people transformed migrants into Yunnanese.”  

Ecological changes, transnational trade, opium, women trafficking and the migration of the Hmong people are also discussed by various scholars who mainly focus on the transformation of Yunnan and Guangxi’s border with mainland Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. The connections between Yunnan, Burma and India, as well as the development of the indigenous communities were recorded in Thant Myint-U’s travelogue published in 2011.

It is obvious that current studies of Yunnan are unbalanced. The ethnic minority-centered discourse provides too narrow a perspective on frontier history. Today, as more and more people become aware of geopolitics and think of Yunnan in a broad global and regional context, the need for more of a “comprehensive” and “longue durée” history becomes urgent. This dissertation attempts to bring the complicated local history of Yunnan to a larger audience.

The aforementioned paradigms of sinicization, the grand unification of China, state building, colonialism (neo-colonialism), and modernization can be critiqued from a variety of points of view.

Sinicization is a Chinese centered approach. It emphasizes Chinese migrants as well as the Chinese administration as the overwhelming forces that swept through the frontier region. There are several major flaws with this paradigm. First of all, sinicization

---

overstresses that the Chinese influence was the dominant force behind the assimilation of indigenous people into the Chinese cultural realm. It exaggerates the level of the Chinese influence on the frontier. At the same time, it neglects the process of the indigenization of the Chinese elements, and underestimates the agency as well as the strength of the indigenous people and local cultures. Second, this paradigm is Sino-centric, emphasizing the superiority of the Chinese culture and the Chinese example of social, political, economic and cultural transformation. Sinicization means the “civilizing mission” of Chinese culture, with parallels to Jackson Turner’s paradigm of the “civilizing mission” on the American Frontier. Stevan Harrell argues that there is no fundamental difference between the civilizing mission of the CCP and its predecessors. Both tried to transform the people of the periphery according to Han-Chinese norms.\(^{11}\) Third, the term sinicization does not have a clear definition, and is used as a general term to portray the vague Chinese cultural influence on the indigenous. It ignores the differences between the state’s operations in the frontier and the Chinese migrant’s activities. Giersch pointed out that sinicization presumes that “indigenous communities will inevitably dissolve in a flood of Chinese values when faced with Han migrants.”\(^{12}\) And in the case of the Qing period, Sinicization “also ignores the facts that the Qing imperial family were not Han, but Manchus, and that many of the high-level officials who served in eighteenth-century Yunnan were Manchu or Han-martial bannermen.”\(^{13}\) The vagueness of Sinicization makes it even more difficult to apply during the PRC era because the CCP has focused on


transforming China and the frontiers according to the principles of indigenized Marxism. Herold Wiens points out that the spread of the communist culture caused the “communization” of the indigenous people, and characterized the process of sinicization during the CCP era.\(^1^4\) Guo Xiaolin argues, the idea that “a dominant culture constantly stands out and is capable of assimilating all others is too simplistic an assumption”.\(^1^5\) On the other hand, scholars whose effort eliminates Chinese centered language sometimes can lead to an ethnic-centered approach that overstresses the independence of the ethnic minorities from the Chinese influence.

The paradigm of modernization has similar problems with sinicization. It is vaguely defined; it does not have a fixed criteria; and it can be often overly Chinese-centered. Also, it can trigger overly ethnic-centered approaches as the solution to overly Chinese centered dialogues. When this paradigm is applied to the study of the Yunnan frontier, it too quite often remains undefined as a reference to industrial and economic development. Political, social and cultural institutions are often excluded from the paradigm of modernization, but inserted instead into state-local power relations or Sinicization.\(^1^6\) The separation of these aspects within the paradigm of modernization creates problems of analysis. It only provides snap-shots instead of providing a complete and long-term picture of the transformation of Yunnan frontier. The paradigm of modernization requires a relatively long-term vision and comparative approaches so that the continuity of as well as the deviation from the past can be taken into consideration.

\(^{15}\) Guo Xiaoling, *State and Ethnicity in China’s Southwest* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 64. 
The paradigm of the grand unification of China has become the official ideological narrative of the PRC government, echoed in the standard works of most Chinese scholars. The grand unification of China argues that China has been a unified country with multi-ethnic minorities since 200BC. It supports the concept of a coherent and unified Chinese nation that was constructed after 1949 in order to fit into a new historical and political discourse of history. Stevan Harrell has pointed out that after the communists took over China, there were two models for China’s future: the model of ancient empire wherein ethnic groups are not given equal rights; and the model of nation state wherein equality is secured on a base of “real or promised erasure of ethnic distinctions”. However, the CCP rejected both models and created a so called “unified country of diverse nationalities”.

In China, Fang Guoyu was considered “the founder of the academic paradigm of Yunnan historical geography and the history of minority nationalities in southwest China” by Chinese scholars. He began to make a significant contribution on ethnic studies (studies about nationalities) as the Chinese government initiated ethnic classification in 1950s. Before the 1950s, many scholars, including Fang Guoyu, Xu Jiarui, Xian Da and others concentrated on the study of the history of ethnic groups. Although the history of local ethnic groups had been studied by scholars, a systematic paradigm based on ethnic classification did not come into being until 1950s “when ethnic minorities were forced into the minority nationalities' autonomy system”. Thus, after 1949, “an academic paradigm on the study of the minority nationalities of southwest

China was needed. This paradigm served as an academic tool for the illustration of the political strategy on China's southwest frontier, so as to construct and interpret the newly-built nation-state system and its history.”19 In the late 1980s, Fei Xiaotong’s interpretation of the Grand Unification of China as well as a multi-ethnic Chinese nation became the orthodox view. This also established the mainstream discourse of China frontier studies that centers on patriotism and nationalism. 20

Under the paradigm of the grand unification of China, the local history of frontier areas is over simplified, and overly ethnicized. The major reason is that complicated local histories reveal too much of the social, cultural and political connections that China’s peripheries had with their adjacent areas, instead of with China and Chinese people. This directly contradicts the new history and identity of a unified Chinese nation especially after the establishment of the PRC. Thus, under the paradigm of the grand unification of China, the frontier and indigenous people are often portrayed as isolated, submissive, backward and suffering under the oppression of ethnic nobles. These people admire Chinese civilization, and are willing to learn from China. Ethnic identity is highly stressed within the PRC in terms of its contribution to the diversity and democracy to a multi-ethnic Chinese nation.

20 Fei Xiaotong initially proposed a theory, namely the pattern of the diversity in the unity of the Chinese nation, in August, 1988 when he addressed a broad audience for the Tanner Lecture held at the Hong Kong Chinese University. Later this theory was expanded and elaborated in his book published in 1999. See Fei Xiaotong (费孝通), “Zhonghua Minzu Duoyuan Yiti Geju” 中华民族多元一体格局 [The Pattern of the Diversity in the Unity of the Chinese Nation], in Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) 北京大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) [Journal of Peiking University (Humanities and Social Sciences)], Vol.4 (1989): 1-19. Also, Fei Xiaotong (费孝通), Zhonghua Minzu Duoyuan Yiti Geju 中华民族多元一体格局 [The Pattern of the Diversity in the Unity of the Chinese Nation] (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1999).
The paradigm of nation building goes hand-in-hand with grand unification theory for Chinese scholars. And yet this is still a very new concept for scholars in China and few scholars have applied that in their research.

Surprisingly, the paradigm of colonialism (and neo-colonialism) is a relatively neutral paradigm, and yet it is being criticized by most scholars in China for taking exception to the paradigm of the grand unification of China and Chinese nation building. The paradigm of colonialism or neo-colonialism does not consider Yunnan as a natural province of Imperial China. Instead, this paradigm advocates the relative independence or quasi-independence of Yunnan region throughout history. The geographical territory that eventually became the Yunnan province of China was a result of Chinese colonialism in response to the expansion of other colonial forces in the world. James Scott points out that a “cultural and administrative process of ‘internal colonialism’ usually accompanied the expansion of states”. This “internal colonialism” was characterized by the economic, political as well as military expansion of dominant peoples and countries.

James Scott gives a global list of internal colonialism, such as the “formation of most modern Western nation states”, “the imperial projects of the Romans, the Hapsburgs, the Ottomans, the Han, and the British,” and the European expansion in America, South Africa and Australia. 21 Moreover, the narrative of Chinese colonization has a continuous theme, composed of periodic progress, steps which are similar in nature but different in specific goals and strategies. In another words, under the paradigm of colonialism the expansion of pre-modern Chinese empires and modern Chinese regimes share the same purpose of colonizing the indigenous peoples and their lands. Stevan Harrell pointed out

that the communists initiated increasing control over frontiers, urging ethnic people to follow the communist model, and praising themselves as the saviors who liberated ethnic people from the control of the landlords and lifted them out of poverty and backwardness.\textsuperscript{22} As a matter of fact, the colonial argument questions the validity of the Chinese control over the frontier area. It undermines the theoretical and legal foundation for the communist China as “inheriting” the ownership of the frontiers from preceding regimes. The Communist colonialism has received criticism not only from western scholars but also from local ethnic minorities. Tibetan and Uyurs activists have become “stubborn” separatists ever since the Communists took over their land after 1949.

Under the influence of liberal and postmodern civil rights movements in the West in the 1960s and 1970s, China scholars changed their approaches to the studies of the frontiers of China. Just like their counter-parts who challenged traditional paradigms about the American West, they have begun the discussion of the “forgotten” and “invisible” history, concerning women, environment, and ethnic minorities. The studies of the functioning of the state’s power on the frontier and the identity of ethnic minorities under the control of state power have become increasingly popular in recent decades.

There is a dichotomy between the Chinese and Western academics in the discussion of the application of state power in Yunnan. The majority of the scholars in China firmly believe in the consistent exercise of a direct state control over the frontier since pre-modern times. There is a consensus among western scholars that China only had limited control over Yunnan before 1949. In 1940s, Tien Jukang pointed out that the

actual range of control exercised by Han-Chinese was hindered by the tropical climate.\textsuperscript{23}

C. Patterson Giersch stresses that the Chinese were not successful in establishing an overwhelming and dominant authority in Yunnan or over other tributary frontiers in general. The complicated social, cultural, economic and political dynamics between Yunnan and adjacent Southeast Asian countries prevented the region from forming a “uniform frontier society” that could be solely dominated by any single political entity such as China.\textsuperscript{24} James Scott observes that the periphery states had the tendency of becoming “a zone of refuge” or “shatter zone”. These zones accommodated people who were proficient in running away from state authority and they remained in a state-less condition, as a result of an on-going process of “state-making” and “state-unmaking”. \textsuperscript{25}

Hence, Yunnan’s experience as the “museum of human races” reflects demographic and cultural change in response to China’s expansion. \textsuperscript{26} John McKinnon points out that the indigenous chiefs of Hani people, Tusi, under both imperial and Republican governments, were considered relatively independent. \textsuperscript{27} Alan Winnington points out that even in inner Yunnan that borders Sichuan, Kuomintang (KMT) penetration was limited.\textsuperscript{28} A. Doak Barnett believes that Yunnan was among the last

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{23} Tien Ju-Kang, \textit{Religious Cults of the Pai-I along the Burma-Yunnan Border} (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University: 1986), 77.
\textsuperscript{24} C Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: \textit{The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier} (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 217.
\textsuperscript{25} C Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: \textit{The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier} (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 7.
\textsuperscript{26} C Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: \textit{The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier} (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 8.
\textsuperscript{28} Alan Winnington: \textit{The slaves of the Cool Mountains: the ancient social conditions and changes now in progress on the remote South-Western borders of China} (Berlin: Seven Seas Publishers, 1962), 147.
\end{flushleft}
provinces to follow the central government’s instruction in many areas. Barnett points out that “the political developments in the province were significantly influenced by the province’s special historical, geographical, ethnic, economic, and political background, and the new provincial leadership had to adjust their priorities and approaches in many ways to deal with the distinctive local problems”.

On the other hand, scholars in China are reluctant to acknowledge China’s limited and indirect control on its frontiers. Most scholars in China still hold unto the “heritage” and “tradition” of a unified Chinese empire since ancient times. Scholars in China often apply a double standard to the border and territorial issues. On one hand, Chinese scholars criticize the imperial forces that colonized and violated the sovereignty in the process, and argue for the restoration of the convicted territories and sovereignty to the victim countries. On the other hand, they equate the ancient Chinese Empire’s less control or nominal control over its frontier area to the sovereignty of a modern Chinese nation. They further claim the right for the PRC to “inherit” these territories from its predecessors. Chinese scholar Zhang Xiaosong refers to the exercise of indirect control (or even absence of control) of pre-modern Chinese empire as the “dual system of administration”, which subtly enhanced ethnic people’s consciousness about the Chinese political system and social integration.

It is obvious that such “dual system” and double standards justify the existence of a unified multi-ethnic Chinese empire, by constructing historical references as well as historical narrative to sustain the foundation, a myth, and validity for PRC to claim its right towards frontiers and tributaries.\(^{32}\) Even so, China has been condemned for invading and colonizing Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, but its control over the Southwestern Chinese frontier has received only minor critiques. And yet, the relatively “quietness” of the indigenous people in the Southwest does not suggest that the Southwestern frontier of China was always an integral part of China. A. Doak Barnett observed that soon after the Chinese Communist Party reached Yunnan, it began to establish “an unprecedented degree of centralized control and extended the Party’s and government’s outreach to the grassroots to an extent that no previous regime had been able to do”.\(^{33}\)

George Moseley points out that in Yunnan, the PLA soldiers were commissioned to bear responsibility for social mobilization and winning people’s royalty towards the new regime.\(^{34}\) Besides pacifying the frontier and chasing bandits, Moseley noticed that the PLA was responsible for the overall improvement of local people’s material needs, thus convincing the indigenous people that the PLA “were more trustworthy than Chang Kai-shek’s bandits who had operated there in the past.”\(^{35}\) However, in terms of the effectiveness of state power, the central Chinese government still faces the dilemma over


the coordination of the central and local powers. Mette H. Hansen points out that there is disconnect between the central government’s blue plan and the actual practice of local authority. Local cadres often reject the government’s proposals and regulation concerning the education of ethnic peoples and local financial difficulties often force deviation from the plan. Herold Wiens called attention to the insight from Chen Pisheng that the Yunnan frontier had the potential of fostering an “evolving separatism” within the sinicized tribal forces. Wiens believed that these tribal forces might become opposed to further continuing migration of Han-Chinese as a threat to undermine the social and economic position of indigenous power holders.

As for identity issue, current literature mainly suggests three forms: a Yunnanese identity, regular ethnic identities and the Chinese national identity. For example, Bing Yang has argued for the existence of a distinct Yunnanese identity. But Yunnanese identity remains vague in many ways. Guo Xiaolin points out that “contacts between locals and outsiders constantly altered the configuration of society. Political affiliations between conquering powers and native leaders inevitably influenced the identity of local communities.” C. Paterson Giersch believes that “a Yunnanese identity must also be scrutinized”. For, Giersch, the historical evidence for a Yunnanese consciousness is

---

37 Herold J. Wiens, China’s March toward the Tropics (Hamden: Shoe String Press, 1954), 332-333.
39 Guo Xiaoling, State and Ethnicity in China’s Southwest (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 64.
limited, and does not build strong argument for identity formation.\textsuperscript{41} David G. Atwill argues that the Panthay Rebellion transformed a Muslim revolt to a confrontation between Yunnan and the central China.\textsuperscript{42} On the other hand, Giersch believes that this is “a bold, intriguing thesis”, however “the supporting evidence does not prove conclusively that a Yunnanese identity existed or that Yunnanese Han, Hui, and non-Han were locked in a coherent struggle against Qing and Han migrants”.\textsuperscript{43}

Currently most scholars lay stress on ethnic identity and its relationship to Chinese national identity. The most discussed aspects of the identity issue are ethnic classifications, education, family and marriage, religions, arts and cultural revival during the post-Mao era. Discussions of the identity of people in Yunnan involve: the loss of ethnic identity, changing identity, searching for identity, construction of identity, keeping the original identity and constructed identity, and also finding a new identity. In fact, these perspectives are often intertwined with each other, and generally suggest the loss of original ethnic identities and the agency of local people. However, in the eyes of Chinese scholars, these are necessary changes for the formation of an ethnic identity that is compatible with a unified Chinese nation.

Concerning ethnic identification, Thomas Mullaney argues that the theoretical foundation of the CCP’s ethnic classification system was derived from Henry Rudolph Davies, who investigated Yunnan in early twentieth century. The twenty-three ethnic

groups listed by Henry Rudolph Davies became the theoretical foundation for the future Chinese ethnological studies and ethnic classification.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, it is a mistake to be too “quick to point out its (ethnic classification’s) political and methodological affinities with that of the Soviet Union, here we find much stronger ties to British colonial practice.”\textsuperscript{45} The new ethnic identities of the PRC period are defined by the state. Stevan Harrell points out that given the state-issued identity labels for some ethnic groups, and he therefore asks, “Is a relatively ideologically neutral history of the Yi possible?”\textsuperscript{46} Stephane Gros’ points out that original ethnic identities were shaped by the political and cultural environment and were later upgraded to the status of a nationality (minzu) of minorities. \textsuperscript{47} This “upgraded identity” is supposed to protect ethnic minorities from becoming marginalized in the Han and communist’s dominated country. In fact, ethnic minorities’ lack of social and economic control determines their dependent relationship with the government, forcing them to exaggerate their ethnic identity in order to survive or make further financial improvement. \textsuperscript{48} Steven Harrell also points out that a distinct ethnic identity with cultural exoticism has become the tool for some marginalized ethnic minorities to gain material advantages in the trend of economic development.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} Thomas S. Mullaney, \textit{Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 45.
\textsuperscript{45} Thomas S. Mullaney, \textit{Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 65.
Susan McCarthy in her study about Bai people in the valley of Dali demonstrated the symbols of identity, and the manipulation of the Bai identity by ethnic elites as well as local government. Specific characteristics of Bai that distinguish them from Han-Chinese still remained ambiguous. She spoke of the “very Bai-ness of the Bai”, which ironically was promoted by the government and Bai elites. The Bai people’s “exotism” and uniqueness have been harnessed by government in order to lure tourist and investor funds. Ethnic peoples with fewer advantages or no advantages at all face the greatest challenge in keeping their identities. Dorothy Solinger points out that the more dependent that certain ethnic group is, the easier for that group to accept a state formulated identity. John McKinnon further reveals that small ethnic groups have suffered intense state control and a fundamental loss of agency. Moreover, the development of the ethnic cultural activities also face an awkward situation caused by the subtle relationship between the intensified state orientation and the zeal of ethnic activists. Sometimes, ethnic people’s distinct identity remains nominal. At the same time, ethnic diversity in the country is used as an instrument of government propaganda.

---

The gender issue also has emerged as part of ethnic identity discussions, especially for the Naxi women. Emily Chao argues that “genderized constructions of ethnic authenticity are not solely oppositional formulations invented to promote national identity in the present”\textsuperscript{58}. Gender belongs to the “residual conceptions embedded in the historical process”, and the gender-politics has already emerged as ethnic people were being incorporated into the Chinese empire.\textsuperscript{59} And in current social, cultural, political and economic setting of China, Naxi women and mountain-people suggest that ethnic people are “different”, in another way, by being authentic\textsuperscript{60}. Chao believes that the stress of ethnic authenticity suggests an imagined or constructed ethnic identity which involves the manipulation of the state’s power.\textsuperscript{61} In the “creation” of particular ethnic culture, also revealed the gender difference that is created through state and ethnic discourse. \textsuperscript{62}

June Dreyer suggests that the minority issue in the communist China is essentially a problem of integration, powered by multiple motives such as the reasons of defense, economic and social well-being, and national pride.\textsuperscript{63} However, it becomes obvious that

\textsuperscript{58} Emily Chao, “Hegemony, Agency, and Re-presenting the Past: The Invention of Dongba Culture among the Naxi of Southwest China”, in \textit{Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan}, edited by Melissa Brown (Berkeley: China Research Monograph, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996), 222.


\textsuperscript{60} Emily Chao, “Hegemony, Agency, and Re-presenting the Past: The Invention of Dongba Culture among the Naxi of Southwest China”, in \textit{Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan}, edited by Melissa Brown (Berkeley: China Research Monograph, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996), 208.


either being Chinese or extremely non-Chinese have become two major ways for ethnic peoples to gain social and political success or attention. In fact, many scholars recognize the inevitable fact that the loss of a particular ethnic identity, or the creation of a new ethnic identity have contributed to the formation of a homogenized national identity of Chinese or sometimes a very vague local identity that is compatible with a higher level of Chinese national identity.\(^{64}\)

Certain cultural practices of the ethnic minorities also became the tools in serving the project of national building. Naxi leaders tried to situate the Naxi “closer to the Chinese according to the contemporary Stalinist-influenced evolutionist trajectory.”\(^{65}\) “Patriotic education is especially high on the state’s agenda for non-Han people.”\(^{66}\) Collin Mackerras argues that in the process of national building in ethnic people “become merely the foil against which the Chinese nation as a whole can be promoted and strengthened.”\(^{67}\) Ethnic minorities are involving into the nation of Chinese in both syntagmatical and paradigmatical sense. “They are becoming more like other Chinese, and they are also becoming integrated with them”. This is a process that is “not yet anywhere near complete”.\(^{68}\)


These paradigms and popular topics of the studies on Yunnan have moved scholarly work into a narrow corner of ethnic-centered studies. This trend is unavoidable as “increasing emphasis on the diversity of ethnic, racial, and gender experience” have swept the academic world in 1990s. 69 It is impossible to avoid ethnicity in discussing frontier history of Yunnan because the Han is the only non-ethnic group there and in some areas of Yunnan. The ethnic population outnumbers the Han. However, when matrilineal society, ethnic revival, ethnic rights and ethnic classification have become the focus of attention, frontier history is also being “ethnicized”, simplified and fragmented. As an overly simplified and ethnicized frontier history begins to thrive, a complicated local history begins to disappear. The ethnicized history often understates the historical, political, cultural and social context of the frontier. Thus, the history of the Chinese migrants has been ignored, and thus their contribution in forming the local dynamics as well as the local history are neglected. At the same time, it is difficult to understand the current situation of ethnic minorities in Yunnan when based on a simplified ethnic history instead of a complete picture emphasizing local history.

In fact, the emphasis on ethnic minority has placed local history inadvertently into the Chinese government’s nation building project. The construction of a unified Chinese nation with multiple ethnic minorities requires a simple local history that proves the frontier’s close connection with China proper. It shows that ethnic people have become a part of Chinese nation and been under the Chinese administration for over two thousand years. It is easier to justify such argument by peeling off the complicated historical, political, cultural and social context of the relatively independent frontier area, in order

teased out the history of ethnic minorities. Without a proper context, fresh and “naked” ethnic studies by focusing on the distinct cultural and religious practices, in another word, exoticism, stress the backwardness of their culture and economic development. This type of frontier history is inadvertently compatible with a unified Chinese national history as well as the discourse that highlights the CCP’s contribution to liberate the ethnic minority from the backwardness and oppression.

It is the comprehensive local history that contests the concept of a unified Chinese national identity. And also it is the rich context of a local history that provided many ethnic activists the resources to question the paradigm of the grand unification of China. In Yunnan’s case, a comprehensive local history demonstrates kinship between Yunnan and Southeast Asia, instead of Yunnan and China. At the same time, many accounts from the local historical records suggest that the indigenization of the Chinese migrants was successful, creating a relatively stable local population. These people, composed by the original settlers, old and new migrants of different ethnic background, were influenced by China as well as adjacent Southeast Asian countries at the same time and at different levels. It is difficult to find the evidence of the existence of a unified Chinese national identity before the mid-20th century, and it is even more difficult to trace the existence of a collective identity that was of a higher level than indigenous local polities. A comprehensive local history preserves the cultural roots and heritage of the indigenous people, on which in-depth ethnic studies and frontier studies are built.

This dissertation breaks with the narrow tradition narrative of ethnic history. It brings back the local history of China’s frontiers. Through the case studies of the Yunnan borderlands, this dissertation examines the comprehensive local history of China’s
southwestern frontier that emphasizes its complexity, instead of its ethnic characteristics. The concept of Mandala describes the radiation of the state’s power in a manner of circles which stretches out without certain boundary and gradually diffuses in the process. In fact, the application of the concept of mandala in this dissertation demonstrates how Yunnan is pictured sitting in a zone that is influenced remotely from China and more directly from other Southeast Asian polities.

On the theoretical and methodological level, this dissertation recognizes the indigenous people of Yunnan as composed of the original settlers, mixing with migrants of different ethnic identities, including Chinese migrants. It argues that the indigenous people and their political entities belonged to several homogenous societies that were based on indigenous people’s kinship by linguistic families, geographic settlements, agricultural and economic patterns, as well as their religious beliefs. These homogenous entities were also tied together by intra-regional as well as transnational migration, trade and wars. This dissertation recognizes the relative independence of the indigenous people and their polities from the absolute control of either the Chinese state or other big regional powers in Southeast Asia.

In this sense, this dissertation attempts to clarify the concepts of the Chinese ruled frontier and Chinese influenced frontier. The former included frontier areas that were directly under China’s jurisdiction. The latter included tributaries that were not governed by China or were under the indirect rule while receiving Chinese migrants. For centuries,

---

70 This dissertation tries to avoid the frequent use of the term ethic people or ethnic minorities before the ethnic classification was conducted in the 1950s. As the majority of the local population the non-Chinese settlers in the Yunnan borderlands did not identify themselves as ethnic people or ethnic minorities before they were identified as such by the scholars and the government during the Republican China and PRC era. Thus, the term ethnic people or ethnic minorities are only used particularly after the establishment of the PRC to indicate the changes to the social status of the indigenous people.
the Chinese state never recognized frontiers people, whether in Chinese ruled or
influenced frontier. China was China proper, and the only Chinese were the Han people.

In fact, Yunnan, especially Southern Yunnan, belonged to mainland Southeast
Asia as a cultural and political entity more than it did to China. I argue that mainland
Southeast Asia was like a cultural, economic and geographic motherboard to Yunnan.
Especially in the 20th century, Yunnan, as well as other parts of mainland Southeast Asia,
were carved out of their motherboard, incorporated into different regional powers, and
given various alternatives of modernization. This dissertation considers Yunnan’s
becoming a part of China as the demonstration of the Chinese alternative to the
development of mainland Southeast Asia and the indigenous people. It carefully
examines the Chinese model and briefly compares the Chinese model with the
alternatives provided by adjacent Southeast Asian countries. It calls scholars’ attention to
how the indigenous societies evolved in response to different alternatives for
modernization provided or enforced by colonial and regional powers. Yunnan became an
isolated and segregated frontier province since the 1950s, in the service of the world-wide
communist camp as well as domestic Chinese politics and economy. The role of an
isolate frontier base for China’s political economy violated Yunnan’s natural function as
the corridor that facilitated the labor, capital and commodity exchange between China,
Southeast Asia and South Asia. The prosperity of Yunnan, as well as other parts of
mainland Southeast Asia lies in degrees to which these areas are involved in regional and
transnational trade as well as labor exchange. From the 19th century until present, the
indigenous communities were incorporated into the colonial world markets, isolated by
different ideological forces, and then gradually sucked into the bottomless Chinese
domestic market. However, the long-term economic integration of this area seems to be shadowed by concerns on national security, particularly Southeast Asian countries’ fear towards China’s increasing ambition in world and regional politics, as well as its aggressive attitude in border disputes with neighboring countries. This perspective provides a new approach to understanding the deep-rooted social and economic dilemmas and inequities caused by the competition between larger powers over the region.

Chapter two explains the emergence of homogenous societies by examining the trans-regional migration from China to Southeast Asia as well as the intra-regional migration and trade within Southeast Asia. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the kinship between Yunnan and Southeast Asia, so as to help the readers understand that Yunnan and adjacent Mainland Southeast Asian area once existed as a relatively independent region. Yunnan thrived because of its active role in connecting China with its Mainland Southeast Asian motherboard. This is not to argue the existence of a regional identity, for one never existed, but to recognize a situation of the “stateless”\(^\text{71}\), the absence of state control, or the limited state control.

Chapter three concentrates on the militarized nature of the indigenous societies, and their relationship with the external colonial forces. First of all, it examines the roots of the indigenous power and legitimacy that were based on religious sanction, the ability for obtaining and monopolizing natural resources, as well as maintaining regional alliances. Based on the structure of the indigenous power and authority, it points out the necessity for indigenous powers to receive external support in order to overpower their competitors. By examining the Chinese colonization in Yunnan, this chapter points out

that Chinese colonization in Yunnan before the late 19th century did not cut Yunnan off from its mainland Southeast Asian motherboard because of the existence of strong localism. However, after 1950, the CCP’s completely uprooted the local powers by depriving the indigenous leaders’ control over natural resources and eliminating any possible basic social organizations. The establishment of the state military farms reorganized the indigenous population, ironically under a centralized and militarized social structure that followed the traditional Chinese strategy to consolidate the frontier.

Chapter four discusses trade and wars as two overarching forces that have been battling and shaping the Yunnan borderlands. It focuses on how physical boundaries carved Yunnan out from mainland Southeast Asian Trade Empire and how the indigenous people struggled over the new lines that separated them and destroyed their original life patterns. By examining how the colonial economy and the communist state economy defined and redefined the economic and political spheres, this chapter discusses the degree to which border people exercised agency when they were caught in the power struggle and competition of interests of external larger powers.

Chapter five examines the cultural changes to the Yunnan frontier forced by the establishment of a new national identity and national histories. By discussing two major educational channels, schools and movie theaters, this chapter presents the process in which the multi-channel educational system disappeared and was replaced by the limited vision of communist education. This chapter stresses the benefits of the multi-channel educational system that was existed before the mid-1950s in sustaining culturally and religiously a plural society. Today the plural society is under threat and is being replaced by a concentration on patriotism and nationalism sanctioned by the CCP. At the same
time, the rich local history of Yunnan presented in previous three chapters is also gradually disappearing, and Yunnan and its history has been ethnicized to fit into the nation building project of the CCP.
CHAPTER 2 THE EMERGENCE OF THE HOMOGENOUS INDIGENOUS SOCIETIES

As a part of mainland Southeast Asia, the Yunnan borderlands, including southwestern, southern and southeastern Yunnan, began to receive migrants from today’s China around 4th century, B.C. Over centuries, waves of new comers of various origins were absorbed by indigenous population and gradually evolved into various modern ethnic groups in this area.

The conventional perspective and methodology stresses the diverse ethnic and tribal distinctions in mainland Southeast Asia and the Yunnan borderlands. This approach naturally divides the indigenous communities into numerous segments.\(^1\) And yet, it is important to recognize that similarities and commonalities existed between indigenous peoples over centuries.

Through cross-classification, this chapter stresses the kinship between the indigenous people in the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia, instead of China.\(^2\) Cross-classification deconstructs the conventional image of the society marked

---

1. Outsiders who also had language and cultural barriers tend to see the differences among the indigenous societies than their ties and deep connections. Thus the emphasis on the diversity and segments of the indigenous people is quite common. Wolfram Eberhard’s survey on over 800 tribes and people mainly in Yunnan in the early 20th century presented a great diversity of the social structure of the indigenous people. Among them, some of the indigenous political units have advanced to relatively organized societies, whereas others, Eberhard called them splinter groups, were “labeled by their geographical location only instead of clearly knowing who they were.” Eberhard particularly pointed out that errors easily occurred particularly when he conducted his research on the splinter groups, “because the same tribe may be found in different geographic regions, and, thus, several different names may occur for the same people.” “Errors occur especially when these groups have no defined folk name but are divided according to horde or clan names.” See W. Eberhard, *Kultur und Siedlung der RandVolkers China*, T’oung Pao, Supplement to Vol. 36, Leden, 1942, in Herold J. Wiens, *China’s March toward the Tropics* (Hamden: The Shoe String Press, 1954), 35. quotation from 12. Also see Peter Bellwood, “Southeast Asia before History”, in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume 1: From Early Times to c.1800*, edited by Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 56.

2. By the early 1990s, scholars have reached the agreement that “there is considerable overlapping of human biological groupings, cultures and languages.” See Peter Bellwood, “Southeast Asia before History”, in *The
by ethnic and tribal distinctions of indigenous communities, and then reconstructs a new image by stressing indigenous people’s linguistic kinship, mass intra-regional migration\(^3\), geographical settlements, economic patterns, and cultural as well as religious affinities. Cross-classification looks into common characteristics and ties that break down the traditional categorization of ethnic identities and re-organizes them into bigger and general groups. This approach provides a more accurate lens for understanding the social fibers of the indigenous societies, as well as the alienation or cooperation between particular indigenous groups.

Thus, the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia witnessed the emergence of several homogenous societies. At the same time, intra-regional migration, wars, and trade further tied these homogenous societies together to a coherent local dynamics that was centered on a self-sufficient economy and limited regional markets.

The appearance of the European colonial powers in mainland Southeast Asia in the 19\(^{th}\) century quickly sucked the Yunnan borderlands into the world market and changed the pattern of local economic development. As the corridor that connected China’s domestic markets with international markets in mainland Southeast Asia as well as South Asia, the Yunnan borderlands became increasing dependent on the fluctuations on both sides, and yet more effected by Southeast Asia and South Asia.

\(^3\) The intra-tribal migration here refers to the migration that happened among the settlements of one general tribal group. The intra-tribal migration of the Bai-Yue tribes might occur between the settlements in southern China and mainland Southeast Asia, depending on the specific time span. Intra-regional migration mainly refers to the migration happened within Yunnan and within mainland Southeast Asia.
The Native Settlers and the Newcomers

Chinese documents generally identify the Bai-Yue and the Bai-Pu tribes as the native settlers in the Yunnan borderlands. Around the 4\textsuperscript{th} century B.C., the Di-Qiang tribes migrated into Yunnan and became the third major tribal group that existed before the Chinese appearance in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century B.C.\(^4\) About a thousand years later, the arrival of the Muslim and later the Miao-Yao tribes together with the earlier settlers formed six major cultural and ethnic systems in Yunnan that have lasted until today.\(^5\)

Chinese colonial expansion since the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century B.C failed to dominate the cultural and political climate in Yunnan. A large number of the new comers who arrived before the Mid-Qing era were gradually indigenized, and became a part of the local population. The native settlers and new comers mingled and evolved into new ethnic tribes and new indigenous political units, most of which were influenced but not dominated by the Chinese.

Jiang Yingliang stressed the “completely indigenous” nature of the native dwellers in mainland Southeast Asia from the very beginning.\(^6\) Archeological records show that earliest native settlers of the Yunnan borderlands could be traced back to the Paleolithic age in some areas of southern and western Yunnan, such as Mengzi, Hekou, and Baoshan. There are more signs of civilizations in the Yunnan borderlands that were dated back to the Neolithic age, spreading across a vast region from today’s southeastern Yunnan to western Yunnan, including the borderland in Wenshan, the Xishuangbanna.

\(^{4}\) Cang Ming (苍铭), \textit{Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi} 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 2004), 1, 2, 178.
\(^{5}\) Cang Ming (苍铭), \textit{Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi} 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 178.
valley and the areas near northern Burma. These sites that were found from the 1960s to 1990s indicated that the ancestors of the Dai people and other indigenous people were possibly very active in these areas more than 3,000 years ago. In a later time, art historians also pointed out that the Dong-son drums that were initially developed in northern Vietnam could be traced back to the late 7th century B.C. and had no connection with the Chinese civilization during that time.

In fact, Chinese historical documents often generalized these native settlers in a broad area of southern China and mainland Southeast Asia as the Bai-Yue people and Bai-Pu people. Archeologist Li Kunsheng from Yunnan pointed out that the native settlers in southeastern Yunnan and Xishuangbanna were mainly the Bai-Yue people. Along the middle Mekong River, the Bai-Yue people were the main settlers. Bai-Yue means numerous Yue tribes. The Bai-Yue tribes were spread in southwestern and southern China to the south of the Yangzi River, and Northern mainland Southeast Asia as well. Individual Bai-Yue tribes were not specifically identified and named either by historical documents or current scholars. It is also difficult

---

8 In Northern Vietnam, the Dong-son bronze drums, or Heger I drums, can trace its origin back to the Neolithic and Early Metal phase pottery that began approximately a little before 600BC. Around 500 BC, Heger I drums have been developed in either Yunnan or northern Vietnam. Art historians believed that the form of the Heger I drums clearly was not borrowed from Zhou or Han China. See Peter Bellwood, “Southeast Asia before History”, in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume 1: From Early Times to c.1800, edited by Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 121-122.
10 Jiang Bingzhao, Wu Mianji and Xin Tucheng (蒋炳钊, 吴绵吉, 辛土成), Bai-Yue Minzu Wenhua 百越民族文化 [the culture of the Bai-Yue people] (Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe, 1986), 5.
to know how they addressed themselves because of the lack of indigenous written records. But the entire tribal group was recognized by some general and collective characteristics, such as pressed mark ceramics, rice cultivation, irrigational skills, tattoos, tooth-dying, brass drums and so forth. To be specific, the Dai and Zhuang people were the earliest Bai-Yue tribes found in the Yunnan borderlands.

Within the Bai-Yue tribes, the Dai people specifically belonged to a general group that began to be identified as the Dan or Shan people in the ancient Chinese documents in the year of 97 AD. It is highly possible that Shan people also have the same origins as the Dai, which could be traced back to the ancient Yue or Bai-Yue people. Fang Guoyu plainly stated that the Dai people were the ancient Shan people who settled in a vast area that stretched from the west bank of the Red River to the upstream Irrawaddy River, and then to Manipur, India. Fang also distinguished the Shan people from the other Bai-Yue tribes. Lee Chi argued that tattooing was the distinct cultural mark of the Shan people.

---

13 In many Chinese documents, Dai people were given different names due to their outward appearance such as the Man Shu 蛮书 compiled during the Tang dynasty. These names included the Black-tooth Barbarians, Golden-tooth Barbarians, Silver-tooth Barbarians, Tattooed-foot Barbarians, and Tattooed-face Barbarians. Besides that, Dai were also called Mang-Man and Baiyi (there were multiple ways to write Baiyi). See Jiang Yingliang (江应梁): Dai Zu Shi 傣族史 [The History of the Dai People] (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1983), 7. Also see Bulang Zu Jian Shi 布朗族简史 [A brief history of the Bulang people](Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1984), 7.
14 Fang Guoyu (方国瑜), “Yuan Dai Yunnan Xingsheng Daizu Shiliao Biannian”元代云南行省傣族史料编年 [The chronicles of the historical documents of the Dai people of Yunnan Province of the Yuan dynasty], in Yunnan Shiliao Congcan Di San Juan 云南史料丛刊第三卷 [The Historical Documents of Yunnan, Vol. 3], edited by Fang Guoyu (Kunming: Yunnan Daxue chubanshe, 1998), 3. Chinese scholar He Ping believed that the Shan people in the Chinese documents in during the first and second century were the Sham, the ancient Syrian people, instead of the Shan. See He Ping (何平), Comg Yunnan dao Assamu-Dai-Tai Minzu Lishi Zaikao yu Chonggou 从云南到阿萨姆-傣-泰民族历史再考与重构 [From Yunnan to Assam: A New Exploration of the History of the Tai Peoples] (Kunming: Yunnan Daxue Chubanshe), 88-89.
15 Fang Guoyu (方国瑜), “Yuan Dai Yunnan Xingsheng Daizu Shiliao Biannian”元代云南行省傣族史料编年 [The chronicles of the historical documents of the Dai people of Yunnan Province of the Yuan
This argument has been accepted by quite a few anthropologists. In fact, scholars have reached a common agreement that the Shan people belong to “the Mongoloid stock of the Tai ethnic group who are spread over southwestern China, Hainan, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Burma, and northeastern India in Assam.” At the same time, “they also known by a variety of names depending upon the color of their costumes, teeth, and tattoos”.

The Bai-Pu tribes were a congregation of numerous Pu branches, and they were often mixed up with the Bai-Yue tribes in Chinese historical documents. The Bai-Yue and Bai-Pu tribes often mingled with other people as they migrated. Later the Bai-Yue tribes evolved to the present Zhuang, Buyi, Dai, Shan, Lao, and Ahom people, and the Bai-Pu people became the ancestors for the Bulang, Jingpo, and De’ang people.

dynast], in Yunnan Shiliiao Congcan Di San Juan 云南史料丛刊第三卷 [The Historical Documents of Yunnan, Vol. 3], edited by Fang Guoyu (Kunming: Yunnan Daxue chubanshe, 1998), 3.


17 A variety names are found such as Tai Lam (Dam, black), Tai Kau (white), Tai Leng (Deng, red), and Tai Lai (striped waistband) due to their dress styles. The Tai Leng (Deng) settle along the Red River, and the Tai Lam (Dam) live along the Black River. J.G Scott has an even more detailed list: Lao, Law, Hkun, Lu, Tai-long, Tai-noi, Tai-no, Tai-man, Tai-mao, Tai-hke, Tai-toi, Pu-tai, Pu-nong, (or nung), Pu-man, Pu-ju, Pu-chei, Pu-en, Pu-yloi, Pu-sui, P’o, Pa, Shui Han or Hwa Pai-I, Pai-jen, Yu-jen, P’u-man, Pai, Hei or Hwa Tu-tao, Nung or Lung-ber, Sha-jen, Hei or Pai Sha-jen, Minchia, and Shui-chai-chung-chai. See Sai Aung Tun, History of the Shan State: From Its Origins to 1962 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 3. James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009), 187-188.

18 It is highly possible that Bai-Yue and Bai-Pu tribes migrated back and forth and mingled in Southern China and Mainland Southeast Asia, most through the passages connected Southern China with Northern Vietnam. Also, according to Hanshu- Dili Zhi (汉书-地理志), China had frequent maritime trade with the Southeast Asia countries dating back to the 1st century AD. People sailed to other parts of Southeast Asia, both mainland and the islands from the coastal areas in Guangdong, Guangxi and Fujian where the Bai-Yue and Bai-Pu tribes dwelled. Migration of people thus occurred within same tribal group, a homogenous community. See Jiang Bingzhao, Wu Mianji and Xin Tucheng (蒋炳钊, 吴绵吉, 辛土成), Bai-Yue Minzu Wenhua 百越民族文化 [the culture of the Bai-Yue people] (Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1986), 9.

19 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yinmin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 11.
Around the 7th century B.C., the rise of the Chinese state of Qin and its military campaigns forced the southward migration of people that lasted for centuries. The earliest victims of the Qin expansion were the Qiang or Di-Qiang tribes. Similar to the Bai-Yue and Bai-Pu tribes, the Di-Qiang tribes also included numerous small branches. The Di-Qiang people were pastoralists who found their homeland in the northwest about today’s Gansu and Qinghai. It is highly possible that their history of settlement could be dated back to the late Neolithic era. It is sure that they remained active in this area at least until the 4th century B.C., and gradually expanded to Shanxi. Many Di-Qiang tribes also shifted between the China proper and the southwest, being considered by many Chinese scholars as one of the origins of the Han-Chinese. The expansion of the Qin State in the 7th century B.C. pushed those Di-Qiang tribes that settled in Gansu and Qinghai to move further into Tibet in the west and also into the southwest.

The forced relocation of the Di-Qiang tribes proved to be a large scale movement and a long-lasting process. The largest relocation of the Di-Qiang people that were

---

20 A few Di-Qiang or Qiang tribes kept their identity as Di-Qiang or Qiang, and were addressed as Di-Qiang or Qiang by Chinese documents, especially for those who settled in Sichuan, whereas other migrants gradually were recorded in Chinese historical documents as the Ji people (棘人), especially in Yunnan. It is highly possible that the migrants from the Yue tribes had already settled in Mainland Southeast Asia when these new comers arrived in this area. Ji tribes possibly intermarried the Yue tribes, and later evolved into various local ethnic tribes especially in the mountains of Southwestern Yunnan and northern Burma. The offspring of these mountain dwellers include the Shans, Dai people (or Baiyi), Burmese and many other ethnic tribes were spread in Yunnan, Burma, Laos and Thailand. Other famous branches of the Ji people included the Bai and Yi people who established Nanzhao Kingdom in the 8th century.


recorded in the history occurred in the year of 383 B.C. A group of the Qiang people named Diyuanrong left their native place in the upstream Weihe River delta so as to escape from the warfare with the Qin armies. They arrived in Qinghai, passed by the headwaters of the Yellow River, and then traveled through the mountains and valleys of eastern Tibetan Plateau and western Sichuan. Some of them settled in southern Gansu, as well as northern and western Sichuan, while others continued to move to Yunnan and Guizhou. Some of them finally arrived at the lowlands of today’s Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Laotian border, and others reached those areas near northern and eastern Burma. Over time, the Di-Qiang people mingled with the indigenous settlers, and were possibly divided by many local regimes and tribes, dating back to at least the 3rd century B.C, which were commonly recognized in the Chinese historical documents by the name of Yelang, Junchang, Qiongdu, Ranmang, Mimo, Dian, Xi, and Kunming.

The Chinese documents from the Han dynasty to the early Ming dynasty also used Ji to refer to some indigenous people that had the Di-Qiang origins, such as the Bai people. However, the Ji became a common term to address both the Bai people and the Dai people since Li Yuanyang compiled the Gazetteer of Yunnan in 1570s. The traditions and customs of the Di-Qiang tribes varied due to their geographic settlements. Some Di-Qiang tribes had the tradition of burring the dead with stone coffins, which are

27 Shiji Xinan Yi Lie Zhuan 史记 西南夷列传.
still found among some mountain dwellers in Western Yunnan today. Some others preferred the tradition of cremation that has lasted until the 20th century.

When the State of Qin expanded to the Sichuan basin, the native Shu people also began to migrate southward in 280s B.C. They reached the Jinsha River in Yunnan, the headwater of the Yangtze, and then traveled along the Lidujiang River to the Red River (Yuanjiang) delta. Over half a century, these Shu migrants continued to move southeastward along the Red River, settling in northern Vietnam. By then their population probably had reached at least 120,000, with other ethnic groups that joined them along the way. Around the 230 B.C., these new comers conquered the indigenous people in northern Vietnam, and established the Kingdom of An’yang.

The earliest Chinese migrants arrived in Yunnan in late 3rd century A.D. In 279 B.C., Zhuang Qiao and his Chu State army conquered the Qielan Kingdom and the Yelang Kingdom in Guizhou. Two years later, this Chinese army permanently settled down in Northeastern Yunnan and established the Kingdom of Dian near the Lake Dianchi. In 214 B.C Guangdong, Guanxi and northeastern Vietnam were annexed into the Qin State’s territory under the administration of the Nanhai Prefecture, Guilin Prefecture, and Xiang Prefecture. War captives, military relocation and state farm

---

30 As the decedents of the Di-Qiang tribes, the Yi people had the tradition of burning the corpse. See Yi Zu Jianshi Bianxie Zu (彝族简史编写组), Yi Zu Jianshi 彝族简史 [A brief history of the Yi People] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1987), 14. See also Herold J. Wiens, China’s March toward the Tropics (Hamden: The Shoe String Press, 1954), 50.
31 The origin of the Shu people left unsettled, but hey had established their own country around the first millennium B.C. and built the capital city in the Chengdu plain. See Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di 2 Juan 中国移民史第二卷 [The history of migration in China, Vol. 2] (Fuchou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 27.
recruitment were the main sources of the Chinese migrants who moved into Yunnan. However, they mainly stayed in inland Yunnan before the mid-Qing period, and seldom appeared in the Yunnan borderlands. 33 Ge Jianxiong estimated that about 10,000 people were forced to migrate into the new colonies in the south during the Qin expansion. They settled in the Pearl River delta, the plains along the Dongjiang River, Beijiang River and Guijiang River, as well as along the main traffic routes that led to China proper. The land to the west of these Chinese settlements were still populated by the indigenous people. 34

Indigenous cultures emerged and thrived in the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia where Chinese administration was absent. Some archeologists identified the existence of city states in the area during the first millennium, 35 whereas others assert the absence of such state structures. 36 The Chinese recorded evidence that canal irrigated rice fields had already appeared in northern Vietnam before 111 B.C, with the possibility of intensive double-cropping. A Chinese census of 2nd century A.D showed that northern Vietnam had accommodated almost one million population, which also suggested that the population prior to the Chinese presence had been large enough to require an indigenous centralized government. 37

33 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 180.
During the mid-first-millennium A.D the scale of some urban centers in the Funan region of the Mekong delta and in the Pyu region of northern Burma had paralleled of the several world’s better-known cities of Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Late Preclassic.\textsuperscript{38} From 1st century A.D to the 11th century, there were more than ten urban centers emerging in Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand.\textsuperscript{39} Some scholars argue that these cities were deliberately created to legitimize and constitute political authority.\textsuperscript{40}

The political, cultural, linguistic, and demographic make-up had hindered the Chinese ambition to create a stable unity in the Yunnan borderlands. The control from the central Chinese government was diluted even in inland Yunnan. Indirect rule seemed to be the most effective way to maintain the communication between China and the indigenous communities. However, new emerged indigenous political units frequently challenged the Chinese authority and interrupted such connections.

In the Yongchang Prefecture, the Chinese exercised feeble authority in two counties, a vast area stretching from southern Yunnan to western Yunnan near northern Burma.\textsuperscript{41} The Chinese migrants only gathered in a small town called Tengyue. The rest of Yongchang Prefecture hosted the ancestral the tribes of the Khmer, Dai, Burmese,

\textsuperscript{38} For example, the Dvaravati site of U-Thong that dated back to the 7th to 11th century measured about 1420 hectares. Towards the end of the first millennium, larger settlements appeared in the Chao Phraya basin of Thailand and the Lower Mekong region of Cambodia. The city of Angkor Thom, one of the Angkorian cities, encompassed about 900 hectares of land by the 13th and 14th centuries A.D. See Miriam T. Stark: “Early Mainland Southeast Asian Landscapes in the First Millennium A.D.”, in \textit{Annual Review of Anthropology}, Vol. 35 (2006): 407-432.


\textsuperscript{41} See Hou Hanshu Xinan Yi Lie Zhuan Juan 86 后汉书西南夷列传 卷 86. Also Lu Ren (陆韧), \textit{Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi} 云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 25.
Jingpo, Min-Pu, Jiu-Liao, Lisu, Luo-Pu and Shendu (Hindu). In the year of 342 A.D., the Yongchang Prefecture was permanently dissolved, because the indigenous rebels cut off Yongchang’s connection with China proper. This event marked China’s total loss of control in Western Yunnan. This situation did not change until the 13th century.

In the southeast, the Linyi Kingdom, settled mainly by the Chinese, declared independence at the end of the Eastern Han dynasty. The Linyi Kingdom kept expanding towards the north, and extended its control over the Rinan, Jiude and Jiuzhen Prefectures that were previously under China’s indirect rule. Later, the Chinese troops also had to fight against the Nan Yue (Nam Viet) Kingdom that emerged in the beginning of the Western Han dynasty, and restored the Chinese colonies it occupied around the 180 B.C. In the following centuries, the Chinese did not retain much control over southeastern Yunnan. In 938 BC, Ngo Quyen defeated the Chinese army and claimed the independence of Vietnam, the Ngo dynasty, which became China’s tributary in the late 10th century. Thus, China’s control over in these areas stayed at a nominal level.

Although China’s authority failed to control Yunnan, its expansion in other part of southwestern and southern China kept driving large numbers of people to leave their homes and move into the Yunnan borderlands during the long second millennium.

---

45 You Zhong (尤中), Zhongguo Xinan Bianjiang Bianqian Shi 中国西南边疆变迁史 [The history of the transformation of China’s southwestern frontier] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1987), 11.
In the 11th century, the Nong people in Guangxi rebelled against the rule of the Northern Song dynasty and fled into southeastern Yunnan. They later became a part of the Zhuang people in China, and the Nong people in Vietnam.  

Muslims were drafted by the Mongolian army and entered western Yunnan in 1253. Besides the military officers and soldiers, there were also many Muslim merchants who arrived along with the Mongolian army. Usually, the Muslim military officers and merchants were called by the names of the Hui people, Semu, Huihu and Huihe (the Uyghurs). Muslims were active in the area where the Mongolian armies were stationed. 

Led by the newly appointed Yunnan governor Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar (Saidianchi Shansiding), who had Persian origin, the second wave of the Muslim arrived and settled in the Honghe Prefecture of southeastern Yunnan in 1273. In the early Ming, a large number of Muslims arrived in Yunnan and also settled in Honghe when General Mu Ying and his army conquered Yunnan in the 1380s. After the Ming army Luchuan rebellion in the mid-15th century, more than 120,000 Muslim and Chinese troops were stationed in southwestern Yunnan. 

---

46 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史* [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 24.
50 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史* [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 31.
Shadian gradually grew to become a Muslim settlement as more and more Muslims rushed in, driving away the original settlers, the Zhuang people (or Sha people).  

In the 20th century, the Muslim settlements in southern Yunnan were gathered along the main cities and towns in northern bank of the Red River and along the main roads.  

The Yao people appeared in Yunnan in the 13th century. But a large scale migration of the Yao people towards the Yunnan borderlands and Vietnam began in early Qing. These Yao migrants moved to southeastern Yunnan from Hunan via Guangdong and Guangxi, and then kept moving north towards the inner land of Yunnan. In the 19th century, the Miao people concluded non-Chinese people’s mass migration into the Yunnan borderlands. The Miao people escaped from Guizhou and Sichuan because of the military confrontations caused by the *gaitu guiliu* policy. After entering into Yunnan, they were mainly spread out in the Honghe Prefecture and Wenshan Prefecture in the southeast, and settled in the mountain ranges as well as valleys in Jinping, Pingbian, Qiubei and Maguan. By the early 20th century, the Miao people have concentrated along the Sino-Vietnamese border as well as the banks of the Nanxihe River. They were also known as the Hmong people in northern Burma and Laos.
A large flow of Chinese migrants also arrived in Yunnan in the 13th century. They still primarily settled in inland Yunnan before the mid-Qing era. In fact, the inland Yunnan was always the final destination for the conventional Chinese relocation. Besides tropical disease like malaria that stopped the southward movement of the Chinese, the Ming court initiated clear regulations to forbid them entering into the area that belonged to the jurisdiction of the Tusi, the Native Officers. After 1730s, the population boom in China proper pushed new waves of people to migrate to the frontiers. 56

In order to consolidate the newly conquered territory in the southwest, and make up the population loss during gaitu guiliu, the Governor General of Yunnan began to recruit peasants in China’s hinterland to farm and consolidate Yunnan in 1732. The Qing government intended to settle more Chinese migrants along the military garrisons and posts. 57 New Chinese migrants would receive moving funds, bulls, seeds, and also twenty mu of land. The Chinese people who previously settled in other areas of Yunnan also responded to the government’s call and were relocated. 59 In Zhaotong, tens of thousands previously abandoned fields during gaitu duiliu finally began to yield fruits after the

---


55 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 35-36.

56 Ge Jianxiong, Cao Shuji and Wu Songdi, Jianming Zhongguo Yimin Shi 简明中国移民史 [A brief history of the migration in China] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 580.


58 1 mu is about 0.165 acres of land.

arrival of the Chinese migrants. The Guangnan County in southern Yunnan received new migrants from Hunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou and Guangdong, despite the threat of malaria. Initially, the Chinese migrants only farmed in the plains. As more and more of them arrived, fertile lands in the plains depleted, and terracing began to appear in the relatively flat valleys and saddles in the mountains. Throughout the 18th and 19th century, when the migrants from Guizhou arrived, they could only find lands and shelters in the deep and high mountains. Besides the fact that malaria was prevalent in the lowlands, this could be one of the reasons why the Guizhou migrants occupied the top of the mountains in this area.

During the Jiaqing era (1785-1820), more than one million migrant workers and their families had moved into Yunnan. According to a census data from the third year of the Daoguang’s rule (1823), more than 24,000 migrant families were registered in Wenshan as well as Anping, and 22,000 families in Guangnan of the Kaihua Prefecture. The Pu’er Prefecture had received migrants from Guizhou, Hunan, Sichuan and Shanxi from the 1730s. Chinese schools were built for the migrants’ children, which added much “Chinese-ness” in this area. The census from 1836 showed that among all the 88,485

---

60 Cao Shuji (曹树基), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di Liu Juan 中国移民史第六卷 [The history of the migration in China Vol.6] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 165.
63 Li Zhongqing (李中清), “Mingqing shiji Zhongguo Xinan Jingji Fazhan he Renkou Zenqiang” 明清时期中国西南的经济发展和人口增长 [The economic development and the population increase in China’s Southwest during the Ming and Qing era], in Qingshi Luncong Di Wu Ji 清史论丛 第五辑 [The Qing history forum, Vol.5] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), in Cao Shuji (曹树基), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, di liu juan 中国移民史第六卷 [The history of the migration in China Vol.6] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 170, quotation from 2.
families in the Pu’er Prefecture, there were 45% indigenous people, 46% percent troops and veterans, as well as 9% merchants and migrant labors. In Yuanjiang, a census also from the Daoguang’s rule (1821-1850) showed that 13,182 families were indigenous people, 11,289 families were troops and their families who were stationed in garrisons, and 283 families were merchants and migrant labors. In Jingdong, it is very highly possible that during the Daoguang era, the indigenous population and migrants (including militaries) each counted about 50% of the total population. By 1786, in Ning’er county of southeastern Yunnan, the Chinese tea merchants as well as migrated labors in the state farms had reached 6,470 households, compromising 56.9% of the total population as well 54.8% of the male population.

However, the Chinese migration into Tusi’s jurisdiction was still not encouraged during the Qing era. The Qing court clearly differentiated the Tusi’s jurisdiction from the direct dominion of the Yunnan provincial government. In some cases, Chinese miners were restricted to enter into the border zones, and in the late 18th century, several silver mines in western Yunnan were even shut down by the government.

Over centuries, Chinese migrants created Chinese cultural belts and cultural islands in the indigenous territories, radiating limited Chinese influence to surrounding areas. Chinese migrants provided advanced technologies and another alternatives for

---

68 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 175.
69 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 179.
education. In Yongchang, the Qing armies were stationed in Baoshan and Tengyue in order to control Southwestern Yunnan. Following the military occupation, new Chinese migrants entered into this area for farming and mining. It was estimated that about 1.3 million Chinese farmers arrived in the mountains in Yunnan from the late 18th century to mid-19th century. During the process of the Chinese migration, the Jinuo people learned forging skills from the Chinese blacksmiths during the Qing era. However, the indigenous people’s adoption of Chinese technologies did not suggest their becoming Chinese, or “Sinicized”. For the indigenous political units in the vast area of mainland Southeast Asia, including the Yunnan borderlands, “adopting Chinese culture never seems to have been viewed as a serious option.”

In fact, as soon as the Chinese migrants moved out of the Chinese cultural belts or cultural islands and mingled with the indigenous population, they faced the fate of being assimilated and becoming a part of the indigenous people. Throughout the history, the majority of Chinese migrants were gradually indigenized. A lot of the indigenized Chinese people still kept a few traces of their original Chinese heritage. Nevertheless, they have become new members of the indigenous people, adding the diversity of the non-Chinese population in the frontier.

For instance, in Jinggu area, the Chinese troops who stayed after the Luchuang rebellion in the 15th century adopted the Dai customs and gradually evolved into a new

---

71 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 146.
73 Ge Jianxiong, Cao Shuji and Wu Songdi, Jianming Zhongguo Yimin Shi 简明中国移民史 [A brief history of the migration in China] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 580.
ethnic group, the Han-Dai or Huayao-Dai. The newly formed Han-Dai people usually had various last Chinese names that the original Dai people never had.  

In Nandian, Chinese migrants married the Jingpo women in order to survive or do business. Their children were raised amidst the Jingpo people and became one of them. In the following years, they populated in western Yunnan and mingled with other Jingpo people. But their Chinese last names and bilingual abilities differentiated them from ordinary Jingpo population.

In Longchuan and Husa of western Yunnan, Chinese migrants lived alongside the Achang people since the late 14th century. The Chinese people gradually lost themselves among the Achang, and became a very important origin of the new indigenous Achang population. The family of the Tusi of Husa was indigenized Chinese. According to an investigation in 1950s, these new Achang people still kept the tablets for ancestry and animist worship, practiced Mahayana Buddhism, and followed some Chinese traditions for their wedding ceremonies.

In Menghai, the Muslim migrants settled with the Dai people since the 1850s, and they had become the Hui-Dai people, having Dai diet, wearing Dai outfit and living in Dai homes. They especially liked sticky rice, and when they were dinning, they also used

---

74 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 173-174.


76 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 171.

77 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 172.
their hands without bowls. They still went to mosques for worship, and would never eat pork. These were characteristics differentiated them from the Dai people.  

So far, it is clear that people who moved to mainland Southeast Asia throughout history were not necessarily Chinese. In fact, the formation of the Chinese population has been a process in which non-Chinese people as well as their cultures and customs were absorbed into the Chinese identity. And at the same time, the territory and boundary of the Chinese empire also shifted over time. During the early pre-modern era, the majority of the migrants who moved towards mainland Southeast Asia actually came from various origins of people who were not recognized as Chinese until the needs for a theoretical construction of a united Chinese nation became urgent, especially during the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the mid-20th century.  

Throughout the long first millennium, many non-Chinese groups lived outside of the jurisdiction of the Chinese authority. At a certain time, their homeland were annexed into China and they fell into direct or indirect rule of the Chinese authority. However, the majority of them were able to keep their distinct identities, and continued to be considered barbarians in the Chinese documents. Many of these “barbarians” chose to migrate south in order to avoid the Chinese colonial power and the Chinese administration. Even most of the Chinese migrants who moved into this area became indigenized, and they were not be able to transform but adapt to the indigenous social, cultural as well as economic structure.  

---

78 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 168.
With the influx of the migrants from the north, the emergence of indigenous political units became the embryo of a unique mainland Southeast Asian social and cultural sphere which would gradually absorb influences from China and India, and yet remain relatively independent from both regional super powers.

**Linguistic Ties and Intra-regional Migration**

From the linguistic point of view, the ancient tribal groups in southern as well as southwestern China and the ethnic people of the Yunnan borderlands had close connections with specific language families in mainland Southeast Asia. This evidence not only suggests the kinship between the indigenous people in these regions, but also the possibility of long-term and large scale of intra-regional migration.

Usually Tai-Kaidai, Mon-Khmer, Sino-Tibetan, Hmong-Mien and Austrian are the five main language families that are found not only in mainland Southeast Asia, but also southwestern and southern China.\(^{80}\) Generally speaking, people who belong to the Tai-Kaidai language family were originated from the Bai-Yue tribes. Members of Sino-Tibetan language family can usually trace their ancestors to the Di-Qiang tribes from northwestern China. The Mon-Khmer language family was comprised by the Bai-Pu people, especially those Bai-Pu who settled in the west of mainland Southeast Asia. In fact, the Mon-Khmer language family members might have settled in the Yunnan borderlands earlier than the Tai-Kaidai family.\(^{81}\)

---


\(^{81}\) Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 1-2.
Within the Kaidai-Tai language families, speakers of the Kaidai group primarily settled in Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangdong. The Tai group are found in Guangxi, highland Burma, northeast India, Laos and Thailand. The Hmong-Mien language families are found in southwestern China as a broad group of the Miao people, as well as their migrants in Laos and Thailand. The Sino-Tibetan speakers are spread in highland Burma, southwestern China, northern Laos, and northern Thailand. 82

Such overlapping language map might have resulted from long-time and constant integration among various ethnic groups. One of the channels to facilitate such integration was intra-regional migration. Archeological data on the patterns of the kilns that were spread in mainland Southeast Asia further suggested the possibility of a continued and frequent migration: 1) between southern as well as southwestern China with mainland Southeast Asia; 2) within mainland Southeast Asia; 3) within the Yunnan borderlands, which further pushed the people’s flow into mainland Southeast Asia.

At least we can map out the flow of the influence caused by the migrants particularly in the first millennium A.D. According to the research that traces the origins of different types of kilns and their zones of the influence (map. 3), there were two main migration routes that connected China to mainland Southeast Asia through western Guangxi and southeastern Yunnan.83 The kiln sites in the Coastal Zone, such as the north and central Vietnam and Cambodia (including Angkorian kilns in northeast Thailand), could be traced back to a single source of origin around the 2nd century A.D. The

---

technology might have been brought in to this area earlier in the Han dynasty when China colonized northern and eastern Vietnam. 84

At the same time, the traces of Chinese influence suggest that after the new comers arrived in Guangxi and the Chinese colonies in northeastern Vietnam, they moved along the coastal area in the south and settled in southern Vietnam, Cambodia, and southern Thailand.

The kilns sites in Inland Zone suggest that the technology was possibly brought in from kiln sites in Yunnan or Guangxi around the 10th century A.D. 85 Such phenomenon could be caused by migrants who emigrated westward from the Yunnan borderlands, or even Guangxi, to Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Northern Thailand. 86

---

84 In fact, the connection between Southern China and Northeastern Mainland Southeast Asia could be traced back to certain remote time in the late fourth millennium BC for the Neolithic technology found at the Ban Chiang site of Northeast Thailand shared common characteristics with those found in Southern China and Vietnam. It is highly possible that this technology was brought in by the migrants, possibly from China, for it is commonly believed that the expansion of agriculture as well as people into Southeast Asia “commenced mainly from the coastal regions of Southern China”. However, consider the possibility of the two-way intra-tribal migration as well as the trans-regional migration between Southern China and Mainland Southeast Asia, the expansion of agricultural techniques could also start from Mainland Southeast Asia and extend to Southern China. And yet, concerning the complexity of the migration flow within and between Mainland Southeast Asia and Southern China, it is still very difficult to map out the exact migration routes that occurred, and it also seems arbitrary to locate a single origin of influence. For example, Peter Bellwood preferred the assumption that the first agricultural inhabitants of Northeast Thailand came from the coastal regions of Northern Vietnam and Southern China. However, C Higham suggested that these migrants were from an early center of agricultural development around the head of the Gulf of Thailand. See Peter Bellwood, “Southeast Asia before History”, in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume 1: From Early Times to c.1800, edited by Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 91, 98-99. Don Hein: “Ceramic Kiln Lineages in Mainland Southeast Asia,” in Ceramics in Mainland Southeast Asia: Collections in the Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, (2008):https://seasianceramics.asia.si.edu/resources/essay.asp?id=40, accessed on 04/11/2014.


Within the Yunnan borderlands, it is highly possible that the people who once established the Dian Kingdom moved to the Yunnan borderlands after their country was wiped out by the Han armies in the 1st century A.D. As soon as they left, their original settlements were occupied by some of the Di-Qiang tribes. 88 During the first millennium,
some Bai-Pu people also emigrated out of the Yongchang Prefecture. By Tang dynasty, they had established many settlements in Xishuangbanna, Jingdong, Lincang, Baoshan and even northwestern Yunnan. 89

The Ailao people in western Yunnan who belonged to the Bai-Yue tribes and Tai-Kaidai language family 90 originally moved from southern China into the Ailao Mountains. Some Ailao people then kept moving southward and westward. For those who moved southward, they reached today’s Xishuangbanna, Laos and other areas in mainland Southeast Asia. They mingled with the Bai-Pu tribes and other Bai-Yue Tribes that arrived later, and became the ancestors of a variety of the indigenous people including the Dai, Lao and Shan. 91 For those who moved westward, they reached the Yongchang Prefecture and submitted to the Eastern Han government. Some continued to move westward and settled along the Ruilijiang River delta. Later a few other Bai-Yue tribes also arrived in this area and even kept moving towards northern Burma and India. The Dai people in Dehong area, the Shan people in northern Burma as well as the Ahom people in India are possibly the descendants of these early migrants. 92 Some Chinese
documents often mixed up the Ailao people and other indigenous people in southwestern China because of their frequent associations with each other.\(^{93}\)

The emergence of the Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms as well as their military expansions in the 8\(^{th}\) and 9\(^{th}\) century further facilitated the intra-regional migration of the indigenous people in Yunnan. In the mid-7th century, the He-Man people from the Di-Qiang tribes moved from the Lake Er’hai area to the Red River delta, southern Simao and Xishuangbanna.\(^{94}\) The Bai people were also relocated by the Nanzhao Kingdom from the Lake Er’hai area to Tengyue in the south during the 7th century.\(^{95}\)

During the Tang and Song era, people of the Bai-Yue origin had formed a crescent shaped settlement area in the Yunnan borderlands, Thailand, Laos and Burma. At this time, the Dai people had successfully distinguished themselves from other Bai-Yue tribes, and were identified as the Mang-Man or Jin-Chi (the Golden Teeth). During the era of the Dali Kingdom, the Dai people marched towards the northern Yunnan, and occupied Yincheng Region (current Jingdong County), and Weiyuan Prefecture (current Jinggu County) that were under the administration of the Nanzhao Kingdom.\(^{96}\)

\(^{93}\) For example, in some ancient documents, such as *Hua Yang Guo Zhi* (华阳国志), *Hou Han Shu* (后汉书), and *Gu Jin Zhi* (古今志), the Pu (Bai-Pu) people were often referred to as the Ailao people who settled in the same area. But in fact, the Bulang people once mingled with the Ailao people in Northwestern Yunnan. Bai Pu Kao (百濮考) recorded that the Ailao people were the Pu people who lived in Yongchang. Fang Guoyu also pointed out that the Pu people in Yongchang were also called the Ailao people, and usually the Pu people had no difference from the Ailao people. See Yang Yuxiang (杨毓骧), *Bulang Zu* [The Bulang People] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1988), 4, 7-9.

\(^{94}\) But in fact, one branch of the Pu (Bai-Pu) tribes called Bulang used to settle in the same area, such as Baoshan, Yongping as well as Shidian. They mingled with the Ailao people and were often addressed as the Pu (蒲) people. In some documents, Pu (蒲) was interchangeable with Pu (濮) people because of their same pronunciation.

\(^{95}\) Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 22-23.

\(^{96}\) *Yuanshi-Dili Shi* 元史-地理史 [The Yuan history- the history of geography]
The Yi people moved southward from northwestern Yunnan along with the expansion of the Nanzhao Kingdom. By the late 14th century in the Ming dynasty, they had become very powerful in the Yunnan borderlands, and began to threaten the control of the Nong (or Zhuang) people in southeastern Yunnan. In 1385, the Yi people ousted the Nong indigenous leaders in Fuzhou (current Funing county), and occupied the mountainous areas. 97 At the same time, many lowlands dwellers also left the plains and valleys of inner Yunnan to search for new homes in the mountains and borderlands because of the influx of the Chinese migrants. During the Qing era, more and more Yi people joined this type of migration, and flew into the mountains and the borderlands in order to escape the Qing military campaigns in initiating the gaitu guiliu policy. Hence, they occupied most of the mountainous areas in southwestern Yunnan. 98

The Jingpo people in the Gaoligong Mountains in Dehong moved northward to Jiangxinpo near northern Burma, and integrated with the native settlers at the beginning of the first millennium. 99 Their settlements were annexed into the Nanzhao Kingdom in the 7th century. Around the Ming and Qing era, some Jingpo tribes moved back to Dehong area after absorbing some other indigenous people into their communities. 100 During the Qing dynasty, Jingpo population in Dehong had already surpassed that of other native settlers such as the De’ang, Bulang and Wa people, becoming secondary to

97 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 27.
98 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 43-44.
99 The ancestors of the Achang people were the Xunchuan people. The Xunchuan people were originated from the Di-Qiang tribes, which means it is highly possible that they have arrived in this area at the beginning of the first millennium along with the southward migration of the Di-Qiang tribes.
100 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004) 5, 21-22.
the population of the Dai people. They moved from Guangxi to southeastern Yunnan in the beginning of the Yuan dynasty, and then moved further southward during the Ming dynasty and settled in the vast area near Vietnam.

The Lahu people followed two routes to migrate into the Yunnan borderlands after the Mongols conquered the Dali Kingdom in the mid-13th century. Some of them moved southeastward and arrived in Jingdong, Jinggu, and Pu’er; others traveled southwestward along the Mekong River and arrived in Lincang, Lancang, Menglian and mainland Southeast Asia. When the Lahu migrants arrived in Burma, they named their new homeland with the name of their old settlements in the Yunnan borderlands. In fact, before the 7th century, the Jingpo people also named the high mountains in their new settlements near northern Burma with the name of the Gaoligong Mountains after the hometown in Dehong of western Yunnan.

The Dai tribes and kingdoms in the Yunnan borderlands became the colonies of the Mongols in the 13th century, and native officialdoms were established by the Mongols to initiate indirect control. The Mongolian appearance in Yunnan brought opportunities for the Dai tribes’ military expansion. The ambitions of the Dai political units was unchecked without the threat from previous regional powers that were wiped out by the

101 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史* [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 38.
102 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史* [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 29.
103 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史* [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 27.
104 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史* [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 5.
Mongols, such as the Nanzhao kingdom, Daili Kingdom and the Pagan Kingdom in northern Burma. Consequently, the Mon-Khmer forces in this area began to shrink.  

**Geographic Settlements, Cultural Zones and Economic Patterns of the Indigenous Communities**

From a two-dimensional view, the geographic locations of the indigenous settlements in mainland Southeast Asia included those in the coastal and inland zones, as well as those in the coastal-flat river deltas and river zones. From a three-dimensional perspective, the indigenous settlements located at various elevations ranged from the plains to the mountains. Thus, mainland Southeast Asia and the Yunnan borderlands provided homes for various mountain settlers and plains settlers, as well as zones defined by their preferred agricultural techniques and economic patterns. Moreover, a congregation of different religious and cultural zones also can be found here, such as the Confucian Southeast Asia (Vietnam) and Theravada Buddhist Southeast Asia (Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos).

In fact, the indigenous people’s choice on the location of their settlements were influenced by a variety of considerations, such as their religions, traditions, customs, climate and etc. The specific location of the settlements further determined and shaped the characteristics of the cultural and economic patterns of the indigenous communities. However, each individual religious and cultural zones, including the Chinese and Indian, were not absolutely exclusive. This vast area has the most diverse and mosaic religious

---

105 Cang Ming (苍铭). *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 23.
and cultural landscape, due to frequent interactions of different indigenous groups as well as intra-regional and trans-national migration.

From a larger picture, the indigenous settlements in Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia received the influences from China and India in varying degrees. The coastal areas in the east and south of mainland Southeast Asia were more affected by foreign cultures and religions due to the commercial and cultural exchanges, whereas the same degree of integration was difficult to find in relatively isolated inland areas.

Furthermore, John R McRae divided mainland Southeast Asia into two major regions: the region of the river systems and the coastal zone. The region of the river systems included the relatively narrow Irrawaddy/Salween zone (the Irrawaddy Zone), the Chao Phraya zone, and the Mekong zone. To the east of the Mekong zone lies the coastal zone, “which came to be controlled by states whose cultural and political identities developed in contact and competition with the Chinese to the north”. In the regions of three major river systems, Chinese influence was limited because the Chinese model basically was not an option for the development of the indigenous political units, such as Nanzhao and later kingdoms of Yunnan. ¹⁰⁷

In fact, the relatively flat deltas of the river system in mainland Southeast Asia overlap the coastal areas as the narrow and mountainous ranges of the headwaters overlap some of the inland areas. This suggests that the influence from South Asia would be well retained and spread along the river system from the northwest to the south and southeast coasts. At the same time, the influence from China could be primarily spread from the northeast along the coastal areas as well as the river deltas where it was less difficult to

access. The relatively flat central and southern mainland Southeast Asia might have seen most frequent integrations and clashes of the influences from China and India, while other areas might be distinctively more “Indian” or more “Chinese”.

During the early time of the first millennium, both Mahayana and non-Mahayana Buddhist inscriptions were found in the coastal and Mekong zones. Mahayana Buddhist elements could be found in the Chao Phraya and Irrawaddy zones. In fact, different sects of Buddhism were not distinctly recognized, and often mixed with together. Besides the influence of Buddhism, Vaisnavism, Saivism, and other Hindu religions were also prevalent in mainland Southeast Asia.108

“While some of the inscriptions at Angkor refer to Mahayana Buddhist doctrines such as sunyata, emptiness, there is only a single known inscription that actually quotes a Mahayana text in mainland Southeast Asia.”109 By the end of the first millennium, inscriptions showed that “a range of texts from various sections of the Pali cannon had been transmitted to Mainland Southeast Asia.”110 In fact, the Liang Emperor Wu of China (Xiao Yan, 464-549 AD) once ordered the translation of the Buddhist scriptures and requested translators from the Funan court in the late 530s AD. Although some of the scriptures among all the translated texts were certainly introduced from Southeast Asia, “there is no way to tell which ones!”111

During the first millennium “cities contained large brick temples, and smaller brick shrines located throughout the hinterlands marked localities with specific meanings. These monuments held sacred statuary, were sponsored by the region’s elite, and reflected a syncretism of indigenous and Indic ideologies. Buddhism seems to have predominated in settlements and regions to the west (in central Myanmar and in central/western Thailand), and Hinduism predominated in areas further to the east in central Thailand, Cambodia, Laps, and Coastal Vietnam. Yet the co-occurrence of Buddhist and Hindu deities and architectural styles throughout mainland Southeast Asia suggests a selective adoption of Indic ideas that did not precisely duplicate their origin areas in South Asia.”\textsuperscript{112} In the Mekong delta, “the Chinese considered Funan a great center of Buddhism, yet its pre-Angkorian statuary tradition is largely Hindu in content.”\textsuperscript{113} Although the indigenous political units in mainland Southeast Asia also felt the influence from China, they “chose to identify themselves as ‘foreign’ to its cultural realm.” For example, the Linyi kingdom used a ‘barbarian’ script, possibly Sankrit, instead of Chinese, to communicate with the Chinese court in the late 3\textsuperscript{rd} century.\textsuperscript{114}

Also, ancestor worship and animism had a dominant role throughout all sorts of indigenous settlements in mainland Southeast Asia. Both plains people as well as mountain people, and both the coastal as well as inland zones more or less had the tradition and commitment to these two earliest forms of native religion. In the mountains,

people who practiced animism sometimes had rituals that were primitive and brutal in the
eyes of the plains dwellers, such as human head hunting.

Most of the Dai people in Honghe Prefecture believed in animism, and only those
who settled three villages in Jinping County became devoted Theravada Buddhist
believers. 115 In Lujiang area, the Chinese settlers in the mountains believed in Mahayana
Buddhism or Taoism, while the Lisu people in the surrounding settlements were animist
believers and were converted to the Catholic Church in the early 20th century. 116

The Dai Native Officers in Xishuangbanna began to send sangha to the Bulang
settlements to preach Buddhism in the beginning of the 16th century. 117 Many Bulang
people became Buddhist believers although animism and ancestor worship continued to
play a significant part of their religious beliefs. More than ten kinds of ghosts, the god of
the village, holy trees, fire, earth, god of water, Chinese bamboo rats, toads and both
female and male ancestors were worshiped in their daily life. 118 Besides that, the
Bulang people learned to speak and write in the Dai language. They adopted the Dai
calendars and followed Dai moral rules. 119

119 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 168.
In Dehong, the De’ang people often cohabitated with the Dai. They were converted to Buddhism. Without their own written language, the De’ang people found a great convenience to read and chant Buddhist scripture in the Dai language. Moreover, the acceptance of the Dai norms promised the De’ang people higher social and economic status in the local community.\(^\text{120}\) The Wa people who settled in Dehong completely dissolved into the Dai and Chinese population by 1950s.\(^\text{121}\) The Achang people in Lianghe and Xiao Longchuan also have become Dai.\(^\text{122}\)

The co-habitation or co-existence of different indigenous groups were not necessarily permanent, partially because of the highly mobility of some groups. Besides that, people often moved together for mutual assistance, and also moved away from each other for religious and cultural conflicts. For instance, the De’ang people gradually moved away from their native place in Longchuan as soon as the Jingpo people arrived. This withdrawal resulted from the De’ang people’s intolerance toward the Jingpo migrants’ tradition of animal sacrifice for ghost worship. As Buddhist believers, the De’ang people were reluctant to butcher animals, and they automatically moved away in order to avoid conflicts.\(^\text{123}\) In Ximeng, the Dai settlers were still found in 1940s, under the protection of a Wa tribe called Banqing. However they later moved to Menglian and

\(^\text{120}\) Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 167. Also see 民族问题五种丛书之一云南省编辑组 德宏傣族社会历史调查 三, 云南人民出版社 1987, 60.

\(^\text{121}\) Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 167.

\(^\text{122}\) Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 166. Also see 民族问题五种丛书之一云南省编辑组 德宏傣族社会历史调查 三, 云南人民出版社 1987, 58.

\(^\text{123}\) Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 110.
Mengsuo in the south when another Wa tribe called Yongbulao began to frequently attack their villages as human head hunters.  

Besides the religious practice and cultural traditions, migrants’ adaptation to the local climate was another major concern when they settled down. In fact, the majority of migrants who entered into the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia before the Qing dynasty gathered in the mountainous areas, while a small number of them settled in the lowlands. Avoiding malaria and other tropical diseases that were spread over the river delta, valleys and plains was the primary reason that the mountains people chose to stay away from the lowlands.

Malaria and other tropical diseases prevented a great number of migrants who were not native to the Yunnan borderlands from building their homes in the plains and valleys. In fact, the Di-Qiang, Miao-Yao and especially the Chinese migrants who settled in the Yunnan borderlands always moved from one mountain top to another, and rarely entered into the lowlands. The Di-Qiang tribes were used to the cold weather in the north, and they naturally preferred the mountains where it was cooler and less effected by malaria. Over generations, indigenous people’s choice on the location of their settlements gradually became a habit. In his investigation among the indigenous tribes in the early 20th century, Eric Von Eickstedt discovered that “many Miao in taking to him

---

125 Cang Ming (苍铭). Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 185.
126 Cang Ming (苍铭). Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 182.
127 Cang Ming (苍铭). Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 183.
raised their hands in horror at the very thought of settling on the plains.” Eickstedt also pointed out that “the Miao, Fan and Chiang (Qiang) belong on the cold mountain heights, in contrast to the Wu-man (Yi) and Liao (Lao and Dai) on the warm slopes, with the Tai people in the hot, steaming valleys.”

In Luxi of southwestern Yunnan, areas below 1100 meter’s elevation were always threatened by the highest death rate caused by malaria. Areas at 1600 meters’ elevation and higher were less effected, which attracted the Chinese, Jingpo and Lisu settlers.

The Miao settlements were wide spreading from Guangdong to Yunnan and mainland Southeast Asia; all these settlements were also in the mountains. The Hani people were found in the entire Yunnan borderlands and some other areas of mainland Southeast Asia, however only in the mountains.

In Mengmeng and Mengku valleys, outbreaks of malaria began to rise in summer, reached a peak in fall, and gradually disappearing by winter. Only the Dai people who seemed to have developed the right immune system as well as medical techniques felt safe enough to dwell in the valley. Usually, people from other tribes would be infected and lost their lives if they stayed in the valley for a few days. Overtime, the surrounding mountains were crowded with non-Dai settlers who simply wanted to avoid malaria.

---

130 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 97-98.
131 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 97-98.
132 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 99.
In the river deltas and valleys in Jinping of southeastern Yunnan, even the indigenous people had to move away during the late summer and early fall. Most often, the rice paddies left by Dai people in the valleys remained abandoned because the new comers had great fear of contracting malaria at the rice paddies. In Ruili, by the mid-1950s, the Jingpo people still would not stay long in the valley. The Lisu and Chinese people who lived in the mountains would not even dare to drink the water from the valley when they came down for the market day.

People who dwelt in the mountains largely counted on the natural environment in order to survive, though their dependent relationship with the natural environment varied, depending on specific agricultural techniques. Many mountain communities in Yunnan borderlands relied on game hunting and food gathering, and put less effort in farming as well as the refinement of farming technologies. They seldom tried rice cultivation, and often used slash-burn and dry-land farming techniques to sustain food supplies.

For example, the Kucong people usually chose a fine corner in the forests during winter when it was dry, and then chopped down all the trees. For small and medium sized trees, they were cut down from the height that was thirty to sixty centimeters away from the ground; and for tall trees, they were cut down right in the middle. After that, the Kucong people let the logs sit and dry until the following March. When March came,

133 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 100.
134 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 100.
they lit a fire according to the direction that the wind blew. The fire often started from the foothill, and began to encroach the dry logs. Usually the newly burnt forests were called the virgin forest. A few years later when the trees and bushes recovered from the initial burning, the land became the juvenile forest. After the burning, no plowing was needed, especially on the newly burnt virgin forests, because the ashes of trees and bushes had provided a plenty of nutrients. Planting was also very casual. One person would dig small holes with sticks, toss the seeds in, and finished by covering the hole with dirt. During May and June, some people might come back to the corn fields to pull the weeds, and some people never. When the corn plants began to ripe, the entire family would move to a shelter built right next to the fields, consuming while harvesting. Besides corn, they also planted wheat. When there was nothing to harvest, they collected fruits as well as vegetables during the dry season and stored them for the rainy season. Most Kucong families constantly face food shortage, and suffered averagely three to four months’ hunger each other.

136 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 81.
138 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 81. Also, Song Enchang (宋恩常), Yunnan Shaoshu Minzu Shehui yu Jiating Zhidu Yanjiu 云南少数民族社会与家庭制度研究 [Studies on the ethnic social and family system in Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan daxue lishi yanjiusuo minzu zu, 1978), 152.
People who relied on the slash-burn agriculture had to move periodically and frequently due to the speed with which the natural resources were exhausted. For example, some Yao, Miao, Lahu, Lisu, Hani and Kemu people moved every two to five years. Some Yao, Miao and Hani people might move every ten to twenty years. For those who settled in one place for a long time, they rotated the fields for slash-burning. There were also seasonal migrants who moved to different areas due to the seasonal natural resources they could obtain.  

For the Kucong people, the juvenile forests they farmed could only sustain three to four rotations. Each rotation had a farming period which lasted about three to four years, and a break period about four to five years. Usually they explored virgin forest while the juvenile forest was still under use or abandoned. In this case, they moved quite often within a small range, and then made a long distance move when all the juvenile forests were depleted. However, there were also some Kucong families constantly exploited virgin forests, abandoned the land next year, and would never return.

At the same time, mountain dwellers always tried to maintain their way of life and economic patterns by staying in the mountainous settlements. In fact, before the mountain dwellers moved into Yunnan, they had already been relying upon similar agricultural techniques. For example, some Di-Qiang tribes were nomads before they left

---

140 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 112.
142 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 80.
143 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 185.
Northwestern China. The slash-burn agriculture was particularly popular among the Di-Qiang tribes. The mountain dwellers would not easily change their agriculture pattern even when they moved to the plains. In Ximeng area, the Da Pingzhang valley (now in Burma) used to host the Dai people, the plains dwellers. When the Wa people moved into this area, they drove away the Dai people. After that, the Wa people let the Dai’s rice paddies sit and never farmed on them.

Usually those who relied on dry-land farming with slash-burn agriculture as the supplementary had more stable sources that sustained a stable life, and thus would develop a more sophisticated social structure. As a matter of fact, dry-land farming and slash-burn mountain people had to live on whatever was provided by the nature, and their interaction with the natural environment tended to be more adaptive rather than transformative. Mountain people learned to limit their acquisition, and keep a subtle balance between acquisitions from nature and contribution to nature in a long run. They preferred to grow native crops, and sometimes would save extra food as well as crops for trade. Mountain people were also interested in cash crops that yielded quick cash in order to relieve poverty. This became an important reason why opium cultivation became popular among the mountain people after the 1870s.

The plains dwellers, such as the Dai people, made up the majority of the population in the Yunnan borderlands before 1950s and had advanced into a higher level

144 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 102.
145 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 103.
in terms of agriculture, and social institutions. They were generally rice cultivators just as their kin tribes in mainland Southeast Asia. They hunted animals and gathered fruits only to supplement their food supply. It is very obvious that rice cultivation was not the specialty of the Chinese migrants. Thus, it seems to be very arbitrary to consider that the Chinese were the indigenous people’s sole origin of rice cultivation and diverse agricultural practices.\textsuperscript{147} In fact, considering the frequent trans-regional and intra-regional between southern China and mainland Southeast Asia, there was a possibility that the Chinese adopted rice cultivation from the mainland Southeast Asian influence.

As rice cultivators, the plains dwellers were not only relying on daily farming. They also had some techniques that took the advantage of the natural environment and reduced the input of labor. One common technique was stamp-plow, which was still found among the Dai settlements in Yunnan as well as Thailand by 1990s. \textsuperscript{148} These people farmed on wetlands that were stamped by elephants, deer or particularly oxen at present day. The weeds in the wetlands were usually stamped into the dirt, which accelerated its decomposing process, adding more nutrients to the soil. Moreover, animal stamped fields were especially welcomed by those who were terracing in the mountains,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{147} Some scholars pointed out that “In the more remote and hilly areas of southeast China, peoples of many backgrounds (Yi, Miao, and Dai, among others) have adapted to Han in-migration and now practice a mix of extensive and intensive agriculture, or hunting and gathering.” See Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, “Introduction” in \textit{Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China} edited by Pamela Kyle Crossley Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (London, Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 18. In fact, the only a very small number of Chinese migrants were able to settle and mingle with the some indigenous population in the remote area of Southeastern and Southwestern China. It was especially for the bulk of Chinese to migrate into the lowlands of these areas before the 18th century, and mingle with the indigenous people, especially the Dai people. In this case, not all indigenous communities’ agricultural practices were influenced by the Chinese. There were considerable diversities of the indigenous economic patterns within various communities before the arrival of the systematic Chinese migration.

\textsuperscript{148} You Xiuling (游修龄), “Baiyue Nongye dui Houshi Nongye de Yingxiang” 百越农业对后世农业的影响 [The Bai-Yue agriculture’s influence towards the future agriculture], in \textit{Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu} 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 307-308.
\end{flushright}
for the dirt became solid after being stamped by animals, which would prevent the loss of water. The vast area of southern China, southwestern China, Vietnam, and southern Thailand were the areas where the stamp-plow technique first appeared. In Yunnan, some of these stamp-plow wetlands were called oxen-stamped fields.

Another technique was bird-plow. Indigenous people who settled in the Red River and Xijiang River delta liked to grow rice on the wetlands that were grazed by bird migrating from the north. Sometimes, indigenous people also drove their poultry into the fields. While the poultry were digging, running, looking for worms and also excreting, the fields were plowed and fertilized. Some wet rice cultivators in southern China and Vietnam also used burn-flood techniques since the Western Han era. Burning was the main method for the burn-flood farmers to get rid of weeds. The process of plowing and

149 You Xiuling (游修龄), “Baiyue Nongye dui Houshi Nongye de Yingxiang” 百越农业对后世农业的影响 [The Bai-Yue agriculture’s influence towards the future agriculture], in Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 308-309.

150 You Xiuling (游修龄), “Baiyue Nongye dui Houshi Nongye de Yingxiang” 百越农业对后世农业的影响 [The Bai-Yue agriculture’s influence towards the future agriculture], in Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 307-308.

151 You Xiuling (游修龄), “Baiyue Nongye dui Houshi Nongye de Yingxiang” 百越农业对后世农业的影响 [The Bai-Yue agriculture’s influence towards the future agriculture], in Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 309.

152 You Xiuling (游修龄), “Baiyue Nongye dui Houshi Nongye de Yingxiang” 百越农业对后世农业的影响 [The Bai-Yue agriculture’s influence towards the future agriculture], in Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 306, 308.

153 Peng Shijiang (彭史奖), “Bai-Yue Ren yu Zhongguo Daozuo Wenhua”百越人与中国稻作文化 [The Bai-Yue People and China’s rice cultivation culture], in Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平), (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 317.
the cultivation of seedling were often skipped. Seeds were directly planted in the burnt
fields. Fields were then flooded for irrigation and the preservation of nutrients.\textsuperscript{154}

From a vertical view in terms of the indigenous people’s geographic settlements, as well as their economic patterns, in southeastern and southern Yunnan, the Dai and Zhuang people settled in the river deltas, relied on rice cultivation, and lived in bamboo homes. The Hani and Yi people lived in the middle of the mountains, farming on terraced rice paddies, dinning on rice and grains, and living in brick and wooden homes. The Yao, Miao, and Kucong people settled in the cool and high mountains, relying on grains and living in very simple shelters.

In southwestern Yunnan, the Dai, Zhuang, Chinese, and Hui people settled in the river deltas, plains and valleys that of 500-800 meters altitude. The Hani and Lahu who belonged to the Di-Qiang tribal system settled in the mountainous areas around 800~1200 meters elevation. Jinuo people are found in the mountains of 800-1000 meters elevation. As for the people from the Bai-Pu system, the Bulang people were found in the mountains of 800-1300 meters elevation. The Wa people settled in lower mountains about 600 meters; and the Yao people were found in the mountains from 600 meters high to 1600 meters. The settlers in the river delta, valleys and plains were usually wet rice cultivators and skillful merchants. And the mountainous people often kept slash-burn agriculture, while growing grains like corn. \textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{154} Peng Shijiang (彭史奖), “Bai-Yue Ren yu Zhongguo Daozuo Wenhua”百越人与中国稻作文化 [The Bai-Yue People and China’s rice cultivation culture], in Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 320.
\textsuperscript{155} Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 124.
In western Yunnan, the Dai people and a very small population of Chinese migrants lived in the river deltas and the lowlands. In the mountains around 800~1500 meters high, there were larger numbers of Chinese and the De’ang people. The Jingpo, and Achang lived in mountains from 1500~2000 meters high, and they grew rice and grains. In the mountains that were higher than 2000 meters, there were the Lisu people who were the last group to migrate in. 156

The relatively unstable economic pattern, as well as food and resources shortages, prompted the mountain people to acquire supplies from the plains dwellers, and sometimes, even in a confrontational way. In Jinghong of Xishuangbanna, Hani and Yi tribes sometimes attacked the Dai tribes in order to gain more resources. As a result, the plains dwellers were chased away by the mountain people. Compared with the mountain people, the plains dwellers had more opportunity to be exposed to the influences from the Chinese, Indian and other civilizations. With such advantages, they often acted as the mediators between the mountain people and the outsiders at the market place. 157

Although there were differences between the mountain and plains dwellers, overtime, the integrating force of the growing inter-dependence between the lowlands and mountain cultures created local political and cultural hegemonies that were alien to the Chinese, and more akin to other mainland Southeast Asian communities. 158

156 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 126.
157 Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 148-150.
Sometimes, the distinctions between the plains dwellers and mountain people became blurred because of high level of mobility and integration between these two groups.

First of all, many mountain people have proved to be seasonal migrants, who shifted their residence between valleys and mountains. They usually lived and farmed in the valley in spring, and then moved into high altitude mountainous homes to avoid malaria in the early summer. When the harvest season came, they moved back to the valley and stay until the next summer. Some of them owned rice paddies in the valleys but chose to live in the mountains. Second, although mountain dwellers were reluctant to settle on the plains, a number of plains dwellers often escaped into the mountains and changed their life style. For example, wars and conflicts with the Mongols in the 13th century forced the Prince of Mengmao and his people to move into the Wa Mountains and intermarry the Masan tribes in Ximeng area. When the Dong people moved from the coastal areas into the mountains in the corner where Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou meet, they gave up rice cultivation and began to mainly rely on slash-burn agriculture. They also tried to keep limited wet rice paddies for rice as well as fish farming.

So far, it is clear that the distinctions between people were not necessarily marked simply by ethnic identities, or any single element that cross-classified people. Although indigenous people were different in many ways, they were closely connected and similarly shaped by common social, cultural, religious as well as economic institutions

159 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 98.
160 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 30.
161 You Xiuling (游修龄), “Baiyue Nongye dui Houshi Nongye de Yingxiang” 百越农业对后世农业的影响 [The Bai-Yue agriculture’s influence towards the future agriculture], in Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 305.
and forces. Intra-regional migration, intermarriage, religions, wars, trade and other practices tied and integrated different ethnic or linguistic groups into several big homogenous groups. Newcomers were indigenized, and their traditions were also absorbed into different hosting communities. At the same time, the indigenous communities were homogenized based on the commonalities they shared as well as the reconciliations they made in order to maintain their co-existence. Despite differences and political confrontations that never ceased to end in this area, the interactions among the indigenous groups gradually mold the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia into a dynamic unity, with considerable degree of similar cultural practices, mutual communication, acceptance, cooperation and interdependence.

For example, when the Achang people moved into the Husa valley of southwestern Yunnan, they used to live along the slopes of mountains and were not familiar with wet rice cultivation. And yet, they did not totally separate themselves from other migrants such as the Chinese, Tai, Muslim as well as the Lisu. Usually, most Achang people lived in the same villages, and others mixed with the Chinese, Tai and Lisu, and developed close cultural and economic interactions with each other. Gradually, Achang people in the Husa valley became rice cultivators. Rice became their main staple food. They also developed many common characteristics that were the same or similar to the Dai and Chinese. For example, they adopted the same or similar cooking methods with the Chinese and Tai living in the same valley. Both the female and female Achang dress style in Husa resembled that of the Dai. Sometimes, male clothing was similar to that of the nearby Chinese. The language of Achang absorbed many Chinese, Jingpo, Tai
and Lisu elements.\textsuperscript{162} Here, Chinese migrants gradually became Achang people. In fact, the Tusi of Husa were of indigenized Chinese origin. \textsuperscript{163} Mahayana Buddhism and Chinese rituals became common in this area. \textsuperscript{164}

Chinese blacksmiths in the military garrisons in Husa and Lasa passed their techniques to the Achang people.\textsuperscript{165} The Achang blacksmiths incorporated the Chinese techniques with their own cultural elements and began to produce iron tools that were loved by the Dai, Jingpo, Lisu, De’ang and even the Chinese people. The Achong long knives were particularly popular among the mountain dwellers. During the late Qing era, Husa became an area center of hand craft economy that was supported by a commercial network composed by the caravans, raw material providers from nearby towns, as well a broad range of consumers of various ethnic backgrounds.

In fact, by the 1920s, Achang ironsmiths still relied on the Chinese mills in Tengyue and Yongchang to provide iron materials, for they did not master the iron forging techniques. Iron materials exported into China became their major resources in the 1920. After the WWII, the Achang blacksmiths mainly relied on abandoned vehicles and iron gas pipes for raw material. At the same time, other mountainous dwellers provided them with charcoals and coals for fuels. Because of constantly food shortage,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{162} The Achang people has a story to explain such phenomenon. A-chang people believed that when the earth created, the emperor assigned languages to the Jingpo, Chinese, Tai and Lisu. However, the languages were depleted when it was the turn for the Achang people to get their language. The Emperor therefore selected some words from each of the existed languages and made a new one for the Achang people. Achang Zu Jianshi Bianxiezu (阿昌族简史编写组), \textit{Achang Zu Jianshi 阿昌族简史} [A brief history of the Achang People] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1986), 3-4.

\textsuperscript{163} Cang Ming (苍铭), \textit{Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史} [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 172.

\textsuperscript{164} Cang Ming (苍铭), \textit{Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史} [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 172.

\textsuperscript{165} Cang Ming (苍铭), \textit{Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史} [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 186.
\end{flushleft}
food stuffs were transported in from Yingjiang and Longchuan. Usually, Chinese migrants were those who owned caravans and shops and some Achang people also engaged in the business. Besides them, merchants and caravans from outside were also very active. Fang Wenming, a famous Chinese merchant in Husa had business in Burma that drew the seasonal Achang labor migrants. An Achang merchant named Wengban opened his business in Burma and became the agent who introduced local Achang laborers to work in Burma. He owned a car and achieved great success as an area distributor of iron wares by the early 1950s.167

In Jinghong and Menghai of Xishuangbanna, the plains dwellers, mountain dwellers and Chinese merchants formed a trading system that incorporated various indigenous communities, particularly in the 20th century before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The plains dwellers, such as the Chinese and Dai were mainly responsible for trade as well as the supply of salt, rice vegetables, fabrics, garments and pottery. The mountain dwellers, such as the Jinuo people, Bulang people and Lahu people, usually provided specialties from the mountains. The Bulang people always traded their bamboo utensils, tea and firewood with the Dai people for food, fabrics, salt, iron pots, felt blankets, needles and yarns. The Jinuo people traded those items with firewood, dye, chili peppers and tobacco. On the other hand, the Lahu people

---


mainly relied on opium to trade for their daily necessities with other tribes. Over time, frequent interactions among various tribes contributed to the emergence of many local markets, such as Gasa, Galong, Galan, Menghun, and Mengzhe.\textsuperscript{168} Same pattern of co-habitation and local market place also could be found in Zhefang, the Wa mountains, and many other areas throughout the Yunnan borderlands. Further in Chiang Mai, although settlers from different origins lived separately, the Chinese, Siamese and others have cultivated a harmonious environment to cohabitate and trade with each other.\textsuperscript{169}

Through frequent corporations and confrontations, many indigenous societies have developed many common traits that bounded them together, as well as common grounds that they integrated with each other at a broad level. They spoke each other’s language, practiced each other’s religion, adopted each other’s customs, and lived each other’s lifestyle. This is not to argue the existence of a common Southeast Asian identity, for such a common regional identity never existed. And even a relatively narrower identity, such as the Yunnanese identity, would not come into being until the 20\textsuperscript{th} century because of the mosaic ethnic and political landscape. However, the non-existing common regional identity does not deny the possibility of co-existing homogenous groups that do not conform to a higher level of collective identity.

Admittedly, there were still many obvious differences between the indigenous communities, or even within the same group of the indigenous people. In fact, if two or three indigenous groups are randomly put together as shown in figure 1, the overlapping parts indicate those people who actively interacted with another group, and have

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{168} Cang Ming (苍铭), \textit{Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi} 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 153.
\textsuperscript{169} C Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier, (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 76}
developed many commonalities. These people might not necessarily stand for the mainstream culture or occupy the core of the indigenous leadership. On other end, there are those who might not interact with people from another group at all, and thus might have kept their cultural traditions largely in conformity with the original way.

Figure 1. The integration and alienation of different indigenous groups.

Overtime, those who stay in the hot-spots of inter-group communication and integration gradually differentiated themselves from those who do not, causing the subtle cultural alienation within the same indigenous group. Nevertheless, there is still a clear line between different indigenous groups, which can be cultural, political or religious, and distinguishes them from one another. However, either the differences within the same group or between different groups would not essentially alien these indigenous groups from each other because of various bonds that tie them together one way or another. For example, in the 13th century, many Bulang people who settled in the lowlands to the west of the Mekong River in Yongchang Prefecture already adopted a lot of Chinese norms, as a result of frequent interactions with each other. They learned rice and bean cultivation, spoke Chinese and engaged in trade as most Chinese people did. On the opposite, those
Bulang people who lived in the mountains still relied on hunting, collecting, as well as tribal wars to obtain food. This situation did not change during the Ming dynasty.  

Traditional approaches that used to categorize indigenous people by their distinct identities such as that of tribes, kingdoms or nations overemphasized their differences and underestimated their common characteristics. Any discussion based on this traditional paradigm is inadequate, failing to explain situations such as the antagonistic segregation existing within the same ethnic group or harmonious co-habitation between two different ethnic groups.

---

CHAPTER 2 THE INDIGENOUS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE
AND ITS TRANSFORMATION

China’s effort to incorporate the indigenous societies into its direct bureaucracy has never been very successful until the establishment of the PRC. During the long first and second millennium, Chinese authority was slowly established in some areas within the range of the Yunnan borderlands, and frequently challenged and even overthrown by the local powers.

The power and authority of the indigenous political units had their local roots. In other words, the indigenous societies did not need the approval of the Chinese or other colonial powers to establish a validate rule for their own people. The capability to obtain and monopolize natural resources was the key for the indigenous leaders to gain their influence. The structure of the indigenous authorities often overlapped with the leaders’ family and clan network. At the same time, secular authority was often intertwined with religious authority, especially Buddhist authority after the 9th century AD.

In reality, limited resources and manpower as well as similar social structure determined that most of the indigenous communities heavily relied on trade and military expansion. Thus, cooperation with other local alliances as well as regional powers seemed necessary in order to survive or compete with peers. As a result, the indigenous people’s connection with China or other larger powers could often be a practical and deliberate choice rather than a loyal submission. On one hand, the power structure of the indigenous society and its aloofness from China determined that the upward circulation of the indigenous elites would reach its top within the indigenous society, and would never mingle with the Chinese domestic politics. On the other hand, the indigenous
authority also shielded the penetration of the Chinese authority and prevented it from reaching down to the bottom of the local communities. This strong localism explains why the efforts to incorporate the indigenous societies into the direct bureaucracy of the Chinese empire always seemed feeble.

And yet, China was not the only larger power that the indigenous political units could count on, especially after the 1850s when new colonial powers from the West entered in the Yunnan borderlands. Although sticking to the Chinese authority remained as the expediency for most indigenous communities, China’s offer of direct rule was still not a practical option. The indigenous authorities retained a relatively high-level of autonomy within the Chinese system. It was not until the establishment of the PRC that the power structure of the indigenous society was completely destroyed and the roots of the indigenous authority unplugged.

**The Power Structure of the Indigenous Societies**

In the Yunnan borderlands, the very basic societal structure of the indigenous communities was built on family and clan relationships, especially for the mountain settlements. More complicated social institutions might develop on this basis, and exact conditions varied, depending on the specific agricultural patterns.

Usually, the rudimentary organizational structure were often found in the slash-burn centered communities. The slash-burn practitioners usually drifted around and tried to avoid fierce competitions over natural resources. As a result, the ownership of properties was not fixed, and it changed every few years. The population of each settlement was also very limited. People learned to pay respect to each other’s territory,
and automatically avoided the land that had been marked by others clans. Therefore, a very organized social structure that could sustain ad manage a large population seemed unnecessary. And at the same time, it was hard for a local authority to locate and organize all the “drifted” families and clans units into a highly centralized community.

The patriarch of the family or the clan often became the head of these slash-burn indigenous communities who did not have distinct social hierarchies. Leaders were elected by the community members based on their prestige and reputation within a family, a clan, or a small village. For example, before the establishment of the PRC administration, the Kucong people in the Jinping area of southern Yunnan (currently identified as a branch of the Lahu people) were organized under the *Ka*. *Ka* was originally formed by three to four generations of immediate family members, with a maximum of twenty to thirty people. Most of the new *Ka* during the early PRC era were organized merely via marriage relationship.¹ Members of each *Ka* worked together and shared food with each other. The patriarch of the family naturally became the highest leader, judge, and priest of the *Ka*. His specific rights included but was not limited to: choosing the fields, coordinating farming and moving, listening and solving family conflicts, approving and disputing marriages, as well as organizing and conducting the

---

rituals and ceremonies for ancestor worship. In southern Yunnan, the Lahu people in the mountains of Yuanjiang also only had a family or clan patriarch who organized farming and hunting. The Miao settlements in the mountains of Yuanyang usually elected the most respected senior male to be the village leader, who took charge of the sacrificing rituals, farming management, forest and irrigation maintenance, civil and criminal cases as well as the connections with other villages and tribes.

As the indigenous settlements incorporated more dry-land farming and became more settled, they also became subjected to more centralized social structures. The functions of the indigenous leadership tended to be more diversified and specialized. In the early 1950s, the Yao people in Honghe of southeastern Yunnan were still governed by a collective village leadership, the Zhailao system, which was composed by a Zhailao, Zhaizhang and Danglongshi (the priest). The Zhailao was the ultimate leader of the village. Zhaizhang was the main administer, and Danglongshi was the highest priest. They were elected by all the community members, taking charge of all the economic, religious, political, economic and diplomatic issues.

---


Republican government began to launch the *baojia* system in the frontier, and yet it did not change the social status of the Zhailao leadership in Yao communities.  

In fact, there were often more than one organizational systems within the same group of the indigenous people because their combined agricultural patterns. For example, the Jingpo people in Dehong had two distinct forms of social structure: the Kumsa system, meaning the old ways, and the Kumwong system, meaning the rebellions. The Kumsa system had a longer history, and was more common as well as highly advanced in Longxi, Luxi and Ruili. The less popular Kunwong system dominated in Yingjiang and a few areas. The Kumsa system initially emerged in the Ming dynasty and began to mature in the Qing dynasty. The history of the Kumsa system in specific Jingpo settlements may vary. Under the Kumsa system, the Jingpo people were governed by the Mountain Officers (Shan Guan). By the mid-20th century, some mountain official positions in Dehong area had been passed along for twelve generations, while some of them only lasted for five to six generations. The less popular Kumwong system dominated Yingjiang and a few other areas. The Kumwong system was evolved from the Kumsa system.

---


7 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in *Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu* [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 111.
system, and was considered more advanced, in terms of land property and the rights of the commoners. The emergence of the Kumwong system was not clearly dated. But it is highly possible that this system appeared during the late Qing and the Republican China era when Jingpo people engaged in a higher volume of interactions and trade with the outsiders. In fact, by the early 1950s, many Kumsa communities were under the transformation into Kumwong communities.9

The Kumsa communities had very strict social hierarchy that was based on the purity of the bloodline. All the members were segregated into three classes: the nobles, commoners, and slaves. Particular prefix must be added to people’s names in order to manifest their specific class status. Even ghosts were classified and specifically connected by different rituals. The intermarriage among different classes were strictly forbidden. Mountain Officers built temples in every village to symbolize their authority, and ordinary people were required to worship inside. Landed property was not allowed to be transferred, and only the Mountain Officer had the authority to distribute and re-arrange the land property. Usually the youngest son was the only legitimate heir of the house. The Mountain Officer’s jurisdictions had clear boundaries, and divided the most of the Jingpo population into numerous segments. The trespass of the boundaries often caused military conflicts between different Kumsa tribes. In Zhefang County alone, there

---

9 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华、史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”《景颇族的山官制度》 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 130
were twenty-three Mountain Officers in the East Mountains, and forty in the West Mountains. In Longchuan, there were ninety-eight Mountain Officers.  

The Kumwong communities were free of the control of Mountain Officers. Community leaders were elected by members or sometimes taken by the wealthy families. The class segregation was not clear, and even disappeared sometimes. People usually worshiped their own ancestors. In general, in the Kumwong system, people had less restrictions but enjoyed the freedom to handle their land property, intermarriage among different social classes, no class-segregational prefix for their names, and all the sons were eligible as heirs of the house.  

Some of these mountain communities were also under the administration of other nearby indigenous political units, especially those highly organized and advanced indigenous political units on the plains. In Xishuangbanna, the Miao communities were also ruled by the indigenous leaders in Mengla and Mengding. Before the establishment of the PRC, the Miao people in the Caishanping village belonged to the jurisdiction of the Tusi of the Hani people.  

10 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhihu”景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu 中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 54-57, 78-94.  

11 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhihu”景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu 中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 53-56.  


13 Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi Bianxie Bangongshi (红河哈尼族彝族自治州民族志编写办公室), Yunnan Sheng Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi 云南省红河哈尼族彝族自治州民族志 85
Dai indigenous leaders. The Dai Tusi often assigned their confidants to oversee the Jingpo settlements. New Jingpo Mountain Officers had to present gifts to the Dai authority, and as in return, they received a recognition letter from the latter. In fact, the control of the Dai Tusi often stayed at the nominal level. First of all, the Dai authority did not have direct contact with the Jingpo commoners. Second, the Jingpo Mountain Officers declared their loyalty to the Dai authority, but they rarely obeyed the orders and requirements from the latter. 14

On the plains, a system that was similar to the centralized mountainous communities was possibly the earliest form of government until Buddhist authority arrived. John R McRae also pointed out that “the earliest forms of political organization were tribal chieftaincies, whose authority came from charismatic ‘men of prowess.’” 15 Besides that “the individual or at most family-based rulers exercised military power in part by their control of wealth and trade, which allowed them to win loyalty by the distribution of gifts and the delegation of local authority.” 16

In the Yunnan borderlands, Buddhism and animism were successfully incorporated into the local power structure at least since the 9th century A.D., especially on the plains and among the rice cultivators. Religious and secular authorities was often intertwined and inter-dependent. But the basic framework of the local power structure was actually more religious-oriented than secular.

In Xishuangbanna, Baiba and Baisun were two major Buddhist sects, representing different values, life styles as well as relationship with the secular authority. Baiba means those who were from the forest. Baisun means those who were from the rice fields. This was quite similar to the general situation in mainland Southeast Asia where the distinction between the Buddhist schools was not identified as Theravada or Mahayana, but defined by a schools’ relationship with the secular society. Generally, Baiba monks were dedicated ascetics, whereas the Baisun monks were more secularized. In the social and political centers of Xishuangbanna, Baisun monks were closer to the heart of the secular authority, and their temples were found in economically advanced cities and

---


17 According to the ancient Buddhist legend, Baiba and Baisun originated from the same Buddhist master. Among his followers, there were three monks and one nun. When the night approached, they all rested under a big tree. Two of the monks rested with their back against each other; however, the other monk and nun rested facing each other. The next day, when the master proceeded into the mountains, and the monk and the nun were not allowed to follow. After the death of the master, the two monks who were allowed to study with him became the masters of the Baiba monks, and the monks and the nun became the masters of the Baisun monks. See Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 13.

18 The distinction between Theravada Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism is more of a modern term to address the difference between different factions of the Buddhism. During the first millennium, there were mainly two models of Buddhism in Mainland Southeast Asia: “one based on the management of royally approved estates as ongoing religious and economic foundations, and the other based on the propagation of Buddhist religious values and ritual practices to communities of lay followers.” See John R McRae, “Comparing East Asian and Southeast Asian Buddhism”, in Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal, Vol. 22, (2009): 97-124.
towns such as Jinghong, Menghan, Mengla, Mengwang as well as Mengpeng. The head Baisun monk of the Grand Buddhist Temple was the Grand Head Monk (Huba) in Jinghong area, and also the head of all the religious leaders in Xishuangbanna.  

The cooperation between the Dai secular leaders with the Buddhist authority, especially with that of the Baisun sect, established a stable political and social structure with strong emphases on civilians’ loyalty to both the secular and religious authorities, as well as their obedience to the moral laws. Furthermore, the Buddhist monastic education provided a stable pool of social elites, the patriarchs, who led civilians to strictly follow the secular and religious rules. Not only Dai boys, but also Bulang, and sometimes Haini boys, left home at a young age of seven or eight to dwell and study at the Buddhist temples. When these boys grew to adulthood, they could choose to leave the temple or stay and advance to higher ranks of the sangha. For those who returned home, daily worship was a common practice. For those who decided to stay, religious dedication alone did not promise higher rank positions.

In fact, the sangha’s relationship with indigenous leaders often became the deciding factor in their religious career. Monks needed a sponsor from the secular sector,  

---

19 They both shared same Buddhist scriptures, but their ways of worshiping and chanting varied. The Baisun monks owned beautiful temples, and frequently associated with secular society. They provided services such as removing ghosts and healing the sick. They dedicated themselves to persuading villagers for donation, from which they would take 2/3 as personal income. They owned servants who were usually lower rank monks in the temple. These servants as well as tenants worked on the private farms of the temple, and brought a fair amount of revenue each year. With multiple income resources, the Baisun monks also run business, owned horse farm and even became money loaners. Baiba monks originally built shelters in the forests, and then gradually moved to temples in the villages. Mendicancy was the only approach for the Baiba monks to keep the one-meal-a-day tradition, which lasted until 1960s in some areas. Usually, Baiba monks never return back to their families once they left home to become a monk. Both rivals had their own faithful believers, and yet, the Baisuns has closer connection with the secular leaders. See Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), *Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao* [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 11-14.
Bowo, meaning a father in the belief, who was capable of providing political endorsement, financial support, and the establishment as well expansion of the monks’ public and religious networks. Bowo played crucial roles especially when the monks returned back to the secular life.\(^{20}\) For higher ranking monks, such as Huba and above, only the indigenous leaders were eligible candidate to be his Bowo.\(^{21}\) For lower ranking monks, their Bowo could be any senior man in the family, or the village head.

Furthermore, the promotion of higher ranking monks needed approval from the secular authority. Lower ranking monks were found in every village, but the population of higher ranking monks was very limited. For example, there were only four Huba monks in each Meng in Xishuangbanna.\(^{22}\) New Huba monks were chosen by both the religious and secular authorities together.\(^{23}\) The ceremony of the new Huba monk’s

---

\(^{20}\) Li Wenhai, Xia Mingfang and Huang Xingtao (李文海, 夏明方, 黄兴涛), *Minguo Shiqi Shehui Diaocha Congbian Shaoshu Minzu Juan* 明国时期社会调查从编少数民族卷 [Compilations of the social surveys of the Republican China Era, the Volumes on ethnic minorities] (Fuchou, Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005), 249.

\(^{21}\) Bowos were also responsible to prepare ceremonial clothing and devices that their monks needed. When a monk became a Huba, his expenditures became unaffordable for ordinary Dai families. In fact, as the Bowo of higher rank monks, indigenous leaders did not have to pay the bill out of his own pocket. Usually, the area council calculated the potential expenditure in advance. Later, in the name of the indigenous leader and the area council, an announcement of fund drive would be passed leaders of lower level of administrative units. Then, lower rank indigenous officials, such as the village leaders, would gather money from the civilians, who were also Buddhist believers. The area council would examine the fund when it was all collected, and then sent officials to purchase necessities for the ceremony and gifts as well. The quantity, quality, amount as well as the weight of the equipped items rise as the ranks of monks goes higher. What’s more, the items on the list are basic requirement, and the more the better. Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), *Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao* 西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 11.


\(^{23}\) When there was a vacancy for a new Huba, the area indigenous leaders, Zhaomeng (召勐) or even the head of indigenous officials, Zhao Pian Ling (召片领), would hold a council to choose a new one. Current
promotion required the presence of both the religious as well as secular leaders, indicating the approval from both authorities. In reality, the Huba monks were often relatives or even family members of indigenous officers, which implied a high level concentration of the secular and religious authority. The concentration of both authorities maintained the stability of the aristocracy within the Dai communities.

On the other hand, the secular leaders also depended on the support from religious authorities to establish their legitimacy. The judicial authority of the Buddhist temples was superior to that of secular judges. Moral laws were also commonly recognized supreme, and higher than any civil laws. The highest-ranked monk had the authority to sustain the legitimacy of indigenous leaders even when challenged by the civilians. The Huba and other representatives from various temples and indigenous officials carefully examined the Huba candidates, who were knowledgeable and faithful senior monks with good reputation. See Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao 西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 12.

Ironically, not many senior monks were willing to dedicate their whole lifetime to higher rank sangha. For most adult men, receiving the candidacy of Huba meant more of a disaster than glory, and some of them might escape to other Meng and even foreign countries. In this case, when the new Huba was chosen by indigenous leaders and the religious council, it became confidential information to everyone. After the preparation, the indigenous leader sent representatives, one from the council, one from the village that the new Huba came from, and another one from the Temple that the new Huba dwelled, and greeted the new Huba with gifts. Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao 西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 12. 15.

---

24 Ceremony usually is held on the date of the 15th on January, April, June or August. But on the 14th, celebrations has already started with drummers, fireworks, and peacock dance that last until the second day. Before the day, people are sent out to fetch all kinds of holy water, herbs, wood as well as beans. Pots are prepared according to the number of the new Hubas. Senior dressed in whites put all these holy items in the pot, boil them and make the holy water for the ceremony. All kinds of gods and ghosts are invited to the ceremony by setting up flags, and tablets with their names on. See Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao 西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 15.

indigenous leaders who irritated the civilians often sought refuge in the Buddhist temples, relying on the head monk of the temple to appease the opposition and restore his authority.\textsuperscript{26} It was a tradition in Xishuangbanna that each year, at the Kaiguan Men Festival (December 15\textsuperscript{th}, Dai calendar), lower level indigenous leaders swore allegiance towards their head leader in the Wanlong temple with the head monk present. \textsuperscript{27}

The monks were exempt from the punishment by any civil law. For monks who committed crimes, they would be expelled from the temple before the civil judge became involved. The head temple and the head monks had the privilege of issuing exemptions from punishment to people who violated civil laws. It was common that some lower ranking indigenous leaders or nobles who committed crimes would secretly bribe higher ranking indigenous leaders and the head monks in order to avoid the punishment. After receiving the bribe, the head temples would dispatch high ranking monks to rescue the suspects or even prisoners. Monks covered the suspects or prisoners with robes to show protection, so they would be free from any trials or punishments.\textsuperscript{28}

Hence, the roots of the indigenous authority stayed within the indigenous society. Restricted to limited resources and population, most indigenous political units possessed

\textsuperscript{26} Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), \textit{Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna]} (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 16.

\textsuperscript{27} Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), \textit{Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna]} (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 15.

\textsuperscript{28} Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), \textit{Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna]} (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 15.
similar capacity on local control. Thus, numerous equivalent indigenous political units gradually sprouted in the Yunnan borderlands.

**Militarization and the Remedies for Local Competition**

It was not surprising that most indigenous political units largely relied on exchange and wars in order to seize more resources. As a result, they were often highly militarized and trade oriented. In order to adapt to the constant wars over on lands, wealth, and labor forces, indigenous communities trained their own militias, and developed self-defense systems. Simultaneously, it was crucial to form alliances and gain support from regional powers in order to overpower their peers. Thus, the entry of the Chinese colonial power in Yunnan was not only the result of China’s one way expansion, but also of a deliberate invitation of some indigenous political units. Since the 19th century, the rise of the European colonial powers and the Japanese in the 1930s provided the indigenous people different alternatives outside submission to the Chinese. Although indigenous people’s attitudes towards these alternatives varied, depending on their practical needs, the alliance with the Chinese seemed to be for expediency.

On the plains, the 13th century marked the large scale militarization of the Dai tribes. Silunfa, the Tusi of Mengmao, initiated military campaigns and annexed most indigenous tribes in the Yunnan borderlands into the Luchuan kingdom. Constant wars engaged not only the standing army, but militias composed of more than 80% of local civilians. 29 Militarization became a long-standing characteristic of the Dai communities.

29 Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi Shilve” 从勐卯果占壁到勐卯安抚司: 勐卯傣族土司史略 [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, di shi ji. (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑
In the early 20th century, it was not difficult at all for the Native Officers to raise all the capable men and organize a military force over a night or within a day. 30

When the Jingpo people expanded into the plains of the Dehong area in the early 15th century, they launched large scale attacks on the Dai and Benglong people. The Benglong people chose not to take the chance to resist the Jingpo forces. As for the Dai, on one hand, they cooperated with the Jingpo tribes, utilizing the Jingpo military expansion as a way to establish the Dai’s indirect control over other small tribes. The Dai tribes even set aside a specific area for the Jingpo Mountain Officers and allowed them to collect taxes. 31 On the other hand, wars between the Jingpo and Dai broke out often, and lasted for centuries. In the early twentieth century, the Jingpo tribes initiated a war against the Longchuan Tusi for three years. The Dai Tusi’s army burnt down villages in the jurisdiction of the Bangwa Mountain Officer. A while later, the Jingpo people took a revenge. They did not hesitate but wiped out several Dai villages. 32

---


31 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu” 景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu 中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 141.

32 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu” 景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu 中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 139-142.
In the mountainous communities, conflicts over on wealth and land were frequent among the individuals, families, clans, villages and even indigenous leaders. Unceasing military operations were organized to seize oxen and land and to seek for revenge. In the mountainous Jingpo settlements, villagers were also militias whose major responsibilities included farming and fighting. Animist rituals were necessary in the military operations in order to achieve victory.  

“After many wars, some Mountain Officers’ land expanded, some shrunk, and some combined”. However, the social structure of the Jingpo society still remained unchanged.

Gradually, well-structured defense systems were developed, especially in the mountainous settlements. For example, defensive structures of the Wa tribes in Lancang of Western Yunnan served the purpose to protect their people from two for two major threats: first, constant wars with other tribes; and second, the notorious tradition of “Human Head Hunting”. Human Head Hunting was a common practice of the Wa people, which lasted until the 1950s. The Wa people cut off and collected their enemies’ heads to make human sacrifice, and pray for good harvest in the following year.

Among all the Wa tribes in Lancang, Da Masan was considered as the mother village of surrounding settlements. The Da Masan’s model of defense system, Awali,

33 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史维忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu 中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 130-137.
34 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史维忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu 中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 73.
35 Zhang Yue and He Ming (张跃, 何明), Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzu Nongcun 30 Nian Bianqian, Shang 中国少数民族农村三十年变迁，上 [Thirty years of transformation of the ethnic villages in China, Vol.1.] (Beijing, minzu chubanshe, 2009), 351.
became the standard for constructing new Wa settlements.\textsuperscript{36} Da Masan were situated at the place of the highest elevation among all the mountainous Wa settlements, with the advantage to oversee the entire area. At its peak, Da Masan was the top authority for forty-five Wa settlements. The original Da Masan village was composed of three sections spreading in a fan-shaped structure.\textsuperscript{37} The village was surrounded by solid wooden fence, or thorns of three to four meters height. Trenches were dug along the defense wall, wherein, sometimes, sharp bamboo sticks were placed. The village gate was closely watched by people who lived near the gate. Six drum towers were responsible for sending signals and stood as the icon of the village.\textsuperscript{38}

According to the recollections of the elderly villagers from Da Masan, ordinary people had to equip themselves with long knives, iron javelins, crossbow, fire-lances and rifles. With an efficient military defense system to reduce the casualties and deaths, Da Masan dominated military confrontations with other villages even in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Militias from Da Masan kept the record for killing fifty-six enemies at the expense of ten people. Da Masan was thus considered as the mother village of surrounding villages, and the Da Masan’s model, Awali, became the standards for establishing new Wa settlements.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{36}Zhang Yue and He Ming (张跃, 何明), \textit{Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzu Nongcun 30 Nian Bianqian, Shang} 中国少数民族农村三十年变迁, 上 [Thirty years of transformation of the ethnic villages in China, Vol.1.](Beijing, minzu chubanshe, 2009), 360.

\textsuperscript{37}Zhang Yue and He Ming (张跃, 何明), \textit{Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzu Nongcun 30 Nian Bianqian, Shang} 中国少数民族农村三十年变迁, 上 [Thirty years of transformation of the ethnic villages in China, Vol.1.](Beijing, minzu chubanshe, 2009), 347-348.

\textsuperscript{38}Zhang Yue and He Ming (张跃, 何明), \textit{Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzu Nongcun 30 Nian Bianqian, Shang} 中国少数民族农村三十年变迁, 上 [Thirty years of transformation of the ethnic villages in China, Vol.1.](Beijing, minzu chubanshe, 2009), 360.

\textsuperscript{39}Zhang Yue and He Ming (张跃, 何明), \textit{Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzu Nongcun 30 Nian Bianqian, Shang} 中国少数民族农村三十年变迁, 上 [Thirty years of transformation of the ethnic villages in China, Vol.1.](Beijing, minzu chubanshe, 2009), 360.
Forming alliances was another effective way for the indigenous political units to overpower others or survive. On the plains in Xishuangbanna, it was very common for the Dai tribes to reach mutual military assistant agreements. Generally, these mutual assistant agreements had written forms that specified the liabilities that the indigenous political units, leaders and Buddhist temples committed to each other. Each of the parties was required to be honest and accountable. They also needed to respect, trust and care for each other. Mutual cooperation was essential to stay in the alliances. The violators of the agreement were usually fined a financial punishment (see, table 1).

Table 1. Financial Punishment for the Violation of the Mutual Assistant Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule/Fine (liang, Silver)</th>
<th>Kingdoms</th>
<th>Banna</th>
<th>High Rank Leaders</th>
<th>Lower Rank Leaders</th>
<th>Buddhist Temples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>106,560</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Wax bars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,140</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Wax bars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>35,200</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Wax bars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Close tribal cooperation undoubtedly existed beyond physical boundaries such as the mountain-plain division or national boundaries. The fact is that the physical boundary between tribes or even larger political entities, such as state, was envisioned differently by the tribal leaders as well as the tribal members. The complexity of the tribal understanding of the boundary was demonstrated by various choices as well as their shifting loyalty to different regional political powers throughout history. As the reward

---

for their allies, the exchange of the tribal land and intermarriage were common. For example, the Native Officer of Xishuangbanna, Sanbaolidai, married a princess from one of the mountain tribes in order to consolidate his control. Even during the 19th and 20th century, land properties were often transferred between the indigenous leaders of different tribes that belonged to two different states.

The alliances and divisions between various indigenous political units remained local issues unless a serious threat towards the Chinese authority was posed. In the 19th century, the Tusi of Guangnan married his daughter to the Tusi of Baole whose jurisdiction was considered in the boundary of Vietnam. As a part of the dowry, the Tusi of Guangnan transferred his right to collect taxes from the Sanpeng area to his daughter. This caused border disputes between China and French in late 1880s when the two countries began to draw the boundary between Yunnan and Tongkin. The French claimed Sanpeng a part of Tonkin, whereas the Chinese believed that the property right transferred by the Tusi of Guangnan did not change China’s sovereignty and boundary. After a forty-day quarrel between the two countries, French took 90% of the Sanpeng area, and China occupied five villages.

Besides the competition with other indigenous political units, there were frequent factional conflicts within the indigenous political units themselves over the position of the leadership. Therefore, gaining the support from regional powers seemed very practical not only for the indigenous leaders to dominate domestic politics, but also to

---

overpower their area rivals. Not surprisingly, their loyalty towards the regional powers was connected to their practical needs for survival and competition.

The submission to regional powers, such as China and Burma, was a main option for the indigenous political units in the Yunnan borderlands. In fact, indigenous leaders’ eagerness to seek external support opened the channel for the colonial forces to enter. In order to obtain protection in constant tribal wars, the indigenous political units began to submit to the Han dynasty as early as the last half of the 1st century B.C. At the same time, the Chinese also initiated policies to coerce the indigenous political units to join the Chinese empire, by the threat of its overwhelming military power or the reward of rich endowments such as lands, wealth and authority over the newly established colonies.

Five hundred years later, the politics among the Yi and Bai tribes in the Lake Er’hai area that later established the Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms was a continuation of such a pattern. The difference was that China was not the only force that could extend its military and political influence in this region. They were challenged by the Tibetans. Likewise, the indigenous communities in Xishuangbanna also swore equal loyalty to Thailand and Burma after the 13th century. Chinese dominance was not reestablished.

---

43 In the year of 47 B.C., Xiansu, a leader of the Ailao tribes, managed to have his tribe become the protectorate of the China after he was defeated by the nearby Luo Duo (grass top with duo underneath) tribes, and lost 6 chiefs and 60,000 troops. In 51 B.C., Xiansu and his 17,000 tribal men surrendered under the control of the Governor of Yuexi prefecture. In 69 BC Liu Mao, another leaders of some other Ailao tribes, also led 553,711 people to submit to the Chinese administration. The Chinese emperor especially reorganized the Yongchang Prefecture to in order to accommodate Liu Mao and his people. Overtime, the new Yongchang Prefecture hence became an administrative unit covered a vast area extended from The Yunnan borderlands to the west of the upper stream of the Mekong River. Chinese documents claimed that the current Dehong and Xishuangbanna were included in the Chinese administration since then. See You Zhong (尤中), Zhongguo Xinan Bianjiang Bianqian Shi (The history of the transformation of China’s southwestern frontier) (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1987), 15.

44 Hu Shaohua (胡绍华), Zhongguo Nanfang Minzu Lishi Wenhua Tansuo (A study on the history and culture of the people in Southern China) (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2005), 298.
until 1910s. In the 1860s, Louis de Carne observed that the coexistence of “the Burman, Laotian and Chinese mandarins” in the same area was not a rare phenomenon. However, “as tributaries to two rival states”, the indigenous political units in Xishuangbanna enjoyed a considerable degree of self-government in reality.  

The Chinese empire provided several alternatives for the indigenous political units in The Yunnan borderlands: first of all, to become a part of China’s directly ruled frontier; second, to be indirectly ruled by the Chinese authority within the Chinese influenced frontier; third, to become a tributary of China. Within the Chinese frontier, the majority of indigenous people were still governed by their own leaders who submitted to the Chinese colonial authority. Li Fuyi pointed out that indigenous communities in Xishuangbanna were not reconciled to the rulers from China proper until the Mongolian armies conquered them on their way to northeastern Vietnam in 1296. It is true that along the Yunnan frontier, Chinese authority initiated a dual system that combined direct rule in a limited area and indirect rule over the majority of the land. Historically the tusi system only had a history of seven hundred years when indigenous leaders were recognized as Native Officers and granted the title of tusi in the Yuan dynasty.

---

45 Li Fuyi (李拂一), Cheli 车里 [Cheli] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1933), 20.
47 However, the PRC has been portrayed all the indigenous political units that were used to the tributaries or indirectly ruled by China during the pre-modern period as “Chinese polities”, and including them in various maps formulated after 1950s. See Geoff Wade, “The Southern Chinese Borders in History”, in in Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social and Cultural Change in the Border Regions, edited by Grant Evans, Christopher Hutton and Kuah Khun Eng (New York: St. Martin’s Press; Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 35.
48 Li Fuyi (李拂一), Cheli 车里 [Cheli] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1933), 1.
Initiating direct rule over the Yunnan borderlands was always the preference for the Chinese empire, but this goal was not achieved because of the inability of access to as well as management of the frontier. Since the Yuan dynasty, indigenous leaders who cooperated with or forced to submit to the Chinese by threat or military forces were granted the title of *tusi*, meaning the Native Officer.\(^{50}\)

During the Ming dynasty, the *tusi* were classified into two types: the civilian-rank *tusi* and the military-rank *tusi*. Civilian-rank *tusi* oversaw the areas “where the economic infrastructure was productive enough to support a large bureaucratic staff, and where Han Chinese in-migrants had established sizable settlements alongside the indigenous population.” On the other hand, the military-rank *tusi* enjoyed a very high level of autonomy in the areas with fewer Chinese population.\(^{51}\) In the Ming period, 1,608 indigenous leaders received the title of *tusi*, and 1,021 of them were in Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan, with a predominant percentage of military-rank positions.\(^{52}\)

In the Ming and Qing era, the attempt to transform the indigenous leadership into the direct administration by the Chinese bureaucracy, namely *gaitu guiliu*, was challenged by unceasing rebellions. The *gaitu guiliu* policy was originally initiated in the

---


Ming dynasty, and intensified during the Yongzheng era of the Qing dynasty. Throughout Yunnan, the Chinese armies encountered the indigenous resistance. In northeastern Yunnan, more than 30,000 Yi people were slaughtered in a small town called Mitie. In Wumeng, Dongchuan and Zhenxiong, not only ethnic people but also the earlier Chinese migrants were killed by 20,000 troops led by Ortai. A large number of Yi people escaped into the Liangshan Mountains in Sichuan.

In the 1730s, in his report to the Yongzheng emperor, Ortai pointed out that the indigenous people were loyal towards Native Officers, not the Chinese authority. Another document from the Department of Military also confirmed that in southeastern Yunnan such as the Pu’er and Xishuangbanna valley where tropical diseases prevailed, Chinese authority was feeble, and the indigenous people were too difficult to “tame”. The governor general of Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi stressed the necessity to keep the tusi system because it would be too difficult to station adequate Chinese troops in the Yunnan borderlands. Therefore, local Chinese bureaucracy had to cooperate with the indigenous leadership, through which the Chinese were able to maintain indirect control over the vast area of the Yunnan borderlands.

53 Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi Shilve” 从勐卯果占壁到勐卯安抚司: 勐卯傣族土司史略 [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, di shi ji. (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑 (德宏州土司专辑) [selections on the historical documents of the Dehong Prefecture, Vol. 10 or the special Volume on the native officers], edited by Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1997), 44.

54 Cao Shuji (曹树基), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di Liu Juan 中国移民史第六卷 [The history of the migration in China Vol.6] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe), 165.


By the mid-19th century, the *tusi* system still dominated Nujiang, Dehong, Xishuangbanna, Zhenkang, Gengma, Shuangjiang, Cangyuan, Ximeng, Lancang, Menglian, Honghe, Lvchun, Yuanyang, Jinping, Malipo and other indigenous settlements, covering almost the entire the Yunnan borderlands.  

Heavy taxation of the Chinese as well as the indigenous authorities often caused riots organized by both Chinese and ethnic civilians. The tension between Chinese authority and the Muslims as well as Chinese migrants and the Muslims intensified in western Yunnan. And yet more conflicts between the Chinese migrants and the indigenous people surfaced. The newly emerging Chinese landlords’ pursuit of land annexation, in particular, violated the interests of both the indigenous people as well as the indigenous nobles.

For example, in the 1840s, the newly assigned Chinese official who oversaw the Jingpo and other indigenous people in Tengyue occupied a large area of land for his private farm, which irritated the Jingpo nobles. Soon many Jingpo Mountain Officers in Tengyue collaborated together and initiated a war against the Chinese official.

During the last quarter of the 19th century, as the European colonial forces rose in the mainland Southeast Asia and gradually occupied the Chinese tributaries, the Yunnan borderlands was at the risk of being encroached upon. The British warred against with Burma in 1820s and 1850s, and secured its control in the southern lowlands. In 1885, as

---


59 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu” 景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in *Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu* 中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 139.
the upper Burma fell into the hands of the British, Burma was entirely annexed into the British Empire in mainland Southeast Asia and South Asia.  

In the same year, the French also approached to the Yunnan borderlands near Vietnam. Three years ago, they occupied Hanoi. From 1884 to 1885, the French involved in military confrontations with the Qing army as well as indigenous forces in Vietnam’s border with Guangxi and Yunnan. Its ambition to control Mingsuo, Menglai and Mengpeng in the Yunnan borderlands was frustrated by the indigenous resistance. At the same time, as the French took over Laos, it also annexed Mengwu and Wude, two indigenous Dai political units in Xishuangbanna near Laos.  

The influence of these colonial powers challenged and surpassed China’s dominance in this area, which provided the indigenous political units another option better than the submission to China.

Generally, the indigenous leaders’ attitude towards other colonial forces varied. Among two or three factions within one indigenous polity, those who received Chinese support and remained in power usually felt reluctant to accommodate to the new colonial powers. Not only would they organize resistant forces to fight, but also they sometimes actively invited the cooperation of the Chinese military to purge the new colonial influence out of their territories. For example, in 1843, the British army fought the Jingpo braves in Longchuan, and suffered a loss of no less than 1,000 people.  

Later,

---

60 The emergence of Modern Southeast Asia, edited by Norman G Owen, 77, 87-92
61 Yunnan Sheng Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui Bangongshi (云南省志编纂委员会办公室), Xu Yunnan Tongzhi Changbian Xia Ce 续云南通志长编下册 [The continued Yunnan Chronicles, Vol. 3] (Kunming: Yunnan Sheng Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui Bangongshi, 1985), 92-91.
when the Sino-Vietnamese border was initially drawn in the 1880s and 1890s, the indigenous people refused to submit to the governance of the French, and organized their own resistance forces.

In Maguan, the French army engaged more than ten battles with a joint force of Miao, Yao, Zhuang and Chinese militia, and eventually gave up these lands for “it was impossible to rule”.63 Around the same time, after Wude and Mengwu were occupied by the French, the Native Officers and local Chinese landlords organized a resistant force that remained active for nearly two decades. 64 In western Yunnan, Dao Anren, the Tusi of Ganya, organized a joint resistance force including the Dai and Chinese troops, and launched military campaigns against the British for eight years.65 Numerous confrontations occurred between the indigenous and colonial forces after the mid-19th century and persisted during WWII. In western Yunnan alone, various indigenous tribes organized the Zhanxi Anti-Japanese guerilla forces and remained active over a large area extending from Zhanxi to the upstream area of the Salween River.66

However, indigenous leaders’ cooperation with China did not suggest their deep loyalty towards the latter. There were cases that the indigenous leaders took the initiative to gain the support from the French or the British instead of staying under China’s

66 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu” 景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu 中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 139.
protection. The reasons that the indigenous leaders became reconciled to new colonial powers also varied. They might simply have cooperated in order to survive. Besides that, those who were not favored by the Chinese and lost power in the local factional conflicts, as well as those who were dissatisfied with the Chinese, tended to seek connection with the Europeans, or later the Japanese, in order to restore their authority.

During the Panthay Rebellion (1856–1873), both French and British ambassadors tried to negotiate with the Muslim regime in Dali in order to resume the trade between Yunnan and mainland Southeast Asia in the 1850s. In fact, the Muslim caravans that stayed in active in the trade between western Yunnan and Burma were under the protection of the Dali regime. In 1868, Louis de Carne received the permission from Dali to enter into Yunnan and even visit the city of Dali. 1870, Dali dispatched an ambassador named Liu Daoheng to visit Great Britain. After his return, Liu Daoheng proposed to Du Wenxiu to seek the assistance from the British and French in order to overthrow the Qing government. In 1872, in the name of the son of Du Wenxiu, Liu Daoheng appealed to the British government for aid to Dali, and expressed the willingness to submit to the rule of the British.

---

At the same time, in order to fight against the Muslim troops, the indigenous political units in Simao of southern Yunnan received assistance from Burma as well as a good amount of European arms, including a musket from a Russian manufacture.\textsuperscript{72}

In the Pianma area near Burma, the heavy taxation of the Denggeng Tusi who was supported by the Chinese governor caused lower rank indigenous leaders to defect to the British. In 1910, two indigenous leaders Wu Jiayuan and Xu Linxiang persuaded other indigenous leaders to contact the British army in Myitkyina, declaring that Pianma was a part of the British territory and requesting the presence of the British army for protection. In response to the request from the indigenous leaders in Pianma, the British government later sent the Consul of Tengyue to Pianma for investigation. The Denggeng Tusi, Maozhao Tusi and Luzhang Tusi immediately reported to the Governor of Yongchang, and requested the Qing army to be stationed in Pianma area. However, the Governor of Yongchang ignored their petition, and concealed this incident. Later, more than 2,000 British troops arrived in the Pianma area. This incident further inflamed border disputes between China and Burma.\textsuperscript{73}

In 1908, the Menghai-Mengzhe War broke out in Xishuangbanna because of the factional conflicts within the indigenous leadership. One of the indigenous noble named Bakangliang fled to Menggen and seek the protection from the British after he lost in the factional conflicts. Around the same time, a local leader named Zaisan who was expelled by the Tusi of Damenglong in the first place, organized a military force to overthrow the


\textsuperscript{73} Liu Bokui (刘伯奎), Zhongmian Jiewu Wenti 中缅界务问题 [The Sino-Burmese Border Issues] (Shanghai: Zhengzhong shuju, 1946), 43.
tusi, and then was pacified by the Chinese authority. In 1914, with the military supplies aided by the British supported Menggen authority, Bakangliang and Zaisan cooperated with each other, and entered into Damenglong to mobilize civilians to rebel. However, the Chinese authority soon pacified this revolt, and put Damenglong directly under the jurisdiction of Jinghong (Cheli), in order to closely watch the interactions between the indigenous people in Damenglong and the British across the border.\(^\text{74}\)

During the WWII, after the Japanese took over Mengmao, Tengyue and Longling in Western Yunnan in 1942, the Chinese authorities that were established at the county level in the 1910s by Republican Yunnan provincial government abandoned this area. By bribery and coercion, the Japanese controlled the indigenous leaders. Native Officers collected taxes for the Japanese authority. Japanese assisted the Native Officers to train their army, and also sent a language teacher to teach them Japanese.\(^\text{75}\)

In fact, the specific situation might be far more complicated, and the indigenous politics often involved the conflicts of various factions of the Chinese, indigenous and the new colonial powers. The indigenous political units developed their own strategy, and often took the initiative to survive and even thrive under the influences of different colonial powers. Among different alternatives, the Chinese remained the best and

\(^{74}\) Sun Tianlin (孙天霖), “Ke Shuxun Zhili Pu-Si-Bian Shaoshu Minzu Diqu Shimo”柯树勋治理普思边少数民族地区始末 [Ke Shuxun’s governance of the ethnic area in the Pu-Si periphery], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 46-47.

\(^{75}\) Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi Shilve” 从勐卯果占壁到勐卯安抚司: 勐卯傣族土司史略 [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, di shi ji. (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑 (德宏州土司专辑) [selections on the historical documents of the Dehong Prefecture, Vol. 10 or the special Volume on the native officers], edited by Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1997), 21, 45-46.
economic option, for it was conventional, and handy, and of lower cost (China had strong desire to cooperate with the indigenous leaders, making more compromises than the Europeans and Japanese). For example, when China and French drew the boundary between Yunnan and Laos in the late 20th century, Mengxing became a part of the French-Annam. In 1914, when the Tusi of Mengxing had a disagreement with the French officials, he escaped back into Yunnan and asked for the protection of Chinese authority. With the interference from the Governor of Xishuangbanna, the Tusi of Mengxing and his families were relocated to Jinghong and placed under the protection of China.76

In fact, in the Yunnan borderlands, China’s influence was restricted to the Chinese cultural islands that were based on the Chinese settlements and military garrisons, or as Chinese cultural belts that overlapped trade routes or military supply lines. The presence of the Chinese influence changed the political landscape in the areas that were directly under its control. Nevertheless, it did not change the dynamics of the entire the Yunnan borderlands as well as the Yunnan borderlands’ connection with Mainland Southeast Asia, but only added more diversities to the indigenous societies.

The Chinese Way

In the early 20th century, the indigenous political units in Yunnan might have developed a more distant connection to the central Chinese government than an indirect rule because of the prevalence of the localism and militarism. The nature of localism

76 Sun Tianlin (孙天霖), “Ke Shuxun Zhili Pu-Si-Bian Shaoshu Minzu Diqu Shimo”柯树勋治理普思边少数 民族地区始末 [Ke Shuxun’s governance of the ethnic area in the Pu-Si periphery], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 47.
during this time period was not substantially different compared with previous centuries. In fact, it developed into at least three faces especially after the 1911 Revolution: first of all, the dominance of the indigenous authorities who were aloof from both the central Chinese government and the provincial government; second, the unsatisfied and expanding local military men who became threats to the current provincial authority; and third, the independence or at least semi-independence of the provincial warlords of Yunnan from the central Chinese government. Thus the direct rule by the Chinese government needed to break through at least three layers of localism, in order to harness these local military forces. Consequently, conflicts existed and persisted at the central Chinese government level, the provincial level, and the local level.

First, throughout the history, there were layers of local powers lying between the smallest indigenous political unit on the bottom of the power hierarchy and the provincial government on the top. Leaders of larger local powers were possibly supported by provincial authority, and thus closer to the Chinese bureaucrats. These local leaders also often acted as brokers between the provincial authority and leaders of smaller local powers. In fact, the intermediate area powers could possibly be indigenous\(^77\), and sometimes, indigenized Chinese (in an earlier time),\(^78\) or actual Chinese officials, especially in the 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) century. Thus, the intermediate area powers actually “shielded” smaller indigenous political units from the penetration of the provincial authority as well as the upward movement of the indigenous people, acting as the *de facto*

\(^77\) Such as the Nanzhao and Duli regime.

\(^78\) In early times, Yong Kai (雍頔), Meng Huo (孟获), Cuan Xi (爨习), Zhu Bao (朱褒), Meng Yan (孟琰), Lv Kai (吕凯) and Li Hui (李恢) were among the famous indigenous warlords that emerged in the chaos of the end of Eastern Han dynasty. See Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), *Zhongguo Yinmin Shi, Di 1 Juan* 中国移民史 第一卷 [The history of migration in China, Vol. 1] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 276.
ultimate local authority. As a result, this not only escalated the prevalence of localism, but also caused the emergence of aristocracy at the local level.

As the representatives of the provincial government as well as intermediary between the indigenous societies and Chinese state, the Chinese governors had to foster close social connections at the local level in order to establish their authority. This made it impossible for them to stay out of the factional conflicts among the indigenous leaders. In this case, the Chinese authorities’ interactions with the indigenous leaders usually had two results. On one hand, Chinese officials who were less diplomatic and ambitious participated in indigenous factional conflicts that would escalate or trigger further confrontations involving other Chinese officials, Native Officers, and even the provincial government. On the other hand, those who were able to coordinate and balance the interests of different indigenous parties, regardless of political background, could easily manipulate the area politics and even establish the dominance of their own faction. The dramatic power struggles in the Xishuangbanna valley during first three decades of the 20th century well demonstrated this pattern.

In the early 20th century, Xishuangbanna was still under the jurisdiction of the Pu’er Prefecture that was established during the Yongzheng’s rule of the Qing dynasty (1722-1735).79 The twelve indigenous political units made up of the Mengs or Xishuangbanna were independent administrative units that were governed by their own tusi, who then submitted to the head tusi, or the Pacifying Commissioner residing in Jinghong (Cheli). At higher level, the Chinese governor in Pu’er only interfered when revolts occurred. Thus, the indigenous leaders at the prefecture level usually had no direct

connections with the provincial government, let alone the Qing court. The Mekong River divided Xishuangbanna into the north valley where Chinese migrants almost equaled the size of indigenous population, and the south valley where indigenous population outnumbered the Chinese. In 1908, the Menghai-Mengzhe Wars broke out because of the factional conflicts within the Menghai indigenous officials over the inheritance of the tusi’s position. Eventually, the war evolved into military confrontations involving the Pacifying Commissioner, indigenous officers, Chinese governors and merchants.

Zhao Xiangyong, the Tusi of Menghai, married the princess of Mengzhe, and raised three sons in the late 19th century. Before Zhao Xiangyong passed away, he designated his younger brother Zhao Yamai to succeed his position. However, his nephews rebelled, with the additional support from their grandfather, the Tusi of Mengzhe. Zhao Yamai thus fled to Burma and found shelter in Kengtung. After a while he returned and reached a peace agreement with his nephews in the presence of the head

---

80 Chinese official Li Zhaoyuan once proposed the Qing court to establish direct Chinese administration in the Northern Valley. After the Xinhai Revolution, the Yunnan provincial government adopted Li Zhaoyuan’s blueprint, and ordered Ke Shuxun to organize the government in the South Valley Yunnan. See Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 40-42.

81 Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 41-50; and Also Sun Tianlin (孙天霖), “Ke Shuxun Zhili Pu-Si-Bian Shaoshu Minzu Diq Shimo” [Ke Shuxun’s governance of the ethnic area in the Pu-Si periphery], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 51-55.
monk of the Grand Buddhist Temple in Menghai. However, he was attacked by the rebels the next day and escaped to Menghun. Later, with the assistance from the Tusi of Menghun and some old royal connections in Menghai, Zhao Yamai was restored to his power and resided in the Grand Buddhist Temple for protection.  

At the same time, the Pacifying Commissioner, the head of all the Tusi in Xishuangbanna, dispatched a military officer from Jinghong with 200 troops to Menghai to organize negotiation between the two sides. In fact, the Tusi of Mengzhe, the grandfather of the rebel leader, harbored deep resentment of the Pacifying Commissioner, because his lands were annexed by the latter years ago. Soon after the army from Jinghong arrived in Menghai, they encountered troops sent from the Tusi of Mengzhe and were defeated. As the Pacifying Commissioner’s army withdrew, Zhao Yamai lost protection, and had to flee into Burma again. 

The Pacifying Commissioner immediately gathered all the other tusi at the Buddhist Temple in Mansa and discussed further military operation against the rebels, the Tusi of Mengzhe, as well as their new allies, the Tusi of Liushun and the Tusi of Dingzhen. At the same time, the Pacifying Commissioner also sent messages to the Chinese governors in Simao and Pu’er, pleading for military intervention from the

---

82 See Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 20-21

83 See Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 22.
provincial government. But there was no response. Later, the Pacifying Commissioner was informed by possibly a Muslim merchant that the governor of Simao had already become an ally of the Tusi of Mengzhe and the Tusi of Liushun and blocked messages intended for the governor of Pu’er. This dilemma was solved when a Chinese merchant named Zhang Tangjie broke through the Governor of Simao’s blockade and delivered the message. Zhang Tangjie was a prominent Chinese merchant in Xishuangbanna. Zhang’s Burmese wife was the adopted daughter of the Pacifying Commissioner. Years ago, Zhang’s caravans had been robbed by an indigenous noble from Mengzhe. Therefore, Zhang Tangjie considered an opportunity for revenge.

When the Governor of Simao was eventually informed about the rebellion, he mistakenly ordered the Tusi of Liushun and the Governor of Simao to organize the peace negotiation, having no idea about the divisions among his lower rank officials. After a very unpleasant meeting with the Pacifying Commissioner in Jinghong, the Governor of Simao proceeded to Menghai and joined the rebels. This triggered the beginning of large scale military campaigns that for years between the Pacifying Commissioner (the head

---

84 See Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 22.

85 See Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 22-23.
tusi), other Native Officers who subjected to the Pacifying Commissioner and the provincial army that involved in later.  

In January 1910, Ke Shuxun, a Chinese warlord originally from Guangxi Province, received the order from the Yunnan provincial authority to solve the conflicts in Xishuangbanna. About four months later, Ke Shuxun pacified the rebellion with his Guangxi army, assisted by indigenous troops, and the provincial army from Kunming. After pacifying the rebellion, Ke Shuxun hired an interpreter in order to communicate with the Pacifying Commissioner and other indigenous officials in order to establish direct Chinese administration in the Xishuangbanna Valley, which did not exist before.

After the 1911 Revolution, the new republican provincial government continued to transform the indirect administration in the borderlands into direct rule, but at a slow and mild pace. The tusi system still dominated the Yunnan borderlands, and coexisted with the Chinese bureaucracy that was established by the provincial government at the county level. In order to gradually undermine the control of tusi, the newly founded Chinese Pacifying Committees only took charge of the local court, schools, business and police forces. The provincial government hoped that the establishment of these institutions would subtly transform the social environment of the borderlands into that of

---

86 See Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 21-27.

87 See Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 33.
the China proper. And in fact, these solutions did not provoke the antagonism of the indigenous leaders by dramatically change their social and economic control. At the same time, from the 1910s to 1920s, the provincial officials were otherwise occupied by their own factional conflicts, which allowed the local authorities a high level of autonomy.

Ke Shuxun naturally became the General Administrative Director of Xishuangbanna, a new post appointed by the provincial government of Yunnan. This marked the beginning that the Pacifying Commissioner was not the sole ultimate authority of all the Native Officers in Xishuangbanna anymore, but had to share the authority with his Chinese counterpart. With very limited control from the provincial government, Ke gained a considerable room to establish his followers. In 1918, some Native Officers attempted to rebel against Ke Shuxun as well as his Guangxi officials and troops for their cruelty and heavy taxation. In fall of 1921, these Native Officers were invited to Kunming where they met Tang Jiyao, the governor of Yunnan. The provincial government granted these indigenous leaders military positions under the leadership of Ke Shuxun and the Pacifying Commissioner, and also instructed them to “listen and assist Ke to govern the area well, and not to violate (such obligation)”.

90 Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 35.
In reality, Ke Shuxun turned Xishuangbanna into his own an independent kingdom. Although Ke still received orders from the provincial government, he had the supreme authority in Xishuangbanna, and was eager to forge alliances in order to consolidate his control and also prepare his son to inherit his position the future. His son, Ke Xianghui, became the “adopted” son of the Pacifying Commissioner. After Ke Shuxun’s death, the Pacifying Commissioner and other indigenous officers requested the Yunnan provincial government to appoint Ke Xianghui as the new governor in Xishuangbanna. However no response was given and the governor’s position was left open for more than eight months. Seeing this as an opportunity to control Xishuangbanna, the Governor of Pu’er placed his confidant Sun Tianlin in the governorship. At the same time, the Governor of Pu’er had a major dispute with the new provincial governor, Long Yun. Taking advantage of this, Ke Xianghui received the support from Long Yun to oust the new Governor of Xishuangbanna. The Pacifying Commissioner in Xishuangbanna made it clear that he wanted to stay out of the “the conflicts between the Chinese”, and he refused to cooperate with Ke. Ke later

---

91 Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji* 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Hui Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 37.

92 Sun Tianlin (孙天霖), “Ke Shuxun Zhili Pu-Si-Bian Shaoshu Minzu Diqu Shimo”柯树勋治理普思边少数民族地区始末 [Ke Shuxun’s governance of the ethnic area in the Pu-Si periphery], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji* 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Hui Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 48.

93 Sun Tianlin (孙天霖), “Ke Shuxun Zhili Pu-Si-Bian Shaoshu Minzu Diqu Shimo”柯树勋治理普思边少数民族地区始末 [Ke Shuxun’s governance of the ethnic area in the Pu-Si periphery], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji* 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Hui Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 48.
purchased weapons, gathered his father’s old troops from Guangxi, mobilized some Tusi to join his force, and expelled the governor in November 1928.94

Over the following months, Ke Xianghui executed a few more Chinese officials in Zhenyuan County, Linjiang County and Jinghong County in order to consolidate his control. Three months later, after solving the disagreement with Long Yun and receiving the support from the provincial army, 95 the Governor of Pu’er occupied Jinghong.96 This marked the beginning of a series military confrontations that last for years.

Localism also prevailed in the Dehong valley of western Yunnan, where Chinese authority had been feeble and the local aristocracy remained within the leadership of the Native Officers. The provincial government of Yunnan organized two new institutions in 1911 in order to coordinate the indigenous affairs with the tusi. In March 1912, Li Genyuan, a provincial military officer, organized a conference in Tengchong, and attempted to persuade all the tusi in southwestern Yunnan to submit to the authority of

---

94 Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴，刀自强，李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyouhuan (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 38.

95 Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴，刀自强，李文贡), “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyouhuan (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 48.

96 Sun Tianlin (孙天霖), “Ke Shuxun Zhili Pu-Si-Bian Shaoshu Minzu Diqu Shimo”柯树勋治理普思边少数民族地区始末 [Ke Shuxun’s governance of the ethnic area in the Pu-Si periphery], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyouhuan (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 48-49.
the newly established County government of Tengchong. Not surprisingly, Li was strongly opposed by the indigenous leaders.

Indeed, the Pacifying Committee had become a nominal institution. It was tusi who still wielded the ultimate authority. In the same month, the Pacifying Committee was dissolved and replaced by the Administration Committee of Five District, with a very small impact on the tusi’ local control. In the following years, the committee chairs were replaced frequently, and all of them often requested the provincial government to grant them more control over the local politics as well as economy.97

In the 1930s, the provincial government of Yunnan led by Long Yun established the First Colonizing Office in Tengchong in order to strengthen control over the Native Officers in this area. At the same time, the provincial government also initiated the baojia system in Yunnan borderlands, intending to tighten its direct social control. And conflicts did not stop but escalated between the local Chinese authority and the indigenous leaders because the latter refused to cooperate. In 1933, a Chinese official named Liao Bin proposed that the provincial government give life time stipends to the Native Officers, and remove their administrative and financial authority. 98 This proposal triggered more

97 Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi Shilve” [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 10 Ji. (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑 (德宏州土司专辑) [selections on the historical documents of the Dehong Prefecture, Vol. 10 or the special Volume on the native officers], edited by Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1997), 43-45.
98 Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi Shilve” [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 10 Ji (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑 (德宏州土司专辑) [selections on the historical documents of the Dehong Prefecture, Vol. 10 or the special Volume on the native officers], edited by Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1997),44-45.
quarrels between the indigenous leaders and the provincial government. The Tusi of Mengmao, Dao Jingban, pointed out that it was necessary for Native Officers to handle native affairs in the border area. As a result, the Native Officers needed to keep 30% of the indigenous revenue for the use of the local Chinese government.  

As the provincial government of Yunnan pushed its control into the Yunnan borderlands, it also faced the military confrontations with the indigenous people. In the mid-1930s, more than two hundred militia men from the mountain villages in Longchuan attacked the provincial army stationed in the area, engaging in three days’ battles.

Second, with the ambition to overthrow and replace the current authorities, or at least expand their control, local military men sought for opportunities to rebel against the provincial government and local Chinese authorities as well. The majority of this type of confrontations were often caused by the factional conflicts and peer competitions within the Yunnan Army. This became more frequent after 1920s, when different factions within the leadership of the provincial Yunnan Army collaborated their followers at the local level and divided the military forces in Yunnan into various segments.

---

99 Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi Shilve” [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 10 Ji (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) [selections on the historical documents of the Dehong Prefecture, Vol. 10 or the special Volume on the native officers], edited by Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1997), 45.

100 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史维忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu” [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 140.

In November 11th 1911, led by the revolutionists from Tongmenghui and military men, Yunnan declared independence and established a militarized administration titled the Great Chinese Yunnan Military Government (Yunnan Military Government). However, the Yunnan Military Government was not the first regime that declared independence in Yunnan after the 1911 Revolution. A few days ago on October 28th, the Western Yunnan Military Government was established in Tengyue, and received the recognition from the British Burma. 102

In 1905, the Tongmenghui became active in Tengyue of western Yunnan, and recruited people from various background, including local merchants, leaders and members of the Gelaohui (the Elder Brothers Society), soldiers from the Qing army that stationed in Tengyue, as well as indigenous leaders. Right after the 1911 Revolution, the Western Yunnan Military Government (WYMG) based in Tengyue became the first independent revolutionary regime in Yunnan. Zhang Wenguang, a local merchant who donated his assets to sponsor the Tongmenghui, was elected the governor general. Soon, the WYMG dispatched armies to control other areas of western Yunnan, and took over Longning, Yongkang, Shunning, Yunzhou, Mianning, Yunlong and the jurisdiction of the Native Officers in this area. With the participation of the secret societies and defected soldiers from the Qing army, the total population of the WYMG army soon reached 30,000. However, this army was not under the unified command from the WTMG government in Tengyue. In early 1912, the WYMG army encountered the

Qing army in Dali that recently declared its loyalty to the new provincial government of Yunnan. The conflicts were not solved until the provincial government dispatched representatives to hold the peace negotiation. Zhang Wenguang was granted the assistant governor general of Yunnan, residing in Dali and commanding the local armies in Tengyue, Yongchang and Shunning.  

Overall, the provincial military garrisons that represented the authority of the provincial government were thinly spread in the Yunnan borderlands. Even by the mid-1930s when the provincial army reached 25,000 including the militia units, there were only three battalions stationed in a few major cities and towns in the Yunnan borderlands, including Tengchong, Hekou, and Guangnan. This in turn, allowed the thriving of various local military forces including defensive forces controlled by local governments, armed gangs, secret societies, bandits as well as private armies and guards organized by local gentries. In fact, the provincial government required the local governors to organize and led their own standing armies and militia for the local security, crisis management, and supplement the provincial armies when necessary. Usually these local defensive forces were bounded to their own areas. However, this rule was not always followed by  

---

the local military men. They also collaborated with the bandit forces and posed threats not only to the provincial government but local civilians.  

From May to August 1926, three local military officers of Yongbei, Baoshan rebelled against Tang Jiyao, the governor of Yunnan. In May, 1926, Luo Shuchang, a military officer who was stationed in western Yunnan to oversee Lijiang, and Weixi rebelled. This incident was triggered by Luo Shuchang’s dissatisfaction towards Tang Jiyao, as well as his disputes with Li Bingyang, Tang’s confidant who recently became his new superior. By May 1926, Luo Shuchang recruited a large number of local militias, bandits and gangs, assembling close to 10,000 troops. In August, 22nd, another military officer named Yang Zhenhuan declared war against Tangyao in Baoshan. In August 26th, Yang Zhenhuan, a military officer who was stationed in Tengchong, declared independence. Yang Zhenhuan was also not satisfied with Li Bingyang, and at the same time had close connection with Luo Shuchang. These three military forces soon combined and reached a total population of more than 10,000 people. In mid-August the rebels fought Tao Jiyao’s provincial army stationed in Yongbei and suffered defeat. In the following months, the provincial army dominated the battle field and penetrated the rebel’s bases in Baoshan and Tengchong by December.  

The bandits, in particular, plagued almost everywhere in Yunnan after the winter of 1943 when a great number of military were gathered in Western Yunnan to resist the Japanese, as well as an influx of war refugees. After 1944, when the provincial

---

government discharged all the guerrillas, militias, scouts and other self-defensive forces that were under the command of the 20th Corps of the KMT army in Western Yunnan, many military officers and soldiers became bandits, robbing the civilians and even attacking the government. These “floating” non-governmental military forces were often mobilized by those warlords who wanted to challenge the current provincial authorities. Later, they also became the targets both the KMT and CCP intended to recruit and tame during the civil war.

Third, the independence, at least the semi-independence of provincial warlords like Tao Jiyao and Long Yun formed strong obstacles for the central Chinese government in incorporating the provincial government of Yunnan, let alone the Yunnan borderlands, as a part of a unified China.

After the 1911 Revolution, Yunnan was independent from the control of the Beijing government. The Yunnan warlords recruited a large number of soldiers, and dispatched armies to aid the revolutionaries in Sichuan and Guizhou. Gradually, the Yunnan Army began to occupy Sichuan and Guizhou. However, Sichuan and Yunnan did not directly integrated into a unified Republican China, and instead, they were annexed into territory of the Yunnan warlords. In 1915, Yunnan became the base for the military campaign against Yuan Shikai. In February 1916, as the conflict escalated, southeastern Yunnan became the battle fields for conflicts between the Beiyang Warlords, Guangxi

---


Warlords and the Yunnan Warlords. At the same time, the Yunnan Army traveled to Tibet. Thus, the degree that Yunnan warlords as well as indigenous leaders in Yunnan participated in Chinese domestic politics increased more than ever before. In the 1930s, Chiang Kaishek relied on the Yunnan army to eliminate the CCP during the Long March. The downward penetration of the Chinese authority was halted as local forces in Yunnan moved upward and participated in China’s domestic politics, especially during the WWII.

Taming Local Forces

From the mid-18th century to the mid-19th century, the Yunnan border lands had been plagued by unceasing military confrontations, ranging from large scale wars to small confrontations. Various military forces were constantly active in the Yunnan borderlands, such as the Tusi’s armies, provincial army, and warlords in Southern China, indigenous guerrillas, bandit forces, gangs, the private forces of the merchants, and towards the 1940s, the CCP’s militia and guerrilla forces, mobilizing the indigenous populations and bringing outside military forces into the Yunnan borderlands.

An opportunity to settle the localism seemed to have arrived in the 1940s, especially after WWII. Both the KMT and CCP had their own blueprint for

109 Initially Yuan Shikai planned to send troops into Yunnan via Vietnam and Guangxi, but he was not allowed to pass Guangxi and Vietnam because of strong objections from the French and the Guangxi Warlord Lu Rongting. Later Yuan Shikai’s military campaign gained the support from Long Jiguang, a Guangdong Warlord who was born to the Haowu Tusi’s family in the Yunnan borderlands. In January 1916, Long Jiguang’s brother led an army of 20,000 and marched towards Yunnan from Guangzhou. At the same time, Long Jiguang’s son secretly returned back to the residence of the Haowu Tusi, and organized an army comprised by the Tusi’s militia as well as local gangs. In February, 1916, the Yunnan army encountered Long’s army in Guangnan, Qiubei, Gejiu, Mengzi and Jianshui. In March, Long’s troops were defeated and withdrew. Yunnan Jindai Shi Bianxie Zu (云南近代史编写组), Yunnan Jindai Shi 云南近代史 [The Modern History of Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1993), 276-284.

110 Chiang Kaishek had the opportunity to incorporate the Yunnan warlords into the system of the national army of the Republican China during the Long March of the CCP in the mid-1935. However, this effort was not successful.
incorporating Yunnan into a greater Chinese nation. The attempt to harness, utilize or even tame regional and local military forces had been a major challenge not only for the KMT but also for the CCP.

Basically, the Yunnan warlords and the indigenous forces’ desire to remain relatively autonomous violated Chiang Kai-shek’s determination to unify China. Chiang tolerated the existence of the Yunnan warlords as well as the indigenous forces so as to utilize them to oppose their common enemies, such as the Japanese and later the CCP.

Before WWII, the Native Officers in the Yunnan borderlands led small militias that were lacking in training. In 1941 and 1942, the standing army of Yunnan led by General Lu Han withdrew from the south bank of the Red River when the Japanese defeated the French Army in Vietnam and Laos, and posed a major threat to Xishuangbanna. Facing the retreat of the provincial standing army, the Native Officers decided to organize a joint military force in order to protect their own land. After a brief meeting with Lu Han in Mengzi, indigenous leaders received Lu’s support for the expansion of their local military forces. Later, eighteen Native Officers who controlled the south bank of the Red River in southern Yunnan received military ranks from the Yunnan provincial army, and turned their troops into guerrilla forces that were under the overall command of the provincial army of Yunnan.111

Taking advantage of the high mobility of people in the Yunnan borderlands during WWII, the indigenous forces were made up of troops from various backgrounds.

The expansion of military forces during WWII brought high conscription and frequent harassments of the local population. For example, the militia of the Tusi of Situo used troops from outside of their jurisdiction because local troops had too much compassion for fellow villagers and were unwilling to fulfill missions, like forcibly collecting taxes. Thus, gangsters and delinquents from Yuanyang, Guanting, Anpingmia, and Ayong Mountains rushed into Situo to join the army.\footnote{Li Zhengcai (李正才), “Tantan Situo Tusi” 谈谈司陀土司 [On the native officer of Situo], in \textit{Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji} 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑 11辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 75.}

After WWII, Chiang Kai-shek seized the opportunity to separate the Yunnan warlords from their military power at the provincial level, and transform them into professional bureaucrats.\footnote{In September, 1945, the Yunnan Army (the 60th Corps and the 93rd Corps of the KMT forces) entered into Vietnam to oversee the Japanese surrender. In order to undermine Long Yun’s power, Chiang Kaishek put Du Yuming in charge of the Yunnan Army, and then replaced Long Yun with Lu Han as the governor. After Long Yun was forced to step down, Chiang Kaishek gave him a nominal position in the central government and invited him to reside in Chongqing, and later in Nanjing. As for Lu Han, the new Governor of Yunnan who succeeded Long Yun, he also was deprived of the authority over the Yunnan Army as well. First of all, the Yunnan Army was relocated from Vietnam to Northeastern China in the fall of 1945. Later, with Du Yumin in take charge of the national army units stationed in Yunnan, Lu Han thus lost military control, and was not given a budget for recruiting a new local army. See Zhao Dingsheng (赵鼎盛), “Huiyi Long Yun Beipo Xiatai Yihou” 回忆龙云被迫下台以后 [The recollection on Long Yun after he was forced to step down], in \textit{Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 23 Ji} 云南文史资料选辑第 23辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 23], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1984), 144-149. Also Li Zuo (李佐), “Wo Dang Dui Kuomintang di Liu Jun Zhengqu Gongzuo Jishi” 我党对国民党第六十军争取工作纪实 [The account on (our) Party’s mobilization towards the 60th Corps of the Kuomintang], in \textit{Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 23 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 23辑} [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 23], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会), (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1984), 23, 26.}

Gradually, the provincial warlords who had shielded the indigenous leadership were removed, which allowed Chiang to exercise more control at the local level. This eventually opened the channel for the upward movement of indigenous elites. When Chiang was in danger of losing mainland China to the CCP,
cooperation between the central and local forces was necessary. However, this strategy also dramatically undermined the Yunnan’s warlords’ local power and directly caused their defection to the CCP.

In 1948, Li Chengxiang, who was then the Tusi of Situo, represented the ethnic minorities in Yunnan and attended the National Congress in Nanjing. After the meeting, Li Chengxiang was granted a position in the Pacifying Committee, with the responsibility of eliminating the CCP forces in Yunnan. In late 1948, Li welcomed the 93rd Division of the National Army to be stationed in Sayi of the Honghe Prefecture. Later the Native Officers in twelve towns nearby organized a joint defense force in order to resist the CCP militia. In the spring of 1949, the 26th Corps of the National Army also organized the Thirteen Joint Forces Defense Army led by Native Officers and Chinese landlords in this area. As the PLA gradually took over China, the KMT forces in Southwest China and Southern China fled into Yunnan and joined the indigenous forces before retreating further into mainland Southeast Asia.

---

114 Li Chengxiang (李呈祥), “Situo Tusi Yange Jilve” 司陀土司沿革纪略 [A brief history of the Tusi of Situo], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 册 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 89.


116 For instance, in March 1950, more than 2,700 KMT troops in Guizhou formed an Anti-Communist and Anti-Russia Self-defense Army (AASA). Later this army was chased out of Guizhou by the PLA and joined other resistance group in Guangxi, reaching a total population of 7,000 fighters. In April 1950, this army was under attack by joint PLA forces from Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi, and they lost half of his troops. The rest of the AASA entered into Yunnan from Guangxi, with the purpose of fleeing into Vietnam. Shortly after the AASA entered Yunnan, they were joined by more indigenous anti-CCP forces; in confronting the PLA army deployed from Guangnan. In the following week, this resistant force suffered deadly damage especially in the Battle of Tiechan where he lost 8,000 troops. By early May, this resistance force was eliminated. See Hu Xingyi (胡兴义), “Tiechang Zhandou”铁厂战斗 [The Battles in
Within indigenous military forces mobilized under the command of Chiang Kaishek, the CCP agents were also very active, not only along the Yunnan borderlands and Vietnam, but also in northeastern China where the Yunnan Army was stationed.

Early communist organizations in the Yunnan borderlands were concentrated near the Sino-Vietnamese border as well as Tengchong County in Western Yunnan. The area along the Yunnan-Vietnam railway especially accommodated a considerable number of active Communist agents. In late 1948, the CCP also established bases as well as schools in the Ha Giang area of Vietnam. More than 400 cadres were recruited and trained in semi-military schools for the communist mobilization in Yunnan. 117

The initial communist units were developed based on the communist agent’s social connections and family kinship. The CCP was open and welcoming to any forces that were useful. The party gradually absorbed gangsters, KMT troops, students as well as government officials. Although labeled as a party that stood for the working class and the peasants, in the Yunnan borderlands, the CCP had to cooperate with the traditional indigenous leaders and local landlords, and grant them high ranking positions within the communist organization.

For example, in early 1947, the CCP Pu’er and Simao Branch dispatched two agents to the Yixiang and Mengzhu areas of the Jinggu County.\(^{118}\) Under disguise, one of them appeared as a journalist and another as a teacher. With the help from relatives as well as students and teachers from the Mohei Middle School, these communist agents soon got in touch with many local patriotic intellectuals and a few local elites. In September, 1948, the CCP Mengzhu Branch was officially organized.\(^{119}\) By the end of the year, the CCP had developed military forces in Jinggu and a nearby town called Langcang.\(^{120}\) In January 1949, Pu Shipmin, a former KMT government official as well as the self-defense force commander of Jinggu decided to join the CCP and prepare for the military operations to occupy the county of Shuangjiang. In February, Pu assisted the CCP in recruiting a 150-man militia. In March, after the CCP militia occupied Shuangjiang, Pu became the vice director of the temporary military and civilian joint committee that oversaw the city of Mengmeng.\(^{121}\)

In the Daping area of Malipo County, Yang Xingguo, a local landlord was approached by the CCP agents in the late 1948. Considering the fact that Yang Xingguo


\(^{120}\) Yunnan Sheng Shuangjiang Lahu Zu Wa Zu Bulang Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (双江拉祜族佤族布朗族傣族自治县地方志编纂委员会), *Shuangjiang Lahu Zu Wa Zu Bulang Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi* 双江拉祜族佤族布朗族傣族自治县志 [The gazetteer of the Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa, Bulang and Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1995), 864.

was the former governor of the three nearby counties, the communist agents invited him to join to United Front of the CCP and offered him the position of honorable commander of the local self-defense force. In the following months, the CCP received more than 20 guns and food supplies from Yang Xingguo. After the establishment of the CCP government in Daping County, the CCP wanted to borrow more weapons from Yang. Although Yang was not eager to cooperate, he had no choice and handed in more than ten rifles. This incident made Yang lost his control in this area and resentful of the CCP. In the spring of 1949, Yang Xingguo not only resumed his connection with the KMT forces, who were secretly hidden in Wenshan, but he also became an ally of anti-CCP forces in the South Mountain of Guangnan led by Nong Tingzhang. In the mid-June, Yang openly rebelled, and executed a few CCP cadres. In late July, Yang’s forces were counterattacked by the CCP militia and surrendered in late September.

Besides the work of communist agents, the CCP also began to form military units in the Yunnan Borderland. In 1947, the CCP Bianzong forces emerged as a hybrid standing army, guerrilla and militia force that actively engaged in military operations against the KMT. Before the PLA arrived in Yunnan in late 1949, they successfully

pinned down about five corps of the KMT troops and occupied fifty-eight towns. Before
the PLA landed in Yunnan in late 1949, the Bianzong forces successfully pinned down
about five corps of the KMT military and occupied fifty-eight towns.  

The approaching CCP military forces caused panic among the public. At the
same time, the CCP agents hastened the pace to urge the KMT troops to defect or
surrender to the PLA. With the cooperation of the local CCP agents, the propagandas
from Yan’an swept through the KMT armies stationed in Southern Yunnan. Soldiers
and officers began to consider and debate about the possibility of defection.

---

125 These forces were officially organized at the end of May 1948, based on a variety of local communist led
military forces that emerged through uprisings and defections during the fall of 1947. From 1947 to
December 1949, the Bianzong forces participated in 1,280 battles, killed and captured 61,600 KMT troops,
and confiscated a large amount of military supplies from the KMT. See Yunnan Sheng Difangzi Bianzuan
Wei yuanhui (云南省地方志编纂委员会), Yunnan Shengzhi Juan 49 Junshi Zhi (云南省志卷四十九军事
志) [The gazetteer of the Yunnan Province Vol. 49 the gazetteer of the military affairs] (Kunming: Yunnan
Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 308-310.

126 In Kaiyuan, during the market days, even a false alarm about the CCP guerrilla’s attack could cause
chaos on the streets. There were several times that the noise of fireworks was misunderstood as gunshots.
All of a sudden, people on the street stamped and screamed, fearing the arrival of the communists. Stores
were closed immediately. More and more who did not know what was going to happen simply followed
and joined the crowd. In waves, frightened people soon jammed the narrow streets around the eastern gate
of the city Yin Ziwen (尹自文), “Shanyu Yulai Feng Man Lou: Kaiyuan Jiefang Qianxi Zhengzhi
Douzheng Pianduan”山雨欲来风满楼: 开远解放前夕政治斗争片断 [The accounts on the political
struggles before the liberation of Kaiyuan], in Kaiyuan Shi Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 5 Ji (开远市文史资料
选辑 5辑) [The historical documents of the Kaiyuan City, Vol. 5], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi
Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Kaiyuan Shi Wenshi Ziliao Wei yuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省开
远市文史资料委员会) (Kaiyuan: Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan Sheng Kaiyuan
Shi Wenshi Ziliao Wei yuanhui, 1992), 233.

127 Yin Ziwen (尹自文), “Shanyu Yulai Feng Man Lou: Kaiyuan Jiefang Qianxi Zhengzhi
Douzheng Pianduan”山雨欲来风满楼: 开远解放前夕政治斗争片断 [The accounts on the political struggles before
the liberation of Kaiyuan], in Kaiyuan Shi Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 5 Ji (开远市文史资料选辑 5辑) [The
historical documents of the Kaiyuan City, Vol. 5], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi
Yunnan sheng Kaiyuan Shi Wenshi Ziliao Wei yuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省开远市文史资料
委员会) (Kaiyuan: Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan Sheng Kaiyuan
northeastern China where the Yunnan Army was stationed, more than one hundred soldiers and officers defected to the CCP each day by September, 1948. The total number of defectors reached 120,000 within six months. On October 15th 1948, the 60th Corps defected to the CCP in Changchun, and was then reorganized as the 50th Corps of the PLA. This significantly undermined the Yunnan warlord’s powers. At the same time, the 93rd Corps was also eliminated in Jinzhou. Thus, already unhappy with Chiang Kaishek for stripping his military power, Lu Han lost all hope of gaining his army back and was left with defection as the most expedient move.

In the 1950s, the CCP carefully entered into the Yunnan borderlands and continued the project to bring the indigenous communities under the direct administration of the newly established PRC. The CCP initially approached the indigenous elites, and provided them a channel to participate in Chinese domestic politics as long as they were willing to share their social control with the CCP and eventually submit to the latter.

However, the militarization of the Yunnan borderlands was not ceased. The
overwhelming PLA forces literally became the highest authority in Yunnan well into the mid-1950s, and served as the intermediary between Yunnan and the central government.  

The military power deeply penetrated into every social and political fabrics at the local level.  

Frequent military operations to pacify the anti-government forces ensured the elimination of any non-governmental or non-CCP organizations. The organizations that had connection with foreign forces or the KMT suffered deadly strikes.  

In the 1950s, the establishment of militarized state farms in the Yunnan borderlands continued a two thousand year Chinese tradition of border consolidation, and introduced a dual administration system to the Yunnan borderlands.

Initially, the CCP dispatched cadres to Southern Yunnan, as part of the Southwestern Service Regiment, in order to win the indigenous population’s cooperation. Although the CCP cadres were of various ethnic identities, they were all seen as the “Chinese” in the eyes of the indigenous people.  

The CCP initially connected the Native Officers, and through them, built further connections with the local population.  

Before the socialist movement campaigns in 1956, the CCP relied on indirect rule to

---


134 Liu Yan (刘岩) “Minzu Zhengce shi Minzu Gongzuo de Linghun” 民族政策是民族工作的灵魂 [The ethnic policy is the soul of the ethnic affairs], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 45 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 45 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 6.

135 Liu Yan (刘岩) “Minzu Zhengce shi Minzu Gongzuo de Linghun” 民族政策是民族工作的灵魂 [The ethnic policy is the soul of the ethnic affairs], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 45 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 45 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 7.
maintain control over the Yunnan borderlands. The Native Officers were still in control, although at the county level communist governments had already been established.

Usually the relationship between the PRC local government and the Native Officers was facilitated by the CCP Working Committees or Working Teams. The indigenous traditional leadership had various attitudes towards the CCP. A small number of indigenous elites misunderstood regional autonomy as meaning restoration of the Tusi system. Under such misconceptions, they were very active in cooperating with the CCP. However, the majority of the indigenous leaders became indifferent and suspicious towards the CCP, and some of them still believed that the CCP’s policy of ethnic autonomy had no difference with the indirect rule of the Chinese government during the Ming and Qing era. The indigenous leaders’ greatest fear was the elimination of the Tusi system and land reform. Some ordinary Dai civilians thought that regional autonomy

---

136 For example, in Xishuangbanna, the autonomous government was founded in 1952, and at the same time, a Working Committee that had the same bureaucratic rank was also founded, taking the responsibility to coordinate the relationship between the native officers and the PRC administration. One important mission for the CCP Working Teams was to mobilize the civilians and develop them into party cadres. The Working Teams especially made effort to convert the young indigenous nobles, in order to prepare for the future land reform. In Xishuangbanna, by the end of 1955, the Working Teams had expanded to 1000 people. From 1952 to 1955, 455 team members had been sent to the PRC local government, and at the same time, close to 100 people were selected to attend the Central Ethnic University, Southwestern Ethnic University as well as the Yunnan Provincial Ethnic University. See Liu Yan (“Minzu Zhengce shi Minzu Gongzuo de Linghun” [The ethnic policy is the soul of the ethnic affairs], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 45 Ji [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui [中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会] (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 8. Also “Yunnan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Di’er Minzu Gongzuo Dui Minzu Gongzuo Gaishu” [A brief summary of the work of the 2nd ethnic working team of the Yunnan Provincial government], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 45 Ji [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui [中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会] (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 11.

137 See “Yunnan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Di’er Minzu Gongzuo Dui Minzu Gongzuo Gaishu” [A brief summary of the work of the 2nd ethnic working team of the Yunnan Provincial government], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 45 Ji [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi
meant that the Chinese would move out of Dai settlements. Others feared that they would not be allowed to donate to Buddhist temples any more.138

On the other hand, some CCP cadres from the Working Teams were planning to completely destroy the Native Officer’s authority as part of the process of establishing regional autonomies. They especially emphasized the rule of the people in the propaganda.139 And yet, the prestige and the *de facto* control of the Native Officers stood in the way for the CCP to fundamentally unify the country. The existence of the Native Officers provided hope for the organization of the anti-CCP forces. The CCP also highly suspected that the Native Officers were the potential alliances with non-CCP forces, such as the KMT forces hovering along China’s border with mainland Southeast Asia, as well as the French and British powers that remained active in this area in the 1950s.

Gradually, the CCP found ways to fundamentally uproot the power of the indigenous elites. By 1956, before land reform swept the Yunnan borderlands, the indigenous elites had already been separated from any effective social control that would enable them to form organizations or armed force that might threaten the CCP’s authority.

---

Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 21-22.

138 “Yunnan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Di’er Minzu Gongzuo Dui Minzu Gongzuo Gaishu” 云南省人民政府第二民族工作对民族工作概述 [A brief summary of the work of the 2nd ethnic working team of the Yunnan Provincial government], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 45 Ji* 云南文史资料选辑第 45 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 22.

139 “Yunnan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Di’er Minzu Gongzuo Dui Minzu Gongzuo Gaishu” 云南省人民政府第二民族工作对民族工作概述 [A brief summary of the work of the 2nd ethnic working team of the Yunnan Provincial government], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 45 Ji* 云南文史资料选辑第 45 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 22.
In the early spring of 1950, as the PLA forces entered Yunnan, providing food supplies became the priority for the newly established provincial government of Yunnan. The province-wide effort at grain collection echoed the national movement, and triggered large scale rebellions throughout the province. By means of mandatory grain collection as well as the pacification of the anti-grain collecting forces in Yunnan, the CCP achieved a number of goals, including: the termination of the indigenous elites’ privilege of exemption from paying grain taxes, and the termination of the indigenous elites’ privilege of receiving grain taxes from the local population, thus reducing their monopoly over local resources. Consequently, the indigenous leaders’ monopoly over local resources fell into the hands of the CCP. Moreover, military operations against the anti-grain collecting forces in fact destroyed the anti-CCP forces, which were considered part of the anti-“bandits” military campaigns in Yunnan.  

In 1950, Working Teams successfully converted the Native Officers in Mengmao in western Yunnan. Indigenous leaders gave up their military forces and firearms and were given government jobs, thus attaining a living standard that was slightly better than

---

140 For example, in the Wenshan Prefecture, the PLA engaged in nine battles with the anti-grain collecting forces from June 1950 to August, 1950, eliminating 65 people, injuring 24, capturing 60 and receiving the surrender of 270. From September 1950 to November 1950, more peasants’ councils were held throughout Wenshan Prefecture, mobilizing 120,000 peasants to become the cadres of the party. This directly contributed to the successful collection of 27 million jin grains by the end of 1950. In 1951, the Southern Yunnan Defense District particularly dispatched more troops into the Wenshan with Chen Geng as the overall commander. From July 1951 to September 1951, the PLA had 137 battles with the rebels, eliminating 25 groups of the resistant forces, killing 306, capturing 106, and injuring 975 people. In the late fall of 1951, more than 700 CCP cadres arrived to assist in the grain collecting, with the propaganda theme of “Anti-American and Aid the Korea”. This time, they obtained 72.73 million jin of grains. At the same time, towards the end 1951, the majority of anti-CCP forces in Wenshan were almost wiped out. By 1953, with continuing effort, the PLA had already eliminated 2438 people, captured 4425, received the defection of 8213, and re-educated 12,289. See Wenshan Zhou Dangqun Zhi Bianzuan Lingdao Xiaozu (文山州党群志编纂领导小组), Wenshan Zhuangzu Miao Zu Zizhi Zhou Dangqun Zhi (03, 1927-03, 1996) 文山壮族苗族自治州党群志 (1927.3-1996.3) [The gazetteer of the democratic parties of the Wenshan Zhuang and Miao Ethnic Autonomous Prefecture (03, 1927-03, 1996)] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2008), 209-215.
before. Some of these indigenous leaders were organized for tours and traveled around China, which significantly opened their perception towards life and politics. Generally, most of the Native Officers received a government position that was higher than their rank during the Qing dynasty and the Republican China era. The Chinese government issued special regulations to ban discrimination against the ethnic minorities. The indigenous elites’ social status as well as their public recognition in the Chinese communities as well as the domestic politics also exceeded that of before. Some of them were given the position of the governor or vice governor of ethnic autonomous administration. Some were selected to serve as officials at the provincial level, and some even served as representatives to National Congress, which seldom happened before. Those Native Officers who were willing to cooperate with the CCP were also given jobs and monthly stipends that were no less than before.

Hence, the CCP skillfully increased the indigenous elites’ satisfaction with the political participation in a unified China. This proved to be a crucial step for the transformation of the local power structure along the frontier. It would be an exaggeration to say that indigenous leaders lost all power after the establishment of the PRC. In fact, many indigenous leaders and their families and clans stayed in power at the local level. However, the differences were that their authority was now given and sanctioned by the CCP, an external power, instead of being rooted in the indigenous society; they were

---

141 Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi Shilve” 从勐卯果占壁到勐卯安抚司: 勐卯傣族土司史略 [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 10 Ji (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑 (德宏州土司专辑) [selections on the historical documents of the Dehong Prefecture, Vol. 10 or the special Volume on the native officers], edited by Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1997), 48.
separated from military control; and their social influence was also largely from their prestige within the local communities. The social and political movements initiated by the CCP would thoroughly destroy the soil that foster an independent indigenous power.

At the mass level, the CCP eliminated the influence of religion and religious organizations. There were signs showing that some religious groups, such as the Yi Guan Dao, a Taoist sect, were unwilling to cooperate with the CCP and associated themselves with the former KMT military units. The removal of the local religious institutions proved to be an essential move to not only cut off the KMT’s connection with local civilians, but also to eliminate the possibility for the civilians to be organized by any non-government organizations.

The Southern Yunnan was swept by the anti-Yi Guandao campaign in early 1950s. In Kaiyuan, all the 179 Yi Guan Dao service centers were dissolved. Seventy three believers claimed to have dropped the Yi Guandao. More than 52 leaders were executed or sentenced. Some of the leaders who were arrested collaborated with the government and provided channels for the government to catch more believers as well as leaders. In Xinping County of the Honghe Prefecture, the government identified 37 Yi-Guandao leaders, 121 service leaders, and 3,308 believers in December 1952.

142 Yi Guan Dao appeared in the early 1940s in Yunnan and was gradually spread to the major cities and towns. In 1950, Yi Guandao failed to cooperate with the newly established PRC government and was charged for having with former KMT military units, and other anti-CCP forces. Some Yi Guan Dao believers hid the anti-revolutionaries from the PRC authority; and some believers spread anti-government rumors.


The government also eliminated another Taoist sect named Qing Jing Dao. Qing Jing Dao appeared in Yunnan during the late 19th and early 20th century. Qing Jing Dao was accused to organize provincial-wide anti-CCP activities since 1946.145

In Yuanjiang, the government arrested formal KMT official Ding Guangfu and Ma Wende, gang leader Dao Xinjian as well as more than ten people for organizing an anti-CCP religious group called People Believe in November 1951. In 1952, the government identified nine major Taoist organizations with 230 members in Yunnan. In October, several leaders of these organizations were arrested and a small number of them went underground. In May 1953, the government mobilized civilians to report and denounce the Taoist groups as anti-government Taoist organizations, causing a dramatic decrease in membership. Soon, all Taoist organizations were outlawed in Yunnan.146

In the Xishuangbanna valley and Dehong valley, the Buddhist monks were required to receive secular education and attend patriotism workshops. Regular religious activities were discouraged and eventually banned.147 Thus, the religious authority was separated from the indigenous secular authority that was replaced by the CCP or has reconciled to the CCP.

Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 223-224.


147 Chapter 4 engages a more specific discussion on this topic.
Furthermore, other policies such as land reform and ethnic classification also contributed to the termination of the 700-year-old Tusi system. Land reform broke the commoners’ basic economic bonds with their local leaders. At the same time, ethnic classification eliminated and reconstructed the indigenous people’s group identities. All these strategies destroyed the social, political and cultural dynamics of the indigenous communities, turned the indigenous people into individuals of a socialist country, and reorganized them under the CCP leadership. While the indigenous authority was uprooted, the CCP followed the traditional Chinese strategy of the frontier consolidation and organized militarized state farms along the border.

The state farm system was established in the early 1950s in Yunnan, with the mission to consolidate the borderlands like all the historical state farms as well as military farms that were organized in China’s peripheries since the Han dynasty. Since the 1950s, Yunnan’s state farms received migrants from cities in and outside Yunnan. A great number of relocated farmers and soldiers dramatically changed the demographic make-up and the social organizations. At the same time, the increasing needs to accommodate

---


149 For example, in 1959, 9,227 migrant workers were relocated from Hunan and arrived in Xishuangbanna valley. In January of 1960, these new comers were appointed to thirteen state farms. In October 1960, 12, 712 arrived in Xishuangbanna and joined the state farms. Throughout the years, the family members as well as the friends of these workers gradually arrived Xishuangbanna to look for jobs. See Xishuangbanna Zhou Nongken Fenju (西双版纳州农垦分局), Xishuangbanna Nongken Zhi 西双版纳农垦志 [The gazetteer of the State Farms of Xishuangbanna] (Jinghong: Xishuangbanna Zhou Nongken Fenju, 1998), 9.
the fast growing population caused large scale of deforestation and the danger of the
depletion of natural resource in the Yunnan borderlands.\textsuperscript{150}

Not surprisingly, the Dai people were not the dominant population anymore as the
makeup of the local population was quickly altered. Over years, veterans, technicians,
returnees from the overseas Chinese diaspora, the educated youth and relocated peasants
of various ethnic backgrounds joined the state farms in Yunnan. In southern Yunnan and
western Yunnan, forty state farms were established in twenty-eight counties and cities,
occupying 1.96 million \textit{mu} land and accommodating 290,000 workers.\textsuperscript{151}At the same
time, state farms always stood as the model of higher level of technology as well as living
and educational standards for the local people.\textsuperscript{152}

As the scale and number of the state farms kept expanding under the state planned
economic system, local people were gradually sucked into a common state-oriented
economic, political and cultural sphere. Local populations were reorganized into different
institutions that functioned as the appendix of the state farms so as to cooperate and
satisfy various needs of the state farm bureaucracy, workers and their families.

Ironically, the tradition of the militarization of the Yunnan borderlands did not cease
when the CCP finally “tamed” the indigenous powers. The difference was that the local
population was strictly organized under a centralized military system, instead of under
local military authorities. Throughout history, the indigenous people were mobilized and

\textsuperscript{150} Judith Shapiro, \textit{Mao’s War against Nature Politics and Environment in Revolutionary China} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 182.
\textsuperscript{151} Wang Bin (王彬), \textit{Nongken Jianjie 农垦简介} [An introduction to the state farms], the Yunnan State Farm website,
\textsuperscript{152} Xishuangbanna Zhou Nongken Fenju (西双版纳州农垦分局), \textit{Xishuangbanna Nongken Zhi 西双版纳农垦志} [The gazetteer of the State Farms of Xishuangbanna] (Jinghong: Xishuangbanna Zhou Nongken Fenju, 1998), 3.
organized to serve the needs of local military powers. After 1950s, the indigenous people were mobilized and organized to in order to fulfill the requirements and expectations of a vast Chinese nation.
CHAPTER 3  DEFINING THE BORDER OF THE TRADING EMPIRE:
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES SHAPED BY TRADE AND WARS

The Yunnan borderlands thrived as the corridor to connect China with mainland Southeast Asia as well as South Asia and was increasingly dependent on both sides particularly in the 19th and early 20th century. 1 It was about the same time that the boundary between China and the adjacent Southeast Asian states was drawn, when the European powers annexed China’s surrounding tributaries, and began to encroach on the Yunnan borderlands. The confrontation between China and the European colonial forces did not cut off the ties between Yunnan and mainland Southeast Asia. Regional and trans-national trade as well as migration acted as an overarching force that overcame confrontations and national boundaries. Cities and towns in the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia were closely connected. They formed a vast trading empire and thrived as commercial centers for regional and the international markets. Transnational commercial networks multiplied and expanded, moving laborers, merchants, commodities, and capitals around in the Chinese, mainland Southeast Asian and South Asian markets via the Yunnan borderlands.

It was not until the establishment of the PRC and the division between the capitalistic camp and the communist camp that Yunnan changed from a corridor of transnational trade to a remote cash crop cultivation base of the PRC political economy.

1 During the first millennium, the indigenous settlements in the inland and coastal Mainland Southeast Asia had already been connected by a transportation network formed by roads, river, seaways, and even canals. Some scholars believed that the ancient canal traces found in Satingra area (peninsular Thailand), were more likely designed for transportation than irrigation. See Miriam T. Stark: “Early Mainland Southeast Asian Landscapes in the First Millennium A.D.”, in Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 35 (2006): 407-432.
The drawing of the state boundaries in mainland Southeast Asia reflected power struggles among various colonial forces, not the agency of the indigenous people. As a matter of fact, the boundaries between states were often blurred or sharpened, especially when the confrontations of international powers were regionalized. The indigenous people suffered through the process and learned to adapt to the changes to their lifestyles and social relations as a consequence of the destruction as well as the traumas brought about by the interference of the external powers.

A Trading Empire without Boundaries

Before the 1950s, the connection between the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asian states was hardly influenced by the newly drawn boundaries. Numerous big and small routes closely tied various regional and area markets in Yunnan to a broad transnational and trans-regional commercial network, especially after the late 19th century. Before the construction of the Yunnan-Vietnam railway, the route along the

---

2 During the first millennium, the indigenous settlements in the inland and coastal Mainland Southeast Asia had already been connected by a transportation network formed by roads, river, seaways, and even canals. Some scholars believed that the ancient canal traces found in Satingpra area (peninsular Thailand), were more likely designed for transportation than irrigation. See Miriam T. Stark: “Early Mainland Southeast Asian Landscapes in the First Millennium A.D.”, in Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 35 (2006): 407-432.

3 Among many regional trade routes, the Yinan Route and the Shendu Route (Hindu Route) were two well-known land routes that connected Southern and Western Yunnan with Mainland Southeast Asia and South Asia. The records of these two routes could be found in the Chinese documentaries that dated back to the first millennium. The Yinan Route connected Southern Yunnan to Chiang Mai, and the Shendu Route (Hindu Route) connected Southwestern China to India via Northern Burma. The branches of these two routes, such as the Five-Feet Path and the Yongchang route, further involved China proper and other parts of Yunnan into a vast trade net-work. Besides that, the Red River combined with caravans provided the most convenient access to the nearest sea port in coastal Vietnam. Lu Ren, Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi 云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 36-37. A thorough examination on the trade routes and their history see Xia Guangnan, Zhong Yin Mian Dao Jiaotong Shi 中印缅道交通史 [The history of the Routes and Communication of China, India and Burma] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1948), 6-46, 57-62, 67-70. See also Yang Bing, Between Winds and Clouds: the Making of Yunnan (Second Century BCE to Twentieth Century CE) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
Irrawaddy River that connected Yunnan with Burma, India and Europe was considered superior to other routes in facilitate the flow of merchandise.  

In fact, scholars often neglected the fact that the expansion of Chinese as well as that of the indigenous regimes in this area also served the purpose of seizing the trade routes as well as the sea ports in order to control regional communication, trade, and politics. Military campaigns since the 1st century B.C., had aimed to establish garrisons along the “secret passage” that led to India via Yunnan in order to guarantee China’s smooth communication with South Asia as well as Central Asia.

Throughout the history, whoever controlled this corridor and was open to transnational communications gained prosperity. However, such prosperity always needed the guarantee from a highly militarized local power to resist constant external harassments, and to harness the competition of various internal political and cultural rivals. The Nanzhao Kingdom was a good example.

---


5 Prior to the 1st century, B.C., the Chinese connection with Central Asia was cut off by the Huns who occupied the Western Region. However, the appearance of the Chinese commodities in the Central Asian markets indicated the existence of another alternate route, and then triggered the Chinese curiosity. Around the year of 122 B.C., China launched a military campaign in Yunnan in order to locate the Shendu (Hindu) Path that connected Yunnan to Northern Burma, India and Central Asia. However, the Chinese armies failed to locate the path and were stationed in the Kingdom of Dian for over a year. About ten years later, the Chinese army turned the Kingdom of Dian into China’s Yizhou Prefecture, and established indirect rule in this area by authorizing the previous indigenous king as the governor of Yizhou. In a few years, the territory of the Yizhou Prefecture had expanded to Western Yunnan, and eventually reached the areas the Shendu Path passed through. Soon Chinese towns, Xitang (current Baoshan) as well as Buwei were founded, and Chinese migrants were relocated to settle there. Hence, the Chinese control over Western Yunnan insured the security of China’s communication with South Asia and Central Asia without the same interruptions that they encountered in the Western Region. In the Southeastern Yunnan, the Chinese had built and controlled the area along the Five Feet Path, and along the Yinnan routes that led to Northwestern and then Coastal Vietnam. See Lu Ren (陆韧), *Yunnan Duwai Jiaotong Shi 云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications]* (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 21-25.

Gold, silver, copper, jade, salt, tea, opium as well as labor were common commodities that circulated from the Yunnan borderlands to China proper, mainland Southeast Asia, and South Asia as well. Since the late 13th century, Chinese laborers and merchants began to gather along the mining areas in the Yunan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia. Small-scale area trade centers thus began to grow. The flow of capital and laborers became increasingly frequent especially when the Qing army finally pacified the harassments from the indigenous Burmese tribes in 1769. These trade centers not only provided raw products for markets outside; they also processed raw materials shipped in from other places and sent the products back to those markets. Overall, the number of the migrant laborers in the mining areas outnumbered that of the merchants. The tea business particularly played a predominant role in trans-regional and transnational trade. Tea cultivation centers naturally became regional retail and trade centers, and mainly seasonal business migrants and small number of migrant laborers.

During the Yuan dynasty, the gem mines in northern Burmese mountains near Myitkyina, Mogaung, Mongmit, and Mogok had already drawn Chinese merchants and laborers who wanted quick cash or big fortunes, despite of the danger of contracting malaria. Further away to the east of these mines, Tengyue became a nationally known

---

gem processing center especially for jade in the 15th century. The governorship of Tengchong was considered one of the most lucrative positions in the country.

During the Wanli Era of the Ming dynasty (1570s -1620s), local population were often driven to explore the gem mines by the government. The military officers and troops stationed in Tengchong area actively participated in business and farming. In order to oversee the security of the jade business, the Ming government later regularly stationed more than 400 troops in Manmo, a town near Bahmo. From 1830 to 1840, merchants from the Shan tribes as well as the Kachin tribes also frequently brought ambers to Mogaung and traded with the Chinese merchants. The jade rocks that were shipped out from Mogaung were sometimes so heavy they needed three men to carry them. After the 1850s, more Chinese fled into northern Burma in order to avoid wars caused by the Panthay Rebellion, and also participated in the jade mining as well. They married indigenous Burmese women and Dai women and engaged in jade business. At the same time, northern Burma largely relied on the Yunnan market for grocery and raw


materials. Thus, jade trading for grocery and raw materials had become a common protocol for the merchants.\textsuperscript{13}

Table 2. Jade Rocks Imported from Burma via Tengchong Custom\textsuperscript{14}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1902</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jade rocks</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 1920s, the British began to lease jade mines to the Chinese and collected taxes. In October 1929, fierce competition occurred among the Chinese merchants in order to obtain the leases, which in turn stimulated the British to raise the taxes. Each year, the jade mines yielded around one million dollar’s revenue, with close to 200,000 dollar’s taxes.\textsuperscript{15} Before the outbreak of the WWII, there were forty-one jewelry shops


\textsuperscript{14} Zhang Zhubang (张竹邦), “Dianxi Bianjing de Zhongyao Maoyi----Yushi Ye” 滇西边境的重要贸易----玉石业 [The Jade business: an important trade in the border of the Western Yunnan], in \textit{Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di Ershi-ba Ji} 云南文史资料选辑第 28 辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 28], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1986), 207.

\textsuperscript{15} Zhang Zhubang (张竹邦), “Dianxi Bianjing de Zhongyao Maoyi----Yushi Ye” 滇西边境的重要贸易----玉石业 [The Jade business: an important trade in the border of the Western Yunnan], in \textit{Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 28 Ji} 云南文史资料选辑第 28 辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 28], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1986), 207.
and companies in Tengchong, producing all kinds of jade jewelries for the markets in Kunming, Shanghai, Hong Kong and other areas.  

The silver mines in this area also attracted migrant workers from Guizhou, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan, causing a dramatic increase of Chinese population. The Chinese arrived in the Bowtwin Mountains of the northwestern Lashio in the early 1500s for silver mining. The local authority allowed the Chinese to mine and pay taxes, because indigenous people were not proficient in mining and alchemy. In the 17th century, no less than ten thousand workers and merchants from Dali, Yongchang, Jiangxi and Huguang relied on the Bowtwin silver mines for living.

In the late 18th century, there were more than 40,000 regular Chinese workers in the Bowtwin Mountains. Moreover, the Maolong and Munai silver mines in the Banhong area in the Eastern Wa Mountains opened in the 1740s, and accommodated no less than 20,000 to 30,000 migrant labors. By the year of 1751, the population of the Chinese laborers in the Bowtwin Mountains reached no less than 100,000.

The mining areas were very highly organized and militarized, under the order that was possibly a mixture of military organization and traditional Chinese secret societies. Chinese laborers were responsible for mining and protecting the mines under the 

---

17 Wu Fengbin (吴凤斌), Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 178.
19 Wu Fengbin (吴凤斌), Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 180. Also, Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 170.
command of the mine owners. Many miners were very brave and good at combating.\textsuperscript{20}

In the early 18\textsuperscript{th} century, Gong Liyan was the most influential Chinese merchant in the Bowtwin Mountains. In order to protect the silver mines, he cooperated with other prominent Chinese families as well as the local Shan indigenous tribes, and organized Chinese miners into military units.\textsuperscript{21}

In mid-18th century, the Maolong and Munai mines encountered a series setbacks and eventually shut down in 1800. In Lashio, the Bowtwin mines were placed restrictions by both the Burmese and Chinese government. They were shut down in 1760s, and restored back to full function in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century when the British occupied Burma and reinvested in the mining business. From 1900 on, Chinese migrant workers gradually returned, mainly from Yunnan and Guangdong. During the WWI, Indian workers were also arrived to work alongside with the Chinese.\textsuperscript{22}

Many Chinese miners married local Wa women, and raised their next generations in the War norms.\textsuperscript{23} When opium cultivation became popular in the Wa Mountains in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Chinese migrants once again moved back to facilitate the trade.\textsuperscript{24} Besides that, the sugar plantations in the Wa Mountains of northern Burma produced the raw sugar whose quality was as good as the best raw sugars from Cuba.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{20} In the mining area of Eastern Wa Mountains, workers and leaders often address each other brothers. Usually the highest leader, or the biggest brother was in charge of the mining business. The secondary leader was responsible for organizing the laborers. The third brother was assigned for military affairs.

\textsuperscript{21} Wu Fengbin (吴凤斌), *Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi* 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 178-179.

\textsuperscript{22} Wu Fengbin (吴凤斌), *Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi* 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 178-179.

\textsuperscript{23} Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 170-171.

\textsuperscript{24} Cang Ming (苍铭), *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 154.

\textsuperscript{25} Wu Fengbin (吴凤斌), *Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi* 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 136.
In the late 1870s, the Burmese independent movement and the corresponding chaos hampered the British trade in Burma. In the mid-1880s, the British tried to put an end to the Burmese rebellions, and initiated a larger scale of trade with China via Yunnan. In 1884, Britain and China sighed the first convention that ensured the British exertion of a greater level control in Burma. In 1890, the British established a consul in Tengyue. In 1894, the two sides signed a treaty to regulate the Sino-Burmese trade, which opened a free overland trade period for six years. After that, China had the right to apply the general tariff of the Chinese Maritime Customs. In 1897, China and Britain signed a treaty to ensure the smooth flow of the cross-border mining business. It was agreed that the Irrawaddy River should be freely opened for ships coming in and out of Yunnan. In the next a few years, Western Yunnan’s connection with the transnational trading network in Burma was accelerated as the railways that connected Myitkyina, Lashio, and Rangoon were constructed. Even remote areas in western Yunnan increasingly involved in trans-regional and trans-national trade since the late 19th century. For example, a small town called Longling became the transition center for commodities to travel either to Yongchang or Tengyue.

In the southeastern Yunnan, Chinese migrants also arrived for copper, silver, and salt mining after the Mid-Qing era. In Jinping County of southeastern Yunnan, the silver

---

28 Fudan Daxue Lishixi Bian (复旦大学历史系), *Zhongguo Jindai Duiwai Guanxi Shiliao Xuanbian Shang Juan di Er Fence 中国近代对外关系史料选编上卷, 第二分册* [Selected historical documents on Modern China’s foreign relations] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1977), 17-18.
29 Lu Ren (陆韧), *Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi 云南对外交通史* [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 338.
30 Lu Ren (陆韧), *Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi 云南对外交通史* [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 359.
mines had been exploited by the Yi people since the first millennium. During the Ming and Qing era, silver mining in Jinping attracted not only the local Yi people, but also Chinese and Muslim workers who brought new silver forging and jewelry making skills.

31 By 1850s, there were seven silver mines that were open. 32

Across the border in Northern Vietnam, the Chinese laborers were recruited by the Vietnamese authority for gold, silver, copper and tin mining in the early 18th century. 33 Before the Panthay Rebellion, “there was a good deal of commerce, especially in metals, between Yunnan and Tonkin.” 34 Zinc, one of the most important metal for exports, was used by the Vietnamese to manufacture the sapeques. Caravans from Yunnan brought Zinc to the markets in Tonkin and trade for silver. This trade was seriously affected by the Muslim wars, but was not completely ceased. 35

Besides, gold mines were also found across the Yunnan borderlands, mainly along the Irrawaddy River, Mekong River and Red River. Chinese miners periodically arrived to look for gold since the 12th century. In Yunnan’s peripheries, major gold mines were located in Tengchong, Wenshan, Mojiang, Yuanyang and Baoshan. The first wave of the gold rush appeared after the mid-17th century. Another wave was triggered during the WWII era. From 1939 to 1940, more than twenty merchants and companies requested

32 Xinping Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Minzu Shiwu Weiyanhui (新平彝族傣族自治县民族事务委员会) Xinping Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Minzu Zhi 新平彝族傣族自治县民族志 [The gazetteer of the Xinping Yi and Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1992), 74-75
33 Wu Fengbin (吴风斌), Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 84.
the Yunnan government to open gold mines, including Mengzi, Maguan, Jianshui, Mojiang, Jinping and Pingbian in the borderlands. From 1938 to 1939, gold mines yield 170,000 liang, making 1/15 of the total gold production of China that year.  

Facilitated by the tea business, towns in southern Yunnan including Simao, Yiwu, Menghai, Jinghong, Mengzhe, as well as Jinggu became regional and area center for the tea trade and retail in Pu’er and Xishuangbanna. The tea from Jiangcheng and Yiwu was very popular in Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines. Merchants from Jiangxi, Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangdong and Guangxi province brought foodstuffs and cotton to Simao. Yunnan merchants were often from inner towns such as Shiping, Jianshui, Tonghai, Hexi and Yuxi. The Merchants Association of Shiping owned the biggest building among all the merchants’ associations in Simao. Merchants from Shiping also monopolized most tea shops and factories.

Simao reached its peak as a regional business center from the 18th to the mid-19th century, but lost its advantage during the Panthay Rebellion (1856-1873). However, even during this period, the market in Simao was still of a good size with commodities from both China and Burma. The caravans did not fail to come in spite of wars. Simao

---

36 Yuan Hongce (员鸿策), “Yunnan Jingkuang Kaicai Shilve” 云南金矿开采史略 [A brief history of the gold mines in Yunnan], in Kunming Shi Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 2 Ji (Shang, Xia Ce) 昆明市文史资料选辑第二辑, 上下册 [The historical documents of Kunming], edited by Kunming Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (昆明文史资料委员会) (Kunming: Kunming wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1982), 243-248.

37 Lu Ren(陆韧), Yunnan Duìwài Jiàotōng Shì 云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 354


gained a brief recovery when the Simao customs began to function after the Sino-French War in late 1880s. However, soon the spread of malaria in 1900 gave Simao a deadly blow, and the prosperity of the Simao city was not resumed until the late 1910s.  

The golden age for the tea merchants in Simao finally arrived in the 1920s. The Heng Yuan Hao tea company sold more than 1,700 dan various kinds of tea in the year of 1920. From the fall of 1920 to the spring of 1921, merchants and their caravans rushed to Simao, with thousands of mules and horses coming in and out of the city daily. In the market place, more than twenty pigs were easily sold out each day, with a total amount up to two thousand kilograms. And yet, another wave of malaria swept Simao in 1922. From 1923 to 1924, the population in Simao suffered deadly losses, with a high percentage at 90% in some areas. Some tea companies relocated their factories and workers in the county of Menghai to continue their business with merchants in Burma, India and Tibet. Simao thus lost its position of the Pu’er as well as the regional tea trade center and became a “dead city”.  

In Simao, the caravans from Western Yunnan were usually called the Houlu (back-street) Caravans. They often traveled from Xiangyun, Zhennan, Midu, Menghua, and Jingdong with local specialties. After these commodities were sold in Simao, they

---

would purchase gypsum and salt and then travel southward to exchange tea in Xishuangbanna. Each year, the Houlu Caravans arrived in Simao around Shuangjiang in the late fall, with more than 3,000 mules and horses. These merchants would be very active in transporting and exchanging commodities between Simao and Xishuangbanna until the next spring. They often left Simao and returned home after the Qingming Festival in the late spring, loading their mules and horses with spring tea or cotton. 43

The caravans from northern and northeastern Yunnan were usually called Qianlu (front-street) caravans. They were from Yuxi, Tonghai, Hexi, Mengzi, Jianshui, Shiping, Xinpeng, Yuanjiang and Mojiang. The Qianlu caravans dominated the trade route from Kunming to Simao, with thousands of mules and horses traveling back and forth each year. They often purchased groceries and local specialties from Kunming and hauled them to Simao where they could trade for tea and then shipped back. The caravans from Yuxi especially favored jasmine tea. The number of the mules and horses active in the jasmine tea business was no less than 1,000 per year. 44

The caravans from northwestern Yunnan were usually managed by the Tibetans from Weixi, Zhongdian and Deqin. Their major purpose was to make the trip to Simao and then bring tea back to Tibet. As the main player in the Simao tea trade market, the number of Tibetan caravans decided the revenue yield each year. During winter, the


Tibetan caravans arrived with more than 1,000 mules and horses, and during spring, the number of their cattle could easily reach 3,000. Not surprisingly, the number of the Weixi caravans directly affected the Simao market.  

Further south, hundreds of the tea merchants from Xuanwei would usually walk twenty to thirty miles a day to go to Xishuangbanna valley in the 20th century. The workers they brought to carry the tea packages often fainted on the road because of the intense workload. In Menghai, thousands of caravans arrived in Menghai during winter. The three-hundred li route from Menghai to Kengtung was often crowded with people, cattle, and tea packages. Tents and stoves were seen everywhere along the way, indicating the density of frequent travelers on the road. When the tea packages arrived in Kengtung, they were loaded onto trucks and sent to the train station right away.

In Yiwu, wealthy migrants opened tea factories and shops, whereas others leased lands for rice and tea cultivation. Chinese migrants often intermarried the Yi and Dai people, and the population in Yiwu reached over 150,000 in the 19th century. By 1850s there were more than nine tea companies in the town of Yiwu, providing close to 10,000 dan tea each year. These tea companies kept growing and formed their own sales network that extended outside southern Yunnan. For instance, in 1912, the business

---


46 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 158.

47 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 158-159.

48 Cang Ming(苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 175

49 Yunnan Sheng Mengla Xianzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省勐腊县志编纂委员会), Mengla Xianzhi-Shangye Zhi 勐腊县志-商业志 [The gazetteer of the Mengla County- the commercial gazetteer] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1994), 338.
of the Heng Feng Yuan Tea Company founded by Ji Xiangting opened tea shops in Kunming. By 1925, Chinese and Muslim merchants from Tengchong, Yuxi, Heqing, Liuzhou, Jinggu, Mengzi, and Tonghai operated more than twenty-two tea companies and thirty-seven tea processing mills.\(^{50}\)

Jinggu provided supplies for nearby counties such as Mianning (Lancang), Yunxian, and Zhenyuan.\(^{51}\) Merchants and caravans from southwestern, northeastern and central Yunnan gathered in Jinggu in spring to wait for the spring tea harvest. They usually brought fabric, foodstuffs and the local commodities from other areas when they arrived. After being fully loaded with the spring tea, these merchants and caravans set out to Kunming, Xiaguan, Zhongdian, Weixi, Xuanwei and other places, and began another business cycle.\(^{52}\) In 1934, Jinggu’s raw tea production had reached 2,000 dan, and yield a revenue worth of 40,000 silver dollars. By 1937, Jinggu was able to produce 11,000 dan raw tea worth of 220,000 silver dollars.\(^{53}\)

Besides the tea business, the Jinggu area also provided salt and in a later time, opium. In the year of 1724, the Qing government established authority in Baomu Jie in Weiyuan to regulate salt mining and processing.\(^{54}\) In the year of 1940, forty-one

\(^{50}\)Yunnan Sheng Mengla Xianzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省勐腊县志编纂委员会), *Mengla Xianzhi Chaye Zhi 勐腊县志-茶业志* [The gazetteer of the Mengla County- the tea business gazetteer] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 1997.


157
merchants in Mengzhu Jie of Jinggu organized the Yiqing Gang, dedicated to opium business. The Yiqing Gang’s caravans were well equipped with weapons to ensure that opium safely reached the markets in Yuxi and Xinping areas. Mengzhujie soon developed into an area center for the exchange and distribution of opium, foreign commodities and local products, and was granted the title “Little Kunming”. Merchants in Mengzhu accumulated their wealth in a relatively short time. By the early 1940s, in Mengzhujie, two merchants owned more than 100,000 silver dollar’s capital, eight merchants owned more than 50,000 silver dollars, and fifteen merchants owned more than 10,000 silver dollar worth of capital.55

In fact, as opium cultivation reached its peak in Yunnan among many indigenous people from the 1920s to 1940s, many other opium cultivation and distribution centers appeared in the Yunnan borderlands, including Kaihua, Guangnnan, Fushi, Xichou, Maguan, Shiping, Suijiang, Weixin, Tengchong, Baoshan, Zhenkang, and Longling. 56

Opium cultivation and trafficking gradually overwhelmed the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Burmese border. Hekou became a well-known major port for opium trafficking. In the Hekou area, opium poppies grew in the eastern and western areas, but production was due to the hot weather. The bulk of opium that went through the Hekou port usually came from Mile, Luxi, Wenshan and Maguan. 57 Hekou especially thrived when opium trade became public and legalized by the government during the late Qing and the

56 Su Zhiliang (苏智良), Zhongguo Dupin Shi 中国毒品史 [The history of the drug in China] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1997), 338, 340.
Republican China era. Opium was sold on the street, with increasing numbers of addicts each day. Sailors, boatmen, road workers as well as those who engaged in other physical labor were the most frequent consumers. In 1933, a devastating fire broke out when a family located in Gang Ling Street tried to process opium. The fire wiped out most buildings and shops, causing a long-term recession of the Hekou market. According to the statistics released in September 1940, the total population of inhabitants of Hekou including opium addicts had decreased because of the WWII. Even in wartime, there were eight opium shops in Hekou, and they paid taxes by the quantity of the oil lamps they owned. Usually each ordinary sized shop owned four to five oil lamps, and small shops owned two to three oil lamps. Besides public opium dens, nineteen families had their own oil lamps. But in fact, the number reported in these statistics was probably considerably lower than the reality.

Usually, the Chinese, Muslim and Bai merchants from Western Yunnan, such as the Xizhou and Heqing merchants, dominated the regional and transnational trade routes that connected Southwestern Yunnan to Southern Yunnan, Tibet, and Burma. The Tibetan merchants were the only ones had enough courage to travel back and forth between Tibet and Yunnan through the snowy mountains in northwestern Yunnan. Merchants from southern and southeastern Yunnan were active traders in nearby regional markets as well as markets in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand. In addition to that, local indigenous traders, such as the Dai and Akha actively engaged in cross-border business.

Akha merchants and caravans were also very active traders as early as the 8th century.

Before 1950s, the Akha caravans could easily reach 100 horses, and a normal sized Akha caravan was consisted of 300 to 400 horses. They have been associated with different groups of people such as the Chinese and Dai particularly in Southwestern Yunnan, as well as the Chinese migrants and indigenous people in Laos, Vietnam and Burma. Akha merchants kept very good connections with the Dai caravans. In the Shan markets in northern Burma, the Akha merchants sold opium, cotton, pepper, pigs, honey and bee wax. They often traded Akha rice and white cotton for silk thread, gold and silver carried by the Chinese. They even delivered embroidered Chinese shoes to the female Chinese migrants in Laos and Vietnam who still practice foot-binding.

For more than three hundred years, the “indefatigable” Chinese merchants and caravans have developed a broad trading network in neighborhood countries. The fluidity of the commodities and capital was highly market-oriented. The temporary absence of the Chinese traders would often be substituted by other indigenous merchants. For example, when it was too dangerous for the Chinese merchants to travel to Luang Prabang during the years of Panthay Rebellion (1856-1873), the Burmese peddlers filled the vacancy and kept facilitating the market.

---


Even in a later time when the railways and new roads began to connect the Yunnan borderlands with mainland Southeast Asia, caravans still remained very active in places that were still out of the reach of the modern transportations. 63

The Hui merchants (the Chinese Muslim), in particular, established a highly active commercial network that tied all the cities and towns in Yunnan with China’s hinterland and Southeast Asia. First of all, the Hui people believed in the superiority of business over farming. For those who could afford horses, mules, and even bulls, it was common for them to deliver goods in a short distance as an extra job. For example, in southeastern Yunnan, the Hui people owned the best caravans, and these caravans also traveled to Siam, Vietnam and Burma. 64 The Hui population were under severe persecution after the Panthay Rebellion, and were killed or driven out of their land. Many of them either purchased mules and horses to start the transporting business or worked for the caravans. In addition, as the annexation of land became more and more common in the late Qing, large groups of Hui people lost their lands similar to other peasants of different ethnicities. The caravans thus became a good choice for securing a living and stable social network for those who were jobless and in need of survival. 65

From the 1880s, the Muslim caravans were also the most fearless transporters in areas where the railways were absent. 66 Chinese caravans would not take the risk to

64 Wang Mingda and Zhang Xilu (王明达, 张锡禄), Mabang Wenhua 马帮文化 [The culture of the caravans] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1993), 91-92
65 Wang Mingda and Zhang Xilu (王明达, 张锡禄), Mabang Wenhua 马帮文化 [The culture of the caravans] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1993), 91
66 Ma Zeru (马泽如), “Yunnan Yuan Xin Chang Shanghao Jingying Gaikuang” 云南原信昌商号经营概况 [A brief account of the business of the Yuan Xin Chang company of Yunnan], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 16 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 16 辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province,
travel along the trails in the mountains because of the threat from hot weather and malaria. In that case, the caravans from the Hui people’ settlements in Hexi, Yuxi and E’shan became the only carriers that would ship goods into Pu’er, Simao and Xishuangbanna. They looked for business opportunities wherever they went, and would travel beyond the Yunnan borderlands and arrive in cities and towns in Burma, Laos and Thailand, such as Kengtung, Lashio, Mandalay, Chiang Mai and Phongsali. 67 The Hui merchants had to walk through tropical forests, swamps and rivers, and deal with scorpions, beasts, tropical diseases and even bandits. Usually the caravans embarked on their journeys in late September, and rested during the rainy season from about March to August. 68

In addition to the goods that they commissioned to ship, the Hui caravans also purchased commodities that were popular along the trade routes for exchange. For example, Tibetan felt blankets were welcomed by the indigenous people in the mountains because they were used to wrap dead bodies for funerals. Yellow wax was popular among the Buddhist believers for the use of rituals and ceremonies. Colored yarns were the favorites of the Jingpo people for the decoration of their outfits. When caravans returned, they were usually fully loaded with cotonss that they could possibly sell at a good price in Simao. In Simao, they had a good chance to be hired by the tea merchants.

---


to transport teas back to Kunming and other areas.\textsuperscript{69} However, this business was still of very high risk. Many people lost money because their mules might contract illnesses on the way. Many caravans and merchants would also stay in Burma or Thailand to look for employment. Some of them married local women and never returned.\textsuperscript{70}

Before the establishment of the PRC, the Muslim Ma Tongzhu and his family gained a high reputation among the Muslim merchants and caravans from the Hexi Settlements since the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Ma Tongzhu was famous for his accuracy as well as punctuality, and was trusted by many customers along the route from Southern Yunnan to Thailand. His customers included retailers, small shop owners, government officials, and foreigners.\textsuperscript{71} In the 1920s, the Ma family decided to expand the business after Ma Tongzhu passed away. The Ma family sold their business in Burma and Laos and changed the focus to the business in Southern China, Vietnam, and Thailand. They organized a few grocery stores, such as the Yuan Xin Zhai in Mojiang, and the Yuan Xin Chang in Simao.\textsuperscript{72} Popular local specialties such as opium, velvet antlers, otter furs,  


ivory, dye, and lac were carried by the Ma family. Later Jing Chang Hao, a tea factory, was founded in Jiangcheng to process black tea to export to Vietnam and Hong Kong. The Ma family soon opened another grocery store in Jiangcheng and established their own commercial network that covered southern Yunnan and a few cities and towns in Thailand, Burma and Laos, such as Kengtung. 

The Ma family’s reputation enabled them to obtain contracts from foreigners, who generally occupied management position in customs, post office, and the bureau of salt affairs. Usually the foreigners’ commodities were free from inspection at the Mengzi custom. With such an advantage, the Ma family could often hide opium inside of the shipping packages and smuggle it into Yunnan. The foreign banks, customs, bureau of salt affairs, post office also hired the Ma families to ship the revenue to Kunming. Based such practices, the Ma family soon opened financial services such as remittance and currency exchange. Their regular customers included not only the foreigners but also Chinese government officials, and merchants, and caravans as well as workers who regularly traveled between Yunnan and other Southeast Asian countries. 


married a local woman whose father was Chinese, and mother, Thai. The wife’s family had relatives who worked for the Thai government. With the help from the wife and her families, Ma Zihou’s business soon thrived in Thailand, and he was elected to become the chair of the Yunnan Association. With such advantage, Ma Zihou established connections with the Fujian and Guangdong merchants in Thailand, which further promoted the Ma family’s business.  

**New Roads, New Migrants and New Cities**

Before the construction of the Yunnan-Vietnam railway (the Dian-Yue Railway), the Yunnan borderlands had already connected with the Southeast Asian countries in a scale that surpassed previous centuries. Commodities from the European countries changed the perception of the indigenous people about consumption and brought new opportunities for trade. This further stimulated the boom of local trade between the Chinese, Southeast Asian, and South Asian markets.

In the 1850s, the French opened the port of Haiphong with the intention to accelerate the trade between Vietnam, Hong Kong and other Southeast Asian areas. In southeastern Yunnan, mining towns such as Gejiu and Mengzi were soon connected to Haiphong via the Red River. In 1883, the French demanded the Chinese authority to open a few towns for commerce in southern Yunnan, including Mengzi and Simao. Before the eruption of the Sino-French War in the late 1880s, the regular transportation route

---

76 Ma Zeru (马泽如), “Yunnan Yuan Xin Chang Shanghao Jingying Gaikuang” 云南原信昌商号经营概况 [A brief account of the business of the Yuan Xin Chang company of Yunnan], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 16 Ji* 云南文史资料选辑第 16 辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol.16], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1991), 71-76.

between Mengzi and Hong Kong had already been established. Commodities were shipped from Mengzi to Manhao by caravans and then loaded on the boats to Lao Chai and Hanoi, and then to Haiphong where they would be shipped to Hong Kong. In this manner, copper, lead, iron, tin and opium from southern Yunnan flowed along the Red River to the international market, whereas the foreign goods also flowed in. 78

In southern Yunnan, the traditional Yinan Route that led to Siam attracted merchants from Yuxi, Hexi and E’shan to travel between Simao and Chiang Mai. They mainly stocked tea and sometimes other local goods such as felt, yellow wax, silk, bamboo hats, yarns and fabrics in Simao, Pu’er, Cheli (Jinghong) and Fohai, and then headed to Chiang Mai. Occasionally, they would also travel to Mawlamyine, purchase medicines and manufactured goods imported from Great Britain and Germany, and return back to Yunnan. 79 In southwestern Yunnan along the ancient Shendu Route, merchants frequently embarked a 12-day trip from Lashio to Tengyue. They would pass Namhkam, Mengmao (Ruili), the first town that was considered within China’s territory, and further reached Wangding, Zhefang, Mangshi and Longling. 80 In addition to these well-known routes, there were numerous small paths that connected the Yunnan borderlands with other areas of mainland Southeast Asia.

In 1865, the French established a Chinese Immigration Bureau in Saigon to recruit Chinese laborers. There were two major channels for the Chinese to move to

---

78 Wan Xiangcheng (万湘澂), *Yunnan Duowai Maoyi Gaoguan (shang)* 云南对外贸易概观(上) [A general review on the foreign trade of Yunnan, Vol.1] (Kunming: Xin Yunnan congshushe, 1946), 18; Lu Ren (陆韧), *Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi* 云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 338-339
79 Lu Ren (陆韧), *Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi* 云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 353.
80 Lu Ren (陆韧), *Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi* 云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 359.
Vietnam through the French authority or earlier Chinese immigrants. Many of them signed contract with the French, and were assigned to work at the railway and city construction sites, mines, farms as well as rubber tree plantations. Others were sponsored by their families and relatives in Vietnam or by the Chinese associations. Cochi-china was the main area that received the majority of Chinese immigrants. By 1889, there were 560,000 Chinese here.  

Under the period of the French rule, over 4/5 of Chinese immigrants in Vietnam concentrated in Cochi-china, Annam and Tonkin.  

Laos, in particular, experienced a big influx of Chinese immigrants in the 1890s. Over centuries, Laos was never an ideal destination for Chinese migration because of its relative isolation and limited markets comparing with Vietnam and Burma. The number of the Chinese immigrants in Laos never exceeded 2% of the total local population. After 1893, the French initiated a series of policies in order to attack Chinese laborers to fulfill the big vacancy in the job market. The French authority allowed the new Chinese immigrants to farm the land without paying taxes, and freely travel across the border. Besides, new Chinese migrants were also granted custom duty waver for exports and imports. The French also invited the Chinese who moved to Vietnam and Burma to come back to Laos. By the end of the 19th century, there were more than 5,000 Chinese

81 Zhang Yu (张俞), Yuenan Laowo Jianpuzhai Huaqiao Huaren Manji 越南柬埔寨老挝华侨华人漫记 [Recollections on the Chinese diaspora and migrants in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos] (Hong Kong: Xianggang shehui kexue chubanshe youxian gongsi, 2002), 4-5.  
83 Victor Purcell pointed out that Laos’ disadvantage in attracting the Chinese immigrants included “a very broken surface, lack of seaboard, the inconvenience of international communications, and lastly, only small commerce was practicable.” See Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia 2nd Edition (London, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1965), 175. Also see Zhang Yu (张俞), Yuenan Laowo Jianpuzhai Huaqiao Huaren Manji 越南柬埔寨老挝华侨华人漫记 [Recollections on the Chinese diaspora and migrants in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos] (Hong Kong: Xianggang shehui kexue chubanshe youxian gongsi, 2002), 233-234.  
immigrants in Laos, and the total number reached 6,710 in 1921s. In the 1930s, the
Chinese population in Laos dropped to 3,000 because the French placed a restriction to
prevent the Chinese from entering into the Indochina area. 85

Table 3. Numbers of Chinese in each of the Countries of Indochina 86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cochinchina</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonkin (Tongking)</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annam</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>-4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>293,000</td>
<td>418,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Burma, along the Salween River, there were more than 100,000 Chinese
immigrants who engaged in farming, animal husbandry and trading in the late 19th and
early 20th century. The Chinese could easily receive a piece of land to grow vegetables,
so they often owned vegetable plantations. The also domesticated Chinese plants for
trade, such as celeries, chives, leechee, dates, plums, peaches and etc. In Bahmo, Chinese
people unitized every possible land that they could find, and turned them into cabbage

85 Zhang Yu (张俞), *Yuenan Laowo Jianpuzhai Huagiao Huaren Manji* 越南柬埔寨老挝华侨华人漫记
and bean fields. In Mawlamyine, Chinese orchards and vegetable plantations occupied in the hilltops. By 1931, the Chinese population in Burma reached 193,594.

In April of 1898, the Chinese and French reached an agreement to build a railway to connect Kunming to Vietnam. The French were responsible for building the section from the newly drawn Sino-Vietnamese border to Kunming. In 1900, French specialists initiated a one-year survey along the Mekong River, and they also mapped Yunnan in detail. In October 1903 the two sides re-confirmed the French responsibility and agreed that the entire project should be finished by 1910.

The construction of the Vietnamese side began in 1901, mainly on the plains, and the Chinese side of construction began in 1903 in the mountains. The entire railroad would later include 172 tunnels and over 2000 bridges and culverts. In 1903, the Qing court established the Dian-Yue Railway Bureau to assist the French. The entire railway was divided into more than ten major sections as well as hundreds of sub-sections. Italian

---

87 Wu Fengbin (吴风斌), Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 136-137.
88 Wu Fengbin (吴风斌), Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 137.
engineers were contracted to manage the railway construction. Chinese labor was hired by individual sections, and each section received a compensation of 5,000 dollars per month from the Dian-Yue Railway Bureau. The initial plan was to recruit 20,000 Chinese workers. Later, more than 6,000 labors from Northern China including Tianjin, Port Arthur, Zhili and Jinan and arrived from the sea, possibly through coastal Vietnam.  

Meager salaries, terrible working and housing conditions, as well as a high death rate marked the fate of these railway workers. These workers on average earned wages of six cents each day. They built very simple shelters from logs and hay, and settled in groups. Inside the shelters, there was nothing but piles of grass for bedding. There was no bathroom for workers, and the dorm area was always filthy and smelly. When the spring came, such working and living condition accelerated the spread of malaria. Workers died one after another. Sometimes, only twenty percent of workers could survive in each dorm. Contaminated dorms would often be burnt down and buried with dirt, eliminating the dead bodies as well as the diseased at once. Sometimes, the sick who rested along the railway tracks were often pushed off the mountain valleys and died. Many workers escaped without getting paid, begging for food along the way until they reach Mengzi. For all the 6,000 workers who were from Northern China, only 600 to 700 survived and returned home. According to the statistics from the Dian-Yue Railway

---


Company, about 67,000 workers were recruited from China for railway construction. More than 12,000 died, and over 10,000 of them died in the road between Hekou and Laha and this number did not include those who were recruited from Yunnan.94

After the loss of the Northern Chinese laborers, new workers were recruited from Vietnam and Guangxi Province of China. These workers seemed to adjust to the climate very well; however, they were often abused. There were cases of workers from Guangxi being beaten to death by their Italian bosses. 95

Yunnan’s connection with the outside world was dramatically accelerated after railway was built. Although the border between China and Vietnam was drawn, it was completely overpowered by the bilateral economic exchanges. The boundary sometimes even seemed invisible since the French were managing the railway transportation from Yunnan to Vietnam. Instead of a month’s journey through the mountains and rivers on horseback and boats, merchants now could easily haul their commodities from Kunming to coastal Vietnam, and then to other sea ports in Southeast Asia as well as East Asia. It only took six to seven days to travel from Kunming to Hong Kong, and nine days to Shanghai. With the stimulation of reduced shipping fees and time, the circulation of the commodities and capital in Chinese and Southeast Asia markets immensely increased.

---


The tin mines in Gejiu were one of the beneficiaries after the Yunnan-Vietnam railway was built. In the 1910s, the tin from Yunnan gradually climbed up to the top five of global tin markets, and became an important resource for Yunnan’s revenue. The silk from Sichuan, wool, leather, ash, musk, herbs, spices and tea from Yunnan were always on the top of the exports list. Simultaneously, foreign commodities also entered into the Yunnan and Southwestern Chinese markets. Cotton from Vietnam, as well as firearms from Germany and France were very popular. Besides that, cotton yarns, metals, automobiles, boats, tools, grains, gasoline, paint and medicine also arrived in Yunnan from Germany, France, Great Britain and the U.S.

The Yunnan-Vietnam railway became the major channel for Yunnan to connect with other parts of China. Almost all the people who had to travel to northern China chose to take the train to Haiphong then travel to their destination. In 1913, the Yunnan

---


provincial government selected 30-40 youth for the study abroad program, and sent them out via the railway. Later the students who were attending the universities and colleges in the hinterland China depended on the railway for travel. 100 The railroad also provided convenience for the politicians and revolutionaries to enter and exit China with less risks. For example, Cai’E entered into Yunnan via Vietnam in 1915. In 1921, Tang Jiyao, the Governor of Yunnan escaped via the railroad after his loss in the factional conflicts with Gu Pinzhen. 101 And soon cities along the railway, such as Hekou, began to accommodate political radicals and dissidents temporarily. The uprising organized by the Republicans and also by the CCP occurred in the cities and towns along the railroad.

Around the same time, some forty government officials, intellectuals and merchants in Kunming proposed to build another railway that would connect Vietnam to Sichuan through Tengchong in southwestern Yunnan. This was largely a positive response to the requirement from the British ambition to facilitate the communication between the British Burma to China proper. After the Qing court approved this proposal, officials, intellectuals and merchants pushed to establish a railway company. 102

---


In January 1906, the Dian-Shu Teng-Yue Railway Company was founded in Kunming, and was usually called the “Railway Bureau”. At the open house, Chen Rongchang, the company head, and other speakers addressed the urgency of the railway construction, triggering the prevalence of nationalism at the event. This soon turned the company’s stock purchase promotion to a patriotic campaign and many people, especially merchants, immediately purchased the company’s stocks.

Students from high schools and the military academy in Kunming promised that they would purchase the stocks with their school financial aid. Some government officials were forced to buy stocks in order to save their positions. Even more and more workers, peasants and hawkers began to purchase stocks. Fund raisings organized by the Railway Bureau were also held in various places in the city of Kunming after the railway company open house. Moreover, purchasing the stock of the Railway Bureau became a trend popular to demonstrate patriotism.\(^\text{103}\)

Later more forms of fund raising were developed by the Railway Bureau: besides stock purchasing, civilians could also soon purchase railway lottery. The salt mine owners in the entire province were required to raise the price of the salt for five cents per jin in order to collect money for the railway construction. The land taxes in major counties were also raised. Furthermore, a small percent of the revenues of each county directly went into the railway construction fund, such as the lijin in Sanyi, and the coal

---

tax in Gejiu. At the same time, the railway company dispatched representatives to go to Southeast Asian countries and encourage the Chinese diaspora to purchase stocks. However, the plan was aborted because of the large scale of corruption spread in the company as well as the government officials who oversaw the project. Many higher level provincial bureaucrats were able to obtain stocks worth far more than the money they paid for purchasing. These special clients even began to receive bonus immediately after the purchase, which in fact drained the railway construction fund fairy quickly. For example, the new Governor General of Yunnan received the bonus for ten years in advance, with the total value that was worth three times more than the money he paid for his stocks. In 1909, the warehouse manager of the Baiyanjing salt mine fled with more than 224,000 liang silver dollars, and more than 460,000 of which were for railway taxes. More problems existed in the land taxes usurping. A large amount of money were also spent in advertising in Southeast Asian countries, hiring the U.S engineers, road survey, purchasing big private houses and etc. By 1923, all the 8.3 million liang silver dollars raised for railway construction 1912 had shrunken for 60%, and the railway construction had seen no progress at all. Nevertheless, this “railway dream” never diminished, even

---


for decades. Posters and advertisements that designed to invite civilians to purchase the railway stocks still could be found in Kunming in 1941.  

Although the blueprint for a Yunnan-Burma railway failed, the British constructed two regional railways in the nearby area: one was from Rangoon to Mandalay and then to Myitkyina; and another one was from Mandalay to Lashio in the Shan States. Besides that, several roads were also constructed in this area: one connected Lashio to Wanding in Yunnan, and another one connected Bahmo to Myitkyina. At Myitkyina, there were two roads that aimed at to two directions: one was heading eastward to Tuojiao and Pianma along the headwaters of the Irrawaddy River; and the other heading northward to Sumprabum of northern Burma along the Mali River (another headwater of the Irrawaddy River). These roads later became the ideal routes for the construction of the Burma Road especially because of the convenience provided by the railway that connected Lashio with Mandalay.

In the Honghe Prefecture, Mengzi Port and Hekou Port were open under the request from the French in 1895. New buildings such as the French consulate, banks, and

---

107 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong, “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu” 景颇族的山官制度 [The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai Yanjiu 中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 41.
108 Lu Ren, Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi 云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 360.
chapels raised in these town quickly after they were opened.\textsuperscript{109} In the early 1900s, tin mining in Gejiu attracted large numbers of merchants and labors. With the construction of the Yunnan-Vietnam railway as well as several other new roads, towns and villages flourished along the railway whereas the southern border of Honghe still remained relatively isolated to the outside world.\textsuperscript{110}

Kaiyuan was the largest transitional center when the Yunnan-Vietnam railway began operation in 1902. In Kaiyuan, life changed for the local population. Missionaries from protestant churches arrived in Kaiyuan after the Yunnan-Vietnam railway was put into use.\textsuperscript{111} The railway not only provided jobs for the adults but also to children who were obligated to help improve the financial situation of the family. Being pushed by poverty caused by wars, bandits as well as unemployment, children often tried all kinds of ways to get onto the trains to sell cigarettes to the passengers. According to the recollection of Wang Zhong'en, a pilot who served in the PLA air force for thirty years, selling cigarettes on the trains that traveled back and forth from Xiao Longtan to Da Zhuang and Yang Jie had become their daily chores.\textsuperscript{112}


It was obvious that both these cigarette children as well as their parents were ignorant and seriously lacked awareness of safety. Cigarette children like Wang Zhong’en would try all kinds of means to avoid the French railway inspectors and get on the trains. Climbing onto the train, and even unto the top, and presumably, jumping off the train, seemed very dangerous and yet very common. Such reckless approaches brought their lives in to risk, and yet such situation was not observed or even intentionally ignored by themselves and their parents. A friend of Wang Zhong’en was killed in an accident, with his head chopped off by the iron bars on the Xiao Longtan Bridge. Another friend slipped under the wheels as he was trying to climb unto a running train and unfortunately lost his leg.

Wang Zhong’en often felt lucky that nothing seriously happened to him except that he spilled all the cigarettes into the water when he was on the ferry across the river in Xiao Longtan, and was badly beaten by his mother when he returned home.  

The railway also brought to the new urban cities increasing influence from China and the outside world. In 1915, the Yiqun Tea house in Kaiyuan hosted a juggling team from Japan. At the same time, the Beijing opera was introduced in Honghe and gained many faithful supporters. Many celebrities from Shanghai and Hankou received

---


invitations from the local Tea House in Gejiu. Gradually fans of Dianju and Beijing opera organized associations in Gejiu, Jianshui, Kaiyuan, Mile and Luxi.\textsuperscript{115}

The earliest movie shown in Honghe was brought by the French in 1907. In 1927, a local photographer in Gejiu named Wang Liwen opened the first professional movie theater. Wang rented the movie projector from Kunming and showed four Chinese produced silent movies. In 1939, Wang Liwen and another investor named Guo Shaocong remodeled the Wexi Theater and opened the first theater that could play sound films in this area.\textsuperscript{116} In addition to these professional theaters, many mobile film teams also traveled to other towns and cities in Honghe. \textsuperscript{117}

Serious interruptions to these centers and regional markets occurred for the reasons of wars and bandit harassment. In Jinggu, merchants began to move away after 1938, tea shops closed and caravans stopped traveling because of the plague of wars and bandits. As the KMT government launched campaigns to pacify the bandits, merchants gradually moved back to the Mengzhu Jie of Jinggu area, new stores were opened, and the ties between the markets in Jinggu, Lancang, Menglian and even Burma and Siam were re-established.\textsuperscript{118} In 1942, more salt shops and companies were opened not only in Jinggu but also nearby towns. Furthermore, seasonal merchants and caravans that only

\begin{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{118}Yunnan Sheng Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省景谷傣族彝族自治县志编纂委员会), \textit{Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi} 景谷傣族彝族自治县志 [The gazetteer of the Jinggu Dai and Yi People’s Autonomous County] (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chubanshe, 1993), 341.
\end{flushleft}
traded during the slack season also became active. Opium, tea, salt, and sugar began to flow along the regional trading routes again. 119

Through trade, the Yunnan borderlands were increasingly connected with both the Chinese domestic and mainland Southeast Asian markets. The closest connections were with the latter because of regional kinship ties, frequent movement of people, and the new roads as well as railways that overcame the restriction of the state boundary. The indigenous people as well as new migrants in the Yunnan borderlands and neighboring countries were introduced to opportunities to grow cash crops such as sugar canes, peppers, tobacco and rubber trees. They gradually became an important part of the global colonial markets. The heyday of this trans-national trading empire has come because of the worldwide colonial economic expansion.

**Wars and the Political Boundaries**

The boundary between the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia did not become clear when wars emerged between the traditional Chinese colonial force and the new colonial forces such as Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S and later the expanding communist China as well as Vietnam. Since the 1930s, the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia were divided into the territories of the Japanese and the Allies, as well as the Communists and the Capitalists. The indigenous communities were redefined into the larger powers’ spheres of influence with boundaries that the indigenous communities would not otherwise recognize for themselves. Thus, the political boundaries of the trading empire began to appear.

It was the French colonial intervention that contributed to the emergence of a clearer boundary between China and Vietnam in the 1880s. As the Qing court and French set up the boundary between China and French Indochina, the future boundaries between China, Vietnam and Laos was being hatched. At the same time, the boundary between China and Laos became clear since the Laos was annexed into the French Indochina. Mengwu and Wude, two of the local political units of Xishuangbanna were ceded to France and then combined with Laos, which became part of the present Phongsali area of Laos.

On the Burmese side, two agreements between China and Britain reached in the year of 1894 and 1897 drew an unclear boundary between China and Burma. The borderline between China and Burma was divided into four major segments. Some of these segments had a clear line that divided China and Burma; some of them remained controversial; and some of them never had boundaries clearly drawn. Basically, the area north to the Jiangao Moutain did not have a set boundary; the area between the Jiangao Mountain and the Nanding River was clear; from the Nanding River to Nanbanjiang River (Nankajiang River), the boundary remained controversial; the area eastward of the Nanbanjiang River was set. In this case, the boundaries of three sections of the Sino-

---

Burmese border were not clearly solved, and further negotiations concerning the national boundaries were carried into the PRC era.\textsuperscript{123}

From the late 1880s to 1940s, the drawing of the boundaries did not change the fluid nature of communication as well as coherence between the Yunnan borderlands and the mainland Southeast Asia. The expansion of traditional colonial power and the new Western colonial powers were similar in terms of “civilization mission” they shared as well as the effort in gaining more resources. It was also the wars in the 1940s that significantly integrated the Yunnan borderlands with the mainland Southeast Asia as well as South Asia, and simplified the border as the boundary between the realms of the Axis and Allies. The construction of the Burma Road, the India-China Road as well as some regional highways especially propelled this process.

In November 1937, the KMT government conceived the blueprint of the Burma Road on Yunnan’s side, which would extend the Kunming-Xiaguan/Dali road to Ruili in the Southwest. In January, 1938, the Chinese and British governments reached an agreement on the specifics of the road on Burma’s side. The plan was to connect Ruili to Muse, with eighteen kilometers’ road construction in Burma. After that, western Yunnan would be connected to two of the aforementioned major regional transportation arteries: the Lashio-Bahmo Road and the Rangoon-Mandalay-Lashio railway.\textsuperscript{124}

The construction of the Burma Road began in December 1937. Seventeen towns and cities along the road were assigned to fulfill the daily labor quota. The Baoshan


\textsuperscript{124} Yunnan Jindai Shi Bianxie Zu (云南近代史编写组), Yunnan Jindai Shi 云南近代史 [The Modern History of Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1993), 463-464.
County provided 28,000 people every day, the highest labor quota among them all. Around 115,000 workers of various ethnic backgrounds were regularly working on the road construction side. During urgent times, more than 200,000 laborers had participated in the construction. The road from Mangshi to Wanding and then Lashio was based on an existing path that the Tusi of Mangshi and Zhefang built from 1927 to 1931. These two Native Officers purchased five automobiles in order to go to Burma for sightseeing and worshiping. The passage from Xiaguan to Wanding was extremely difficult to pave with mountain valleys and cliffs all along the way. In December, 1937, the workers gradually arrived at the construction sites. Many of them had walked a long distance varied from three to six days, carrying clothes, tools, and food supplies that usually lasted for ten days. Simple shelters were built from tree logs chopped down along the way.


128 Xie Zijia (谢自佳), “Kangri Zhanzheng Shiqi Dianmian Gonglu de Xiujian” 抗日战争时期滇缅公路的修建 [The construction of the Burma Road during the WWII], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di...
The average stipend was twenty cents each day. Because of the shortage of tools and the absolute lack of machinery, many had to dig with their own hands. Workers’ health was troubled by harsh weather, malaria, hunger, and frequent accidents. The technicians and engineers who participated in the road construction estimated that around 2,000 to 3,000 people died during the process of the road construction. Many women were also recruited because of the labor shortage.

Kunming experienced a boom after the construction of the Burma Road. The total population of Kunming increased from 100,000 to 300,000, becoming the most important economic, cultural, military and transitional center in southwestern China. Cities and towns along the Burma Road such as Lufeng, Chuxiong, Xiaguan, Yongping, Baoshan,
Mangshi, Zhefang and Wanding also began to thrive. The town of Wanding only had four houses that accommodated four to five peasant families as seasonal farmers. After the Burma Road was constructed, factories and mechanic houses were also added. Soon modern government institutions such as the customs, taxation and police departments were established, hotels, restaurant and shops also flourished.\(^{133}\)

In September, 1938, the Nanjing government relocated the KMT Military Committee’s General Board of Transportation for the Imports and Exports in Southwestern China (The General Board of Transportation) from Guangzhou to Kunming, coordinating the transportation of military supplies as well as other supplies from Rangoon. In October 21\(^{st}\), 1938, after Guangzhou fell into the hands of the Japanese, China’s connection with the outside world had to depend entirely on the Yunnan-Vietnam railway and the Burma Road. In 1939, the military supplies shipped into China via the Burma Road reached 27,980 tons, with a monthly average of 2,544 tons, and the highest record of 4,907 tons.\(^{134}\)

After the Spring Festival of 1939, more than 3,000 Chinese workers and engineers (including two female drivers) in Southeast Asian countries gradually returned back to China via Vietnam and Burma to serve the KMT General Board of Transportation. They were initially stationed in Kunming and later organized into twenty teams, being

---


responsible for the transportation of the military supplies on the Burma Road. Besides these returned Chinese migrants, workers from Guangdong Province formed another major group of drivers along the Burma Road.\textsuperscript{135}

A year later, the Japanese landed in Beihai, Guangxi, and began to bomb the Yunnan-Vietnam railway. \textsuperscript{136} After the Japanese took over Vietnam, they paralyzed the railway in October 1940. The Burma Road became China’s only channel to break though the Japanese blockade. \textsuperscript{137} More than 7,800 military trucks as well as private cars rushed back and forth on the Burma Road day and night. In July, 1940, a truck that passed through the city of Mangshi every three minutes. \textsuperscript{138} In 1941, the military supplies shipped in via the Burma Road reached 132,000 tons, one third of which was gas. \textsuperscript{139} In the same year, 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese refugees gradually returned back to China via

\textsuperscript{135} Feng Junrui (冯君锐), “Nanyang Huajiao Jigong Hui Guo Fuwu Shimo” 南洋华侨机工回国服务始末 [The history of the service of the returned Southeast Chinese mechanics], in \textit{Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanj Di 32 Ji} 云南文史资料选辑第 32 辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 32], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1988), 262-64.


the Burma Road since April. During the WWII, China received the 1.37 billion US Dollar’s financial aid from the $0.45 billion U.S Dollars from the U.K (1938-1941), and 1.56 billion Chinese Dollars from the overseas Chinese (by August, 1941). More than half of the military supplies was transported via the Burma Road.

In 1941, the need to build a road that connected Yunnan with India became urgent as the Japanese took over central Burma. In May 1941, Tengchong and Longling fell into the hands of the Japanese and the road construction was aborted. A few years later the construction survey resumed in May 1944, and the construction began in summer though the Japanese still occupied Longling. Many indigenous women joined the road construction and they proved to be very strong laborers. By November, two delivering squares were built to receive food airlifted from the aircrafts operated by China National Aviation Corporation that flew back and forth from Calcutta.

---


142 Yang Poting (杨钷廷), “Kang Ri Zhanzheng zhong Xiutong Zhongyin Gonglu Shilve” 抗日战争中修通中印公路史略 [A brief history of the construction of the China-India Road during the WWII], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 32 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 32 辑* [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 32], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1988), 247.

143 See Yang Poting (杨钷廷), “Kang Ri Zhanzheng zhong Xiutong Zhongyin Gonglu Shilve” 抗日战争中修通中印公路史略 [A brief history of the construction of the China-India Road during the WWII], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 32 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 32 辑* [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 32], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1988), 247-249. See also Zhang Tianen (张天亘), “Tengchong yu Zhongyin Gonglu” 腾冲与中印公路 [Tengchong and the China-India Road], in in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 37 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 37 辑* [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 37], edited by
From Tengchong to the Sino-Burmese border, more than 6,500 people including Chinese and U.S sappers engaged in more than ten hours hard work each day. More than 13,500 people and 200 machines joined the construction from Longling to Myitkyina. Statistics show that of the total number of laborers participating in the Yunnan-India road construction, 20,000 were Chinese and 700 U.S sappers. In March, 1944, the preparation and construction of the gas pipeline between India and China was initiated. This gas pipeline would connect Calcutta and Kunming, passing through the Hump of the Himalayan Mountains and stretching close to 2,000 miles. In the 1940s, more than 490,000 tons of military supplies, 10,000 vehicles and more than 200,000 tons of gas entered into China via the Burma Road and India Road.

It was obvious that the war did not stop the flow of labors, commodities and capitals, at least between the Ally countries. In the mid-1940s, the population of the

---


146 Xia Guangnan (夏光南), Zhong Yin Mian Dao Jiaotong Shi 中印缅道交通史 [The history of the Routes and Communication of China, India and Burma] (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1948), 142-143.

147 Zhang Jiade, Cai Zejun and Zhang Yu (张家德, 蔡泽军, 张愚), "Dianmian Gonglu de Xiujian ji Zuoyong”滇缅公路的修建及作用 [The construction of the Burma Road and the contribution], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 37 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 37 辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 37], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1988), 33.
Chinese immigrants in Laos grew from around 3,000 in the 1930s to no less than 40,000. Since the WWII, the Chinese merchants in Burma gradually replaced the Indians and became the major shopkeepers, as the Indian population suffered a great decrease.148

“The Chinese overseas Bank, the Bank of China, and Chinese insurance, shipping, rice, and mercantile firms maintained five branches along the Burma Road and the payment of Chinese customs could be made through these branches.”149

Within the Communist Camp

In fact, the only boundary that the indigenous people wished to draw might be the line between the colonizers and themselves. However, such boundary was gradually merged with the division between the Capitalists and the Communists, and was sharpened, especially after the WWII. This further divided the indigenous communities into political and military segments with different national identification as well as ideological affiliation. On one hand, more wars and confrontations between same indigenous communities broke out because of their disagreements on national identification and ideological orientation. On the other hand, close connections between people within the same ideological camps sometimes overcame the national boundaries. Thus, indigenous communities paid a great price for the colonial expansion as well as the drawing of such “forced” boundaries. As a result, traditional transnational migration, trade as well as business cooperation, was interrupted and halted, and only persisted within the same political or ideological sphere.

---

As the confrontation between the communist and the capitalist camp was regionalized after the WWII, the \textit{de facto} boundary between China and mainland Southeast Asian countries began to fluctuate due to the Cold War regional politics, as well as China’s diplomatic policies. The Sino-Southeast Asian borderlands were accommodated and divided up by various regional powers as well as local military forces, such as China, exiled KMT forces, and communist forces of Vietnam and Burma. Thus, the cross-border interactions became purely ideologically oriented. Trade and communications of the border people were limited to a small scale and usually restricted only within the communist camp.\textsuperscript{150}

Up to the mid-1960s, the PRC stood at a “gray zone” in terms of its relationship with the adjacent countries in mainland Southeast Asia. The PRC kept its regular relationship with the Vietnamese and Burmese government, and also the communist forces in both countries.\textsuperscript{151}

In fact, in order to save the Chinese communist revolution from the besieging of the capitalist countries, China initiated the strategy that the Soviet Union adopted in the 1920s: exporting the communist revolution and aiding the communist parties in small countries. By 1967, it was estimated that more than five billion issues of the \textit{Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung} were published, with the average of 1.5 for each person in

\textsuperscript{150}A common misconception was that the foreign trade between Yunnan and the outside almost did not existed before China opened up again in the late 1970s. For example, Grant Evans pointed out that “From 1949 up until 1978 there was almost no foreign trade with Yunnan, which lived up to its reputation as a ‘mysterious land beyond the clouds’.” See Grant Evans, “Transformation of Jinghong, Xishuangbanna, PRC”, in \textit{Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social and Cultural Change in the Border Regions, edited by} Grant Evans, Christopher Hutton and Kuah Khun Eng (New York: St. Martin’s Press; Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 166.

\textsuperscript{151}Ma Jisen (马继森), \textit{Waijiao Bu Wenge Jishi} 外交部文革紀實 [The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China] (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), 148.
the world. And yet as China’s Cultural Revolution escalated after the mid-1960s, its main diplomacy of exporting revolution and Mao’s idea exacerbated China’s tension with the international world as well as with neighboring countries.  

Gradually, the boundary between China’s revolutionary and diplomatic relationship with other countries blurred. In the neighborhood, although Nepal, Burma, and Vietnam received China’s aid over years, they openly rebelled against China’s propaganda. Nepal requested China to recall its diplomatic personnel in August, 1967 after anti-Chinese demonstrations occurred. Even Cambodia, with whom China tried to maintain a close relationship, could not bear such Cultural Revolution strategies.

As the first non-Communist country to recognize the legitimacy of the PRC on December 18, 1949, Burma tried to demonstrate its friendship to the new born China, and neutrality in the Cold War politics. However, Burma was unavoidably caught in the extended Chinese domestic conflicts between the CCP and the KMT, as well as military confrontations between the world communist and capitalist camps. The fraction between the CCP and the Burmese government has appeared in the early 1950s. Burmese government’s anxiety regarding the collaboration between the CCP and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) never ceased. The CCP blamed the Burmese incapability to eliminate the KMT army led by General Li Mi. Simultaneously, the KMT army made serious efforts to stir up the hostilities between the Burmese and the Chinese.

---

governments. Burma accused the U.S for supporting the KMT army and initiated some anti-U.S strategies, including the refusal of the communication with the KMT, which caused the deterioration of the U.S–Burmese relations. At least, Burma had two major fears: first of all, the possible future intervention from the Chinese government and military confrontations with the Communist China; and second, the possibility of becoming another “Korea”.  

Before the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government clearly expressed that it would not interfere in the Burmese domestic politics and hoped that the Burmese government and the CPB could sit down for peace negotiation. However, the situation dramatically changed in 1966 as the communist movements intensified in Burma, causing tremendous distrust between the Burmese government and China. Large scale radical anti-Chinese actives occurred in Burma in the summer of 1967, and were soon as answered by anti-Burmese protests in China. With Mao’s approval, slogans that called for the execution of Ne Win became very popular in Beijing. The Burmese Embassy was attacked by Chinese civilians with bricks. The Chinese and Burmese media began to quarrel with each other via newspapers and radios. In June 30th 1967, the Chinese

---

156 Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., *The Effect of Chinese Nationalist Military Activities in Burma on Burmese Foreign Policy* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1959), 2, 6,8,9,15, 16, 19,23, 39.


158 Within the core of the CCP leadership, the rise of the Central Cultural Revolution Committee gradually began to exclude Zhou’s Enlai from the foreign diplomacy. In July, 1967, Kang Sheng asked Mao Zedong if the slogan of Destroy Ne Win was appropriate in the public, which received Mao’s approval. In July 4th 1967, Guan Feng and Qi Benyu promoted the slogan of Destroy Ne Win at a conference organized by the Central Cultural Revolution Committee. Soon, the slogans of Destroy Ne Win, Hang Ne Win and Deep Fry Ne Win became very popular among the public. See Ma Jisen (马继森), *Waijiao Bu Wenge Jishi* 外交部文革纪实 [The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China] (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), 138.
government openly supported the military operations of the CPB, and criticized the anti-revolutionary and fascist nature of the Burmese government. 159

When China’s relationship with the Burmese government soured in 1968, thousands of Chinese educated youth crossed the Sino-Burmese border, and joined the CPB’s military base in northern Burma. The majority of these Chinese volunteer troops were from Yunnan. Many of them were attracted by the adventurous revolutionary life instead of hard and boring chores of faming each day. The bulk of volunteers were young people who saw no opportunity of being recognized by the Chinese authorities because of the class status of their families. For them, going across the border meant reaching the very forefront of the “world revolution” and the chance to change their life as well as social status. 160 With the dream to support “international leftism”, they sought opportunities to prove their loyalty as well as value to their home country. They joined the CPB forces, looking for opportunities to become revolutionary heroes. Many of them carried a pamphlet about the story of Che Guevara when they crossed the border. 161

159 The PRC’s support towards the Burmese communist movement dated back to 1950 when a Kachin communist as well as ethnic leader and his followers received unofficial asylum from the Chinese government, and then settled in Guizhou province. The CPB forces began to seek the military aid from China at the end of 1951 when being forced to withdraw from urban areas to its bases in the Kachin State. Although the CPB delegates were well received by the Yunnan and Sichuan local government in 1951 and 1953, “China was not willing to sacrifice its friendly relations with the U Nu government for the sake of the CPB.” It was not until 1962 when Ne Win rose in power that the CPB received open support from China. It was very clear that the CPB received radio transmitters and other aid from China in 1963. At the same time, the CPB also began to look for alternative routes to access Northeastern Burma via Yunnan. The CPB cadres’ requests to take a “short cut” and reach those military bases were well documented in the Yunnan local archives. Ma Jisen (马继森), Waijiao Bu Wenge Jishi 外交部文革纪实 [The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China] (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), 149. Also Bertil Lintner, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma, Kindle Edition, 2014, loc 494, loc 506, loc 584, loc 592, loc 631, loc 644, loc 657.


As for Laos, Chinese assistance in the communist occupied area in Laos began in early 1960s. From 1962 to 1963, China constructed the road from Phongsali to Paka in Xishuangbanna. In responding to the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) needs in fighting against the U.S. from November 1966 to September 1967, the CCP central committee and the LPRP reached a series of agreements that China would unconditionally build six paved roads near the Sino-Laos border, and also repave the Phongsali-Paka road. In September 1968, a group of Chinese troops entered into Laos under the cover of artillery forces from the Second Artillery Corps as well as the Air Force dispatched from Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Lanzhou, Fuzhou, Nanjing, Chengdu, Kunming military regions. During the ten year construction period in Laos, the Chinese artillery force engaged in ninety-five battle and shot down thirty-five planes and damaged twenty-four. The PLA army also encountered small battles in the road construction area, and suffered minor loss.

On the Vietnamese side, China’s interaction with the Vietminh was what really impacted the Sino-Vietnamese border. From 1949 to 1978, the cross border trade did not cease between China and Vietnam before the Sino-Vietnamese War broke out. From 1955 to 1964, Vietnam heavily relied on the imports from China to restore the heavy industry sector. In 1952, China and Vietminh opened the border markets to allow the

162 Yunnan Sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省地方志编纂委员会), Yunnan Shengzhi Juan 49 Junshi Zhi 云南省志卷四十九军事志 [The gazetteer of the Yunnan Province Vol. 49 the gazetteer of the military affairs] (Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 403.
163 Yunnan Sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省地方志编纂委员会), Yunnan Shengzhi Juan 49 Junshi Zhi 云南省志卷四十九军事志 [The gazetteer of the Yunnan Province Vol. 49 the gazetteer of the military affairs] (Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 403.
164 Yunnan Sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省地方志编纂委员会), Yunnan Shengzhi Juan 49 Junshi Zhi 云南省志卷四十九军事志 [The gazetteer of the Yunnan Province Vol. 49 the gazetteer of the military affairs] (Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 403.
165 Yunnan Sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省地方志编纂委员会), Yunnan Shengzhi Juan 49 Junshi Zhi 云南省志卷四十九军事志 [The gazetteer of the Yunnan Province Vol. 49 the gazetteer of the military affairs] (Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 403-404.
local civilians to trade. In August 1953, the CCP and Vietminh reached an agreement and officially recognized small-scale bilateral trade. In July 1955, China and Vietminh signed a treaty to allow the provincial governments on both sides to directly trade with each other. According to this treaty, the Yunnan Trading Company and the trading companies from Lao Cao, Ha Giang, Cao Bang and Lang Son further confirmed that from September, 1956 to 1969, the total trade value between Yunnan and Vietnam should be controlled within 1.5 million yuan each year. The commodities exported from Yunnan would be shipped from Kunming to Chinese ports, including Hekou, Jinshuie and Tianbao. In June, 1958, another treaty between China and Vietminh allowed the Hekou County Trading Company to have direct business with the trading companies in Lao Cai, which extended the government oriented trade on both side to the county level. From 1958 to 1965, the Hekou County Trade Company handled 1,597,598 yuan value of commodities for exports and imports.

As for the local civilians, in 1952, those who resided within 20 km’s radius were able to receive a border pass issued by the local government. Besides the border pass, the county government also permitted local civilians to purchase a pass to enter into designated market places for trade. In 1955, the Provincial Government of Yunnan issued a new regulation to introduce passports as the valid travel documentation. The flow of cross-border communication significantly reduced in 1960 when small-scale trade

was terminated by the Chinese government. In 1960, only 108,452 people crossed the Hekou Port. In 1961, the number slightly raised to 43,422. In 1962, the number decreased again, and only 22,982 people crossed the Hekou port from January to August. In 1963, the Provincial Government of Yunnan signed a treaty with the Northwestern Autonomous Region of Vietnam, Lao Cai Province, and Ha Giang Province in order to increase twelve regular routes for the civilians to travel. Besides that, temporary travel routes would be opened to the civilians during holidays. This solution caused a rise in cross-border records, and yet the total number was still far below the records set before the small-scale trade was ceased.

China continued to aid the Vietminh even when it was troubled by economic problems itself. The Sino-Vietnamese border in Yunnan saw frequent visits between the Vietminh and the CCP delegations up to 1978. And yet, more and more conflicts occurred along the border since 1974. The Chinese records charges Vietnam with being responsible for more 121 conflicts along the border in 1974, 439 in 1975, 986 in 1976, 752 in 1977, 1,108 in 1978 and 129 alone in the first 1.5 months in 1979. These cases

172At the end of the year 1949, China collected 600,000 jin food in Hubei and Hunan, and then delivered to Vietminh via Guangxi. Later the PLA 13th Corps saved 100,000 food from their daily consumption and also delivered that to Vietminh. In December 1954, Vietminh received the donation of 10,000 ton rice and 5,000,000 m cotton fabric. From 1955 to 1978, China assisted to build more than 100 factories in Vietnam, in both light and heavy industrial sector, and also eight large scale farms and ranches. More than 200 Chinese experts arrived in Vietnam to train local technician and engineers. Up until 1978, the economic and military supplies as well as currency exchange totaled more than 20 billion US dollars, including: weapons, firearms and other military supplies that were capable to fully equip more than 2 million troops of the Vietnamese army, navy and air force, hundreds of factories and mechanic centers, 0.3 billion fabrics, 30,000 vehicles, hundreds of km of railways and all the railway tracks, and trains; more than 5 million ton food, more than 3,000 km gas pipe, and hundreds of thousand U.S dollars. See Fan Honggui and Liu Zhiqiang (范宏贵, 刘志强), Zhong Yue Bianjing Maoyi Yanjiu [A study on China-Vietnam border trade] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2006), 127.
included confrontations between the border patrols from both sides as well as Chinese civilians’ being threatened by Vietnamese police forces.  

During the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, the Vietnamese army bombed the Chinese civilian sites in Malipo County 2,959 times, causing the death of 341 people and injury for 440 people. Around 23,272 mu lands were deserted, and 338 ditches and channels were destroyed. About 10,086 mu forests were damaged, and 2,250 mu cash crop forest were also destroyed. Besides that, 21,996 people from 3,074 families of 120 villages along the border also were relocated.

On the Vietnamese side, the border people, regardless their age and sex, were all organized and joined the military forces to fight against the Chinese. When the Chinese troops went across the border and entered into Vietnam, the past experience of their fellow soldiers, their fear as well as strong desire to survive drove them to shot whoever Vietnamese they met. At that point, it was already too difficult to tell who distinguish ordinary border people from the Vietnamese troops and militia.

---

173 Yunnan Sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省地方志编纂委员会), *Yunnan Shengzhi Juan 49 Junshi Zhi* [The gazetteer of the Yunnan Province Vol. 49 the gazetteer of the military affairs] (Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 404.


175 Oral interview with the Sino-Vietnamese War veterans: Cheng Zhi (程志), *Conversation with Cheng Zhi* (Xiaguan, Yunnan, China: 07/26/2013). Zhao Zhimao (赵之茂), *Conversation with Zhao Zhimao* (Xizhou, Yunnan, China: 07/15/2013). Zhu Yunsheng (朱云生), *Conversation with Zhu Yunsheng* (Dali, Yunnan, China: 07/25/2013). DuanXX (段XX), *Conversation with Duan XX* (Duan is a government official who refused to disclose his name) (Eryuan, Yunnan, China: 07/31/2013).
Trade vs. Wars, and Open vs. Isolation: Roles of Opium and Rubber Cultivation

From the late 19th century on, two major currents battled against each other in the Yunnan borderlands and its adjacent counties: trade directed by the larger powers and its relatively open environment, and the wars led by the larger powers, and its consequence of isolation. In the Yunnan borderlands, either colonial economy before 1949, or the communist state economy after 1949 provided an ideal pattern to handle the economic connections between the indigenous societies and the outside world. The commonality between the trade and the wars, as well as between the open and the isolated environment, was that the indigenous population were often placed in a dilemma in terms of their agency to choose their own future development.

The indigenous communities were caught in the clashes among the conventional imperial powers (such as China) when new colonial powers such as France and Britain and later Japan and the U.S. in the 19th and 20th century created frequent and devastating wars, making it impossible for constant foodstuff cultivation. Driven by the desire to relieve poverty and starvation, the indigenous people embraced new trade opportunities in opium and rubber that were presented by outsiders. Soon, local production of cash crops was stimulated and dramatically enlarged by increasing demand of the global market, and that of the Chinese domestic market in particular.

Opium cultivation had become popular in Yunnan in the late 19th century, and reached its peak among many indigenous people from 1920s to 1940s. 176 “The

176 Su Zhiliang (苏智良), Zhongguo Dupin Shi 中国毒品史 [The history of the drug in China] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1997), 160, 340.
province’s currency was supported by opium, and the political independence of the regime was based firmly on opium income”, especially in the 1930s. 177

For the mountain people, this new business promised a better and stable income, and fit their slash-burn style of farming. Opium poppy fields were soon found across the vast area from southern Yunnan to western Yunnan during the late 19th century and early 20th century. Indigenous people such as the Bulang, Dai, De’ang, Lahu, Hani, and Wa were active opium poppy cultivators. 178 In Honghe, the opium tax paid by the Hani cultivators became the major income of the Native Officer in Situo. In the Wa communities, every family grew opium poppies. Opium were often used as dowry for marriage, credit in local banking, and even currency in the Wa market. Slaves were sold and purchased especially for opium cultivation. 179

In the late 1940s, in order to fund their military operations, the CCP guerilla forces in northeastern Yunnan openly supported the indigenous people and mobilized them to grow opium poppies despite of the opium ban of the Republican government. In Luoping County, the CCP began to urge farmers to grow opium in 1946 and 1947. In 1948, the opium cultivation areas also became the base for the CCP guerilla forces. In a vast area where Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi bordered, centers for opium growing and selling were organized and protected by the CCP military forces until 1951. 180

The long-lasting and broad problems caused by opium cultivation and

179 Su Zhiliang (苏智良), Zhongguo Dupin Shi 中国毒品史 [The history of the drug in China] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1997), 340.
consumption plagued the indigenous communities for more than 100 years during the 19th and 20th centuries. Heavy fines and taxes extracted from opium farmers proved that opium cultivation was not a cure for poverty. Indeed, opium cultivation triggered a chain of negative effects both in the short-term and long-run.

For example, in Guangnan County near the Sino-Vietnamese border, the price of opium fields and suitable lands for opium cultivation exceeded that of the rice fields. The rising land prices motivated local landlords and gangsters to occupy farmers’ lands by force. Tax collectors sent by local authorities always coerced the farmers for bribes. There were often conflicts between greedy officers and angry farmers. Wealthy opium dealers were able to purchase positions and became local officials. Once they become local officials, they never hesitated to raise tax rates in order to gain the money they needed to maintain their connections with still higher level officials. As for ordinary people, less than a quarter of them avoided opium addiction. Some children even had become drug addicts before they turned ten years old. 181

In fact, the opium cultivation and trade accelerated the militarization and confrontations in the Yunnan borderlands. Wanting the tremendous profits that opium had promised, indigenous officers, landlords and gangsters organized forces and robbed caravans that were not from Yunnan on the trade routes, with the result that military confrontations often broke out. Merchants had to hire safety guards and equip themselves with armed forces for the sake of protecting their caravans. Soon weapons and firearms

181 Dai Qilin (戴启林), “Guangnan Yapian de Chanxiao ji Weihai” 广南鸦片的产销及危害 [The production and harm of the opium in Guangnan], in Jindai Zhongguo Yandu Xiezhen Xia Juan 近代中国烟毒写真下卷 [Historical documents on the opium in Modern China, Vol.2], edited by Wenshi Jinghua Bianjibu (文史精华编辑部) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1997), 382-388.
became another popular commodity that began to circulate wherever opium was traded. In the 1930s and 1940s, robberies and homicides plagued Guangnan society.  

Opium cultivation in China gradually disappeared after the establishment of the PRC. But opium consumption and smuggling continued to plague the borderlands in Yunnan. In Laos, the CIA sponsored opium poppy cultivation remained into the 1960s and 1970s. Opium also became the major source of income for the exiled KMT armies that were hovering in the mountains of the Northwestern Thailand, Laos and Burma. On the Burmese side, by the 1970s, the CPB controlled “a 20,000 square kilometer area adjacent to the Chinese frontier, stretching uninterruptedly from the Mekong River and the Lao border to the border town of Pangshai where the Burma Road crosses into Vietnam.” Later after China withdrew financial support to the CPB in 1975, communist party members in Burma began to engage in the opium trade in order to become self-reliant. The drug problem along the Sino-Burmese border caused increasing problems as well as tensions between the CCP and CPB. Heroin was being smuggled to Yunnan, and then distributed into other places such as Hong Kong. Thus, the opium cultivation and trade provided a middle ground where the interests of various forces from different ideological and political backgrounds were directed into a common world market, particularly that of the U.S.

In order to resume regular cross border trade with Burma and eliminate the drug problem, the CCP tried to persuade the CPB leaders as well as high-ranking cadres to

---

182 Dai Qilin (戴启林), “Guangnan Yapian de Chanxiao ji Weihai” 广南鸦片的产销及危害 [The production and harm of the opium in Guangnan], in Jindai Zhongguo Yandu Xiezhen Xia Juan 近代中国烟毒写真下卷 [Historical documents on the opium in Modern China, Vol.2], edited by Wenshi Jinghua Bianjibu (文史精华编辑部) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1997), 382-388.
give up and retire in China. The initial effort was made in 1981, and repeated in 1985 and 1988. The offer from the CCP included asylum with monthly pension, with homes or a piece of land provided by the Chinese government. Eventually younger low ranking CPB cadres accepted. In early 1989, the Chinese tried again and were rejected again by the CPB. The current CPB chairman, Thakin Ba Thein Tin denounced Chinese interference. He expressed that the CPB had no desire to become revisionists like the CCP, saying that “this is the same as in 1981, 1985 and 1988.”

CPB leaders continued to visit China often well into the early 1990s, and were always provided transportation, like limousines, as soon as they stepped into the Chinese border. On March 12, 1989, the ethnic Chinese belonging to the CPB KoKang units openly rebelled, and within a month, the CPB collapsed. About 300 former CPB leaders found shelter in China. Many of them retired to Kunming, gradually passing away in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Some younger former CPB cadres started small business as traders in Tengchong, Ruili and other towns along the border.

Compared with the communist opium economy of the CPB controlled area in Burma, the indigenous people in the Yunnan borderlands engaged in another type of communist economy. From the 1950s to the 1980s, state farms along the Sino-Burmese, Sino-Lao, and Sino-Vietnamese border absorbed local peasants and private capital into a semi-isolated and militarized entity dominated by the state political economy. The local economy began to yield to the general needs of China’s domestic plan of economic development, potential world wars, and Cold War policies.

---

The PRC’s engagement in the Korea War and its urgent needs for rubber supplies led to systematically rubber tree cultivation in the Yunnan borderlands. From early 1950s to mid-1980s, rubber tree cultivation represented China’s self-sufficient response to the U.S embargo on China. During this time period, state farms became the centers for cultivation and technological support. At the same time, cooperation between China and the Soviet Union boosted rubber cultivation in China and further satisfied the Soviet Union’s hunger for rubber. In Xishuangbanna, the first large-scale state farm was established in Mengzhe and Menghai in 1955. From then on, one main purpose of the state farm system was to build the second rubber cultivation center in China. Around 1984 to 1985, private companies and peasants were allowed to separate from the state farm system and to establish their own plantations. Private rubber tree plantations boomed because of the tremendous profits they yielded. Today, rubber tree farmers are exhausting all the available lands to build more plantations.

In the past 20 years, alleviating poverty has been the top priority for the local government, state farms and the peasants in the Yunnan borderlands. With an increasing need from the “bottomless” Chinese market and advanced technology, rubber cultivation provided the fastest way for both government and peasants to quickly get out of poverty. Farmers, private companies, state farms and government actively participated in the “white gold rush”, destroying the original local landscape and vegetation in the process.

---

From 1950s to 1970s, overly deforestation and hunting came as the result in the dramatic increase of the state farm population and their needs for food, housing and etc. From 1971 to 1972, Judith Shapiro personally witnessed the disappearance of more than forty springs in Jinnuo. Rubber trees are like water pumps that suck a huge amount of water and moisture each day. Over decades, rubber tree cultivation has gradually taken away the moisture of Xishuangbanna. The weather has been getting hotter each year. The dry season is getting longer. We are expecting less rains each year.” Big, firm bamboo stalks that were used for building homes are difficult to find now because all the land where bamboo used to grow has been turned into rubber tree plantations. In Menglun Town, the Dai people had to gradually give up the habit of collecting and cooking mushrooms and wild vegetables because of the disappearing rainforests. Villagers in the Chengzi Village even cleared the original rainforest for rubber tree cultivation in the sacred White Elephant Mountain where logging and farming was forbidden for centuries. At the same time, many also stopped growing kassod trees for firewood, not only because of the widespread use of electronic appliances but also because rubber trees have already taken every possible piece of land for cultivation.

With the introduction of the PRC political economy, the Yunnan borderlands became separated from the adjacent Southeast Asian countries, and was turned into a remote cash crop cultivation base for China. The relatively better-off life on the China side of the border does suggest the success of China’s economic policies to certain degree,

190 Judith Shapiro, Mao’s War against Nature: Politics and Environment in Revolutionary China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 182.
191 Li Xiaoxiao 李晓: Conversation with Li Xiaoxiao (Xishuangbanna, Yunnan, China: 06/21/2012).
192 Zhang Yue and He Ming 张跃, 何明, Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzu Nongcun 30 Nian Bianqian, Shang 中国少数民族农村三十年变迁, 上 [Thirty years of transformation of the ethnic villages in China, Vol.1.](Beijing, minzu chubanshe, 2009), 187, 206.
if all the setbacks before the late 1980s are not taken into account. However, the progress speaks more to stagnant economic development on the mainland Southeast Asian side, caused by constant social turmoil throughout recent years. Even at the end of the 20th century, the border people were still fighting and seeking opportunities for cross border trade, trying to improve their financial status.

Landmines: Another Type of Trauma that We Don’t Mention

From the 1980s, when the indigenous population on both side tried to resume the trade and regular communication between Yunnan and its neighboring countries, the greatest challenge came from the physical destruction in the borderlands. This includes the threat of the landmines, a subject that is often neglected by both the Chinese civilians as well as most of scholars.

During the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, China and Vietnam laid more than one million landmines along the major routes between China and Vietnam. The landmine zone in Wenshan Prefecture extended for 438 kilometers and covered fifteen townships as well as 142 villages. More than 5,000 mu fields were deserted because of the threat of landmines. The regular connections that the border people used to have for generations were cut off. 193 Over the years, the wars as well as the landmines explosion have killed 1,683, disabled 1,274 and injured 1,418 people. 194

Over the years, many local civilians in Yunnan and Guangxi lost their legs and lives when they crossed the border to trade with the Vietnamese. For example, the landmine zone in the Tianpeng Town of the Funing County used to be the main passage for people to travel between Tianpeng and Binh Tay Market. A large number of landmines, including anti-tank mines, were buried, which essentially hindered development of this potentially most important outpost of the trans-national trade between Yunnan and Vietnam. The Balihe village is separated from Vietnam by the Dongshan Mountain, which was one of the most important battle sites during the Sino-Vietnamese War. There are fifty-four families in the Balihe village, and more than 100 people have lost at least one leg in landmine accidents. That is one leg per family.

From April 1993 to September 1994, the central Chinese government and its military committee organized the first large scale landmine elimination campaign. The military and more than 8,287 local workers swept through 200 square kilometers area and cleared 83,643 unexploded ordnance (UXO), 27,661 bullets, 13,996 fuses, as well as
more than 1,000 caltrops. Later, they blocked off around 145 square kilometers land with wood and concrete bars as well as barbed wires. Following this operation, in 1993, the total foreign trade value of this area increased 63% compared with 1992, achieving a trade surplus for the first time.200

However, these landmarks for the landmine zones were gradually removed or relocated by floods as well as landslides that are common to the mountainous terrain. The landmine accidents began to increase again. From the rainy season of 1995 to 1997, 489 accidents occurred, injuring and killing hundreds of cattle as well as 139 people. The terror caused by landmines was again gripping the border.201 From January, 1997 to June 1999, a second landmine elimination campaign was organized, involving more than 500 troops from the provincial army as well as the village cadres and militias near the landmine zones. Government demining teams swept through around 92.1 square

---

198 A caltrop is a large iron or steel nail that has four points especially designed to penetrate the horse hooves and vehicle tires. Zhou Yanxian (周亚贤), “Zai Wenshan Zhou Bianjing Sao Lei Jieshu Zuotanhu shang de Jianghua” in 文山州边境扫雷结束座谈会上的讲话 [The talk given on the concluding meeting of the demining operation in the border of the Wenshan Prefecture], 07/07/1994, in Wenshan Zhou Sao Lei Bangongshi Dang’an Juanzong 34-1-4 (文山州扫雷办公室档案卷宗,34-1-4) [the archival documents of the demining office of the Wenshan Prefecture,34-1-4] (Wenshan: Wenshan Zhou Dang’an Guan, 02/1994-12/1994), 3-4.


kilometers area and blockaded close to 55 square kilometers of land. The local villagers were compensated with 670,000 yuan.\textsuperscript{202}

In fact, China has planted an estimated ten million mines along its borders with Russia, India, and Vietnam over the years. At the same time, China declared that it was “not a country seriously affected by (land) mines.”\textsuperscript{203} By the late 1990s, only 60\% of the mines were cleared along the Sino-Vietnamese border by the government. After the last campaign, signs and concrete walls were built to stop civilians entering into the landmine zones. According to government officials from the Malipo County government, the government has blockaded the mountains and discouraged civilians from wildcat demining, meaning to clear the mines themselves. The government is planning to close the landmine zones for several more decades until the land mines expire. Until then, professionals will be hired for demining. Currently, the state government does not provide any compensation for those who were injured by landmine accidents. The provincial government set aside around 2.5 million yuan each year, and gives 2,600 yuan per disability compensation to villagers.\textsuperscript{204}


Ultimately, some local civilians took the responsibility to clear landmines instead of passively waiting for the government’s actions. Volunteers from the Balihe village near the border began to detect and clear landmines twenty years ago. By 2013, Wang Kaixue, Wang Kaifu and three men from the Balihe Village in Malipo County of Wenshan Prefecture had already cleared up more than 20,000 landmines on China’s side, and turned hundreds of mu of landmine zones into productive farming lands. 205

Nevertheless, it would to too arbitrary to argue that the landmine zones between the Sino-Vietnamese border have completely cut off the connection between the two sides. Over the years, border people have figured out numerous paths to cut through the landmine zones. These routes provide convenience for local bilateral communications, as well as cross-border smuggling and human trafficking.

In fact, China gradually loosened its control on the cross border trade in the 1990s, allowing small scale border markets to flourish. Recently, China actively promoted the economic integration of Yunnan and mainland Southeast Asia and initiated several regional projects such as gas pipelines that connect Yunnan to Burma and the Trans-Asian Raiway (TAR). China’s private capital also flowed into Vietnam, Laos, and Burma for building rubber tree farms as a substitute of opium poppy cultivation. And yet, the majority of the border people were not the direct beneficiaries of the state policies promoting foreign trade as well as regional cooperation. Their daily consumption on foreign commodities, the same as for many other Chinese people, is still affected by China’s strict tariffs and high taxation. Driven by the large needs of China’s domestic

---

market and profit, smuggling has been very common. But the most cunning smugglers were those who walked across the landmine zones between the Sino-Vietnamese border.

In June, 2014, a joint mission named LS06 that involved customs agents from Shenzhen, Xiamen, Jinan, Zhengzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Nanning, Chengdu, Kunming and Urumqi cracked an electronic devices smuggling network through the landmine zones along the Sino-Vietnamese border. The smuggling network avoided the traditional routes through Shenzhen, and developed a seemingly high risk but safe route using their experience and familiarity with the landmine zones.

Map. 4. Smuggling Routes via the Landmine Zones in Yunnan, by Zhang Dingping, Jinbao.  

---

This revival of legitimate border trade and smuggling echoes earlier periods, but it is only a fraction of the vibrant trans-border economies of the Qing and Republican periods, when the Western colonial forces dedicated to incorporating the trading empire of the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia into the global market. The PRC and modern national borders destroyed many of the old ties that bonded China with Southeast Asia and South Asia, placing a political boundary across a vast transnational trading empire. Recently, China strives to revitalize Yunnan’s nature as the transnational corridor and promote regional economic cooperation. In the early 21st century, China began to actively lead the economic integrations between Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia.

In August 2014, China and Thailand reached an agreement to initiate the construction of the railways that connect Yunnan and Thailand in 2015, as a part of the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR). The TAR starts at Kunming, and is supposed to split into three routes in Yunnan. These three routes will connect some major cities in Yunnan, such as Kunming, Yuxi, Dali, Mengzi, Jinghong, and Hekou to the major cities in Burma, Laos, and Vietnam, and eventually merge in Bangkok, Thailand. After that, the TAR will proceed to Singapore via Malaysia. The total budget worth 143 billion yuan would be split by the China and Thailand. However, the Chinese side is responsible for the construction, providing all the technicians, mechanics, as well as equipment. It is highly

---

possible that China would request Thailand to trade all the technological support that China provides with its rice.  

Map.5. Trans-Asian Railway by Wang Chuncai, Jinghua Shibao.  


On the other hand, the construction of the railway between Kunming to Kyaukpyu, Burma, as a part of the TAR, was suspended in July, 2014. This was largely resulted by the objection from the Burmese civilians, as well as the Burmese government’s lack of interests at the surface level. 210

Currently, it seems difficult for China’s Southeast Asian neighbors to accept its offers of economic integration without hesitation because of their fear and distrust towards China’s power. The borders between China and adjacent countries are more defined than ever before, marking the boundaries of national security for both sides better than demarcating any ideological or political order.

CHAPTER 5 FROM A MULTICULTURAL LAND TO A REMOTE SOCIALIST FRONTIER

As militarized and pro-trade people, the indigenous communities in the Yunnan borderlands did not deliberately focus on the development of education, particularly as a way for upward social mobility in ways that fit into the traditional Chinese perception of education. Generally speaking, by the late 19th century, the Buddhist, Muslim and Christian communities possessed relatively advanced educational systems while the Confucian communities of Chinese upheld education as the main approach for political participation. The Chinese government attempted to civilize the barbarians by establishing Chinese public schools and norms in the frontier area, but it failed to penetrate and change the indigenous society, rooted in cultural and political localism.

This makeup of the educational systems did not change too much during the Republican era, although standard curriculum that stressed personal development as well as citizen education appeared in Chinese public schools. And a result, generally, the development of a public educational system allowed the co-existence of alternate educational approaches that fostered the soil for multi-culturalism.

The context of the Chinese civilizing mission in the Yunnan borderlands changed after 1950 when the CCP arrived as the new leader. Representing an alien culture and norms, as did the Mongolian as well as Manchu, the CCP initially intended to transform the frontier by Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong’s Marxist theories. However, even the CCP itself did not have a clear vision of its long-term goals for educational reform in the context of socialist nation building.
The CCP failed to anticipate the practical problems caused by its new policies, and, at the same time, also failed to anticipate the social and cultural disconnect caused by the dramatic transformation of education and the tightening of state ideological controls. Moreover, the CCP leadership simplified educational reform, equating it with ideological education and propaganda, and thus significantly degraded the status of education in the society. The CCP leadership was itself confused and constantly plagued by factional conflicts, which contaminated the educational sector and triggered nationwide confrontations and confusion.

The Soil for Multi-culturalism

The education in the Yunnan borderlands varied significantly because of the different cultural and religious traditions represented in indigenous societies, including animist, Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and Confucian communities. Generally, the animist sphere overlapped with the Buddhist as well as Confucian sphere. The Muslim sphere adopted certain educational approaches from the Confucian sphere. The Christian sphere remained relatively independent. Education was provided in different ways, and thus bore different purposes and outcomes in the distinct spheres. The existence of the Confucius sphere did not suggest that Chinese education became the overarching force that shaped the cultural landscape of the Yunnan borderlands.

Informal education provided most indigenous people with the basic knowledge and living skills, such as farming, hunting, tool making, and house building.¹ The youngsters were usually homeschooled by parents and seniors or taught in the fields.

¹Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 376.
orchards, and hunting sites for an early age. Bai boys started their apprenticeship at eight years old. The Lisu boys followed their fathers for group hunts, where they learned how to distinguish beasts according to their footprints and feces, and also how to track and hunt them with dogs. After a period of training, Lisu boys received small hunting tools that were customized for them, like jute nets, bows and arrows, and crossbows, allowed them to catch birds, rabbits and other small animals in the fields and woods near their homes. In addition, Lisu boys were given small plows so that they could practice plowing with dogs. During the time that the whole family gathered together, parents and seniors also passed on the knowledge of their own history, moral judgment and ethics to the younger generation in the form of conversations, storytelling, and art. Myths and stories of the creation, big flood, migration, romantic love as well as people’s interaction with the environment were very common in indigenous parables, songs, dances, and dramas.

Indigenous people also developed special skills according to their specific needs and cultural characteristics. For example, martial arts were very popular in the highly militarized Dai and Jingpo communities. The Dai martial arts had around a hundred

---

2 Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 280-281.
3 Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 226.
4 Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 279.
5 Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 280.
6 Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 347-348, 425, 452, 519-520.
routines. Martial arts and sword contests were quite common in the Dai communities.  

The Jingpo people also frequently held hunting, shooting, martial arts, as well as other forms of athlete competitions so as to test and challenge both young men and young women’s skills and strength. 

Relatively formal education came from religious activities and institutions, such as the Buddhist Temple and Muslim Mosque, the content and intensity of which varied due to specific religious beliefs and cultural traditions. Education received in the religious institutions was usually elite education, aiming at the preservation of indigenous history and tradition, as well as the facilitation of social mobility and political participation.

Generally, almost all the frontier settlers had the tradition of ancestor worship, regardless of their religious inclinations. At the same time, animism co-existed within the Buddhist as well as Confucian communities. Thus, ancestor worship as well as animist rituals and ceremonies were a common part of what children learned about their beliefs, history, societal laws and regulations. For example, the Lisu priests, wizards, and singers often chanted the doctrines of their animist belief as well as the mythical origin of their tribal history. 

---

7Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), *Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi* 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 186.
9Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), *Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi* 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 281.
religious activities. Over the years, they mastered the procedures and the vocabulary needed to conduct all kinds of ceremonies, setting an example for their own children.\textsuperscript{10}

Among all the religious institutions outside of the Confucian sphere, Buddhist monasteries provided the most formal education in the Yunnan borderlands during the second millennium. The tradition for young men to spend a significant amount of their early life in the temples in order to become literate and educated began no later than the 10\textsuperscript{th} century. In the Buddhist communities, temple schools often co-existed with informal educational institutions, aiming at elite education. By the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century, the most consistent, systematic and wide-spread educational opportunities were still found in the Buddhist temples. In the plains of Xishuangbanna, whoever failed to dwell in the Buddhist temple for education was considered as “Ai-li”, meaning a stranger who was not civilized, and was often despised by others.\textsuperscript{11} The Dai people’s discrimination towards the Hani people was a demonstration of their superiority generated from regular Buddhist monastery education.

The Dai men usually followed two steps to become a monk: first, they needed to serve as an apprentice in the temple. In Xishuangbanna, they were called Ke-yong. Ke-yong boys began to attend classes at a local Buddhist temple without residency at the age of seven to eight. In Dehong, apprentices in the temple were called Jiabei, meaning those who were not shaved. They were usually about ten years old. Apprenticeship served as the kindergarten education so as to prepare young boys for the Dai language skills and

\textsuperscript{10}Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), \textit{Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi} 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 430.

\textsuperscript{11}Zheng Peng and Yang Shunning (征鹏, 杨胜能), \textit{Xishuangbanna Fengqing Yiqu Lu (Di San Ban)} 西双版纳风情奇趣录 (第三版) [The exotic culture and customs in Xishuangbanna, 3rd edition] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 190.
the basic Buddhist knowledge that they needed in order to start official schooling in the temples.\textsuperscript{12} Second, when the time was ready, their heads would be shaved, and they would dress up in yellow and become official monks with a particular home-leaving ceremony. New monks were usually called Panan, meaning young monks. As their age and knowledge grew, they moved closer to the medium level of the sangha ranks.\textsuperscript{13} Usually, not many young men would desire to be dedicated enough to spend their whole lifetime in the Buddhist temple, so the majority chose to return to secular life as grown men. Higher ranking sangha were Buddhist scriptionians, who were rarely found in the community. At the same time, strict selection procedures kept their population small. The legitimacy of higher ranking sangha as well as the selecting procedure had to be sanctioned by the local secular authorities.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, it is clear that Buddhist temples produced both professional and temporary sangha, a pool of social elites who further stabilized the religious as well as secular authority. In the indigenous society, especially in areas where Buddhism reigned and was interdependent with the secular authority, religious leaders usually were kin of secular leaders. And some of the secular leaders even acted in the position of religious leaders. Buddhist monastic education thus maintained a decent size of sangha monks who were loyal to both the religious and secular authorities. Also it provided the platform for future

\textsuperscript{12} In Western Yunnan, Dai and De’ang boys sometimes did not go to monastery school until ten. See Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), \textit{Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi} 漕西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 55,184. Zheng Peng and Yang Shunning (征鹏, 杨胜能), \textit{Xishuangbanna Fengqing Yiqu Lu (Di San Ban)} 西双版纳风情奇趣录 (第三版) [The exotic culture and customs in Xishuangbanna, 3rd edition] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 190.

\textsuperscript{13} Zheng Peng and Yang Shengneng (征鹏, 杨胜能), \textit{Xishuangbanna Fengqing Yiqu Lu (Di San Ban)} 西双版纳风情奇趣录 (第三版) [The exotic culture and customs in Xishuangbanna, 3rd edition] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 190-191.

\textsuperscript{14} Zheng Peng and Yang Shengneng (征鹏, 杨胜能), \textit{Xishuangbanna Fengqing Yiqu Lu (Di San Ban)} 西双版纳风情奇趣录 (第三版) [The exotic culture and customs in Xishuangbanna, 3rd edition] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 191.
religious and secular leaders to develop and cultivate connections with current authorities when they were still on the preparatory stage of their life.

Moreover, monastic education opened the channel for the upward movement of Dai commoners, and even a small number of non-Dai converts. In Xishuangbanna and Dehong, smaller ethnic groups such as the Bulang people and De’ang people, who cohabitated with the Dai, often followed the Dai norms of education, learning the Buddhist classics as well as the Dai language. In the 16th century, when Buddhism was introduced into Luxi in western Yunnan, Buddhist monastic education became standard not only for the Dai people but also for the De’ang people. Besides the Dai language, Pali script, and Buddhist scriptures, they would learn about medicine and herbs, skills like paper cutting, drawing and divination, as well as rituals for marriage, funeral and other occasions. Education in the Buddhist temple enabled the Bulang people to get involved in the Dai dominant society and climb up on the social ladder in their communities. It was rare, at least before the 1950s, to find an adult man who had never spent time in the Buddhist temple in his youth.

Another outreach aspect was the mass education the educated male elites were able to bring to the commoners, including women, who had no other opportunities for formal education. Those who were once temporary sangha returned to the religious and

---

16 Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 55,184.
secular social network, bringing with them Buddhist knowledge, a sense of loyalty towards the authorities, and also the opportunities of literacy.

The Dai language was based on the ancient Pali script, the main written language of the Theravada Buddhist scriptures. There are four major dialects of the Dai languages adopted by the Dai people in the Yunnan borderlands: the Dai-Le, Dai-Na, Dai-Beng and Dai-Duan (or Jinping-Dai). The Dai-Le is the classic Dai language and popular in Xishuangbanna, which was also used in the Chiangmai area in Thailand, Kengtun in Burma, and Laos as well. Dai-Na language was possibly created somewhere during the 14th century, by the end of the century, it had become an official language adopted by the Sangha as well as indigenous nobles in western Yunnan.

When monks returned to secular life, some of them became clerks in the village, while others, teachers for the commoners. Uneducated young people usually liked to set aside three months in summer each year to learn the language. Three months was considered as the time needed to become a rudimentary reader in the Dai language. Students would learn vowels, consonants, syllables, and spelling rules so they could gather together and begin to read simple Buddhist scriptures as well as songs and drama scripts. In Longchuan, each student brought the teacher a few baskets of grain for tuition. Such learning methods had functioned for more than 500 years and remained as

---

20 Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 潞西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 55,184.
21 Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 潞西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 55,184.
one of the most important ways for the Dai culture and traditions to be passed on, sustaining a literacy rate of around 10%-20%.  

In western Yunnan, by the early 1950s, there were 140 Buddhist monastery schools in Luxi County, which provided education for 11% of the Dai intellectuals. In Longchuan, 102 Buddhist temples were in full service. These Buddhist schools disappeared in the 1950s, and did not reappear until the 1980s. In southern Yunnan, 183 Buddhist temples were still found just in 230 villages in Xishuangbanna in 1955.

Muslim mosque schools appeared around the late 18th century during the Qianlong era (1735-1796). They were the only non-Chinese institutions what would offer Chinese language classes. The major reason for this was that the Muslims, as migrants from inner China, had higher level of involvement in the Chinese domestic politics as well as the civil service examination. During the Qianlong rule, Muslim scholar Ma Dexin (1794-1874) from Dali incorporated the practice of Chinese private schools in Islamic institutions and organized the Muslim mosque schools.

The Muslims in Baoshan of western Yunnan organized a Chinese-Arabian school at the local mosque in Changning, teaching both Chinese and basic Arabic to a limited number of students.  

---

23Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 43-44.
24Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 55.
25Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County, 2000], 23.
26Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 55.
28Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 308.
number students. More young people were able to learn Arabic, and some of them were selected to study in the schools in Weishan. In Xinping of southern Yunnan, the Mosque school was opened in 1913. In 1942, the Mosque school was put under the direction of the Xinping County Educational Bureau, and shared the same curriculum with other regular Chinese public schools. The only difference was that while all the public schools were off in the afternoon, the students at the Muslim school stayed to learn Arabic and scriptures.

Christian church schools appeared in the late 19th century when the missionaries arrived in mountainous areas that were considered too remote to be settled by the Chinese. They lived among the indigenous people, learning their languages and then developing written language systems such as the Lahu, Jingpo and Lisu languages. These newly developed written languages became very popular among the indigenous elites, and later became formal languages for the local church schools as well as worship services.

In Shuangjiang of Southern Yunnan, the Lahu people, Yi people, and Wa people were the major groups who used Lahu language to receive Christian education before the first indigenous Chinese teacher began to practice in 1927. The Lahu people’s multi-gods religious system included Mahayana Buddhist elements, and Taoist and animist

---

29 Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 308.

30 Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 308.


32 Xiang Guangli (项光丽), Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang Zu Zizhi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 双江拉祜族佤族布朗族傣族自治县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan Jiaoyu Xueyuan yinshuachang, 2000), 209.
ingredients as well. In the 1920s, many of them converted to Christianity and began to learn the Lahu languages that had been recently introduced by an American missionary who arrived in 1905. The Yi people in the same area were Buddhist believers before the Jiaqing era (1796-1820). Towards the late Qing era, they converted to Christianity and studied the Holy Bible in Lahu language. From the 1920s to 1940s, the Yi people were forced to attend public schools, but only a few of them mastered Chinese by 1947. The Wa people in Shuangjiang were converted to Buddhism during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Some of them became Christians during the Republican era and also began to study the *Holy Bible* in Lahu language.

In western Yunnan, the protestant church began to thrive in Luxi in the 1890s and chapels were raised in more than ten towns and villages. A Baptist church missionary from America named Ola Hanson (1864-1929) arrived in the Kachin area of upper Burma about this time and formulated a local Kachin written language based on the Jingpo language system. In the late 1890s, missionaries also formulated the Lisu

---

33 Xiang Guangli (项光丽), *Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang Zu Zizhi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi* 双江拉祜族佤族布朗族傣族自治县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan Jiaoyu Xueyuan yinshuachang, 2000), 194, 206.
35 Xiang Guangli (项光丽), *Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang Zu Zizhi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi* 双江拉祜族佤族布朗族傣族自治县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan Jiaoyu Xueyuan yinshuachang, 2000), 207.
36 Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), *Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi* 满西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 185.
written language in the Muchengpo area of Luxi and opened more than four church
schools among the Lisu settlements.38

The newly introduced Jingpo language was frequently used by the missionaries to
proselytize, and also for the literacy classes. 39 This new language became very popular
among the Christian converts and the Jingpo nobles in the late 19th century. 40 In the
beginning of the 20th century, the first copy of the New Testament and a hymn book in the
Jingpo language came into being.41 At the same time, both Protestant and Catholic
churches began to build more schools in Jingbo and Lisu settlements in Huwa, Nongxian,
Bangwan, Gongshan, Lubao, Gaoli and Shibe. 42 On the other hand, Chinese was spoken
only by a few indigenous nobles, 43 and Chinese public schools were not established
until a few decades later. The government’s effort in developing education in Longchuan
was interrupted by a lack of teachers and funding. 44 By 1937 there were only five public
schools for the 319 students in Longchuan and adjacent area. The student’s number kept
decreasing in the following decades because of war.45

38Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 潞西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 1, 185.
39Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 潞西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 57.
40Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 潞西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 185.
41Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 潞西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 57.
42Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 陇川县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 44.
43Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 潞西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 185.
The missionaries’ effort to proselytize and build schools was not stopped by low attendance or war. Two more church schools were built in the Jingbo and Lisu settlement in the 1930s, with around forty students in their classrooms. \textsuperscript{46} For example, in 1937, a missionary with a Chinese name of An Shipu built a chapel in Mushui for church as well as school, converting over ten people and enrolling more than ten Jingo children. An Shipu’s effort persisted until he and his families were captured by the Japanese army and sent to Wanding in 1942. \textsuperscript{47} At the same year, most schools were closed because of the Japanese invasion. In 1945, only five schools were still providing classes for around 100 students. After two years’ recovery period, the school number in Longchuan reached twenty-four in 1947, admitting 666 students. \textsuperscript{48} In the year of 1946 and 1947, missionaries from Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic Church resumed their work in Longchuan and remained active in the 1950s. \textsuperscript{49}

Christian church schools in Luxi became the main platforms for the indigenous people to gain education and became literate before the public schools proliferated. \textsuperscript{50} By the 1950s, many Lisu people who were over 50 years old could read and write, and even teach the Lisu language. Blackboards could be found in every house, with parents

\textsuperscript{46}Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 24.
\textsuperscript{47}Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 44.
\textsuperscript{48}Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 24.
\textsuperscript{49}Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 45.
\textsuperscript{50} Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 滇西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 180.
responsible for teaching their own children. On the other hand, those Lisu people who were proficient in Chinese were extremely rare to find.  

Christian church schools’ curriculum also brought a new scope for the indigenous education. In 1932, the Manyun Christian Church in Xishuangbanna administered by missionaries from the U.S opened an elementary school that provided Chinese language, Dai language, English language, math, and medical classes. The Mingdao-Yuan Christian Church founded by American missionaries in the mountains in Luxi provided a four-year education for the indigenous people. Both English and Chinese were taught. Besides that, students could also take abacus, music, morality and ethics, PE, art and other classes. This new school even attracted the Native Officer of Zhefang to send his sons and nephews for school. The Gongshan Church School in Longchuan used the Holy Bible as the main text book. But students were also taught Jingpo language, Burmese, English and Chinese. For the second and third graders, geography, history, music, PE and art classes were part of the curriculum. Outside of the church schools, those indigenous people who were converted were taught to stay away from Ghost worship, stealing, prostitution, and gambling. Besides that, the hygiene situation among the converts was significantly improved.

51 Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), *Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi* [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 185.
Besides religious educational institutions, Chinese private schools flourished as Chinese migrant workers moved into southern Yunnan to work on the tea plantations and mines. In Longchuan, schools run by Chinese migrants were concentrated in the Chinese settlements. Some schools that taught in both Chinese and Dai languages were even established before the 16th century. During the Qing dynasty, these private schools were mostly occupied by Han children and it was rare to find indigenous children. Some private Chinese schools in Tengyue not only taught Confucian classics but also calligraphy, writing, and abacus. Chinese schools were also found among the Chinese settlements in the mountains. In Luxi, each Chinese school provided education for forty to fifty families on an average basis by the late Qing era. In Xishuangbanna, Chinese and Confucianism based private schools were founded after 1892 in Yibang and Yiwu after a big influx of Chinese migrants who arrived for tea business. By 1902, six private schools were found in Xiangming, Yiwu, Mengla, Laojie, Jiumiao, and other areas, although they were turned into public schools after 1910.

Another form of the private Chinese schools were operated by the Native Officers and indigenous nobles, with the purpose of learning Chinese so as to facilitate communication with the Chinese authorities. These schools appeared during the Ming

---

58 Li Cunzhong (李存忠), Tengchong Xian Jiaoyu Zhi (Neibu Faxing) 腾冲县教育志 (内部发行) [The gazetteer of the education of Tengchong County (internal circulation)] (Tengchong: Tengchong Xian Jiaoyuju, 1990), 44.
59 Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 潞西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 56-57.
dynasty and became very common during the Qing and Republican China era. Native Officers often hired Chinese teachers and set aside a room or two in their own residence for such a school. These schools only admitted children of the Native Officer as well as indigenous nobles, and occasionally, other Chinese children. In these classrooms, both Chinese language and Dai language were taught, and yet most of the text books were based on Confucian classics. 61

By the late Qing era, the Yunnan borderlands demonstrated a dynamic cultural landscape sustained by its educational diversity. On one hand, in terms of individual spheres, the dominant religious or cultural institutions provided the main educational platforms as well as the standards of moral and value judgment while allowing the existence of practices from other spheres. Both the Dai communities and the Muslim communities demonstrated this pattern by accommodating Chinese approaches. In this case, the individual religious and cultural sphere appeared to host a certain cultural pluralism in which the dominant cultural norms co-existed with those of various other cultures. This structure sustained stability and assured inheritance of particular indigenous cultures and social structures.

The Chinese Civilizing Mission

Government public schools, were also called Confucius Temple schools. Compared with the Chinese private schools that the Chinese migrants sporadically built in their settlements, public schools stood as the symbols of the expansion of Chinese power and its aim to transform the culture and traditions of the frontier in conformity

---

with Chinese norms. Besides preparing students for the Civil Service Examination, public schools had another distinct mission, which was to civilize and educate the indigenous population. During the Republican China era, besides the pedagogy of Confucian norms and ethics, a standardized curriculum as well as citizen education were introduced as new elements in the public schools. However, the Chinese Civilizing Mission had little success until the establishment of the PRC. During the PRC era, intensive language training, standardized curriculum based on the Marxist ideology, the overall dominance of public schools, and indoctrination of patriotism as well as state selected values pushed the indigenous value-based educational system off the horizon.

The expansion of Chinese colonial power brought Chinese public schools to the western Yunnan borderlands as early as the second century BC. However, these schools soon perished as indigenous powers rose and expelled China’s authority. It was not until the Ming dynasty that they began to thrive again. During the mid-Qing era, as the *gaitu guiliu* policy was hastened in the Yunnan borderlands, the government opened Yixue School, particularly for common indigenous children. Northeastern Yunnan initially saw the founding of sixty-one Yixue schools. The purpose of opening Yixue was to civilize the “barbarians”. Indigenous children were required to go to school and study with the Chinese children for six years. The school curriculum was based on the Confucian

---

62 From the late 14th century to the late 19th century, four Confucius Temple schools were established in the Baoshan County. All of them were destroyed during the Panthay Rebellion, and rebuilt at a later time. See Du Shaomei and Wang Xinmin (杜少美, 王新民), *Baoshan Diqu Jiaoyu Zhi* [The Gazetteer of the Education of the Baoshan District] (Kunming: Yunnan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1994), 33-36.

classics. Yixue forced out those who made no accomplishments and selected new candidates to fill the vacancies. Outstanding students, on the other hand, were assigned to teach indigenous children outside of school as part of a selection process. 64

The situation in southern Yunnan was nothing compared to western Yunnan. The earliest public school did not appear until 1729 in Pu’er when the gaitu guiliu policy was initiated. The candidates had to pass a strict examination in order to enroll. 65 In 1737, Yixue began to appear in southern Yunnan. The indigenous officers in Yibang (one of the oldest tea centers), Jinghong and Mengzhe provided funding and organized three Yixue schools. However, in the year of 1788, these three schools were closed down, largely because of the shortage of both teachers and students.66 By 1746, over 700 Yixue were established throughout Yunnan. 67 By the late Qing era, more than 100 Yixue schools were fully in function in Southern Yunnan.68

As the indigenous youth enrolled in public schools and received Confucian educations, the path for moving higher and participating in Chinese domestic politics seemed to have opened for the indigenous people. However, few could take advantage of

---

64Pan Xianlin and Pan Xianyin (潘先林, 潘先银), “Gaitu Guiliu yilai Dian Chuan Qian Jiaojie Diqu Yi Zu Shehui de Fazhan Bianhua” 改土归流以来滇川黔交界地区彝族社会的发展变化 [The transformation of the Yi People’s communities in the intersectional area of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou since the gaitu guiliu], in Yunnan minzu xueyuan xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 云南民族学院学报 (哲学社会科学版) [Journal of Yunnan Nationalities University (Social Sciences Edition)] Vol. 4, (1997): 37-43.


67Pan Xianlin and Pan Xianyin (潘先林, 潘先银), “Gaitu Guiliu yilai Dian Chuan Qian Jiaojie Diqu Yi Zu Shehui de Fazhan Bianhua” 改土归流以来滇川黔交界地区彝族社会的发展变化 [The transformation of the Yi People’s communities in the intersectional area of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou since the gaitu guiliu], in Yunnan minzu xueyuan xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 云南民族学院学报 (哲学社会科学版) [Journal of Yunnan Nationalities University (Social Sciences Edition)] Vol. 4, (1997): 37-43.

such an opportunity in the frontier area. First of all, only a small portion of the indigenous
students performed well under the Chinese language and Confucian based education. The
Bai, Yi and Muslim students particularly had an advantage because of their long-term
involvement with Chinese authority and education. For example, the Yi and Bai people
who moved to Baoshan with the expansion of the Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms sent their
children to Chinese schools. Especially during the 19th and 20th century, Chinese public
schools thrived within the Bai settlements in Western Yunnan. 69

The Yi people, who dwelled along the area where Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan
intersected, actively engaged in civil service examinations and some gained access to the
Chinese bureaucracy. Moreover, Yi nobles usually liked to go to Chinese schools and
become government officials in order to improve their social status, perfectly
understanding that this meant acceptance of Chinese cultural norms. 70 During the
Republican China era, Yi poets and intellectuals appeared, and the number of those who
had participated in the civil service examination were too large to trace. 71

Second, the autonomy of the frontier area, separated from the centralized Chinese
political system, created disconnect between the social mobility of the Yunnan border
lands and that in China proper. As elaborated in the previous chapters, the independent

69 Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山
市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu
chubanshe, 2006), 226.
70 Pan Xianlin and Pan Xianyin (潘先林, 潘先银), “Gaitu Guiliu yilai Dian Chuan Qian Jiaojie Diqu Yi Zu
Shehui de Fazhan Bianhua” 改土归流以来滇川黔交界地区彝族社会的发展变化 [The transformation of
the Yi People’s communities in the intersectional area of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou since the gaitu
guiliu], in Yunnan minzu xueyuan xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 云南民族学院学报 (哲学社会科学
71 Pan Xianlin and Pan Xianyin (潘先林, 潘先银), “Gaitu Guiliu yilai Dian Chuan Qian Jiaojie Diqu Yi Zu
Shehui de Fazhan Bianhua” 改土归流以来滇川黔交界地区彝族社会的发展变化 [The transformation of
the Yi People’s communities in the intersectional area of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou since the gaitu
guiliu], in Yunnan minzu xueyuan xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 云南民族学院学报 (哲学社会科学
roots of indigenous power and authority made it relatively less appealing and even less meaningful for the indigenous elites to pass beyond local politics and interact with the core of Chinese authority emanating from Beijing. There was little incentive for the bulk of indigenous elites to try to succeed within the Chinese educational system. Nevertheless, Yixue successfully taught the indigenous elites the advantages as well as disadvantages of reconciling with Chinese authority. Overtime, many indigenous elites aligned themselves with Chinese authority and even participated in military operations to pacify other indigenous rebellions.72

Educational reform in the Yunnan borderlands sped up after the establishment of Republican China. The expansion of public schools had a new goal: to train and cultivate indigenous people as modern citizens of the Chinese nation. However, these efforts largely failed, for public schools failed, because of strong localism and the dominance of indigenous education and, at the same time these effort were often interrupted by frequent wars and social disturbances.

The public school system became more formal and expanded faster in the 1920s, and yet often failed for the lack of students.73 In 1927, all the private schools in Xishuangbanna were replaced by the public schools promoted by the Republican

---


government. In 1930, the Chinese educational system received the support from the Dai indigenous leaders of Xishuangbanna and began to grow. In 1931, the provincial government of Yunnan promoted the Periphery Education program (边地教育). Thus, Chinese language learning was urged even by indigenous leaders. Children at eight years old were required to go to school. Those who had already begun school in the Buddhist temples were asked to attend the Chinese language class held at the Zhuangdong Temple in Jinghong. In 1937, a private school operated by the Native Officers was combined with the Longchuan elementary school and administered directly by the educational department of the province. By 1941, sixteen elementary schools were functioning in Zhenyue; and by 1938, eight elementary schools, two short-term elementary schools, a provincial administered elementary school and a church elementary schools were found in Jinghong, enrolling 399 students all together.

As for higher level education, in 1935, the Jinglong Buddhist temple in Menghai hosted a short-term training program for teachers. A year later, this program was turned into an official rudimentary normal school that was overseen by the provincial government. Later, two more rudimentary normal schools were also established in Jinghong in 1936 and Zhenyue in 1941. Many of schools were suspended because of the

---

Japanese attacks that occurred in the spring of 1942; they resumed later. In 1944, the first middle school in Xishuangbanna was founded in Zhenyue. In 1946, the state Twelve-Xishuangbanna Middle School opened. Six elementary schools in Cheli and eight elementary schools in Nanqia and Fohai were also restored.\(^{78}\)

With the fast expansion of public schools, standard curriculum and citizen education were put onto the agenda. The effort to cultivate the awareness of “new citizens” of a modern nation began after the Xinhai Revolution. In 1912, the Nanjing government announced a new educational principle that stressed the balance of the ethical, intellectual, physical, and artistic cultivation of the students. Although the old texts were discarded, Confucian behavioral principles were still taught.

In Tengchong of western Yunnan, the principal of the Tengzhong County Middle school established the new school regulations that were based on the Educational Ministry’s blueprint. The fundamental goal for education was to educate and elevate elites for the society and country, towards high moral judgment, noble character, and pure personality.\(^{79}\) Each week students would gather in the classroom for a particular training session on the School Motif. The school motto emphasized honesty, self-independence, bravery, cleanliness, politeness, obedience, social ethics and strength, which more or less resembled the Educational Principles established by the late Qing court in 1906. In fact, each month there would be a day when the school principal and faculty members led the students in bowing to a Confucius tablet. After that, the principal would give a lecture or


\(^{79}\)Li Cunzhong (李存忠), *Tengchong Xian Jiaoyu Zhi (Neibu Faxing)* [The gazetteer of the education of Tengchong County (internal circulation)] (Tengchong: Tengchong Xian Jiaoyuju, 1990), 224.
a special moral training session based on the Confucian classics. At the end of each month, all the faculty members would have a meeting, discussing and improving approaches for moral education at school.  

In southern Yunnan, honesty, respect, filial piety, and the obedience to the school discipline became the basic behavior codes for elementary students. In 1929, the government declared that the Three Principles of the People should be the foundation on which education was based. The schools in Simao all produced a moral educational blueprint. The elementary school attached to the 4th Provincial Normal School in Simao implemented a series of ethical training exercises that stressed diligence, providence, moderation, and forgiveness. The training outcomes were designed to teach some traditional Confucian and Taoist values. Students were required to reflect on personal development as well as their roles at school, at home, in the communities, and in the country. The stress on indignity, independence, strong determination, harmonious relationships and personal cultivation was intended to produce a higher level of collective identity and good citizens of a modern country.

In Shuangjiang, students at advanced elementary schools began to take citizen lessons (the KMT Party Principle) in the 1930s. Every Monday morning, all the students, staff and faculty members would gather together, bow to the picture of Sun Yat-sen, and sing the national song. The school principal and faculty gave lectures on topics such as respect for teachers and seniors, love for parents, care for classmates, and love of country. At the same time, national holidays were also established to enhance the awareness of

80Li Cunzhong (李存忠), Tengchong Xian Jiaoyu Zhi (Neibu Faxing) 腾冲县教育志 (内部发行) [The gazetteer of the education of Tengchong County (internal circulation)] (Tengchong: Tengchong Xian Jiaoyuju, 1990), 225.

81Yuan Qingguang (袁庆光), Simao Diqu Jiaoyu Zhi 思茅地区教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Simao District] (Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe, 1993), 87-88.
citizenship and national unity. For example, on March 12th of each year, for the Memorial Day of Sun Yat-sen that was also Arbor Day, students were required to plant trees on school campus to fulfill their obligation to the country.\(^{82}\)

The Anti-Japanese War served as an opportunity to develop patriotism and nationalism among the new socialist civilians at the local level. During the Anti-Japanese War era, Boy Scout (Tongzi Jun) classes began to be popular in Shuangjiang. Students also learned to sing anti-Japanese songs. Individual responsibility and the survival of the country was indoctrinated into every student at school. \(^{83}\)

In Tengchong, all boys under fifteen were required to join the Boy Scouts and its training. For those who were sixteen and above, military training was required. A military training class was held once a week for three hours, included weapons and firearms, strategies, and tactics, as well as physical training.\(^{84}\) In Yiwu, Zhenyue elementary school became the center for patriot activities after 1939. Students participated in anti-Japanese parades, public presentations, and mobilization. \(^{85}\)

Standardized curriculum came relatively late, in 1936. It was difficult to initiate the common curriculum because of the lack of qualified teachers. According to the standard junior high school curriculum published in 1936 by the educational ministry, two middle schools in Xishuangbanna began to provide regular classes including citizen

---

\(^{82}\)Xiang Guangli (项光丽), \textit{Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang Zu Zizhi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi} 双江拉祜族佤族布朗族傣族自治县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan Jiaoyu Xueyuan Yinshuachang, 2000), 168.

\(^{83}\)Xiang Guangli (项光丽), \textit{Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang Zu Zizhi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi} 双江拉祜族佤族布朗族傣族自治县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan Jiaoyu Xueyuan Yinshuachang, 2000), 132.

\(^{84}\)Li Cunzhong (李存忠), \textit{Tengchong Xian Jiaoyu Zhi (Neibu Faxing)} 腾冲县教育志 (内部发行) [The gazetteer of the education of Tengchong County (internal circulation)] (Tengchong: Tengchong Xian Jiaoyuju, 1990), 225-228.

training, PE and scouts, national language, English, math, physiology, botany, zoology, chemistry, physics, history, geography, craft, art and music. But it was not until later that other parts of the Yunnan borderlands began to adopt the standardized curriculum. In 1944 the Zhenyue middle school started to follow the standard curriculum. However, because of the lack of teachers, only National language, math, English and Thai language classes were available by 1946.

**The Communist Civilizing Project**

Educational reform took a gradual and yet sharp turn in the 1950s after the establishment of the PRC. Beginning in the early 1950s, the indigenous people were identified as ethnic minorities, and given specific ethnic identities. In the eyes of the CCP, the backwardness of ethnic minorities was demonstrated in various ways: first of all, according to Marxist theories, the indigenous societies’ modes of production were backward, placing them in the primitive, slavery, and feudal stages of development, which in turn dictated the backward level of their culture and education. Their problems could only be solved once a socialist mode of production was established in China, enabling the indigenous societies to advance to a higher level of social development.

Second, the CCP believed that religion equaled superstition, which in turn exacerbated the backwardness of the indigenous people. Why did almost all the indigenous people have religious beliefs? A standard answer is that they were ignorant and weak. In order to understand life and death, up and downs, and even the changes of

---


weather and climate, they relied on illusions, primitive religions and cults to help them understand reality. Moreover, religion was the way that the ruling class fooled and brainwashed civilians in order to maintain control over society.

Third, the CCP stressed that the backwardness of the indigenous societies made them vulnerable to manipulation and segregation by outsiders, such as the KMT, Chinese landlords, foreign missionaries, and all types of other oppressors. Thus, the CCP’s mission was to save the indigenous people from inequity and discrimination in the first place. Second, the CCP would lead the indigenous people and advance them to a higher level of social, economic, and cultural development.

In order to liberate indigenous people from ignorance and backwardness, the first remedy was to replace all the religious educational institutions with the state run, and politically correct public educational system.

The CCP considered the appearance of foreign missionaries and churches not only a challenge that undermined the CCP’s theoretical foundation of Marxism, but also that connected the “uncivilized” and “ignorant” people to anti-communist and anti-revolutionary forces. This was dangerous for a newborn country, threatening the stability and unification of China. Thus, cleaning up the foreign influences projected by churches and church schools and protecting the purity of the communist ideology became more and more urgent during the 1950s. The connection between indigenous education and foreign forces must be cut off, and the church schools had to be remodeled to fit into the socialist framework of the New China. Most church schools in Yunnan were closed in the

---

1950s, while a few newly opened ones stumbled through and eventually failed before 1960, when a large scale socialist reform swept the country.  

In Longchuan of southern Yunnan, the Gongshan Church School was founded in 1947. The main text book was the Holy Bible, but students were also taught Jingpo language, Burmese, English, and Chinese. For the second and third graders, geography, history, music, PE and Art classes were in the school curriculum. In 1951, the PRC government assigned a representative named Wang Enzu to teach at the Gongshan church school in order to stress patriotism, promote CCP policies, and undermine the influence of church teaching. Many students who studied at the Gongshan Church School had no awareness that they had become Chinese citizens and showed indifference towards the concept of a new fatherland of China. In 1953, the government tightened the restrictions on Gongshan Church School and implemented a series of reforms, including that the County government would directly monitor the Gongshan Church School, teachers could only be assigned by the government, the school would be no longer allowed to charge students for tuition, book fees and any other school fees, and the

---

89 In 1950, the Gaoli Church School was closed. The Bangwan church school founded in 1950 was closed around 1952. Shibe church school was founded in 1954 with over 80 students registered for classes, but soon lost about 50 students and finally closed in 1956 for lack of teachers. Gongshan church school was organized in 1947 and lasted until 1958. Over years, more than 180 students attended and participated a 3-year school. See Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 44.

90 Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 44.

91 Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 45.
County government would be responsible for the school budget. As the Gongchan Church School was subtly transformed to a government public school, it eventually closed down in 1958. On the other hand, the number of public schools grew. By 1958, thirty schools in Longchuan hosted 2,410 students and among whom 1,425 were of indigenous background. In the year of 1958 alone, seven schools were established

Dramatic changes also occurred within the Buddhist and the Muslim communities. Strong propaganda about materialism as well as atheism and the state’s opposition to religious influence in China not only created harsh religious conditions but also cut off the very social and cultural fiber on which traditional indigenous education was built. Thus the impact on Buddhist monastery education was most devastating. With the religious institutions deprived of roles as educator as well as the elite selection mechanism, traditional channels for commoners to elite upward mobility at the local level was terminated and were replaced with a system based on Chinese language and new CCP standards. Compared with previous periods of the Chinese history, the opportunities to move up the social ladders became dim not only common indigenous people, but also for previous indigenous leaders, because of language and ideological barriers.

The educational reforms began at the elementary school level, admitting not only young children but often, adults. At the same time, not just ordinary indigenous students but also Buddhist monks were pulled out from the temple to attend government schools.

---

92 Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 45.
93 Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 44.
94 Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 45.
In 1955 and 1956, Yun Jinghong Elementary School opened two bi-lingual classes solely for the Dai youth, and 50% of the students in these two classes were young monks. 95 While the CCP promoted elementary school education, the CCP cadres also made efforts to gain support from the indigenous nobles as well as senior monks. Some ethnic nobles not only sent their own children to government public school, but also convinced others to do so. Some senior monks even urged their young apprentices to go to public school instead of staying in the temple. 96 For example, in a small town named Puwen in Xishuangbanna, most Buddhist temples ceased to select senior monks in 1958, allowing the young men to go to elementary schools. In 1959, fourteen new elementary schools were established. These schools accommodated 415 new students, and the total student population in Puwen almost doubled, with 530 indigenous students in total. 97 From 1961 to 1964, some students temporarily returned to the Buddhist temple schools as religious activities became less restricted. However, in 1966 when the Cultural Revolution occurred, all religious activities were banned again, and all the Buddhist temples were destroyed except the Mangangna Temple 98

There was no substantial change to the educational system in the Yunnan borderlands in the late 1970s. According to an official record, from 1979 to 1984, the Dai people in Puwen transferred their enthusiasm of rebuilding Buddhist temples into

building schools.\textsuperscript{99} In fact, in the early 1980s, the central government and local
government published regulations to outlaw any religious activities that would interrupt
or prevent the Dai children and youth from attending public schools. In order to eliminate
the traditional Buddhist monastic education, the prefecture government of
Xishuangbanna initiated a new policy in 1985 to ensure that the monks were attending
public schools. New schools were founded in order to recruit junior and senior monks to
study in the monks-only classes or mix classes.\textsuperscript{100}

Besides that, the government even organized regular classes in the Buddhist
temples. In 1988, two classes for the monks were open at the Jingzhen Temple, and
recruited eighty-three monks, including six senior monks for school from nine temples
nearby. The Dai language, Chinese language equivalent of the junior elementary school
level, math, music, PE and art were the major classes that these monks needed to take.
The Dai language teachers were local senior monks, and the Mengzhe elementary school
provided teachers for other subjects. In December, Li Tieying, a high ranking official
from the central government visited Mengzhe elementary school and highly commended
the contribution of this class. By 1990, among the 5,353 monks in the whole prefecture
of Xishuangbanna, there were 2,060 who had reached the school age, and 1,388 of them
were officially enrolled in government public schools.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{99}Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun (管开荣, 王军健), \textit{Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi \ 西双
版纳傣族自治州教育志} [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic
Autonomous Prefecture] (Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe, 1998), 64.
\textsuperscript{100}Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun (管开荣, 王军健), \textit{Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi \ 西双
版纳傣族自治州教育志} [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic
\textsuperscript{101}Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun (管开荣, 王军健), \textit{Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi \ 西双
版纳傣族自治州教育志} [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic
Gradually, not only the Buddhist temple schools but also the Muslim Mosque schools turned into sites solely for religious worship and indigenous language training. In the late 20th century, the Muslim mosque school began to thrive again. Usually each mosque had its own private school. Gradually, these mosque schools became pure language and scripture learning institutions. In Baoshan of western Yunnan, A-hongs taught young children Arabic every evening. Special language classes were held during the summer and winter recessions. Outstanding students were sent to more advanced schools in Dali, Kunming and Weishan County.102

Thus religious educational institutions in the Yunnan borderlands were marginalized and separated from the domestic politics and the popular ideologies. Religion’s function of social integration and social control in the Yunnan borderlands were also diminished. Religion and religious activities became pure cultural practice, and strictly kept away state power. Furthermore, religion and non-Chinese cultural practices of the indigenous people were considered “economically useful”, especially after the 1990s when ethnic monitors and their culture became popular commodities in the burgeoning Chinese market economy. “In Xishuangbanna, Dai culture, including Theravada Buddhism, is the bedrock upon which trade and especially tourism are founded. Temples and other institutions are sources of revenue, and help spur growth in the hospitality sector. Religious traditions shared with transnational Tai communities function as social capital that can be deployed to forge trade agreements and regional

102Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi 保山市少数民族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Baoshan City] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 309.
development schemes.” As Buddhism became the government’s instrument to facilitate transnational and trans-regional business as well as foreign relations, the indigenous people’s identification towards their traditional culture and religions were contaminated by economic pragmatism and opportunism promoted by the state.

While the issue of ignorance seemed to be solved by eliminating religious educational systems, the CCP began to solve the inequity issue caused by the long-term segregation of the Chinese and ethnic communities. In the mid-1950s, ethnic autonomies were gradually established at various administrative level within the framework of a unified Chinese nation so as to fulfill the indigenous people’s right to be independent and self-governed that was promised by the CCP.

In echoing the policy of ethnic autonomy, the CCP began to organize ethnic schools and Chinese literacy classes. The year 1951 marked the beginning of a growth of ethnic schools on the frontier. Ethnic schools sprouted in 1951 and 1952, and were directly administered by the provincial educational ministry. In Xishuangbanna, twenty-six elementary schools were in full function by 1953, and enrolled 3,193 students from ten ethnic groups. The expansion of ethnic school was challenged by low literacy rate among all the indigenous communities. Low literacy rate was not only found


in the indigenous written languages, if there were any, but also the Chinese language. In 1952, the first elementary school in Megla County of Xishuangbanna began the classes at the previous residence of the Native Officer. Chinese teachers and local students could not understand each other at all without the assistant of an interpreter who had to aid the students of all age groups.  

At the same time, public schools also suffered other problems, such as low education quality and high loss of students. Low education quality originated from the lack of qualified educators, as the outcome of the fast expansion of public schools. High loss of students were caused by various reasons, including the lack of labor at home. In the Town of Puwen, lots of people did not want their children to go to school for they feared that their children might become the party cadres after receiving the education and would not farm and take care of the families.

In order to solve these problems, the district educational department of Xishuangbanna stressed that education should become "ethnicized", meaning teachers should be able to speak or learn to speak indigenous languages or dialects. Besides that educators should use approaches that the ethnic students liked in order to motivate them, and increase the efficiency of their teaching. In the year of 1955, the "ethnicized" education was again emphasized by the prefecture educational department of Xishuangbanna. Each school had the responsibility to help their teacher understand that

---

ethnicization would be the direction of the future education in this area. However, native language was still not the focus of public education. It was considered as a basic transitional skill for the students to be able to eventually learn knowledge in Chinese. Schools in Longchuan began to use the Dai and Jingpo language text books organized by the provincial as well as local government in 1961. The government also especially selected and trained some ethnic students to become teachers, and also required non-ethnic teachers to learn indigenous languages. In 1963, Longchuan began to implement a series solutions in order to improve the quality of Chinese language learning.

At the same time, the Dai and Jingpo language class began to be available even for the first graders in some schools. A semester later, some students could even read the Tuanjie News in their own language. The Nongguan Elementary school provided weekly Dai language class for the third graders and above. By the time the students graduated from elementary school, they were able to use the Dai language in a basic way. Bilingual education was halted at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and was not resumed until 1972. In Manla Elementary school, the first graders would learn Dai language for a whole year, and then began to learn Chinese in the second grade. From the second grade to the third grade, students were only provided one to two Dai language classes weekly. So by the time they graduated from elementary school, most students’ Dai language

---


ability still stayed in an average level. In 1978, preschool for Dai children were opened in Yun Jinghong elementary school with the purpose of Chinese language training and eliminating the language barriers for the Dai students when they were ready for the first grade. The Mengzhe elementary school opened a Dai-Chinese bilingual testing class in 1986. Thirty-seven students who enrolled had to learn the Dai language for a year to fulfill the pre-school requirement. Beginning in the second year, as first graders, they were given Thai-Han text books. Although there was opportunity for them to learn in their native language, Chinese was still the main subject for learning as well as teaching, and Thai, the supplementary.

Over time, the problems of ethnic as well as bilingual education began to emerge. The CCP often criticized the traditional Chinese superiority towards the non-Chinese based on the Hua-Yi division and Wufu system, and proclaimed the equality of all people in China. However, the CCP never recognized the ironic outcome that brought forth not by its ethnic theories and practical policies. While the Chinese government denied the superiority of any cultural group in China and granted legal equality to all the ethnic minorities, inferiority of ethnic minorities did not cease to exist and yet was intensified by CCP’s ethnic classification, as well as the nation-wide acknowledgement of the

---

112Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi (陇川县教育志) [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 107-108.

113Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun (管开荣, 王军健), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi (西双版纳傣族自治州教育志) [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous Prefecture] (Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe, 1998), 70.


115The ethnic identification began in the early 1950s and lasted until 1980s gradually put ethnic minorities in the different positions of the civilized spectrum that centered at the Han Chinese norm. Ironically, ethnic minorities were classified by Leninist theory of the definition of ethnic minorities that focusing on their common language, residential territory, cultural and customs, and the level of economic development.
social, political and cultural backwardness of ethnic minorities. \textsuperscript{116} Thus, some scholars believed that the existence of the notion of backward ethnic minorities was the stepping stone on which a more advanced, or civilized, Han Chinese group was established. \textsuperscript{117}

As the CCP has been touting its ethnic identification and all kinds of special policies that it gives to the ethnic minorities in the education, it ironically fortifies the majority Han Chinese attitudes of superiority towards the ethnic minorities. The privileges that ethnic minorities have at school, such as extra credit for all sorts of qualifying examinations as well as ethnic only classes as well as schools label them as weaker and less competitive compared with the Chinese. Even in the political sphere, it has been a common rule that the CCP cadres of ethnic background would not be on the top of the CCP leadership at any level, even within the ethnic autonomies. Ethnic officials are seen at the assistant positions of the local leadership, or sometimes the governors’ position in the government. And yet, they are never to be found as the chairs of the local CCP committee that overpowers all the local authorities. In this case, the \textit{de facto} disadvantages of ethnic minorities is justified by the Marxist theory; and the backwardness of ethnic people as well as the exemplary role of Chinese is maintained, although with a new face, is disguised by the Marxist theory.

Besides that, the CCP also dispatched survey teams to investigate the economic, political and social institutions of ethnic people, and identified their basic mode of production and social structure. Based on these investigation and analysis, CCP further suited ethnic minorities into different phase of the evolution of human society based on the Marxist theory, and unsurprisingly, most of them remained in the stages of primitive society, slavery society and feudal society, or a fusion that contains all these elements.


249
As a specific approach of ethnic education, the bilingual education maintained the development of indigenous culture and traditions in limited ways, particularly in cultural tourism and commercial sectors. And its contribution towards the overall personal advancement in a Chinese-norm dominated country stays feeble. First of all, ethnic people who do not have a script see no possibility of receiving bilingual education; second, “When ethnic groups with different languages were classified in the same minzu, it is impossible to use bilingual teaching materials in only one of those languages for all the members of the minzu” (for examples: people classified as Hani in Xishuangbanna do not use the Romanized script created for their minzu, because it is based on the Luchun dialect of Haini living mainly in Luchun, Honghe, Yuanyan, and Jinping. Consequently, there is no bilingual teaching for the people classified as Hani (mainly Akha, Akhe and Phusa) in Xishuangbanna,\textsuperscript{118}

In fact, the bilingual market is shrinking in terms of personal education since the channel for upward mobility has been sealed off to those who do not master mandarin Chinese. In currently situation, knowing English, Japanese or other popular foreign languages instead of native language would even bring more educational or occupational opportunities. Many members of local elites received higher level education and are happy to embrace main stream Chinese culture. At the same time, teachers who are proficient in both Chinese and ethnic native languages have become increasingly rare and are disappearing. Those who are proficient and use their own language on daily basis are not qualified to become educators. These people either lack the professional qualifications to teach at public educational institutions, or they find it too difficult to fit

in, such as the Buddhist monks, local artists and musicians. The discontinuity of the “old ways” and the emphasis of the new norms established by the government has driven representatives of the old culture and traditional indigenous education away not only from the core of popular cultural, but the local power structure as well.

**When the Lines between Education and Propaganda Blurred**

As the consequence of the CCP’s mass mobilization, as well as social and political campaigns, the boundaries between the education and propaganda has been very blurring. The purpose and function of school education and mass education converged, in order to be in conformity with the CCP’s political agenda as well as ideological propaganda. Moreover, the inconsistency of the state political agenda and ideological propaganda campaigns made it impossible to fulfill the PRC’s fundamental goals for education before 1980s, such as cultivating the awareness of citizenship as well as the individual development of students.

Facing the large number of illiterates well as the ignorance of the communism and state politics, art performances, displays, and movies were the most effective ways of mass education. Government led cultural centers (*wenhua zhan*)\(^{119}\) and organizations surfaced and provided civilians various types of educational programs. From 1950s to 1980s, film and live theater, in particular, surpassed all the other forms of arts, becoming

---

\(^{119}\) Cultural centers were not the invention of the CCP. In fact, during the Republican China era, cultural centers were already a government post for mass education; however they were not as ideological propaganda oriented as those established after 1950. In Wenshan Prefecture, cultural centers were established in the 1930s in Kaibua, Maguan, Guangnan, Wenshan, Xichou and Qiubei. These cultural centers provided literacy classes for civilians. Besides that, people could also organize drama, 洞经音乐演奏 clubs. See Wenshan Zhuang Zu Miao Zu Zizhi Zhou Wenhua Yishu Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhuì (文山壮族苗族自治州文化艺术志编纂委员会), *Wenshan Zhuang Zu Miao Zu Zizhi Zhou Wenhua Yishu Zhi* 文山壮族苗族自治州文化艺术志 [The Gazetteer of the Wenshan Miao and Zhuang People’s Ethnic Autonomous Prefecture] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2005), 69.
the dominant way for Chinese civilians to construct a spiritual world. Movies and theaters were the place where the civilians received and constructed their understanding on state ideology, and formed value judgments promoted by the state authority. Over years, education in the Yunnan borderland with a rich cultural heritage was replaced by a single public ideological discourse of language and communication.

From the late 1950s to late 1970s, the education in the Yunnan borderlands suffered devastating blows just like elsewhere in China. The interruptions and destructions of schools drove off a large number of students. The semi-paralyzed school system turned its educational function over to societal mobilization. Social and political movements penetrated into schools, and replaced school education with ideological education and political struggles.

For examples, in 1951, schools in Shuangjiang organized large scale singing and dancing performances to assist the state propaganda about the establishment of the new PRC government, Korea War, and the contributions of the CCP. Students were taught to love and support the party and the PLA. Communist heroes who fought in the Anti-Japanese War, Civil War and Korea War such as Liu Hulan, Huang Jiguang and Qiu Shaoyun were glorified as role models. In Tengchong, the patriotic education was focused on the theme of “Against the America and Aid Korea” in 1951. Schools were

---

120 Liu Naikang(刘乃康), “Wenbao zhi Hou, Rang Qiongren You Meng: Chengshi Di Shouru Qunti yu Dangxia Zhongguo Dianying Yanjiu Zhiyi”温饱之后，让穷人有梦: 城市低收入群体与当下中国电影研究之一[The dream after being fed: a research the urban low income groups and the contemporary Chinese films], in Kua Wenhua Yujing de Zhongguo Dianying: Dangdai Dianying Yishu Huigu yu Zhanwang 跨文化语境的中国电影: 当代点电影艺术回顾与展望 [Across the cultural discourses: a review and preview on the film culture of contemporary China], edited by Ding Yaping and Wujiang (丁亚平, 吴江) (Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, 2009), 208.

121 Xiang Guangli (项光丽), Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang Zu Zizhi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi 双江拉祜族佤族布朗族傣族自治县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa and Bulang People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan Jiaoyu Xueyuan Yinshuachang, 2000), 132-134.
required to help the students understand the power of the socialist movement and the weakness of the capitalistic camp. Soviet Union heroes such as Pavel Korchagin from the novel *How the Steel was Tempered*, as well as Zoya Kosmodemyansky and her brother became role models. Many students wrote letters to the PLA soldiers in the Korean War, and participated in the fundraising effort to increase military budget. All of the sudden, the military academies became a popular place for students to apply for.  

In 1953, Young Pioneers that were selected in Simao area for participation in intensive service projects in afforestation, the Four Pests Campaign, public property protection and caring for the veteran’s families.  

In 1955, in response to a nation-wide socialist campaigns, schools in Shuangjiang were required to be sure that students understood that the socialist reforms were the only way to lead China out of poverty. In 1957, Marxism theories became a mandatory part of indoctrination about socialism, patriotism, nationalism and revolutionary traditions. The state empowered the civilians with what it perceived as appropriate. In ther words, the state established new standard for proper education, the cultivation of consciousness as well as value judgments based on the socialist virtues it preached.

However, the state indoctrination still faced a great challenge in the early 1950s, because the majority of indigenous people were unschooled and illiterate, and often kept 

---

122 Li Cunzhong (李存忠), *Tengchong Xian Jiaoyu Zhi (Neibu Faxing)* 腾冲县教育志 (内部发行) [The gazetteer of the education of Tengchong County (internal circulation)] (Tengchong: Tengchong Xian Jiaoyuju, 1990), 227.
their children at home. Thus, mass education seemed urgent, and the government cultural centers became the most important outpost for that purpose.

The missions of the cultural centers during this time period included eliminating literacy, organizing villagers’ club and peasants’ mobilization. In Southern Yunnan, two month after the PLA occupied in Kaiyuan in January, 1950, the People’s Cultural Center was open to the public, with the specific purpose to serve as the main propaganda instrument of the CCP, and as a facilitator in the social and political movements. In February 1953, a broadcast station was set up and began to broadcast three times a day through the speakers installed on the old city tower and the streets. Most of the broadcasting scripts were supplied by the Propaganda Department of the CCP County Committee, Educational Department, and Working Teams. Other scripts were from newspapers. Each week, the Propaganda Department of the CCP County Committee would develop programs and schedule them for the forthcoming week. At the same time, the broadcasting station also served as the event organizers for the County Council.

Besides that, cultural centers often offered classes on literacy, and sometimes, basic science knowledge, hygiene and farming skills. Along the Sino-Vietnamese border, more than 80 people graduated from various levels of the literacy classes in 1954.
In 1950, the PLA 39th Division organized a film team to show movies such as *The Triumphant of the PLA*, and *The Liberated China* across the nation. In Simao, a propaganda team sent by the central government arrived with a revolutionary film titled *The Red Banner in the Western Wind* (红旗漫卷西风) in the same year. In 1952, two film teams from Kunming traveled to ten towns and showed movies about the unification of the Chinese nation, Korea War as well as the happy life in the Soviet Union. In December, the film team of the PLA 39th Division finally arrived in three small towns and played more revolutionary and patriotic movies produced in China and the Soviet Union. The Wa people in this area were able to see a movie for the first time in their life. In 1954, film teams from Kunming were assigned to stay in Southern Yunnan, covering a vast area from the Xishuangbanna to Mojiang. 129

In the 1950s, anti-bandits shows and land reform shows echoed current political and social movements. Students’ propaganda teams often joined the cultural center to bring about more public attention. Li Zhensheng, a local intellectual from Kaiyuan, recalled the time that when he joined the students’ propaganda team and set on a performing mission for two months in the mountains. According to Li Zhensheng, they did not have a fixed place to host the shows. Instead, they often walked almost every day to different villages in the mountains, dragging their luggage and costumes from place to place. They ate two meals a day, mostly corn meals and yams. Two shows that they performed were about the cruelty of the landlords and harsh life of the peasants as to trigger strong hatred from the audience. On occasions, angry peasants became so agitated

---

and irritated by the show that they jumped onto the stage to beat up actors and actresses who played the landlords.  

Even in the In the 1980s, when the Sino-Vietnamese relationship soured, the Qiaotou Cultural Center not only aired programs on the CCP and PRC’s foreign policies, but also sent flyers and pamphlets over towards the Vietnamese side. Programs praised the traditional friendship between China and Vietnam. Performing teams were organized to visit the border patrol and the border outposts. The Qiaotou Cultural Center was never closed, even though it was situated in the frequent bombed area by the Vietnamese. 

In 1958, the radical propaganda of the Great Leap Forward campaign began to plague the educational system. The Three Red Banners (the General Line for socialist construction, the Great Leap Forward and the people's communes) became the compass for the direction of education. In mass education sphere, *Five Golden Flowers (Wu Duo Jinhua)* made the national debut in 1959, promoting the concept of submitting personal interests to collective interests. This movie portrayed the story that the young Bai men and women dedicated their life into the Great Leap Forward campaign, reconciled their own personal desire to the common goal of the society, and were eventually rewarded the romantic love from their equally dedicated comrades. In the nation-wide zeal to surpass the western countries, educators and students were required to follow their role models, and participated in intensive ideological and labor education. The damage was soon

---


overwhelming: too many political assignments interrupted regular class schedule, occupied the curriculum and eventually, led to the decline of the educational quality. The greatest disaster was associated with the Great Leap Forward mentality, which still influences the educators in a subtle way today.

No school was exempt from the political quest in how to support the Great Leap Forward. In Xishuangbanna, many second graders were required to set the goal to “leap” into the fifth grade within a year. Some teachers even finished one semester’s math lessons in fifteen days. Unsurprisingly, many failures in the school examinations occurred. 132 In middle schools, regular classes were replaced by educational as well as political assignments to eliminate the illiteracy, and labor campaigns such as plowing, planting, harvesting, and working in the backyard furnaces. 133

In 1960, a new principle was added in, which was to eliminate the capitalistic thoughts and promote those of the proletariat. Students were required to stick to the goal of becoming good children of the Chairman Mao. 134 In 1962, the CCP stressed that school education must follow the principle of class struggle: students should be organized to visit factories and the poor in the country. Elderly workers, peasants, cadres and PLA veterans should be invited to talk about the history of their factories, villages, families as well as revolutionary careers. In 1963, students in Xishuangbanna and Simao were encouraged to follow the example of Leifeng to serve others, obey the school discipline,

---


protect the public facilities and reconcile to the collective interests. In Shuangjiang, besides Lei Feng, schools also glorified several other national heroes such as Wang Jie and Liu Wencue, as well as the model of submitting and sacrificing personal life for the collective interests. From 1964 to 1966, three of Mao’s essays as well as his quotations became the main text for the ethnic and politic training class.

Early in 1961, elementary school system encountered a great setback caused by famine and errors in government policies. In that year, 6,261 students including 5,962 ethnic students in Xishuangbanna left school, directly causing the closure of many public schools. In order to get the students back, mobile schools, and farm-and-read schools were organized. In the Jingna Elementary School of Jinghong, 52.6% of students frequently missed or even dropped out of school after 1961. From February to April 1962 almost all the students disappeared, returning home for farming so as to earn the labor credit in order to redeem monthly stipend from the people’s commune. This left only eight regular school attendees. It was not until the end of the year, that students came back for school after a big the effort was made by the CCP district committee.

In Luxi County of western Yunnan, people still insisted that their children should participate in the people’s commune so as to multiple the income of the family instead of going to school. Also parents believed that farming instead of school gave their children

---

the opportunities to learn practical skills. In order to recruit more students for school, the government enhanced the ideological as well as patriotic education. The government initiated propaganda procedures that addressed the necessity of receiving education in the following aspects: 1. Teach the civilians to love the Party and Chairman Mao. Through the education that the Party as well as Chairman Mao were mighty, glorious and correct, and the educational policies of the Party a demonstration of its concern on the behalf of people, the goal was to persuade the civilians to love, and then be obedient to the Party’s call for education; 2. Cultivate patriotism. Through the comparison of the “Old China” and the “New China”, students were encouraged to recognize the superiority of the CCP led socialist China, and to set goals to study in order to protect and construct the new country; 3. Enhance the understanding on the importance of education; 4. Tie the education with the long-term goal of building the socialist and communist society, and prepare civilians to contribute towards such transformations led by the Party. 139

Later during the Cultural Revolution, domestic politics, class struggles as well as factional confrontations were fulfilled as the main purposes of education at the expense of basic knowledge learning. 140 In 1966, many teachers were recognized as anti-revolutionaries throughout the borderlands, such as in Longchuan, Baoshan and may other places. 141 Those educators who survived the harsh political scrutinization were

---

141 Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), *Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi* (The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 45. Also, Li Cunzhong (李存忠). *Tengchong Xian Jiaoyu Zhi (Neibu Faxing)* (The gazetteer of the education of Tengchong County (internal circulation)) (Tengchong: Tengchong Xian Jiaoyuju, 1990), 20.
afraid of teaching. Students were gradually tired of learning Mao’s words and essays. In 1967, according to the new policy that the military force should be in charge of the society, and support the left wings of the society as well as the working class and peasants, the PLA representatives began to take charge of schools throughout the Yunnan borderlands. The military administration as well as training was initiated, and the intellectuals were banished.

In terms of mass education, it witnessed a sharp turnaround during the Cultural Revolution. The movie Beautiful Xishuangbanna was criticized for ignoring the class struggle, pleasing Imperialism and Revisionism. The documentary series that recorded Liu Shaoqi’s visits to Indonesia and Burma were criticized for Revisionism, and his betrayal of international communist movements for his communicating with Ne Win. The puppet animation Peacock Princess (1963) was found guilty for preaching the braveness of the prince as well as the beauty and kindness of the princess. Also the intention of praising the ruling class, their patriotism, and romantic love became a huge

---

142 Longchuan Xian Jiaowei Bian Zhi Weiyuanhui (陇川县教委编志委员会), Longchuan Xian Jiaoyu Zhi (陇川县教育志) [The gazetteer of the education of the Longchuan County] (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 45
143 Li Cunzhong (李存忠), Tengchong Xian Jiaoyu Zhi (Neibu Faxing) (腾冲县教育志 (内部发行)) [The gazetteer of the education of Tengchong County (internal circulation)] (Tengchong: Tengchong Xian Jiaoyuju, 1990), 10. Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun (管开荣, 王军健), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi (西双版纳傣族自治州教育志) [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous Prefecture] (Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe, 1998), 107-108.
144 Qi Xiaoping (祁晓平), Xiang Hua Du Cao: Hongse Niandai de Dianying Mingyun (香花毒草: 红色年代的电影命运) [Fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds: the fate of the film during the Red China] (当代中国出版社, 2006), 252.
145 Qi Xiaoping (祁晓平), Xiang Hua Du Cao: Hongse Niandai de Dianying Mingyun (香花毒草: 红色年代的电影命运) [Fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds: the fate of the film during the Red China] (当代中国出版社, 2006), 251-252.
offense to the working class people.\textsuperscript{146} *A Shi Ma* (1964) was also found guilty in preaching the purity of romantic love and attacking the socialist system.\textsuperscript{147}

As for the previous mentioned *Five Golden Flowers* (*Wu Duo Jin Hua*, 1959), the major offense key in the portrayal of the romantic love of the young people instead of their political progress. Besides that, the songs also had major problems.\textsuperscript{148} Yang Likun, the major actress who casted in *A Shi Ma* and *Five Golden Flowers* was persecuted as counter-revolutionary. On the other hand, movies such as *Lishaungshuang* (*李双双*) and *Duo Yin* (*夺印*) were actively praised and promoted by the government.\textsuperscript{149}

At school, the traditional PRC ethnical principle that was established in 1949, the *Five Loves*, was now criticized for preaching the capitalistic theory of humanity. Strong populism and anti-intellectualism emerged while schools were destroyed, and teachers, humiliated. Top students who obeyed school rules were considered as Revisionists. The new models became the rebellious and those who followed Zhang Tiesheng’s example to hand in an empty sheet for examination.\textsuperscript{150}

In 1971, the central government initiated another plan, which required that schools should be available to all of the poor. The slogan that “every village owns an

\textsuperscript{146}Qi Xiaoping (祁晓平), *Xiang Hua Du Cao: Hongse Niandai de Dianying Mingyun* 香花毒草: 红色年代的电影命运 [Fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds: the fate of the film during the Red China] (当代中国出版社, 2006), 234.

\textsuperscript{147}Qi Xiaoping (祁晓平), *Xiang Hua Du Cao: Hongse Niandai de Dianying Mingyun* 香花毒草: 红色年代的电影命运 [Fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds: the fate of the film during the Red China] (当代中国出版社, 2006), 230.

\textsuperscript{148}Qi Xiaoping (祁晓平), *Xiang Hua Du Cao: Hongse Niandai de Dianying Mingyun* 香花毒草: 红色年代的电影命运 [Fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds: the fate of the film during the Red China] (当代中国出版社, 2006), 211.

\textsuperscript{149}Lv Mao (吕茂), *Lincang Diqu Dianying Zhi (1927-1990)* 临沧地区电影志 (1927-1990) [The Gazetteer of the Film of the Lincang District (1927-1990)] (Lincang: Yunnan Sheng Dianying Gongsi Lincang Fen Gongsi, 1992), 73.

elementary school, every production brigade owns a middle school, and every commune owns a high school” triggered the nationwide radical educational reform, and further paralyzed the educational system by irrational school expansion and upgrading. In Xishuangbanna, in order to fulfil this goal, rudimentary elementary schools that only taught the first and second graders now began to admit students from third grade and above. Elementary schools began to provide middle school education, and teachers were often drafted to teach middle school, leaving vacancies filled by new and possibly underqualified teachers hired within the community. School funding was always tight and facilities severely inadequate. 151

In Tengchong, all the elementary school shortened the school duration from six years to five years according to Mao Zedong’s Five-Seven Command (五七指示). The next year, elementary schools began to hold middle school classes in 1970. In 1973, eighteen middle schools were established. Two years later, the Xiaoxi Commune established an Agricultural University. In the 1970s, the educated youth from urban area became an important sources for new teachers across the Yunnan borderlands. By 1976, 53 schools were closed and 2,313 students left school in Xishuangbanna compared with the previous year. In 1979, as the educated youth returned back to urban cities, the Yunnan borderlands, the state farm school system in particular, faced a large scale shortage of teachers. 152 Thus, low educational quality, lack of teachers, inconsistence of

the text books, the termination of ethnic language learning and teaching had become the
landmark of these years. 153

After the Cultural Revolution, low school attendance was the number one
challenge. Low school attendance rates was not only caused by the revival of the
Buddhist activities after the Cultural Revolution, but also the civilians’ hesitance towards
the public education as well as state politics in general. In Xishuangbanna, the school
attendance rate was 71.3% and only 58% at the rural area by 1982.154 Another challenge
was to move away from the constantly shifting educational principles back to a
standardized core course, although the standard course itself remained vague and was still
dominated by the state politics and ideological orientation.

In 1977, the Xishuangbanna Educational Bureau dropped the basic knowledge of
industry and military training classes off from the school curriculum, and attempted to
resume physics, chemistry, foreign language, biology, and PE. However, such effort was
frustrated because of the lack of qualified teachers. 155 In addition to the attempt to
revise the curriculum, traditional PRC citizen education focusing on the patriotism or
nationalism as well as the loyalty to the party was also revised due to the new political
climate. Slogans such as Five Stresses, Four Beauties and Three Loves, as well as Five
Loves dominated schools in the frontier.

153Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun(管开荣, 王军健), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi 西双
版纳傣族自治州教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic
Autonomous Prefecture] (Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe, 1998), 49
154Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun(管开荣, 王军健), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi 西双
版纳傣族自治州教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic
Autonomous Prefecture] (Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe, 1998), 50
155Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun (管开荣, 王军健), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi 西双
版纳傣族自治州教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic
Although personal development has been stressed by the government over the years, it was narrowed down and settled on the basis of patriotism and nationalism that conform to the orientation of the dominant faction within the CCP core leadership. Moreover, even the narrowly defined patriotism or nationalism was also subtly replaced by hatred, prejudice, and antagonism towards what the dominant faction within CCP leadership has perceived as wrong.

Accompanying the establishment of a standard public thinking and behavioral code was the loss of indigenous cultural education and local history. Local culture and history classes are not provided since it is not part of the requirement for advancing to higher level of education. As students and educators actively engaged in the course of national building at schools as well as all kinds of public scenarios, their awareness of local history and legacy are replaced by the curiosity as well as eagerness to participate in the mainstream Chinese culture. Indigenous culture and religious beliefs are separated from the substantial advancement of the local societies, in terms of political and societal development. They gradually became “decorations” of the main stream cultural and ideological orientation that demonstrate the achievement of the government policies, or symbols of exotic cultures and cultural tourism that please the outsiders and brings quick cash. Overtime, the soil for the survival of multi-culturalism has depleted. The indigenous societies are being pushed into a mono-cultural dominated sphere with limited individual characteristics and awareness of self-identity.
Growing up in the western Yunnan, I always knew that I was a minority there. Although I have the blood of Tibetan, Muslim and Han Chinese running in me, I was officially registered Han Chinese. I was told by many people that we were living in the Lao-Shao-Bian-Qiong (老少边穷) area, a term that describe the places that remained in poverty, especially those old revolutionary bases like Yan’an and frontier areas with many ethnic minorities. Even in the late 1980s, when my parents and I went shopping at the market place, we easily recognized those who were different. Among them, we stood out easily, because we did not dress up in the ethnic costumes, and also, we spoke Chinese without ethnic accent. I remember the Yi women from the mountains who always wore beautiful clothes, with embroideries on the sleeves, pants and sash. I particularly remember their triangle shaped hats, as well as round-shaped felt pads that they wore on their backs. They were usually white color with two black dots at the center. These Yi women always brought honey, fern, pine pollen, pheasants, mushrooms, and all kinds of cool things that excited my eyes. In July and August, they brought tons of pine tree logs for people to burn for the Fire Torch Festival. And in the late fall and throughout the winter, these women came back in town with baskets of chuckles hauled by mules for heating supplies. When I was small, my father always taught me to talk and behave carefully and with respect around the Muslim as well as Tibetan lamas whom we might come across time to time, so I would not offend them and get into trouble.

When I went to elementary school, we were required to speak mandarin all the time, and many of my Bai classmates really had a hard time with their accent. They felt more comfortable at home when they could speak the Bai dialect. But at school, it was
quite a transition, and unfortunately, many of them did not do well at all especially in the Chinese class. Over-correction and criticism from the teachers about their way of speaking Chinese gradually destroyed their self-esteem and motivation to learn.

The school provided us with breakfast every morning. It was either buns or rice noodles with pork sauce. My Muslim classmate Lina Ma learned to eat pork because no accommodation was made for her on the rice noodle days, which she hates. My father still talks about the day he was surprised to run into Lina Ma after she happily bought a pork and ate bacon cake for the first time in her life.

When it was time to take the national examinations for college (gaokao), in the late 1990s, our teacher asked all non-Han students who were eligible for getting extra credit granted to ethnic minorities to raise their hands. Everyone in the class raised their hands except two or three of us.

This was also the same time when Yunnan became popular tourist destinations, especially ethnic theme tours. Everywhere there were colorful images of ethnic minorities, popular ethnic music, and portrayals about unique ethnic traditions, such as the matrilineal society in Lijiang. When I arrived in Xi’an for college in 1999, almost everyone I talked to looked at me with amazement because I was from Yunnan, a place they considered remote, backward and full of ethnic people.

All I knew about Yunnan up until my twenties related to ethnic people. This did not change until I began to study history and read more books on my own. I was never taught about Yunnan’s rich local history at school. Even my parents never mentioned local history to me! Only my grandfather, who was born in 1903, told me some stories about the Nanzhao Kingdom. There was a local history text book on my uncle’s book
shelf, who was a high school history teacher. But no one cared to teach from that book. There was no need to speak about local history, because Yunnan was a part of China. It was China’s national history that I needed to care about.

Knowledge of local history is disappearing fast as new generations of Chinese students like me attend public schools and are trained to become modern patriotic citizens of the New China. In this part of China, the history and complicated local context has been gradually replaced by the tourism-associated ethnic history with a simplified context that fit into the Marxist categories. The public image of Yunnan was stereotyped, becoming a remote, primitive, and exotic place where ethnic minorities dwell. It became a place for people to escape the civilizations and urban life, and be entertained by those who were different and essentially, not Han-Chinese. In the most extreme case, Yunnan also became a place for “sex tours” where the minority women, whose customs and habits did not conform to that of the Han-Chinese order, were turned into “the ultimate ‘sexual personae’ for the ‘Eastern Eye’ of the broader Han Chinese society.” ¹ This situation fits into a nation building discourse that stresses the unification of fifty-six

¹ See Camille Paglia, *Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 40, 71, in Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities”, in *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no.1 (February, 1994), 92-123. Dru C. Gladney gave a Beijing taxi driver’s account on ethnic women in Yunnan in 1991. This male taxi driver confessed that ethnic women in the TV programs and other public media were “a lot ‘looser (suibian, casual) than Han women. They bathe naked in the rivers and wear less clothing.’” The taxi driver really “liked to watch those minority girls.” Some of his friends, as he told, “have gone down to Yunnan….or was it Guizhou?….to see if they would meet some minority girls” who were considered to be very casual. Gladney pointed out that “the image of Dai (Thai) and other minority women bathing in the river has become a leit-motiv for ethnic sensuality and often appears in stylized images throughout China, particularly on large murals in restaurants and public spaces. School children are often encouraged to make wood-block prints of Thai bathers and other exotic representations of minorities.” For example, Felicity Lufkins argued that the public portrayal of minority nudes in China at the Beijing Capital Airport in the late 1980s and early 1990s was too confrontative and too publicly exposed.” See Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities”, in *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no.1 (February, 1994), 92-123. See also Felicity Lufkins, *Images of Minority in the Art of the People’s Republic of China. M.A. thesis*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 35 in Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities”, in *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no.1 (February, 1994), 92-123, quotation from 15.
ethnic minorities into one Chinese nation for over 2000 years. It also glorified the CCP’s contribution in liberating and civilizing the ethnic minorities, bringing them into a new socialist Chinese nation as equal citizens. Why would people study the local history that challenges this discourse?

Moreover, after five decades of national history discourse building, Chinese scholars have become used to interpreting the local history of Yunnan in ways that follow the main stream national narrative. Ironically, the records of the Non-Chinese people in the Chinese historical documents still provide solid evidence to prove that they were a part of the Chinese nation for thousands of years. Sometimes, even western scholars, lacking in-depth understanding on the local history of Yunnan, conduct research in acceptance of the discourse on ethnic minorities that China has constructed. And yet, on

---

2 The Western scholars have pointed out a long time ago that the historical records of the non-Chinese people in the Chinese ancient documents were gathered for “political reasons”. For example, W (Wolfram) Eberhard and Herold J. Wiens stressed that “the overwhelming bulk of the information about alien people” was gathered “to inform the Chinese frontier authorities who had to do with these aliens; to inform the military who had to fight them; to inform the ‘diplomats’ who had to know how to deal properly with them; and finally to inform the ‘interior’ magistrates of China Proper in the event of the arrival of tribute missions.” At least, these historical documents also served the purpose of demonstrating the superiority of the Chinese civilization and touting its position as the Kingdom of Heaven. See W. Eberhard, *Kultur und Siedlung der RandVolkers China*, T’oung Pao, Supplement to Vol. 36 (Leden: 1942), in Herold J. Wiens, *China’s March toward the Tropics* (Hamden: The Shoe String Press, 1954), 30-31, quote from 3.

3 In fact, most scholars who study China’s frontier are bounded by the narrative of the fifty-six ethnic minorities of China, Sinicization, and other ethnic-related issues. Ironically, they more or less accept the discourse that the CCP deliberately and gradually established in discussing the non-Han people for over six decades. In another word, such discourse actually has become the very foundation on which a lot of ethnic studies are based. When scholars only concentrate on the ethnic people in China’s frontier, their identity, their classification as well as their non-Chinese cultural and traditions, they somehow engage in the project of the construction of Chinese ethnic minorities, both historical and contemporary. The ethnic centered frontier study creates a historically “imagined” community composed by the majority, the Han, and the minority, the non-Han people. Ethnic discourse exaggerates the degree that the minority was absorbed into the majority. Furthermore, it equates the influence of the Chinese migrants with that of periodically indirect rule of the Chinese, and then magnified both to that of an overwhelming force of assimilation. Although problems have been diagnosed, it only provides answers or solutions to problems existed “within” the Chinese ethnic construction system. Both the praising and criticizing words from various scholars fulfill the needs of the propagandas for the continuing construction of such “imagined community”. In fact, as shown in this dissertation, this imagined community actually did not always exist along the Yunnan frontier, where the Chinese population were not the majority and Chinese norm was not the only standard. Even during the PRC era, the acceptance of the Chinese way only happens in a few scenarios, especially in the spheres of political participation and government propaganda, when the Chinese way means ideological
China’s frontier, especially in Xinjiang, the state has been challenged by unceasing ethnic independent movements. This makes re-discovering local history more urgent.

This dissertation is not simply trying to explain how the Yunnan borderlands were transformed to a frontier of China. It tries to present a rich local history in a more complicated context that has disappeared from sight. It also tries to show how China’s periphery areas became a part of China, and the deeply-embedded problems that remain unsolved in that process. These questions are crucial to understanding not only today’s Yunnan borderlands, but also border and frontier issues in other parts of China.

Admittedly, the Yunnan borderlands are different from Xinjiang and Tibet, and yet there are many parallels that can be found between China’s frontiers with Mainland Southeast Asia and the latter with Central Asia. Historically, the Yunnan borderlands were the corridor connecting China with Southeast Asia and South Asia, just like Xinjiang, the then Western Region, that connected China with Central Asia. These shatter zones were the places where ideas, people, cultures, religions as well as commodities met either at the trans-regional market place or battle fields. These areas were rarely ruled indirectly and permanently by certain state power. The mosaic makeup of the settlers, the limited natural resources, as well as people’s approaches to exploiting natural resources resulted in the main characteristics of the indigenous border societies: being pro-trade and

correctness and further brings economic and political security to individuals. And the nature of the Chinese way during the PRC period is obviously different than that of before. Besides that, the commonalities between the Han and ethnic people in the daily life nowadays indicate the similarities formed on a more technological based life style, instead of Chinese norms and customs. The most powerful forces that shape the coherence between the Han and ethnic people seem to be patriotism and Chinese nationalism, which are disputed by a handful of ethnic elites. Besides that the non-Chinese economic dependence on the Chinese people played a tremendous role to glue these two parts together. Thus, a coherent Chinese nation composed by various ethnic minorities is still wishful thinking. At certain point, the distinction of Fifty-six ethnic groups can be narrowed down to one: the dichotomy between the majority and the minority, as well as the Han and ethnic. This is still the wall for the ultimate integration of the Chinese nation. The Han people are still Han and the non-Han people are still barbarians. Such deep-embedded notion emerges to the surface especially when the Han and non-Han tension was escalated after the terrorist attacks in China recently.
highly militarized. Trade and the natural flow of migrants tied indigenous societies together, so that at times they could exercise regional power. Constant military confrontations between indigenous political units gave an opening to external super powers for entering in and establishing indirect, or, occasionally, direct control over the indigenous groups by supporting one of the local powers holders.

In fact, there was an obvious difference between the Yunnan borderlands and Xinjiang as well as Tibet. At certain point of time, the local authorities of Xinjiang and Tibet became allies with Beijing, whereas, the local authorities of the Yunnan borderlands were mostly under the control of the Chinese. There were “stateless” communities in these shatter zones in terms of their loose connections with regional larger powers, and yet all the local political units were well organized under indigenous powers. They were always ready to fight for what they needed to survive, but more likely to make alliances in order to dominate local competition.

Historians cite ancient Chinese documents that often record the “barbarians” adoration towards the Chinese civilization, and their willingness to learn from China and become civilized. They often neglect the political and economic motives behind these flattering words. The roots of the indigenous legitimacy remained local, being supported by local religious authorities. The indigenous powers were often more interested in seeking the support and protection from the regional power rather than total submission. There was no need for the indigenous people to integrate into a distant and alien cultural and political system. Before the 1911 Revolution of 1910-1912, the Chinese Hua-Yi distinction and Wu-fu system strictly segregated the barbarians from the Chinese. There
were no vehicles for the central Chinese power to penetrate to the local level, just as there was no way for indigenous people to join the core Chinese power establishment.

Besides protection from China, indigenous societies on China’s frontier had other options. In Xinjiang, indigenous people wished to establish an independent Muslim country, claiming connections to the ancient Turkic people, and receiving the support from Russia, British, Japanese, and then later the Soviet Union. In the Yunnan borderlands, local tribes also were once reconciled to Burman, Tibetan, and later the French authority as well as British. With the support from the British, the Tibetans attempted to organize a great Tibetan Nation that included part of the northwestern Yunnan in 1950s, and many have not given up this idea. It would be naive to argue that the assertion of colonial powers in either Central Asia or mainland Southeast Asia was the solely result of a one way expansion, without considering the agencies of indigenous political units and their practical choices.

And yet, with the coming of colonial expansion as well as the formation of the nation state in the 19th and 20th centuries, it placed the indigenous people’s agency under the wing of outsiders. The indigenous people were trapped in the confrontation between colonial powers and thus pulled into the world colonial market. Indigenous political units became divided, ruled and indoctrinated along different cultural and ideological norms.

When communist insurgences arrived to push the colonial powers out of Asia, Yunnan borderlands were transformed to a frontier of socialist China in 1950s. The adjacent Mainland Southeast Asia countries were also divided up into the spheres of influence by colonial powers as well as communist-led nationalist indigenous forces. In Central Asia and South Asia, Xinjiang and Tibet became buffer zones separating the
socialist China-Soviet Union camp from the capitalist British-India Camp. The expansion of the Soviet Union into Central Asia further caused political, economic and social divisions in the region. In mainland Southeast Asia, the confrontation between the communist and capitalist camps, and later between communist regimes brought further segregation and destruction. At China’s boundaries, both the Yunnan borderlands as well as Xinjiang lost their position as corridors for trans-regional and trans-national communication, becoming strictly bound within ideological boundaries. Their territories were pulled into the state political economy and turned into militarized zones, governed by means of state farms and populated by a large number of Chinese state farm soldiers and workers. Decades later, the soldiers and workers in the state farms of Northwestern China suffered poverty, because of the stagnant economic institutions. The soldiers and workers in state farms on the Yunnan borderlands faced the same challenge.

Ironically, when indigenous people were pushed into the concept of a single nation, they were not given many options. They were left divided and warring against each other across borders, not because of their own collective identification but because of political and ideological boundaries set by state power or regional military powers. In mainland Southeast Asia cities like Rangoon, Saigon and many other cities that once were among the most flourishing Asian transnational trade centers were gradually degraded because of wars. A few years after the WWII, Kengtung, “the largest and wealthiest of the Shan States” began to host “a large number of Chinese army deserters, bandits and orginary immigrants.” This once prosperous city and trade center was
plagued by smuggling throughout the 1950s, and finally became one of the least accessible regions of Burma to operations by government forces.  

The expedient commodity for indigenous people to relieve their poverty, including those organized as communist forces, was heroin. When opium poppy cultivation was banned in China in 1950s, rubber tree cultivation in the Southwest along with the natural gas and oil fields in the Northwest— the white gold and the black gold—became the backbone supporting local and China’s wartime economy. The Yunnan borderlands was constantly plagued by the drug smuggling from the Golden Triangle. Xinjiang had to deal with drugs smuggled from the Golden Crescent.

Today, many have argued that people in China’s Yunnan Province as well as China’s Xinjiang seem to be better off than brothers and sisters in neighboring countries, having been elevated out of extreme poverty and wars. In terms of material life, that may be so. The communist political economy has made the material life of indigenous people within China’s boundary better than that of fellow border dwellers on the other side. For example, the economic superiority of Chinese side turned Hekou, the Chinese border town with Vietnam, into the major site that accommodates not only thousands of Vietnamese traders each day, but also numerous active Vietnamese prostitutes. In Mengla, a border town next to Laos, Laotian brides willingly marry Chinese men, risking stateless status for years.

China’s transformation of its borderlands with mainland Southeast Asia as well as with Central Asia shows its advantages, but only in comparison to the war torn neighboring areas that have not had a proper opportunity for social, economic, cultural

---

4 Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The Effect of Chinese Nationalist Military Activities in Burma on Burmese Foreign Policy (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1959), 3.
and educational development. In these adjacent countries, it is clear that the decisions by the external powers centering on their own interests at the expense of the agency of the local people have caused deep trauma to the indigenous societies. Political and ideological confrontations between larger external powers destroyed the social fibers as well as economic bonds that used to hold the indigenous communities together, leaving long-term and deep political, social, economic, cultural and religious segregation. It is difficult for the current indigenous communities to mend and build bridges to connect to not only other culturally and politically heterogeneous groups, but also to their traditional cultural heritage and history. The insintegration of the indigenous homogenous communities, marked by distrust and fear towards each other and especially towards China’s increasing grip in regional and global politics, would become a major obstacle as China tries to push forward the regional economic integration in Southeast Asia as well as Central Asia, and resume both Yunnan as well as Xinjiang’s role as the corridors for transnational migration and trade.

In China, the public discourse about nation building and national history has mended and bridged these gaps for the indigenous people. It also has subtly changed the indigenous people’s way of perceiving their individual as well as collective identities. Years of poverty and political struggle have proved that economic development is top priority. As the Yunnan borderlands are integrated into the Chinese domestic market as well as political system even much closely than before, indigenous people who are left more outside the main stream cultural and educational system have less opportunities to improve both their economic and political status. On the other hand, the PRC has gradually developed a broad group of new local elites who have been the beneficiaries of
the existing system and unwilling to make any changes. Local culture and traditions
gradually are absorbed into the elite culture that are promoted by intellectuals and artists,
or are preserved in museums and books. What to preserve and pass to future generations
becomes a rough issue that few intellectuals and artists freely tackle.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives:


Interviews:
Li Xiaoxiao (李晓晓). Conversation with Li Xiaoxiao (Mengman, Yunnan, China: 02/21/2012)
Cheng Zhi (程志). Conversation with Cheng Zhi (Xiaguan, Yunnan, China: 07/26/2013)
Zhao Zhimao (赵之茂). Conversation with Zhao Zhimao (Xizhou, Yunnan, China: 07/15/2013).
DuanXX (段 XX). *Conversation with Duan XX* (Eryuan, Yunnan, China: 07/31/2013).

**Newsletters and online resources:**


Xiemin and Zhang Dingping (谢敏, 张定平). Zhong Yue Bianjing Leiqu Cheng Zousi Tongdao 中越边境雷区成走私通道 [The landmine zones along the Sino-Vietnamese border have become smuggling passages], in Jing Bao 晶报 [Jing Bao] (June 16th, 2014), http://jb.sznews.com/html/2014-06/19/content_2913161.htm, accessed on 01/05/2015.
Major Primary Resources:


Dai Qilin (戴启林). “Guangnan Yapian de Chanxiao ji Weihai” 广南鸦片的产销及危害 [The production and harm of the opium in Guangnan], in Jindai Zhongguo Yandu Xiezhen Xia Juan 近代中国烟毒写真下卷 [Historical documents on the opium in Modern China, Vol.2], edited by Wenshi Jinghua Bianjibu (文史精华编辑部) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1997).

Dao Xuexing, Dao Ziqiang and Li Wengong (刀学兴, 刀自强, 李文贡). “Ke Shuxun Tongzhi Xishuangbanna de Jingguo” 柯树勋统治西双版纳的经过 [The history of Ke Shuxun’s rule in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 19-40.


Fanchuo (樊绰), Man Shu 蛮书.


Hou Hanshu Xinan Yi Lie Zhuan Juan 86 [后汉书西南夷列传卷 86].


Li Chengxiang (李呈祥). “Situo Tusi Yange Jilve” [A brief history of the Tusi of Situo], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji* [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 84-94.


Li Wenhai, Xia Mingfang and Huang Xingtao (李文海，夏明方，黄兴涛), Minguo Shiqi Shehui Diaocha Congbian Shaoshu Minzu Juan 明国时期社会调查丛编少数民族卷 [Compilations of the surveys of the Republican China Era, the volumes on ethnic minorities] (Fuchou, Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005).


Liu Yan (刘岩). “Minzu Zhengce shi Minzu Gongzuo de Linghun” 民族政策是民族工作的灵魂 [The ethnic policy is the soul of the ethnic affairs], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 45 Ji* 云南文史资料选辑第 45 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xiesheng Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyouhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 6-10.


*Minguo Xinzuan Yunnan Tongzhi Juan 134* 民国新纂云南通志卷 134.


Shi Ji Xinan Yi Liezhuan [史记 西南夷列传]

Sun Tianlin (孙天霖). “Ke Shuxun Zhili Pu-Si-Bian Shaoshu Minzu Diqu Shmo”柯树勋治理普思边少数民族地区始末 [Ke Shuxun’s governance of the ethnic area in the Pu-Si periphery], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 11 Ji* 云南文史资料选辑第 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wensi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1979), 41-50.


Wenshan Zhou Dangqun Zhi Bianzuan Lingdao Xiaozu (文山州党群志编纂领导小组).


Yuanshi-Dili Shi 元史-地理史.


Yuanshi-Dili Shi 元史-地理史 [The Yuan history- the history of geography].
Yunnan Sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省地方志编纂委员会). *Yunnan Shengzhi Juan 49 Junshi Zhi* 云南省志卷四十九军事志 [The gazetteer of the Yunnan Province Vol. 49 the gazetteer of the military affairs] (Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1997).


Yunnan Sheng Mengla Xianzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省勐腊县志编纂委员会), *Mengla Xian Zhi* 勐腊县志 [The gazetteer of the Mengla County] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1994).


Zhao Dingsheng (赵鼎盛). “Huiyi Long Yun Beipo Xiatai Yihou” 回忆龙云被迫下台以后 [The recollection on Long Yun after he was forced to step down], in *Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 23 Ji* 云南文史资料选辑第 23 辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 23], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Hui Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1984), 144-158.


Zhang Xingzhi (张兴智). “Cong Zhongyan dao Jinyan de Qinjian Qinwen” 从种烟到禁烟的亲见亲闻 [(My) Personal experience of the opium cultivation and opium ban], in Jindai Zhongguo Yandu Xiezhen Xia Juan 近代中国烟毒写真下卷 [Historical documents on the opium in Modern China, Vol.2], edited by Wenshi JInghua Bianjibu (文史精华编辑部) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1997), 329-336.

Major Secondary Literatures:


Cang Ming (苍铭). *Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi* 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 2004).


Jiang Bingzhao, Wu Mianji and Xin Tucheng (蒋炳钊, 吴绵吉, 辛土成), Bai-Yue Minzu Wenhua 百越民族文化 [the culture of the Bai-Yue people] (Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe, 1986).


———. Cheli 车里 [Cheli] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1933).

Li Zhongqing (李中清). “Mingqing shiji Zhongguo Xinan Jingji Fazhan he Renkou Zengzhang”明清时期中国西南的经济发展和人口增长 [The economic development and the population increase in China’s Southwest during the Ming and Qing era], in Qingshi Luncong Di Wu Ji 清史论丛 第五辑 [The Qing history forum, Vol.5] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju: 1984).


Lu Ren (陆韧). Yunnan Duìwài Jiàotōng Shí 云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997).


Mullaney, Thomas S. Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).


Peng Shijiang (彭史奖). “Bai-Yue Ren yu Zhongguo Daozuo Wenhua”百越人与中国稻作文化 [The Bai-Yue People and China’s rice cultivation culture], in Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平), (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 315-322.


Qi Xiaoping (祁晓平). *Xiang Hua Du Cao: Hongse Niandai de Dianying Mingyun* 香花毒草: 红色年代的电影命运 [Fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds: the fate of the film during the Red China]


Wan Xiangcheng (万湘澂). *Yunnan Duiwai Maoyi Gaoguan (Shang)* 云南对外贸易概观 (上) [A general review on the foreign trade of Yunnan, Vol.1].


You Xiuling (游修龄). “Baiyue Nongye dui Houshi Nongye de Yingxiang” 百越农业对后世农业的影响 [The Bai-Yue agriculture’s influence towards the future agriculture], in *Guoji Bai-Yue Wenhua Yanjiu* 国际百越文化研究 [International studies on the Bai-Yue culture], edited by Weiqiao and Dong Chuping (魏桥, 董楚平), (Beijing: Zhongguo shenhui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 303-314.


GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Geographic Terms

哀牢山 Ailao Mountains
安平 Anping
安阳 An’ yang
白象山 the White Elephant Mountain
白盐井 Baiyanjing
八里河 Balihe
邦弯 Bangwan
抱母 Baomu
北江 Beijiang River
大马散 Da Masan
菜杉坪 Caishanping
滇国 Dian Guo
德钦 Denqin
东江 Dongjiang River
东山 Dongshan
峨山 Eshan
富宁 Funing
高丽 Gaoli
高黎贡山 Gaoligong Mountains
广南 Guan nan
贡山 Gongshan
拱山 Gongshan
桂江 Guijiang River
河口 Hekou
鹤庆 Heqing
河西 Hexi
红河 Honghe
户萨 Husa
户瓦 Huwa
尖高山 Jiangaoshan Mountains
江城 Jiansheng
江心坡 Jiangxinpo
金沙江 Jinsha River
金平 Jinping
景洪(车里) Jinghong (Cheli)
景东 Jingdong
景谷 Jinggu
开化 Kaidahua
开远 Kaiyuan
澜沧 Lancang
腊萨 Lasa
吕保 Lvyao
临沧 Lincang
陇川 Longchuan
龙陵 Longling
麓川 Luchuan
潞江 Lujiang
礼杜江 Lidujiang River
马关 Maguan
马散 Masan
孟艮 Menggen
蛮耗 Manhao
孟定 Mengding
勐海 Menghai
勐憨 Menghan
勐库 Mengku
蒙化 (巍山) Menghua (Weishan)
勐腊 Mengla
孟连 Menglian
勐勐 Mengmeng
勐卯 (瑞丽) Mengmao (Ruili)
孟梭 Mengsuo
勐旺 Mengwang
蒙自 Mengzi
勐遮 Mengzhe
勐住 Mengzhu
勐主 Mengzhu
冕宁 Mianning
弥渡 Midu
磨黑 Mohei
木城坡 Muchengpo
南甸 Nandian
南定河 Nandinghe River
南溪河 Nanxihe River
Indigenous Groups and Political Units

哀牢 Ailao
百越 Bai-Yue
百濮 Bai-Pu
氐羌 Di-Qiang
金齿 Jin-Chi
鸠僚 Jiu-Liao
狄獂戎 Diyuanrong:
河蛮 He-Man
裸濮 Luo-Pu
茫蛮 Mang-Man
茫蛮 Mang-Man
闽濮 Min-Pu
苗瑶 Miao-Yao
濮/ 蒲 Pu
羌 Qiang
君长 Junchang
昆明 Kunming
夜郎 Yelang
邛都 Qiongdu
靡莫 Mimo
冉駹 Ranmang
身毒 Shen du
蜀 Shu

嶲 Xi
白衣/ 白夷/ 摆夷 Baiyi
班箐佤族 Banqing Wa people
布朗 Bulang
布依 Buyi
傣 Dai
德昂 De’ang
傣族 the Sha branch of the Dong people
景颇 Jingpo
汉傣(花腰傣) Han-Dai
哈尼 Hani
回傣 Hui-Dai
苦聪人 Kucong people
拉祜 Lahu people
傈僳 Lisu
侬人 Nong people
苗 Miao
瑶 Yao
永不劳佤族 Yongbulao Wa people
壮 Zhuang
佤 Wa
People

陈荣昌 Chen Rongchang
杜文秀 Du Wenxiu
丁光荣 Ding Guangfu
方文明 Fang Wenming
宫里雁 Gong Liyan
郭少聪 Guo Shaocong
何宏年 He Hongnian
纪祥廷 Ji Xiangting
柯树勋 Ke Shuxun
柯祥晖(柯祥辉) Ke Xianghui
刘道衡 Liu Daoheng
李秉阳 Li Bingyang
李承祥 Li Chengxiang
李希哲 Li Xizhe
罗树昌 Luo Shuchang
马文德 Ma Wende
沐 英 Mu Ying
马泽如 Ma Zeru
马同柱 Ma Tongzhu
马子厚 Ma Zihou
马德新 Ma Dexin

侬廷章 Nong Tingzhang
浦世民 Pu Shipmin
思伦法 Si Lunfa
孙天霖 Sun Tianlin
汤希绪 Tang Xiyu
王恩祚 Wang Enzuo
王立文 Wang Liwen
王开富 Wang Kaifu
王开学 Wang Kaixue
王仲恩 Wang Zhong’en
吴荣轩 Wu Rongxuan
徐为光 Xu Weiguang
杨兴国 Yang Xingguo
杨振寰(杨震寰) Yang Zhenhuan
宰散 Zai San
赵国华 Zhao Guohua
召亚卖 Zhao Yamai
召亚陶 Zhao Yatao
召香水 Zhao Xiangshui
张文光 Zhang Wenguang
Social, Political, Religious, Cultural and Commercial institutions, Organizations and Titles

土司  Tusi  Native Officer
山官  shanguan  the Mountain Officer
宣慰/宣慰使司 Xuan Wei/ Xuanwei  Shisi  the Pacifying Commissioner
改土归流 gaitu guiliu
保乐土司 the Tusi of Baole
登埂土司 the Tusi of Denggeng
顶真土司 the Tusi of Dingzhen
邦瓦山官 The Mountain Officer of Bangwa
干崖土司 the Tusi of Ganya
六顺土司 the Tusi of Liushun
勐海土司 the Tusi of Menghai
猛悻土司 the Tusi of Mengxing
思陀土司 the Tusi of Situo
三保历代 Sanbaolidai
阿佤哩 Awali
当龙师 Dang Long Shi
古姆萨 kumsa
古姆朗 kumwong
寨老 Zhai-Lao
摆八 Baiba
摆孙 Baisun
波沃 Bowo
祜巴 Huba
戛备 Jiabei
科勇 Keyong
帕图 Panan
帕沙佛寺 Pasha Fosi  the Pasha Buddhist Temple
清静道 Qing Jing Dao
一贯道 Yi Guandao
童军 (童子军) Tongjun (Tongzi Jun)
Boy Scouts
五七指示 Wu Qi Zhishi  the Five-Seven Command
官学 Guanxue government schools
义学 Yixue  the Yixue schools
庙学 Miao Xue  the Confucius Temple schools
Periphery Education program 边地教育
贡山教会学校 Gongshan Church School
戡乱委员会委员 Pacifying Committee
恒丰源茶庄 Heng Feng Yuan Tea Shop
义庆邦 Yi Qing Bang  The Yiqing Gang
源鑫昌 Yuan Xin Chang
源馨斋 Yuan Xin Zhai
逸群茶园 Yi Qun Chayuan  Yi Qun Tea House
文明茶园 Wenming Chayuan  Wenming Tea House
滇舞茶园 Dianwu Chayuan  Dianwu Tea House