Intrapersonal Culture Clash:  
The Effect of Cultural Identity Incongruence on Decision-Making  

by  
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A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  

Approved March 2019 by the  
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ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2019
ABSTRACT

Research and theory in social psychology and related fields indicates that people simultaneously hold many cultural identities. And it is well evidenced across relevant fields (e.g., sociology, marketing, economics) that salient identities are instrumental in a variety of cognitive and behavioral processes, including decision-making. It is not, however, well understood how the relative salience of various cultural identities factors into the process of making identity-relevant choices, particularly ones that require an actor to choose between conflicting sets of cultural values or beliefs. It is also unclear whether the source of that salience (e.g., chronic or situational) is meaningful in this regard. The current research makes novel predictions concerning the roles of cultural identity centrality and cultural identity situational salience in three distinct aspects of the decision-making process: Direction of decision, speed of decision, and emotion related to decision. In doing so, the research highlights two under-researched forms of culture (i.e., political and religious) and uses as the focal dependent variable a decision-making scenario that forces participants to choose between the values of their religious and political cultures and, to some degree, behave in an identity-inconsistent manner. Results indicate main effects of Christian identity centrality and democrat identity centrality on preference for traditional versus gender-neutral (i.e., non-traditional/progressive) restrooms after statistically controlling for covariates. Additionally, results show a significant main effect of democrat identity centrality and a significant interaction effect of Christian and democrat identity centrality on positive emotion linked to the decision. Post hoc analyses further reveal a significant quadratic relationship between Christian identity centrality and emotion related to the decision. There was no effect of situational
strength of democrat identity salience on the decision. Neither centrality or situational strength had any effect on the speed with which participants made their decisions. This research theoretically and empirically advances the study of cultural psychology and carries important implications for identity research and judgment and decision-making across a variety of fields, including management, behavioral economics, and marketing.
This dissertation is dedicated to the following people/Siberian retrievers:

My parents, Katie and Mark Barbour, who have loved and supported me in good
times and bad, and always gently encouraged me to reach for what they knew I could
achieve. I would truly not be here without you.

My sisters, Cary Rodgers and Laura Marshall, who are my intellectual, social, and
comedic role models, and lifelong friends.

My mother- and father-in-law, Laura and George Marcoulides, who have been so
very kind to me, and so supportive of my goals.

My dog, Steven Prefontaine, who has I think contracted the stress and anxiety of
graduate school. Sorry, Pre. Hopefully it won’t hurt your 5k time.

Finally, my wife, Katerina Marie Marcoulides Barbour, who has helped me in
every way a person can help another person, and who has during this process of attaining
my Ph.D. become the reason I am driven to succeed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge several people and organizations that have helped make this dissertation possible. First, I would like to acknowledge the Army Research Institute for funding this research (grant number W911NF-17-1-0175). I would also like to acknowledge the Academy of Management for granting me an award for Most Promising Dissertation Proposal, as well as a generous stipend that helped fund the research.

I would like to acknowledge my supervisory committee, Naomi Mandel, Dave MacKinnon, and Doug Kenrick. I was extremely fortunate to have such an experienced and brilliant committee. Each member helped this project, and my overall development, immensely with their unique insights and expertise.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the mentorship of my committee chairperson, Adam Cohen. Adam is a gifted thinker and even more gifted mentor. His own work on cultural psychology inspired the theorizing that led to this work, and his guidance throughout the process was invaluable.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Which of these two options should I choose? Which is a better reflection of who I am, or try to be? Why do I sometimes feel like I go against my own values and beliefs in making decisions?

People are complex multicultural actors. It is crucial that researchers and practitioners in psychology, marketing, management, and politics broaden their view of culture, and develop a more nuanced understanding of multiculturalism and its complex role in human thought and action. The reason for this is that the cultures to which we belong (and there can be many to which we simultaneously belong; A. B. Cohen, 2009) help shape our sense of who we are; our self-concept. And our self-concept, in turn, acts as a schema that guides many of our cognitive and behavioral processes, including, but not limited to, the manner in which we make decisions (Mandel, 2003; Markus & Kitayama, 2010).

While we know from social, cultural, and organizational psychology that members of different cultures (usually, different ethnicities or nationalities) make decisions in certain different ways (e.g., cultural frame switching; Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002), this area of research deals almost exclusively with national (or east/west) culture. Furthermore, culture research has had little to say about when and why our various cultural identities (thinking of culture very broadly) become salient, whether the cause or degree of salience is meaningful in guiding behavior, or the various ways in which conflicting or complimentary salient cultural identities impact decision processes. The intent with the current research is to advance theory regarding cultural contributions
to, and centrality within, the self-concept, and to demonstrate how the culturally-informed self-concept influences three specific aspects of decision-making: Direction of decision, speed of decision, and emotion related to decision.

The current research adds to the literature in a variety of ways. First, it for the first time addresses the chronic salience (i.e., centrality) of cultural memberships (via cultural identity). And while it does this in part by using relevant existing theory from identity research (e.g., Identity Theory; Stryker, 1968, 1987), it also expands upon this theory by investigating the interactive role of multiple incongruent cultural identities that are central to varying degrees. Second, it investigates the relative effects of chronic cultural identity salience and situational identity salience on decision-making.

Third, it is the first research in either the culture or identity areas to treat situational strength (i.e., social pressure to conform to group norms or expectations; Mischel, 1977) as a potentially important factor in whether decisions track chronic cultural identity salience or situational cultural identity salience. Finally, while the direction of one’s decision (e.g., whether the decision is consistent with the underlying values, norms, etc. of a salient identity) is always an outcome of interest, and is in the current research, it is not the only important aspect of the decision process with regard to intrapersonal culture conflict. The current research is the first to explore how incongruent salient cultural identities affect speed of decisions and emotion related to recently made decisions, and it discusses the implications of these decision outcomes for various relevant fields.
Culture and Self-Concept

To understand the role of culture in self and identity, one must first have a sense of what a culture is. While many aspects of culture can affect decision processes, the field has not done a comprehensive job laying the groundwork. The vast majority of the psychological research on culture has focused on a limited set of forms of cultural variation (i.e., national/geographical), made comparisons between east and west (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and largely made use of a single cultural dimension; individualism/collectivism (Hofstede, 2011). This approach to cultural research is consistent with the notion that culture, by definition, involves shared geography and language (Triandis, 1996).

While this view of culture and line of cultural research have been valuable and have produced some of the most important and widely-cited findings in all of psychology, one should be careful not to let their conception of culture be confined to only these groups, dimensions, and cultural forms, or to assume these are the only aspects of cultures that are important to identity and/or decision-making. As argued by A. B. Cohen (2009), there can even be culture shared between people who live in different countries and who speak different languages. With this in mind, the view of culture to be implemented in the current research, and the one more in-line with the ‘many forms of culture’ notion, is articulated well by Fiske (2002), who contends that culture is:

…a socially transmitted or socially constructed constellation consisting of such things as practices, competencies, ideas, schemas, symbols, values, norms, institutions, goals, constitutive rules, artifacts, and modifications of the physical environment (p. 85).
Indeed, there is now compelling evidence in social psychology for regions (e.g., southeast United States) as cultures (D. Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996), religions as cultures (A. B. Cohen, 2015) and socio-economic statuses (SES) as cultures (A. B. Cohen & Varnum, 2016), among others. Additionally, the notion of organizational or institutional culture has been present in the business, I/O psychology and education literatures for decades (see, Smircich, 1983). Still, we do not know whether the identities linked to such cultures follow predictable patterns in relative chronic centrality, or whether they are more idiosyncratic (people vary widely in centrality and the reasons for it). Nor do we have a well-developed understanding of the implications of this for decision-making.

Regarding culture and the self, Markus and Kitayama (2010) note that our psychological processes form, and are formed by, our social/cultural surroundings and structures. Selves and cultures, they argue, are mutually constituting, and are, therefore, dynamic in their influence on one another. They suggest that “Being a person—a self—requires input from sociocultural meanings and practices, and the self is the center of awareness and agency that incorporates and reflects these sociocultural patterns” (p. 423). In keeping with this, the current research suggests that, with regard to culture, the self is an amalgamation of cultural ‘selves’ or identities, with at least some representation of every culture to which we belong.

**Content and Structure of Self**

There have been many terms used in the research regarding the ‘self,’ including self-concept, self-schema, self-knowledge, self-perception, and identity. There is a fair amount of overlap in certain of these terms and an active debate as to how each should be
conceived and defined (see Baumeister, 1987). Some terms might refer to the actual self or the contents of the self, while other terms might refer to how the self is organized cognitively, or to one’s knowledge or perception of oneself. What these self-related terms have in common is the goal of establishing the process by which the biological being becomes a meaningful being, or person (Markus & Kitayama, 2010).

The current research uses the term self-concept to refer to the general self (i.e., the collective of all, more specific identities), because this term has typically been used in conjunction with self-regulation, agency or action (Markus & Wurf, 1987), which is important given the decision-making component of this research. It will also, however, use the term identity, often when referring to the individual, lower-order ‘selves’ that are linked to specific cultures (and other groups and individual characteristics), and that combine to make up the overall self-concept. The rationale is that much of the prior research and theory discussed herein uses the term identity to refer to conceptions of self that are tied to specific characteristics, groups or social roles (e.g., Social Identity Theory; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It is not, however, important to the current research to attempt to meaningfully distinguish between these closely-related terms.

Classic research and theory on self-concept in psychology suggests that self-concept can be broadly split into two sub-components: Content and structure (Campbell et al., 1996). Content consists of self-knowledge (i.e., who am I?) and self-evaluations (e.g., what do I think of myself?). Structure refers to how that content is organized, and includes elements such as complexity (e.g. Linville, 1985), clarity (e.g., Campbell et al., 1996) and consistency (e.g. Gergen & Morse, 1967).
Of the various selves or identities that collectively form a person’s self-concept (content), some are of a personal nature (e.g., tall, introverted, intelligent) and some are of a group or cultural nature (e.g., American, Catholic, soldier). Evidence of the variability of selves that can exist within the overall self-concept can be seen in research using the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), which simply asks people to answer 20 times the question ‘who am I?’ The current research, because of its focus on cultural identities, will exclusively emphasize cultural inputs to the self-concept, and investigate questions pertaining to both the content and structure of self-concept.

Of critical importance in the current research, not only are there more forms of culture than have been well explored in psychology, but the identities linked to these cultures combine in ways which should, in theory, affect decision-making. One is not just an American or a Southerner or a Christian or a soldier. One might be an American, Southern, Christian soldier. And, these individual cultural identities can be central to one’s overall self-concept to varying degrees. To use an organizational example, in the same military squad, there might be two American, Southern, Christian soldiers – but for one, American might be the most central identity, while for another, being a soldier might be the most central identity. We would expect that these two individuals may make certain decisions differently in order for each to be consistent with the centrality hierarchy of their cultural identities.

Moreover, it is not simply that the first individual might make decisions solely as an American and the second individual as a soldier, but that the combination of identities will interact to affect relevant decision-making in unique ways. A variety of factors may be integral to this, including qualitative and quantitative differences between the salient
cultural identities, whether, and to what degree, those differences are pertinent to the
decision that needs to be made (or the cultural issues embedded within the decision), and
what the source of identity salience is (chronic/centrality-based or situational).

**Possession and Relative Salience of Multiple (Cultural) Identities**

In order for the current research to make theoretically-grounded predictions
regarding decision-making based on some prioritization or salience of cultural selves, it
is useful to draw upon existing theory and research related to this phenomenon across a
variety of fields. Indeed, the notion of multiple selves or identities, as well as how those
identities might be organized, has been the focus of researchers in areas ranging from
psychology and sociology to business and organizational behavior. So, how do people
organize their cultural identities? Or, perhaps the question should be, why might people’s
cultural identities be centralized to varying degrees? Like many social phenomena, in lieu
of a clear, unanimously agreed upon answer to these questions, there are several answers
which are in some ways overlapping and in some ways divergent.

The idea of multiple discrete selves, or identities, is not a new one. James (1890)
maintained that the ‘empirical self’ comprised a material, social, and spiritual self, and
that each of these selves contained its own sub-set of multiple selves. Multiple individual
identities are also evident in the Role Theory work of Mead (1934), who emphasized the
importance of interpersonal interaction in the development of multiple ‘selves.’ Role
Theory has, in fact, amassed a substantial literature over the past century, and might be
considered the most popular explanatory framework for the link between group identity
and behavior (e.g., Simmel, 1920; Mead, 1934; Linton, 1936; Moreno, 1934).
Later theories in social psychology have, in their own ways, acknowledged the multifaceted self. Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), for example, specifies that the self is derived, in large part, from social identities and perceived group memberships. SIT laid the theoretical groundwork for a variety of related theories and research including Social Categorization Theory (SCT; Tajfel 1979) and research on social identity processes such as increasing positive self-esteem and self enhancement (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988). None of the above-mentioned lines of inquiry, however, have attempted to address how, when, and why multiple identities might be more or less central to one’s overall sense of self.

But there has been research to specifically address identity prioritization. In psychology, for example, Rosenberg (1979) provides us with the notion of psychological centrality of social identities. Specifically, a person’s identities vary in the degree to which they are central or peripheral according to how much they are perceived to ‘count’ by the person (i.e., how important they are). Work by other researchers has provided alternative explanations for how identities are prioritized within the overall self. Ramarajan (2014), for example, theorizes about an identity network which can be dense (i.e., lots of overlap between identities) or sparse (i.e., little overlap between identities). Importantly, this theory also specifies that, of our many identities, only some are activated at any one time; the others are dormant. The ‘network’ consists only of activated identities (e.g., only soldier and Christian may be activated from among a dozen or more identities).

Identity theory, role commitment, and chronic salience (centrality). Identity Theory (Stryker, 1968, 1987) in sociology has provided perhaps the most cogent
framework for a hierarchical structure of the multiple identities within the self. Stryker argues that one has a portfolio of selves from which to choose, and the likelihood that an identity (or role) will be called upon exists according to a salience hierarchy based on one’s ‘commitment’ to their various roles.

Role commitment, according to Stryker, exists in two forms: Interactional commitment, which is the number of valued relationships associated with that role, as well as how often one interacts with those in that role; and affective commitment, which is the depth of emotion associated with relationships in that role and the perceived loss one would feel if relationships associated with that role were to be terminated. Commitment, in this sense, has been shown by Identity Theory researchers to be predictive of both role salience (i.e., centrality) and role-consistent behavior (e.g., Merolla, Serpe, Stryker, & Schultz, 2012). Identity Theory’s original use of commitment as the grand single factor in identity salience and prioritization suggests that the readiness to act out a role lies entirely within the person (and their commitment) and is stable across situations. This is an important point to the current research and will be revisited later in this section.

Identity Theory researchers McCall and Simmons (1978) propose a somewhat different framework for the organization of identities that takes into account the role of both chronic and situational identity salience (though they use slightly different wording). They argue that there are two related hierarchies of identities. The first is the ideal self, which is a hierarchy of prominence and the basis for long-term prediction of behavior. The location of an identity within this hierarchy is the consequence of support provided to that identity by the person and others, commitment and investment to the identity and
intrinsic and extrinsic gratification associated with identity. The second is the situational self, which is a hierarchy of salience and the basis for short term predictions of behavior. The position of an identity in this hierarchy depends on the salience of an identity, its need for support, the person’s need for satisfaction gained from its presentation, and the perceived opportunity for rewarding presentation of the identity. Important to this overall theory of identity hierarchy is that salience determines prominence. Also, a person’s affective response toward an identity will determine its place in both hierarchies.

An important area of agreement between each of these different conceptions of the hierarchical organization of self is that prioritization, or centrality, of identities, roles, or selves is driven by salience. There is clearly much debate, however, as to what ‘salience’ entails, what its source is, and what its precise relationship is to self-consistent behavior. For example, Stryker’s (original) Identity Theory perhaps fails to sufficiently account for situational factors influencing the hierarchy of identities. Much early research on identity theory maintains that identity salience remains stable across time and situation, and that people will seek out situations that allow them to behave in accordance with their current salience structure (Serpe, 1987; Serpe & Stryker, 1987).

By this logic, a soldier who prioritizes their Christian self above their military self would carry that prioritization from situation to situation, always behaving in a manner most consistent with the values, beliefs, etc. associated with that, most prioritized self. Surely one can think of examples where this would not be the case. Later identity theorists do account for the role of situations in identity salience (McCall & Simmons, 1978), though perhaps not in a way that addresses the extent to which situational salience interacts with chronic salience (or identity prominence as they call it) to affect behavior.
Ramarajan’s (2014) theory regarding activation of individual identities also seems to account for the influence of the situation on identity salience. However, this theory perhaps fails to sufficiently take person-level factors into account (e.g., centrality). Also, it proposes that situations activate only some of a person’s identities, while others are left dormant. This notion of the self as being always dichotomously split between active and dormant identities seems imperfect because it will never fully account for the additive or moderating effect that less prioritized (what Ramarajan would call dormant) identities have on the relationship between the most salient (active) identities and the chosen behavior. Ramarajan argues that two or more identities are activated in any given situation, but that no prioritization between them is taking place. They are simply equal, as activated identities, and some degree of compatible and contrasting (Ramarajan, Rothbard, & Wilk, 2016).

The current research takes the position that, from a social psychological perspective, none of the aforementioned theories or lines of work sufficiently capture the cause(s) of identity salience, and thus identity prioritization and self-consistent behavior. A more comprehensive theory of identity salience might combine portions of the theories of both Stryker and Ramarajan (as well as other work that stems from, or is closely related to, this work). Specifically, with regard to situational identity salience, it seems improper to ignore the fact that situations are not all equal in the degree to which they evoke group or cultural thoughts or feelings, or in the degree to which they apply pressure to conform to group or cultural norms or expectations. With that in mind, the current research proposes that situational salience needs to, at the very least, take
situational strength (Mischel, 1977) into account, particularly when considering any
effect on behavior or decision processes.

Additionally, with regard to chronic salience or centrality, while Identity Theory’s
notion of commitment clearly plays an important role, it could perhaps benefit from
theoretical supplementing. That is, number of, and emotional investment in, role-specific
relationships is perhaps not the only, or even the most powerful, predictor of chronic
identity centrality. It may be that other, similarly deeply-rooted and socially-distal factors
are at play. With that in mind, it is proposed that the perceived evolutionary fitness
benefits credited to a particular group, culture, or role should account for meaningful
variance in chronic identity centrality.

**Perceived fitness benefits as a source of centrality.** One of the principal ideas in
the evolutionary psychology meta-theoretical perspective is that, to a large degree, our
perceptions, cognitions, and behavior are consciously or unconsciously influenced by
basic human goals and need states (Bargh, 1990). A central tenet of this idea is that the
goals and motives that have the most powerful and immediate effect are closely linked to
the management of adaptive problems (i.e., problems that directly or indirectly inhibit
genetic or inclusive fitness; Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003). These goals and needs include
self-protection from danger, disease avoidance, affiliation (e.g., friendship, coalition
building), status, mate acquisition, mate retention, and kin care (Kenrick, Griskevicius,
Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010). They can be thought of as existing in a hierarchy as listed
here, in that the satisfaction of one goal can often not take place until the previous goal
has been satisfied. Crucially, however, there is freedom of movement within the
hierarchy, largely according to situational or environmental changes. For example, a man
who has attained high status and a reproductive mate still needs to protect himself (and his mate) from danger if the situation calls for it.

Empirical research based on the fundamental social motives has addressed a wide variety of questions in psychology and other fields and produced much evidence of the robust predictive power of this framework (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Kenrick, Li, White, & Neuberg, 2012). In the context of the current research, it may be that the fundamental motive framework works somewhat synergistically with Identity Theory in explaining the deeply rooted causes of identity centrality. It seems reasonable that the cultural groups that are most conducive to, or that best facilitate, the solving of adaptive problems and the reaching of evolutionary goals might be the most highly valued, particularly if decision-making follows directly from identity centrality. It would therefore be expected that identities linked to the cultures that provide the most assistance in the solving of evolutionary problems would be the most central, and therefore the most called upon in decision scenarios (all other things being equal).

**Cultural Identities and Decision-Making**

A wealth of research exists across a variety of fields that lends support to the notion of self or identity-consistent thought and behavior. As articulated by Markus and Kitayama (2010), the self is ‘at work’ in all types of cognition and behavior, including attention, perception, cognition, motivation and decision-making. That is, the self-concept functions as the overarching system that calls upon and arranges these more precise self-regulatory systems. Additionally, people are motivated to behave consistently with their self-concept in order to avoid negative emotions that accompany self-
discrepant thinking and behavior (Higgins, 1987). And, at least in North America, people are happier, nicer and more intelligent when their selves are verified through their actions (e.g., Oyserman, 2008; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).

Research in social psychology has begun to establish a link between behavior and culturally-informed selves or identities. Work on bicultural identity has highlighted the ability of people who hold both East Asian and Western identities to ‘frame switch.’ That is, the ability to think and behave consistently with the values, beliefs or norms of whichever of their cultures is made salient (Benet-Martinez et al., 2002). Some research in this area has used what has become known as the dynamic constructivist approach, which posits that cultural icons may be used to make salient the commonly available cultural meanings and practices with which they are associated (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000).

In a pioneering study by Hong et al. (2000), bicultural participants who were exposed to Chinese images, such as dragons and the Great Wall, behaved more interdependently. When they were exposed to American scenes, such as the Statue of Liberty or the Liberty Bell, they behaved more independently. Findings such as these provide evidence for the human capacity to hold different cultural identities simultaneously, and to behave in a manner consistent with only the one that is most salient. Moreover, this is true even when the two cultures are of the same type (i.e., national), and are theoretical opposites with regard to the cultural dimension in question (i.e., independence/interdependence). However, though this line of work is specific to cultural identities and behavior, it does not adopt a very broad view of culture, nor does it
address various types (i.e., chronic or situational) and degrees (strong or weak situations) of cultural identity salience.

In other fields, including sociology, economics and organizational behavior, researchers have likewise made contributions to the collective evidence regarding the ability, and tendency, of people to behave consistently with a salient identity or identities. Stryker (2008) notes, for example, that Identity Theory’s fundamental position hypothesizes that the choice between or among behaviors expressive of particular roles will reflect the relative locations of the identities in the identity hierarchy. For example, Stryker and Serpe (1982) found that level of commitment to a religious identity predicted salience of that same identity, as well as amount of time spent engaging in religious activities.

Work by Callero (1985) adds that identity salience is linked to viewing others in terms of role identity, increased social relations premised on role identity, expectations of others and prosocial behavior (e.g., donating blood). Karen Winterich and colleagues provide additional empirical support for the effect of salient social identities on behavior. A recent study shows that conservatives, who are known for being highly conforming, gave to charity when membership in a non-political group shared with charitable liberals was made salient (Kaikati, Torelli, Winterich, & Rhodas, 2017). Importantly, the effect went away when political orientation was made salient in the study because, ostensibly, behaving like a conservative overpowered the natural inclination of conservatives to generally conform.

Notably, research in economics has also endorsed the importance of self-concept or identity in the process of choosing. The logic of appropriateness theory of decision-
making (March, 1999) includes only three essential components of the decision-making process. The first is that situations are identified according to distinct categories (e.g., cultural categories). For example, a Protestant Christian may identify a religious ceremony as being part of a ‘religious culture’ category. The second is that those categories are matched with the identities that decision-makers use in determining appropriate behavior in a situation (March notes that different identities may be mobilized in different situations). For example, a Christian may match the ‘religious culture’ category with his or her Christian identity, which is then used in determining appropriate behavior in the situation. The third is that the matching of identities to situations results in attentional allocation and response selection appropriate for the mobilized identity and the observed situation. For example, the Christian would then make decisions in that ceremonial situation that are appropriate for the mobilized Christian identity (e.g., forgiving rather than angering if bumped into).

March contends that decision-making is, in fact, identity fulfilment rather than the attainment of best results. Moreover, this theory suggests that decision-making does not represent goal pursuit and/or the calculation of future consequences that may result from one’s actions. Rather, this notion of decision-making simply assumes that a set of rules, summarized by the concept of identity (a set of rules, norms, values and assumptions that are associated with a system in which they are meaningful and important), are matched with a situation (March, 1999).

**Decision-Making under conflict.** Because the focus of the current research is on two (or more) simultaneously salient cultural identities, it is also worth noting that there is existing multidisciplinary research that elucidates the issue of multiple salient identities
being in conflict with one another, and the implications that this may carry for behavior. Ramarajan, whose work on the identity network states that, at any given time, some identities are active while some are dormant, argues that identity conflict and compatibility are predictors of interpersonal problem solving. Quite simply, when identities are compatible, problems are solved more efficiently. He further maintains that conflict and compatibility are, in fact, two orthogonal dimensions rather than opposite ends of the same dimension (Ramarajan et al., 2016).

Furthermore, Identity Theorists have introduced a cybernetics model of control to explain the relationship between identity and behavior (Burke, 1991). According to this model, identities and perceived expectations associated with identities serve as reference points for behavior. When a situation activates an identity, a person compares the expectations of the identity to the overall self (i.e., according to their commitment-driven identity hierarchy). If a difference exists between them, behavior is altered in order to align the behavior with the self (Stryker & Burke, 2000).

Finally, with regard to identity conflict, Blake Ashforth’s work (see Ashforth, 1989) on organizational identification, which is based in SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) notes that there are identities within the organization that are nested (team, division, organization, industry, etc.) as well as, of course, non-organizational identities. Any/all of these can be potential areas for cohesion or conflict with regard to the values, beliefs, etc. associated with the various social groups. Ashforth’s research shows that, when multiple identities are made salient in a scenario (e.g., multiple nested organizational identities may be made salient in a work scenario), people tend to favor lower order identities
rather than higher order identities because they are more proximal, concrete and exclusive. They constitute the ‘primary group’ and are central to task interdependence.

It is also worth noting that much work in marketing has investigated the role of tradeoffs in decision-making (e.g., Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 2001). This is pertinent to the current research in that identity conflict in decision-making scenarios can also be seen as an identity tradeoff. Particularly relevant to the current research, Luce, Payne, and Bettman (1999) found that decisions involving tradeoffs (e.g., quality versus price) often elicit negative emotions. Furthermore, research in this line has demonstrated that, as a result of the accompanying negative emotions, people generally avoid decisions that involve tradeoffs (Luce, 1998).

**Need for Research in Cultural Identity and Decision-Making**

The aforementioned theories and research collectively provide a rationale from the various literatures for the notion of a functional self-concept in the process of decision-making. The current research takes the position that, in certain decision-making scenarios, more than one choice may seem appropriate or representative of self-consistent behavior because more than one culture-based identity may be salient (or mobilized, in the words of March). One may be unable to behave consistently with both, particularly if the cultures differ from one another significantly along a dimension or set of dimensions relevant to the decision being made. However, it is, again, unclear whether it is the deeply-rooted internal centrality of the cultural identity or the external, situational salience that is the more powerful determinant of self-consistent behavior.

Work on chronic versus temporary accessibility of constructs suggests that there is an additive effect when both are present that increases the likelihood of a construct’s
use (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986). So, for example, if both centrality and situational salience of a southern (i.e., southeast U.S.) identity are present, it should result in a higher likelihood of behaving in a ‘southern manner’ than if centrality or situational salience alone were present. This does not, however, account for potential interactive effects of conflicting constructs, either chronic or temporary.

In keeping with classic social psychological theory regarding the inherent interaction between person and situation (See Mischel, 1977; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Weiss & Adler, 1984), one might expect that cultural identity consistent decisions are primarily driven by personal factors (e.g., centrality), but moderated by conflicting factors associated with the situation (e.g., the demographic makeup of the environment, pressure to conform, etc.). In a person who has chronic salience of both military and California cultural identities, making California culture salient in a situation that highlights the incongruence of those cultures may have an additive effect on the likelihood of behaving in ‘California manner,’ but should have an interaction effect on the likelihood of behaving in a ‘military manner.’

Moreover, it should be noted that, just as people vary in their commitment to a role or identity, situations vary in the social pressures that they place on the individual, and it seems that the research has not addressed how variability in situational strength (see Mischel, 1977) may factor into identity-based decision-making. This is a critical point in the current research – not all situations (that make salient a cultural identity) are equally likely to add to, or interact with, chronically salient cultural identities, or influence behavioral outcomes.
**Current Research**

Self-concept provides a schema that is utilized in a variety of cognitive and behavioral processes, and people are motivated to behave in ways consistent with their overall self-concept and/or their individual identities. However, we still do not have a good understanding of the various cultural identities contained in the self, how and why they are prioritized, and how they interact in various decision-making circumstances.

The current research adds overlooked components to the picture of cultures and the self—how the relative centrality and/or situational salience of multiple incongruent cultural identities affects decision-making. To be clear, the aim is to advance theory and research primarily in the field of cultural psychology by drawing upon and synthesizing work on culture, self-concept, and identity across a variety literatures and fields as well as incorporating novel theoretical pieces. The project investigates how (chronically and/or situationally) salient cultural identities interact with one another as components of a functional self-concept that guides decision-making.

The current research highlights religious culture and political culture for the purposes of making predictions regarding cultural identity salience and decision-making. The rationale for this is twofold: First, intrapersonal political and religious culture conflict in decision-making makes for novel and provocative research in an area (i.e., culture) that has long focused on national and ethnic groups. It is acknowledged that past research on social influence has highlighted the ability of religious and other cultural primes to influence political decision-making (LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson & Finkle, 2012). And while the current research capitalizes on some of the theory and methods used in such studies (e.g., salience through priming), it is less concerned with the ability
of religious salience to influence political decisions (for example), and more concerned with the how degree and type of salience of conflicting cultural identities are meaningful in decision processes.

Second, research has recognized that certain religions and political affiliations overlap to such an extent that they are often thought of as being culturally one and the same (e.g., Hunter, 1991; Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). However, it is important to not conflate these cultural groups, and to remember that they may diverge in key ways (e.g., though the Christian and republican groups may seem culturally similar, they may differ in the extent to which they value personal sacrifice, conciliatory versus retaliatory response to interpersonal conflict, etc.). Conversely, people can also be simultaneous members of religious and political groups that seem to be cultural opposites in many ways (e.g., Christian and democrat). It is important to highlight that fact and investigate how such people might navigate culturally ambiguous decisions. Importantly, regardless of how well aligned one’s cultural groups are, there will always be areas of divergence between any two cultures. These areas make for interesting and demonstrable decision scenarios.

The current research also makes predictions regarding elements of the decision-making process beyond the decision itself. That is, how quickly one decides and how they feel emotionally about their decision are overlooked aspects of the decision-making process, and carry potentially important implications depending on the context and type of decision. For example, police officers need to be able to decide quickly whether they are willing/able to take a person’s life. Even a marginally slower decision process resulting from conflicting religious and political values might be very costly. Regarding
emotionality of decision-making, post-decision negative emotion due to simultaneously salient incongruent identities might, in addition to being generally negative for the actor, result in mind-changing or back-tracking (e.g., a shopper returning a purchase that they just don’t feel good about). As noted above, research in marketing has even highlighted the tendency of people to avoid conflict laden decision-making scenarios due to the accompanying negative emotions (Luce, 1998).

The current research answers the following questions:

1. Do people make decisions in a manner consistent with cultural identity centrality?
2. How do two incongruent cultural identities interact to influence decision-making?
3. Does situational strength (of situations that make salient a cultural identity) influence decision-making, or interact with conflicting cultural identity centrality in doing so?

Overview of Predictions

Foundational predictions: Cultural identity centrality in decision-making.

People will make decisions according to the centrality of cultural identities that are, because of underlying cultural beliefs, values, norms, etc., relevant to the decision. Additionally, the manner in which chronically salient (i.e., central) cultural identities interact to influence decision-making depends on the extent to which each is central to the person, and on the extent to which the identities in question are complimentary or conflicting with regard to the decision being made. Whereas past research has shown the ability of bicultural people to behave consistently with a salient culture (e.g., Hong et al.,
2000), this phenomenon has only been examined *within* cultural types (e.g., national cultural), rather than between (e.g., religious and political). Furthermore, cultural research in this area has emphasized situational salience (as opposed to chronic salience), and has not investigated the effects of multiple salient cultures.

The current research proposes that cultural identity centrality will predict decision-making consistent with the underlying values, beliefs, norms, etc. of that culture. Specifically, those high in Christian identity centrality will be more likely than those low in Christian identity centrality to choose to support a traditional option rather than one that indicates change. Conversely, those high in democrat identity centrality will be more likely than those low in democrat identity centrality to choose an option that indicates change rather than a traditional one. These predictions are tested in preliminary analyses prior to the testing of main hypotheses.

**Main predictions: Chronic and situational salience in decision-making.** When two salient cultural identities are conflicting with regard to the underlying values, beliefs, etc. that are relevant to a decision, the decision will be significantly slower (because there should be increased intrapersonal conflict in determining the ‘correct’ course of action) and result in negative emotions associated with the decision (due to self-consistent dissonance surrounding the decision; Higgins, 1987). Furthermore, decisions will be consistent with a cultural identity that is chronically salient (i.e., central), rather than a conflicting cultural identity that is made salient in a ‘weak’ situation (see Mischel, 1977). That is, chronic cultural identity salience, which is deeply rooted in social and evolutionary motives, should not be overpowered by simply being ‘reminded’ of another cultural identity. Therefore, I predict that Christian-democrats who are high in Christian
identity centrality but not high in democrat identity centrality will make decisions that are consistent with Christian culture and inconsistent with democrat culture, even when their democrat identity is made situationally salient.

However, in ‘strong’ situations (i.e., where there exists added social pressure to conform, or behave in a manner that demonstrates group or cultural loyalty), decisions will favor cultural identities made salient by the situation over chronically salient conflicting cultural identities (see Mischel, 1977). This will be true even when the cultural identity made salient by the strong situation is low in centrality. The theoretical rationale for this is that the social pressure to conform (or demonstrate loyalty) bought on by the strong situation will overpower the effect of centrality of a conflicting culture on a decision scenario. To be clear, this would mean that the more socially and evolutionarily beneficial cultural identities would be trumped by those made temporarily salient in a strong situation.

Specifically, I predict that Christian democrats who are high in Christian identity centrality but low in democrat identity centrality will make a decision that is consistent with democrat culture and inconsistent with Christian culture when democrat culture is made situationally salient in a ‘strong’ manner. Moreover, this decision will be slower and more emotionally taxing than when democrat culture is made salient in a ‘weak’ manner. Importantly, centrality itself will not change as result of situational salience. That is, neither weak nor strong situations that make salient democrat identity will alter the centrality of either cultural identity; they will only alter the decision-making outcome.
Hypotheses

**H1a.** I predict main effects of Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality and Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision DV (see pilot below which describes the choosing of a decision DV), such that high-centrality Christians, low-centrality democrats, and those in the weak democrat situation will all be significantly more supportive of traditional restrooms than their respective counterparts.

**H1b.** I predict a two-way interaction between Christian Centrality and Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision, such that low-centrality Christians will support gender-neutral restrooms (i.e., the choice more consistent with democrat values) in both the strong and weak democrat situations, but high-centrality Christians will only support gender-neutral restrooms in the strong democrat situation. Their responses will be significantly more toward traditional restrooms in the weak situation.

**H2a.** I predict a main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Speed (i.e., response time to the Restroom Decision), such that all responses will be significantly slower in the strong condition than in the weak condition.

**H2b.** I predict a two-way interaction effect between Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality on Decision Speed, such that those high in both Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality will make the decision significantly slower than will both those high in one and low in the other, and those low in both.

**H3a.** I predict a main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Affect (i.e., positive affect related to the Restroom Decision), such that positive affect will be significantly lower in the strong condition than in the weak condition.
H3b. I predict a two-way interaction effect between Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality on Decision Affect, such that those high in both Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality will have significantly lower positive affect than will both those high in one and low in the other, and those low in both.
CHAPTER 2

PILOT STUDY

In order to find a decision-making DV that was suitable for the main study, it was necessary to run a pilot study that tested, in an exploratory manner, several decision items that represented theoretically plausible issues on which members of religious and political groups might hold differing opinions. Identifying the best decision item to use in the main study involved assessing responses to each decision-making item by religious and political group membership, as well as examining the relationship of decision item responses to religious and political cultural identity centrality. It was predetermined that, in order to recruit an adequate sample for the main study, the religious culture in question needed to be Christian (i.e., the largest broad religious group by membership in the United States), and the political culture in question could be either democrat or republican (i.e., the two largest political groups by membership in the United States).

It was unimportant to the current research whether cultural identity incongruence (for the main study) was established between the Christian and democrat cultures or the Christian and republican cultures. Though, because there is theory and research to suggest that political conservatives and the highly religious share many of the same values and beliefs, particularly regarding social/cultural issues (e.g., opposition of abortion; Jelen, 2009; Layman & Green, 2005), more of the decision tasks in the pilot study highlighted Christian-democrat differences than Christian-republican differences. Ultimately, however, the statistical results from the pilot would guide which decision item, underlying cultural issue, and two cultures (Christian-democrat or Christian-republican) would be used in the main study.
Many of the cultural values or beliefs embedded in the decision items in the pilot study were gleaned from existing work on religious and political similarities and differences (e.g., Malka, Lelkes, Srivastava, Cohen, & Miller, 2012). These decision items were developed to capture issues known from previous research to be relevant to religious and political values and beliefs, but were disguised so as not to be overtly politically or religiously charged.

Additionally, some decision items in the pilot were the result of original theory-building efforts regarding how and why political and religious cultures might differ ideologically. While it is acknowledged that this method of theorizing is susceptible to bias and/or stereotyped views of cultural groups, it was appropriate here due to the exploratory nature of pilot testing. In fact, lending initial empirical validity to previously unresearched or unsupported notions is a principal function of pilot testing.

**Method**

**Participants and procedure.** Participants in the pilot study were undergraduate psychology majors at a large four-year university. A total of $N = 2123$ participated in the study ($53\%$ female, $56\%$ white, $M_{age} = 18.79$). The sample included 812 self-identified Democrats, 507 Republicans, 992 Christians (including 458 Catholics), and 1131 non-Christians (including 267 Atheists).

Participants were recruited through the department of psychology SONA system, and participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The study was administered in electronic survey form using the Qualtrics program. The survey consisted of demographic questions (many of which served as indicators of cultural membership) including
religious and political affiliation, short decision scenarios, and religious and political centrality scales, in that order.

**Measures.**

**Decision tasks.** Ten decision-making items were included in the pilot, each representing a theoretically plausible issue on which the Christian and democrat, or Christian and republican, cultures might diverge. The questions were accompanied by a slide bar for the participant to indicate their choice. The slide bar ranged from 1 to 7, with the ends of the spectrum representing opposing positions on an underlying issue. The slide bar started in the neutral position (i.e., 4), forcing participants to move in one direction or the other, yielding a binary choice but offering the added information of a continuous variable.

The questions were worded in such a way that people could indicate the extent to which they supported a choice, or the likelihood that they would make choice. Certain decision items were intended to get at Christian/republican cultural differences in beliefs or values. For example, to tap into the value of forgiveness versus retaliation when wronged, one decision item asks: “A coworker has done something unfair or harmful to you at work - how likely are to want to get even with that person versus just forgive them?” Other decision items were intended to get at Christian/democrat cultural differences in beliefs or values. For example, to tap into the value of traditionalism, one decision item asks: “You are given a great deal of freedom in dress code at work - what is the likelihood that you will choose to dress in more professional/traditional way versus a more causal way?”
Included among these was the item that was eventually chosen, which was: “To what extent do you support traditional men's and women's restrooms versus gender-neutral restrooms?” The response scale for the item ranged from 1 (Traditional) to 7 (Gender-neutral). This item was chosen from among the ten included in the pilot solely because it was the best option statistically. That is, members of Christian and democrat cultures favored opposing ends of that issue and do so with a greater spread than do either religious/political combination for any other item included.

**Centrality.** Cultural identity centrality (for both religious and political centrality) was measured using an adapted version of the Centrality sub-scale of Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1997). The centrality subscale (Appendix A) of the MIBI was developed specifically to measure stable (across situations) racial identity salience from the perspective of Identity Theory (Stryker, 1968). It consists of 8 items (e.g., In general, being Black is an important part of my self-image; I have a strong sense of belonging to Black people, etc.) and is scored on Likert agreement response scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The scale showed high levels of internal consistency reliability with both Black ($\alpha = .75$) and White ($\alpha = .78$) samples. In the pilot study, internal consistency reliability was again high with both Christian ($\alpha = .81$) and democrat ($\alpha = .87$) groups. The pilot study also adapts the scale to use language that is specific to the cultures in question (e.g., In general, being a member of my religious group is an important part of my self-image; I have a strong sense of belonging to my religious group).
Results

A pilot study tested the effect of religious and political group membership and centrality on several decision tasks thought to be relevant to the values, beliefs, etc., underlying those cultures. This study was exploratory, with the goal of identifying a single item that could be later used as the focal DV in the main study. Results indicated that a decision item that measured preference for traditional (i.e., men’s and women’s) versus gender-neutral restrooms was the most statistically viable option from among the decision items used. This item was intended to capture the cultural value of traditionalism (or change aversion) and was embedded into a timely, real-world issue. Past research has indicated that change aversion is an issue on which the highly religious and the politically left (or liberal, in a modern political sense of the word) differ (Malka et al., 2012). That is, the highly religious tend to support traditionalism and are generally change averse, and the political left tend to be the opposite. Obviously, there will be exceptions to this. However, it was expected that this might be especially true with regard to gender roles, and on this particular social/organizational issue. The pilot data confirmed this expectation.

Members of the Christian and democrat cultural groups support opposite ends of traditional versus gender-neutral restrooms, as indicated by the pilot data. This conclusion was established by the collective results of three tests: First, a dichotomous variable was created for democrat and republican group membership, and another for atheist and Christian group membership (from the religion and political group demographic questions which each contained several response options). These two dichotomous variables were then correlated with the Restroom Decision (Table 1).
Results show that being Christian (rather than atheist) is significantly correlated with support for traditional restrooms ($r = -.20, p < .001$), and being democrat (rather than republican) is significantly correlated with support for gender-neutral restrooms ($r = .51, p < .001$).

Second, an ANOVA was conducted to examine means of each of four religious-political group combinations. Means for democrat-Christian ($M = 4.13, SD = 2.06$), democrat-atheist ($M = 4.92, SD = 1.99$), republican-Christian ($M = 1.88, SD = 1.71$), and republican-atheist ($M = 3.32, SD = 2.11$) were compared. Multiple comparisons (i.e., Tukey) reveal significant support for the effect of being Christian on support for traditional restrooms, and the effect of being democrat on support for gender-neutral restrooms (see Table 2).

A factorial 2 (atheist/Christian) × 2 (democrat/republican) ANOVA was then conducted to test for a potential interaction effect. Results of the factorial ANOVA yielded identical means as the initial ANOVA. They also confirmed a main effect of being democrat (as opposed to republican) on the restroom decision, such that democrats prefer gender-neutral restrooms to traditional men’s and women’s restrooms; $F(1, 355) = 55.94, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .14$. Finally, they confirmed a main effect of being Christian (as opposed to atheist) on the restroom decision, such that Christians prefer traditional restrooms to gender-neutral restrooms; $F(1, 355) = 18.90, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .05$. There was not a significant interaction between the atheist/Christian and democrat/republican; $F(1, 355) = 1.59, p = .21, \eta^2_p = .00$ (see Table 3).

Third, a multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine whether Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality significantly predict responses to the Restroom
Decision. Results show that Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality significantly predict, in opposite directions, how likely one is to support traditional versus gender-neutral restrooms. Christian Centrality significantly predicted support for traditional restrooms; $B = -.38, p < .001$. Democrat centrality significantly predicted support for gender-neutral restrooms; $B = .55, p < .001$. The model as a whole was significant; $F (2, 313) = 30.81, p < .001$, with $R^2$ indicating that 17% of the variance in in the Restroom Decision is accounted for by Christian and Democrat Centrality (see Table 4).

**Power Analysis**

A power analysis was conducted using G-power software to establish the sample size required to detect the expected effect(s) and guard against Type II error in the main study, which involved both multiple regression analysis and then $2 \times 2 \times 2$ ANOVAs for interpretation/visualization. Required samples size was calculated for both regression and factorial ANOVA analyses. Regression analysis in the main study involved three between-subjects factors: Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality and Situation Strength (i.e., an experimental manipulation – weak versus strong democrat salience situation). The factors were then manipulated for the ANOVAs as follows: Christian Centrality was dichotomized (high/low); Democrat Centrality was dichotomized (high/low). Centrality variables were split at the scale mid-point (i.e., 4 on 1-7 scale) rather than the median because there is theoretical value to establishing the groups based on being above or below ‘neutral’ on such a measure.

First it was necessary to decide what effect sizes could be expected. In instances such as these, it is customary to rely on effect sizes in similar research to guide expectations in current research, or to use one’s own data if possible. Data from the pilot
study was used to establish (1) the effect of Democratic Centrality on the Restroom Decision \((d = .99)\), and (2) the effect of Christian Centrality on the Restroom Decision \((d = .68)\). These values represent medium to large effects.

Regarding the effect of the Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision, research on the effect of strong (versus weak) situations indicates that one can expect a medium to large effect (i.e., Cohen's \(f^2\) ranging from .17 to .42) of a strong situation on behavior (Meyer et al., 2014). Based on these collective effect sizes, it was reasonable to plan the power analysis around the ability to detect a medium effect. For multiple regression, calculations reveal that, at power of .8, a sample of 77 is needed in order to detect a medium effect. For a \(2 \times 2 \times 2\) factorial ANOVA, calculations reveal that, at power of .8, a sample of 128 is needed in order to detect a medium effect.
CHAPTER 3

MAIN STUDY

The main study experimentally assessed how the centrality of incongruent cultural identities interact in an ambiguous decision-making scenario, and whether and how situational salience of varying strengths influenced these effects. All hypotheses were tested in this study.

Method

Participants. Participants in the main study were a combination of undergraduate psychology majors at a large, four-year university and Mturk participants. A total of 328 Christian-democrats took the survey. Roughly one-third of participants were randomly assigned into a control condition which was not used in the testing of hypotheses, yielding a final $N$ of 239 (64% male, 60% white, $M_{age} = 35$; for full descriptive statistics see Table 5).

Design and Procedure. The main study first employed a correlational design to test hypotheses using variables in their original, continuous state. It then tested an experimental $2 \times 2 \times 2$ factorial ANOVA to provide additional information and to interpret and visualize the effects.

A survey was created using online survey creation software (Qualtrics) and administered electronically. Participants were randomized to levels of the Situation Strength factor. The Christian and Democrat factors were based on self-reports of participants. Participants were recruited in two ways: (1) through the psychology research participation system (SONA) at the university, and (2) through Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk (Mturk). University students took the survey in exchange for course credit.

Because concerns have been raised regarding the reliability of data collected from Mturk workers recently, several extra measures were taken to ensure that the sample and data were of the highest quality possible. First, the study was set up and launched through TurkPrime, which allows researchers to screen participants for certain criteria. The current research needed members of the Christian and democrat groups, and it was important that participants were honest about those group memberships. TurkPrime has the ability to only allow workers who have consistently identified as being members of certain demographic categories to meet the screening criteria for new studies. Therefore, the current research was not just relying on responses to its own political and religious demographic questions to establish group membership.

The threshold for ‘worker quality rating’ was set at 95% for the current research, which is higher than the default threshold, and better ensures responsible and attentive participants. Furthermore, two steps were taken to guard against the survey being taken by robots. The first was a Captcha checkbox built into the survey, which uses a proprietary method of detecting human versus robot mouse movements. The second was a randomly generated alphanumeric code that each participant was provided on the final page of the survey, and that needed to be entered into Mturk following completion of the survey. Finally, Mturk now has the ability to flag workers who have taken a survey from the same exact geographical location, or from the same IP address, as another worker in the survey.
In the survey, participants first answered a series of demographic questions, including religious and political affiliation. They then were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: ‘strong’ democrat situation, and ‘weak’ democrat situation. Each condition was directed to a page containing a manipulation (i.e., picture of a democratic donkey accompanied by text unique to each condition). All participants then responded to the Restroom Decision item and were timed while responding.

Next was the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which measured how participants felt about the decision that they had just made on the previous item. The language in the PANAS was adapted such that their responses were to reflect only how they felt about the previous item (i.e., not in general). Finally, each participant responded to measures of Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality. These two centrality measures were randomly presented so that roughly half of participants responded to each one first. The last page contained a robot catch item. Participants were then debriefed, given a randomly generated code to enter into Mturk (for Mturk participants only), and the responses were recorded.

**Measures and manipulations.**

**Restroom decision.** The decision-making item was chosen from the pilot. It read: “To what extent do you support traditional men's and women's restrooms versus gender-neutral restrooms?” The question was accompanied by a slide bar for the participant to indicate their choice, from 1 (*Traditional*) to 7 (*Gender-neutral*).

**Decision speed.** Speed of decision-making was measured by recording the time spent on each question. Specifically, the survey was programmed to record time elapsed between start of question and (1) first click, (2) last click, and (3) page submit. Also
recorded were the number of clicks per page (which may be an indicator of mind-
changing during the process of making a decision). ‘Page submit’ was chosen as the
timing variable for use in the main study because it is perhaps the most representative of
when the decision is actually made.

**Decision affect.** The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et
al., 1988) was used to measure negative and positive affect related to the restroom
decision. The PANAS (Appendix B) includes ten positive (e.g., happy, joyful, pleased)
and ten negative (e.g., depressed, frustrated, angry) adjectives. The extent to which
participants “feels that way” is indicated using a response scale ranging from 1 (*very
slightly/or not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*). The PANAS has been effective in evaluating
positive and negative affect in the moment, day, past few days, week, past few weeks,
year and in general (Watson et al., 1988). Cronbach’s alpha levels during initial
validation of the measure ranged from 0.86 to 0.90 for positive affect and from 0.84 to
0.87 for negative affect using samples of undergraduate college students.

The instructions for the measure in the current research were slightly adapted to
guide thinking toward the recently answered restroom decision item. That is, participants
were instructed to “indicate the extent to which you feel this way about your answer to
the previous question.” Internal consistency reliability for the positive affect scale in the
current research was high (α = .91). Likewise, internal consistency reliability for the
negative affect scale in the current research was high (α = .92). The subscales were
combined (i.e., positive affect minus negative affect) for hypothesis testing.

**Centrality.** Cultural identity centrality (i.e., Christian and Democrat) was again
measured using an adapted version of the Centrality sub-scale of Multidimensional
Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI; Sellers et al., 1997). The scale (Appendix A) again showed high levels of internal consistency reliability with both Christian ($\alpha = .92$) and democrat ($\alpha = .90$) groups. Like the pilot study, the main study adapted the scale to use language that is specific to the cultures in question, however, because I knew the religious and political group membership of all participants in the main study, that, more specific, language was used (e.g., In general, being Christian is an important part of my self-image; I have a strong sense of belonging to my Christian group).

(Weak) democrat situation condition. The weak situation condition (Appendix C) consisted of a picture of a cultural icons (the democratic donkey symbol, accompanied by the word ‘Democrat’) that was shown to the participants just prior to the Restroom Decision item. The picture was part of a page containing the following text:

ATTENTION, PARTICIPANT: The following several pages will contain some decision scenarios. Please answer as honestly as possible. Please click the 'next' arrow to continue with the survey.

This manipulation (i.e., using a picture of a cultural icon) is an adaptation of one used in work on frame switching in social psychology (see Hong et al., 2000). However, it technically constitutes a weak situation that makes salient one’s cultural identity, in that it is relatively devoid of social pressures to conform to cultural norms or expectations, or to publicly demonstrate loyalty to one’s group or culture.

‘Strong’ democrat situation condition. The strong situation condition (Appendix D) was created by making people believe that there is a possibility that they will be discussing their answers to the decision items in a focus group consisting of other democrats. The text read:

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ATTENTION, PARTICIPANT: You have been randomly selected to participate in an online focus group with other self-identified Democrats. **In the focus group, you will be discussing your answers to the questions on the next several pages.** If you choose to participate, your personal information (including your name) will be entirely confidential and you will be compensated. There will be an opportunity at the end of the survey to indicate whether you would like to be contacted for participation in this focus group. Please click the 'next' arrow to continue with the survey.

According to classic theory regarding the effect of strong versus weak situations (see Mischel, 1977), the expression of personal dispositions is inhibited in situations that exert a strong pressure to behave in a certain way. Behavior is more likely to reflect personality or person-level factors when the demand for socially acceptable behavior is weak, and weak situations afford people more latitude in their behavioral choice than do situations more laden with social pressure. Empirical work in social psychology has evidenced the moderating effect that situation strength has on the relationship between personal disposition and behavior (see Withey, Gellatly, & Annett, 2005).

This scenario constituted a strong situation that made salient one’s democrat identity. Because the participant was told that they might be sharing their answers with a democrat in-group, there was situational pressure to answer the restroom decision question in a manner consistent with democrat cultural values. Though the participant did not actually see or hear how other ‘participants’ responded, they would have anticipated their answers being judged by their fellow cultural group members, which created an in-the-moment strong social pressure.
**Restroom picturing covariate.** The Restroom Decision item is meant to tap into the cultural value of traditionalism or change aversion. The question intentionally does not show, or describe in detail, what exactly a gender-neutral bathroom looks like because the goal is for the participants to be concerned with the underlying cultural value (tradition or change), not on the characteristics of the room itself. However, because of this, there is the potential for between-group differences in what a ‘gender-neutral’ room looks like to underlie an effect of centrality (either Christian or Democrat) on the DV in addition to, or instead of, traditionalism. It is not expected that this is the case, as there is no theoretical reason why democrats and Christians would picture this restroom differently. Nevertheless, differences in in how the gender-neutral restroom is pictured or thought of may have an effect on the DV and should thus be controlled for.

The Restroom Decision item was piloted to solidify its appropriateness for inclusion in the main study, and it was important to keep it unchanged from the pilot. However, the main study takes the opportunity to ask participants what kind of bathroom they were picturing during the asking of the Restroom Decision item. The goal in doing this was to establish how the actual restroom in the question is being thought of. If some participants picture a single private room, and others picture a public room being simultaneously used by men and women, this would likely predict how for or against this option people would be, regardless of cultural values. Therefore, this was deemed an important part of the story, regardless of the outcome, and was statistically tested along with other potential covariates prior to and during the running of the main analyses.

If Christian-democrats are divided in how they picture ‘gender-neutral,’ it can play out in one of two equally interesting and potentially important ways. Either,
Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality will predict the Restroom Decision above and beyond the type of bathroom pictured, which would suggest that while all predictors may account for variance in the Restroom Decision, how the bathroom is being pictured is not a function of cultural membership and/or values. Or, Christian and Democrat Centrality will not predict above and beyond bathroom type pictured, in which case a very interesting potential mediator has been uncovered. That is, it might be in that case that the degree to which one’s cultural identity is central influences how they think of and perceive ambiguous elements of their environments (e.g., ‘gender-neutral’ restrooms).

**Results**

For clarity, variable names for the main study and beyond are explained here. The dependent or outcome variables in the main study were: (1) Restroom Decision – the focal decision-making item where participants were asked to rate the degree to which they support traditional versus gender-neutral restrooms; (2) Decision Speed – the time it took them to respond to that item; (3) Decision Affect– how they felt about their response to the item.

Independent or predictor variables for the main study were: (1) Christian Centrality; (2) Democrat Centrality; (3) Situation Strength.

Covariates analyzed in the main study were: (1) Age; (2) Sex; (3) Restroom Picturing – whether the restroom was pictured as a single, private room or as a public room simultaneously shared by men and women.

**Preliminary analysis.** A preliminary multiple regression was run in order to lay the foundation for the main hypothesis testing. Specifically, it was important to confirm (i.e., replicate from the pilot study) that Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality do
in fact predict the Restroom Decision before any potential interaction or experimental
effects are tested. This was accomplished by regressing the continuous Restroom
Decision on the two continuous centrality variables. Additionally, it was appropriate to
use this opportunity to test whether any theoretically plausible covariates account for any
variance in the DV.

A hierarchical multiple regression was run to assess whether the Christian
Centrality and Democrat Centrality predict the Restroom Decision above and beyond a
series of theoretically plausible covariates. Specifically, Age, Sex, and Restroom
Picturing (i.e., whether the restroom was pictured as a single, private room or as a public
room shared by men and women) were identified as potential confounders to the
relationship between Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality and the Restroom
Decision. These three covariates were entered into block 1 of a hierarchical multiple
regression, and Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality were entered into block 2.
All assumptions for multiple regression were tested and met prior to, or during, the
running of the analysis.

Model 1, which included the three covariates (Age, Sex, & Restroom Picturing),
significantly accounted for variance in Rest; $F (3, 280) = 8.56, p < .001$. $R^2$ indicates that
roughly 8% of the variance in the Restroom Decision is accounted for by the covariates.
However, while Age ($B = -.02, p < .05$) and Restroom Picturing ($B = -1.22, p < .001$)
each significantly account for variance in the Restroom Decision, Sex ($B = .12, p = .64$)
does not. This indicates that while Sex was a theoretically plausible covariate, the
statistics do not support it as such, and it can be excluded as a covariate in hypothesis
testing.
Model 2, which included the main predictors Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality along with the covariates Age, Sex, and Restroom Picturing from model 1, also significantly accounted for variance in the Restroom Decision; $F(5, 278) = 11.15, p < .001$. $R^2$ indicates that roughly 17% of the variance in the Restroom Decision is accounted for by these five predictors together. The addition of Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality at step 2 significantly increased the amount of variance accounted for in the Restroom Decision, $\Delta R^2 = .08, F_{inc} (2, 278) = 13.86, p < .001$. Additionally, Christian Centrality ($B = -.32, p < .001$) and Democrat Centrality ($B = .36, p < .001$) each significantly account for unique variance in the Restroom Decision (see Table 6).

In addition to testing Age and Restroom Picturing as potential covariates, it was important to examine whether any interactions may be occurring between them and the Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality predictors. Centrality variables were centered ($\bar{x} - x$), and interaction terms were created with each of them and each of the covariates (i.e., Christian Centrality $\times$ Age, Christian Centrality $\times$ Restroom Picturing, Democrat Centrality $\times$ Age, Democrat Centrality $\times$ Restroom Picturing). Regression analyses indicate that neither Age nor Restroom Picturing is interacting with either of the centrality variables in predicting the Restroom Decision.

Due to these findings, Age and Restroom Picturing, but not Sex, are later controlled for in regression analyses with the Restroom Decision and included as covariates in the subsequent factorial ANCOVA analysis. Importantly, these are only covariates for the testing of the Restroom Decision DV. There is not a theoretical or statistical basis for including them as covariates in the main Decision Speed or Decision
Affect analyses. Furthermore, they did not significantly account for variance in those DVs when tested in regression.

**Missing data.** There was no missing data in this study. This is perhaps in part attributable to the fact that the sample consisted of high-quality, well-compensated participants recruited specifically because they belonged to the necessary groups (i.e., democrat and Christian). Additionally, most of the variables used in the analyses had forced responses in the survey. Importantly, however, it was made clear that participants could opt out at any time during the survey.

**Outliers.** Outliers were identified by examining z-scores and boxplots. Outliers were handled on a by-analysis basis (i.e., if the variables included contained outlying cases, those cases were excluded). The proper handling of outliers was particularly important for the Decision Speed DV because participants might take long pauses or become distracted during that item, causing delayed responding and skewed data. It would have helped the sample size to keep those cases and simply reduce their score to within the normal range. However, because time delays of this nature are not necessarily indicative of slow decision-making for the predicted reasons (i.e., identity conflict), those case were excluded from their respective analyses.

**Decision rules.** Three out of eight of the items in the centrality scale (used to measure both Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality) are reverse worded and scored. Because of this, the scale can act as a ‘catch question.’ A participant who is responding with 6s and 7s to the positively coded items should, in theory, respond with 1s and 2s for the negatively coded ones. However, there were several instances of participants responding with 6s and 7s across the board (or 1s and 2s). Cases where a
single number is given for every centrality item for either Christian Centrality or Democrat Centrality were identified as potentially problematic. All analyses were run with and without these cases. There were no meaningful differences in the results when the problematic cases were excluded, therefore all results below are presented with all cases (i.e., no exclusions).

Centrality variables were dichotomized to allow for factorial ANOVA analyses ($2 \times 2 \times 2$). While it is common to perform a median split in these instances, it was decided that, due to the nature of the centrality variable and scale, the mid-point of the scale (i.e., ‘4’ on a 1 to 7 scale) would be an appropriate dividing point. Incidentally, the median for each of these scales was within .20 of the scale mid-point, therefore group sizes (i.e., high and low) are roughly equal for both Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality.

**Hypothesis testing.** Main study hypothesis testing consisted of a series of multiple regressions using grouped data; one regression analysis for each of the three DVs. The dependent variables in this study again were: (1) Restroom Decision – the focal decision-making item where participants were asked to rate the degree to which they support traditional versus gender-neutral restrooms; (2) Decision Speed – the time it took them to respond to that item; (3) Decision Affect – how they felt about their response to the item. Specifically, continuous predictors (i.e., Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality) were centered by subtracting the mean from each case, and the binary predictor (i.e., Situation Strength) was coded as -1 and 1. Interaction terms were then created for all combinations of Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation Strength (i.e., three two-way interactions and one three-way interaction). All predictors and interaction terms were entered into a multiple regression model. Additionally, for the
Restroom Decision analysis, a hierarchical multiple regression was performed to account for the effect of two covariates; Age and Restroom Picturing (i.e., how the gender-neutral restroom was pictured by participants). The covariates were entered in block one, and all predictors and interaction terms in block 2.

Next, to provide additional information and a method of interpretation, a series of factorial ANOVAs were conducted; one for each of the three dependent variables. The design for each of the three analyses was $2 \times 2 \times 2$ (Christian Centrality: high vs. low) × 2 (Democrat Centrality: high vs. low) × 2 (Situation Strength: weak vs. strong democratic situation). Additionally, for the Restroom Decision analysis, an ANCOVA was performed in order to account for the effect of two covariates; Age and Restroom Picturing. A Bonferroni adjustment was applied to all analyses to account for the increase in Type I error that can be expected when there is a high number of hypotheses per analysis/data set (i.e., the probability of finding a statistically significant effect goes up with the number of hypotheses). This adjustment multiplies the $p$-value of each $F$ statistic by the number of predictors in the model while leaving the alpha at the traditional .05 level. Assumptions of ANOVA/ANCOVA were tested prior to, or during, the running of each analysis, and were all met.

**Restroom Decision analysis (H1a & b).** A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to determine the main and interaction effects of Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision when controlling for Age and Restroom Picturing. It was predicted that there would be main effects for all three IVs in the model (Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation Strength), as
well as a two-way interaction effect between Christian Centrality and Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision.

Model 1, which included the two covariates (Age and Restroom Picturing), significantly accounted for variance in the Restroom Decision; $F(2, 197) = 8.85, p < .001$. $R^2$ indicates that roughly 8% of the variance in the Restroom Decision is accounted for by the covariates. Additionally, Age ($B = -.03, p < .01$) and Restroom Picturing ($B = -.94, p < .01$) each significantly account for unique variance in the Restroom Decision.

Model 2 included the main predictors Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation Strength, and all interaction terms, along with the covariates Age and Restroom Picturing from model 1. Model 2 also significantly accounted for variance in the Restroom Decision; $F(9, 190) = 5.80, p < .001$. $R^2$ indicates that roughly 21% of the variance in the Restroom Decision is accounted for by the model. The addition of the predictors and interaction terms at step 2 significantly increased the amount of variance accounted for in the Restroom Decision; $\Delta R^2 = .13, F_{inc}(7, 190) = 4.60, p < .001$.

Additionally, Christian Centrality ($B = -.31, p < .01$) and Democrat Centrality ($B = .36, p < .01$) each significantly account for unique variance in the Restroom Decision. Specifically, Christian Centrality negatively predicted the decision (indicating support for traditional restrooms) and Democrat Centrality positively predicted the decision (indicating support for gender-neutral restrooms). Neither Situation Strength nor any of the interaction terms significantly accounted for unique variance in the Restroom Decision. These results provide partial support for hypothesis 1a; both Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality significantly predicted the Restroom Decision, but Situation Strength did not ($B = -.17, p = .22$). Support for hypothesis 1b was not found;
the interaction term Christian Centrality $\times$ Situation Strength did not significantly predict the Restroom Decision ($B = .05$, $p = .58$).

A $2 \times 2 \times 2$ analysis of covariance was then conducted to interpret these findings and confirm whether they hold with dichotomized centrality variables. ANCOVA results (see Table 7) confirm a significant effect for the covariate Age, $F(1, 173) = 8.80$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .05$, and a significant effect for the covariate Restroom Picturing, $F(1, 173) = 4.98$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2_p = .03$. Additionally, there was again a significant main effect of Christian Centrality, $F(1, 173) = 8.59$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .05$, and a significant main effect of Democrat Centrality, $F(1, 173) = 6.39$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2_p = .04$, after accounting for the effect of the covariates. There were no other significant main or interaction effects. See Tables 8 and 9 for adjusted means, standard errors and confidence intervals. See Figures 1, 2, and 3 for group mean bar charts.

**Decision Speed analysis (H2a & b).** A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to determine the main and interaction effects of Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation Strength on Decision Speed. It was predicted that there would be a main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Speed, as well as a two-way interaction effect between Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality on Decision Speed.

The model included the main predictors Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation Strength, and all interaction terms. The model as a whole did not significantly account for variance in Decision Speed; $F(7, 177) = .39$, $p = .91$. $R^2$ indicates that roughly 2% of the variance in Decision Speed is accounted for by the model. Additionally, no individual predictor or interaction term significantly accounted
for unique variance in Decision Speed. The results thus provided no support for hypotheses 2a and b. Neither Situation Strength ($B = .11, p = .68$) nor the Christian Centrality $\times$ Democrat Centrality interaction term ($B = -.06, p = .59$) significantly predicted Decision Speed.

A $2 \times 2 \times 2$ analysis of variance was then conducted to interpret these findings and confirm whether they hold with dichotomized centrality variables. ANOVA results (see Table 10) confirm no significant effects. See Table 11 for means, standard errors and confidence intervals. See Figures 4 and 5 for group mean bar charts.

**Decision Affect analysis (H3a & b).** A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to determine the main and interaction effects of Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation Strength on Decision Affect. It was predicted that there would be a main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Affect, as well as a two-way interaction effect between Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality on Decision Affect.

The model included the main predictors Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation Strength, and all interaction terms. The model as a whole significantly accounted for variance in Decision Affect; $F(7, 230) = 3.27, p < .01$. $R^2$ indicates that roughly 9% of the variance in Decision Affect is accounted for by the model. Additionally, Democrat Centrality ($B = .21, p < .001$) and the Christian Centrality $\times$ Democrat Centrality interaction term ($B = .08, p < .05$) each significantly account for unique variance in Decision Affect. No other predictor or interaction term accounted for variance in Decision Affect. These results fail to provide support for hypothesis 3a; Situation Strength did not significantly predict Decision Affect ($B = .01, p = .92$). The
results do provide support for hypothesis 3b in that the interaction term Christian Centrality \times Democrat Centrality did significantly predict Decision Affect.

A 2 \times 2 \times 2 analysis of variance was then conducted to interpret these findings and confirm whether they hold with dichotomized centrality variables. ANOVA results (see Table 12) confirm a significant main effect of Democrat Centrality, $F(1, 207) = 8.30, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .04$, and a significant interaction effect of Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality, $F(1, 207) = 5.03, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .02$. In the low Christian Centrality group, both high ($M = 1.16, SE = .17$) and low ($M = 1.06, SE = .15$) Democrat Centrality groups are roughly equal (and not significantly different from one another) in Decision Affect, with scores indicating that they are in positive affect territory (each scoring near 1, with 0 representing neutral affect).

However, in the high Christian Centrality group, positive affect goes down for those low in Democrat Centrality ($M = .83, SE = .15$), and up for those high in Democrat Centrality ($M = 1.50, SE = .14$); and these groups are significantly different from one another in Decision Affect. There were no other significant main or interaction effects. See Tables 13 and 14 for means, standard errors and confidence intervals. See Figures 6, 7, and 8 for group mean bar charts.

**Post hoc analyses.** In addition to hypothesis testing, it was beneficial to run certain post hoc analyses that could further illuminate these findings. First, testing the main hypotheses in multiple regression allowed for the testing of non-linear relationships between the predictor and outcome variables. This was done by visually examining scatterplots and fitting linear, quadratic, and cubic lines to the data for all predictor-outcome relationships. Potential non-linear relationships were then tested in hierarchical
multiple regression for significance and magnitude of unique effect by squaring (or cubing in the case of cubic relationships) the predictor term and entering it into the model at step 2.

It was found that Christian Centrality has a significant quadratic relationship with Decision Affect; $F(2, 236) = 6.10, p < .01$. $R^2$ indicates that roughly 5% of the variance in Decision Affect is accounted for by the model. The addition of squared Christian Centrality term at step 2 significantly increased the amount of variance accounted for in Decision Affect, $\Delta R^2 = .05$, $F_{inc}(1, 236) = 12.10, p < .01$. Those high and low in Christian Centrality felt more positively about their answers to the Restroom Decision than did those with middle levels of Christian Centrality. Or, stated differently, the regression slope is negative from low centrality to middle centrality, and positive from middle centrality to high centrality (see Figure 9).

Second, because certain of the PANAS items are particularly pertinent to the feelings that might be associated with cultural identity conflict in decision-making, it was worth testing them as individual dependent variables. Of course, being single items (as opposed to scales), these results should be interpreted cautiously, and it is suggested that they serve as preliminary evidence for future research that can employ more rigorous methods.

A series of 2 (Christian Centrality: high vs. low) $\times$ 2 (Democrat Centrality: high vs. low) factorial ANOVAs were conducted with each of the individual items of the PANAS as dependent variables. While there was a main effect of either Christian Centrality or Democrat Centrality on several items, the only item for which a significant interaction emerged was the positive affect item, ‘Attentive.’ As would be expected,
those high in centrality for both cultures were more attentive to the Restroom Decision question than were those high in centrality for one and low in the other and those low in centrality for both; $F (1, 212) = 4.00, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .02$. See Table 15 for group means and Figure 10 for bar charts. While there was not a significant interaction effect on any other single PANAS item, both ‘Proud’ and ‘Guilty’ were trending towards significance ($p < .10$).

Additionally, it was sensible to test these same effects as a three-way interaction with a dichotomized Restroom Decision variable. That is, it was important to determine whether the direction of the response to the focal decision DV (i.e., whether the person chose to support traditional versus gender-neutral restrooms) interacted with their Christian and/or Democrat Centrality in determining how they felt about their decision. Though there was a main effect of the dichotomized restroom decision DV on several of the individual PANAS items, there was no two- or three-way interaction between it and the two centrality variables.

Nonlinear relationships between Democrat Centrality/Christian Centrality and each of the individual PANAS items were also tested. Results show that Christian Centrality has a quadratic relationship with the positive affect items ‘Interested’ ($B = .08, p < .01, R^2\text{ Quadratic} = .03$), ‘Enthusiastic’ ($B = .09, p < .01, R^2\text{ Quadratic} = .03$), ‘Alert’ ($B = .09, p < .05, R^2\text{ Quadratic} = .04$), ‘Inspired’ ($B = .09, p < .05, R^2\text{ Quadratic} = .03$), ‘Determined’ ($B = .09, p < .05, R^2\text{ Quadratic} = .02$), and ‘Attentive’ ($B = .08, p < .05, R^2\text{ Quadratic} = .03$), as well as negative affect item ‘Scared’ ($B = -.05, p < .05, R^2\text{ Quadratic} = .02$). Additionally, results show that Democrat Centrality has a quadratic relationship with positive affect items ‘Enthusiastic’ ($B = .08, p < .05, R^2\text{ Quadratic} = .06$), ‘Alert’ ($B
=.12, p < .01, R^2 Quadratic = .05), and ‘Attentive’ (B = .09, p < .05, R^2 Quadratic = .03), as well as negative affect item ‘Guilty’ (B = -.05, p < .05, R^2 Quadratic = .02).

All quadratic relationships are positive with positive affect items and mirror the pattern of the relationship between Christian Centrality and Decision Affect (Figure 9). That is, positive affect decreases from low to middle centrality, and increases from middle to high centrality. Which essentially means that people feel more positively about the decision and underlying issue at low and high levels of centrality than at middle levels. The only negative quadratic relationships were between Democrat Centrality and ‘Guilty,’ and between Christian Centrality and ‘Scared.’ For these, positive affect increased from low to middle levels of centrality and decreased from middle to high levels.
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

The first of three questions asked in the current research was, ‘do people make decisions in a manner consistent with cultural identity centrality?’ Results of the current research suggest that they do. This question was foundational (i.e., not a novel aspect of the research); it was not hypothesized about, but it was necessary to establish this as a basis for the hypotheses that were made. Results of both the pilot study and the main study show that Christian centrality predicts support for traditional restrooms and Democrat Centrality predicts support for gender-neutral restrooms.

The second asked, ‘how do two incongruent cultural identities interact to influence decision-making?’ Results of the current research suggest that they interact to affect the emotion related to the decision, such that having high Christian and high Democrat Centrality leads to significantly higher decision-related positive affect than all other group combinations (though upon further analysis, this effect appears to be driven by attentiveness to the decision task). This question was addressed by examining the two-way interactions between Christian and Democrat Centrality with each of the three decision-making DVs.

The third asked, ‘does situational strength (of situations that make salient a cultural identity) influence decision-making, or interact with conflicting cultural centrality in doing so?’ Results of the current research suggest that strong situations did not affect decision-making, and that cultural identity centrality was resistant to the effects of the strong situation. However, there are many theoretical and methodological
considerations associated with these findings, which are discussed in detail in the sections that follow.

**Summary and Interpretation of Results**

The results of the main study provided support for some but not all of the predictions that were made. There were main effects of Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality, but no main effect of Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision (H1a). Additionally, there was no interaction effect of Christian Centrality and Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision (H1b). There was no main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Speed (H2a) nor was there an interaction effect of Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality on Decision Speed (H2b). There was no main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Affect (H3a), however, there was an interaction effect of Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality on Decision Affect (H3b). Additionally, post hoc analyses revealed a significant nonlinear (i.e., quadratic) relationship between Christian Centrality and Decision Affect, as well as a significant interaction effect of Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality on the PANAS item ‘Attentive.’

All results, regardless of whether they surpassed thresholds of statistical significance, are worthy of interpretation and should be seen as being potentially important to the literature and relevant theory. This section will discuss and interpret the results of the hypothesis testing by dependent variable. It will then interpret results from the post hoc analyses and discuss their relationship to the predictions and the larger theoretical picture.

**Restroom Decision.** The results of multiple regression and ANCOVA analyses collectively show a main effect of Christian Centrality on support for traditional (men’s
and women’s) restrooms and a main effect of Democrat Centrality on support for gender-neutral restrooms after controlling for the effect of age (i.e., younger participants supported gender-neutral rooms) and Restroom Picturing (those who pictured the gender-neutral room as a single-use, locking room supported gender-neutral rooms). This finding replicated the same finding from the pilot study which was used as part of a suite of evidence that Democrat and Christian culture do in fact support opposing ends of this decision scenario (and the values underlying it).

Importantly, what was established by this finding was that the proclivity to make decisions that verify a cultural identity goes beyond just membership in that culture. It involves the degree to which that cultural identity is central to the overall self-concept. All participants in the main study were members of both the Democrat and Christian cultures, meaning all participants violated the values of at least one of their cultural identities in making the Restroom Decision. The data show that they did so according to how relatively central each of those cultural identities were.

Additionally, while the interaction of Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality did not quite reach statistical significance, there was a small (and nearly significant) effect that is worthy of cautious interpretation. At high levels of Christian Centrality, people slightly supported traditional restrooms regardless of level of Democrat Centrality. At low levels of Christian Centrality, however, low-centrality Democrats still supported traditional restrooms, but high-centrality Democrats strongly supported gender-neutral restrooms. This raises two questions: First, why does support for traditional restrooms outweigh support for gender-neutral restrooms when Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality are both high, or both low? In theory, these would
cancel one another out and lead to neutral responses. Why did they lean toward
traditional instead of gender-neutral? Second, why was the apparently strong effect of
Democrat Centrality restricted at high levels of Christian centrality, while the same was
not true with reversed roles? It seems that Christian Centrality suppresses the effect of
Democrat Centrality – but why?

The answer to both questions may be the same - perhaps this finding, albeit
nonsignificant, provides some insight into which of these two cultural identities (i.e.,
Christian and Democrat) is more intrinsically important to people, or least how important
they are regarding the value of traditionalism. While the current research contends that
the sort of intrapersonal culture conflict demonstrated here should, in theory, be the same
for any two similarly incongruent cultures, it does not contend that all cultures are
equally meaningful to people.

It may be that, on average, religious cultural identities override political cultural
identities. The data do show that Christian Centrality is significantly higher than
Democrat Centrality among Christian-democrats in the control condition. Additionally,
research on cultural identity prioritization using the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn &
McPartland, 1954) shows that religious identity is significantly more prioritized than
political group identity across all religious and political groups (to the extent that order on
the Twenty Statements Test indicates prioritization; Barbour & Cohen, 2019). Or it may
be that for this particular decision, religious values suppressed conflicting political values
because the Christian stance on traditionalism is more important to people than the
Democrat stance. Of course, an alternative hypothesis regarding the leaning of responses
toward traditional restrooms is that traditional restrooms were just slightly more preferred.
by everyone, perhaps for reasons unrelated to political or religious values. Though this would not explain the aforementioned interaction.

There was no effect of Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision (or any other DV), nor was there an interaction effect of Situation Strength and Christian Centrality. These results are, of course, related and can be interpreted together. The null effect of situation strength on the Restroom Decision is inconsistent with prior research on person × situation interactions in strong versus weak situations (Johns, 2006; Weiss & Adler, 1984). Such research essentially demonstrates that when situations do not add social pressure to behave in a certain way, personal characteristics are free to dictate behavior (Meyer et al., 2014).

In theory, the strong (Democrat) situation in the current research would have applied social pressure (as opposed to the intrapersonal, self-applied pressure ostensibly taking place in the weak situation) to choose gender-neutral restrooms. This should have done two things: (1) Move all responses in the strong condition in the direction of gender-neutral restrooms, and (2) curb the effect Christian Centrality on the decision for those high in Christian Centrality. This did not happen for one of several potential reasons.

First, while the strong situation was strong in theory, it may not have been strong enough in reality. This manipulation hinged on selling that the participants may later have to account for or justify their responses to cultural ingroup members. The perception, or the imagining, of that future accountability is what should have created the in-the-moment situational strength for them. The pressure to decide a certain way may have
been one step too far temporally removed from the decision itself to have the desired effect.

Second, it is possible that decision-making driven by centrality is robust to the effects of situational salience, weak or strong. The personal and situational characteristics in person × situation interactions can vary quite a bit. There is likely variability in the extent to which personal characteristics in particular will hold with the hypothesis. Traditionally, they have been examined with personality constructs (e.g., the NEO-PI; Costa & McCrae, 1985; see Meyer et al., 2014). And while the logic of the hypothesis should hold with other similarly intrinsic, dispositional traits (e.g., identity centrality), clearly not all are equal in all ways. It may be, for example, that while extraversion may be suppressed by the effects of a strong situation, one’s religious identity centrality may not be. It is conceivable that there are differences in the extent to which these internal constructs matter enough to carry through to affect behavior and/or resist social pressures.

Finally, it should be considered that strong situations are simply no more powerful than weak situations in this particular decision-making scenario. Results that are inconsistent with prior research do not necessarily indicate faulty methods; they may simply indicate the existence of a moderator. It may be that some force was at play in the strong situation condition that counteracted the pressure to make ‘the democrat decision’ for that particular decision scenario. For example, the Restroom Decision DV was, and is, a hot button issue in society. People may be wary of self-disclosing potentially damaging information even if they have reason to believe they are in the safety of an ingroup (i.e., like-minded people; Kenrick, Cohen, Neuberg, & Cialdini, 2018).
It may be that certain elements of the strong situation (e.g., pressure to conform to democrat values) pushed people in the direction of gender-neutral restrooms, while other elements pushed them back toward traditional restrooms (e.g., potential cost of self-disclosure outweighing any potential reward). Participants knew they would need to defend their answers (in the later focus groups), and even in a ‘friendly’ in-group, that is a socially risky proposition given such a controversial question. Therefore, a more moderate answer (i.e., toward the middle from the gender-neutral extreme) is safer, especially given the unconcealable fact that focus groups would be full of multicultural people (i.e., not just monocultural democrats) who may have mixed views on such a topic. Or perhaps people think that traditional is safer. Going against the group to support change may seem riskier than going against the group to support maintaining the status quo. The same experiment with a Christian (instead of democrat) strong/weak situation manipulation would illuminate that for us.

**Decision Speed.** Results show no main or interaction effects of Democrat Centrality, Christian Centrality, or Situation Strength on Decision Speed. This likely indicates one of three things: (1) There was no intrapersonal culture conflict taking place, (2) any intrapersonal culture conflict taking place simply did not translate into a detectably slower decision process, (3) culture conflict was present and would have led to a slower decision process had the decision been sufficiently consequential and/or had another factor (e.g., desire to finish the survey) not suppressed the effect. I feel that third option is most likely and discuss further below in the ‘Limitations and Future Directions’ section.
**Decision Affect.** Results show a main effect of Democrat Centrality and an interaction effect of Democrat Centrality and Christian Centrality on Decision Affect. As Democrat Centrality increases, positive affect increases. However, this needs to be considered in the context of the interaction. As stated in the results, in the low Christian Centrality group, both high and low Democrat Centrality groups are roughly equal (and not significantly different from one another) in Decision Affect, with scores indicating that they are in positive affect territory (each scoring near 1, with 0 representing neutral affect). However, in the high Christian Centrality group, positive affect goes down slightly for those low in Democrat Centrality, and up significantly for those high in Democrat Centrality.

While the interaction of Democrat Centrality and Christian Centrality on Decision Affect was predicted (i.e., Hypothesis 3b), the observed interaction did not occur in the predicted way. According to the hypothesis, those high in both Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality should have had the lowest positive affect of all group combinations because they would have been experiencing the most internal conflict. This would have been consistent with self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) as well as marketing research on the negative emotional states that accompany conflict-laden decisions (Luce 1998; Luce et al., 2001). Instead, this group experienced the highest positive affect of all group combinations (see Figure 6).

The most logical interpretation of this paradoxical finding is that the PANAS is a complex measure of emotional states, and the items in the scale vary a great deal in their relevance to cultural identity conflict. They need to be analyzed individually to deconstruct the meaning of this interaction. One would not expect a participant to be
‘Hostile’ due to conflicting Christian and democrat identities, for example. But perhaps the best example of this is the positive affect item ‘Attentive,’ on which the interaction of Christian and Democrat Centrality also had an effect. These results are elaborated upon further in the discussion of the post hoc analysis of individual PANAS items.

**PANAS items.** A stated above, we would not expect all of the items of the PANAS to yield information that is useful to this research. For example, it would be unusual for one to feel ‘Jittery’ when thinking about the response that they just gave to the Restroom Decision item. Some, however, seem particularly relevant. For example, one who is not conflicted by similar levels of centrality between the two cultural identities might feel ‘Strong’ about their answer. One who is more conflicted (i.e., similar levels of centrality between the two cultural identities) might feel ‘Upset’ or ‘Guilty’ about their answer. This is not trivial. How a person feels about their behavior has the ability to affect their mood for extended periods of time, or change the likelihood of a future behavior.

Post Hoc analyses reveal an interaction effect of Christian and Democrat Centrality on the positive affect item ‘Attentive.’ This is an important discovery for two reasons: (1) it is consistent with what one would expect regarding the role of cultural identity conflict in choice (i.e., conflicting intrapersonal guidance on the correct course of action would cause one to more closely attend to and consider the options), and (2) it explains the paradoxical finding of Decision Affect being highest for those who are high in both Christian and Democrat Centrality. That is, being ‘Happy’ about your decision if you are conflicted does not seem logical but being attentive if you are conflicted does.
Nonlinear relationships. While no predictions were made about potential nonlinear relationships between centrality variables and any DVs, regression analyses provided a convenient opportunity to check for these. Results of post hoc analysis of nonlinear relationships show that Christian Centrality has a positive quadratic relationship with Decision Affect. Furthermore, several of the individual PANAS items display the same quadratic relationship with Christian Centrality (e.g., ‘Interested,’ ‘Inspired’), and several (but fewer) do with Democrat Centrality as well (‘Enthusiastic,’ ‘Alert’).

The general pattern is that at both high and low levels of centrality, positive affect is higher and negative affect is lower, and at middle levels of centrality, positive affect is lower and negative affect is higher. An interpretation of this is that people are least sure of who they are at middle levels of centrality, leading to greater general uncertainty and emotional discontent about identity relevant decisions. Conversely, those high in centrality know who they are and those low in centrality know who they are not (in theory), both of which may lead to greater confidence and emotional contentment about identity relevant decisions.

Implications

The findings of the current research carry several important implications for research and theory in various fields. First, biculturalism (and, in theory, multiculturalism) exists across, as well as within, categories of cultures. As noted in the introduction, while social psychology and related fields have in recent years expanded culture research to acknowledge increasingly more forms of culture, still too many people equate culture with ethnicity and cultural ethnicity with east versus west. Moreover,
bicross-cultural research (e.g., Hong et al., 2010), while also expanding to include forms such as social class (Herrmann & Varnum, 2018), has focused on within-category biculturalism. The current research provides evidence of cross-category biculturalism and demonstrates how the identities associated with these cultures interact in decision scenarios relevant to the values of both (e.g., the extent to which one values traditionalism).

Second, centrality of cultural identity, perhaps more than mere possession of cultural identity, is meaningful in understanding the effects of culture on thinking and behavior. The current research advances the cultural literature by taking a self-concept/identity approach to thinking about the effect of multiple cultural memberships. It is not simply that we all belong to many cultures and those cultural memberships conflict with and complement one another to varying degrees. It is that each of those cultures represents an identity (i.e., the content of self), and each of those identities is somewhere in a chronic hierarchy of salience. Not all Christian-democrats think the same way; not all make decisions in the same way. Some choose one extreme end of a controversial and polarizing issue; some choose the other extreme end. Cultural psychology can benefit from a stronger appreciation of cultural identity centrality (as opposed to cultural membership alone).

Third, our cultural identities interact to influence behavior and decision-making in subtle ways (e.g., attentiveness increases with internal conflict). The foundational finding that Christian Centrality predicts support for traditional restrooms and Democrat Centrality predicts support for gender-neutral restroom is interesting, and adds to the culture literature (1) evidence of how relatively important different cultural identities are,
and (2) how this plays out behaviorally. But these findings are consistent with existing research and theory in other areas (e.g., Identity Theory; Stryker, 1968). The more impactful findings come from how the centrality of these cultural identities interacts.

Perhaps the most impactful implications of the current research come from the Decision Affect findings. The interaction of Christian and Democrat Centrality on positive affect related to the decision is important not only for basic research in psychology, but for applied research across various fields, such as marketing. This is particularly true given the post hoc finding with the attentiveness item. For example, it would benefit marketers to know that people will give greater attention to an item if it highlights a cultural inconsistency for cultures that are highly central.

The quadratic relationships between both Christian and Democrat Centrality and the individual PANAS items are meaningful as well. A consumer who feels guilty about a recently purchased item of clothing (e.g., that might signal membership in a mid-centrality cultural group) may be less likely to wear it or more likely to return it, either of which would have implications for the manufacturer and/or retailer. A consumer who is enthusiastic about a restaurant choice based on its cultural conduciveness to a high-centrality cultural identity may spend more money than less enthusiastic patrons.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

The results of the current research highlight certain limitations and areas for future work. One limitation was the Situation Strength manipulation. As noted above, while it did manipulate situation strength in theory, because the social pressure required imagination, and was temporally removed from the decision-making scenario itself, it was not as strong as it could have been and often is in the environment. The strong
situation may also have manipulated other closely-related constructs. For example, it may be that justification or accountability was being activated by the ‘strong’ condition. Future research can measure these and other similar constructs or take steps to make the manipulations as ecologically valid as possible.

Additionally, regarding the lack of an effect of Situational Strength, it may be that participants held back on fully committing to democrat values in the strong situation due to the knowledge that others in the focus would be multicultural and hold mixed views on issues. Every participant in the study was democrat, but also Christian. They were recruited that way and were aware that others were recruited that way. They may have suspected that the focus group that they would later take part in would also contain Christian-democrats and answered more moderately as a result.

Relatedly, participants may have been wary of self-disclosing potentially damaging information given the controversial subject matter of the decision-making item. Future research can utilize theory on relational mobility (Yuki et al., 2007) to shed light on the cognitive and affective states and processes of participants in similar situational manipulations. Research on relational mobility has shown that when people perceive that close relationships within a cultural group are not easily broken or formed, they are less likely to self-disclose personal information about themselves (Schug, Yuki, Horikawa, & Takemura, 2009). The logic is that, when new close relationships are hard to form, self-disclosing potentially damaging information is risky, in that it might lead to social exclusion. Conversely, when new close relationships are easy to form, self-disclosing potentially damaging information is a way of signaling loyalty and trust to existing close others (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Collins & Miller, 1994; Laurenceau, Barrett, &
Pietromonaco, 1998). This can be a very useful construct in future research on the behavioral effect of conflicting cultural identities.

Another potential limitation was that the decisions in the current research were not binary, nor were they categorical, but rather were continuous. One might argue that, because of this, the Restroom Decision was in fact not a decision-making scenario but rather a measure of one’s attitudes toward an issue. The current research contends that participants were forced to choose a direction on that item (and on similar items used in the pilot study), thereby making it a choice. It is acknowledged, however, that it was a choice clearly based on attitudes toward an issue, and that the choice itself was a somewhat trivial and easily measured one compared to some of the more consequential choices that could possibly have been measured, or that take place in the environment. It was not important to the current research to theoretically tease apart the attitudes from the decision that they led to, but because the decision was so inconsequential, it blurred the line between the choice being made and the attitudes underlying it.

Future research in this area can do three things to further develop these findings and add rigor to the decision-making outcome: First, it can consider some of the cognitive and affective constructs that might be mediating the relationship between centrality (or situational salience) and decision-making and measure those variables. It might be, for example, that attitudes or certain combinations of cultural value or belief dimensions (e.g., power distance, masculinity; Hofstede, 2011) mediate the cultural identity decision-making process.

Second, decision-making can be measured by observing behaviors as opposed to asking what one would decide. When a behavior is observed, there is little room to argue
that a choice was not made. When one is asked what choice they would make, it is more difficult to disentangle the reported hypothetical behavior from the attitudes that underlie it. Third, the decision scenarios can be as consequential to the participant as possible without risking harm or violating ethical guidelines. That is, if they do not believe that the consequences of their decision have any basis in reality, they will not put forth the thought and effort necessary for interpretable results.

This final point ties into another limitation of the current research; for the Decision Speed DV, it was essential that the participants cared enough about their response for cultural identity conflict to impact the speed of their response. This was likely not achieved. This research, more than most, hinges on people thinking about and caring about how they answer. There is a strong incentive to finish a survey quickly; the incentive to make the ‘right’ decision on the DV item needs to be at least as strong.

An example of a decision scenario that might seem more consequential to the participant is asking them to vote on a certain issue as if they were an elected official. Of course, truly consequential decisions involve real-world consequences for the choice being made. In an experimental setting, this would need to involve a high degree of deception.

A potential methodological limitation of the main study was the ordering of the items in the survey. The ordering was thoroughly thought out, but it was necessary to build in certain imperfections to avoid larger, more costly errors. The order was limited in at least two ways: First, the IVs Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality were measured after the manipulation. This allows for the possibility of the Centrality responses varying as a function of experimental condition. However, past theory and
research in Identity Theory (Stryker, 1987) has made clear that centrality is stable, and should be resistant to the short-term effects brought on by situational salience.

Second, the covariate Restroom Picturing was measured after the DVs. In theory, a covariate should be measured prior to the measuring of a DV, which was not possible in this case because the covariate measure asked the participant about their response to the DV item. It is unlikely that this limitation had any impact on the results, but it is nevertheless important to mention.

An important future direction will be to expand this research from bicultural intrapersonal processes to multicultural intrapersonal processes. The current research zoomed in on two cultures to clearly and parsimoniously answer specific conflict-related questions, but it is undeniably important to address the fact that people are not bicultural, they are multicultural. A person might possess four cultural identities that pull them toward traditional restrooms and only one that pulls them toward gender-neutral restrooms. And of course, these five identities will be central to different degrees. While it seems daunting to attempt to account for the complexities that must accompany more than two cultures (and all of their values, beliefs, rituals, norms, motives, etc.) it is within our ability.

On that note, future research in this area might employ more advanced statistical modeling techniques. A structural equation model could answer research questions regarding several cultures (e.g., race, nationality, gender, political group, religion), the centrality of those cultures, several different decisions (some that get at areas of cultural agreement and some at areas of cultural disagreement), and several cultural dimensions
(e.g., tightness; Gelfand et al., 2011; relational mobility; Yuki et al., 2007; values; Schwartz, 1992) that might mediate or moderate those decisions.

Conclusion

This research posited that not all cultural identities are equally important, meaningful, or salient in a given moment or decision-making circumstance, and that this notion was glaringly absent from the culture literature. It made novel predictions about how the centrality and situational salience (of varying strengths) of conflicting cultural identities might interact to influence decision-making. The questions asked and answered in this project make important advances in cultural psychology, and the results carry implications for many related fields, notably those with a strong interest in judgment and decision-making. While the results yield several interesting and important findings, they also yield new questions and areas for future investigation. Indeed, the study of multicultural cognitive and behavioral processes is young, and there are many questions to be addressed. The current research should serve as evidence of the importance and the potential for growth in this area of research.
REFERENCES


Table 1

**Correlations of Democrat and Christian Members with Restroom Choice (Pilot)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republican/Democrat</th>
<th>Atheist/Christian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican/Democrat</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>__</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist/Christian</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional or Gender-</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Restroom</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.20**</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Note.* Religious and political variables are coded as follows: Republican = 0, Democrat = 1; Atheist = 0, Christian = 1. Restroom decision is on a scale from 1 (*Traditional*) to 7 (*gender-neutral*). **p < .001
Table 2

Restroom Decision Means, St. Deviations, and Multiple Comparisons of Four Political × Religious Groups (Pilot)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group (I)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>Comparison Group (J)</th>
<th>I-J</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4.92 (1.99)</td>
<td>AR</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>- .79</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
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<td>3.32 (2.11)</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>-1.60</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>- .81</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.18</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>4.13 (2.06)</td>
<td>AD</td>
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<td>.33</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td>AR</td>
<td>.81</td>
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<td>CR</td>
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<td>1.88 (1.71)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>-2.25</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. AD = atheist-democrat, AR = atheist-republican, CD = Christian-democrat, CR = Christian-republican*
Table 3

ANOVA Summary Table for Restroom Decision (Pilot)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>ηp²</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>165.96</td>
<td>52.51</td>
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<td>.31</td>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>Atheist/Christian</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>59.10</td>
<td>18.70</td>
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<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat/Republican</td>
<td>176.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>176.82</td>
<td>55.94</td>
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<td>.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACxDR</td>
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<td>1.59</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Error</td>
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<td>355</td>
<td>3.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>359</td>
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<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>1619.93</td>
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</table>

Note. Bonferroni adjustment applied to p-values; p is significant at α = .05.

¹ $R^2 = .31$ (R² adjusted = .30)
Table 4

*Multiple Regression of Restroom Decision on Christian and Democrat Centrality (Pilot)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rest</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$SE$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.70***</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Christian Centrality</td>
<td>-.38***</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat Centrality</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.17***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** $p < 0.01$
Table 5

*Main Study Demographics*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>64% female</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35.41</td>
<td>14.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>41% Middle Class</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>60% white</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>4% veteran</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>76% employed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>89% U.S. citizen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Group</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>100% Democrat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Group</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>100% Christian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>38% Catholic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Socioeconomic status (SES) was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (working class) to 5 (upper class).
Table 6

Restroom Decision Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rest</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.38***</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.02*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restroom Picturing</td>
<td>-1.22***</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.08***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.42***</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.03***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restroom Picturing</td>
<td>-1.00***</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Centrality</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Centrality</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.17***</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$
Table 7

**ANCOVA Summary Table for Restroom Decision**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>η²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>136.70</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.19</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>563.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>563.09</td>
<td>146.68</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>33.79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.79</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restroom Picturing</td>
<td>19.12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19.12</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Centrality</td>
<td>32.96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32.96</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Centrality</td>
<td>24.54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24.54</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Strength</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian × Democrat</td>
<td>14.07</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.07</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian × Situation</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat × Situation</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian × Democrat × Situation</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>664.14</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3529.32</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>800.84</td>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Bonferroni adjustment applied to p-values; p is significant at α = .05.

¹ $R^2 = .17$ ($R^2$ adjusted = .13)
### Table 8

**Restroom Decision Adjusted Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$SE$</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>3.19, 4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>4.45, 5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>2.79, 3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>3.12, 4.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9

Restroom Decision Adjusted Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group and Situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>3.07 - 4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>2.80 - 4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>4.37 - 6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>3.94 - 5.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>2.72 - 4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>2.51 - 3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>2.78 - 4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>3.00 - 4.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 10

**ANOVA Summary Table for Decision Speed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>η²p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>24.09¹</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>17886.36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17886.36</td>
<td>1486.99</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Centrality</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Centrality</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Strength</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian × Democrat</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian × Situation</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat × Situation</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian × Democrat × Situation</td>
<td>13.38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.38</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>1912.54</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>12.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20906.76</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>1936.63</td>
<td>166</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Bonferroni adjustment applied to *p*-values; *p* is significant at α = .05.

¹ $R^2 = .01$ ($R^2$ adjusted = -.03)
Table 11

**Decision Speed Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group and Situation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.64</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>9.19 to 12.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.38</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>8.76 to 11.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>8.46 to 11.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>9.66 to 13.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.37</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>8.47 to 12.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10.76</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>9.36 to 12.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10.97</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>9.67 to 12.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>9.34 to 12.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12

ANOVA Summary Table for Decision Affect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
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<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>η²</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>17.85</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>274.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>274.06</td>
<td>237.81</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Centrality</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Centrality</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Strength</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian × Democrat</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian × Situation</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat × Situation</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian × Democrat × Situation</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>238.55</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>1.15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>550.13</td>
<td>215</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>256.40</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Bonferroni adjustment applied to p-values; p is significant at α = .05.

¹ $R^2 = .07$ ($R^2$ adjusted = .04)
Table 13

Decision Affect Adjusted Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14

*Decision Affect Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group and Situation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.67 - 1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.68 - 1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.67 - 1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.72 - 1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.24 - 1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Figure 1. Centrality group means on Restroom Decision for all participants, regardless of condition. Values below 4 are toward traditional men’s and women’s restrooms; values above 4 are toward gender-neutral restrooms.
Figure 2. Centrality group means on Restroom Decision in the weak condition. Values below 4 are toward traditional men’s and women’s restrooms; values above 4 are toward gender-neutral restrooms.
Figure 3. Centrality group means on Restroom Decision in the strong condition. Values below 4 are toward traditional men’s and women’s restrooms; values above 4 are toward gender-neutral restrooms.
Figure 4. Centrality group means on Decision Speed (i.e., seconds spent responding to Restroom Decision item) in the weak condition.
Figure 5. Centrality group means on Decision Speed (i.e., seconds spent responding to Restroom Decision item) in the strong condition.
Figure 6. Centrality group means on Decision Affect (i.e., emotion related to Restroom Decision response) for all participants regardless of condition.
Figure 7. Centrality group means on Decision Affect (i.e., emotion related to Restroom Decision response) in the weak condition.
Figure 8. Centrality group means on Decision Affect (i.e., emotion related to Restroom Decision response) in the strong condition.
Figure 9. Quadratic relationship between positive affect and Christian Centrality.
Figure 10. Group means on ‘Attentive’ (i.e., how attentive they were to the restroom decision question – from positive affect subscale of PANAS).
APPENDIX A

ADAPTED CENTRALITY SUBSCALE OF THE MIBI
1. Overall, being [a member of this culture] has very little to do with how I feel about myself. (reverse scored)
2. In general, being [a member of this culture] is an important part of my self-image.
3. My destiny is tied to the destiny of other [members of this culture] people.
4. Being [a member of this culture] is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. (reverse scored)
5. I have a strong sense of belonging to [members of this culture] people.
6. I have a strong attachment to other [members of this culture] people.
7. Being [a member of this culture] is an important reflection of who I am.
8. Being [a member of this culture] is not a major factor in my social relationships. (reverse scored)
APPENDIX B

THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE
Instructions: For each item, please indicate to what extent you feel this way about your response to the last question.

Response Items: 1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = extremely

Interested - PA01
Distressed - NA01
Excited - PA02
Upset - NA02
Strong - PA03
Guilty - NA03
Scared - NA04
Hostile - NA05
Enthusiastic - PA04
Proud - PA05
Irritable - NA06
Alert - PA06
Ashamed - NA07
Inspired - PA07
Nervous - NA08
Determined - PA08
Attentive - PA09
Jittery - NA09
Active - PA10
Afraid - NA10

Scoring: Sum PA items for total Positive Affect score; sum NA items for total Negative Affect score. The current research subtracts NA total from PA total for final affect composite.
APPENDIX C

WEAK (DEMOCRAT IDENTITY) SITUATION
ATTENTION, PARTICIPANT: The following several pages will contain some decision scenarios. Please answer as honestly as possible. Please click the 'next' arrow to continue with the survey.
APPENDIX D

STRONG (DEMOCRAT IDENTITY) SITUATION
ATTENTION, PARTICIPANT: You have been randomly selected to participate in an online focus group with other self-identified Democrats. **In the focus group, you will be discussing your answers to the questions on the next several pages.** If you choose to participate, your personal information (including your name) will be entirely confidential and you will be compensated. There will be an opportunity at the end of the survey to indicate whether you would like to be contacted for participation in this focus group. Please click the 'next' arrow to continue with the survey.
APPENDIX E
IRB HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH APPROVAL
EXEMPTION GRANTED

Adam Cohen
Psychology
480/965-7345
Adam.Cohen@asu.edu

Dear Adam Cohen:

On 3/3/2017 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:

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<th>Initial Study</th>
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<tr>
<td>Title:</td>
<td>Prioritization of Cultural Selves</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigator:</td>
<td>Adam Cohen</td>
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<td>IRB ID:</td>
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The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 3/3/2017.

In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).

Sincerely,

IRB Administrator

cc: Joseph Barbour