‘Can you imagine what’s happened in Durham?’ Duke University and a new university-community engagement model

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Abstract

Problem, research strategy, and findings: As Durham’s economy collapsed in the mid-1990s, Duke established a plan to intervene. Its actions aligned with anchor institution models at many universities; its approach, however, was unique: In a city where Duke was a fixture, university leadership understood a top-down approach was not viable. Instead, administrators launched a community-led model intended to change the “story [from] look at what Duke did,” to “can you imagine what’s happened in Durham?” I use a longitudinal case study to examine Duke’s anchor institution model in 12 Durham neighborhoods. The research considers Duke’s approach from the mid-1990s to present, drawing from: interviews with Duke administrators, community organizations, and neighborhood representatives; newspaper articles and reports; and a descriptive analysis of neighborhood change. This case explores an anchor model that engages non-profit partners and community development strategies. Findings show the potential for a multi-partner anchor model that cultivates neighborhood improvement and minimizes (to an extent) gentrification pressures that can arise from anchor investment. Duke’s anchor model offers a unique perspective on university-community engagement, partnerships and neighborhood investment.

Takeaway for practice: Duke’s case offers insights for how major institutions—from university anchors to local government—can recast their roles in communities; it also offers a roadmap for how institutions can engage (and benefit) neighborhoods in meaningful ways. Informed by a collaborative anchor model, Duke empowered residents to identify their own neighborhood priorities and partnered with local community organizations to meet those aims. This anchor model reveals a powerful role for intermediaries, including planners and community organizers, to connect institutional resources with neighborhood priorities. Supported by a participatory planning process, there are opportunities to realign anchor institution strategies and tools with neighborhood priorities to move towards mutually beneficial outcomes.

Keywords: Anchor institution, university-community engagement, revitalization, community development, affordable housing
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Introduction

In the 1990s, Duke’s rising reputation was mismatched with Durham’s (NC) economic decline. As prospective students visited campus, they drove past boarded-up neighborhoods. Duke’s administration established a plan to address Durham’s decline—an emergent trend among elite private universities (Rodin, 2007). Its approach, however, was unique: In a city where Duke was a fixture, university leadership understood a top-down approach was not viable. Instead, administrators launched a community-led model intended to change the “story [from] look at what Duke did,” to “can you imagine what’s happened in Durham?”.

Whereas anchor institution theory frequently lauds the goal of “mutually-beneficial” university-community investments, research suggests it can be difficult to achieve. Ehlenz finds that anchor revitalization initiatives tend to target physical upgrading or new development, while investments in community development strategies are rare (2018a). As a result, anchor investments—particularly those targeting the built environment—are often associated with gentrification pressures and lack mitigation strategies (Ehlenz, 2017, 2018b). Duke’s model offers a counterpoint, elevating deep community engagement and direct investment in non-profit organizations with affordable housing missions.

Duke’s anchor model is built upon community-defined needs rather than institutionally-established priorities. Conceiving of institutional resources as tools for change, its strategy relies on three factors: empowerment, partnership, and evolution. Empowerment engages community leaders to facilitate a bottom-up neighborhood planning process on Duke’s behalf. Partnership embodies Duke’s primary investment strategy, distributing Duke dollars among non-profit community organizations to mobilize local change. Evolution allows neighborhood-specific
problems to dictate solutions over time, enabling Duke to invest differently within neighborhoods.

Duke’s approach also offers insights into university-community engagement strategies. Fifty years after its initial publication, Arnstein’s ladder of participation continues to resonate with planners (and non-planners) (1969). The theory offers planners an objective for engagement—one that seeks to redistribute the power from traditional players to affected communities (Slotterback & Lauria, 2019). This case offers insights about the important work institutions pursue in communities and how they often intersect with planning practice. Duke’s experience underscores how institutions can embrace planning strategies to generate deep community engagement and partnerships.

Using a longitudinal case method, I answer the following question: how can a university design its anchor model to ensure benefits for local neighborhoods and, thus, some degree of mutually-beneficial outcomes? Relying on interviews, news accounts, and reports, I examine Duke’s engagement with 12 Durham neighborhoods since 1993. Findings show the potential for a multi-partner anchor strategy that cultivates neighborhood improvement and minimizes (to an extent) gentrification pressures. Duke’s anchor model offers a unique perspective to university-community engagement, partnerships and neighborhood investment.

**Anchoring the community?**

Anchor institutions earn their name from their substantial physical assets, reducing odds they will relocate to other regions. The term originates from a 2001 convening on institution-community partnerships (Fulbright-Anderson, Auspos, & Anderson, 2001), but the concept grows out of the 1960s when these institutions remained in cities while corporations fled for the suburbs (Taylor & Luter, 2013). As Ehlenz describes, university-community interactions—and
the contemporary anchor institution model—have evolved across five eras, spanning land grant
designations, the early 20th century urban laboratory, urban renewal, and two more recent
iterations: university-community partnerships and university anchor models (Ehlenz, 2018a).
These two remain prevalent in practice and research today.

Two bodies of research offer insights into the contemporary anchor model. The first
engages with the model’s ideological roots, arranged on a continuum. Enlightened self-interest is
the least progressive ideology, situating institutional needs within the context of its neighborhood
but without explicit acknowledgement of community-focused change (Hodges & Dubb, 2012).
While spillover community benefits are possible, they are not the inherent objective. The shared
value ethos is an incrementally more progressive ideology, where anchors adopt a “win-win”
value proposition with communities (Dubb, McKinley, & Howard, 2013a, 2013b). While shared
value does not guarantee equal benefits (or costs) for all, it does explicitly identify a system for
evaluating revitalization strategies and impacts. Last, democratic civic engagement constitutes
the most liberal ideology for anchor models. Unlike its counterparts, it expressly states that
anchor institutions have an obligation to adopt sustained civic engagement missions, including
physical, economic, and social objectives (Harkavy, 2006; Harkavy & Hodges, 2012). In this
arena, the literature most commonly points to service learning, community service, and applied
research (e.g., Lowe, 2008; Reardon, 1998).

The second discourse focuses more heavily on the what and how of anchor institution
models. Since the 1990s, universities have embraced revitalization as a means of blurring the
town-gown boundary, with a number of scholars examining the scale and scope of university
investments in neighborhoods (e.g., Bromley, 2006; Ehlenz, 2017, 2018a; Etienne, 2012;
Friedman, Perry, & Menendez, 2014; Perry & Wiewel, 2005). Research spans single cases and
comparative analyses, as well as anchor model typologies. Contemporary typologies enumerate the assets embedded within universities and identify ways to align them with community interests (e.g., Dubb et al., 2013b; Hodges & Dubb, 2012; Initiative for a Competitive Inner City, 2011). Typologies frequently categorize community-facing investments into economic development (e.g., local procurement and hiring), housing (e.g., rehabilitation or homeownership incentives), and community building efforts (e.g., K-12 partnerships or public amenities). The thrust is broad and targets mutually-beneficial outcomes for universities and their communities (Hodges & Dubb, 2012), although research suggests few universities achieve this goal (Ehlenz, 2016; Silverman, Patterson, Yin, & Wu, 2015; Silverman, Taylor, Yin, Miller, & Buggs, 2018). Typologies also highlight the potential for revitalization to align university missions with communities, although research suggests this is more likely an aspiration. Using difference-in-difference modeling, Ehlenz illustrates how anchor efforts can stimulate physical revitalization without socioeconomic benefits (2018b). Other research highlights the transactional nature of anchor models, capturing shortfalls when neighborhood benefits are shoehorned into institutional strategy (Silverman, Lewis, & Patterson, 2014; Silverman, Taylor, Yin, Miller, & Buggs, 2019).

A disconnect emerges between anchor ideologies and the ways universities implement their strategies, as well as one between university-community engagement and anchor revitalization efforts. Recent publications identify this gap, arguing for a conceptual framework to realign communities (and anchor ideologies) within anchor strategies (Luter & Taylor, 2020; Taylor, Luter, & Miller, 2018). I contribute to this gap with Duke’s case study, conducting a deep dive of its efforts to bring community engagement and partnership into the forefront of the anchor model and engage the concept of mutually beneficial revitalization.
Research Methods

Relative to other university anchor revitalization models, Duke’s approach is distinctive, though this may not be immediately clear based on prior work. Ehlenz surveyed 22 universities (including Duke) about anchor revitalization, asking them to identify which strategies, drawn from the existing literature, they pursued (2018a). Based on these standard categories, Duke’s approach was not immediately notable; however, administrators’ open-ended responses revealed a departure from the typical anchor model. This longitudinal case extends Duke’s initial survey responses, examining its approach to anchor revitalization (beginning in 1993 to 2018) in greater detail and its implications for anchor institution theory. Informed by university, non-profit, and resident perspectives, I explore the process and structure of Duke’s multi-partner model. I compare these qualitative accounts with a descriptive assessment of demographic, socioeconomic and housing trends in target neighborhoods (via census tracts).

Duke’s anchor strategy (and this case study) targeted 12 campus-adjacent neighborhoods, situated within six census tracts (Figure 1). Administrators selected these neighborhoods because of their proximity to Duke and, thus, their mutual interest in neighborhood conditions. To examine Duke’s efforts and neighborhood impacts, I used interviews, newspapers, and reports, alongside demographic, socioeconomic, and housing data from the U.S. Census and American Community Survey (ACS).
Figure 1. Study area

*Note: Duke’s anchor strategy targeted 12 campus-adjacent neighborhoods, contained within six tracts (identified as Duke Target Neighborhoods). These tracts serve as the primary focus area for the study, including the descriptive analysis. Tracts 15.01, 15.02, and 15.03 are Duke-affiliated tracts and are excluded from the descriptive analysis. Tracts 15.02 and 15.03 are entirely covered by the Duke campus. Tract 15.01 functionally serves as an extension of the Duke campus, consisting of Duke-affiliated buildings and multi-family properties targeted to Duke students. Tract 22 contains Downtown Durham and is included in the analysis as a reference.

I conducted 25 semi-structured interviews with 20 stakeholders\(^1\) in 2015 (n=18) and 2018 (n=7), including Duke administrators, representatives from Duke’s non-profit partners, a City of Durham planner, and neighborhood representatives (Table 1). I identified participants through
recommendations from Duke administrators, a review of local news related to Duke’s anchor model, and snowball sampling. Interviews spanned several topics, including: long-standing neighborhood conditions and university-community relationships; characterizations of Duke’s anchor model; and Duke’s anchor impacts, including neighborhood changes and perceived benefits and challenges. I analyzed full interview transcripts, using a combined deductive and inductive coding strategy. I triangulated interview data with local sources, including newspaper articles and reports related to Duke’s neighborhood interactions. Subsequently, I assessed neighborhood change, using U.S. Census and ACS tract-level data to analyze demographic, socioeconomic, and housing trends between 1990 and 2015.

Table 1. Description of interview participants

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<thead>
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<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tr>
<td>University administration/faculty</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>City of Durham</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community organization</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neighborhood representative</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
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Note: I conducted 25 interviews, total, in 2015 (n=18) and 2018 (n=7) with 20 individuals.

This case has limitations. It relies on qualitative perspectives and descriptive statistics to understand neighborhood impacts; while this data can demonstrate change, it cannot establish a causal relationship. Further, interviews capture a segment of neighborhood and institutional experiences over a specific period of time. The data engages a range of perspectives on the research themes, but self-selection and sample size limit the analysis.

20th century Duke and Durham: Intertwined fortunes, urban renewal, and the plantation

Duke has been a part of Durham, NC since 1892, when Trinity College (its predecessor) relocated (King, 2015), affording the institution greater access to students, faculty, and financial
support. In 1924, the Duke family established a $40 million endowment, including $19 million for the conversion and campus expansion of Trinity into a university, aptly named Duke University (King, 2015).

Trinity’s conversion set a precedent for town-gown relations with Durham (Moyne, 2004). Duke redeveloped its original East Campus and acquired land to expand into contiguous West (720 acres) and Central (200 acres) campuses, nestled among 7,200 acres of forest. Importantly, Duke’s expansion pushed westward, negating conflicts with Durham’s urbanizing downtown to the east; its land acquisitions also lessened future town-gown land disputes. While Duke purchased land quietly to minimize conflict and speculation, its leaders emphasized Duke’s intention “to bring Durham to greatness” (Moyne, 2004, p. 216).

In the mid-20th century, Durham saw its tobacco and textile industries collapse (Ehrsam, 2010). Unable to prevent urban decline, Duke continued to assert a shared Duke-Durham future, proclaiming “Duke needs Durham... [and will strive to be] a good Durham citizen concerned with all its problems and hopes, and as useful as we are able to be in all its civic enterprises” (Moyne, 2004, p. 281). Duke was also diplomatic: Whereas many universities leveraged local urban renewal programs to expand (Ashworth, 1964), Duke’s existing assets allowed it to sidestep the bitter those controversies (e.g., Carriere, 2011; Rodin, 2007). Duke’s sole urban renewal attempt involved a former textile mill situated between the East and West campuses (Moyne, 2004). The university land-banked the properties, including 150 homes, before applying—unsuccessfully—for demolition funds; Duke moved ahead without funding, constructing its Central campus. Meanwhile, Duke maintained a politically neutral stance regarding Durham’s urban renewal efforts, quietly acknowledging project benefits, while publicly calling for “sensitivity” towards existing communities (Moyne, 2004). Ultimately,
Duke’s navigation of urban renewal evaded the contentious legacies that many other universities carried (Diner, 2017; Teaford, 2000).

Even so, Duke’s relationships with Durham neighborhoods were tense. Despite verbal declarations of Duke-Durham ties, Duke’s perceived ambivalence and inaction, especially towards Durham’s African-American population, generated ill will (Moyne, 2004; Talhelm, 1995a). A long-time community leader described Duke’s reputation as the plantation, “…a place where you work, you provide labor, but you don’t participate in other aspects of the university.” At neighborhood meetings and in newspapers, local residents expressed suspicion about Duke’s motives, as well as the sentiment that Duke did not embody unilateral opportunity—particularly for residents in low-wage Duke jobs (Duke-Durham Neighborhood Partnership, 1996; Talhelm, 1995c).

By the 1990s, Duke’s academic star was rising, while Durham’s economy went up in smoke—Duke administrators, also longtime Durham residents, characterized it as “a gritty, ugly tobacco community without any energy”. Boarded-up houses signaled loss in the hardest hit neighborhoods; meanwhile a Duke administrator described downtown Durham as “going to hell in a hand-basket.” Duke, for its part, felt compelled to respond. A local newspaper contrasted Duke’s sentiment against another elite institution: “Duke d(id)n’t want to be another Yale… [an] Ivy League school [that] paid little attention as its New Haven, Conn., home fell on hard times… Too late, administrators and faculty realized [Yale’s] campus was surrounded by dangerous neighborhoods and a daunting dilemma” (Dickinson, 1996b). As Duke’s administration witnessed the consequences of inaction, there was consensus that the university could not isolate itself from Durham’s problems. A Duke interviewee described “[y]ou’re this wealthy, privileged place… [And] what are you doing for the community surrounding you? Some of the poorest
neighborhoods in Durham are literally a block or two off campus. So, there was… social pressure… [Y]ou bring folks on campus and they start to drive around and see this vast inequality that exists… There was a self-interest... We have to do something…. [But,] also, it’s the right thing to do.”


**Redefining the Duke-Durham relationship**

Keohane’s administration brought a fresh perspective to the Duke-Durham relationship (Dickinson, 1996b; The Rensselaerville Institute, 2008). Shortly after her arrival, Duke staff took Keohane on a neighborhood tour, where administrators recalled showing her one vacant house after another. Disinvestment and abandonment were clear community concerns—and a looming threat to Duke’s interests (Dickinson, 1996b). Yet, administrators acknowledged the context remained qualitatively different than many urban universities engaged in revitalization efforts during this period (e.g., Jiang, 2016; Rodin, 2007; Webber, 2005). Whereas other elite universities were combatting neighborhood decline and threats to physical safety, Duke’s expansive campus and forest land created a literal buffer between town and gown. The absence of physical threats to students and staff reduced the exigency for Duke, creating space for a deliberative response to neighborhood improvement, rooted in conversation and partnership.

Before Keohane’s tenure, the perception was that Duke was “so wrapped up in its own affairs that the city on the other side of the East Campus wall was little more than an afterthought” (“Duke and Durham: Getting to Know You,” 1995). In contrast, a local editorial
captured the significance of Keohane’s renewed commitment: “In her first year at Duke, President Nan Keohane adopted community involvement as not only an institutional goal, but a personal one … Keohane believes deeply that colleges and universities fail both themselves and their communities if they cling to the academy-as-cloister model… Duke and Durham, one and inseparable, are getting to know each other again” (“Duke and Durham: Getting to Know You,” 1995). This outsider perspective complements Keohane’s own leadership philosophy, which rests on “leaders defin[ing] or clarify[ing] goals for a group of individuals, and bring[ing] together the energies of members of that group to pursue those goals” (2010). In a recent interview, Keohane goes on to underscore “how crucial it is to engage people in collaboration and consultation… You can’t consult forever, but if you don’t… at all, you’re almost bound to make a much less significantly good decision” (Keohane, 2017). For Duke’s anchor model, collaboration would come to mean not only engaging Duke’s own ranks, but also the community itself.

Notably, Keohane’s predecessor, Keith Brodie, responded to this aloof characterization of Duke with his own editorial, citing the institution’s many contributions to Durham during his preceding tenure (1985-1993), asserting Duke had never absented itself from Durham (Brodie, 1995). Yet, the basis of Brodie’s Duke-Durham engagement was largely rooted in university community service or volunteerism, which relied on individual contributions and lacked an overall purpose. Late in his tenure, Brodie did seed small gestures towards Durham’s needs, including the allocation of $1.2 million towards affordable housing and participation in the Triangle Housing Partnership, d (Brodie, 1995; Moyne, 2004). But they were insufficient to address decline or build a meaningful bridge between Duke and its neighbors; Keohane’s arrival sparked a reimagined Duke-Durham relationship. Keohane actively listened to Durham’s
voices—including pent-up frustrations (Talhelm, 1995a, 1995b; Wallace, 1995), laying the groundwork for a new anchor institution model that privileged community engagement and partnership (Dickinson, 1996a, 1996b).

**Building a new university-community engagement model**

Keohane’s administration made the case for a deliberative approach to Duke-Durham engagement. As a first step, Duke initiated a series of neighborhood meetings, intended to generate priorities for its anchor strategy. Owing to its standoffish reputation, however, Duke administrators recognized the conversation could not—and should not—be Duke-led. As a neighborhood representative described, “to Duke's credit, they pretty quickly realized that the top-down approach was not going to work… [they acknowledged the] massive lack of communication happening… [and, instead] organize[d] community meetings where people could come together… [for] a bottom-up effort to identify what problems they saw in their neighborhood, what kind of solutions they would be interested in.”

Duke made two strategic hires to lead this bottom-up process: Sandy Ogburn and Bill Bell, two former elected officials with deep community ties (Dickinson, 1996a). Duke interviewees described them as key players, as their community roots lent credibility to Duke’s process and established a culture of community trust. They were supported by other Duke staff with community organizing roots, forming the initial iteration of Duke’s neighborhood-facing anchor strategy. Keohane tasked Ogburn and Bell with leading a strategic neighborhood plan for Duke, substantiated by deep community engagement. Initially, complaints from long-ignored neighbors and deep skepticism overwhelmed Duke’s community meetings (e.g., “Duke Appointments: The Bill and Sandy Show,” 1996). The initial venting, however, seeded new
progress: alongside its community, Duke produced a neighborhood-by-neighborhood priority matrix that would guide its anchor efforts for the next decade.

For about a year, Ogburn and Bell’s team listened to Durham’s neighborhoods, including community leaders and individual residents, recording their individual concerns across several broad categories. As a community resident and organizer described, Duke “basically came to the meetings [and] there wasn’t a lot of facilitation. People talked and yelled and vented and did whatever they needed to do… And, as the process went on, people came up with a list of concerns that they wanted to have action items [for].” Table 2 identifies key neighborhood priorities generated during this process, adapted from Duke summaries (Duke-Durham Neighborhood Partnership, 1996). For context, I have grouped the neighborhoods by their traditional low- or middle/high-income status, revealing key differences in the ways neighborhoods prioritized their concerns and, subsequently, Duke responded.
Table 2. Summary of neighborhood-identified priorities from DDNP community meetings (circa 1996)

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<tr>
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Note: Two downtown neighborhoods in the study—Old West Durham and Downtown Durham—were not included in DDNP’s neighborhood meetings report.


During the initial process, all neighborhoods expressed misgiving over Duke’s intent, as well as concerns over lack of communication. Twenty years later, however, neighborhood residents and community partners told a different story: neighborhoods were largely supportive of Duke’s efforts and fear over its intent disappeared. In its place, neighborhood representatives talked about how they had interacted with Duke staff to solve a problem or expressed satisfaction that they knew who to call when there was an issue. When Ogburn left Duke in 1999, the local
paper captured the change in Duke-Durham relations with local residents describing her efforts
to “improve Duke’s reputation as a receptive, solution-oriented neighbor” and characterizing
"the kind of hope she has instilled in all these different neighborhoods, the things that she has
done in developing the partnerships, [as] phenomenal" (Fisher, 1999).

On other issues, Duke’s community engagement process illuminated differences, with
each neighborhood defining its own relationship to the institution. Everyone identified crime and
safety as an ongoing priority, reflecting citywide concerns during the period. Traditionally low-
income neighborhoods placed greater emphasis on community improvements, including
priorities related to housing access and quality, economic development opportunities, health
concerns, and greater youth support. By contrast, Duke’s higher income neighborhoods
emphasized quality of life disruptions, including problems with Duke students, traffic, and
housing issues related to landlords and student tenants.

The Duke-Durham Neighborhood Partnership

Duke’s community engagement process and the resulting neighborhood priority matrix led to the
formalization of a university-community partnership at Duke: The Duke-Durham Neighborhood
Partnership (DDNP) situated within Duke’s Office of Durham & Community Affairs (DCA).
DDNP was (and remains) the central hub for Duke’s neighborhood-focused efforts. Its
employees have backgrounds in civic engagement, community organizing, and community
service; many have deep roots in Durham, including Duke’s local neighborhoods. Two long-time
Duke employees are at the helm of DDNP, including the former Director (1999-2016) and
Assistant Vice President (2016-2020)—now the Deputy Chief Administrator of DCA, and the
current Assistant Vice President, who has been a community activist and leader in DDNP since
2000 (Duke Today staff, 2019).
From the start, the neighborhood matrix was DDNP’s blueprint. As a Duke administrator stated, “[we] did not do anything in those identified neighborhoods that didn’t jive with the matrix… [A]nd this is an important point for universities, because [we] get requests from all over Durham… [But] we would look [to the matrix]… It had to be these identified neighborhoods and it had to be something that they had already identified as a priority.” DDNP staff distilled the neighborhoods’ leading concerns into four thematic objectives: (1) academic enrichment and youth achievement, including partnerships with Durham schools; (2) neighborhood stabilization, including safety, housing, amenities, and neighborhood engagement; (3) strengthened partnerships, including efforts to develop, support, and improve communication with community partners; and (4) university engagement, including programs to engage Duke students and faculty in Durham (Center for Assessment and Policy Development & Marga Incorporated, 2006).

Subsequently, DDNP began building relationships. As Duke administrators described, there was disinvestment in the neighborhoods, but there were also strong voices committed to change. Administrators also knew that Duke’s financial resources were not enough: “[we] don’t do building of homes at universities… [we do] education, research patents, and all that stuff… But it was pretty clear that we believe…in [access to affordable housing and communities]… And the only way we could do that in an affordable way was through a partnership with agencies committed to that.” Instead of reinventing the wheel, Duke’s leadership established partnerships with community organizations, aligning DDNP’s strategies with local efforts for community improvement.
Duke’s neighborhood-focused anchor institution model

Since 1996, DDNP has built a broad strategy for community partnerships and investment in neighborhood revitalization, with housing at its core. Early on, DDNP earmarked affordable housing as a priority, recognizing it as a win-win-win: responding to community priorities, generating wealth for low-income households, and fostering homeownership to combat crime and disinvestment. Duke’s housing initiatives have spanned loan funds, housing production, personal finances, and partnerships. This multi-faceted approach is unique among university anchor models. Figure 2 enumerates Duke’s neighborhood revitalization investments, with an emphasis on housing, between 1993 and 2019.
Figure 2. Timeline of Duke’s Housing Investments and Partnerships (1993-2019)

- **1993** Duke contributes $2M loan to Self-Help, targeting homeownership in Walltown (tract 3.01).

- **1994** President Keohane joins Duke University.

- **1996** Ogburn and Bell begin year-long community engagement process, resulting in neighborhood priority matrix (see Table 2). Duke-Durham Neighborhood Partnership is formalized.

- **1998** Trinity Heights (tract 3.01): 50 homes sold at market rate to Duke faculty and staff adjacent to East Campus (1998-2002).

- **2001** Duke and partners renovate 140 units of affordable housing with the Quality of Life project, a neighborhood improvement coalition of six West End neighborhoods.

- **2004** Duke doubles loan commitment to Self-Help, increasing affordable loan funds to $4M.

- **2006** Duke makes first deposit at the Latino Community Credit Union ($400K) with 5-year commitment of $5M for Durham mortgages.

- **2008** Southside Revitalization Project: With Duke support, Self-Help acquires 105 properties redeveloped by the City of Durham, Durham Community Land Trustees, and Habitat for Humanity.

- **2010** Maplewood Square Apartments (tract 5): Duke contributes $500K to a partnership in support of an affordable senior housing complex.

- **2011** Duke doubles loan commitment to Self-Help, increasing affordable loan funds to $8M.

- **2013** Duke Homebuyers Club, in partnership with Reinvestment Partners, begins offering financial literacy and homebuying resources to Duke-affiliated first-time homebuyers.

- **2016** After six years of preservation work by DDNP staff, the Pauli Murray House is named a National Historic Landmark.

- **2017** Duke partners in East Durham to build 50 affordable housing units, 4 Habitat for Humanity homes, and economic development projects, resulting in $25M in private investment.

- **2018** Duke invests $5K in a Repair Fund available to Habitat for Humanity and Durham Community Land Trustees homeowners. Duke increases loan commitment to Self-Help to $10M.

- **2019** Duke increases deposits into Latino Community Credit Union to $6M. Willard Street Apartments (tract 22): Duke donates $2.5M to DHIC and Self-Help for 82 affordable housing units near Durham’s bus depot (to be completed in 2020).

*Summary: 1993-2019*
- 400+ units of affordable housing (plus units produced by partnering organizations)
- $22M+ of loan commitments, deposits, and/or investments in affordable housing projects

Adapted from: The Office of Durham & Community Affairs and DDNP’s Housing in Durham Community Conversation handout (December 2019).
Monetarily, Duke has committed more than $22 million to further affordable housing and homeownership opportunities in Durham since 1994. The majority of Duke’s outlays have taken the form of revolving loan funds or deposits with non-profit financial intermediaries. Rather than a one-time allocation, this strategy has provided an ongoing resource to non-profit partners, advancing an array of projects from affordable housing development to mortgages. Self-Help, a local credit union and CDC with an empowerment-driven mission, is a long-time DDNP partner (Office of Durham & Community Affairs, 2008; Self Help, 2008). As Duke’s loan commitment has grown from $2 to $10 million, Self-Help has established a land bank, acquired property for affordable housing development, and funded other non-profit developers to meet community housing needs. Similarly, Duke’s ongoing commitment to the Latino Community Credit Union—from $400,000 (2004) to $6 million (2018)—has supported mortgages and other lending opportunities in Durham neighborhoods. More recently, DDNP has contributed $500,000 to a housing repair fund and $3 million to a city-wide affordable housing loan fund, alongside a coalition of funders and government agencies. These recent investments illustrate Duke’s efforts to broaden its partnerships and formalize a collaborative conversation around affordable housing in Durham.

DDNP’s initiatives and partnerships have supported the creation of more than 400 affordable housing units. Here too, Duke plays a supporting role, enabling partners to pursue their community-centered missions within target neighborhoods. As a housing-focused community organization said, “doing [affordable housing] is another issue… [we] had expertise the university could not obtain, so that precipitated the relationship.” The interviewee added, “this partnership work[s]… because of its [focus on] mission. We still include the community… listening to issues and needs… [T]hat has been the glue—other than money—that keeps [our]
relationship [with Duke] bonded.” In recent years, Duke’s partnerships have expanded beyond target neighborhoods to support affordable multi-family housing projects in central locations, including the Southside neighborhood and downtown (“Duke Looking to Help in Redevelopment,” 2012; Baumgartner Vaughn, 2019; Johnson, 2019).

Duke’s anchor strategy has also looked within the institution to support neighborhood revitalization. The first initiative matches Duke’s employee-directed giving campaign to its anchor model through the “Doing Good in the Neighborhood” program. Launched in 2008, the program enables Duke employees to send their charitable contributions to local issues, including several directly aligned with DDNP and neighborhood-identified priorities (Duke Office of Durham & Community Affairs, 2020; “Wynn Makes Worker-Giving Pitch,” 2008). During 2018-2019, the campaign generated $658,000.8

The second initiative, the Duke Homebuyer Club (HBC), responds to challenges for Duke’s low-wage employees as they pursue affordable homeownership within Durham’s neighborhoods. Established in 2013, HBC was created to address the homeownership challenges facing Duke’s lower-wage employees (Duke Office of Durham & Community Affairs, n.d.). It grew out of a failed $10,000 forgivable loan program Duke had created as part of a Southside neighborhood revitalization project (Gronberg, 2013). Despite a large pool of interested employees, Duke administrators discovered “…that about 80% were really credit challenged” and could not qualify for homeownership at all—subsidy or not. DCA created HBC as a response, offering Duke employees “more time and more guidance and more support to [achieve] a credit worthy, stable financial situation” that would qualify them for first-time homeownership in Durham. DDNP staffs HBC, alongside several partners, including lending institutions, community development organizations, and the City of Durham. In the 2018-2019
reporting year, HBC counseled 70 Duke-affiliated participants, with 26 earning homebuyer education certificates, seven prequalifying for a mortgage, and seven attaining first-time homeownership (Duke-Durham Neighborhood Partnership, 2019).

**Transforming Durham: Neighborhood change in Duke’s target neighborhoods**

Duke’s anchor model has produced a number of results over the last 25 years. Qualitatively, relationships are deeper with clear communication lines. As a city representative said, “the thing I have appreciated… is that [Duke is] willing to entertain and enter into the dialog necessary to work through issues [with the community and the city]…That was not the case for [many] years [when] there was no dialog going on.” Neighborhood representatives were also favorable towards Duke, expressing confidence in communication channels, even amidst challenges. Neighborhoods viewed Duke as a partner, supporting their pursuits of a community garden or a local park. In these respects, Duke’s investments changed the town-gown culture in meaningful ways.

Neighborhood compositions are changing too—often for better, although there are new challenges, including market pressures and gentrification. Neighborhood changes have been varied, reflecting different priorities and DDNP efforts. In traditionally lower-income neighborhoods, DDNP and its partners have initiated effective, bottom-up transformation through affordable housing, education, health and community investments that have largely delivered initial benefits to the intended community recipients. As neighborhoods improved and private investors appeared, these early investments continued to serve long-time communities. Still, residents increasingly talk about the loss of community character and gentrification threats. As a neighborhood representative described in a local paper, “if your little house is sitting here and then you’ve got this [new] big monstrosity beside you, it’s causing your property tax to
increase and a lot of people cannot afford that anymore and some people have been… asked to move from their rental property because [the owner] sold it and they tore it down” (Eanes, 2018).

By contrast, Duke’s more affluent neighborhoods have had a different experience. As noted in the neighborhood matrix, quality of life disruptions from students, parking, and traffic were more substantial issues for them (e.g., Gronberg, 2014; “Town-Gown Strain Can Be Eased,” 2014). As Duke administrators described, relative to funding home renovation programs or parks, it can be more challenging to tackle student citizenship within neighborhoods. Yet, communication lines with residents have remained open, which constitutes a success. Recently, Duke and Durham developed a “protocol” for residents, identifying appropriate Duke and/or city department(s) contacts for various behavioral issues (e.g., parties, public drunkenness, property damage). Neighborhood representatives were piloting the protocol and, in interviews, expressed cautious optimism, in large part due to their perception that Duke took a partnership role in the problem.

For this analysis, I have grouped neighborhoods within their respective census tracts; Table 3 summarizes the neighborhoods by Census tract, along with their traditional income levels. While there are some cases of lower and higher income neighborhoods in the same tract, overarching trends remain visible.
Table 3. Duke target neighborhoods by Census tract

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Tract (2010)</th>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Traditional Neighborhood Status (LI, MI/Hi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>Walltown</td>
<td>LI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trinity Heights</td>
<td>MI/HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>Trinity Park</td>
<td>MI/HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>Watts Hospital-Hillendale</td>
<td>MI/HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>Old West Durham</td>
<td>MI/HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Burch Avenue</td>
<td>LI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West End</td>
<td>LI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lyon Park</td>
<td>LI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morehead Hill</td>
<td>MI/HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lakewood Park</td>
<td>MI/HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Downtown Durham</td>
<td>MI/HI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Crest Street neighborhood (tract 15.01 and 15.02) is not included in the descriptive analysis, as the vast majority of the tracts consist of the Duke-affiliated uses. Two downtown neighborhoods—Old West Durham (tract 4.02) and Downtown Durham (tract 22)—are included in the descriptive analysis, although they were not part of DDNP’s initial community outreach process. The City of Durham offers a reference point.

Tables 4 through 6 illustrate demographic, socioeconomic, and housing trends in 1990 (before Duke began investing), 2010, and 2015. Statics for the city of Durham provide a regional reference. Between 1990 and 2015, Durham experienced significant population growth (80% increase); meanwhile, DDNP’s target neighborhoods showed stable to moderate growth (Table 4). Majority-White neighborhoods largely retained their composition (except for tract 6), while the share of African-American residents declined in several tracts. This is particularly noteworthy in Walltown⁹ (tract 3.01), a historically African-American neighborhood that received significant DDNP focus (Office of Durham & Community Affairs, 2008; Self Help, 2008); between 1990 and 2015, the neighborhood saw growth in Hispanic (940% change) and minimal decline in White (-4% change) populations, while the African-American population fell by -44%. This reflects Durham trends, with significant increases in the Hispanic population (to 14%) alongside modest declines for African-American (-13% change) and White (-25% change).
populations. Meanwhile, downtown (tract 22) experienced a population bump, growing by 42% and transitioning to a majority-White neighborhood.

### Table 4. Demographic indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Indicators</th>
<th>Tract 3.01</th>
<th>Tract 3.02</th>
<th>Census Tract and Affiliated Neighborhoods</th>
<th>Tract 4.01</th>
<th>Tract 4.02</th>
<th>Tract 5</th>
<th>Tract 6</th>
<th>Tract 22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White, non-Hispanic (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Walltown, Trinity Heights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,267</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>4,113</td>
<td>4,411</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>136,611</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,504</td>
<td>2,523</td>
<td>4,093</td>
<td>5,177</td>
<td>1,946</td>
<td>187,035</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2010 Change (%)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,552</td>
<td>2,882</td>
<td>3,477</td>
<td>6,148</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>246,084</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4. Demographic indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Indicators</th>
<th>Tract 3.01</th>
<th>Tract 3.02</th>
<th>Census Tract and Affiliated Neighborhoods</th>
<th>Tract 4.01</th>
<th>Tract 4.02</th>
<th>Tract 5</th>
<th>Tract 6</th>
<th>Tract 22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African-American, non-Hispanic (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Walltown, Trinity Heights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2010 Change (%)</td>
<td>-30%</td>
<td>-44%</td>
<td>-60%</td>
<td>-50%</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>-54%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-76%</td>
<td>-36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>-44%</td>
<td>-46%</td>
<td>-61%</td>
<td>-68%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-63%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Hispanic (%) |            |            | Walltown, Trinity Heights                  |            |            |         |         |         |
| 1990 | 2% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 2% | 3% | 1% | 1% |
| 2010 | 21% | 20% | 8% | 15% | 21% | 27% | 11% | 9% |
| 1990-2010 Change (%) | 770% | 1072% | 1730% | 23339% | 929% | 718% | 864% | 626% |
| 2015 | 25% | 20% | 4% | 8% | 6% | 16% | 1% | 14% |
| 2010-2015 Change (%) | 19% | 0% | -42% | -44% | -71% | -41% | -93% | 62% |
| 1990-2015 Change (%) | 940% | 1071% | 968% | 12964% | 202% | 387% | -35% | 1077% |

Economic and housing indicators also reveal change in Duke’s target neighborhoods. As a whole, Durham saw relatively modest growth in these arenas between 1990 and 2015 (Tables 5 and 6). The share of college educated people increased, although the city still claimed fewer college graduates than Duke’s neighborhoods. Unemployment and poverty shares remained
fairly steady over time. And, whereas Durham’s median income was similar or higher than Duke’s neighborhoods in 1990 ($2015), it saw substantially less change over time. On the housing front, steady growth was the watchword: Durham saw minimal homeownership gains to 49% and modest growth in median rents and home values between 1990 and 2015 (11% and 25% change, respectively).

**Table 5. Economic indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Indicators</th>
<th>Tract 3.01</th>
<th>Tract 3.02</th>
<th>Tract 4.01</th>
<th>Tract 4.02</th>
<th>Tract 5</th>
<th>Tract 6</th>
<th>Downtown Durham</th>
<th>City of Durham</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational Attainment, % with BA or more</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2010 Change (%)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2015 Change (%)</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment Rate (%)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2010 Change (%)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-82</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-80</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty Rate (%)</strong></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2010 Change (%)</td>
<td>-67</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-14</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-39</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Median Household Income, $2015</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1990 ($2015)</td>
<td>$30,506</td>
<td>$48,985</td>
<td>$58,426</td>
<td>$37,007</td>
<td>$25,737</td>
<td>$52,737</td>
<td>$33,829</td>
<td>$49,466</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2010 Change (%)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$32,141</td>
<td>$50,474</td>
<td>$72,778</td>
<td>$45,610</td>
<td>$24,343</td>
<td>$43,509</td>
<td>$62,917</td>
<td>$50,420</td>
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<td>2010-2015 Change (%)</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>86</td>
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</table>
At the tract level, economic and housing variables reflect DDNP’s neighborhood-by-neighborhood priorities. For instance, DDNP’s efforts to respond to economic growth and affordable housing in Walltown appeared to be successful, though tempered over time. Between 1990 and 2010, tract 3.01 showed significant economic improvement (Table 5): the proportion of college graduates increased 72%; poverty rates fell sharply; and median household incomes climbed 44%. However, several of these gains were minimized or reversed between 2010 and 2015. This could indicate losses in economic stability—perhaps related to the Great Recession—and/or increased student housing demand as the neighborhood improved. In housing, tract 3.01 saw increased homeownership, as well as median rents and home values (Table 6), aligning with

### Table 6. Housing indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Tract and Affiliated Neighborhoods</th>
<th>Tract 3.01</th>
<th>Tract 3.02</th>
<th>Tract 4.01</th>
<th>Tract 4.02</th>
<th>Tract 5</th>
<th>Tract 6</th>
<th>Tract 22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walltown, Trinity Heights</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2010 Change (%)</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Rent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2010 ($2015)</td>
<td>$755</td>
<td>$782</td>
<td>$876</td>
<td>$1,110</td>
<td>$683</td>
<td>$833</td>
<td>$961</td>
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<td>1990-2010 Change (%)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$750</td>
<td>$816</td>
<td>$984</td>
<td>$1,064</td>
<td>$727</td>
<td>$854</td>
<td>$1,193</td>
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<td>2010-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>86%</td>
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<td>Median Home Value, $2010</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 ($2015)</td>
<td>$146,304</td>
<td>$241,413</td>
<td>$264,674</td>
<td>$181,848</td>
<td>$125,000</td>
<td>$215,978</td>
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<td>47%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>115%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>119%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$156,000</td>
<td>$257,700</td>
<td>$259,400</td>
<td>$230,600</td>
<td>$145,300</td>
<td>$288,600</td>
<td>$256,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2015 Change (%)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>173%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>239%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
the experiences of neighborhood interviewees and local reporting (e.g., Eanes, 2018; White, 2016). These gains were sustained through 2015, though they were modest compared to other neighborhoods and Walltown remains, relatively speaking, more affordable.

Meanwhile, other traditionally lower-income tracts (5 and, in part, 6) displayed mixed to negative trajectories. The proportion of college graduates was a moving target—falling between 1990 and 2010, before reversing course. Poverty rates increased modestly, as median household incomes remained steadily low or decreased. Homeownership rates improved in tract 5, while tract 6 remained steady. Median home values rose more than 50% over 25 years—more than in Durham, but less than in many of Duke’s target neighborhoods. For affluent neighborhoods (tracts 3.02, 4.01, and 4.02), college graduates represented more than half of residents and unemployment and poverty rates were steady. Median household incomes increased ($2,000 to $14,000). Housing indicators also improved: homeownership remained steady in most cases; rents increased modestly, while median home values increased between 54% and 173%—substantially more than Durham. Downtown often displayed the biggest swings, with sharp decreases in poverty and unemployment and dramatic growth in educational attainment, median household incomes, and median rents and home values.

**Lessons from Durham: A collaborative approach to university-community engagement**

The Duke case highlights three philosophical beliefs that are embedded within its anchor model. Broadly, Duke has embraced planning strategies to generate deep public engagement and leverage partnerships with community-facing organizations. Specifically, Duke administrators point to three takeaway philosophies that have guided their anchor work—and continues to do so in the future. These philosophies illuminate opportunities to move towards more mutually-beneficial anchor models and can guide university-community partnerships in neighborhoods.
Philosophy one: Empowerment

The first philosophy emphasizes an empowerment-based approach to engagement, elevating local knowledge and placing the institution in a supporting role. In the parlance of Arnstein, this means actively engaging residents and enabling them to retain decision-making power, moving past the lower rungs of non-participation or tokenism and into the realm of partnership (1969).

As its first step, Duke invested significant energy in neighborhood relationships, enabling residents to establish their own revitalization objectives. As a rule, Duke administrators designed an anchor model that “intentionally… stayed behind the community. We didn’t want to say ‘look at what we did’… We were behind [the community’s] objective.”

In practice, Duke’s empowerment philosophy produced its multi-neighborhood strategy. Duke recognized that its 12 target neighborhoods were distinct with respect to wealth, tenure, and racial composition, as well as social and political identity. One-to-one engagement enabled Duke’s anchor model to give each neighborhood a voice, building stronger relationships and responding to an array of divergent priorities. Duke administrators were also better able to “focus on the [neighborhoods] and [make them] our ‘passionate yes’ priorities, [while] saying no to all the other requests” coming from across the region.

Philosophy two: Quiet partnership

The second philosophy emphasizes Duke’s choice to eschew an institutionally-branded anchor initiative, in favor of an approach rooted in partnership. Duke administrators dub this a “quiet partnership” model, which favors making things happen over “taking credit.” As neighborhood representatives highlighted, a top-down process would not have been well-received in the neighborhood. And Duke administrators recognized the liability of branding its anchor strategies, stating “while it would be really nice to have the photo ops and all the rest of it, what needed to
happen was that the residents needed to be in charge of their programming. [Our] role was to provide the resources, expertise, and other kinds of things that they needed.” Duke faced criticism for this approach, with administrators recounting that “external evaluators said ‘yeah, but then you don’t get the big credit.’ [But Duke administration believes] we did get the credit. We did. And what we would say is ‘we got the credit with the people that counted.’”

In practice, Duke’s quiet partnerships maximized institutional resources and minimized weaknesses. Duke’s strengths included its financial reserves, which included substantial support from The Duke Endowment, as well as the human capital generated by its students and faculty. Yet, Duke lacked neighborhood revitalization expertise, particularly in the areas of affordable housing production and community development—areas where Duke’s non-profit partners excel. Duke occupies a supporting role in its partnerships, allowing community experts to lead the intervention. Ultimately, Duke serves as a hub—rather than the driver—for neighborhood transformation; administrators describe it as “a collective action approach to addressing [neighborhood] issues. We may identify crucial issues in the community that need some attention and, to create a sustainable sort of solution, we build collaborative relationships. We find other partners that perceive these issues the same way we do, and [then we] commit the time and… resources necessary to make a change.”

*Philosophy three: Evolution*

Duke’s model is designed around reflexive change, anticipating neighborhood priorities and collaborations will evolve over time. DDNP’s efforts support a “mobile capital” approach, a term administrators use to describe their belief that Duke’s investments need be pliable, shifting to meet needs over time. A Duke administrator describes how the anchor model has “moved [Duke’s] loan funds around quite a bit. I mean, we’ve done affordable housing in three different
areas of Durham. We’ve done commercial redevelopment projects in two different areas...

[W]e’ve used this… mobile capital model to continue to recycle loan funds that we put into our partner, Self Help, as new needs have emerged.”

This approach has increased Duke’s responsiveness, calibrating its resources to emergent issues. For instance, as Walltown transformed, DDNP described how “there wasn’t a lot more work to do, where the math worked to buy houses, renovate them and make them affordable to first-time buyers. And the need was less.” Thus, they took stock of neighborhood need and deployed their resources elsewhere, relying on the mobility of capital to “[go] from Walltown to” other areas of need within Durham. Duke has also taken an iterative approach to programs, shifting capital to identify the best tool for the problem at hand. Duke’s HBC offers an example of the anchor model’s ability to reconsider the problem (credit worthiness) and redesign the program to support the solution (first-time homeownership).

**Learning from the anchor institution model: Relevance for planning**

Since the mid-1990s, Duke been crafting a different approach to the anchor model. As a Duke administrator noted, “we are not [trying to be] an 800-pound gorilla in the room … We are trying to work with partners, nonprofit partners, and local government to mutually identify what’s most important and then find ways to get it done… We’ll be a partner.” This case offers insights for how major institutions—from university anchors to local government—can recast their roles in communities; it also offers a roadmap for how institutions can engage (and benefit) neighborhoods in meaningful ways.

Duke’s anchor model suggests there is an important role for intermediaries, including community activists, community organizers, and planners to facilitate deeper collaboration between large stakeholders (e.g., cities and anchor institutions) and communities, who are too
frequently (meaningfully) excluded from the decision-making table. Through a collaborative, community-led process, there are opportunities to align tools and resources with neighborhood needs. And, whereas Duke was once cast off as the plantation, that is no longer the case; today, the community is more likely to label Duke a partner and neighbor.

Looking ahead, Duke administrators are expanding their efforts beyond the 12 original neighborhoods for the next generation of its anchor model. DDNP and its partners recognize emergent opportunities to respond to new pressures and advocate for issues that impact Durham residents more broadly (see Appendix 1). This work is an extension of community-identified priorities that have shaped Duke’s anchor model over the past 25 years. As Durham’s population has grown and urban neighborhoods have appreciated, the community is experiencing new affordable housing pressures. In large part, Duke’s anchor model remains the same; DDNP continues to facilitate “listening sessions [to create] partnerships. With some notable failures, we’ve been able to maintain the same strategy of listening and responding to the voice, needs of the community because what you discover… is that we’re building community from the inside out.”

1 Interviews include initial (2015) and follow-up (2018) conversations with stakeholders.
2 To identify relevant articles, I searched available digital archives (1995-present) for Durham’s home paper, The Herald-Sun. I used keywords to identify relevant articles, including those related to key actors, departments, and places. Keywords included: Duke, neighborhoods, Duke-Durham Neighborhood Partnership (DDNP), Keohane and Brodie (i.e., former Duke presidents), and specific neighborhoods (e.g., Walltown, Southside, Trinity Heights).
3 I searched for reports from agencies and partners involved in the Duke-Durham relationship, including Duke (and specific offices therein), Self-Help, and Habitat for Humanity of Durham. This included internally produced reports, as well as external evaluations of relevant investments or initiatives. I also requested relevant materials from key stakeholders during interviews.
4 Triangle Housing Partnership is an organization focused on housing issues within the Research Triangle region.
5 I determined neighborhood income status (low or middle-to-high) by reviewing Census data (including median household income) and consulting interviewees.
6 The housing repair fund supports two long-time housing partners, Habitat for Humanity of Durham and Durham Community Land Trustees.
7 Partners include Self-Help, Habitat for Humanity of Durham, Durham Community Land Trustees, and the City of Durham.
8 These resources provided support for DDNP’s 12 target neighborhoods, 10 schools, three community health clinics, and 69 organizations across Durham’s greater Triangle region.
9 Walltown is the largest neighborhood in Tract 3.01; the much smaller and higher-income Trinity Heights neighborhood is also located in the tract.
References


Appendix

Duke’s anchor model 2.0: Challenges and next steps for DDNP and Duke-Durham engagement

In 2015, it was clear that revitalization was gaining traction in Durham. However, the scale of change was not yet evident and interviewees did not express concern over “too much” growth. Instead, the new apartment complexes and luxury hotels bewildered many, with a former Duke administrator wryly stating “I think it is speculative. [O]ne person jokingly told me, but I thought about it afterwards and it did not seem irrational, ‘one of them will fail.’ And Duke will buy it for 50 cents on the dollar and turn it into graduate housing.”

By 2018, however, the sentiments had changed. Duke did not have the opportunity to buy failed multi-family projects. Instead, economic development and population and job growth gained momentum in Durham and gentrification concerns echoed across interviews. Duke’s anchor strategy also shifted: Within Durham, Duke was no longer sowing seeds of revitalization or leveraging assets to stimulate private development; instead, it was grappling with filling shortfalls amidst an influx of new dollars, energy, and Durhamites.

2018 interviews revealed three themes. The first was Duke’s evolving commitment to empowerment. Duke administrators characterized its community relationship as “on probation,” recognizing “[the community] want[s] to see if we are going to be a sustainable and incredible partner. It's going to take time to build trust.” To meet these expectations, Duke has continued to define its anchor strategy through partnerships. Affordable housing has become a predominant concern and Duke has worked to expand its network, partnering with additional affordable housing developers and community-focused lenders. Duke’s strategy has continued to emphasize quiet partnership, shifting the focus from “how it affects [Duke]… [to] work[ing] with various stakeholders” to understand their priorities for Durham. It has also continued operate with mobile
money, as Duke directs much of its anchor resources towards pots of money for its partners (e.g., affordable housing repair funds) and larger deposits in local credit unions to increase affordable lending opportunities.

The second theme draws from the challenges within the anchor revitalization model, including misalignments in missions, approaches, and implementation. One misalignment consists of ongoing discussions about which players are at the table—and who is not—leading to missed or limited opportunities. For instance, a Duke-Durham partnership in the Southside neighborhood incorporated new affordable housing, but excluded Habitat for Humanity of Durham homes—interviewees suggested the city “wanted a certain look” that Habitat homes did not have—despite community preferences for the affordable housing option. This decision limited the project’s accessibility, which is further compounded as housing values soar and affordable covenants expire (Eanes 2018; White 2016; Abrams 2018). As DDNP staff member—and long-time Durham resident—contended, “when you think about who’s on these panels, who’s having these conversations, who’s within the room, we’re not there yet… We continue to have the same people… in the room, but not others.” This is a recurrent challenge for an anchor institution seeking to generate not just goodwill, but deep community ties.

Other misalignments include loop holes and short(er) affordable housing protections, limiting Duke’s long-term intentions. For example, many affordability restrictions on recently-built units emphasize income and not wealth. As an affordable housing producer from a community organization described, this has created an occasional mismatch between “somebody who is technically, by the letter of the law, low-income because ‘I don't have a lot of income,’ but, in reality” is a cash-poor graduate student and does not satisfy the program’s intent. In other cases, projects have not adopted long-term affordability restrictions, so “that first generation of
[affordable] buyers stands to make a lot of money” within five to ten years of their initial subsidy. However, even this misalignment is not straightforward: As a Duke administrator argued, households who “went in with no equity… and [now] they can walk away with all this wealth created [by the market]” could be interpreted as a “positive unintended consequence”; yet, “all of the sudden, our prized Southside affordable housing development is no longer affordable.” It has been a lesson in anticipating not only intent, but also the realities of market pressures and user motivations.

The third theme flows from Duke’s affordable housing experiences, wrestling with wealth creation versus gentrification. Community organizations described how “downtown… and Durham in general… [have] drastically changed”; the general sentiment was that changes have been largely favorable, but have also introduced new housing affordability and supply pressures. These interviewees “differentiate[d] between the downtown, where there historically—recently—was virtually nobody living [t]here and a lot of vacant storefronts” and the neighborhoods, “where people really get pushed out just as rents go up or houses get replaced.” Residents talked about the loss of affordable housing as rents and home values increased, but also the decrease of units more broadly as incoming homeowners purchase “three vacant lots and put a single house on it. To [the neighborhood representative], that’s an incredible waste of space and further increases the price of [the] neighborhood.”

Durham’s market forces have precipitated two conversations for Duke and its partners. The first is about the meaning of market appreciation. It is obvious that downtown-adjacent housing is less affordable, sparking serious concern. However, the appreciation also represents wealth creation for initial homebuyers and “there’s a side of [this] that says, we shouldn’t begrudge that… family, now having owned a home, taken care of it, purchased through Self-Help. And [they] see
it go up in value by 500%. They have every right to sell it if they wish.” While Duke and its partners lament the loss of affordable housing supply and subsidy, they recognize their early efforts helped revive Durham’s neighborhoods and generate new equity. In hindsight, they also see opportunities to better protect long-term affordability, which is a substantially more pressing question now than it was a decade ago.

The second conversation for Duke is how to deal with a dearth of affordable housing supply in an expensive market. Gentrification has made it difficult to continue producing affordable housing within downtown neighborhoods. To that end, Duke’s anchor priorities have changed: there is now a city-wide push for affordable housing that includes a recently formed strategy group, several new affordable housing partnerships, and investments in a land bank and affordable housing loan fund (Baumgartner Vaughn 2019). The idea is to broaden the focus to opportunity neighborhoods at risk of rising market pressures. Expanded priorities also include more conversations around rental housing and the gap between affordable supply and downtown’s expanding job center. Lastly, there is an ongoing transportation discussion, as stakeholders work to maintain ties between the downtown job center and neighborhoods—especially as some employees are moving to outlying areas in search of affordable housing.

Internally, Duke’s anchor model has remained a priority as new waves of leadership have come to the institution. Since the model’s inception, three Duke presidents have supported DDNP’s mission: Keohane (1993-2004), Richard Broadhead (2004-2017), and, most recently, Vincent Price, who, notably, arrived after his tenure at the University of Pennsylvania—another early adopter of an anchor institution model to neighborhood revitalization (Ehlenz 2016; Rodin 2005). DDNP also has a new leader at its helm, with Stelfanie Williams occupying the role of Vice President for Durham Affairs, situated in the Office of Durham and Regional Affairs, in late 2018.
(Duke Today staff 2018). As local articles discussed the future of DDNP and Williams’ vision, the core philosophies of *empower*, *partner*, and *evolve* remain evident: in Williams’ words, she describes “…advancing public service, community engagement, and strategic partnerships to the mutual benefit of the university and the community” (Duke Today staff 2018). As Duke and DDNP consider the next generation of university-community partnerships, the office reports three criteria to guide their work: alignment with Duke University and, more recently, Duke Health System’s missions; connection to “quality of life in the community;” and—in line with the earliest iterations of Duke’s anchor model—representative of key priorities, as identified by the Durham community (Mock 2020).
References


