Foucault and Education:
The Punitive and Disciplinary Societies

by

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the relationships and implications of Foucault's genealogical analytic, his most recently published course, *The Punitive Society* and its connections to *Discipline and Punish* through an analysis of productive power, and the potential offerings for educational research. The purpose of this study is to clarify Foucault's genealogical approach in making it more accessible to educational researchers, to investigate the applications and significance of Foucault's most recently available lectures to education, and to analyze Foucault's reimagining of the notion of power as it is developed throughout the lectures and fully realized in *Discipline and Punish* to better develop an analytic lens from which to interrogate relations of power in pedagogical practices.
To my most precious Lauren and M, who remind me of what is most important.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Context

Throughout my work on this project, I have buried myself in the pages of Foucault’s dense and challenging texts, grappling with his complexities, provocations, and illuminations. Despite the difficulty for me as a beginning scholar, I have found myself enamored of his thinking ever since I read my first Foucault text, *Madness and Civilization* (1961). I was instantly enraptured by Foucault’s style, his instigations and analyses, the manner in which he wrote history. I knew I had found something that resonated with me when I began to perceive my work as an educator differently.

At this point in time, I was a practiced teacher, having taught for nearly a decade, and I had already cultivated a vast repertoire of engaging learning experiences and strategies that I believed reached a wide variety of student abilities and interests. I was immersed in my work and took pride in ensuring that I kept current and enacted the latest pedagogical insights in the field, particularly with the adoption of the Common Core State Standards. As I progressed through my first class on Foucault, I found my head swimming with notions like exclusion, gazes, tables, autopsies, mirrors, and then I read *Discipline and Punish*. From the opening pages of the excruciating execution of Damiens to the description of the carceral, I was transfixed and transformed. Not only was my classroom the picture of panopticism, my daily practices and interactions were the embodiment of disciplinary power at work. I was simultaneously disturbed and fascinated. I had not quite figured out how to make sense of everything (arguably, I still am trying), but continued to trudge along reading more Foucault and what others wrote
about his work. As I became more and more convinced that I wanted to continue my work with Foucault, I found myself contending with multiple dissertation topics, knowing that *Discipline and Punish* would somehow fit into my project. I soon discovered what would become the fortuitous publication of Foucault’s lectures on *The Punitive Society*, made available for the first time in English in September 2015, and thus an entire project began to take shape. As a beginning Foucauldian scholar, this publication presented an exciting opportunity to conduct an original analysis of a challenging new material as well as bring a new text to the forefront. The book offers thirteen lectures that Foucault gave at the Collège de France from January 3, 1973 through March 28, 1973. With the exception of the courses on governmentality, *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault’s lectures have been largely underutilized in the field of education and throughout research in general. Not only were these lectures unavailable until very recently in both French and English, they were given a critical juncture in the trajectory of Foucault’s work.

Education may well be, as of right, the instrument whereby every individual, in a society like our own, can gain access to any kind of discourse. But we well know that in its distribution, in what it permits and in what it prevents, it follows the well-trodden battle-lines of social conflict. Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it (Foucault, 2010a, p. 227).

This quotation is borrowed from Michel Foucault’s inaugural lecture, “The Discourse on Language”, given at the Collège de France on December 1, 1970. I have selected this quotation to introduce the insights Foucault’s work offers the field of
education. In this quotation on education, Foucault highlights the competing tensions of politics, discourse, and knowledge and power circulating beneath a visage of equity and opportunity against a backdrop of civil warfare. All of these notions are paramount in Foucault’s work, particularly the time frame in which this study is focused, and demonstrate the critical potential of Foucault’s thought for educational research. Foucault never devoted a comprehensive study to educational institutions in the same way that he investigated prisons, sexuality, or government; however, the implications of his work continue to offer educational researchers analytical tools with which to investigate accepted and authorized practices that perpetuate certain rationales, guises of benevolence, and the notion of progress.

This quotation also provides an important marker from which to trace a transformation in Foucault’s work that will be considered from multiple angles in this study. Following The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Foucault abandons his attempt to establish a theory of discourse and instead transmutes his thinking to address some of the larger dilemmas afflicting his life and work. This initiates a caesura that brings about a tremendous time of intellectual, political, and creative change for Foucault. In this lecture, Foucault begins to emphasize power relations, which will function at the core of his genealogical work. Throughout this project, I explore the cultivation of Foucault’s genealogical analytic through his personal experiences and political activism, his treatment and extension of Nietzsche’s genealogical work, and his recasting of power in the 1973 lectures on The Punitive Society which allows for the full deployment of genealogy in Discipline and Punish (1975).
On August 26, 1974, Foucault concluded his work on *Discipline and Punish* (1975), the most frequently referenced and cited work of Foucault’s collection throughout the entirety of educational scholarship. Despite the absence of an extended statement on education, Foucault’s work, particularly his conception of disciplinary power, has been highly appropriated throughout educational research. Foucault’s study of the emergence of the modern prison provides scholars with a divergent means of describing the many workings of power in various pedagogical processes and procedures. For Foucault, the setting of the prison and the society in which it thrives functions in his analyses as a concentrated form of the operationalization of power, thus making it an ideal location for his study. Researchers have adopted Foucault’s work on the prison to examine points of power within educational praxes to describe multiple aspects of pedagogy and curriculum. Foucault’s genealogy of the emergence of the modern prison system in *Discipline and Punish* has become a fixture in educational scholarship to interrogate the practices of the present moment in education.

Foucault completed a draft of the seminal text in April 1973, immediately after finishing of his course on *The Punitive Society*. Access to previously unpublished material at such a crucial time in Foucault’s thought would undoubtedly provide immeasurable insight into his work in *Discipline and Punish*, a compelling text that has been utilized to interrupt innumerable dominant educational discourses. The publication of the lectures on *The Punitive Society* coupled with the firmly established influence of *Discipline and Punish* in education constitutes a new space from which to investigate Foucault’s genealogical approach, his unique analysis of power, and their connections, applications, and implications for the field of education.
Purpose and Significance of the Study

This project examines the connections and ramifications of Foucault’s genealogical approach, his most recently published lectures on *The Punitive Society*, and its linkage with *Discipline and Punish* through an analysis of productive power, and the possible offerings for educational research. The purpose of this study is to elucidate Foucault’s genealogical analytic in making it more employable for educational scholars, to explore the usage and importance of Foucault’s most recently available lectures to education, and to expound upon Foucault’s recasting of the notion of power as it is refined throughout the lectures on *The Punitive Society* and fully actualized in *Discipline and Punish* to better develop an analytic prism from which to investigate power relations in pedagogical practices.

Research Questions

This study is guided by the following research questions:

1. With the absence of a methodological framework for Foucault’s genealogical analytic, how do educational scholars go about conducting genealogies and how can the work of genealogy contribute to education?

2. What insights, implications, and connections do the lectures on *The Punitive Society* offer educational scholars?

3. How does Foucault describe productive power in *The Punitive Society* and in *Discipline and Punish*, and what are the implications of productive power for education?
To address these intentions, this project is organized around three journal articles that focus on Foucault’s genealogical analytic, the potential offerings of The Punitive Society to educational researchers, and a description of productive power.

In Chapter 2, “Foucault, Method and Education: La Naissance de la Généalogie” I endeavor to shade in some of the space left open by the absence of a methodological framework. I attempt to bridge this gap analyzing and synthesizing from three convergent directions. First, I explore the transformative personal and professional events and influences that helped shape the cultivation of Foucault’s genealogical analytic and in doing so, I highlight the significance of the experiential aspect of genealogical thinking. Second, I illuminate the elements of Foucault’s genealogy based on his essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in order to guide educational scholars in undertaking their own genealogical inquiries. Third, I demonstrate how Foucault’s genealogical elements are realized and operationalized in Discipline and Punish, his first comprehensive genealogical study. Throughout these three portions of the article, I connect Foucault’s genealogical work to its applications and potential for educational researchers. Due to the relative lack of direction from Foucault, this article seeks to illuminate a path so that others may employ genealogy in education to provide alternative explanations, hidden histories, and rethinking of accepted pedagogical practices.

In Chapter 3, “An Introduction to The Punitive Society”, I focus on the offerings of Foucault’s most recent published course at the Collège de France in 1973. I contextualize the lectures, providing a description of Foucault’s involvement in projects and organizations that undoubtedly informed the content of the lectures. Next, I provide a summary of the lectures, tracing the how the modern prison system is not only made
possible, but how it becomes assured and guaranteed despite the fact that it is condemned as universal punishment in both penal theory and practice. Third, I thematically relate the lectures on *The Punitive Society* to some of Foucault’s other works to establish connective pathways for potential analysis and provide linkage for educational researchers. And last, I present an example of Foucault’s notion of productive power as a prism for describing power in the literacy approach of close reading.

In Chapter 4, “Describing Productive Power in Education: A Re/reading of the Punitive and Disciplinary Societies”, I offer a reexamination of Foucault’s recasting of power in *Discipline and Punish* from one that represses to a power that produces, in light of the lectures on *The Punitive Society*. With the extensive treatment of Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power as expounded upon in *Discipline and Punish* throughout educational research, the recent publication of the lectures on *The Punitive Society* that offer so much illumination into the development of Foucault’s conception of power in *Discipline and Punish* demands a critical comparison of the texts. I build this rereading of a prospective of power looking forward from the lectures to the book on Foucault’s responses to four theoretical schemata: exercising, diffusing, constitution, and the relationship of power-knowledge that dominate power analyses, as outlined in the last lecture in *The Punitive Society*. I analyze examples of each of the four means for describing power from the lectures and the book in order to discern points of similarity, tension, and refinement from 1973 lectures to the 1975 book. Furthermore, I consider these four vehicles for power description and their relevance for educational research as a way to describe power in pedagogy.
In Chapter 5, I offer reflections, points of convergence and divergence, as well as draw conclusions based on the content of this study. First, I explore the future applications of Foucault’s genealogical analytic and how it might become more widely accessible and utilized throughout educational research. Second, I expand on the relevance and potential uses of Foucault’s latest lectures. And third, I broaden the discussion of Foucault’s four elements of describing power and further consider their use in curriculum studies. I also consider future directions for this project.
References

CHAPTER 2

FOUCAULT, METHOD AND EDUCATION:
LA NAISSANCE DE LA GÉNÉALOGIE

Introduction: Foucault’s Method?

“Q: Discipline and Punish, like your previous books, is based on a considerable quantity of archival work. Does Michel Foucault have a ‘method’?” (Foucault, 1996f, p. 149).

This question was posed by Roger-Pol Droit in an interview with Foucault, appearing in Lemonade on February 21, 1975, right around the same time as the French publication of Discipline and Punish. Droit’s inquiry echoes the fascination and frustration of innumerable scholars who persistently question, wonder, appreciate, and scrutinize Foucault’s approach. Foucault does not offer a prescriptive or even a clear methodology that allows for ease of transferability of his work towards areas of pedagogical inquiry. Furthermore, he has certainly interrogated many of our contemporary institutional practices; yet, he does not offer a full analysis devoted to the practices of education in the same way that he richly investigated prisons, sexuality, or government. Despite the absence of a model of education mixed with what might be perceived as a vague methodological approach, the thought of Michel Foucault, simultaneously perplexing, provocative, and profound, offers illuminative opportunities for educational scholars to engage his work in their respective fields of interest.

It is certainly possible to find insightful fragments, potential directions, and “methodological precautions” scattered throughout the catalogue that sketch potential answers to Droit’s question. In striving to contribute a working response, this article endeavors to bridge some of the gaps created by the absence of a detailed methodological
framework by exploring some of the connections between Foucault’s influential experiences, his description of genealogy, its subsequent actualization in *Discipline and Punish*, and the ties of genealogy to educational research. Drawing primarily on what might be considered Foucault’s most descriptive text about genealogy, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History” (1971) and the realization of the essay’s contents in *Discipline and Punish*, this article explores what allowed the shaping of Foucault’s genealogical analytic, the elements that constitute Foucault’s genealogy, the deployment of those elements in *Discipline and Punish*, and what these links offer educational research. In order to better appreciate the formation and development of Foucault’s genealogical analytic and how it might be deployed in educational research, this paper is divided into five parts: first, a review of the current literature engaging Foucault’s genealogy in education; second, an analysis of the connections between the conclusions of Foucault’s archaeological work and his political and personal experience that culminate in the clearest articulation of his genealogical analytic, the essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”; third, an unraveling of the essay in order to trace the methodological threadwork Foucault reveals; fourth, an analysis of the realization of the genealogical elements described in the essay as deployed in *Discipline and Punish*; and fifth, conclusions and insights offered for educational research.

Although Foucault expands upon and intensifies his genealogical analytic in his volumes on *The History of Sexuality* and the later lectures at the Collège de France, this study focuses on Foucault’s earlier work on genealogy to better capture its emergence rather than its later maturation in efforts to help potential researchers realize how they might formulate their own applications of Foucault’s analytic.
A Review of the Literature: Genealogy and Education

This first section of the article offers a review of some of the recent literature that applies Foucault’s genealogical analytic in various areas of educational research. In a conversation with Jana Sawicki, following the completion of her lengthy dissertation project applying his work to feminism, Foucault “suggested that I not spend energy talking about him and, instead, do what he was doing, namely, write genealogies” (Macey, 1993, p. 450). Based on his response to Sawicki, the importance of carrying on Foucault’s critical project is undeniable. Engaging in a genealogical study does not adhere to a methodological framework, but rather the approach becomes a vehicle for description of problems of the present. Although Foucault has not fully examined educational practices, the applicability of his genealogical work to the current situation in education reveals boundless potential for educational scholars to engage in a different type of analytical work. In fact, Tamboukou (1999) emphasizes that Foucault’s ingenuity lie not in his outlining of a genealogical method, but rather the prospects his pursuits open up for others. The questions that drive genealogical analysis “inspire the writing of new genealogies to interrogate the truths of our world” (p. 215). In this light, I offer a range of scholarship enlisting Foucault’s genealogy to present examples of the relevance of his approach and reveal possibilities for furthering his project through an investigation of taken-for-granted practices in education.

Ball has published extensively on Foucault and education; in fact, his (1991) edited volume was one of the first to highlight the value of Foucault’s work for the field of education. In one of the chapters, Marshall (1991) considers the place of genealogy in educational research, advising, “…a genealogical approach to education would involve
considerable shifts in methodology and outcomes” (p. 22), but due to the lack of a definitive methodology and inconsistency, he suggests focusing on its practical rather than theoretical applications to assess the present. In the same volume, with a genealogical study of the educational practices surrounding the emergence of physiology, Jones (1991) underscores the role of genealogy in its potential to disrupt causal historical narratives, to challenge conventional perceptions of contemporary society and provide alternative views, in addition to spotlighting the practices that enable certain types of subject. One of the main strengths of Ball’s edited book is that it offers potential researchers examples of a range of contexts in which genealogy may be employed as well as opening up a wide array potential areas of research for genealogical inquiry.

Meadmore et al. (2000) address some of the tensions involved in undertaking a genealogical investigation including the marginality of the approach in general due to its misunderstanding and misrepresentation in addition to the perceptual shift, as the present becomes the point of inquiry. This new vantage point affords researchers with the opportunity to view things differently. To this extent the authors provide three different contexts for the deployment of genealogy to demonstrate its utility, adaptability, and opportunity for an innovative research approach. Meadmore et al. (2000) do not conduct a comprehensive genealogy here; rather the article is focused on the possibility of genealogical inquiry, and have “aimed to make genealogy as a project, method, and politics more available as a research instrument for those interested in challenging ‘what is’” (p. 474). So, this article provides comprehensive overview of genealogy as well as tying in the experience of the authors in their employment of genealogical inquiry.
In more recent scholarship, Foucault’s genealogical analytic has been put to work in diverse areas of research in the field of education. Harwood and Rasmussen (2007) utilize what they describe as genealogical tactics to investigate the diagnosis of behavioral disorders and the essentializing of sexual identity in youths. Drawing on Rasmussen’s (2000) earlier work, they apply four angles of scrutiny developed out of Foucault’s genealogical elements: discontinuity, contingency, emergences, and subjugated knowledges to interrogate the ostensibly “smooth” history of conduct disorders. Here, genealogy becomes an effective means for challenging and breaking up the practices that produce essentializing notions of youth sexual identity. The authors do not directly transfer concepts from Foucault’s analytic toolkit; rather, they provide their interpretation of what they describe as “genealogical tactics” to investigate youth sexuality and psychopathology. They innovatively adapt Foucault’s analytics, retaining the tone of his genealogy while also tailoring to consider the truths being produced about identity.

Stuart (2009) applies genealogy to sketch the appearance of the word, “strategy” from its military origins to business and management, and here to its usage in the document, “A Ten-Year Strategic Plan for Early Childhood Education from 2002-2012”. Stuart uses genealogy to trace the history of the military language used in this document as a means to manage problematize certain groups of people, the unnamed Maori, the indigenous people of New Zealand who have been engaged in an ongoing political, economic, and social struggle with those who settled the islands later, primarily of European descent. Stuart effectively employs aspects of Foucault’s genealogical analytic to tease out the implications and complications of this educational policy and open up
new spaces for critical thought regarding how language is employed and the effects of its use.

Lesko (2012) writes what she describes as a “history of the present” of adolescence in *Act Your Age!: A Cultural Construction of Adolescence*. She problematizes the idea of adolescence as shaped by historical, social, political, and cultural influences and examines its construction in response to tensions about race, concern over male dominance, and a desire to strengthen nationalism. In doing so, Lesko (2012) seeks to interrupt the predominant characterizations of adolescence by identifying the interests and forces of early developmental psychology, uncovering the material practices that accompanied the scientific rethinking of adolescence, challenging the developmental construct, and finally address the changes that must take place to conceive of adolescents differently (p. 2). In aligning with Foucault’s history of the present, Lesko’s book calls into question widespread perceptions of adolescents by tracing alternative histories of how such conceptions have become commonplace.

Carlson and Albright (2012) write a critical history of writing assessment, namely the student portfolio, to investigate the struggle of power/knowledge to form and fashion student bodies and to challenge prevalent ideas in the history of secondary English education. They engage genealogy as a strategy to dismantle some of those forces that comprise the practice of the portfolio, “laced with the residue of the discourses and practices of the dispositive reveal the movements of power/knowledge” (Carlson and Albright, 2012, p. xviii). In order to determine how the portfolio became an authorized and accepted form of assessment, Carlson and Albright deploy genealogy, which they
describe as “comparative and uses history to offer a critical reflection in present taken-for-granted practices” (p. 203).

Vakirtzi and Bayliss (2013) look the emergence of the autistic subjectivity and the technology built around the subject utilizing Foucault’s work on archaeology and genealogy. In examining the emergence of the autistic subject with a genealogical lens, Vakirtzi and Bayliss look to relations of power to understand the production of psychiatry as a discipline and the phenomenon of autism as a discourse. In doing so, they reconsider the research and interventions based on the notion of the autistic subject as a medical body.

Anderson (2015) maintains that previous critiques of student participation projects fail to consider that this practice also represent a historical break with previous schooling practices. She employs genealogy to enhance the critique of these projects because Foucault’s approach offers the critical potential to focus on and question the central assumptions upon which modern practices are built through a history of the present.

Lastly, Christensen (2016) deploys genealogy as a critical approach in investigating some of the assumptions involved in the how the child is subjectified through the modern Danish education system. Genealogical investigation is used to understand how the child is subjectified both as an active individual and through the process and as the product of multiple documentation techniques for the tracking of student learning. Through genealogical analysis Christensen determines that there are certain individualizing and structuralizing tendencies embedded in educational practices.
which position students as subjects who are continually engaged in self-reflective and self-categorizing.

In a unique publication on Foucault and education, Ball (2013) engages in a self-reflective journey as he works through Foucault’s analytical tools to reveal a different history of an educational policy laced with racism and population management. Ball (2013) traces a genealogy of normalization, a genealogy of “exclusions and of blood” (p. 29) to reconsider policy, but also to narrate the “possibilities and costs” (p. 153) in committing to Foucault’s analytic design. The value of the personal dimension in undertaking a genealogical will be explored later in considering the importance of Foucault’s formative experiences in shaping his analytic.

The scholarship that utilizes Foucault’s genealogical analytic to investigate established educational practices offer examples of potential avenues for going about conducting genealogical research. The potential of genealogy offers a wide array of possibilities with which to problematize, challenge, and reconsider accepted conditions, assumptions, and practices in education. Foucault (1983) reminds us, “If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do” (pp. 231-232), so there is much open within the field of education to problematization and investigation. In order to more fully consider the applications of Foucault’s genealogy to education and enhance the undertaking of genealogical investigations, it is imperative to appreciate the role of the relationship between Foucault’s work and personal experiences in the development of his genealogical approach.
Cultivating Genealogy: “Something absolutely new” (Ewald, 2015)

This second section of the article outlines some of the transformative experiences that contributed to the cultivation of Foucault’s analytic in order to better consider the approach involved in pursuing a genealogical study. Appreciating the transitions in Foucault’s thought, political activism, and personal experiences from 1968 through 1975 provide additional layers of insight from which to consider Foucault’s engagements with genealogy in addition to undertaking one’s own genealogical study in education. Foucault did not simply transfer Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals to the prison; the kind of genealogical work Foucault deploys was only made possible through a period of tremendous change that reshaped how he approached the world and engaged in his work. In 1975, *Discipline and Punish* was published, a genealogical study of the emergence of the modern prison system. As one of Foucault’s most frequently cited works throughout educational research and reference for some of Foucault’s most influential conceptions, this seminal text is a realization of the genealogical work Foucault had been exploring in his lectures at the Collège de France and the outcome of the political activism that occupied the majority of his time outside the university. The years from 1968 leading up to the publication of *Discipline and Punish* in 1975 were transformational both professionally and personally for Foucault and are considered here to better appreciate how he cultivated his genealogical analytic. The importance of Foucault’s life outside of the university in shaping his genealogical work also emphasizes that genealogical thinking does not occur in isolation; it is a personal, dynamic, connected, experiential endeavor.
Political Activism

In 1966 Foucault took a position at the University of Tunis and remained there until the fall of 1968. During his stint, he worked on *The Archaeology of Knowledge* while lecturing; however, his work was soon overshadowed by the political turmoil that plagued Tunisia during and following the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Foucault soon found himself entangled in the violent conflict through his activist students as well as in his own encounters with police. Macey (1993) postulates that it was his experience in Tunisia that prompted his activism in the early 1970s upon his return to France (pp. 205-206).

Although Foucault was still in Tunis, Paris in May of 1968 was a time of tremendous political and social upheaval. Civil unrest was rampant, particular among students at universities in regards to an obsolete system as well as workers who also went on strike, resulting in demonstrations, protests, and occupations, many of which exploded in violence throughout the city. Although Foucault was not directly involved in the events in Paris, the legacy of what might be considered a social revolution prompted much of the activism that took place in France in the 1970s that sought reform for marginalized groups such as women, homosexuals, and prisoners.

Foucault became entwined with French politics, particularly those of the prison system and joined *the Groupe d'Information sur le Prisons’* (Prison Information Group), or *GIP*. The organization’s mission was to provide a voice for prisoners in addition to amassing and distributing information about the prison system based on first-hand accounts and interviews. The problem of prisons was very much a current issue with which Foucault was involved, thus notions of punishment occupied a pivotal role in Foucault’s research. A year after starting the *GIP*, Foucault also participated in the
beginnings of the GIS, *Groupe d’Information sur la Santé* (Health Information Group) in May 1972. Although Foucault was not a heavily involved in GIS, he still contributed to public discussions regarding the objectives of the organization and he helped to write the group’s manifesto nearing the end of 1972. His activism with the GIP and association with the GIS undoubtedly influenced his perspective concerning the issue of the prison and his continuing work lecturing at the Collège de France.

Foucault’s political involvement left him with little time for extra work, only allowing for his courses at the Collège de France, smaller pieces, and interviews, essentially creating a six-year gap in major publications which Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) regard as a self-imposed silence (p. 100), (Macey, 1993, 257-258). Although it is certainly the case that Foucault did not produce what might be regarded as a singular opus between 1969 and 1975, the years spanning this publication gap were hardly hushed; they were spent in earnest both directly and indirectly refining what would become his genealogical design and working through the problem of the prison and punishment, central to his second and third courses at the college, and of course, *Discipline and Punish*.

**The Power of Attica**

In April 1972, Foucault had an experience that was instrumental in making possible the kind of genealogical analysis of power relations that begins to take shape in his third course at the college, the 1973 lectures on *The Punitive Society* and then fully mobilized in *Discipline and Punish*. Foucault visited the prison at Attica, which he describes as an “immense machine”, a “phony fortress à la Disneyland”, “a curious mechanism of circular elimination” (1996c, pp. 113-114). This encounter with the inner
workings of the prison system was so intense for Foucault, that he came to the realization that the operations of power had to do more than simply repress; experiencing the prison in action led Foucault to realize that power had to be a productive force—power produces. This reimagining of power as a positive, productive force rather than one that is negative or repressive, would allow Foucault to undertake the type of genealogical analysis found in *Discipline and Punish*. This notion of power as a power that has the ability to do things, to produce effects functions at the core of Foucault’s genealogical thinking. As what becomes the heart of genealogy, the basis upon which this type of analysis operates, isolating the productivity of power becomes central to the genealogist’s enterprise. In an interview regarding his experience at Attica, Foucault’s transformation is discernable:

Well, the question that I ask myself now is the reverse: prison is an organization that is too complex to be reduced to purely negative functions of exclusion; its cost, its importance, the care that one takes in administering it, the justifications that one tries to give for it seems to indicate that it possesses positive functions. The problem is, then, to find out what role capitalist society has its penal system play, what is the aim that is sought, and what effects are produced by all these procedures for punishment and exclusion? What is their place in the economic process, what is their importance in the exercise and maintenance of power? What is their role in the class struggle? (1996c, p. 115).

Correspondingly, Bernauer (1990) underscores the magnitude of Foucault’s recasting of power and the stakes of this transformation, explaining that without this transformation, *Discipline and Punish* may have been a further extension of Foucault’s previous analyses.
of exclusion. Innovatively, reimagining power as productive transcends notions of confinement and exclusion, and instead, “his objective will be to decipher the workings of a power that perhaps might still manifest itself most clearly in a prison, but that operates throughout the whole of society” (p. 123).

This reconception of power is first evident in the 1973 lectures on *The Punitive Society* in response to the question of the existence of prisons, given their mass objection. Here, Foucault (2015) articulates a genealogical concern supported by the work of archaeology linked to the problem of prisons:

> Now it is a matter of finding the power relationships that made the historical emergence of something like the prison possible. After an archeological type of analysis, it is a matter of undertaking a dynastic, genealogical type of analysis, focusing on filiations on the basis of power relations” (p. 84).

Foucault pursues an investigation into the power relations that create the conditions for the prison to materialize and become accepted as the overall means for doling out penalties. Through genealogical analysis, Foucault examines the production of delinquency as a necessary instrument of power to curb the problem of illegalisms in society while simultaneously generating the notion of the psychological subject.

**Writing Genealogically**

To be able to fully proceed through an investigative genealogical prism, there was a period of philosophical negotiation and transformation between the archaeological method in which the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) and Foucault’s previous major publications are clearly expressions, and the integration, exploration and full deployment of genealogy. In considering Foucault’s political involvement in relation to his emerging
genealogical approach, it is also important to look at Foucault’s experience as a writer. François Ewald, long-time assistant to Foucault, perspicaciously captures the very personal, subjective dimension of the turmoil of this time period and its resonance in Foucault’s experience as a writer in the presentation, “Foucault and May ’68”. The political landscape unleashed conditions under which Foucault realized his previous approach to writing was no longer possible and so the practice of writing had to take on new meaning in a changed context. Ewald points to the metamorphic nature of the political climate as the catalyst for Foucault to reinvent himself and transform the creative capacity of his writing, engendering “something absolutely new” (Ewald, Hartcourt, & Velasco, 2015).

This transmogrification is discernable in Foucault’s inaugural lecture, *L’ordre du discours*, at the Collège de France on December 2, 1970, the contents of which establish some of the themes and corresponding implications that will direct his work in subsequent years. With discourse momentarily remaining at the center of his analysis, Foucault endeavors to examine the conditions, activities, and effects that make possible the production of discourse. Here, Foucault offers an interesting proposition to execute this project; he suggests a working relationship between the archaeological approach with a genealogical complement through this examination of the production of discourse. In doing so, both descriptions, “alternate, support and complete each other” (Foucault, 2010a, p. 234). The partnership Foucault suggests here is somewhat eclipsed by what becomes an expansion of the core of his genealogical approach: power relations; however, Foucault was certainly working through all of these ideas simultaneously.
Considering Foucault’s personal and political experience, research on prisons, and reimagining of power as productive, Foucault offers an explanation for the reconciliation:

Prisons convinced me that power should not be considered in terms of law but in terms of technology, in terms of tactics and strategy, and it was this substitution of a technical and strategical grid for a legal and negative grid that I tried to set up in *Discipline and Punish*, and then use in *History of Sexuality*. So that I would rather willingly abandon everything in the order of discourse that might present the relations of power to discourse as negative mechanisms of rarefaction” (1996d, pp. 207-208).

With this acknowledgement, tactics and strategy become the tools for contending with some of the social issues and concerns that Foucault was unable to previously probe. So, the archaeological emphasis of discourse is reassessed and Foucault’s analytic is infused with a diagnostic of power relations; albeit, the archaeological mode still retains importance with the identification of discontinuities and the recognition and dissipation of interpretations, although discourse is no longer central and relations of power, namely, power-knowledge, becomes key to analysis. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) ultimately attribute the insufficiency of archaeology to two shortcomings: first, the inability of the rules that regulate discursive systems to explain the effects of social institutions, and second, the failure of archaeology to bring the critical weight needed to contend with the social and political issues that are at the forefront of Foucault’s concerns at this time (pp. xxiv-xxv). Foucault’s work in the 1970s assuredly retains some of the character of his previous forays; however, the publication of *Discipline and Punish* undeniably heralds an
intensified dimension of work through a genealogical lens as indicated by the centrality of power relations to his analyses.

Foucault did not just embark on a genealogical analysis to write *Discipline and Punish*; this incredibly influential work was made possible through a time of tremendous transformation. The complexities involved in the formation of Foucault’s genealogical analytic shed some light on why he does not offer a structure, a framework, or a solidified methodology. Engaging in this type of thought and writing is an experiential, transformative, dynamic experience. Foucault (2000a), of course, explains it better in describing the explorative nature of writing one of his books:

If I had to write a book to communicate what I’m already thinking before I begin to write, I would never have the courage to begin. I write a book only because I still don’t know exactly what to think about this thing I want so much to think about, so that the book transforms me and transforms what I think (pp. 239-240).

Although undertaking a Foucauldian genealogical investigation may absolutely be a metamorphic experience that eschews a formulaic execution, Foucault does furnish a description of the elements of his genealogy in his essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”. This text is the closest Foucault ever comes to anything resembling methodology and for any scholar endeavoring to conduct genealogical work in education in the style of Foucault, an invaluable description of its fundamental elements.

*Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*: Influences and Elements

This third portion of the article focuses on two aspects of Foucault’s reverberant essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” to better situate the one piece which comes closest to Foucault articulating something that approaches methodology. The threads of
all of Foucault’s genealogical work can be traced to this essay, making it the most important reference for understanding Foucault’s approach and undertaking one’s own genealogical project. To better facilitate the process of pursuing a genealogical study in education, this portion of the article is organized into two sections: the first briefly traces the constellation of influences that contributed to Foucault’s thinking in his resonant essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in order to further situate the circumstances that made possible Foucault’s genealogical analytic and the second part provides a description of the essential features that comprise Foucault’s genealogy, the indispensible elements of a genealogical investigation. This section offers educational researchers a frame of reference for Foucault’s thought and a summary and analysis of Foucault’s interpretation and mobilization of Nietzsche’s genealogical elements.

**Systems of Thought: Hyppolite and Nietzsche**

“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” first appeared in *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite* (1971), an anthology posthumously dedicated to the philosopher and scholar to whom Foucault is “indebted” (2010a, p. 235), perhaps a harbinger not just in its content but also in its original publication residence. Hyppolite supervised Foucault’s thesis and was one of Foucault’s first philosophy teachers, with whom he first studied in 1945 at the Henri IV Lycee. Foucault succeeded Hyppolite at the Collège de France, honoring his chair by appropriating “History of Systems of Thought” from Hyppolite’s chair title. Although Foucault’s adaptation of genealogy is obviously Nietzschean, the publication space of what can be cautiously indicated as the most methodologically descriptive essay in an honorary volume dedicated to Hyppolite is highly significant as it is outlines threads of Foucault’s own *Herkunft* and establishes his genealogical *Enstehung*. Foucault (2010a)
held Hyppolite in the highest regard, and framed his first lecture at the college with the gravity of his absence and dedicated his subsequent work in his honor:

It is because I have borrowed both the meaning and the possibility of what I am doing from him; because, often, he enlightened me when I struck out blindly; because I would like to dedicate my work to him, that I end this presentation of my projected work by invoking the name of Jean Hyppolite (p. 237).

The content of this essay holds great import for the trajectory of Foucault’s work as it clearly indicates his refocused attention on the genealogical in addition to demarcating his debt to Nietzsche’s genealogical thought. The breadth of Nietzsche’s work is extensive; however, Mahon (1992) explains that Nietzsche, the genealogist, is paramount in Foucault’s work:

The Nietzsche who is so important to Foucault, first, is Nietzsche the genealogist, the one who problematized truth as intimately entwined with relations of power, who sought a multiplicity of relations of forces at the origin of our taken-for-granted values and concepts and even the things we experience (p. 2).

Nietzsche held great importance for Foucault early on, grating against a landscape dominated by Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. Here, Foucault (1988) describes the significance Nietzsche held for him early in his life: “Nietzsche was a revelation to me. I felt that there was someone quite different from what I had been taught. I read him with a great passion and broke with my life, left my job in the asylum, left France: I had the feeling I had been trapped. Through Nietzsche, I had become a stranger to all that” (p. 13). The influence of Nietzsche on Foucault’s thought is
capsulized with this essay and reaches a new profundity with the full mobilization of
genealogy with *Discipline and Punish* followed by *The History of Sexuality* the next year.

During the spring of 1973, Foucault traveled to Brazil to offer a series of five
lectures, where a variety of topics were discussed, including Nietzsche’s genealogy,
centering on a theme of “Truth and Juridical Forms”. Here, Foucault (2000d) credits his
source of inspiration:

> It would have been possible, and perhaps more honest, to cite only one name, that
of Nietzsche, because what I say here won’t mean anything if it isn’t connected to
Nietzsche’s work, which seems to me to be the best, the most effective, the most
pertinent of the models that one can draw upon (p. 5).

Furthermore, one of the reasons for the choice of the prison and punishment, more
specifically, a question of “how” rather than “what”, led Foucault to consider, “*how does
one punish?*” as part of his research projects can in part also be indebted to Nietzsche:

> My second reason for wanting to study the prison was the idea of reactivating the
project of a ‘genealogy of morals’, one which worked by tracing the lines of
transformation of what one might call ‘moral technologies’…It’s a method which
seems to me to yield, I wouldn’t say the maximum of possible illumination, but at
least a fairly fruitful kind of intelligibility (2000b, p. 224).

Foucault refines the spectrum of his analytic in the early 1970s, evident
throughout his lectures at the Collège de France. The publication of *Discipline and
Punish* stands as a culminating genealogical moment of scholarship and functions as part
of an ongoing project within the trajectory of his larger body of work. Foucault’s
genealogy clearly echoes Nietzsche’s, but unquestionably establishes its own innovations and insights, framed in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”.

**Foucault’s Genealogy**

Foucault (1977) delineates genealogy at one point as “gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary” (p. 139) focused on three objectives. First, genealogy extracts and examines events not on a continuum, but as individual occurrences. Second, the search for these events is conducted in historically unorthodox places, with an analytical lens for the intangible, abstract, and ethereal. And third, genealogy brings to light instances which were never sparked and moments of dormant potential. The three objectives of a genealogical endeavor requires of its practitioner diligence, attention to precision, archival acumen, and scholarly commitment. Genealogy writes a different type of history, an “effective history” through a rejection of origins (*Ursprung*), and instead proceeds through an analysis of descent (*Herkunft*) and emergence (*Entstehung*).

**Wirkliche Historie.** As opposed to the course of a traditional history, which employs suprahistorical and teleological perspectives, Foucault looks to Nietzsche’s *wirkliche Historie*, a coalescence of history and genealogy, as descent and emergence, to provide a more candid account. The path from traditional to “effective history” is one of fracture and disconnect that uses knowledge not for understanding but for cutting (Foucault, 1977, p. 154). Effective history pursues events produced through random collisions that overturn force relationships in the ahistorical inverted universe. This history meanders though “a profusion of entangled events” all of which are unfixed and in flux while affirming our latent suspicions in “our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or point of reference” (Foucault, 1977, p. 155). Effective
history also has a unique relationship with proximity and distance. In order to avoid recounting events and ideas from the lofty lily pad, effective history studies that which is closest, such as the body, only to hold it from afar and examine it aerially. Particular to effective history is also the inclusion and disclosure of the historian’s bent and bias. In this way, historical intuition, unhampered knowledge, and awareness play a key role in genealogical analysis. The notion of an alternative or anti-history and the idea of the presence of the researcher are of particular importance to the educational scholar who wishes to reveal different explanations for pedagogical assumptions.

Dean (1994) describes Foucault’s history as effective as it “upsets the colonisation of historical knowledge by the schemas of a transcendental and synthetic philosophy of history” (p. 20) and as critical inasmuch as it has the “capacity to engage in the tiresless interrogation of what is help to be given, necessary, natural, or neutral” (p. 20). In their critical history, Carlson and Albright (2012) investigate writing assessment and through genealogy, interrogate the battle of power/knowledge to govern student bodies in secondary English education. Their critical history of writing assessment seeks “to expose these contestations, while dismantling claims of agency, progressivism, conventionalism, and liberation” (Carlson and Albright, 2012 p. xxi). Rejecting a history built on progress and continuity has the potential to disrupt and dismantle the countless justifications and rationales for the perpetuation of certain educational practices.

**Ursprung.** Following Nietzsche’s challenge of the notion of “origin” or *Ursprung*, as a springboard, Foucault positions genealogy as a fundamentally divergent endeavor. Origin pursuits seek to uncover pure, perfect, and protected essentialisms that require anchoring in the impossibility of a fixed existence. Genealogy instead, disavows any
notions of an immovable reality and dismisses capsulized elixirs of truth; the genealogist, rather, reveals “the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms” (Foucault, 1977, p. 142). Citing examples of the history of reason and the invention of liberty, Foucault asserts that dissension and disparity are found at the origin of things, not a story of sanctity (1977, p. 143).

Furthermore, the purity and piety associated with the search for origins, Foucault contends, is denudated by evolution. The concept of the origin then becomes a site of truth production and dispersion where truth is recorded and rerecorded through iterations of productive truth discourses, which work to obscure any actual notions of truth. The genealogy displaces and dismisses notions of origins and instead, undertakes an alternate pursuit of history. This is where the work begins for the educational scholar who isolates seemingly humane traditions and the credence given to those practices fixed in the curriculum. The educational genealogist turns to a different path of “origin”, a pursuit of **Herkunft** and **Entstehung**, the analytic dyad through which genealogical inquiry takes place.

**Herkunft.** Foucault restores an understanding of the notion of origin, expounding on Nietzsche’s concept of **Herkunft**, also meaning origin, but a different type of origin—that of descent, which can be traced through individuals, ideas, and ultimately, carved onto the body. First, Foucault describes a densely populated accumulation of engravings etched by family lines, tradition, race, and social status, all of which leave their markings on individuals for genealogy to reveal. Second, an analysis of descent allows for certain ideas that are valued to be understood through events that make possible their existence. This search maintains events in their singular existence rather than on a timeline.
trajectory, looks for subtle deviations or more patent reversals and errors, and fractures foundations in order to reveal “truth or being” in “the exteriority of accidents” (Foucault, 1977, p. 146). Third, as a tenacious recorder of all of the experiences and encounters to which it bears witness, past and present, descent decisively culminates in the body. Here, Foucault locates the project of genealogy: “Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the body” (1977, p. 148).

Entstehung. Through his explication of Entstehung or emergence, Foucault further delineates the duty of genealogy: to record the history of interpretations. The surviving interpretations are the product of those who have been able to successfully capture, twist, alter, and replace the previous rules. Rules become vessels for various forces to engage in “the hazardous play of dominations” (Foucault, 1977, p. 148). These relationships of forces enact “meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations”, “establish marks of its power”, and “engraves memories on things and even within bodies,” coming to a boil in the instance of emergence (Foucault, 1977, p. 150). This moment of arising exists autonomously and becomes an undesignated space for “substitutions, displacement, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals” to detonate (Foucault, 1977, p. 151).

The notion of emergence in genealogy is a point of departure for Foucault as compared to Nietzsche’s genealogy. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) underscore that Foucault looks at the site of emergence as a space generated through practices which operate through force relations or strategies, whereas Nietzsche anchors social
institutions in the strategic acts of individuals (p. 109). For Foucault’s work, this places more emphasis on the notion of space, as exemplified by his detailed analysis of Bentham’s Panopticon in *Discipline and Punish* and minimizes the role of individual who is instead subjectified through various societal practices and procedures, as is the space in which the relationships of domination play out. To better discern the working potential of descent and emergence in an educational genealogy, this next section is devoted to the operationalization of the elements of Foucault’s genealogy in *Discipline and Punish*.

**Tracing Genealogy: *Discipline and Punish***

Although Foucault illuminates the elements of genealogy in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in his uniquely insightful and eloquent fashion, connecting his descriptions to the project of undertaking one’s own genealogical study in education would be aided by appreciating those elements at work in *Discipline and Punish*. The above outline of the cultivated erudition through *Herkunft* and *Enstehung* required for genealogical analysis can be better viewed, expanded, and examined through their mobilization in his genealogy of the modern prison. As one of the most frequently referenced Foucauldian texts in educational research, this text offers a profound fulfillment of the genealogical analytic outlined in the essay. In the opening section, Foucault (1995), reveals the scope of his ambitious project:

> This book is intended as a correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge; a genealogy of the present scientifical-legal complex from which the power to punish derives its bases, justifications and rules, from which it extends and effects and by which it masks its exorbitant singularity (p. 23).
Foucault follows the descent of modern punitive practices from the middle eighteenth century, established with the dichotomy at the onset of *Discipline and Punish* isolating two discrepant episodes of criminal treatment. First, the excruciating episode of Damiens’ execution, an excerpt from a system in which the body is judged, sentenced, and publicly punished through torture. Second, a time-table of the daily agenda for the prisoner, exemplifying a penal structure where attempts are made to control, manage, and reform the body, through the soul. Foucault juxtaposes these “alien forms” as blatantly divergent approaches in punishment to reveal a fundamental rupture in penal practices. The space informing what made these distinctive events possible within a relatively short span of time and the field between these two markers is what Foucault intends to interrogate. He maintains that we have been all too quick to credit this drastic transformation to humanization discourses, necessitating further inquiry pursuant to the rather sudden vanishing of the public spectacle of torture. He describes a new type of power that emerges with the modern prison system in the form on discipline and norming that catalyzes the transformation of the punishment of the body to the reformation of the soul, “the prison of the body” (1995, p. 30).

Reflecting on the “philosophical fragments” offered by his work in *Discipline and Punish* in a 1978 interview, Foucault discusses his analysis of the descent and emergence of contemporary prison practices. His examination targets and traces the “regimes of practices”, which he explains as “places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect”, that make possible the emergence and acceptance of the manner in which imprisonment perpetuates in modern society (2000b, p. 225). Foucault describes these practices as “not
just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances—whatever role these elements may actually play—but possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and ‘reason’” (2000b, p. 225). Stretching out this space allows Foucault to conduct an analysis of descent. Foucault’s examination of descent is carried out in three exhibitions: first, he traces the disappearance of torture; second, the humanization of punishment; and third, their culmination in the flesching out of the time-table: discipline, docility, and panopticism, all of which synergize to create the conditions for the emergence of the modern prison system and the assembly of a new soul.

Appreciating Foucault’s description of descent and emergence in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” and their subsequent deployment in Discipline and Punish enhances the understanding of the genealogical analytical features in order to better investigate descent and emergence in one’s own genealogical study in education. In addition to the importance of descent and emergence in conducting a genealogical investigation are some further elements of Foucault’s descriptions including the significance of his singular notion, power-knowledge, the implication of the psychological fields, the role of the body, and the idea of space.

**Power-Knowledge.** Recognizing the centrality of the relations of power-knowledge in creating the conditions of possibility for the emergence of practices in education is critical to conducting a genealogical study. Although Foucault examines power and knowledge his previous works, it is his unique conception of the reciprocal relation of power and knowledge that distinguishes his analysis. The force relations of power-knowledge are what make possible the emergence of the modern prison system.
Foucault explains that the forces of power and knowledge are interlaced accomplices; they “directly imply one another” and are reciprocally ignitable: “Power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field on knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (1995, pp. 27-28). Power-knowledge functions as the linchpin in Foucault’s (1995) analytic schema operating on a grid of power relations mobilized through “dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings” (p. 26). This interface of power relations is active and constantly in flux:

Relations of power are strategic relations. Every time one side does something, the other one responds by deploying a conduct, a behavior that counter-invests it, tries to escape it, diverts it, turns the attack against itself, etc. Thus nothing is ever stable in these relations of power (1996e, p. 144)

In fact, power-knowledge, as it is reshaped throughout history, is responsible for the domains of all possible fields of knowledge; it delineates what is knowable be at a given time and place. So, in tracing lines of punishment, Foucault locates the power-knowledge relations that allow and perpetuate the conditions for a new scientific and legal assembly. Later, Foucault (1980) will describe the amassing of these relations of forces and the “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions…” (p. 194) through which they circulate as dispositif, translated as apparatus. These elaborate forces coalesce to shape the field of psychology and accompanying techniques for disciplining and normalizing the body. Here, psychology-related fields appear as more than just a practice; they are entangled in proliferating
practices and give rise and take returns on other discourses and fields of knowledge. Interrogating the interstice which psychology occupies is one of the aims of Foucault’s genealogy of the modern soul. The ability to isolate and trace the descent and emergence of pedagogical phenomena demands attentiveness to the interplay of power-knowledge relations in addition to an awareness of the psychological implications that are woven into educational practices.

**The Body.** Undertaking an analysis of the educational body may be better enhanced with the understanding of Foucault’s commitment to the centrality of the body to genealogy, spotlighted in *Discipline and Punish*. Foucault illuminates a shift that occurs in penal styles within a span of eighty years, and it is the transformation in treatment of the prisoner’s body and the shift from body to soul that Foucault subjects to analysis. Foucault (1995) maintains that punishment can be located in the “political economy” of the body, and that regardless of the style of punishment employed, “it is always the body that is at issue—the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission” (p. 25). And, in outlining the “general rules” for his genealogy, Foucault aims “to discover whether this entry of the soul on to the scene of penal justice, and with it the insertion in legal practice of a whole corpus of ‘scientific’ knowledge, is not the effect of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations” (1995, p. 24). These power relations operate on a political grid and economic field animated by a microphysics of power institutions and practices that penetrate the body. Through forced productivity and imposed subjection, the body is made, molded, and manipulated by power relations. This is accomplished through a knowledge and mastery of the body, what Foucault terms, the “political technology of the
body” within the larger “body politic”, clearing the arteries for power-knowledge to circulate. The pedagogical body can also be understood through this mode of analysis, as it becomes a privileged meeting site for descent and emergence engraved with countless educational practices and caught between the interplay of instructional forces. In looking at how Foucault isolates the body as the location for political technologies of power to work, it is worth noting how this compares to the body for Nietzsche’s genealogy. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) explain Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche’s concept of the body as one of total malleability provided the proper procedures; however, for Foucault, the body must also be able to absorb and retain the techniques applied to it, so there must be some stability to the body if it is to carry out the tasks entrusted to it through the techniques of disciplinary power (pp. 110-111).

**Space.** The space that surrounds and engages the pedagogical body is also critical to genealogical analysis. In considering the importance space holds for the body, Foucault (1995) weaves a visual history into his larger genealogical project scrutinizing “the political investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture” (p. 31). The genealogical threads braiding space, discipline, and power are united in the Panopticon for Foucault (1996a), who recognized that Bentham, who theorized the scope of the design, “invented a technology of power capable of resolving the problems of surveillance…Bentham considered his optical procedure to be the major innovation needed for the easy and effective exercise of power” (p. 227). For Foucault, the architecture of the Panopticon became the ultimate space where disciplinary power manifested.
Flynn (1994) examines Foucault’s innovative approach to history as a type of historical cartography, and in doing so, highlights Foucault’s application of spatial reasoning with his description of Bentham’s Panopticon. He underscores the explanatory efficacy of Foucault’s spatial descriptions and their contribution to his overall historical analysis: “…now the line of sight is **strategic**, not just descriptive; the contours inscribe the relations of control, not just forms of intelligibility. The space has become genealogical” (pp. 41-42). Foucault’s vivid descriptions and their bearing on his larger genealogical project further relieve him of more traditional progressive history constraints and create additional room for genealogy to work:

His shift from time to space as the paradigm guiding his approach to historical topics counters the totalizing, teleological method favored by standard histories of ideas, with their appeal to individual and collective consciousness and to a ‘tangled network on influences’” (Flynn, 1994, p. 41).

The ideas of space and topography are given generous consideration in the work of Deleuze. In describing Foucault as “A New Cartographer”, Deleuze (1988) illuminates Foucault’s (1995) use of the notion, “diagram”; a word Foucault only uses twice, first to refer to the military camp as “the diagram of a power that acts by a means of general visibility” (p. 171) and second, to depict the how the Panopticon functions:

But the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use (p. 205).
Deleuze (1988) depicts Foucault’s diagram as “highly unstable”, “fluid”, “intersocial”, and “constantly evolving”, and more intensely as, “the diagram or abstract machine is the map of relations between forces, a map of destiny, or intensity, which proceeds by primary non-localizable relation and at every moment passes through every point…” (pp. 34-36). The notion of the diagram exists both individually and as part and parcel of a perpetually proliferating collection of diagrammables; a meticulous plexus for the circulation of power relations, for knowledge to materialize and coalesce, for bodies to be compartmentalized, observed, trained, and disciplined.

Foucault’s vivid description of the space of the Panopticon as an ultimate enabler of disciplinary power relations offers a rich model from which researchers may draw descriptive potential to characterize the spaces that educational phenomena occupy. A detailed description of the space illuminating the stage on which power relations are activated in education highlights another important dimension from which to describe pedagogical practices and institutions.

**Countermemory.** One of the most valuable insights the work of genealogy provides is a countermemory to the traditional, progressive, continuous depictions that lay claim to the recounting of history. The notion of a counterhistory is crucial for educational research as it offers an alternative way of rereading pedagogical practices that are embedded and accepted in the curriculum. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault offers a compelling countermemory of the transformation of punishment spanning the age of torture, sovereign power, and the spectacle—the flesh, bone, and blood of the body through a warp of humanist rhetoric and reform to the formations of a modern penal system that disciplines and yields a new soul with dossiers and a gaze. With his powerful
recounting of the transmogrification of punishment, Foucault presents a challenge to reconsider what is taken for granted, the assumptions upon which our daily existence is built, to reimagine what appears ‘normal’. Foucault (1995) concludes his genealogy of the prison with an open invitation to take up and continue his critical project on “the power of normalization and the formation of knowledge in modern society” (p. 308).

Genealogies in education take on the critical role of providing an alternative narrative of pedagogical processes and procedures that have become assumed and normalized. As the institution through which the great majority of individuals are made subjects through the practices of education, the traditional, accepted, and authorized practices are rife for genealogical investigation.

Conclusions: Thinking Genealogically

In taking a closer look at the literature mobilizing Foucault’s genealogy in education, the experiences and influences that contributed to the shaping of Foucault’s genealogical analytic, the elements of his genealogical design, their subsequent realization in Discipline and Punish, and their ties to the field of education, I have sought to establish a fuller viewpoint from which to approach one’s own genealogical project. Thinking genealogically in education through a field of problems opens multiple avenues from which to pursue this critical project. With the discussion in this paper of the elements of genealogy in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” and their actualization in Discipline and Punish, Foucault provides the analytic tools with which to interrogate the current situation of education. Appreciating the experiential dimension of the shaping of Foucault’s genealogical thinking also conveys the importance of reflexivity in conducting this type of research. Thinking genealogically in education means thinking differently,
considering alternatives, reimagining how practices are carried out. Did it have to be this way? Does it have to continue to be this way? Rethinking pedagogical practices through a genealogical prism breaks up an educational foundation built on a history of progression. Widening cracks and fissures for genealogical interrogation in educational contexts unlocks opportunities for revision, reconsideration, and rewriting how we educate. In doing so, the absence of a prescriptive methodology may present a challenge; however, engaging in a Foucauldian genealogy is an experiential, intellectual journey that allows scholars to critically engage with a certain freedom. Here, Tamboukou (1999) highlights this aspect of a genealogical undertaking:

I have come to the conclusion that there is no way of truly understanding what genealogy is about, other than by concentrating on genealogy per se, analysing it in its minor details, reaching the most remote points of its network, revealing the hidden micro-mechanisms of its operation, grasping the most delicate aspects of its theorization. This is the first stage that inevitably leads to the adventure of writing one’s own genealogy” (p. 211).

I have endeavored to work through this “first stage” in order to navigate the absence of a methodological map. Frankly, to conform the magnitude of Foucault’s critical project to a restrictive method seems somewhat antithetical to his efforts. So, “Does Michel Foucault have a ‘method’?” I will leave the last word to him:

I like to open up a space of research, try it out, and then if it doesn’t work, try again somewhere else. On many points—I am thinking especially of the relations between dialectics, genealogy, and strategy—I am still working and don’t yet know whether I am going to get anywhere. What I say ought to be taken as
“propositions,” “game openings” where those who may be interested are invited to join in—they are not meant as dogmatic assertions that have to be taken or left en bloc. My books aren’t treatises in philosophy or studies of history; at most, they are philosophical fragments put to work in a historical field of problems (Foucault, 2000b, pp. 223-224).

Foucault undoubtedly offers us “philosophical fragments to put to work”. In endeavoring to draw some of those fragments closer together, this article sought to explore some of the links between Foucault’s influential experiences, his delineation of genealogy, its realization in Discipline and Punish, and the potential areas of connectivity of genealogy to educational research.
References


CHAPTER 3

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PUNITIVE SOCIETY

Introduction

Foucault presented thirteen courses at the Collège de France from January 1971 until his death in June 1984. The lectures on The Punitive Society was Foucault’s third course following the lectures on the Will to Know in 1971 and Penal Theories and Institutions in 1972. Despite Foucault’s indication of no posthumous publications in a letter a year prior to his death that was later determined to constitute his will, his request has been interpreted by the managers of his estate to include work that surfaced in some form during his lifetime, thus the continual appearance of texts, including all of the thirteen courses at the Collège de France in French and eleven translated into English.

As the latest published series of lectures from Foucault’s courses at the Collège de France, The Punitive Society offers educational scholars multiple avenues from which to re/consider various aspects of their areas of study. One of the most significant aspects of these lectures are the thematic and temporal relationship to Discipline and Punish, the most frequently cited and referenced of Foucault’s texts throughout educational research. Scholars who have incorporated aspects of Discipline and Punish into their work, particularly Foucault’s description of disciplinary power, will undoubtedly find illuminative supports, connections, and insights from these lectures, as they were given while Foucault was working on a draft of the influential text and at the height of his political activism.

In order to better facilitate the application of this fresh text to various studies in the field of education, this paper is organized into four sections. First, I contextualize the
course, situating it within and against the intellectual landscape in which Foucault was working as well as providing an overview of his political involvement with prison and health reform movements, which thematically inform the content of the lectures. Second, I summarize the main aspects of the lectures, introducing the content in response to the genealogical question of how the prison system became authorized and accepted as universal punishment. Here, I outline the prevailing penal theory, the notion of the criminal as social enemy, the element of the penitentiary, aspects of parapenal control, the theory of illegalisms, and the body of the worker. Third, I relate these lectures to Foucault’s other works, drawing connections to the previous years lectures, Penal Theories and Institutions, the Brazil lectures given directly after The Punitive Society, Truth and Juridical Forms, his essay, “Force of Flight”, and of course, Discipline and Punish. And last, I highlight thematic lines from Foucault’s concept of positive, productive power, developed in the lectures, which serve as a connector to other aspects of research. To this end, I provide an example using the literacy practice of close reading. These lectures undoubtedly stand on their own as a self-contained analysis of the emergence of the modern prison system; however, educational researchers who engage Foucault’s disciplinary power in their work find will that these lectures offer an enriched reading and multifaceted understanding of Foucault’s unique analyses of power.

Context

Lectures on The Punitive Society

The Punitive Society was published in French in May 2013 and then translated by Graham Burchell into English, first available in September 2015. Bernard Harcourt, the
editor of *The Punitive Society* lectures as well as *Penal Theories and Institutions*, assembled the text based on Foucault’s notes and the transcriptions of Jaqueline Germé. Foucault would lecture from his notes and requested that Germé compile a typed manuscript based on Gilbert Burlet’s recordings of the lectures, which Foucault would then edit; however, there are currently no recordings in existence of the 1973 lectures—only Germé’s typescript remains. Following the lectures and course summary, Harcourt provides an insightful contextualization of the lectures in addition to detailed notes throughout the lectures to indicate omitted or altered passages, provide clarification, and flesh out incomplete text.

The lectures on *The Punitive Society* were given from January 3, 1973 through March 28, 1973, a highly politically active time for Foucault. In addition to numerous interviews, published responses, articles, and the essay, “The Force of Flight” complementing Rebeyrolle’s paintings, the course was soon followed by the completion of a draft of *Discipline and Punish* in April, the lectures on *Truth and Juridical Forms* in Brazil in May, and a course summary, later published in the *Annuaire du Collège de France*, most likely written in June. Since Foucault would summarize the course a few months after it ended, it allowed him time to illuminate some of the more salient aspects of the lectures. In fact, the summary here has clear lines to *Discipline and Punish*, particularly Foucault’s discussion of what he describes as a new physics of power which outlines a new optics, mechanics, and physiology that emerges alongside the modern prison system.

Foucault dedicates the lectures to the preparation of *Moi, Pierre Rivière* for publication, a two-year project with which Foucault and his weekly exclusive seminar
group were immersed at the college. Rivière’s case was captivating; despite generally being regarded as unintelligent, Rivère composed a highly detailed statement following his murder of his mother, brother, and sister to be used in compiling a psychiatric report. The distinguished group synthesized an outline and frame for the collection to illuminate the case with Rivère’s account, legal and medical documents, news articles, and depositions. Legal and psychiatric discourses merge with Rivière’s intimate statement, enrapturing the seminar for the entirety of their study and preparation of the dossier.

**Relationship with Marxism**

In the lectures, Foucault interrogates the conditions of possibility in which the prison emerges, catalyzed by a recasting of power as productive that may be understood as a rebuttal, resistance, and/or departure from a Marxist intellectual panorama. Foucault’s writing on and around the prison system in these lectures open new lines of analysis propelled by his reconsideration of power that very much liberate him from the Marxist discourse that permeated French intellectual culture. With his reimagining of power, Foucault responds to the binary notion of class struggle, the equation of man and labor, and through an insinuation of Althusser’s work on ideology, the generative abilities of power and knowledge. The tension of Foucault from his intellectual surroundings becomes a point of departure for illuminative analysis on the prison system and the society in which it is located.

Foucault’s first departure reconceptualizes the class struggle into a class relationship positioned in the midst of civil warfare. In the very first lecture, Foucault (2015) underscores the idea of civil warfare as crucial to grasping the political struggle around which power functions, describing it as “the matrix of all struggles of power, of
all strategies of power, and, consequently, it is also the matrix of all the struggles regarding and against power” (p. 13). For Foucault, civil war is able to exist through the relationship between classes, a supplanting of the concept of a binary class struggle between the dominant and dominated. He acknowledges the presence of a class that maintains a privileged position, but as the result of accumulated tactical victories not through the possession, but the exercise of power. The differing analysis of class dominance compared to a class relationship opens a new vantage point from which to consider and describe class.

Foucault also responds to the equation of labor and man’s concrete essence by reevaluating it as an effect through a different analysis of power. Instead, he asserts that the time of man is driven by instincts that seek indulgence, leisure, and irregularity. The system of sequestration is then employed over the lifetime to convert this wild energy into labor power by affixing men to the apparatus of production, resulting in the appearance of man’s time as labor and thus, the desired effect is produced. The insertion of the system of sequestration between man and labor enacted through a coercive timeline of institutions and normalization becomes a catalyst for acceptability of the equation. Foucault will continue to expand this argument a few months later in the last lecture of *Truth and Juridical Forms*.

Foucault also responds to, without directly addressing Althusser’s work on ideology, which expands on Marx’s theory of the State. Foucault takes issue with the direction of ideological power of the state apparatuses being expressed in a pure state of violence or in the masked manner of discourse. Instead, Foucault complicates this bifurcation with the reciprocal activation of power and knowledge: wherever power is
exercised, knowledge is generated and vice versa. Sites of power and knowledge work to form an intricate and extensive network of practices operating through multifarious institutions and apparatuses.

Foucault’s flight from the Marxist-laden landscape is made apparent throughout this course as he cultivates a divergent lens for describing power through the materialization of the modern prison. These points of departure captured throughout the text in Foucault’s reimagining of the class struggle, the effect of man’s tethering to labor, and the proliferative relationship of power and knowledge become fertile areas to explore Foucault’s relationship to his intellectual context.

**Political Life**

The chronology of Foucault’s political life has been recounted in innumerable biographies; however, the publication of this connecting course provides a more direct consideration of the confluence of Foucault’s activism and research. In addition to his academic responsibilities at the Collège de France, much of Foucault’s time in the early 1970s was spent on his political involvement in the GIP, *Groupe d’information sur les prisons*, (Prison Information Group), which he cofounded in 1971. The organization sought to create opportunity for prisoners to speak for themselves about their experience in order to disseminate as far and widely the “intolerable” conditions in prison. Foucault soon found himself involved in meetings, appearances, protests, and press engagements to promote the group’s purpose of gathering and publicizing information in efforts to highlight the deplorable state of prisons. Although the goal of the group was meant to amplify the voices of prisoners, Foucault was at the center of the organization’s activities with his apartment even becoming a hub for mobilization as a center for gatherings,
interviews, and location for questionnaire collection and publication distribution. The GIP advanced a cause about which Foucault was deeply passionate; however, it occupied a great deal of his time and energy. Following the publication of *Suicides de prison*, a recounting of prison-related suicides that occurred in 1972 with a corresponding collection of victim case histories, it was determined that the group’s objective was met and the GIP was dissolved by the end of 1972, right at the start of *The Punitive Society* lectures.

Although Foucault had some early experience in institutional settings, Foucault’s work with the GIP and interaction with those who were involved in the prison system in the two years prior to these lectures, had undoubtedly colored his views of the modern prison. These perceptions would take shape in the previous year’s lectures, *Penal Theories and Institutions*, of course, in *The Punitive Society*, and then would culminate in *Discipline and Punish*. The relationship would also flow in the opposite direction with Foucault’s research informing his work and interaction with the GIP.

In the year following the initiation of the GIP, Foucault also became involved in the early work of the GIS, *Groupe d’Information sur la Santé* (Health Information Group) in May 1972. He participated in round-table discussions concerning the aims of the organization and contributed to the group’s manifesto, composed towards to tend of 1972. Although Foucault was not occupied to the same extent in GIS affairs as he was with the GIP; in October 1973, Foucault was summoned by authorities to answer for a pamphlet he coauthored advocating the legalization of abortion. His political engagements with the GIP in addition to his involvement with the GIS undoubtedly
informed and reformed his experiences around the theme of the prison and his continuing work lecturing at the Collège de France.

Although Foucault’s analysis obviously addresses the prison system and prisoners, he does not directly reference any of the politics surrounding the GIP in the way he addresses the causes concerning the GIS in this course. In the February 7th lecture, Foucault interjects a salient link between the historical lines of dissident morality groups he has been tracing and the contemporary issues with which the GIS was occupied. In this moment, he sketches a history of the present circumstances engraved by an inseparability of a system of morality and the exercise of this kind of power that has been inextricably fused since the materialization of the punitive society in the early 1800s. The issues in which the GIS was enmeshed—the health of industrial workers, immigration, the power of the medical community, and what became its foremost cause, the legalization of abortion—Foucault maintains, are all products of the binding of morality and power characteristic of the punitive society.

**Summary of the Lectures**

**Inconsistency of the Prison**

Foucault opens the lectures with the idea that societies can be described based on the type of punishment they apply: banishment, redemption, marking, and of course, confinement, which has become the universal penalty applied by contemporary Western society. Confinement as general punishment in the form of imprisonment, Foucault highlights, was not part of the system prior to the penitentiary reforms that took place in the early nineteenth century. In fact, Foucault underscores that general imprisonment as punishment was highly criticized and dismissed as a solution during this time period for
several reasons: first, due to its isolation, the judiciary is unable to confirm application of penalty; second, secluded from society, criminals become more cohesive and thus dangerous; third, prisons encourage delinquency because basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter are met; and last, prisoners are relegated to a life of crime due behaviors acquired in prison. These criticisms translate into what Foucault (2015) describes as the “carceral circle” (p. 251), the explanation for why in both theory and practice, imprisonment is condemned as universal punishment. Nonetheless, Foucault (2015) underscores, “It is as if at the end of the eighteenth century, the prison, a parapenal punishment, had entered the penal system and very quickly occupied its whole space” (p. 250). This inconsistency then leads Foucault (2015) to the question at the core of analysis throughout the lectures of how not only the prison system is made possible, but how in such a short time, it becomes “inevitable”, and a “fundamental given” (p. 252).

The significance of this analysis, he points out, resides in the difficulty in discerning the conditions that permitted the emergence of the prison.

**Penal Theory**

The first line of inquiry Foucault traces is the penal theory that emerged more or less at the same time as the materialization of the modern prison system. Theorists such as Beccaria, Palen, Beaumetz, Servan, Blackstone, and Brissot upheld a principle of utility based on the notion of the criminal as social enemy with crime as a breach of the social pact. Justification for punishment would then be tethered to the protection of society and accordingly, penalty would be directed at prevention and determent. To this end, punishment would be relative to the danger incurred by society and could be figured proportionally to the level of necessary protection. So, the established penal theory of
this time proposes a relativity of punishment referenced by the protection of society, which directly contradicts the notion of prison as universal punishment. In the penal practice of this period, imprisonment in some form, whether forced labor or a reciprocal penalty to fit the crime, is factored into punishment. However, Foucault underscores that prison is neither prescribed as a general penalty, nor does it justify the moral and psychological reconstitution of the criminal inherent in the modern system. The impossibility of universal prison for punishment fitting the crime relative to the potential threat to society allows Foucault to conclude that the development of the prison cannot be drawn from the prevailing penal theory of the time.

**Criminal as Social Enemy**

Using the conception of the criminal as social enemy operationalized through the penal theories that characterize the criminal through exclusionary measures, Foucault instead depicts the function of the notion of the criminal as an exchanger, a transcriber, and connector. The criminal then becomes an instrument, appropriated by those in power, through which various effects that take the form of institutions and domains of knowledge that describe criminality and inscribe criminals are achieved. The idea of societal protection is the critical linkage which allows Foucault to explain the formation of systems that act on behalf of society: the prosecutorial sector, investigational branches, and a reconsideration of the jury as representative of the social body, and the materialization and intervention of the psychiatric sciences into what will become an entire field of delinquency.
Penitentiary

In contrast to the prevailing penal theory of social utility where crime was defined by the extent to which society was endangered, Foucault turns his attention to the establishment of the Quaker system in America in the late 18th century. The Quakers sought religious freedom and sanctuary from the harshness of the English legal system and in settling the Pennsylvania colony, established their own system of laws and punishment that would reflect their own sense of morality. The Quaker “penitentiary”, what Foucault (2015) describes as “an incredible term” (p. 101), became a site for the blurring of law and religion; in fact, this is the first system to fully enmesh Christianity into its practices. Transformation of the criminal through repentance became central to this endeavor. It was necessary to denudate the prisoner through a cleansing and purifying of the mind and body—a blank slate ready to receive new habits, routines, and rituals. Penitence does its work through total and then, partial isolation and counsel through limited communication with those who supervise the process. To ensure transformation—the aim of punishment, it was necessary to study, to learn, to know the prisoner. The criminal becomes a new object to scrutinize which necessitated supervision and observation through continuous surveillance. The confluence of religion, reflection, penitence, renewal, and rehabilitation under a close, scrutinizing watch coalesce into a moral treatment compared to preventative actions taken for the safeguarding of society. The Quaker penitentiary on Walnut Street then becomes influential in tracing the moral and transformative elements incorporated into the modern system, which will also provide an entryway for the emerging fields of psychiatry, psychology, and criminology. Foucault stresses that the Quaker penitentiary does not
directly imply the modern system; rather, it is the element of the penitentiary in which the prison is formed.

**Parapenal Control**

Despite the prevailing penal theories that distinguish between morality and punishment through the justification of a social pact breach, Foucault articulates that the growing practice of localized superintendence over the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries instead suggest the opposite: a moralization of the penal system. Foucault turns his attention to the emergence of what he describes as parapenal control in the form of morality policing, circulating through France and England during the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. Despite differing means of repression, but similar locations of activation through local communities of families, places of work and religious groups, both England and France are successfully able to exercise a form of social control. Through the proliferation of these policing groups appearing in multifarious forms and their eventual infiltration into the State apparatus, grew a whole system of surveillance, confinement, coercion, and the emergence of what Foucault (2015) refers to as the punitive society: “that is to say a society in which the judicial State apparatus makes additional use of corrective and penitentiary functions” (p. 140).

**Lettres de Cachet.** During the *Ancien Régime*, military and judicial intervention offered the only avenues for control and repression, both of which proved ineffective due to cost and excess in the former, and since judicial positions were often purchased and inherited, a conflict of fiscal interests in the latter when it came to enforcing matters of royal taxation. A different mechanism was needed to excise individuals who proved a moral danger to society who did not require the force of the military and whose deeds fell
outside of the penal code and the judiciary. The *lettres de cachet* served this very purpose. History characterizes them as arbitrary abuses of power since the king’s stamp could bypass an entire legal system; however, Foucault depicts their function quite differently. The letters were locally sought to address matters of concern for individual behaviors, tendencies, predilections that ran contrary to the morality of a family or a parish, for example. Letters were sent to the throne for approval, typically requesting confinement not in prison, but in a place such as a convent or hospital, with the aim of transforming the morality of the individual in question. The stipulation contained in the letters did not advocate a punishment, but a corrective action, a rehabilitation of the morally corrupt individual. Furthermore, an entire field of knowledge materializes through the letters about the described individuals and the marginalized grouping to which they belong. For Foucault, the process of the *lettres de cachet* work as a mechanism for circulating power from below as the letter is requested from the community, through the State by way of the sovereign signature, and back to the community where the letter is executed. The *lettres de cachet* are an instrument dispersed through relays, exchangers, and networks of power to mark, document, prescribe, confine, and correct; a prime example of parapenal control that illustrates a shift from the preventative nature of the penal to the penitent, coercive system of the punitive.

**Morality Societies.** The brutality of the English penal code in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contributed to the formation of various groups that sought to establish their own methods to maintain order based on religion and morality. Foucault describes four types of policing groups that surfaced successively in English society,
beginning with the Quakers and Methodists in the mid seventeenth century. These dissident communities broke away from the Anglican Church and endeavored to define a new system of order based on their religion. They enacted various forms of supervision and control to cultivate in their followers a strict morality by prohibiting all indulgent behavior. In addition to repressing immorality, these groups also took on an assistive role, but kept meticulous watch over the conditions in which welfare was given.

Extending into the eighteenth century, other middle-class morality organizations that were still associated with but not centered on religion, focused on curbing individual conduct through social pressure and interventions. By aligning their interests in morality with those of state, they could enact the intentions of the law without applying the severity of the English penal code. Foucault highlights that these religious and morality societies initially appeared among the middle classes to escape the brutality of English law in one form or another: the Quakers and Methodists established their own laws based on religion whereas morality societies echoed much of what was prohibited under English law yet by comparison, both groups exercised social control, but with a much gentler hand.

Contrastingly, in the nineteenth century, Foucault distinguishes that parapenal organizations form in response to the transformation to an industrial economy fueled by capitalism. These morality groups shift to the upper classes comprised of merchants and aristocrats—those connected to power—and instead, take on a different objective: the safeguarding of wealth through the curbing of morality not just in the margins of society, but the whole of the lower classes through the suppression of popular movements. In response to various social uprisings among the lower classes, the upper classes—with
only peripheral state support, organized self-defense infantries that brought a moral order with patrols and supervised various localities. Foucault highlights that the spread of these types of morality groups coincided with the new system of material wealth ushered in by the rise of capitalism. A need arose to control populations that posed a threat to Bourgeoisie property and consequently, a private police was organized to ward off the continual threat of depredation at concentrated points of economic activity such as warehouses and docks. The shift to an industrialized economy and wealth in the form of property necessitated population control and the protection of Bourgeoisie resources, which engendered an entire movement to moralize the worker and justify the moralization of penalty, which would eventually be catalyzed into the State apparatus to be even more effective.

Theory of Illegalisms

Through the emergence of the lettres de cachet in France and morality societies in England, Foucault is able to trace a transition from pocketed policing to what becomes a State controlled system of coercion, which is then transferred to the concentrated location of the prison and extended throughout the whole of society. This process suddenly quickens and by the early nineteenth century, amasses into a coercive system run through the State. Foucault attributes this acceleration to the fast appearing threat of illegalisms to Bourgeoisie wealth.

During the eighteenth century, the practice of illegalisms by every level of society formed a functional, prevalent, and developmental part of an economy comprised of the artisanal system and nascent capitalism. The transformation to an economy completely powered by capitalism in the nineteenth century saw a shift in work in the lower classes
from artisan products to wage labor, and a switch from feudal land rights to contractual property. These changes in practices ushered in different types of illegalisms in an economic landscape dominated by manufacturing in the cities and the increased valuing of land in the countryside.

Foucault illuminates several significant consequences that result from the change in target to property through popular illegalisms. First, delinquents who were permitted, if not encouraged to function within the old system are now branded as enemies of society. This alteration in perception holds tremendous consequence for those labeled as delinquents, as they will now become the catalyst and target for a new bourgeoisie tactic. Second, the bourgeoisie will utilize its own agents and spies to dismantle illegal activity. Third, a need arises for a form of superintendence that reaches beyond the law to produce a moral accounting between the worker and his work. This unwritten code of conduct imposed on the working class by the bourgeoisie carries with it the elements inherent in the penitentiary. This dispersion, through the surreptitious actions of one class upon another, repurposes the punitive with the underlying intentions of controlling the apparatus of production. Lastly, an additional step is required of the bourgeoisie to quell the threat of popular illegalisms and ensure continued productivity: a distinction must be established within the lower classes to separate delinquents from workers. It must be noted that certain illegalisms will continue to benefit the bourgeoisie, and those practices will continue; however, to suppress the threat to property, two instruments are wielded: the dogma that recasts the delinquent as social enemy and a procedure for containment, the prison.
Through analysis of the pivot point of popular illegalisms from useful to economic development in the eighteenth century to the target of bourgeoisie control in the nineteenth, Foucault illuminates the elements that coalesced to form the prison system and by extension, the punitive society. Of particular import is the delineation of the process through which the bourgeoisie form a new perception of delinquency and procedure for its repression. Delinquency becomes the function and fuel of the prison system and the punitive society; it serves as a vehicle to suppress disadvantageous illegalisms, it opens up an entire field of possibility for rehabilitation and correction, and ultimately, it operates as instrument to exercise power.

**Worker’s Body**

The new illegalisms that surfaced within the changing economic conditions also yielded problems in the relationship between the worker and the apparatus of production. Complications arose from worker inconsistency; conduct taking the form of truancy, debauchery, and an unsettled lifestyle in general, impeded productivity. The problem then became a question of how to tether the worker’s body to the apparatus of production in order to form a labor force that would be effective and efficient. The constitution of such a force was driven by the bourgeoisie to moralize the worker and cultivate certain behaviors that would be conducive to maximizing production. This meant exerting control by promoting institutions that fostered regularity such as marriage and savings banks; and accordingly, irregular conduct is circumscribed as immoral from which Foucault highlights, the demarcation of delinquency can be derived.
Foucault’s Conclusions on *The Punitive Society*

Foucault concludes that imprisonment as the general form of punishment emerges in response to the new problem of bodies and production: the issue of how to convert bodies into productive forces and affix them to the materiality of the production apparatus. The history of morality Foucault traces to discover the formation of the modern prison system instead reveals alongside it another history—the history of the relationship between bodies and power. Bodies—training, time, and forces—and their relationship with political power yields what Foucault describes as a changed physics of power which is executed through the multiple spheres of a new optics, mechanics, and physiology. A new optics meant ubiquitous surveillance made possible through the coordination of police and documentation; a new mechanics rearranged the population to better regulate products and maximize forces of production; and a new physiology established and maintained a norm against which people could be compared and corrected.

Connections to Foucault’s other Work

The lectures on *The Punitive Society*, given from January to March 1973, are positioned at a critical juncture in Foucault’s work. During this time, Foucault is drafting what will become one of his most influential works, *Discipline and Punish*, cultivating the genealogical approach that also characterizes the analysis in his four-volume project on *The History of Sexuality* and the subsequent courses given at the Collège de France, which illuminate much of the thought underlying the trajectory of Foucault’s work. Elements of *The Punitive Society* can undoubtedly be connected to almost all of
Foucault’s works; however, these lectures are most strongly linked to some of the other lectures and of course, *Discipline and Punish*.

**Penal Theories and Institutions**

*The Punitive Society* follows the 1971-1972 course at the Collège de France on *Penal Theories and Institutions*, with which it shares strong thematic ties. In the course summary, Foucault explains that these lectures lay the requisite historical groundwork for a study of penal institutions and by extension, the society in which their existence is made possible. Foucault frames these lectures in terms of power-knowledge, an overarching hypothesis he offers to thematically connect his first three courses. He explains his first lectures, *The Will to Know*, emphasize the concept of *measure* as a form of power-knowledge, employed in establishing a certain order within the Greek city-state and in the formation of mathematics and physics; the second course; *Penal Theories and Institutions* describes the idea of *inquiry*, another form of power-knowledge as a means to centralize information in addition to establishing observational knowledge and the life sciences; and next year’s course, which becomes *The Punitive Society*, will explore *examination* as a form of power-knowledge and its workings through practices of exclusion and punishment. Not only does Foucault’s significant notion of power-knowledge link his first three lectures, this dynamic concept undergirds much of *Discipline and Punish* as well.

**Truth and Juridical Forms**

Nearly two months after Foucault finished his lectures on *The Punitive Society* at the *Collège de France*, he traveled to Brazil to give five-lecture series, compiled as *Truth and Juridical Forms*. The first two lectures tie into Foucault’s lectures on *The Will to
Know, the third to *Penal Theories and Institutions*, and the fourth and fifth lectures synthesize the content of *The Punitive Society*. The fourth lecture outlines the mechanisms for social control and surveillance that spread throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that made possible the conditions for the emergence of what Foucault depicts as the punitive society, which he later describes as the disciplinary society, characterized by panopticism. The fifth lecture expands on the paradox of the prison that Foucault unravels, highlighting the transition from more isolated situations of social policing to its extension into the whole of society as an expression of capitalism. The latter two Brazil lectures extract the core of Foucault’s argument developed throughout the course given two months earlier and preview some of the major thematic content to follow in *Discipline and Punish*.

**“Force of Flight”**

During the time of the lectures on *The Punitive Society*, Foucault was also preparing his essay, “The Force of Flight” to accompany Paul Rebeyrolle’s series of paintings of confined dogs, *Prisoners*, for an exhibition in March 1973. Foucault describes Rebeyrolle’s sequence as a freeing of force from the power and politics of imprisonment through the dog’s movement from enclosure to escape. Foucault describes the prison as a space where forces are formed and history is shaped—in this case, a history of the force of a confined dog that liberates himself not through the expected window depicted throughout the series of paintings, but through a contest of force and power that instead tears down the surrounding walls. Extrapolating undergirding notions of an unexpected history connects to the genealogy of the relationship of forces and
power that inspire Foucault’s analysis in discerning the conditions of acceptability that permit the general imprisonment as universal punishment described in the lectures.

**Discipline and Punish**

Foucault finished a draft of *Discipline in Punish* in April 1973 after the lectures with the final draft complete in August 1974, allowing much of the work Foucault develops in *The Punitive Society* to be magnified and intensified, and in some cases, reconsidered and transformed in *Discipline and Punish*. The society that Foucault (2015) first describes as punitive—“a society in which the judicial State apparatus makes additional use of corrective and penitentiary functions” (p. 140)—is amplified later in the lectures with what “would be better to call disciplinary” (p. 237n); he elaborates, “The supervision-punishment couple is imposed as an indispensible power relationship for fixing individuals to the production apparatus, for the formation of productive forces, and characterizes the society that may be called disciplinary” (p. 196). In the lectures, the disciplinary society and its sustaining power relations are traced through elements of the penitentiary and pinpointed in parapenal control, initially localized in religious groups and morality organizations, which later proliferate and diffuse throughout society as a means to suppress lower-class illegalisms. This results in a movement to moralize the worker and bind his life and time to the apparatus of production. The disciplinary power that Foucault builds towards in the lectures becomes analytically harnessed and articulately depicted in the book; however, the power that was operationalized through moralizing the worker is now exercised through what becomes the delinquent. The management of illegalisms through the political production of the delinquent,
normalization, and the surrounding field in which the human sciences are enmeshed instead become central to analysis.

Another important element for consideration in connecting the lectures to *Discipline and Punish* is the notion of the examination, which Foucault presents in the course summary for *Penal Theories and Institutions* as the third type of power-knowledge that links his first three courses. Foucault first develops the idea of examination in the lectures in comparison the notion of inquiry. The process of inquiry connotes a means of knowing events through observation, whereas knowing through the examination is also based on observation, but of individuals compared to a norm established by those who exercise power. This transformation in discourse from one of observation to one of examination becomes part of the “supervision-punishment couple” which Foucault presents as requisite for affixing individuals to the apparatus of production. The examination becomes a continuous practice embedded in various institutions linked to production over a lifetime to learn, adjust, and review individuals in reference to an established norm. Foucault’s discussion of the examination is somewhat brief in the lectures though its thematic ties to the other elements connected to the disciplinary society are developed throughout the course. The notion receives much more intensive treatment in *Discipline and Punish*. In the book, the examination becomes the prime instrument of disciplinary power taking on the techniques of both hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment to concurrently objectify and subjectify examinees, create an entire field of documentation around them, and then project the individual and compile the generated knowledge into a case. The notion of
the examination first introduced as a form of power-knowledge becomes the ultimate technology of disciplinary power.

**Qualitative Research Connections**

According to Ewald and Fontana (2015), Foucault viewed his lectures as an avenue to conduct research as well as open areas of problematization to others. Foucault, himself, even ends *Discipline and Punish* with an invitation and challenge to continue his project. Captured in numerous interviews, the generous and unpretentious manner in which Foucault (2000b) approached research, he remarks, “What I say ought to be taken as ‘propositions,’ ‘game openings’ where those who may be interested are invited to join in…” (p. 224). Aligning with the spirit of Foucault’s research endeavors, the publication of *The Punitive Society* in French in 2013 and English in 2015, opens multiple avenues and new points of connectivity in which educational researchers might take up and apply Foucault’s work in their respective fields of interest.

To better convey how these lectures might be applied and connected to aspects of education, this section provides a description of how Foucault’s notion of power as one that is productive may be used as a prism for looking at “close reading”, an approach to literacy offered with the intention of helping students negotiate the deeper and complex texts required of the Common Core State Standards (CCSS)/Arizona’s College and Career Readiness Standards (ACCRS). This is by no means an extensive genealogical analysis of the practice; rather, it is intended to furnish an example of a potential tie from the content of the lectures to investigate an accepted pedagogical practice. The first portion expounds upon Foucault’s notion of a positive, productive power and in the second part, I use productive power to think about close reading.
Productive Power

One of the most significant and rich conceptions to emerge from these lectures is Foucault’s reimagining of power as productive. In the course context to *The Punitive Society*, Harcourt underscores an important distinction in how Foucault characterizes the notion of power. The 1972 lectures on *Penal Theories and Institutions* offer an analysis of a negative conception of power that represses and excludes, while the 1973 lectures instead explore a positive recasting of power that is productive, in fact, in the last lecture, Foucault outlines a response to four schema for an analysis of power, which are mobilized in *Discipline and Punish*. There certainly exists a vast body of literature on his analyses of different types power; however, these lectures provide an invaluable link to traceable moments where we are first able to witness Foucault’s (2015) deployment of this type of analysis:

Now it is a matter of finding the power relationship that made the historical emergence of something like the prison possible. After an archaeological type of analysis, it is a matter of undertaking a dynastic, genealogical type of analysis, focusing on filiations on the basis of power-relations (p. 84).

The recasting of a negative, repressive power that characterized analysis in much of Foucault’s previous work to a power that produces will have a tremendous effect on Foucault’s trajectory of thought. This reconsideration is often traced to Foucault’s (1996c) comments from his visit to Attica in April of 1972:

…prison is an organization that is too complex to be reduced to purely negative functions of exclusion; its cost, its importance, the care that one takes in
administering it, the justifications that one ties to give for it seem to indicate that it is possesses positive functions (p. 115).

In the thirteen lectures on *The Punitive Society* given eight months later, we are privy to the operationalization of this reconsideration as Foucault derives the conditions that make possible universal imprisonment and the society in which it is situated. Enacted from the very first lecture, Foucault announces that the repressive and negative functions underlying notions like exclusion are insufficient to analyze what allows those concepts to function in society. The practice of exclusion is instead a tactic made functional by relations of power. Throughout the lectures, Foucault interrogates the positive, productive workings of power that have enabled the acceptance of imprisonment as comprehensive punishment, culminating in the last lecture in a response to four schemata for describing power—exercise, diffusion, constitution, and power-knowledge that may be used to describe this power. The development of this notion of productive power in specific moments throughout the lectures and the application of Foucault’s prismatic for power from the last lecture may be used in innumerable research settings to describe the workings of power that produce accepted pedagogical practices.

**Close Reading**

Although close reading is not new to literature and criticism, it has recently been adopted and adapted as the current remedy for all students to improve their comprehension of more robust texts. As the new literacy linchpin, close reading has displaced many previously instituted reading strategies and approaches, shifting the practice into the standardized instructional repertoire. Here, the Partnership for
Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC) (2011) offers an explanation of close reading and its emphasis on the text:

Close, analytic reading stresses engaging with a text of sufficient complexity directly and examining its meaning thoroughly and methodically, encouraging students to read and reread deliberately. Directing student attention on the text itself empowers students to understand the central ideas and key supporting details. It also enables students to reflect on the meanings of individual words and sentences; the order in which sentences unfold; and the development of ideas over the course of the text, which ultimately leads students to arrive at an understanding of the text as a whole. Close, analytic reading entails the careful gathering of observations about a text and careful consideration about what those observations taken together add up to — from the smallest linguistic matters to larger issues of overall understanding and judgment.

Furthermore, PARCC (2011) highlights that “A significant body of research links the close reading of complex text—whether the student is a struggling reader or advanced—to significant gains in reading proficiency and finds close reading to be a key component of college and career readiness” (p. 7). With its endorsement and proliferation through the Common Core Standards and PARCC, the practice of close reading in elementary and secondary classrooms has become a widespread technology for tackling the complex texts required of the Common Core.

**Productive Power and Close Reading**

In this section, I provide a brief vignette to illustrate how to think with productive power to view the literacy practice of close reading, as described through the four
vehicles for describing power of exercising, diffusing, constituting, and power knowledge, providing a brief vignette.

**Exercising.** Power is exercised rather than possessed through the practice of close reading in numerous ways. Power is exercised through close reading by way of a multiplicity of levels and relays. Investigating the functioning of close reading in the localized setting of the classroom reveals a network comprised of students, teachers, administrators, and parents with each person functioning as a transmitter for power to both shape them into subjects and further subjectify others as they also become conduits for power. Further, as power is exercised through close reading, a battleground is generated for power relations to engage. The classroom, as perhaps one of the most concentrated locations for close reading to play out facilitates the contest for power through various pedagogical strategies, for example, desk arrangements, student grouping, text selection, etc., all of which contribute to how power is exercised.

**Diffusing.** Power is also diffused through close reading rather than being amassed entirely in a State apparatus such a department of education. Close reading advances power in local settings like individual classrooms, resource rooms for reading, and within families as students complete homework. In looking at how close reading functions in dispersion, all of the small acts of power diffused through teachers, students, parents, and administrators act as transmitters that can then provide supports and work in concert with more concentrated sources of power such as district offices, and state and national departments of education. The importance of diffusion works to maintain and move power through the proliferating network of close reading.
Constituting. Through the practice of close reading power and production constitute one another and may be seen in the various acts of subjectification. Teachers, for instance, are made subjects of close reading through trainings and professional development sessions that discipline them in how to correctly administer routines of the program (“Close Reading Routines,” 2013). Teachers can also be subjected through surveillance via classroom scheduled and unscheduled observations, evaluative instruments, and student testing to ensure that they are appropriately following close reading protocol. It is also incumbent upon the teacher to in turn produce certain types of students, to aid them in cultivating the correct dispositions and habits as close readers.

Power-knowledge. Close reading as a mobilizer of power-knowledge is undeniable as power is activated at each site where knowledge is formed, and where power is circulating, knowledge is amassed. Information is collected through student observation in classroom practice and grades are given based on how well students can follow the close reading routine; teachers are judged based on their instruction of the routine and the performance of their students as evaluated by their administrators; administrators are held responsible by their superiors in accounting for the overall performance of their schools on standardized examinations. All of these acts of judging, evaluating, grading, performing, recording, etc. through the entanglement of students, teachers, and administrators make close reading an ideal practice for power-knowledge to thrive.

In thinking with productive power to describe close reading to discern how it functions and what its effects are, Foucault’s responses to the four designs for power
analysis, exercising, diffusing, constituting, and power-knowledge, offer much with which to consider accepted pedagogical practices.

Conclusion

The reciprocity of Foucault’s political and theoretical work in light of the published courses during this time period open up fascinating connections from which to consider beyond his writing, a more multifaceted Foucault with further connections and illuminations. All of the Collège de France courses have been published in French, with Subjectivity and Truth forthcoming in 2017 in English, making Penal Theories and Institutions the only course not yet translated. The continuity of the Collège de France lectures between the major publications of Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) and Discipline and Punish (1975) offer a new context from which to explore the themes and concepts Foucault was interrogating.
References


CHAPTER 4

DESCRIBING PRODUCTIVE POWER IN EDUCATION: A READING OF THE
PUNITIVE AND DISCIPLINARY SOCIETIES

Introduction

What is fascinating about prisons is that, for once, power doesn’t hide or mask itself; it reveals itself as tyranny pursued into the tiniest details; it is cynical and at the same time pure and entirely “justified,” because its practice can be totally formulated within the framework of morality. Its brutal tyranny consequently appears as the serene domination of Good over Evil, of order over disorder. (Foucault, 1996b, p. 77).

The above quotation is from a conversation with Deleuze in March 1972, where Foucault expounds on the bare state in which power exists in the prison. In its morally sanctioned, unbridled and unapologetic form, the prison proffers power for analysis, a location that reveals more than just the workings of power in prison, but its operation in an entire societal spectrum through which power is diffused. The prison and the system of power in which it appears and perpetuates becomes the privileged location for Foucault’s work in his most recently published course at the Collège de France, The Punitive Society, given in 1973, and his subsequent, illuminative text, Discipline and Punish (1975). Discipline and Punish occupies a core position in the spectrum of qualitative research on education as a touchstone for describing the circulation of power throughout curricular practices. With the extensive application of Foucault’s analysis of power throughout educational research, the recent publication of the lectures on The Punitive Society that furnish so much insight into the cultivation of Foucault’s notion of power.
power in *Discipline and Punish* necessitates a critical juxtaposition of the texts, so that they may be resituated throughout educational research. To facilitate a more extensive and enriched application of Foucault’s work on productive power to the scholarship on education, this paper offers a reading of Foucault’s recasting and realization of power in *Discipline and Punish* building on his responses to four theoretical schemata, as outlined in the last lecture in *The Punitive Society*. The 1973 lectures provide further intensity and insight to Foucault’s work on power, specifically, his reconsideration of the negative, repressive aspects of power to a power that is dynamic, positive, and productive. This transformation is developed throughout the 1973 lectures and fully harnessed in 1975 in *Discipline and Punish* as Foucault traces the emergence of the modern prison. Foucault’s illuminations for describing power in the lectures distill a new dimension of insight from which to analyze the workings of the positive power that Foucault deploys in his genealogy of the prison, cited and referenced extensively throughout educational research.

To better appreciate the importance of Foucault’s deployment of productive power, its development throughout the lectures and into the book, and its potential for educational research, this paper is organized into five sections. First, I provide an overview of the scholarship that utilizes Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power to interrogate various aspects of pedagogical practices to demonstrate its significance and prevalence throughout the field. Second, I situate Foucault’s reimagination of power from a power that represses to a power that produces to contextualize the intellectual stakes for Foucault’s work and by extension, for educational researchers engaging his work on power. The third section comprises the body of the article, offering a
prospective of productive power that draws upon Foucault’s responses to four schemata that dominate power analysis: exercising, diffusing, constituting, and power-knowledge. For each of these four responses, I analyze examples of how Foucault operationalizes his responses from both the lectures and the book to delineate the complexities and insights of Foucault’s reconsideration of power so that educational scholars might adapt Foucault’s responses to further investigate productive power in curriculum studies. Fourth, I offer conclusions on the development of productive power from the lectures to the book highlighting the transition from the punitive to the disciplinary societies to better bridge the two texts. And last, I present some implications and suggest connections for the applying productive power to investigations of pedagogical practices.

A Review of the Literature

Michel Foucault’s work with power has provided multiple avenues for qualitative researchers to interrogate various accepted pedagogical practices and educational institutions. His insight into the operation of power offers scholars in education a way to work against a historical panorama of educational discourses dominated by the rhetoric of progress. Although Foucault never conducted an extensive study of the school or education, his seminal book, *Discipline and Punish* (1975), has influenced abundant scholarship in the field of education, inspiring reconsiderations, rewrites, and reimaginations of accepted elements of pedagogy.

One of the first publications to investigate Foucault’s application to education was Ball’s (1991) edited book, which illuminates the institution of education as a primed site for social management and control through the deployment of technologies of power. Many of the essays draw upon *Discipline and Punish*, namely, Foucault’s notions of
power-knowledge, the examination, and the disciplinary practices that constitute subjects. In the first chapter in this edited volume, Marshall (1991) provides a further introductory chapter in the volume, setting up the potential for Foucault’s work in education. He underscores that Foucault’s application to education lie in his design for studying the present, a framework of power-knowledge that would drive a genealogical analysis of modern power in contemporary schooling practices. In the same volume, Hoskins (1991) moves beyond the idea of the examination as a technology of power-knowledge and instead, posits the examination as the constitutive hyphen that enables the activation of both power and knowledge. This becomes an important concept to consider in examining how the relationship between power and knowledge not only constitute each other through the examination, but constitute subjects as well as the conditions that make possible certain subjectifications throughout pedagogical practices. Jones (1991) also looks at the examination, but in late eighteenth century French educational practices alongside the concurrent usage of internal organizational practices in the burgeoning field of physiology, drawing on genealogical interpretation to reconsider the close ties of developing educational practices and the formation of scientific knowledge. Goodson and Dowbiggin (1991) consider the similarities in how the docile subject is formed with a certain social purpose in mind by nineteenth century French psychiatry and through modern curriculum in secondary schools. And in Ball’s own chapter, he adopts a critical stance on the modern notion of management in educational administration, which draws upon the techniques of disciplinary power: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and of course, the examination. In his more recent book on Foucault and education, Ball (2013) puts the genealogical approach to work writing a self-reflexive
critical history of educational policy informed by the notion of normalization. In addition to some of Foucault’s other texts, Ball engages the notions of disciplinary power and its techniques to expose a divergent history of educational policy fraught with racism aimed at population control.

Gore (1998) employs Foucault’s analytics of power to interrogate how power relations work at various pedagogical sites and to determine the extent to which their workings are similar. Gore’s study mainly applies Foucault’s notion of power relations as a lens with which to view pedagogical practices and maintains that power relations are mobilized through many of the techniques that Foucault delineates in *Discipline and Punish* (surveillance, normalization, distribution, etc.); notably, Gore indicates that the practices of individualization and totalization were the most prevalent. Gore’s work is limited to extracting Foucault’s notion of power relations and focusing on its iterations and similarities across pedagogical practices; she does not thoroughly situate power relations in these present moments of pedagogy historically in the style of Foucault’s genealogy.

Although Jardine’s (2010) *Foucault and Education* addresses many of Foucault’s notions in relation to education, the undeniable connections to be drawn from *Discipline and Punish* occupy the core of the book. She summarizes Foucault’s description of power-knowledge, disciplinary power, and disciplinary technologies that provide a critical angle through which to reconsider the effects of progressive educational theories and practices such as standardized curricula and testing. Jardine’s book offers a starting point for beginning scholars attempting to conduct research in the field of education that ties in Foucault’s work. She does not offer an application of Foucault’s notion of power,
but furnishes points of departure and connections for consideration for scholars first starting out with Foucault’s work.

Jackson and Mazzei (2012) adopt Foucault’s notion of power as productive as a prism of power-knowledge to think about the subjectivities of two professors. Their study in this section is brief; however, they touch upon the potential for how to think with power-knowledge to examine certain pedagogical acts and in doing so, trace the “productive effects of power as it circulates through the practices of people in their daily lives” (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. 56). Accordingly, they identify networks of power relations connected with the local experiences of the professors and delineate the technologies that facilitate the power circulation that constitute the professors as subjects and catalysts for power. However, their chapter on thinking with Foucault’s power-knowledge only offers a cursory overview of his unique notion and neglects to flesh out the kind of detailed analysis to fully convey the complexities of power-knowledge. Jackson and Mazzei also neglect to historicize the present moment of professor subjectivities that they are investigating.

The applications of Foucault’s notions of disciplinary power continue to be extensive in more recent and diversified areas of educational scholarship as well. Bowdridge and Blenkinsop (2011) adopt Foucault’s discussion of the “Means of Correct Training” as a framework to explore and demonstrate the disciplinary mechanisms at work in outdoor and experiential educational programs. They conclude that awareness of the effects of this kind of power is something of which educators need to be aware and not let the relations of power inherent in the student-teacher relationship inhibit student growth. What Bowdridge and Blenkinsop offer is an area of pedagogy, outdoor and
experiential education, where Foucault’s work on disciplinary power is applicable. They demonstrate relevance and transferability, and perhaps open up an area where further research is needed. The connections Bowdridge and Blenkinsop establish are given cursory analysis; however, further exploring the complexities of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgments, and the examination, in addition to historical contextualization in the spirit of genealogy, would undoubtedly enrich this investigation.

Ball et al. (2012) look at certain neoliberal practices of education through a Foucauldian lens, first as a technology of performance effectuated through policies promoting a certain visibility of students, teachers, and schools; second, by analyzing the political technology employed that objectifies students through disciplinary techniques; and third, as a reinvention of disciplinary power through neoliberal-tinged practices and institutions. They draw upon Foucault’s analytical toolkit to describe the present situation of school performance and its alignment with the government’s agenda as well as its extension into society in general. Foucault’s insights are very much used as a frame here and the body of the article is devoted to mobilizing his concepts through the present culture of the necessity to perform well, or deliver. Utilizing Foucault’s description of power from *Discipline and Punish*, Ball et al. diagnose the current moment in education and spotlight the effects and implications of these practices inherent in the pressure to deliver.

Given the continued and widespread application of Foucault’s description of power from *Discipline and Punish* throughout educational scholarship, the very recent publication of Foucault’s third course offered in 1973 at the Collège de France, the lectures on *The Punitive Society*, affords educational researchers a new text with the
opportunity to appreciate the description of power in *Discipline and Punish* with a fresh purview. The lectures illustrate the development of productive power enhancing Foucault’s descriptions in *Discipline and Punish* that furnish qualitative researchers with a broader and intensified understanding of productive power to better utilize in investigating pedagogical practices.

**Producing Power**

In this second portion of the paper, I provide a brief situating of Foucault’s recasting of power from a power that represses to a power that produces to establish the intellectual stakes for Foucault’s work and by extension, for researchers in the field of education employing his work on power to examine curricular practices.

In the same conversation with Deleuze from which the opening quotation is taken, Foucault points to the inadequacy of traditional examinations of governmental mechanisms in regard to power, and in response, explains, “Everywhere that power exists, it is being exercised” (p. 79). This notion of the exercise rather than possession of power becomes one of the principle ideas on which Foucault will build his analysis of the prison system. In April 1972, Foucault (1996c) visited the prison at Attica, an instrumental experience as he began to reimagine power as a positive force, a productive power rather than a power characterized by suppression:

Well, the question that I ask myself now is the reverse: prison is an organization that is too complex to be reduced to purely negative functions of exclusion; its cost, its importance; the care that one takes in administering it, the justifications that one tries to give for it seem to indicate that it possesses positive functions (p. 115).
Correspondingly, Bernauer (1990) underscores the magnitude of Foucault’s reconceptualization of power and the stakes of this transformation in comparing his earlier analyses to his work on productive power in *Discipline and Punish*:

…his study of the prison might have become a history of yet another form of exclusion such as he had explore in *HF [History of Madness]*. Instead, as his remarks after the visit to Attica already suggest, his study of the prison will aim to understand a type of power that cannot be reduced to its tyrannical exercise of confining and excluding; his objective will be to decipher the workings of a power that perhaps might still manifest itself most clearly in a prison, but that operates throughout the whole of society (p. 123).

Through the 1973 lectures on *The Punitive Society* we become privy to Foucault’s recasting of power as it takes shape through the analysis of the prison system’s appearance, with its full realization in *Discipline and Punish*. The formation of the prison system then becomes the venue for studying the shifting broader systems of a productive power that permeate the society in which the prison is shaped and situated: prison-form becomes the social-form. What Foucault (1995) will later refer to as the “carceral net” (p. 297), the social body adopts an entire disciplinary chromatic through the infiltration of the judiciary, penal, coercive, and normalization that extends far beyond the prison walls.

In the course context for the 1973 lectures, Harcourt (2015) points to Foucault’s methodological revision from the suppressive aspects of how power was considered in the previous year’s (1972) lectures, *Penal Theories and Institutions*, through the examination of the emerging State through repressive means, particularly the penal
system as a means to corral popular movements, to the productive aspects of power reimagined in 1973, in *The Punitive Society*. Much of Foucault’s earlier thought, particularly his analysis in *Madness and Civilization*, applies the binary conception of exclusion; however, the very first lecture of *The Punitive Society* opens with Foucault dispelling the notion of exclusion for purposes of understanding the process by which individuals are cast as abnormal or deviant. Foucault (2015) reconsider the idea of exclusion now as “composite and artificial” (p. 2) and “inadequate inasmuch as with the notion of exclusion the individual’s excluded status is basically given in the sphere of social representations and it is in virtue of this that he appears, precisely, deviant” (p. 3). Instead, he argues, exclusion functions to cloak the actual mechanisms—strategies and tactics of power, through which the process of exclusion takes place, consequently regarding essentialized notions, like exclusion, as an effect rather than a cause, produced by relations of power. So, underlying the insufficiency of the notion of exclusion for analysis instead reveals a different project: a continuous examination of the workings of a productive power—its tactics and strategies, which produce the conditions for exclusion. The process by which those who are excluded is recast instead as an instrument of power, to which the correlative notion of transgression is added, and Foucault proposes a new analysis of the couplet of exclusion and transgression, not in regards to law and representation, but notably, in terms of power and knowledge. Accordingly, Foucault reimagines punishment as punitive tactics operating within domains of power—to exclude, to compensate, to mark, and at the center of analysis—to confine. Indicated as verbs, perhaps a demonstration that these punishments are products of action, that they are the positive workings of power. Foucault is now concerned with the idea that
relations of power engender conditions that make possible certain practices; this notion, of course, retains immeasurable import for Foucault’s ensuing work. The idea of power as a generative force becomes fundamental to understanding the system and society in which confinement, which takes the form of the institution of the prison, is able to function.

The idea of productive power becomes central to the analysis of the materialization of the prison system in *Discipline and Punish*. The importance of the positive aspects of power is highlighted in the opening chapter of *Discipline and Punish*, with the first of four rules that Foucault’s subsequent analysis will follow:

Do not concentrate the study of the punitive mechanisms on their ‘repressive’ effects alone, on their ‘punishment’ aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series of their possible positive effects, even if these seem marginal at first sight. As a consequence, regard punishment as a complex social function (Foucault, 1995, p 23).

Drawing on this first rule, the productive workings of power become the connective tissue that allows the operation of power in the prison system to be extrapolated and extended into the entirety of society. In the lectures, as well as the book, the institution of the prison becomes a privileged site as a concentrated location of the shifting systems of power from a system of overt violence and spectacle to what Foucault captures as our present moment of productive power generated through the disciplines and diffused throughout society.
A Prospective of Producing Power: A Response to Four Schemata

The third portion of the article contributes a prospective of productive power that call upon Foucault’s responses to four schemata that dominate power analysis: exercising, diffusing, constituting, and power-knowledge. For each of these four responses, I examine examples of how Foucault actualizes his responses from both the lectures and the book to illustrate the intricacies and insights of Foucault’s reconsideration of power so that educational scholars might fashion Foucault’s responses to further analyze productive power in pedagogical practices.

In the last lecture of The Punitive Society, Foucault provides a prismatic of power from which to analyze its productive features. He offers a response to four frequently employed schemata for power analysis, with his first three notions indicated as verbs: exercise, diffuse, constitute, and power-knowledge, that synthesize the trajectory of analysis of the previous twelve lectures and foreshadow how the positive aspects of power will be operationalized in Discipline and Punish. Foucault provides different lenses through which to examine power in response to an intellectual landscape dominated by Marxist notions of power. Here, Foucault furnishes four analytic descriptions as a way to discern the system that makes possible the conditions in which the prison is able to exist and accordingly, how the society in which it thrives emerges. The following analysis offers a look forward from The Punitive Society looking towards Discipline and Punish, which draws upon each of the rebuttals for analyzing a productive power that Foucault sketches at the end of the 1973 lectures.
1. Exercising Power

Foucault’s first notion, that power is exercised, grates against the Marxist idea that power is something to be possessed, particularly by a specific class. Foucault responds that power is not in fact held for multiple reasons. First, power transpires throughout the breadth and depth of society greased by an entire network of relations that reinvigorate power at every point. Second, power is concurrently instantaneous and continual through infinite micro-battles, and because “at the heart of power is a warlike relation” (p. 228), power occurs through contest, the execution of which can triumph or fail. And third, power is never entirely concentrated in the hands of one class; instead, Foucault acknowledges the presence of those who take up a position of privilege with the ability to wield various strategies to maintain their ground; however, the illusion of power appropriation is merely an effect of advantageous positioning. The following analysis of Foucault’s discussion of civil war, the body, popular illegalisms, and delinquency provide examples (alternating between the lectures and the book) of Foucault’s reply to the first schema with a counter explanation of how power is exercised.

Exercising through Civil War

In content original to the lectures, power is exercised against the backdrop of continuous civil warfare. The concept of civil war is introduced in the first lecture as the critical underlay for understanding penal tactics and as crucial to grasping the political struggle around which power functions: “the matrix of all struggles of power, of all strategies of power, and, consequently, it is also the matrix of all the struggles regarding and against power the struggles” (Foucault, 2015, p. 13). In his description responding to the first schema for analysis, Foucault (2015) presents power as a means to “conduct and
continue” civil war as it “occupies, traverses, animates, and invests power through and through” (pp. 31-32). This idea of a constant civil war may be read as an attempt to displace the Marxist notion of class struggle. For Foucault, there exists a relationship between the classes rather than automatic dominance and oppression. Foucault concedes that some groups may be better situated than others to cumulatively exercise power through more favorable strategic locations; yet, the appearance of the possession of power instead becomes an effect of the various power relations in play.

The concept of civil war as a matrix of power, integral to animating Foucault’s recasting of power in the lectures, diminishes significantly in importance in *Discipline and Punish*. Harcourt (2015) views the absence of the notion of civil war in 1975 as a shift in emphasis to the subject—the delinquent, the case, the individual; the underpinnings of civil war instead give way instead to themes of biopolitics and racism, upon which Foucault will later expand in his lectures (p. 298). Although Foucault no longer presents the notion of civil war as the undercurrent of analysis, more broadly, the concept of the exercise of power is immediately discernable with the language Foucault employs in *Discipline and Punish* to illustrate the various facets of a productive power. In extending the idea of the warlike relation, power becomes a “perpetual battle”, an unceasing, unrelenting contest rather than the conclusiveness of the “conquest of territory” or a “contract regulating a transaction”. Furthermore, through strategy, power is not only possessed or exercised, but more intensely, it “invests”, “exerts pressure”, and is “transmitted” through an operative “network of relations” (Foucault, 1995, pp. 26-27).
Exercising through the Body

Foucault’s explanation of a power that produces is evident with his remarkable description of how power is applied and exercised through the body. Using the example of the making of the eighteenth century soldier as a starting point, Foucault spotlights the body as both subject and object for the exercise of power. The body must first be reduced and refined until it exists in a pure state of docility from which it can then be transformed through manipulation, articulation, training, and practice to achieve maximum utility. The procedures used to exercise and circulate power through the body “…make possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relationship of docility-utility, might be called ‘disciplines’” (Foucault, 1995, p. 137). So, power is exercised through the disciplines, through the body with control of movements, but also through the control of space, time, and society. Disciplinary power wields a variety of instruments and techniques to accomplish its asks including tables, precise movements, exercises, and tactics, “the highest form of disciplinary practice” (Foucault, 1995, p. 167). Tactics become the basis of military organization and requisite for the emergence of the nation-state. To this end, disciplinary instruments and techniques also become a way to simultaneously totalize and individualize a multiplicity of individuals, a design that facilitates the management of the state and its population.

Exercising through Popular Illegalisms

In the lectures, Foucault first begins to unfold his theory of illegalisms that is instrumental in the formation of what Foucault will describe as the punitive society. The exercise of power through certain bourgeois tactics, Foucault contends, precipitated the
emergence of the punitive society through demands for the social control of illegalisms among the lower classes once it ceased to align with their interests. This was accomplished with the bourgeoisie exercising power through control of the judiciary through purchased, positions, subsequent infiltration of the legal system, and finally through advocating for illegalisms that would surreptitiously benefit them. Popular illegalisms served the bourgeoisie well for some time; however, they gradually proved problematic as illegal activity began to shift from rights to property, producing a system of depredation and theft in the changing economic landscape. This necessitated repression, and located in these threats were the roots for the reorganization of the legislative and penal system. Through a series of tactics and instruments, the bourgeoisie had to move to protect their assets. This was achieved through several means: first, a recasting of the delinquent as social enemy and as violator of the social contract; second, the dispensing of bourgeoisie spies to dismantle illegal networks; third, a sense of morality and obligation attached to the law imposed on the lower class beyond the workings of the market; and lastly, a sifting of delinquents to parse out political from common law criminals and extract threats which, of course, meant the solution of the prison, in addition to work colonies, the army, and police. Through the exercise of power, the threat to bourgeoisie wealth drove an entire project of recasting the lower classes, specifically, its criminal delinquents, as an object to be corrected and transformed through a restructuring of the penal and penitentiary systems.

**Exercising through Delinquency**

In *Discipline and Punish*, the disciplinary power exercised through the tactics of the Bourgeoisie, Foucault argues, produces the notion of delinquency, which becomes the
justification and strategic purpose of the prison system. Through the prison system, criminals are transformed into a whole field of delinquency. The bourgeoisie exercise of power through incomparable tactics, provides multifarious benefits to its wielders; economically, there are benefits to be gained through illicit practices and networking; politically, it disrupts working-class cohesion and potential resistance; and significantly, it provides a rationalization for a police apparatus and surveillance of the population. For Foucault, the formation of the whole institution of the prison becomes the product of the ultimate tactic and exercise of disciplinary power.

It should be noted that Foucault’s theory of illegalisms is modified to focus on the political sphere and its ramifications in *Discipline and Punish*, whereas his argument in the lectures focuses on a moral angle and Bourgeoisie necessity to cultivate morality in the lower classes to obligate them to their work, thus tethering them to the production apparatus.

### 2. Diffusing Power

Foucault’s response to the second schematic for describing power impugns the notion of the State apparatus as the ultimate residence of power; he instead argues that the State apparatuses are part and parcel of a much more diffuse system of relations of power. Here, Foucault (2015) addresses the role of the State apparatus, not as an axis of power, but as “…a concentrated form, or even a support structure, of a system of power that goes much further and deeper” (p. 229). This system of power encompasses a multiplicity of mechanisms spread throughout society that can take the form of groups religious communities or within established families, which execute their own granular acts of power. Foucault illustrates these “micro-instances of power” (p. 230) in the
lectures with examples of morality groups in England and the *lettres de cachet* in France. Despite differing means of suppression but similar points of initiation through local groupings of families, places of work, and religious organizations, both England and France prevail in exercising social constraint through judicial and extra-judicial means. These diffused communal practices amass and work in concert with the State apparatuses, entangling into a much more penetrative network, gathering into what Foucault (2015) first illuminates as the punitive society—“a society in which the judicial State apparatus makes additional use of corrective and penitentiary functions” (p. 140). The punitive society is comprised with the accumulation of the correlative and collaborative efforts of the micro-instances of power, innervated through the workings of the State. Foucault describes the punitive society as an extension into daily life of supplemental corrective measures employed by the State apparatuses derived from the implanting of the coercive, penitentiary system onto the penal institution. Furthermore, Foucault argues that the adoption of these additional corrective practices by State apparatuses was hastened by the bourgeoisie urgency to control and suppress popular illegalisms. The notion that power works in dispersion is further expanded in *Discipline and Punish* through Foucault’s discussion of panopticism and hierarchical observation. The following analysis of Foucault’s discussion of morality groups, the *lettres de cachet*, panopticism, and hierarchical observation (the former two from the lectures and latter two from the book) illustrate Foucault’s response to the second schema that power is diffused.
Diffusing through Morality

In England, various types of organizations arose that endeavored to monitor the morality of individuals during a time of economic growth, industrialization, and burgeoning capitalism. To ensure prosperity and protection, these groups materialized in the margins of morality and penalty with the intentions not of punishing, but with the aim of coercion through assaults on immoral conduct and the conditions that bred those behaviors. In the seventeenth century, dissident religious communities, primarily the Quakers and Methodists, used repression to cultivate a certain morality through an internal control of individuals. Extending into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, other groups that were still connected to, but tended less toward the religious, sought external control of morality with social pressure, interventions, and even involved the judiciary when necessary. Defense groups emerged that took the form of controls and superintendence to restore moral order, and a sort of private police was formed to watch over Bourgeoisie property at locations like docks and warehouses. The transformation and nature of economic activity at this time required a constant monitoring of the population, which was accomplished by these groups diffused throughout the whole of society. Religious and morality organizations, defense groups, and police associations existed in dispersion to form a new type of control and coercion, a power that linked morality and penalty with the governance of the daily conduct of individuals.

Diffusing through Lettres de Cachet

During the Ancien Régime, a mechanism was needed to excise individuals who proved a moral danger to society who did not require the force of the military and whose deeds fell outside of the penal code and the judiciary. The lettres de cachet were locally
sought to address matters of concern for individual behaviors, tendencies, and predilections that ran contrary to the morality of a family, or a parish, for example. Letters were sent to the crown for approval, typically requesting confinement not in prison, but in a place such as a convent or hospital, with the aim of transforming the morality of the individual in question. The stipulation contained in the letters did not advocate a punishment, but a corrective action, some kind of rehabilitation for the morally corrupt individual. Significantly, an entire field of knowledge materializes through the letters about the described individuals and the marginalized moral grouping to which they belong. For Foucault, the process of the lettres de cachet work as a mechanism for circulating power from above with the sovereign signature and more significantly, in dispersion from below, as the letter is activated and executed in the community. The lettres de cachet are then an instrument that circulates through networks of power to document, prescribe, confine, and correct; an example that demarcates a shift from the preventative nature of the penal to the penitent, coercive system of the punitive through a dispersed communal power.

**Diffusing through Panopticism**

The analytic notion that power operates in dispersion is undoubtedly developed in *Discipline and Punish*. The characterization of “a system of power that goes much further and deeper” (p. 229) in the lectures reaches “right down into the depths of society” (p. 27) in the book. Power is not centralized in the State; instead, “What the apparatuses and institutions operate is, in a sense, a micro-physics of power” (Foucault, 1995, p. 26). This atomic power is diffused throughout the entire social field through variegated disciplinary mechanisms and techniques. This is most clearly manifested in
Foucault’s extension of Bentham’s Panopticon and Julius’ universal surveillance, which are explored in the lectures, but much more intensely advanced in the chapter on panopticism in *Discipline and Punish*. Bentham’s architecture distributes power across the space of an idealized prison through a principle of visibility where bodies are subjected, seen, observed, studied, and known. Through Bentham’s illustration of the perfect disciplinary institution, Foucault (2015) underlines the import of power dispersal beyond its physical architecture:

“…he also set out to show how one may ‘unlock’ the disciplines and get them to function in a diffused, multiple, polyvalent way throughout the whole social body…Bentham dreamt of transforming into a network of mechanisms that would be everywhere and always, running through society without interruption in space or time” (pp. 208-209).

The plans of the panopticon are protracted with Julius’ historical conception of the conversion from the civilization of the spectacle to the society of surveillance. Julius attributes this transformation to the augmentation of State superintendence, which seeped into daily life with a greater degree of supervision, management, and interference. The theory and practice of panopticism informs and undergirds what Foucault describes as a new political anatomy. Julius’ surveillance society operates “under the surfaces of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge” (p. 217). The dispersion of power, elemental to the functioning of panopticism, driven by the underlying principles of Bentham’s architecture coupled with Julius’ notion of
surveillance, work to gradually extend relations of discipline and their mechanisms into and throughout the multiplex network of society through Foucault’s idea of diffusion.

**Diffusing through Hierarchical Observation**

Foucault takes the conception of panopticism and further elaborates on how disciplinary power makes use of uninterrupted, carefully ordered surveillance. Hierarchical observation works in conjunction with a space that will activate its transformative capabilities to watch, know, and coerce individuals with unrestrained visibility dispersed throughout a space. The ideal disciplinary apparatus facilitates this continuous gaze and through an exponential and circulatory network; disciplinary effects are distributed and amplified on all who are illuminated by it. Surveillance this pervasive allows for disciplinary power to function discreetly, profoundly, and ubiquitously—“like a piece of machinery” (Foucault, 1995, p. 177). The power inherent in this unchecked visibility of hierarchical surveillance detains the body through the “uninterrupted play of calculated gazes”, (Foucault, 1995, p. 177), and with its captive, disciplinary power can operate through an optics of coercion. The instrument of ordered, perpetual observation through the analytic of diffusion enables disciplinary power to train and manipulate individual bodies for maximized productivity.

3. Constituting Power

In his third response to the schema for the analysis of power outlined in the lectures, Foucault looks to the nature of the relationship between power and production as being constitutive. For Foucault, power does not just assure production, power is what furnishes the conditions for the comprisal of production. To this end, power must be understood as both the prerequisite and propulsive core for the emergence of the
production apparatus. This section looks at three illustrations of the constitutive nature of power; first, the linkage between the system of sequestration and time, highlighted in the lectures; second, the relationship between subjection and the body, illuminated in the book; and third, the theme of normalization, traced through both the lectures and elaborated upon in the book.

**Constituting through Sequestration and Time**

This constitutive relationship of power to production is made possible through the critical system of sequestration, which Foucault explicates in the lectures. The entirety of an individual’s time of life is coerced through the system of sequestration and synthesized into labor power. Sequestration takes responsibility for accounting for every aspect of an individual’s time and systematically converting it into time directed towards production. As a system of power, sequestration seizes the time of individuals through a whole series of apparatuses (nurseries, schools, reformatories, prisons) distributed within society, funneled through the course of a lifetime. By means of these various constitutive apparatuses, sequestration systematically coerces through the dissemination of knowledge, the pressing of normalization, and the precepts of production over a lifetime.

By demonstrating the constitutive nature of power to production and inserting between them a whole system of sequestration, Foucault responds to and complicates the Marx-tinged, seemingly natural equation of labor and man’s concrete existence. Foucault (2015) posits instead that labor is not naturally man’s concrete existence, but rather man’s existence is comprised of more instinctive activities, which may take the form of “pleasure, discontinuity, rest, need, moments, chance, violence, and so on” (p. 232). Man’s impulsivity and the time it occupies must then be converted through the coercive
and constitutive system of sequestration into labor to power the production apparatus. Foucault asserts the notion of the equivalency of labor and man’s existence is not inherent, it is instead produced and projected through the system.

Foucault’s expounds on his criticism of the theory of labor as man’s essence in *Discipline and Punish*. The linkage of man to his labor is produced through the practices of capitalist production. Man is made docile through disciplinary practices and thus can be fixed to the machinery of production. Docile bodies can then be accumulated alongside the simultaneous accumulation of capital. The problems of the accumulation of men and the accumulation capital provide reciprocal support for each other, with their existence made possible by discipline. Disciplinary techniques allow for the reduction of man to a receptive, malleable body, a unit of force that can then in turn be manipulated, transformed, and multiplied into exponential forces for utility. In the nineteenth century, Foucault (2015) explains, “The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting force and bodies, in short ‘political anatomy’, could be operated in the most political regimes, apparatuses or institutions” (p. 221). For Foucault, man’s existence cannot equate labor; this relationship is instead generated through the constitutive disciplinary practices facilitated by the capitalist production apparatus.

**Constituting through Subjection and the Body**

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault does not directly use the term from the lectures, “sequestration”, to describe the system of power through which the time of life is transformed into labor power; instead from 1973 to 1975, the object of time of life focuses more heavily on the body, which becomes central to analysis and the system of
sequestration is articulated as one of subjection. Foucault (1995) pins the body at the cross-section of the political and economic: “it is always the body that is at issue—the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution, and their submission” (p. 25). Compared to what have been more traditional histories of the body, Foucault (1995) shows that the body is both politically enmeshed as it becomes a slate for power relations to “invest”, “mark”, “train”, and “torture”, and economically interlocked as the body’s “constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political instrument meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body” (pp. 25-26). Focusing on the body’s economic utility in terms of labor power, Foucault points to the precondition of subjection to shape the body into a useful force from which productivity can be derived. This careful subjection relies on certain knowledge and mastery of bodily forces that comprise what Foucault terms, “the political technology of the body”.

Foucault later expands on the practices of subjection with an analysis of new techniques that emerged in the eighteenth century targeting the body. Three new methods emerge with the realization that the body could be constituted, manipulated, transformed, and improved. First, the scale of control shifts from “‘wholesale’” to “‘working it ‘retail’’”; this meant a refined and subtle system of control and management of small, detailed movements. Second, the object of control changes to a focus on economy, efficiency, and organization. And lastly, the mode in which this is carried out becomes one of continuous compulsion that prioritizes the constitutive process over the outcome. The deployment of these new techniques generates the conditions for a new
management of the body, which in its preciseness “assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called ‘disciplines’” (Foucault, 1995, p. 137). Discipline provides for a constant coercion of the body, and through practices and subjection, made possible by this “‘political anatomy’” and “‘mechanics of power’”, bodies are rendered docile. Through the inverse relationship created through multiplying the body’s forces as it becomes more proficient and thus economically useful while simultaneously dividing the efficacy of the forces it builds through political submission and compliance, discipline severs power from the body.

Foucault furthers his analysis, extending the relationship between the body, the political and economic, with the workings of constitutive disciplinary techniques. Here, Foucault looks at the reciprocity between the burgeoning Western economy characterized by the accumulation of capital with the concurrent emergence of political climate dominated by new management methods for the accumulation of men. Capitalism ushered in a new apparatus of production as the economic landscape was overtaken by industry while the political and specifically, the military, sought new methods for large-scale organization, management, and control. The spectrum of discipline affords techniques that individualize, distribute, segment, surveil, hierarchize, strategize, multiply, normalize—all of which orchestrate the manipulation of bodies and their forces. This constitutive disciplinary revolution operates with great efficiency and applicability through a decrease in the economical and political costs of power while synchronously intensifying its effects.
Constituting through Normalization

In describing the system of power established through the apparatuses of sequestration through the constitutive character of power in the lectures, Foucault points to the shaping of individuals, through knowledge, normalization, and production. During the Ancien Régime, marginalized individuals were separated from the population through practices of exclusion. In the nineteenth century; however, those on the fringes are reabsorbed, and through ensembles of sequestration that coerce, with the dissemination of certain knowledges, and by tethering to the production apparatus, individuals are made to conform and adhere through multifarious practices that normalize. These institutions and practices concurrently give rise to a certain discursivity that describes, judges, evaluates over the course of a lifetime in relation to the norm. Here, Foucault (2015) establishes the linkage between the apparatuses of sequestration and normalization: “To be sequestrated is to be caught within a discursivity that is at once uninterrupted in time, produced from outside by an authority, and necessarily ordered by reference to the normal and the abnormal” (p. 216). So, the individual is constituted and throughout his lifetime is described, corralled, and pressed through a discourse of normativity disseminated through the authority embedded within the apparatuses of sequestration.

One of the ways in which disciplinary power is constitutive in Discipline and Punish is through what Foucault underscores as “a new power to judge”, the instrument of normalizing judgment. Through the pressure of a continuous assessment, normalization derives its effectiveness from its ability to enact uniformity as well as differentiate individuals. To accomplish this, normalizing judgment operationalizes five techniques: comparison, differentiation, hierarchicalization, homogenization, and
exclusion. These practices subject individuals to a spectrum of penalization for even minute deviations from the established correct behavior, rendering any noncompliant conduct as punishable. In addition, normalization, through correction, reduces divergence through penalties of intensified training exercises. Through a spectrum of good and bad behaviors, normalizing judgment orders and describes the acts of individuals relative to others. Finally, individual conduct can be quantified through ranks and thus made numerically measurable against the others. Through constitutive disciplinary power, the technique of normalization acts as an ever-present judgment that coerces individuals to conform and through that process, become more docile, and thus more useful and productive.

4. Power-Knowledge

In opposition to a schema of ideology with an implied reference to Altusser’s “ideologico-political struggle” (p. 286), Foucault counters with his singular notion of the relationship of power and knowledge (Harcourt, 2015). For Foucault, the exercise of power produces the correlative generation of knowledge (savoir) and correspondingly, at every site at which knowledge is established, power is executed. It is important to note that power and knowledge work concurrently and directly imply each other through intricate circuitry; however, they are not interchangeable, they do not represent, nor do they equate one another.

In the lectures, Foucault provides the example of enacting the administrative survey (surveillance) during the eighteenth century as a way to accumulate and utilize information gathered on the population, which gave rise to the formation of multiple knowledges and correspondingly, the activation of multiple points of power. The
practice of population accounting yielded two critical developments: first, the emergence of the agent and his report became as a site of power and a relay for knowledge; and second, the appearance of independent sources of privileged knowledge, such as medical practitioners, who by virtue of the power affixed to their station, have the knowledge they espouse endorsed by their audience.

In *Discipline and Punish*, power-knowledge is crucial to Foucault’s analytic design operating on a grid of active, fluxing power relations. In fact, power-knowledge, as it is renovated throughout history, is culpable for the scope and sphere of all possible fields of knowledge; it demarcates and defines what can be known at a given time and place. So, in tracing the emergence of the prison system, Foucault pinpoints the correlative workings of power-knowledge that become the means with which to tease out what creates the conditions for a new scientific and legal congregation. These labyrinthine forces materialize to form the constitutive fields of the human sciences and techniques to discipline and normalize the body through various mechanisms and instruments. Myriad examples of power-knowledge abound in both of the lectures and book; however, the notion of the examination is taken up here as a privileged location for the workings of power and knowledge in both texts because it is one of the three major techniques of disciplinary power, and the examination is unique in that it is comprised of the first two instruments, hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment.

**Power-knowledge through Examination**

The examination functions as a constant, calibrated, aggregation of inquiries through institutions and practices into the lives of individuals to determine normativity. It becomes a technique for distributing bodies across the production apparatus and
managing the new illegalisms through a continuous reference of the established norm. The examination produces and in turn is produced by a whole field knowledge, establishing an impermeable connection between punishment and documentation. What was once a judicial tool is appropriated and extended beyond the judicial apparatus, reaching into the daily existence of individuals, amassing into elements of what Foucault refers to as the disciplinary society.

In the lectures, Foucault (2015) outlines the difference between inquiry, a way of knowing events through observation criteria, and the examination, also way of knowing, but knowing individuals, through observation criteria based on the observations of power-holders with reference to the norm (p. 115). In looking at the emergence of the phenomenon of the criminal as social enemy, Foucault’s notes suggest a change in questioning that departs from the facts and the discursive practice of inquiry, and instead, draws upon nature and norm through the discursive practice of the examination (Foucault, 2015, p. 56). So, the shift in discursivity from inquiry to examination illustrates a new way, informed by relations of power with which to know individuals.

Foucault describes and delineates the notion of the examination with greater intensity in *Discipline and Punish*, as he develops the practice as a central technology in proceedings of disciplinary power. The examination is primed for analysis with Foucault’s illumination of the relative size of the technology compared to its extensive institutional application. Through its simultaneous making of subject and object of examinees through hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment, the examination is nexus to power relations that shape what is extracted and consequently constituted as knowledge. Foucault offers the examples of what became the examining institutions of
the hospital and school where through examining practices, authoritative figures extract and comprise knowledge about their objects of study, and collectively, that knowledge comprises an entire area from which to draw knowledge. These institutions offer fertile ground for the continual state of examination which furnishes a constant source for various relations of power to make subject and object through judging, organizing, ranking, arranging, recording practices, thus constituting a whole field of knowledge.

At the core of disciplinary power, the technique of the examination carries out three tasks. First, as disciplinary power works surreptitiously, the examination exposes individuals to a perpetual state of objectification and subjection through the constant visibility it imposes. Through the examination, individuals are always seen through the authoritative gaze and as a result, can be maintained as continual subjects and objects of discipline. Second, the examination opens the individual up to an entire sphere of documentation, which describes and records aspects of individuality while simultaneously extrapolating those features for evaluation, comparison, and distribution with a multitude of other individuals. Innumerable writings on a multiplicity of individuals amass into a database that can be used to manage, calculate, describe, predict, and most significantly, determine what constitutes the norm. Third, the examination permits the accounting of the lives of individuals condensed into what becomes a “case”. This filing system authorizes a certain describability that opens the individual to a host of control and management techniques. The entanglements of power and knowledge with the disciplinary instrument of the examination are indeed profound.
Conclusions on Productive Power: from the Punitive to the Disciplinary

In the last lecture of the *Punitive Society*, Foucault takes the power that he has traced and characterized as punitive and expands it to become disciplinary, thus the punitive society becomes part of the broader disciplinary society. Foucault describes the punitive society as the outcome of the implanting of the coercive, penitentiary system onto the penal institution, establishing a perpetuity between the punitive and the penal, where the apparatuses of the State adopt and employ supplemental corrective measures that permeate every aspect of daily life. Foucault later elucidates that the existence of this system depends on the maintenance of surveillance and the acquisition of knowledge about individuals. This system, constituted through these manifold instruments and techniques, works to circulate vital relationships of power through apparatuses of sequestration that bind individuals to the apparatus of production:

The supervision-punishment couple is imposed as an indispensable power relationship for fixing individuals to the production apparatus, for the formation of productive forces, and characterizes the society that may be called *disciplinary*. We have here a means of ethical and political coercion that is necessary for the body, time, life, and men to be integrated in the form of labor, in the interplay of productive forces” (Foucault, 2015, p. 196).

Following Foucault’s responses to the four schemata for the analysis of power in his last lecture, he briefly lays out what will become thematically central to *Discipline and Punish* and act as a threshold between the two. Here, Foucault characterizes the system of power in which the prison is enmeshed. In the lectures, as well as in *Discipline and Punish*, the institution of the prison acts as a pivot chord and a privileged example in
between two unique systems of power as “a symbol, a concentrate, but also a strategic functional component” (Foucault, 2015, p. 239). Foucault juxtaposes the system of power during the Ancien Régime characterized by marks and violence, ceremony and spectacle, and the sovereign, from whom all of this emanates, with what will become a history of our present, a system of power generated through what Foucault (2015) in the lectures delineates as “a series that characterizes modern society: formation of labor-power—apparatus of sequestration—permanent function of normalization” (p. 239). The footnote for this sentence indicates a different order in Foucault’s notes worth mentioning: “‘Apparatus of sequestration. Formation of a labor force. Disciplinary society. Permanent function of normalization/normativity’” (Foucault, 2015, p. 239). The materialization of the prison then becomes a location for studying the broader, shifting systems of power in which it is shaped, situated, and reinvigorates relations of power, and the site for examining the construction of individuals concertedly as subject, object, and effect of power relations and the generation of knowledge.

So, a re/reading of Discipline and Punish referenced and framed by the 1973 lectures on The Punitive Society offers fresh profundity into Foucault’s reconsideration of power expounded upon throughout the lectures and put into full effect in 1975. Foucault’s power is productive through its exercise, diffusion, constitution, and power-knowledge. To these ends, Foucault (1995) illuminates the implications of power recast: “In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault, 1995, p. 194).
Implications for Qualitative Research in Education:

Productive Power and Pedagogy

This last section offers some implications and connections for the applying productive power to studies in curricular practices. Foucault has certainly interrogated many of the institutional practices that imbue our current situation; however, he does not offer a full investigation committed to pedagogical practices in the same manner in which he studied prisons, sexuality, or governmentality, although the relevance and linkage for illumination are certainly present. Throughout his work, Foucault (2000b) provides us with what he describes as “‘propositions,’ ‘game openings’ where those who maybe interested are invited to join in…philosophical fragments put to work in a historical field of problems” (p. 224). Educational scholars might take Foucault up on his offer employing his genealogical approach bearing in mind the “methodological precautions” he offers in Society Must Be Defended (2003, pp. 27-34), but also consider refining the direction of analysis given the responses to the four schemata for the analysis of power that Foucault outlines in the lectures and extends into Discipline and Punish. In the 1973 lectures, Foucault outlines a rebuttal to four theoretical schemata that inform analyses of power, which may also be employed as an analytical lens for considering the producing power of pedagogy. Following with what we might take as an invitation from Foucault at the conclusion of Discipline and Punish to continue work on this project, it is possible to employ his responses to the four schemata as a flexible framework for examining and describing accepted pedagogical practices, their operationalization through various educational institutions, and the conditions that make possible their existence.
Looking at the designs of Foucault’s reimagined productive power through the analytic lenses of its exercise, diffusion, constitution, and power-knowledge offers educational researchers a four-fold prism through which to describe manifold present and accepted pedagogical practices and their circulation through various institutions of education. In order to better establish how this reading of power in the punitive and disciplinary societies might be better adopted through various areas of qualitative research in education. Here, I work through Foucault’s notion of productive power and their pedagogical implications through the four vehicles for description: exercising, diffusing, constituting, and power-knowledge.

**Exercising through Pedagogy**

Foucault’s notion that power is exercised and not possessed is one that provides an entry point from which to study various aspects of pedagogy. Power is exercised throughout an entire network of educational practices revitalized by each and every curricular act—homework, testing, grading, rules, etc. In identifying the exercising of power, educational researchers must look to the effects that are produced through curricular practices. What are the potential ripplings of a classroom seating arrangement, a recess game, a particular literacy approach, a special education intervention, the wording of a mathematics problem? These lines of inquiry turn into questions of “how?”, how is pedagogical power exercised? How does it function and what are its effects?

Not only do scholars need to locate and examine the effects of a curricular act, they must also probe the space in which the practice takes place. The execution of power through each small curricular movement generates a battleground, a network of relations
through which power may be exercised—a classroom, administrative offices, conferences, the playground, groupings of students, etc., in which a continuous contest is carried out.

Aligning with the Marxist notions of possession that Foucault was working against, the idea of power-holders, such as policy-makers or administrators, exists as an effect of the exercise of power. Foucault acknowledges the favorable positioning of certain groups as a result of accumulated victories and advantageous positioning, which is undeniable; however, the crux is the propagation of power through a relationship of exercise; not possession. This element of power that Foucault cultivates over the lectures and in *Discipline and Punish* undoubtedly offers researchers a new way to reconsider the notion “power-holders” in educational practice.

**Diffusing through Pedagogy**

Foucault’s concept that power is diffused and not harnessed opens numerous pathways from which to examine curricular acts. In response to the idea that power is ultimately bound up in the State apparatus, Foucault instead proposes that power is ubiquitous; however, this pervasiveness is diffused throughout the whole of society into a much more subtle and complex system, an arrangement that undoubtedly transfers to the field of education. Accordingly, Foucault would contend that the State organizations that govern education are not the ultimate seat of power from which practices are imposed, but rather a more intensive point through which power is mobilized and reactivated.

Curricular practices extend far beyond departments of education that instead serve as relays for power to be diffused through much less imposing groupings. Power is diffused through more localized pedagogical points—families, tutoring groups, and clubs—small
organizations that potentially operate through and in relation to individual school sites. These community sites execute their own pedagogical acts of power, which would align with the interests of the State educational apparatuses. It is this massive networking—the continuous aggregation of small curricular acts of power coordinated with State interests that engenders an entire educational system for power to be productive. Investigating localized sites of diffused power opens research opportunities to interrogate more localized practices that ripple to the State and circulate through the pedagogical network of power relations.

**Constituting through Pedagogy**

Foucault’s notion that the connection between power and production is more than requisite, it is constitutive, also opens numerous avenues from which to consider pedagogical acts. In other words, power is not just required for production; it allows and creates the conditions for the occurrence of production. In looking at the pedagogical applications for Foucault’s notion of constitution, the possibilities for production in education have to be scrutinized. First, what is being produced; for example, cultivating a pedagogical subject with certain behavior/disposition. And second, in establishing the constitutive relationship with power, what conditions are created by power relations that allow for that production; what permits the forming of this type of pedagogical subject? The power relations circulating through curricular practices constitute pedagogical subjects far too enmeshed in their subjectification to anticipate their situation. Research on re/production in schools/schooling is prevalent in educational scholarship; however, applying Foucault’s work here may offer additional layers of critical description. A Foucauldian analysis would investigate the conditions that are made possible through a
pedagogical network of power and in tracing the humble paths of those conditions of possibility, illuminate how such production is feasible.

**Power-knowledge through Pedagogy**

Foucault’s innovative concept of the reciprocal, exponential relationship of power-knowledge continues to be a rich perspective from which to interrogate various pedagogical practices. The continual, dynamic presence of power-knowledge accounts for what it is possible to know at a given time and location, making it simultaneously a generator and trap for potential areas of research. For the researcher, power-knowledge circulates to create the conditions in which the work is being conducted. The terms, procedures, and limits of the research are all fashioned by the workings of power-knowledge. Conducting this type of research requires a certain reflexivity in which there is a continual acknowledgement of the circumstances in which the researcher is working in addition to the realization that the researcher is in fact an instrument for power-knowledge to mobilize.

**Conclusions**

This is perhaps one of Foucault’s most well known quotations, offered shortly before his untimely death. Foucault gifts us with tremendous insight into his work and thought process if we consider this as a perspective that he took in his approach to his projects and life. In heeding Foucault’s call, we of course must bear in mind his insight:

> My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, pp. 231-232).
Everything is dangerous. As educators, researchers, scholars, and as members of society—nothing is without risk; however, for Foucault, this is not necessarily a bad thing. There is always work to be done—criticism, innovation, developing and raising awareness, evaluation, and assessing the world in which we live. Education seems to be particularly dangerous ground as it functions as a microcosm and a continuous foundation for preparing young people for a world continually shaped and molded by the productivity of power. Outfitted with Foucault’s analytic toolkit, particularly his insights into the productive workings of power, the task here is to take on an active role in the community with vigilance and conscientiousness, but also with hope.
References


CHAPTER 5

REFLECTION

What I think is never quite the same, because for me my books are experiences, in a sense, that I would like to be as full as possible. An experience is something that one comes out of transformed. If I had to write a book to communicate what I’m thinking before I begin to write, I would never have the courage to begin. I write a book only because I still don’t exactly know what to think about this thing I want so much to think about, so that the book transforms me and transforms what I think. Each book transforms what I was thinking when I was finishing the previous book. I am an experimenter and not a theorist. I call a theorist someone who constricts a general system, either deductive or analytical, and applies it to different fields in a uniform way. That isn’t my case. I am an experimenter in the sense that I write in order to change myself and in order not to think the same things as before (Foucault, 2000a, pp. 239-240)

This quotation is taken from an interview conducted in 1978, where Foucault describes the transformative experience of writing one of his books. Not only does this comment encapsulate how Foucault’s approached his research, but it also captures the importance of experience and transformation in embarking upon scholarship. I would also characterize the experience of my dissertation project much in the same way. This process has very much been a transformative experience in how I consider myself as an educator and scholar. My experience in engaging with Foucault’s work and drawing connections to the field of education has been perpetually humbling, challenging, and rewarding. I would describe my experience in grappling with Foucault’s work as an
intellectual limit-experience. I have undoubtedly had to “wrench” myself from positions of scholarly comfort and in order to fully appreciate Foucault’s work, I have also “aimed at pulling myself free of myself” so that I might read, think, and write differently than I had before (Foucault, 2000a, pp. 241-242).

This dissertation project was organized around the composition of three potential articles that draw upon Foucault’s genealogy, his notions of positive, productive power, *The Punitive Society*, and *Discipline and Punish* and create linkage to various aspects of curriculum and instruction. Each working piece constitutes a chapter as part of a whole project, but is also designed to stand on its own as three distinct pieces, though there are many lines of similarity and thematic continuity that run between them. These articles are primarily theoretical; however, part of my task has been to establish points of connectivity and roads between Foucault’s genealogical work that deployed the lectures on *The Punitive Society*, and *Discipline and Punish* and their applications to the field of education.

In Chapter 2, “Foucault, Method and Education: *La Naissance de la Généalogie*” I attempt to fill in some of the gaps created by the lack of a structured genealogical methodology. I synthesize from three different avenues to furnish supports for those wishing to conduct their own genealogies in education. First, I look to some of the events and influences that made possible the development of Foucault’s genealogical prism in order to underscore the importance of experience in the role of the genealogist and the shaping of genealogical thinking. Second, I highlight the basic aspects of Foucault’s genealogical investigations drawing upon his essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” with the intention of facilitating the process for researchers wishing to embark upon a
Foucauldian-inspired genealogy in education. Third, I convey how Foucault’s elements of genealogy are actualized and mobilized in *Discipline and Punish*, his first extensive genealogical investigation of the prison. Throughout these three sections of the article, I link Foucault’s genealogical offerings to potential connections in areas of education. Since Foucault did not furnish a cohesive methodology to pursue his style of genealogy, this paper aims to offer some direction so that educational scholars may utilize this analytic to reconsider and rewrite histories of taken-for-granted curricular practices.

In Chapter 3, “An Introduction to *The Punitive Society*”, I illustrate the potential of Foucault’s most recent published lectures at the Collège de France in 1973. I situate the course, providing insight into Foucault’s political activism that undoubtedly sheds light on the material of the lectures. Next, I provide a summary of the lectures, following how the emergence of the modern prison is not only conceivable, but how its formation becomes certain, notwithstanding that the idea of universal prison is dismissed in both theory and practice. Third, I connect the themes of the lectures on *The Punitive Society* to some of Foucault’s other pieces to delineate links for possible analysis and offer connections for educational researchers. And last, I present an example of how elements from the lectures could be applied in education through a vignette of how Foucault’s notion of a power that is productive may be used to consider the literacy practice of close reading.

In Chapter 4, “Describing Productive Power in Education: A Re/reading of the Punitive and Disciplinary Societies”, I offer a rereading of Foucault’s reconsideration of power in *Discipline and Punish* from one that is negative and represses to a power that is positive and produces, considering the lectures on *The Punitive Society*. With the vast
application of Foucault’s work of disciplinary power as described in *Discipline and Punish* throughout educational research, the recent publication of the lectures on *The Punitive Society* that offer so much insight into the expansion of Foucault’s notion of power in *Discipline and Punish* insists upon a critical juxtaposition of the texts. I build this rereading of power as a prospective looking forward from the lectures to the book on based on Foucault’s responses to four theoretical designs: exercising, diffusing, constitution, and the relationship of power-knowledge that monopolize power analyses, as sketched in the last lecture in *The Punitive Society*. I examine examples of each of the four vehicles for describing power from the lectures and the book in order to determine points of similarity, tension, and refinement from 1973 lectures to the 1975 book. Additionally, I consider these four means for power description and their connections to educational research as a way to describe power in pedagogical practices.

I have begun the process of creating pathways to and from Foucault’s work here towards curriculum studies; however, this project as far from complete. I believe the next step would be embarking upon a genealogy of my own making, drawing upon the rich “philosophical fragments” that Foucault has so generously provided. I believe I have cultivated my own understanding of what constitutes a Foucauldian-inspired genealogy and feel ready to engage his analytical toolkit. This project has definitely equipped me to endeavor on my own reflexive genealogical path to examine the effects of productive power in taken-for-granted pedagogical practices and assumptions.

Furthermore, I would continue to study how Foucault’s genealogical analytic extends in the last decade of his life following his work on *Discipline and Punish*. I have established a working understanding of how Foucault cultivated his genealogical
approach and I would be interested in exploring how he refines and expands upon his analytic in *The History of Sexuality* as well as trace some of that work through the remainder of his lectures at the Collège de France. In fact, the sequential manner of the lectures might offer a great deal of insight into his work on *The History of Sexuality*. 
References

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