Subvert City
The Interventions of an Anarchist in Occupy Phoenix, 2011-2012
by
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ABSTRACT

By way of combining the methodological practices of autoethnography and informal anarchist analysis of social movements, this project establishes anarchist autoethnography as a way of navigating the unavoidable and irreconcilable tensions between academic research and the ethical commitments of anarchists. By way of this method, I explore some of my interventions – as an anarchist – during the Occupy movement in Phoenix, Arizona from October, 2011 through until mid-2012. I explore the internal movement conflicts that arise when certain individuals, factions and political tendencies attempt to homogenously define the interests of a heterogenous social movement that happens to employ anarchist principles of organization and includes the participation of anarchists. I focus on the conflicts around decision-making processes, the debates about nonviolence, and attitudes towards policing. Beyond analyzing some of my experiences in Occupy Phoenix, and doing so transparently as an anarchist, I additionally explore how the underlying connection between utopianism and the techniques of maintaining urban social orders shape the experience of movements in cities. I find that the moral strategies of left activists very often mirror the dualist ideologies of utopian urban planners, thus reproducing statist ways of seeing. Against the movement managers of the left, who I argue ultimately end up helping to reproduce the social order of cities, I turn at the end towards an exploration of historical Luddism as exemplars of sabotage. In framing anarchism and Luddism as accomplice tendencies that seek to subvert social order so as to preserve autonomy in capitalist states, I carefully distinguish neoluddism as a separate and undesirable approach to questions of technology and techniques of social control.
DEDICATION

To the loving memory of my mother, Barbara Anne Sherk.

…

And, for my accomplices!
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PREFACE

Since as far back as I can recall, assertiveness has been a constant struggle for me. In kindergarten, our report cards evaluated the development of a series of skills and personality traits, marking with an X either the column labeled “satisfactory” or the column labeled “needs improvement”. All of my X’s were in the satisfactory column, except for the assertiveness row; that, unbeknownst to me as an unreflective five-year-old, needed improvement. I distinctly recall the conversation with my parents about it, but had no idea what this meant. All educational, evaluative frameworks aside, I have consistently struggled in my life (and writing) to assert a voice that is my own: to strike first, rather than continuously parry and counter. This analogy to combat isn’t hyperbolic, it references the years of training I had in Muay Thai kickboxing, where I similarly noticed a parallel lack of assertiveness.

“The time has come to say things without mincing words,” writes egoist anarchist Wolfi Landstreicher on the cover of the Fall 2004 issue of his self-published Willful Disobedience. I couldn’t agree more! However, for this project that means ceasing to muddle my voice beneath the worry of judgement, coming possibly on the one hand from university mentors, colleagues and students over my anarchist and nihilist tendencies, and on the other hand from anarchists – especially those who I consider friends – over my role in academia given the way that universities create rather particular voices. It is one thing to empathize with what others think, to register the judgements of those we respect for consideration. It is another thing entirely to micro-manage ourselves in accordance with those judgements in what I would characterize as a self-imposed process of subordination. And too often our worries about the judgements of others turn out to be
erroneous projections. Vulnerable and shameless self-expression is an important form of liberation that contributes to the establishment of agency, and works against learned patterns of reluctance, passivity and silence developed in response to traumatic experiences. Thus, this writing process, and how I choose to engage with it, is just as much a form-of-life as the interventions and engagements in social movements that it describes.

This project is explicitly centered around my anarchist (and nihilist, and Luddite, and race traitor, and…) tendencies coming into conflict with others in social movements. Why then would I now shy away from giving voice to this conflict at the moment of writing? Who is it that I think I am protecting from my voice? No one has asked me to temper my language, or mind their sensibilities. Those worries are purely perceptive, and heavily projected – perhaps the social manager in my head (who specifically is a micro-manager, thanks to my stepfather). My defiance then, is against shame. Of course, like all rigid hierarchies, the institutional structures of universities do contribute to high levels of self-consciousness, especially when one has been subject to disciplinary action from that administration for speaking out. But, none of that precludes me from simultaneously expressing open hostility towards chosen targets while at the same time constructing an intellectually sound argument throughout the chapters below that would satisfy the requirements for a doctoral dissertation. As Serafinski (2016) writes in their introduction to concentration camp resistance and anarcho-nihilism, *Blessed is the Flame*,

“The anarcho-nihilist position is essentially that we are f***ed. That the current manifestation of human society (civilization, leviathan, industrial society, global capitalism, whatever) is beyond salvation, and so our response to it should be one of unmitigated hostility. There are no demands to be made, no utopic visions to
be upheld, no political programs to be followed – the path of resistance is one of pure negation” (p.7).

This hostile tension is also against my own memories as I recount them, not because I’m having trouble recalling certain events, but due to the fact that my attitude as an anarchist – at the time of my participation in the Occupy movement in Phoenix – is one that I would characterize today as being somewhat naïve and too hopeful about anarchism as an “ethical discourse about revolutionary practice” (Graeber, 2004). This is not an expression of regret, but a commentary on personal growth. The perspective from which I now write, and that I now have on those experiences is greatly enriched, not only by a decade of ongoing participation in direct actions, demonstrations and various social movements in Phoenix, but also through the process of teaching and furthering my studies inside the university. While there are few openly anarchist voices in academia, and even fewer with nihilistic tendencies, this fact should be of no consequence to me in how I choose to express myself here, or at the very least should be easily shrugged off.

This is a story about conflicts, so it should come as little surprise that some language and positions expressed are conflictual. This is neither an apology nor a warning, more a statement of my particular commitments as an anarchist.

While my anarchist commitments will become clear through the conflicts and interventions described in the pages below, I will simultaneously be telling a story about the ethical, philosophical and theoretical terrain that weaves seamlessly throughout those engagements. I very consciously avoid the tired theory/praxis dualism, because like all dualisms, it reifies (sometimes useful) descriptive distinctions into metaphysical entities that float above our lives endowed with benevolent or malevolent character. The
attachment to movement and organizational strategy that exemplifies leftist activism – which I sharply distinguish from tactics (following Michel de Certeau’s *The Practice of Everyday Life*) – (re)produces a world that I want to sabotage and desert. Likewise, the invocation and establishment of moral duties to uphold certain causes, even when framed as a heterogenous series of immanent, ethical Goods, does not escape the metaphysical realm of dualisms. Of equal consequence to my experiences described in this project, I read Spinoza’s distinction between ethics and morality as a nihilist:

> the only ethical gesture is negative: a rejection of the claims to authority by universalism and pluralism. For us, all such claims are empty, groundless, ultimately meaningless. And this is what was really at stake in distinguishing ethics and morality. My idea of a happy life is not something I reason my way to, or choose, but rather something that manifests senselessly… but I can use my reasoning (my judgement, even!) to help in pushing back, reducing, destroying everything that blocks my way of life (de Acosta, 2014).

My anarchist commitments often coalesce in affinities with others in certain times and in certain places, as they did in Phoenix from October 2011 until the spring of 2012 during Occupy, the desire to scale up those commitments and create goods that are capitalized and universalized is a civilizing and statist project. And those are worlds I want to sabotage and desert. By way of doing autoethnography, an *anarchist* autoethnography, I explore the internal movement conflicts that arise when certain factions and political tendencies attempt to homogenously define the interests of heterogenous groups. I focus in separate chapters on decision-making processes, the debates about nonviolence, and attitudes towards policing. Beyond analyzing some of my experiences in Occupy Phoenix, and doing so transparently as an anarchist, I additionally explore how the underlying connection between utopianism and the techniques of maintaining urban social orders frame those experiences. Against the
movement managers of the left, who ultimately end up helping to reproduce the social order of cities, I turn at the end towards an exploration of historical Luddism as exemplars of sabotage. When Le Corbusier (1987) imagined the “city of to-morrow”, it was with a view of it as a statistically and “scientifically planned urban machine” (Scott, 1998). To my ears, that sounds like a description of automation, which I will seek to qualify. Even though I would count Le Corbusier as an enemy, I don’t think his utopian aspirations exaggerate the attempts made to manage life in contemporary cities. I look to the Luddites for inspiration and possible insight into what sabotaging the city as a statistically and scientifically planned urban machine could mean for anarchists. This concluding discussion will be developed alongside a rejection of neoluddism, which fights an imagined monster named technology because it leaves unaddressed its own technologically determinist ideologies. While such an exploration is done with the purpose of locating sabotageable targets, it also is for the purpose of finding accomplices that value autonomy against the prerogatives of managerial strategies in capitalist states as much I do.
CHAPTER 1

WRITING AN ANARCHIST AUTOETHNOGRAPHY

In society’s eyes, any refusal of its order is a crime, but this immersion into life moves insurgence beyond the level of crime. At this point, the insurgent has ceased to merely react to the codes, rules and laws of society and has come to determine her action on his own terms without regard for the social order.

~ Wolfi Landstreicher, Against the Logic of Submission

Crossing the border from Canada into the United States (and back) never felt like much to me while I was growing up. I understood the process of passing from one country into another, and the fact that we crossed a bridge to do it made it feel all the more official. My family did it all the time, typically fielding but a few questions at border checkpoints with agents mostly wondering if we had purchased anything during our time in the U.S. We often smuggled purchases back into Canada without declaring them, thus avoiding duty taxes. Knowing now the difficulties that many non-white people face crossing borders, my family very clearly benefited from being white while crossing the border.

My father is a U.S. citizen, so the naturalization process was made that much easier for me when I moved from Canada to Phoenix, Arizona in the summer of 1996 to start college. Benefiting from whiteness was becoming something that I no longer simply took for granted the more I became aware of, and involved myself in, political struggles. Challenging whiteness as a white person came rather easy to me, not only because white racial standing is articulated differently in Canada than it is in the U.S., but most notably from experiences in high school going to Anti-Racist Action benefit shows. What these
experiences exposed me to were examples of other white people, in particular SHARPs (skinheads against racial prejudice), in direct racialized confrontations with white nationalists and neo-Nazis. I recall one occasion especially, standing out in front of a small venue between band performances in St. Catherines, Ontario, Canada, while show promoters commented on how known neo-Nazis were seen driving by taking photographs of concert-goers. Street fights between anti-fascists (alongside anti-racist skinheads) and neo-Nazis bonehead squads were common in the 1980s and early-1990s in North America and especially throughout Europe (Testa, 2015; Birchall, 2010). Even my rather conservative mother and step-father seemed aware of this reality when they forbid me from wearing my Dead Kennedys “Nazi Punks Fuck Off” t-shirt to school, worried I’d be jumped by a gang of neo-Nazis. Even though my encounters with racism against Black and Indigenous peoples in Canada were subtle and more institutionalized, the organized resistance against white supremacy I witnessed as a teenager in underground music scenes very much inspired the race traitor\(^1\) politics I developed later on among Phoenix anarchists. In the U.S. southwest, specifically Arizona, I was exposed to many expressions of ongoing white settler-colonialism and white nationalism that also facilitated my comparably easy naturalization process. But I could now see them for what they are, and felt no latent need to preserve aspects of a white identity (even in how they manifest in white allyship). As a teacher and in the classroom, I regularly and

\(^1\) See Race Traitor: the journal of new abolitionism (online archive available at https://libcom.org/library/race-traitor-journal-new-abolitionism). This journal has been more recently re-imagined as Hard Crackers. Rather than attempting to reform whiteness or imagine a place for white allies in movements of color, race traitor politics sees nothing redeemable in white identity and establishes a role of perpetual treason against it until it’s abolition.
critically leverage my unquestioned immigration status when discussing border politics: I have yet to be asked by a student in these dialogues if I’m a citizen. This isn’t surprising given that citizenship is one of the core components of whiteness in the U.S. (Olson, 2004). Nonetheless, regardless of how treasonous I may be to whiteness, it remains a political status from which I at times benefit. Thus, my navigation with borderlands, what Abraham DeLeon (2010) calls “the middle ground”, has a privilege associated with it, one that I frequently attempt to leverage to its breaking point.

In this dissertation I try to write an anarchist autoethnography of my involvement/interventions in the Occupy movement in Phoenix, Arizona. The decision to refer to the ‘Occupy movement’ and not the “Occupy Wall Street” movement is intentional: as Aragorn! (2012) notes in the introduction to *Occupy Everything*, occupation as a tactic in recent memory, which inspired what happened on Wall Street in 2011, had its beginning in the various student takeovers of 2009, the “so-called Arab Spring” in 2009, and the Indignados of Europe in the summer of 2011. Aragorn! (2012) also insinuates that Occupy Wall Street (OWS) as a U.S.-based movement, partly due to media framing, at best obscured its anarchist origins, and at worst actively sought to repress them. Since I wasn’t simply playing the role of researcher as circumstantial activist in Occupy Phoenix (OP; Juris, 2007), I could have opted to write a series of less formalized action report-backs, reflecting upon my involvement as an anarchist in the Occupy movement during 2011-2012, and simply self-published them as a pamphlet or an online blog.\(^2\) A published collection of action report-backs and reflections from other

\(^2\) Nonetheless, this project will be made openly available online as a way of contributing to ongoing conversations, not only about the involvement of anarchists in the Occupy
anarchists exists and has been helpful to compare with my own experiences. The rather challenging, time-consuming and student debt-inducing nature of this project could have been avoided, if I wasn’t an anarchist seeking a PhD. My anarchist tendencies do create tensions that permeates this entire project. Specifically, I struggled with the navigation of a different kind of borderland between institutional commitments and the ethical ones that ground my anarchism. This tension isn’t something I’m trying to resolve so that anarchists can more easily flourish in state universities; I don’t believe that sort of resolution is possible. However, it is important that I navigate this tension well, both for my intellectual mentors and for accomplices who exist outside the institutional confines of the university. How I contribute to ongoing conversations in and outside the university, through my writing, very much matters to me.

Now, I am not ready to abandon the university as a worthwhile site of struggle, writing (and teaching) behind enemy lines is not yet ethically problematic for me. This is not to say anything about how other anarchists might feel about this decision. The criticisms encountered within anarchist milieus about the corrupting influence of being in academia, either as a student or teacher, are oftentimes hyperbolic and mostly absent substantive analysis. In my experience thus far, I have benefited from many invaluable learning experiences there, both inside and outside of classrooms, particularly in

movement, but in relation to urban social movements and urban rebellions more generally.

4 “An accomplice as academic would seek ways to leverage resources and material support and/or betray their institution to further liberation struggles.” See the pamphlet Accomplices Not Allies: Abolishing the Ally-Industrial Complex for a better understanding of why I’m interested in finding accomplices and not being an ally. It is available online from Indigenous Action Media: http://www.indigenousaction.org
extended dialogues with my intellectual mentors. As a teacher, I am continuously gifted so much from my interactions with students. The classroom – even one that belongs to the bureaucratic apparatus that is Arizona State University – remains a space where anti-authoritarian dissent, alongside critical thinking, can flourish when lesson plans and student assessments are approached tactically – consciously barricading classrooms from administrative protocols. My goal as an anarchist within academia could never be to develop an “anarchist studies” department. If one was created, I would most likely want to sabotage it. I don’t want the attitude or atmosphere of the classrooms I share, nor my way of practicing what Michel de Certeau calls “making do”, to be transformed into a replicable teaching strategy (or worse a department). The ethos is my own in that I’m not trying to institutionalize it. Until the university makes my practice of it impossible, I will continue to find value teaching behind those enemy lines. An anarchist autoethnography is what writing behind enemy lines looks like for me.

Instead of self-publishing a series of informal action report backs sprinkled with polemical reflections, I want this project to be the telling of a story (my story). First, you might be asking, why should you care about what I have to say about the Occupy movement? And second, you may be wondering about the relevance of what happened during Phoenix’s particular occupation for social movements more generally. It is precisely because I am answering these questions as an anarchist that anyone involved in

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5 Understood briefly, my goal is to momentarily suspend student concerns with institutional systems of performance evaluation and performance expectation so that they might have space to think. This needn’t be understood as vocal participation, as silent reflection can be equally liberating when detached from how not participating could impact a grade.
or reflecting upon social movements ought to care. Before you scoff at this claim, please consider methodologically what is being undertaken here. I am writing an anarchist autoethnography in order to narrate my experiences as an anarchist within OP. Beyond giving a passive description of some things that happened during movement meetings and demonstrations, which is often the approach one finds in a typical movement-generated, action report back, I am looking to critically interrogate internal movement conflicts that arose specifically as a consequence of my anarchist tendencies. Occupy organized itself around anarchist principles of consensus decision making, direct action and mutual aid (Graeber, 2013), and yet participants in various occupations across the U.S. in late-2011 were often in conflict with anarchists on similar movement-related issues: decision making process; the legitimacy of violent direct action; and attitudes towards cops and internal movement policing. After providing some relevant theoretical and conceptual frameworks in the second chapter, subsequent chapters are oriented towards notable and consistent conflicts at OP arising from the expression of my anarchist tendencies. While whiteness (Olson, 2011) and middle-class-ness (Insurgent, 2012) have been provided as more general explanations for attacks upon radicals and a limited political imagination in the movement, I believe that giving sustained attention to several key points of conflict I encountered as an anarchist will provide space for a better understanding of ways that political commitments to things like whiteness and middle-class-ness play out inside broadly leftist social movements. Even though I will be sharing stories to help give a

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6 See the various location-specific, first-hand accounts of anarchist interventions in different U.S. cities in *Occupy Everything: Anarchists in the Occupy Movement 2009-2011* for commonly themed conflicts between anarchists and liberal-left occupiers.
sense of the atmosphere surrounding different experiences in OP, I will, in addition, be elaborating upon the criticisms that arose specifically because I was an anarchist participating in the movement. The individualization of my story is important in that it coincides with my affinity for more individualist, anti-organizational and nihilist expressions of anarchy. I think it is important to draw out the implications of our own tendencies, especially in relation to other positions we often encounter in social and political struggles. For readers who are or have been involved in social movements, my story may resonate with aspects of your own, or it may help you understand the dissonance you experience around anarchists.

At no point in this project is my voice assumed to be neutral or an authority. It would raise serious issues to my ethical commitments as an anarchist if I claimed to speak for other anarchists. My experiences are only as generalizable as they are relatable and understandable to any given reader. I am adding to a conversation, not taking it over. While I do have a privileged access to my own subjective experiences in this autoethnography, this can only be a sound approach to doing research if I also possess a sincere desire for reflexivity and transparency throughout the writing process. The methodological goal here isn’t one of objectivity, but it is the creation of a believable subjectivity: “autoethnography is one of the approaches that acknowledges and accommodates subjectivity, emotionality, and the researcher’s influence on research, rather than hiding from these matters or assuming they don’t exist” (Ellis et al., 2011). You as the reader are being invited into the “emergent experience” of this research (Ronai, 1992, p.123). However, like my involvement in OP, the writing process is also an intervention. Texts are an active site of contestation for anarchists, but writing as a
communicative technique is not afforded a privileged standing in anarchist circles. And though most anarchist texts don’t pass through a formal peer-review process as is found in academic journals, there is no doubt that anytime an anarchist chooses to write something down for the purpose of distribution, the critique-proliferation-machine of the anarchist milieu is ready and waiting! While I will be looking to publish parts of this dissertation in academic journals (and perhaps as a standalone manuscript), open access will also be granted through online distribution networks. Getting a rejection letter from a journal is one thing, being subject to a relentless interrogation on anarchist web boards is another thing entirely! In writing as an anarchist, my ethical commitments are under scrutiny. This is to say that the narrative presentation of my subjectivity through what I’m calling ‘anarchist autoethnography’ requires just as much rigor as any other approach to doing social science research. The project should in no way be read as a manifesto or a blueprint for struggle (I have patience for neither); anarchists are permanently suspicious of those authoritative strategies towards political writing.

Even while being a white, cisgendered man – the most common embodiment of authority within U.S. society – I would argue that the conflicts I experienced within OP as an anarchist cannot be written off as simply being products of identarian politics. Anarchist attitudes towards, for example, violence and police confrontation are often criticized as the expression of white, male privilege or hypermasculinity. The assumption being that only people possessing high amounts of privilege would opt to engage in dangerous and aggressive tactics. This line of argumentation – common in both movements for social justice and academia – very often mistakes privilege as something inherently possessed through an abstracted marker of identity (being white or male),
rather than as an expression of political power that emerges from doing whiteness, masculinity and heteronormativity. As Joel Olson (2004) has argued regarding race in the U.S.: you aren’t privileged because you’re white, you’re considered white because you have privilege. Dominant identity markers like white (Olson, 2004) or masculine (Evans, 2013) aren’t universal, not only due to being socio-political constructions that haven’t always existed, but specifically because they are expressions of actively reinforced interests that could be abolished. Aside from sustaining my own treasonous relation to whiteness, maleness as masculinity and heteronormativity, as constituent to my way of life and ethical commitments, it was anarchists in OP who organized interventions around left colorblindness.⁷ Reductionist, class-centered understandings of oppression in the U.S. were in no short supply at OP, at times openly marginalizing issues raised about race or gender or colonialism as a “losing focus of why we’re here” (the “we” clearly being exclusionary). In addition, it is of great concern that queer, femme and BIPOC anarchists are consistently forced to speak out against their own anarchist commitments being reduced to white, male chauvinism (Walia, 2010). Anarchists aren’t the only ones often attacked within social movements because what they say or what they get up to runs counter to progressive left organizational goals. A language of privilege⁸ has been attached to certain actions that white anarchists can be

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⁷ See the YouTube clip (https://youtu.be/-0HlQNLhbBE) of Joel Olson’s teach-in on November 26th, 2011 at OP on his pamphlet “Whiteness and the 99%”, organized by Phoenix Class War Council.

⁸ Discourses on privilege have been reversed in many left activist circles and function as quick silencing tools. Someone who looks white is immediately assumed to have privilege, rather than understanding whiteness as a political category attached to citizenship and characterized by social and political commitments to anti-Blackness (Olson, 2004). For leftist movement organizers, this provides quick ways of policing
seen to participate in (violence, property destruction, police confrontation), without consideration that people of color – who don’t claim any particular ideological affiliation – have historically participated in the same sorts of rebellious and insurrectionary actions (Stafford and Shirley, 2015). In writing a history of Black insurrection in the southern U.S., Stafford and Shirley (2015) implicate “the Left” as “playing a crucial role in containing and managing revolt” against white supremacy (p.12). They name “the Left” as an enemy of rebellious individuals, whether acting alone or in affinity with others (Stafford and Shirley, 2015). In acknowledging the degrees of ambiguity and fluidity inherent to that term, they flesh out “certain identifiable patterns” in leftist politics, whether revolutionary or reformist, internationalist or nationalist: “an emphasis on modernity, rights, progress, and industry on the one hand to a reliance on bureaucracies, political parties, civil society, legalized protest, and the federal government on the other” (Stafford and Shirley, p.11). When I speak of the left, leftists or leftism throughout this project, I very much share their understanding of it both theoretically and from my own experiences. I am particularly interested in drawing out the implications of the left’s social managerialism, moral strategies and white political imagination in social movements. Rather than considering this as a blanketed generalization about the left, I see this more as the ongoing development of a tactical understanding against its strategic tendencies. (Things to be weary of when organizationally-oriented leftists are around.) As I’ll explore below in chapters four and five, the attempts made to silence anarchist criticisms of nonviolence and policing are themselves perpetuations of white, middle-

behavior, but leaves unchallenged their own organizing strategies that are thoroughly informed by white political imaginations.
class political imaginations. It has been my experience in Phoenix that leftist-led social movements and organizations cheerlead for slightly reformed, but highly recuperated, social orders through the propagandizing of whitewashed histories about social change. It is in the process of exploring counter-narratives through an anarchist autoethnography that so many of the localized tensions surrounding individual identities and agencies are unavoidably thrown into critical relief, with a desire of producing unexpected and teachable knowledges.9

*On/Against Method*

Anarchist autoethnography is a methodological description of what is done at the moments of participation, fieldnote creation, reflection, dissemination and writing. It is, to my mind, the closest approximation of what anarchists regularly do outside of academic institutions, while simultaneously locating the project within trajectories of contemporary scholarship. To see this as an awkward balancing act between theory that happens in universities and practice that happens in the streets would be a mistake. Following Spinoza10, I eschew ontological dualism: two separated realms of existence are imagined; the task then becomes figuring out how they might influence or interact with each other as entirely different sorts of things that exist on entirely different planes of

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9 For an extended discussion of the deep complexities around identity formation that emerge within social movements, see Scott L. Morgensen (2011), *Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

10 For Spinoza (2000), this is born out of the mistake of imagining minds to be completely separate substances apart from bodies. In his *Ethics*, Spinoza replaces the Cartesian dualism of Descartes with a monist ontology where minds aren’t things in themselves, but best understood as the corresponding ideas of bodies in various modes of being.
experience. Instead of imagining theory as something completely different than practice, happening in an altogether elsewhere, it is better understood as the ideas about practices. Anarchists theorize and academics have practices they engage in (and visa-versa). Often the scope, goals and interests are radically divergent between the two groups of people, but those can be explained both in methodological terms and as they relate to political or anti-political commitments. Thus, it would be a mischaracterization to imply that the conflicts that often arise between anarchists and academics could be reduced to matter of one theorizing and the other putting into practice, or doing politics. Anarchist commitments could well be considered as “something other than a politics” (de Acosta, 2014). Reflecting on the relationship between ethics and politics in anarchist circles, Alejandro de Acosta (2014) writes, “I have always considered my inclination to anarchy to be irreducible to a politics. … They are more intimate, concerning supposedly personal or private matters; but they overflow the instrumental realm of getting things done” (28).

As an anarchist researcher, I am wanting to evade the institutional pressures of neoliberal universities that seek to operationalize and instrumentalize knowledge for the purpose of promoting an ever-narrowing field of political and economic policies.

My intention in doing research is not to expand this narrow field, but to subvert and negate aspects of it throughout the entire process, from participation to writing and distribution. Anarchist autoethnography is anti-political in that it refuses to be an instrumental description or blueprint of doing politics. The anarchy that informs my ethical commitments as a researcher is constantly searching for and imagining new tactics. Paul Feyerabend (2010) also sought to (somewhat) famously outline an anarchist methodology in his book Against Method, though did so while keeping anarchy at a safe
distance and simultaneously championing the most socially progressive attitudes in the few anarchists he consulted for guidance. In short, a more liberated and anarchistic approach to knowledge creation is what leads to exciting instances of progress in scientific research (Feyerabend, 2010). If we, you and I, ask the questions – *Progress for whom? Progress to do what?*\(^{11}\) – political commitments get revealed. Anarchist autoethnography methodologically troubles the political commitments endemic to neoliberal institutions. Autoethnography as a method already does this through the way it makes the role of researchers explicitly and intimately visible to the research process. What doing autoethnography as an anarchist allows for is the creation of a temporary space in which to leverage resources against the political commitments of neoliberal academic institutions.

Without the anarchist qualifier, autoethnography already stands as an established research method. In an overview of autoethnography, Ellis et al (2011) state that

> Autoethnographers must not only use their methodological tools and research literature to analyze experience, but also must consider ways others may experience similar epiphanies; they must use personal experience to illustrate facets of cultural experience, and, in so doing, make characteristics of a culture familiar for insiders and outsiders.

Many “facets” of my experiences at OP were ones of conflict because I am an anarchist, which is why I have chosen to frame this project in the way I have, organizing chapters to focus on those particular conflicts. The debates I engaged in around movement attitudes towards the police and violence aren’t new in any way. If anything, for many of my

\(^{11}\) See Chapter 1 from Slack & Wise (2007) *Technology + Culture: A Primer* (pp.9-25) for a systematic treatment of the way in which narratives of progress are deployed in the technological culture of North America.
anarchist friends in the Phoenix area, these debates were tiresome by the time that the Occupy movement emerged onto the streets, parks and plazas of U.S. cities. Anarchists and anti-authoritarians in Arizona had these same conversations ad nauseam during demonstrations within the anti-globalization movement, the anti-Iraq war movement and in challenging the limitations of leftist-nonprofit coalitions during struggles for immigrant rights. Nonetheless, I took my own turn engaging in these debates during OP with the hope that my interventions break through limitations setup in advance by OP organizers. In more recent urban uprisings in 2020 against police brutality in the wake of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor’s murders, these same debates again took place as if no one in the past had ever tried to dispel the whitewashed myths about nonviolent social change.

Through telling the story of my debates during OP, I seek to make visible the cultural and political dynamics that contribute to their continual, amnesia-like reproduction. An important part of this story is that anarchists continue – within each new uprising or social movement – to criticize and attack the managerial tendencies in leftist political organizations. I personally witnessed the positive outcomes of these efforts during OP as several people who at first were emphatically critical of anarchist interventions in the movement, in just a few months found affinity with anarchy as a tendency. In addition, if my story offers other anarchists insights into how they could intervene in present struggles, or perhaps anticipate expressions of liberal and leftist social management, then I would count these narratives as especially valuable.

Anarchist autoethnography as method is doubly stigmatized: autoethnography without the anarchist qualification already faces an uphill battle to legitimize itself in
social science research, “either [for] being too artful and not scientific, or too scientific and not sufficiently artful” (Ellis et al., 2011); and there are few anarchists writing autoethnographies (DeLeon, 2010). Even if the stress is simply self-imposed, I experience the challenge of writing both for those inside and outside university walls (there are institutional walls that seek to both contain and restrict knowledge). Writing what passes both as recognizable academic research and anarchist critique has been challenging. While DeLeon (2010) has sought to establish an affinity between anarchism and autoethnography through reference to Alexander Berkman’s often quoted, (de)mythologized anarchism that is not bombing, or robbery, or murder, or perpetual social war, I would remind him that many times anarchy does mean engaging in those activities (Bayer, 2015; Aragorn!, 2013; Miller, 2013; Serge, 2012; Parry, 1987). Even though Berkman (2003) was trying to distance anarchism from the reductionist definition towards erratic chaos and disorder, he, along with many others, have offered an anesthetized expression of anarchy that ends up limiting the means of rebellion. I fully agree with DeLeon (2010) that autoethnography is situated against hierarchy and has the potential to be situated outside of statist discourse and be subversive. However, that cannot avoid the various ways in which anarchists have chosen to express their tendencies, which includes robbing banks (Bayer, 2015; Serge, 2012; Parry, 1987), assassinating government officials (Aragorn!, 2013; Miller, 2013) and blowing things up (Davis, 2007).

If this research is going to be my own through doing autoethnography, then it is going to require a great deal of reflexivity, transparency and vulnerability. Autoethnography, as a method, was chosen anachronistically. This retroactive movement
is characteristic not only of the writing process in autoethnographic research (Ellis et al, 2011), but also in the way it methodologically avoids being opportunistic about experiences. Field note taking was consistently an afterthought, especially after a long general assembly or tiring demonstration. The moments were quite fresh in my mind when writing my field notes, but I wasn’t participating in OP for the purpose of eventually putting this project together. Even when I was able to quickly jot down a few memory-jogging words to expand upon at a later time, experiences I had after creating those brief queues very much modulated the initial reflections before the field note was elaborated. Furthermore, the experiences between field note transcription, data analysis, and now writing, additionally shaped my sense of what happened. My anarchist tendencies are much more developed in these later moments of writing than they were while intervening in OP. At times, my voice here is expressed descriptively through what happened, relaying emotional states or thought processes as I remember experiencing them, but the overall narrative feels very present, thus being subject to my present attitudes.

I have had a good deal of time to explore my field notes and give space for un-transcribed experiences to be recalled during the writing process. Delayed recall was triggered by going through field notes, reading about the experiences of other anarchists in the Occupy movement, watching YouTube clips of events during OP, in conversation with others about the project, and sometimes even just by running into people who I remember meeting at OP. At first, I felt that the method of practicing militant ethnography best described what I was doing as an anarchist researcher in the Occupy movement: what Juris (2007) refers to as “ethnographic research that is both politically
engaged and collaborative in nature” and which creates a “practical, embodied understanding” of activism (p.166). The more time passed since the ending of OP, and with the overall dissolving of the Occupy movement, moments of writing felt less and less collaborative. The appeal of militancy and activism as ways of framing and understanding what I was (and am) doing faded in correlation with a growing pessimistic inflection in my attitudes as an anarchist. I wasn’t becoming jaded in anarchist spaces – quite the opposite! However, I did become disillusioned with the remnants of leftism in my anarchy. This has left me with the feeling that being an anarchist is something different than being an activist or being a militant. The shifting and sobering attitude towards my ethical commitments as an anarchist very much became part of this story. The way that I experienced, intervened and have reflected upon my participation in OP can be better explained when you know where I’m coming from and how I got there (and here).

While an anarchist autoethnography can methodologically approximate what anarchists outside of academia do when they write about their experiences as anarchists, I would argue that it has demanded a more rigorous approach in me than a self-published action report back would have because of its embeddedness in the formalities of a mentor-reviewed, university system. The challenge of defending this project to respected mentors outside of anarchist spaces – in addition to other anarchists and people who participated at OP – has compelled me throughout this process towards greater intellectual clarity and to seriously evaluate how I navigate my commitments as an anarchist in academia.
In order to understand the method of anarchist autoethnography, it is necessary to talk about both autoethnography as a method and anarchy as a way of life. I want to be as clear as possible in how my anarchist tendencies modulate my approach to doing autoethnographic research. There are a multitude of anarchist tendencies, but the story of how I came to associate as an anarchist describes a series of events both inside and outside of the university that may demonstrate how I navigate the aforementioned tension of being an anarchist working within the state university system. Abraham DeLeon (2010) describes those who exist in this tension as people dancing across worlds, borrowing from the literature on borders to help explain complex relationships that are often in conflict, though not simply in conflict. As one of the few openly anarchist testimonials I discovered that engages specifically with the process of doing autoethnographic research, DeLeon’s account is useful as a starting point for approaching my autoethnography. DeLeon (2010) wasn’t simply using autoethnography to be able to tell his story as an anarchist, but argues that anarchist tendencies can inform the field of autoethnographic writing. My intentions though are less informative and more disruptive: qualifying my autoethnography as anarchist is interventionist upon participatory methodology in academia, which includes autoethnography.

I participated in OP as an anarchist and took extensive field notes about my participation in the hopes of giving some sort of action report back. Yet it was only after receiving some very critical feedback from my dissertation committee while presenting...
my prospectus for review that I decided to frame my research as an autoethnography. In reference to speculative field note taking, but I think equally applicable to my unconventional field note taking practices, Ruha Benjamin (2017) remarks that this “methodological exercise is a way to fashion possible futures and probable pasts, enabling analysts to critically reflect on the present.” My shifting anarchist commitments and intellectual growth that inform the construction of this project are reflected in the complex interplay of past experiences, recalled senses of self and present attitudes. While my ethical commitments in writing this remain tied primarily to fellow anarchists with shared tendencies, my academic mentors especially (but also the university protocols associated with writing a dissertation) have very much collectively given shape to this project.

The intimacy of the project leaves me to speculate on the ways in which certain others will perceive it. Because my interests are antithetical to those of university administrations, including the one I have at times been subject to disciplinary action from, what they think isn’t of consequence beyond avoiding their red tape. I didn’t seek approval through the IRB process because I wasn’t doing anything like research on other subjects, which isn’t to discount or undervalue the presence of others. Anonymity is a crucial ethical commitment for anarchists, especially because of our inherently troubled relationship with the law and the state. I’m also not an outside researcher seeking admission to a group. Being part of OP wasn’t an academic research project, even if these moments of writing produce something that counts as a dissertation. Lauderdale and Cruit (1993), while doing an embedded ethnography, also eschewed the IRB process, partly because one of the researchers became a permanent insider through the
development of a long-term romantic relationship with someone in the group of people being studied. Unlike Michael Cruit, I didn’t become an insider by circumstance after beginning the research process. I occupy a position as what Leon Anderson (2006) refers to in the context of doing analytic autoethnography as a “complete member researcher” that has a “commitment to theoretical analysis” of broader social phenomena (p.378).

While I am clearly visible in the narrative, this isn’t just about me. John Freeman (2015) warns autoethnographers that the “methodology is prone to suffer when … research focuses too strongly on the auto” and not enough on the ethnography (924). The conflicts I had at OP spaces are shared not only with other anarchists and anti-authoritarians in Phoenix who participated, but across social movements, rebellions and insurrectionary moments. States and reactionary interest groups will always seek to manage and discipline unruly behavior that explicitly targets the social order.

Autoethnography troubles the prevalent insider/outsider dynamic in social science research, while an anarchist autoethnography seeks to dismantle the way in which that binary is present in academic research. Do I need to gain permission through a state IRB process to reflect on and write about my own experiences? I would argue that my own ethical commitments as an anarchist towards autonomy, the agency of others and the establishment of consensual relationships are more meaningful than the abstract bureaucratic principles expressed by neoliberal universities. My being at OP wasn’t an exercise in gaining trust and acceptance for the purpose of doing research, which is not to say that trust and acceptance aren’t important aspects of affinity groups or social movements. However, I do have a critique of various forms of participatory research that have emerged from within academia, particularly those seeking to bridge the
insider/outside gap through opportunistic forms of trust building and reflexivity as researchers. In the context of anticorporate globalization movements, Jeffrey Juris (2007) notes that people involved “are uniquely self-reflexive, [and] as activists produce and distribute their own analyses and reflections through global communication networks”. It is the breakdown of the divide between participant and observer in traditional academic studies that is being challenged here (Juris, 2007). Anarchists are already wildly critical by nature, almost to a fault, so to imagine that they would seek state approval to do what they regularly do seems naïve. Writing about the global social movements that prefigured the Occupy movement, Juris (2007) argues that “[w]hen nearly everyone engages in theorizing, self-publishing, and instant distribution through global communication networks, the traditional function of the organic intellectual – providing strategic analysis and political direction – is undermined”. Juris’ criticism of the organic intellectual, a concept developed by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1971), applies equally to academics, movement leaders, vanguards and revolutionary governments. In other words, this is a criticism of representation and the benevolent attempts at social management that follow from the audacity of speaking for others. Advocacy models very often either struggle with how best to speak for someone else, or attempt to reform a speaking-for into a speaking-with. The inability to recognize agency very often lies at the heart of well-intentioned attempts to help others through intervention (Bilge, 2010). This becomes especially true when ideological commitments don’t allow for an acceptance of someone else embracing what appears to be, from our perspective, an oppressed or subordinated way of life. While Bilge (2010) looks at this dynamic in relation to how certain feminist tendencies approach veiled Muslim women,
the very same relationship has historically existed between Marxists and the poor and working classes. The problem is both one of identification, not to, but within a group being spoken for, and a lack of ethical commitment to the agency of others, which might otherwise be understood as empathy. To the social science researchers who cannot locate themselves in their work, I would hope that this criticism at the very least gives them pause. What I’m calling an anarchist autoethnography, Juris (2007) describes in similar but distinct terms as militant ethnography, which he argues is a good methodological approximation of the knowledge production that happens within social movements (as opposed to the knowledge produced about them by outsiders). Graeber (2004) uses the term anarchist anthropology to name the process of developing a theory through anarchist practices. Methodologically, I am doing something different than both Juris and Graeber, though our relationship to research within social movements speaks to a similar insider account. While Juris’ (2008; 2007) militant ethnography puts an emphasis on doing ethnography in social movements as an activist, and Graeber (2009; 2004) on doing something like a cultural anthropology or ethnography of social movements as an anarchist, and both give very detailed accounts of movement meetings and demonstrations, neither feel particularly anarchist in tone. They share the insights of people very experienced in social movements as radicals, but in tone the “auto” feels like a passive observer, even given that they are mostly describing events they were involved in. Perhaps we simply have a difference in attitude and tendency that provokes a different approach to how we convey our presence in the writing process.
The Disintegration Loops

Composer William Basinski is most known for a series of music recordings called *The Disintegration Loops*. This series of releases were created by transferring the material from pre-prepared reel-to-reel tape loops as those physical audio tape reels quite literally disintegrated in the recording process. These disintegrating recordings share similarities with our own abilities to accurately recall memories for the purpose of reliably recounting past experiences in research. Certain memories remain quite present, while others feel brittle, delicate even, as though they are degrading over time, perhaps even evoking the impression that they could at some point be lost forever.

The more I write and delve into my experiences during OP, the more memories I recount that were entirely absent from my field notes. “As I write, right here and right now, I find myself falling into memory…” (Poulos, 2012). It is a reminder to me that what might at a given time appear as inconsequential, may actually become an important and productive moment for the project. Memory is a crucial methodological part of my anarchist autoethnography. If I was spending all my time transcribing what was happening and what I was doing at OP, I wouldn’t have been able to actively participate in the movement in the ways that I did. In fact, creating field notes is often impossible, *as an anarchist*, in certain protest or direct action situations (Graeber, 2009; Juris, 2008). If I were simply taking notes and occasionally participating to maintain acceptance, I’d look like any other participatory researcher who gains temporary access to a group in order to write about it. Memory has to be relied upon to later provide some of the important details of experiences for analysis. Most autoethnographers require a great deal of reliance upon memory because moments are lived first and only recalled for
research second. While a narrative about researching may include the transcription of a critical reflection upon the process of data collection through field note taking, almost all of my experiences in OP were lived outside of doing research. To give an example: stopping to write something down while in a street confrontation with cops would betray people I am actively in struggle with, take focus away from a dangerous situation, and subtract moments from the very experience I’d hope to reflect upon later. Even immediately after a demonstration, not only is everyone often making sure they are accounting for people’s well-being, but sometimes it’s just nice to head out for drinks afterward to decompress and talk about the action. Field notes and data collection come later because they are of secondary importance to the experiences themselves. This isn’t only the case for anarchists writing autoethnographies, but is applicable to other researchers in entirely different contexts. The reflective process in autoethnography has multiple utilities, from “enhancing the representational richness and reflexivity of qualitative research” (Humphreys, 2005), to working through the emergence of personal traumas (Poulos, 2012). The primacy given to lived experience – particularly my situatedness in those lived experiences – is part of what attracted me to autoethnography as a method for in undertaking this project. My role as a researcher was something I could no less avoid than my anarchist tendencies. Autoethnography as a method requires a “self-awareness of our partialities and positionalities as … researchers” (Monaco, 2010). Though in contrast to autoethnographies that make use of memory through poetic-narrative to accent otherwise clinically presented research, for me memory functions as a tool for accessing and situating my subjectivity as research. This is not only for uncovering mundane details of my experiences in OP, but also for recalling
formative parts of my past that can help others, and myself, better understand my interventions and how I’m making sense of them now. Memory remains a collective project when we share ours because others are given the opportunity to add to it, or remind us of where we may be mistaken.

_Falling Out of Love with Marxism and the Left_

Histories aren’t linear. The ethical commitments and nihilism that animate my current tendencies as an anarchist in the moment of writing weren’t so clearly formed in the past. While I could partially romanticize my punk and industrial subcultural leanings during high school to approximate something like an anarchist attitude, my step-father emotionally and physically discouraged those expressions at every turn. My teenage years were at select times filled with local punk shows hosted by Anti-Racist Action groups, skateboarding and some mild trouble-making (though I was still a relatively straight-laced kid who mostly listened to his parents, got good grades and experimented with prohibited things very little). I distinctly remember mentioning anarchy to my step-father during one of our many debates and feeling completely unprepared to defend it against the very common reproach of it being a silly, unrealistic and impossible idea.

After moving out of the house, I began exploring subversive philosophies, such as those of Friedrich Nietzsche and E.M. Cioran. However, it was as an undergraduate philosophy student seeking courses outside of the Anglo-American focused, analytic

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13 In the history of western philosophy, there was a clear split at the beginning of the 20th-century between analytic and continental traditions. While both traditions were influenced by the linguistic turn in philosophical inquiry at the time, they widely diverged on how they responded to it based upon the regional thinkers that grounded their intellectual traditions. Analytic philosophy is primarily rooted in Anglo-American thinkers, while continental philosophy is a French and German-based tradition.
philosophy department at Arizona State University (ASU) that I got introduced to Marxian-left readings of Martin Heidegger and Sigmund Freud. I was grateful to escape the confines of analytic philosophy and be able to explore thinkers and ideas I was already engaging with on my own (ultimately the consequence of bringing up Nietzsche to someone on a bar patio one night and being recommended to attend a Heidegger * Being and Time* seminar with Dr. Ramsey at ASU’s west campus).

David Graeber (2004) has pointed to an affinity between Marxists and academics (influenced heavily by the continental tradition) to orient themselves around the ideas of certain authors, rather than distinguishing “themselves by what they do, and how they organize themselves to go about doing it” (pp.4-5). I’ve found that some Marxists have a difficult time engaging in conversations with anarchists when (western) anarchism cannot be reduced to a neat, canonical collection of thinkers: Mikail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, etc. The folly in this false canon is that many anarchists reject it. While Kropotkin is noted as an important anarchist writer, that didn’t save him from condemnation by other anarchists when he came out in support of the first world war. By contrast, apologist sentiments in Marxist circles come with the trade of trucking in personalities and not organizing principles or ethical commitments. Even though I began this paragraph by referencing the late anarchist and academic David Graeber on a position he takes that I agree with, it would be absurd to reference myself as a ‘Graeberian’ anarchist or as a ‘Graeberist’. He would be rolling in his grave at the awkward thought. But more cogently, this establishes an intellectual hierarchy where

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Politically, the traditions can loosely but consistently be mapped onto leftwing (continental) and rightwing (analytic) tendencies.
status is afforded to those with the most followers, or references, dependent upon the context. Anarchists participate in sectarianism just as much as Marxists and academics do, but their differences are oriented around what they get up to: are they anarcho-syndicalists, anarcho-communists, insurrectionaries, nihilists, co-operativists, individualists, platformists, etc. (Graeber, 2004). These aren’t the names of great thinkers or schools of thought; each describes a different approach to anarchy with differing, and often conflicting, principles of organization (and even anti-organizational principles in the case of nihilists and post-left anarchists).

In part, it was running across what anarchists in Phoenix were getting up to that steered me away from Marxism. Even though my encounters with the CPUSA (Communist Party of the United State of America) and the RCP (Revolutionary Communist Party) aren’t representative of all Marxists, the things they were doing were uninspiring, unimaginative and cultish in the case of the RCP. Though, it wasn’t only running into Phoenix anarchists back in 2009 that challenged and began to change my political commitments. After attending several events and demonstrations organized by the Phoenix Class War Council (PCWC), I still maintained a wavering Marxist-Leninist politics. I would argue that two other notable and concurrent experiences also strongly shaped my shifting attitude: first, the ongoing intellectual engagements I was having as a graduate student; and second, learning and coming to embody humility in my role as a step-parent. I’ll speak to the latter of these two first.

Disciplinary strategies and micro-managerialism were inscribed onto me by my step-father, emotionally and physically, growing up. Suddenly finding myself in the role of parent to a 4-year-old in 2006, I was forced to confront the ways in which I had
internalized those experiences of authority growing up, subsequently seeing myself reproduce them in my own patterns of parenting. Marxist-Leninist politics have historically been obsessed with the revolutionary strategy of imposing a certain vision of a socialism on a population, framed with the best interests of the working classes in mind. The state maintains a central role in revolutionary governance in Marxist-Leninist political imaginaries. Despite the insistence by Lenin (1974) and Leninist commentators like Georg Lukács (2009) that their “purely, praxis-oriented thought” allows for the just use of state power by the dictatorship of the proletariat, class-antagonisms were not resolved by the Bolsheviks, and thus the state only did the opposite of “withering away”. Developing a formalized state system of resistance to capitalism that would control process and outcomes is ideal for administrators uncomfortable with the questioning of authority, especially rebellious questioning. Intellectualizing and rationalizing authority doesn’t legitimize it to those who are subject to it. My own tendency to micro-manage as a parent was irrational, though enacting it did allow me to avoid confronting the subtleties of control issues and underlying physical and emotional traumas that fueled the tendency in my own childhood. While Lenin proved himself to be a particularly unhumble political leader, my Leninist embrace of authority was challenged by a growing child who forced me to confront the limits of authority if I were to simultaneously maintain ethical commitments to respect and agency.¹⁴ Being a parent

¹⁴ My master’s thesis, Don’t Be Afraid of the Party!: A Critique of Biopolitical Economy, included a dedication to the child I was helping raise for teaching me that authority needs to be humbled. In criticizing the political works of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, specifically Empire (2000), Multitude (2004), and Commonwealth (2009), I saw in the interventionist nature of Leninism a way out of Hardt and Negri’s libertarian, Italian autonomist variant of Marxism. The mistake in my argument there was to assume that
taught me humility, which is not to say that is what it will teach everyone. The rebellious obstinance of every child’s “No!” could be counted as exemplar to why Bakunin (1970) thought that rebellion is a constituent part of natural human development. Though it isn’t simply accepting the legitimacy of a child’s rebellion that forms humility, but in caring enough to understand why they are rebelling and implicating you as parental authority in that process. While Marx may have imagined that the state would eventually wither away, Lenin helped erase all the libertarian elements present during the Russian Revolution, such as the soviets, which would have established more autonomous spaces outside of the statist administration. In discouraging and delegitimizing the very act of rebellion in children, the lesson of absolute authority is internalized. It is no wonder that we so often reproduce the structures of authority we previously experienced while in subordinated roles. There is no issue, even for anarchists, in questioning the how or the why of someone’s rebellious actions – that is why our ethical commitments matter so much – but to actively preclude people from being capable of rebellion by morally sanctifying certain people or ideological positions, helps to ensure the longevity of

intervention had to be structured in order to ensure the intended result. The critique I made in the paper of Hardt and Negri’s valorization of immaterial labor is one I would continue to presently put forth. Their variant on the Marxist belief that capitalism will eventually outmode and dissolve itself, because it has reached a point in history where there is no longer an outside to feed on, remains mistaken whether my response to it is Leninist or anarchist. Though instead of imagining a new Leninist party to actively challenge the “republic of property”, I would suggest Luddite-like interventions against automated systems in cities, both in and outside of workplaces, but not because I believe this will end capitalism (a theme I will return to in the final chapter below). I neither believe that the system can be overturned by global proletarian revolution, nor do I believe that something like Hardt and Negri’s multitude will make capitalism obsolete. My (anti)political imagination of rebellion today sees only various ways of surviving, more or less well.
authoritarian structures in society. It has been personally instructional to look back upon
the overlapping shift in my attitudes towards both parenting and revolutionary
governance through the methodological framework that autoethnography provides.
While two very different scales of authority are being contrasted here, it is the similarity
in their structure and delivery that is of great issue to me as an anarchist.

*Black Marxism and A Shifting Attitude Towards Governance*

Up until my encounter with Dr. H.L.T. Quan in the Justice Studies graduate
program at ASU, my engagement with the Black Radical Tradition, specifically Black
Marxism, was limited. I was vaguely familiar with the work of W.E.B. DuBois, Franz
Fanon and Angela Davis, as well as some Black social movements in the U.S., but little
else. Over the course of my doctoral studies with Dr. Quan, including two graduate
seminars and a semester long reading and conference investigating revolutionary
governance and genealogies of communism, where I engage much more thoroughly with
literature from the Black Radical Tradition, with a desire of better understanding racial
capitalism and Black political imaginations.

Through the benefits of a semester long reading and conference with Dr. Quan,
the chair of my dissertation, I committed myself to a long conversation mediated by an
engagement with communist literature in order to explore the subjects of justice, the state
and revolutionary governance. What emerged from this was a genealogy of communism
*from below*\(^{15}\), one that centered Marx, Engels and Lenin as its prophets without
completely jettisoning their contributions. At the time, I was very interested in

\(^{15}\) See E.P. Thompson’s *History of the English Working Class* or Peter Linebaugh’s *The London Hanged* for excellent examples of what doing “history from below” looks like.
uncovering the historical agency and revolutionary potential of both the so-called working class, as well as superexploited underclasses. Today, my interest in rebellious agency is not chained to Marxian understandings of revolution. To focus solely on the working class – normally filtered through Marx’s understanding of it as the industrial working class – is to ignore a wide range of super-exploitative practices that aren’t reducible to a rigid economism, even a rigorous historical materialist one. And even though, for instance, it was Lenin who had pushed the communist party in the U.S. to incorporate black labor into their ranks (Robinson, 2000), neither Lenin nor Marx possessed a well-developed understanding of what Robinson calls racial capitalism. Silvia Federici (2014) makes a parallel critique of Marx, but from the perspective of gender, particularly in relation to the subordination of women and their reproductive labor. Federici (2014) argues that this is attributable to Marx’s mistake in not giving the process of primitive accumulation a central role in not only the emergence of capitalism, but also in its ability to sustain its relationships. It is not until more recently that we can find an expansion on an explicitly Marxian interpretation of primitive accumulation (Harvey, 2010).16

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16 One could attempt to raise the issue of Lenin’s contributions regarding imperialism, which I would have been sympathetic to at the time given my Leninist orientation. But Lenin’s description of an ongoing process of plunder as being central to monopolizing tendencies under capitalism is anthropologically backwards. See Fredy Perlman’s excellent pamphlet “On The Continuing Appeal of Nationalism” where imperialism is the description of much earlier historical process related to state formation. Lenin’s contribution was arguably restricted to his post-revolutionary focus on legitimizing the newly formed Soviet state. The Soviet Union is but one example of revolutionary governance, and a completely reactionary one at that. And yet it is this example of really-existing socialism that dominates political imaginations of revolutionary governance.
Communism as the description of a certain way of life did not begin with the collected works of Marx and Engels. The attempt by both orthodox Marxists and anti-communists to confine communism to Marxist dogma is inaccurate and unhelpful both our historical and political understandings of it. Certainly, it is quite difficult to entirely write off Marx’s analysis of 19th-century capitalism despite what one could criticize in his indebtedness to classic liberal economists and his affinity with what David Noble (1999) has called the religion of technology and progress. Further, as Robinson (2001) remarks, “radical politics in both the West and elsewhere might very well have lacked the conceptual purchase which proved so important at the peripheries of the world-system to the resistances to imperialism and colonialism which have decorated the present century” (156). Despite this concession, Robinson still wants to depose Marx and Engels from their position of command over socialist and communist struggles.

Popular historiography has also done its fair share to reduce rebellion to a history of the revolutionary struggles of great men and women. To this day, their names are well known and their images adorn the propaganda of both the left and right. A history of great leaders and their ideas, so to speak. David Graeber (2004) argues that this is why academia and Marxism go together so well, as both of these groups revere the ideological strategies of particular intellectual and political leaders over ethical practices. As James Scott (1998) writes of Lenin’s What Is To Be Done?, “The idea that superior knowledge, authoritarian instruction, and social design could transform society pervades” the entire text. The analysis and critique of managerial impulses in Scott’s Seeing Like A State, of which Lenin’s revolutionary party is one instance, plays a central role in how I understand the functioning of modern social orders. While Scott (1998) sought to make a
case against overly schematic, imperialist social orders, noting “emphatically” that he was “not making a blanket case against either bureaucratic planning or high-modernist ideology” (p.6), I don’t share his trepidation over extending the analysis to include a managerial impulse in governance more generally. While explicitly authoritarian states and their corresponding administrations have developed especially heinous social engineering schemes throughout history, relatively democratic states have demonstrated that they are no less capable of “the administrative ordering of nature and society”, adhering to a high-modernist ideology and establishing “a prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans” (Scott, 1998, p.5). What unites Scott’s critical analysis of revolutionary leaders like Lenin and urban planners like Le Corbusier is a reduction of their utopian impulses to a managerial impulse realized in large scale social engineering schemes. The two impulses become indistinguishable, whether being realized in the revolutionary party, the scientifically planned forest or radically redeveloped cities (Scott, 1998). In navigating cities, the Occupy movement was forced to contend with how the utopian dreams of high-modernists are embodied in the fabric of urban ecologies, from the built environment to the policing of behavior. The gridded streets of downtown Phoenix, for example, offered cops a legible, ready-made network to corral OP in. Revolutionary imaginaries that themselves remain trapped in the managerial impulse, by proxy, also end up policing rebellions. The biopolitical impulse to manage life, rather than live it, began to solidify as a permanent enemy in both my thinking and ethical commitments as my affinity towards anarchism increased.
My Anarchism

Coming to my anarchist tendencies has meant the abandonment not only of Marxist-Leninist political ideologies, but also of the left generally. This has never meant embracing the right or occupying an ambiguous center, but the position is best characterized by the emergence of post-leftist tendencies in anarchism over the past several decades. Post-left anarchism draws from a longer lineage of individualists, illegalists, nihilists, rebels and those who have sought to avoid or abandon civilization. The people of Zomia in upland Southeast Asia that have historically fled the state-making projects of low-land agricultural societies for nearly two millennia express anarchist tendencies, though aren’t professedly anarchists (Scott, 2009). One of the most inspiring features of the people who have resided in the diverse regions of Zomia is their inherent heterogeneity (Scott, 2009). That kind of fragmentary existence animates what I also find attractive in post-left anarchist tendencies because they avoid projects that seek to establish homogeneity. A rather common feature of left political organizing is the call for unity. Criticizing the worst historical expressions of that through leftist attempts to coopt the energies of Black insurrections in the U.S. South, Shirley and Stafford (2015) argue

There is no single narrative that can encapsulate rebellion against oppression, no single revolutionary subject that can seize the reins of history to deliver us from our misery, no politician that can save us from this hell. There are many other stories of revolt yet to be liberated from archives or recirculated from a grandmother’s mouth, but we can only find them if we stop needing them to be legitimized by anyone other than ourselves (12).
The left has a notably strong history of narratives of struggle to attach to spontaneous uprisings and a habit of doing just that. Histories from below don’t find monolithic social movements, but local tendencies with their own embedded habits of rebellion.

It is not by happenstance or accident that I embraced a post-left tendency of anarchism given that my introduction to Phoenix anarchists came by way of the Phoenix Class War Council (PCWC). Though inactive now, their online blog, *Fires Never Extinguished*¹⁷, provides a decent history through their actions and writings. PCWC is self-described as

a fanatical, revolutionary anarchist group pressing the attack against capitalism, the state and all systems of hierarchy and oppression. We fight for a self-determined, projectual life for ourselves and all humanity. We oppose those who hinder working class self-organization. We are libertarian and libertine. We support movements but we don't wait for them. We are in the thick of it.

In stark contrast to the uninspiring Communist Party organizing I was briefly exposed to, the anarchists in PCWC were hosting actually enjoyable socials (*Beer & Revolution* being the most notable and longest-running) and putting callouts for demonstrations that not only consistently challenged the reactionary politics in Arizona, but also the standard leftist responses to it. Probably the most emblematic contrast between PCWC’s anarchist tendencies and the revolutionary leftist organizations I had previously encountered in Phoenix came at the second Inglorious Basterd’s Bloc in late-2010. While a contingent of several hundred anti-fascists, anarchists and anti-authoritarians, answering a PCWC call-out, escalated a counter-demonstration into a riot to stop neo-Nazis marching in support of SB-1070, members of the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) who

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¹⁷ See firesneverextinguished.blogspot.com
“parachuted” into Arizona stood on the sidewalk with stacks of their party newspapers to sell. RCP was there opportunistically at the behest of their “great leader”, Bob Avakian, looking for ways to coopt the energy of the larger immigrant rights movement. Important also to mention, Puente, a well-known human and immigrant rights organization in Phoenix, denounced the PCWC call for confrontation against the National Socialist Movement (NSM) in 2010, and the one the previous year. After the riotous confrontation with NSM in 2010, they have yet to organize another public demonstration in the city. PCWC’s post-left anarchism wasn’t a badge they wore, but woven through the demonstrations and socials they organized. They openly attacked attempts by popular front leftists like RCP to gain a base of organizing in Phoenix. Though I am quite sure my Leninist political orientation was questionable to them at first, something I’ve surprisingly never asked them about, they definitely respected my participation at their events and my openness to engaging with anarchists. Thinking back, I imagine this probably had to do with my non-organizational affiliation. Leninism for me was a political ideology I found appealing for a period of time, but never hung out with any Leninists, nor ever found membership in a Leninist political organization. PCWC’s post-left tendencies were never announced, but the attitude was inherent in what they did. It was never a matter of, oh hey, we’re post-left anarchists; I was just drawn to what they got up to and who they were as people.

Something about my anarchism that I explore much less overtly in this project are my nihilist or cosmic pessimist tendencies, though they are no less formative over my disposition. They are expressed through the attitudes I take towards hopefulness as a
political mobilizing tool, both in statist social engineering schemes and “yes we can”-style movement energy.

The Project

In understanding parts of my story: my way of coming (or returning) to anarchism, my present anarchist tendencies and the experiences at\textsuperscript{18} OP I write about are best framed through intervention and conflict. Given the anarchist tendencies, organizing principles and participation that permeated the larger Occupy movement, “capacities for self-organization and social conflict” were not yet “institutionalized” by the left (Shirley and Stafford, 2015, p.12). Not naïve to the strong likelihood of leftist attempts at corralling the energies of the movement, Phoenix anarchists established an affinity group and approached our participation in OP as an intervention against left social management schemes. The key points of conflict I located through my experiences as an anarchist guide the trajectory and frame the focus of the subsequent chapters. In the second chapter I draw out the implications for OP of it being a social movement threatening the

\textsuperscript{18} I choose to talk about my experiences “at” OP, rather than “with” OP, because the participation of anarchists in the movement was consistently challenged (though never completely marginalized), and the anarchist affinity group I intervened in OP with wasn’t present at any of the formative OP planning meetings prior to the first official October 14\textsuperscript{th}, 2011 demonstration. While I participated in dozens of general assemblies, marches and direct actions that were organized by OP, I wouldn’t ever say that I felt like I held a membership there. People trusted me there, and respected my participation, but the occupation felt like a perpetual action through which many things got done, as opposed to an official organization that had members. While I participated at OP, I never referred to myself as an “occupier” or said “I’m part of the movement”. Perhaps that is a testimony of my anti-organizational tendencies, or because I never stayed overnight at OP to develop stronger bonds with others who did participate in that way. Participation consistently felt uphill and interventionist because open anarchists were viewed suspiciously by many occupiers, though over time this lessened and even completely went away for certain people at OP.
social order of the city. In order to better grasp the nature of contemporary, urban social orders, it is important to ask what visions have shaped its current forms, which necessitates a concurrent examination of modern utopianism. The affinity I locate in the second chapter between leftist managerial strategies and the social engineering strategies that constitute cities provides a theoretical grounding to explain the internal movement conflicts I experienced as an anarchist. Before returning to a confrontation with the city in the sixth or final chapter, as a Luddite against what Le Corbusier calls a “scientifically planned urban machine”, I explore the limits of democracy through consensus process of the general assemblies at OP in chapter three, the ubiquitous violence/nonviolence movement debate in chapter four, and the role of policing and surveillance in the fifth chapter.

Methodologically, writing this anarchist autoethnography has offered a way to share some of the conflicts I experienced as an anarchist at OP. The focus I have given to decisions making processes, the debate about nonviolence, and attitudes towards movement policing had a shared sense of importance (and conflict) in many other cities where an occupation locally emerged (Aragorn!, 2012). Throughout my own experiences in social movements and direct actions, and in engaging the histories of other anarchists, anti-authoritarians, and rebels participating in various struggles for liberation, managerial strategies of left social movements and political organizations are clearly noticeable. These strategies help to reproduce aspects of the current social order by working to police and pacify those perceived to be most rebellious and unruly. Although the urban nature of the Occupy movement appears quite obvious, the city itself and its urban ecology remained largely absent from the tactical considerations at OP – even while being
consistently confronted with the disciplinary techniques and security measures that help to maintain the social order of the city. An engagement with historical Luddism offers anarchists and other urban rebels a way of seeing the city that challenges place-specific forms of discipline and control. Seeing the city like a Luddite makes explicitly visible the techniques and disciplinary machines that restrict autonomy in order to produce a docile and useful population in capitalist states.
CHAPTER 2
UTOPIAS, SOCIAL ORDER & THE CITY

The city! It is the grip of man upon nature. It is a human operation directed against nature, a human organism both for protection and for work.

~ Le Corbusier, The City of To-morrow and Its Planning

The two genres, utopian and apocalyptic, which once seemed so dissimilar to us, interpenetrate, rub off on each other, to form a third, wonderfully apt to reflect the kind of reality that threatens us and to which we shall nonetheless assent with a correct and disabused yes.

~ E. M. Cioran, History and Utopia

The dystopian, disciplinary ecologies of cities are the terrains on which the Occupy movement existed. At Occupy Phoenix (OP), we found ourselves in one of the downtown centers of a sprawling mass of highly legible, gridded roadways that extend out endlessly in all directions into the undeveloped desert. According to James Scott (1998) the legibility and simplification of urban space, and the population that lives and works in it, “provides the capacity for largescale social engineering,” what he names the high-modernist city. With Le Corbusier presented as exemplar urban planner of the high-modernist city, functions are to be segregated for efficiency, people are simplified to a citizenry of abstracted demographics, and aberrance completely erased or ultimately managed (Scott, 1998). In short, cities according to Le Corbusier ought to be “noble, scientifically planned urban machine[s]” (Scott, 1998, p. 115). Thankfully, though not relieving, the utopian impulse to imagine such a place can never translate “precisely as designed by its prophet-architect” (Ibid., p.117). Nevertheless, the impulse toward the utopian in modern nation-states, particularly when embodied in the social order of cities,
creates a disciplinary terrain that is unavoidable to urban social movements. The partiality of implemented utopian impulses in U.S. cities, often becoming innocuous in their mundaneness, still present serious challenges for people seeking to create social unrest in the face of widespread injustices. Whether that be the multi-lane, arterial roadways in cities which were initially developed with counter-insurgency and policing in mind (Harvey, 2006), or the disparate, isolating and endless horizontal grid of housing one finds in a city like Phoenix, which presented a challenge to many would-be occupiers getting together more regularly at Cesar Chavez Plaza in the heart of downtown. To speak more to this latter point: the difficulty for some involved in OP wasn’t only making a 20-30 mile drive, each way, from-and-back-to exurban enclaves, but in a socialized lack of meaningfulness around shared urban spaces in the downtown area. In Phoenix, this could be attributable to the disconnectedness of sprawl, something expressed by multiple people on different occasions at OP. But cars can overcome those distances. However, the downtown Phoenix area had been relatively vacant for decades in the time leading up to the emergence of the Occupy movement. While trends in downtown revitalization had begun, especially in the housing market bubble that broke in 2008, there were few meaningful spaces remaining that were remained connected to long-standing, local cultures. This is explained by neoliberal city planning strategies that would rather tear down older buildings, leave lots empty for a decade or more, and seek investment from outside developers who will create higher-scale, anaesthetized projects aimed at upwardly-mobile, placated consumers. These new “urban living” developments are marketed with a utopian flair, but are experienced from below as dystopian, disciplinary ecologies.
I think it is safe to start from the presupposition that utopian impulses are rooted in relatively benevolent desires for a better world, albeit from a particular perspective with unavoidable, though at times hidden, beliefs and interests. Conspiracy theorists begin from the opposite assumption: namely that grand social engineering schemes emerge from the evil desires of malicious cabals. I find the banality of evil thesis that Hannah Arendt (1994) put forward in her critical exposition of Nazi Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem to be far more convincing on the question of intent in the administration of statist regimes. Metaphysical understandings of evil are unhelpful in explaining the functionary, day-to-day activities that maintain large social orders. Metaphysical evil also plays an important conceptual role in high modernist discourses about the necessity of progress by any means, making the demonization of heretics, rebels, scapegoats, naysayers and holdouts that much easier (Slack and Wise, 2007). Indifferent to differences on the left/right political spectrum, these impulses have been mobilized through “state power to bring about huge, utopian changes in people’s work habits, living patterns, moral conduct, and worldview” (Scott, 1998, p.5). Modern impulses towards the utopian, despite their benevolent intent, and taking the best cases from liberal democratic societies where planners are forced to make temporary concessions in the presence of social unrest, have led only to moderate reforms within highly stratified, statist regimes. Dependent upon who you are and where and how you live in an urban social order, even the reforms that nowhere near approximate the marketed visions of utopian dreams only thinly veil the cities that many experience as dystopian, disciplinary ecologies. The quintessential utopian city on a shining hill is an organized nightmare
when not being viewed from the god’s eye perspective of a planner or the sales pitch of a neoliberal city official.

It is an unavoidable necessity to provide a theoretically grounded discussion about how utopian impulses are incorporated into the built environment of urban social orders, without distracting too much from my personal experiences with OP in subsequent chapters. With this research focused on involvement in an explicitly urban social movement that was subject to continuous police repression, it seems important to me to address the ways in which modern utopian impulses are satisfied within the social order of cities, and to what ends. Are cities, as Le Corbusier dreamed, designed to be noble, scientifically planned urban machines? Was the temporary disruption of that plan by the Occupy movement part of the reasoning for a nationally coordinated police repression against it? Whose utopian dreams was Occupy threatening? The political economic importance of the free flow of goods, services and workers through the urban centers of the republics of property are threatened by social unrest. The Occupy movement threatened the smooth functioning of the capitalist city.

Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* and Lenin in all of his polemical writings against political and antipolitical enemies deployed ‘utopian’ as a slur. Utopian, from the perspective of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary treatise, meant something like unrealistic dreamers, often attached to the bourgeois intellectuals, libertarian socialists or anarchists of their time. That sort of so-called unrealistic utopian dreaming, even if I’m not particularly sympathetic to it, is of little consequence compared to the lucid dreaming of high-modernists like Lenin and Le Corbusier. Utopianism, as the dreaming of future social orders, only really becomes dangerous in the hands of authoritarians and state
administrators (Scott, 1998). This is not to imply that the utopian impulses of individuals are otherwise neutral, but that their tendency towards developing social engineering schemes remain unrealized. By contrast, speaking of high-modernist desires, Le Corbusier (1987) reminds us, “What gives our dreams their daring is that they can be realized” (p.150). My permanent suspicion with social management schemes comes not only from confrontations with them, but also through an engagement with the theoretical frameworks of dreamers of future social orders, from political revolutionaries to technophiles to urban planners. Where else other than cities do we find the most phantasmagoric visions of the future forced onto the surface of this planet? In this chapter I explore the nightmarish, disciplinary systems that have emerged out of the benevolent dreams of utopians. The goal is to understand what the utopian dreams are in order to better survive through the nightmarish social orders they have been animated in.

Utopian dreams of perfectly planned, docile societies are unrealized fantasies of control; upon manifestation through the efforts of state administrators, they are operationalized in the strategies of maintaining safety and security in a social order. Because there remains a persistent margin for error in every system, doubts can arise in a population and threaten to erode public support for social engineering schemes. Narratives of hope and fear have proved to be the most effective way to emotionally redirect doubts about future plans or past failures. Through a rather complex exposition of the emotions, Spinoza (2000) posited that certain emotions like hope and fear, love and hate, differ only in their expressed relationship to pleasure and pain. Accordingly, hope being an inconstant pleasure, pain an inconstant pain, both of which having “arisen from the idea of a thing that is future or past, about whose outcome we are in some doubt”
When provoked through moral frameworks, the emotions of hope and fear aide in facilitating the rather smooth functioning of a disciplinary system, precisely because it saves an authority from needing to resort to violence. The problem with overt expressions of state violence for administrators rests not in the capacity to dish it out, but in the management of the public response to it. Writing of eighteenth-century hangings in England, Peter Linebaugh (2006) notes that the “agony of the hanging stirred various emotions – rage, glee, pity, terror and fear – with their own potentialities of action” (p.xxii). Similarly, as I write, responses to the recorded executions of Black people on the streets of U.S. cities have given rise to various emotions, most especially the outrage towards police violence resulting in mass uprisings for months across the country. While the state retains a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, this legitimacy is easier to manage and maintain when doubts about it are self-policing within a population.

The Three Pillars of Social Order

In his late lectures, Michel Foucault (2007) proposed that three political strategies for maintaining social order have emerged in modern, Western societies: legal/juridical; disciplinary mechanisms; and security apparatuses. The legal/juridical pillar of social order creates demarcated populations grouped together into neighborhoods, cities, counties and states (Foucault, 2007). This pillar deals specifically with the concept of belonging based upon how well people adhere to standards of justice created to maintain peace (Kropotkin, 2006). Peter Kropotkin (2006), considered the founder of modern social ecology, argues that the modern sovereign and its power to punish grew out of collective demands for standardized legal codes and civils rights. Standardized legal
codes require arbitration, a judge to handle disputes. Among the three political strategies used to maintain social order, the legal/juridical pillar is by far the most abstract. It is what Foucault (1995) famously referred to as the soul “of a political anatomy” and “the prison of the body” (p. 30).\textsuperscript{19} Later conceptualized as biopolitics (Foucault, 2007), which can be otherwise understood as the administration of life, the soul refers to the legible, simplified and accounted for aspects of our existences that are monitored and counted by social managers and state administrators. The collective agreement of a population – made either explicitly or implicitly – to adhere to some social contract, which formally regulates the behavior of individuals, works by ascribing negative rights to those determined to belong. This functions mainly through the framework of citizenship in modern nation states. Belonging, in this classic liberal sense, has much to do with how people act in accordance to legal standards and dominant, majoritarian social norms.\textsuperscript{20} The legal/juridical pillar creates a population based not upon shared space, but through emphasizing proper social and political behavior. This is quite easy to see demonstrated in the U.S. through the history of white supremacy in the chattel slavery system, Jim Crow laws, segregation and mass incarceration (Olson, 2004). Even after the state granted the concessions of civil rights to Black people in the 1960s, whiteness remained

\textsuperscript{19} Foucault makes a rather convincing argument that this is where the modern concept of (negative) rights come from that adorn state constitutions, especially the U.S. one.

\textsuperscript{20} To offer an example from within OP: understandings of good and bad protestors have been defined by cops and media in terms of adherence to legal and moral authority, establishing a sense of what the population of a social movement should look like. Good protestors follow laws, or at least follow police instructions when breaking laws during acts of civil disobedience, and respect the moral authority of the law in general as something not to undermine. They speak out, but only until an assembly is declared unlawful. Bad protestors disregard both the law and demands to follow the orders of arbitrary moral authorities.
the defining category of political belonging because its political imagination defined the legal/juridical pillar of the U.S. social order (Olson, 2004). The political commitment to anti-Blackness in the U.S. continues because an integrationist politics of inclusion achieves membership, but only by demonstrating a willingness to behave properly. Until whiteness isn’t the standard for what counts as proper belonging, calls for unity and peace in social movements and struggles for liberation will reproduce the systems of hierarchy and subordination they profess to challenge.

Populations are governed by a territorial sovereign that does not simply demarcate members abstractly, but also deploys a whole series of disciplinary mechanisms that function as the next pillar of social order (Foucault, 2007). “The basic function of discipline”, Foucault (2007) writes, “is to prevent everything, even and above all the details” (p.45). This is the sphere of active policing and punishment, but discipline isn’t simply a function of punitive justice as carried out by a network of people.21 The built environment can be just as disciplining of behavior as a cop or prison guard. Consider this ubiquitous urban example: the walls and fences constructed around a gated community are erected primarily to keep people who don’t belong out of those exclusive spaces. Even someone who is a member of that community would be unable to get in (save scaling the physical barrier) if they lost their access key or couldn’t present the proper identification that qualified their belonging. Walls are the ideal disciplinary mechanism because they do not discriminate.22 Even the most ardently by-the-book cop

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21 See critical police studies.
is limited in the effectiveness of their discipline by their subjectivity. Walls (until they are torn down) continuously regulate everyone and everything that encounters them. In order for discipline to function as the primary method of maintaining social order, an empty, artificial space must be constructed to create a totally planned environment (Foucault, 2007). However, in a capitalist market economy, growth and progress put serious stresses upon rigid planning techniques. The circulation of capital, labor, goods and services has a revolutionizing effect upon villages, towns and cities, essentially forcing social managers to adapt their administrative techniques to meet future needs for maintaining order that are not exactly known in advance. In capitalist markets, the calculation of statistical probabilities crucially aids in the forecasting of places and times for profitable investment. Foucault (2007) mapped this economic framework of imperfect assurances onto the management of populations in cities: “It is simply a matter of maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient” (p.19). However, when the disciplinary walls of medieval cities were dismantled to make way for capitalist economic development (particularly the relatively free flow of capital), the “harmful” elements that were previously neutralized by the disciplinary function of walls became a much more ominous threat (Foucault, 2007).

Disciplinary techniques and machines function as a way of keeping things from changing, of maintaining certain habits and enforcing codified behavior. It is inherently

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23 Walls, even after they are torn down, can be seen regulating the behavior of nonhuman animals who had previously established new migratory paths in response to a physical barrier. Reference here to article about Iron Curtain.
conservative, and acts as the immune system of a given social order. Disciplinary mechanisms are the default instruments of control for sovereign authorities when people fail to self-regulate their behavior. Yet how do we reconcile the conservative function of discipline in social orders with the technologically progressive and ever-changing makeup of our contemporary cities? Or following Foucault, we might ask what kind of cities are created through the disciplinary mechanisms of the social order. Fredric Jameson (2007) very rightfully points out that cities are one of the most utopian undertakings in human history. They involve the creation, maintenance and continual revamping of massive socio-technological infrastructures. How then do we account for the fact that social order is not simply kept, but successfully thrives amidst the flux of urban development? I would like to propose, and develop throughout this chapter, the idea that social order is maintained in contemporary U.S. cities through the piecemeal incorporation of utopian, urban planning schemes, or what James Scott (2009) would call state-making projects: attempts at socially engineering large concentrations of people by establishing a highly legible population and environment, seen largely through standardized measures and national language. While discipline is but one of the three pillars of social order, it is arguably the one most wedded to the teleological function-follows-form model contained in nearly every utopian program. Disciplinary techniques very directly reinforce the legal/juridical pillar of the sovereign.

The built environment of cities cannot simply be reduced to an architectural aesthetic or a network of usable features, but is also a mechanism of control. In fact, it is when the aesthetics and utility of the built environment are rendered indistinguishable from its disciplinary function that social order is most efficiently maintained in spite of
the continual flux of city life. Foucault (2007) importantly notes that the circulation of capital required the dismantling of medieval cities, especially their surrounding town walls. Despite its privileging of less obstructed spaces for trade routes, market capitalism requires a great deal of administrative structure to control the influx of “questionable” migrants to whom cities had become much more accessible. The deployment of surveillance and security measures in cities – the third pillar of social order – doesn’t mean that a disciplinary built environment isn’t still constructed to keep certain people out of certain places. Gated communities, for instance, function much in the same way as previous walled medieval cities, complete with guarded gates and checkpoints controlling access. In addition, other novel developments in cities, like massive freeway systems, function not simply as transportation paths, but also as physical barriers to non-automobile traffic that very directly manage space (Rodgers, 2007), not to mention the way that entire neighborhoods are torn down and/or divided in the process, which is to say nothing of the environmental and cultural desecration that these types of projects have upon Native American indigenous populations. In the Phoenix area and on the Gila River Indian Community, the development of the Loop 202 freeway extension up against the base of South Mountain has been a long-contested issue. The progressive innovations of cities, while liberating certain spaces for approved activities, have inherent to them a series of commands, sometimes openly displayed, though many times simply inferred.

25 I always use the term ‘innovation’ in a derogatory way, to call out how it is deployed in urban development projects to provide a false air of benevolence.
Phoenix is a city, with a massive, sprawling, gridded layout, and its mostly unwalkable spaces, commanding residents and visitors alike to get access to a motorized vehicle of some sort (or hope that the public transit system will be feasible as an alternative to an automobile). Grids lend themselves perfectly to policing and surveillance given their high degree of legibility – something crucial to mapping (Scott, 1998). If you ever doubt the commands that are inherent to certain urban spaces, I invite you to test\textsuperscript{26} them in your daily life by challenging the framework of legal protocols that are deployed to specify how people and things should move through cities. Following Foucault, I explore the overt and mundane disciplinary mechanisms in place, such as elaborate gridded roadways, walls and hedges, that produce subjects in cities as a way of maintaining social order. In robbing these mechanisms of their smooth, innocuousness, they can be connected more easily to other forms of oppression and subordination.

In light of the changes that have taken place in cities over the past several hundred years, it is important to understand what novel apparatuses have been set up to help maintain social order in constantly fluctuating, comparatively open spaces. Given the complexity of ever-expanding, contemporary cities, spaces and people must be simplified and made legible to maximize the effectiveness of surveillance technologies for the purpose of maintaining security or effective management of the populace. Foucault (2007) suggests that this is a matter best handled by calculations of statistical probability. The collecting of demographic information in modern states – who people are, where

\textsuperscript{26} This testing could involve any number of challenges to protocol, though become especially problematic to social managers (and people expecting a smooth movement through urban spaces) when roadways are obstructed in some way.
they live, what they do, etc. – allows for a more efficient management of a population. According to Scott (1998), it was the standardization of demographic information that allowed it to be more simply collected, meaning that even things like the creation of permanent last names function in a way so as to make a population more legible and easier to manage. The legibility of a population and terrain relates to mapping in the way that simplification relates to statistics. This adaptation of governance in modern nation-states allows not only for an inventory of land, resources and labor, but also for an inventory of deviance (Scott, 1998). State administrators can effectively target certain areas of a city for surveillance and discipline because those spaces have been simplified and made highly legible. Taken for granted things like street addresses and neatly planned transportations routes make policing much easier than they otherwise would be if a thorough knowledge of local geography were a prerequisite. The growth of police forces corresponds quite readily with the increase in circulation routes for capital; and in the U.S. specifically with the tracking down of runaway slaves. Foucault (2007) argues that it is impossible, in advance, to guard against all the various ways that city spaces may be used if open circulation for capitalist markets is desired. On the one hand, goods and services must be able to move freely and efficiently, but this leaves open opportunities, especially on the street, for undesirable elements like thieves and rioters. Given the value placed upon private property by capitalist regimes, streets – and really all spaces valuable to the circulation of capital – require the territorial sovereign to deploy security and disciplinary mechanisms. This will take the form of networked surveillance.

27 See also Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*. 
technologies, built environment design, active policing and local ordinance. The novelty that security measures, specifically surveillance technologies, offer to a social order is the prospect of a ubiquitous reminder that one should be self-disciplining. Cameras specifically remind people that someone might be watching and therefore you should be on your best behavior. For instance, multiple cameras were installed on the rooftops of the buildings that surrounded Cesar Chavez Plaza in downtown Phoenix to remind occupiers of just that.

These three pillars of social order function together as an assemblage.28 Taxonomically, this “anthropomorphic assemblage” could be called the state (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005), society or civilization, in that these concepts name the result of maintaining social order. Against the oversimplified periodization of technological eras, we should not see security and surveillance networks as the primary method of maintaining social order, as if legal/juridical and disciplinary approaches somehow have been outmoded. Previous techniques remain in use (and quite necessary), even if they are used in coordination with novel approaches. Disciplinary mechanisms, such as the erection of walls and fences or the use of force by increasingly militarized police departments, remain ubiquitous throughout contemporary U.S. cities and actively aid in the management of populations. Likewise, populations continue to be demarcated through complex and abstract legal/juridical protocols, which offers the retroactive

28 My use of ‘assemblage’ here is derived from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. An assemblage isn’t simply a collection of unrelated things, but refers to a novel whole that is continuously produced through the agglomeration of interrelated parts, though isn’t reducible to any of those parts. Our social order would collapse in the absence of any one pillar, but isn’t simply the combined character of each pillar.
justification for when cops assume a threat, for example, of a Black man walking down the street at night. The bi-polar racial order in the U.S. had been embedded in the legal/juridical framework even before it became a country. It will be examples like the policing of Black communities that help illuminate the relationship between the three pillars of social order, utopian thinking and urban development – on why certain people are marked out as deviant either before they’ve done anything or through certain innocuous details of their appearance or behavior. When we look at what Loïc Wacquant (2008) calls ‘urban outcasts’, we find a concerted effort carried out through public policy, done in the service of particular interest groups, to marginalize certain groups as outsiders from secured enclaves within cities. Simultaneously, barriers are built, and security officers are deployed, in order to respond to the ever-widening surveillance network that, unfortunately, people voluntarily participate in. Legal/juridical institutions continuously and carefully define what behavior qualifies people for membership in the population and to categorically exempt certain people from ever being able to be considered for membership because of their behavior.

I will be looking at the significant developments of urban development in the U.S. during the past several hundred years, including some of its colonial history, in order to diagram out dominant regulating strategies through the three pillars of social order in cities. In contrast to the perfected plans of utopians that project onto the world a totalizing, closed system, when their plans are put into development, they must contend

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29 The way in which social networking technologies like Facebook can function as an aspect of this will be explored in chapter five below, notably in my own successful attempt at blocking a proposal to extend the Occupy Phoenix general assembly to online participants.
not only the previously existing terrain, but also with ongoing resistance and rebellion to the larger, authoritarian schema (Scott, 1998). Urban planners and architects rarely consider the heterogenous needs and desires of the people who will be living in the spaces they imagine on paper, in scale models or in three-dimensional modeling programs. The people imagined are schematized, thus divorced from any specified, affective embeddedness in such spaces. Proposals for urban developments typically display smooth, dream-like spaces, constructed more as advertisements than actual models of a lived space. And when planners and architects do consider who might live in their imagined spaces, residents are imagined as abstracted, model subjects primed to consume the form as intended. This is equally true for more reflexive planning approaches such as those of the new urbanists, which should be clear to anyone currently residing in a large U.S. city where luxury, mixed-use developments are being built at an alarming rate without consideration for the people who currently reside there.

There are several consequences to omitting actual people from planned urban forms. For one, many people end up feeling alienated from parts of the city supposedly designed for their use. The built environment, unsympathetic to those traversing it, functions, intentionally and naively, as a network of disciplinary technologies that maintain social order. Thankfully, spontaneous urban rebellions rarely get accounted for in advance, which however requires continuous, fragmented-but-heavy-handed policing and surveillance. And of final consequence, an array of unintended consequences and technological failures that are not easily repaired as the folly of constant progress reaches its limits. Nonetheless, with cities increasingly becoming the centers of human existence – where over fifty percent of people in the world now reside – planners, developers and
architects will continue to work alongside state officials and capitalist investors to secure marketable spaces while simultaneously attempting to maintain social order.

To what degree did the Occupy movement challenge aspects of the prevailing capitalist social order? And to what degree did elements in it reproduce discernable parts of the status quo? What I am paradoxically investigating is the way that social orders change in order to keep things the same, often as a reaction to rebellion and social unrest. In this way, social innovations act as the basis for conserving political power (Clastres, 2010, p.24). Adaptation in this sense has functioned not as the means of survival in a species as an evolutionary biologist would characterize it, but as a way of prolonging a specific social order that ultimately seeks to evade its adaptive deficiencies through technological innovation.

_Utopia, or the Non-place Built by The Horrifying Dreams of Progress_

“The utopian”, write Avery Gordon, “has a bad reputation in many circles, especially radical intellectual ones” (Gordon, 2004, p.113). Gordon (2004) wants to recuperate the utopian as something other than a history of terrible social engineering and state-making projects; she wants to liberate the dream of another world being possible in the face of dystopian, global capitalist regimes. I do sympathize with Gordon’s argument, and think that she is right in urging us not to overestimate the power authorities have in making us conform to their utopian program. However, I believe this should lead us away from utopianism to a place where our dreams are grounded in more immediate, libertine imaginations, which we have developed a capacity to fulfill. Utopianism is wrought with fantasies about possible worlds that are mired in hopes and
fears of the future, to frame the conversation using Spinoza’s language. Thus while I’m very attracted to the experiments that emerge from a liberated and libertine imaginations, what Fredric Jameson (2007) somewhat similarly calls utopian impulses, I am perpetually antagonistic to any attempt at systematizing those impulses because that is essentially just a manager’s job. Utopianism, I’d posit, is limited in the same way that hermeneutics, or the practice of the linguistic interpretation of texts, is. Virtual spaces of possibility are opened by the ability of people to abstractly interpret situations differently. This statement is qualified by the terms “virtual” and “abstractly” because I do think there is an important difference between merely linguistic interpretations and the embodiment a change of perspective. As a philosophic discipline, hermeneutics emerged from transcendental thought (Rosen, 2003), which is also where I’d argue utopianism has its origins. I don’t think that the influence of the linguistic turn in Western philosophy can

30 My thinking remains very indebted to Spinoza’s Ethics in many ways, particularly in the crucial distinctions he makes between both ethics and morality, as well as between capacity and possibility. Ethics, for Spinoza, is grounded in a rich description of very concrete modes of being, whereas morality remains an attempt to impose inadequate ideas of the world as if they were universal duties we ought to adhere to. Possibility, for Spinoza, is a modality of hopes and fears about the future; whereas capacity, as a concept, seeks to describe the actual valences of people as they exist in the world. It is no small footnote in the history of Western philosophy that the idea of other possible worlds emerges from the philosophy of Gottfried Leibniz, someone who very much venerated the genius in Spinoza’s framework, but couldn’t follow him to his atheistic conclusion that God is just an infinitely extended, impersonal substance. If one was to delve into Leibniz’s fascinating monadology, one would find the precursors of multiverse theories that, I would argue, simply seek to preserve the possibility for alternative conclusions to the decisions we make. It holds out the hope for alternatives that our decisions have foreclosed. And this is because some of the greatest fears that human beings have emerge from the knowledge of our frail mortality: namely, that we will die and there’s nothing we can do to change that.
be downplayed in terms of its influence over leftist thought in the 20th- and 21st-centuries, which is why I bring it up here in relation to contemporary thinking about utopianism.

The difference between Jameson’s (2007) utopian impulses – the imperative to imagine possible alternatives (p. 416) – and what I’m calling a liberated and libertine imagination, rests in the way that allegory and narrative are approached. By Jameson’s own admission, utopian impulses are specifically ahistorical despite emerging from certain grounded conditions of existence, because they are said to signify a transcendental break with those conditions (Jameson, 2007, p.37). The desire for a transcendental break comes from anxiety and the attempt to escape from it without suffering through it. By this I mean that when life is imagined as something reduced to linguistics, regardless of how rich the interpretation, the raw material of existence is necessarily and unfortunately excluded. This difference can be demonstrated in how sacred texts are engaged with.

From a hermeneutic or utopian perspective, sacred texts can offer opportunities for prophetic openings that break with current circumstances. From my position, one that is heavily influenced by Spinoza, sacred texts are seen as emerging from certain historical circumstances as ways of making sense of the world that ultimately are inadequate even if they are very meaningful and resonate on a large scale. Utopia then becomes the only place where free will can be valorized, even in its most secular interpretation. Autonomy doesn’t require free will because the fact that we’re all born into a world we don’t choose isn’t something to lament unless one has the constitution for suicide. That is the nihilist in me speaking, but that position is appealing to me because it cuts to heart of many issues even if it presents a bleak framework to operate in. Though even if everything is profane, it is unavoidable that human beings make sense of the world through allegory
and narrative. But we can’t be so naïve to think that those stories emerge from a vacuum. Unfortunately, both Jameson and Gordon maintain that aspects of the utopian remain free as pure, interpreted expressions, separate from specific historical conditions like wishes are from the randomness of the conditions of wish fulfillment.

The problem with seeing the future in terms of possibilities that emerge through some dutiful need to dream them is that a cumbersome dualism is openly maintained: what Jameson (2007) frames as the distinction between utopian impulse and really existing utopian projects/programs. And with the utopian project/program, Jameson (2007) declares that an intention exists for realizing the vision through political policy and practice. In the former sense, the utopian is like a daydream, retaining an adolescent, benevolent naivety; whereas in the latter sense, the utopian becomes a lure, or bait, for ideology – these representations of the future are, in their worst cases, devoid of reference to any present capability of realizing them without a genocidal slate cleaning. Consider Le Corbusier’s mid-nineteenth century plan to level Paris in order to realize his vision conveniently avoids dealing with the desires of the people who lived there or what those people could accommodate. Even in more benevolent manifestations that appeal to a mythic sense of community, utopian projects/programs make cumbersome attempts to bring the lived experiences of people back into the fold of planning: “New Urbanism builds an image of community and a rhetoric of place-based civic pride and consciousness for those who do not need it, while abandoning those that do to their ‘underclass’ fate” (Harvey, 1997).

Though what is it that keeps the utopian impulse as something distinct from the utopian program it influences, especially given the terrible track record of utopian
political projects? The desire to keep them distinct seems to be motivated by a desire for purity, which is something the I would argue plagues all dualistic perspectives: one part is typically the corrupting influence, whereas the other is the liberating or transcendent part. Even when dualisms are inverted, they remain cumbersome and problematic to navigate. Jameson’s (2007) utopian impulse strikes me as the part he wants to save from the corruption of, for example, the imagining of spatial totalities to be mapped upon city spaces (p.3). It is hard to see how the duty to have daydreams of a better life (or utopian impulses) remain simply detached, transcendental possibilities, when one starts reading about what influences notable utopian planners. Alternatively, Karl Mannheim (1936) would argue these above examples of plans for city redevelopment are not utopian at all, but ideological: the difference being that ideological approaches to social change are said to maintain “the existing order of things”, while utopian approaches are said to be exclusively revolutionary in their seeking to break with the current social order (pp.192-193). However, let us consider the dystopian scenario of Le Corbusier’s plan for Paris as an example that is decidedly revolutionary, but that would have reproduced most aspects of the prevailing social order. As Fishman (1977) notes, the ideals of urban visionaries are mediated by prevailing social theories, national traditions and individual personality. How could it be otherwise? And beyond that, why would one desire a complete escape from the present? To answer this last question is to betray one’s present desires, and thus demonstrate why the present is inescapable for anyone except through death.

What is dangerous about utopian thinking, and likewise managerial ideologies, is not whether they are revolutionary or reforming, but that they are imagined by experts who assume an omniscient, god-like vantage point over human groups. The distinction
Mannheim makes between utopia and ideology immediately collapses when the managerial approach of both paths is pointed out. Social order requires maintenance, whether revolutionary, reforming or reactionary. An implicit assumption is made when someone assumes that we might somehow escape the horrible folly of the current social order if our desires are revolutionary (i.e. utopian) enough. The problem is that one person’s revolutionary dreams consistently end up being so many other people’s reactionary, dystopian nightmares when imposed politically. Politics have always been about social management when the connections between the emergence of civilization and urban culture are diagramed out (Evans, 2013). Etymologically even, politics refers to the organization of the polis, or city. And this hasn’t much changed as a project originally imagined by Greek philosophers several thousand years ago. The problem then isn’t that we have differing judgements about what ought to be done (that will always and unavoidably be the case for creatures with desires), but the problem comes when some people desire to organize political power around their interests for the purpose of systematically imposing themselves upon others.

Thankfully, dreams and desires aren’t inherently utopian. They become utopian when, first, we create a political program for the future that purports to hypothetically provide for the interests of a particular kind of human being, or what Foucault would designate as a population; and second, when, in our desires, we fail to account for the impossibility of bringing that political program to realization given the limits of current, collective human capacities (Gray, 2007). Now, I’m not going to trace this line of thought into a crass anti-utopianism that would foreclose upon the importance of the imagination. Jameson (2007) aptly attempts to preserve what is truly important in the
utopian: namely a creative imagination that operates in a way unmediated by social management schemes, despite his relegation of this creative impulse to what I’d lament as a Kantian imperative.\textsuperscript{31} Being anti-utopian in the sense I am advocating is not about a desire for guarantees – \textit{for there are none} – nor is it about pragmatism. My position against utopianism is grounded in a critique of possible world theories, which, following Spinoza, I would characterize as emerging solely from the feelings of hope and fear. Fantasies of other possible worlds requires a chasm to be constructed between our dreams and our continually affected capacities, as if our dreaming were able to escape our bodies. I do not mean this in a mechanistic or crass materialist reductive sort of way, but that particular emotional attitudes towards the future construct metaphysical realms so as to reflect back a judgement of assuring the dreamer of the fantasy’s value. The trouble with dualisms is that they posit profound metaphysical categories based upon false distinctions. Since I won’t assume that anyone reading this will have engaged with how the philosophies of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz form a conversation that encapsulates dualistic cultural ideas in the West, I will seek to establish here how the mind/body dualism maps onto the distinction between utopian impulse and utopian projects. It is not that there needs to be a demand for a blueprint of how to realize our utopian fantasies – in fact, that is exactly what I argue needs to be avoided. There is a wide chasm between our utopian dreams and our collective capacities to realize them that produces the social and

\textsuperscript{31} The concept of duty that Jameson integrates into the utopian impulse, I would argue, is reducible to something like one of Kant’s categorical imperatives. This is why I would characterize it as having a transcendental status, given that this is how Kant would anachronistically describe Jameson’s framework. It is not the case that I don’t appreciate the distinction that Jameson makes between utopian impulses and utopian projects, but there is an ontological dualism that underwrites it.
political conditions that the nightmarish realities of modern, urban societies thrive. Though these nightmares are predominantly lived by people who inhabit the most marginalized and subordinated groups. The impulse gets imagined as being transcendental in order escape from being corrupted by the projects. There is no guarantee of incorruptibility, except for those things imagined to escape from the corrupting influences of the world. The utopian impulse, then, can be best understood as a quasi-religious category that eschews impulsiveness in the true emotional sense of it while staking a transcendental claim over the passionate side of life.

The challenge to ontological dualisms and false distinctions (or dichotomies) is a common theme throughout this project, be it reform/revolution, violence/nonviolence, order/chaos or utopian/dystopia. My desire is to cut through certain arguments in leftist social movements that are predicated on Cartesian-like dualisms. This sort of dualistic thinking will be most notably on display and criticized in the fourth chapter below in the debates against nonviolence.

Deserts: The Limit of Liberal Utopian Imagination

Deserts grow and continue to grow (anonymous, 2011).

Modern utopian thought is an attempt to map out the conditions that would circumvent the growth of deserts and the collapse of civilizations. Given its roots in European cultural traditions and its political foundation in classic liberalism, utopianism ends up being simultaneously conservative and progressive (Herf, 1984). Against this, and again indebted to Spinoza, I would argue that our desires are best articulated in projects that are neither conservative nor progressive (Bijlsma, 2011). Spinoza’s Ethics coupled with Eugene Thacker’s cosmic pessimism will be accomplices in thinking our
way out of the utopian without needing to relegate ourselves to a horribly ironic, postmodern ambivalence or a crass, authoritarian realism.

Utopianism as a tendency has no particular favoring of right over left forms of state governance. However, they converge in transcendental, religious imaginaries, particularly wedded to a narrative in which technology is savior (Noble, 1999). Even the most presumably secular utopian programs, those of the Marxists for example, betray a deeply religious structure of belief in providence.

The main structure of Thacker’s (2011) argument from *In the Dust of this Planet* rests upon fleshing out the consequences of three ways of seeing the world: as an anthropocentric world-for-us; as an elusive but objective world-in-itself to be discovered through scientific inquiry; and finally, as a horrific and unthinkable world-without-us that betrays the meaninglessness of human life from a cosmological standpoint. In utopian terms, the world-for-us characterizes the reduction of nature to a mere means to the ends of human civilization. The goal is more than imposing human will upon the world, but to objectify everything as something reducible to the projects of scientific inquiry and knowledge acquisition where the nonhuman world becomes reduced to an assemblage of objects and resources to be put to work. The world-without-us, however, presents us with not only the limit of our collective capacity to avoid death as a species regardless of our technological innovations, but also with a world in which we are but specks of dust that are meaningless from the perspective of the universe. Trying to assume this perspective of the universe short-circuits anthropomorphizing because it is entirely inhuman. The world-without-us can neither be utopian nor dystopian; it simply is, and yet remains the most unthinkable thing. If one were to frame this in psychoanalytic
terms, the anxiety caused by attempting to think about the world-without-us – a morally
impermissible thing from any religious or secular standpoint – represents an inhibition of
ego-functioning, and utopian thinking becomes a symptom of this inhibition (Freud,
1959). The imagining of other possible, future worlds, in the utopian sense, is an attempt
to get beyond the horror of life on this planet. Though even the impulses that push for
this escape cannot help but drag emotional baggage with them. There can be no clean
break and the attempt to impose one – with even the most benevolent of intentions – has
ended up manufacturing the worst horrors in the process. It is the discomfort with the
unknowable in human civilization that leads utopians and administrators alike to seek out
the planning and development of a closed system. Of course, no such system can exist,
but this has not stopped the attempt at creating one, if only to try and keep civilization’s
deepest fears buried.

Gordon (2004) characterizes utopia as an elsewhere, or an otherwise, that must be
thought if we are to escape our present hell of global capitalism (p.116). Gordon, like
many academics and intellectuals, miss the way that ongoing rebellions, crime and
shameless anti-authoritarian acts in daily life subvert the “merely utopian” already:
preventing utopian programs from being imposed as their authoritarian, social engineer’s
original intended – in short, people rebel (Scott, 1998). The desire for something
“elsewhere” or “otherwise”, as an alternative to contemporary conservative dystopias,
relies heavily on a progressive, leftist utopianism (Gray, 2007), which is itself still riddled
with social and moral management looking to guide us to one of these possible future
places. The oppressive and subordinating political consequences of designing a future
like this as an abstract thought experiment are unavoidable, regardless of whether this
future is thought in the dreams of an urban planner or as a reaction to the nightmares that radical intellectuals and activists are confronting. Most radical theorists on the left fail to recognize the technological progressivism inherent to conservative dystopias (Herf, 1984), and are simply reacting against the conservative cultural formations (white privilege, patriarchy, heteronormativity, etc.) by positing the possibility of another, more just world that escapes identity-based oppressions while largely ignoring the administrative technologies of social order. Justice itself, as an organizing social and political principle, is assumed as the basis for many leftist utopian imaginaries without challenging any of the pillars of social order, or simply trying to put a kinder face on them. Imagining a more just society as a utopian “elsewhere” or “otherwise” falls into the trap of failing to take into account how the administration of social justice, for example through an expansion of human rights, implies an increase in policing and surveillance. Human rights requires a regime, even if it does seek to address some issues of inequality and mistreatment. Commenting on the dystopian reality of statelessness for so many Jewish people in the aftermath of the second world war, Arendt (1996) conceptualized “the right to have rights” which pointed to an underlying structural limit to the demand for human rights, namely its reliance upon citizenship (and hence the state). Someone has to define, enforce and surveil human rights on a large scale. I argue that this will remain a feature of every utopian “elsewhere” and “otherwise” that seeks to maintain a social order rather than elude or attack it.

Despite there being an inability to reduce utopian imaginaries merely to a function of modern urban planning schemes, cities do occupy an exemplary case to consider, which is why I am theorizing the production of cities, social order and utopia together. It
is within cities in both capitalist and communist states that Scott (1998) finds the most far-reaching attempts at improving the human condition, which have largely failed. I will be focusing in the next section on urban utopias – both imagined and partially implemented – but I think it is important to first ground utopian projects in the cultural desires that fueled them.

Jameson (2007) discusses the utopian, in part, as a desire for alternative social and economic futures with a strong relationship to both science fiction as a literary genre and the politics of ending history. Utopianism is said to involve the impulse for a better life, being inherently “future-oriented” on the one hand, though on the other hand, utopianism also collects together a series of socio-political experiments done in the past and present (Jameson, 2007). Utopia is a dream, a science fiction, about progress that is continuously imagined through a framework of technological and social management innovations. One might even go so far as to label the entire genre of utopianism as technologically deterministic given the centrality that technology and techniques occupy in utopian scheming. Dreaming, if we take Freud (1995) at his research, is fundamentally comprised of desires (wish-fulfillment) or the distortion of desires caused by anxiety and fear. In U.S. cultural imaginaries, desires and fears are respectively fulfilled and overcome, at least temporarily, through technological progress (Slack & Wise, 2005). Consider the fulfillment of numerous science fiction fantasies during the 20th- and early 21st-century: space exploration, mass inoculation against disease, advanced virtual warfare, nanotechnology, wireless communication, self-driving vehicles, and the continuing expansion of automated systems. So many of these innovations were earlier imagined by science fiction writers and film-makers earlier in the 20th-century, not in a
teleological way, but in a way that reflects certain cultural desires. Bill Joy (2000), in his (at the time) widely popular essay “Why the future doesn’t need us” in Wired magazine, contrasts science fiction stories with scientific and technological realities to give us a skeptical form of futurism. Futurism, though celebrating technological progress, especially in urban development, is not quite utopian, which helps to understand why Joy’s skeptical futurism only flirts with contrasting dystopian imaginaries. Utopianism, as distinguished from futurism, is not simply a celebration of progress, but points to the underlying dream of divine perfection through progress, even if framed in the secular language of the Enlightenment (Gray, 2007). Thus, to reiterate my previous statement in a slightly different way: utopia is a dream, a science fiction, about overcoming the limits of finite, mortal beings. Whether those limits are biological or moral makes no difference – in fact, the line between the two are blurred by utopian projects that end up being either intentionally or accidentally genocidal in application. The utopian, with some of its imaginaries as they are expressed in cyber-punk literature and film, flirt constantly with post-humanist ideology in which seemingly progressive daydreaming embraces conservative and reactionary identity politics. As Steven Jones (2006) has pointed out, the neoluddite counter-culture of the 1960s very easily transitioned into reactionary managerial roles in the computer and web industries, just as 1990s counter-culture hackers so easily took jobs within the U.S. government’s security and surveillance apparatus. Neoluddite technophobia in counter-cultures appears vacuous because in many ways it is: the monster named technology is the product of technologically deterministic thinking which overvalorizes technology as the driving force of human society.
The technophilia of utopianism embedded in particular machineries and techniques doesn’t need to be demonstrated, though the moral dimensions are regularly avoided, or eclipsed by what David Nye (1994) has called the “technological sublime” and Vincent Mosco (2004) expanded to include the “digital sublime”. Though it should be stated that the avoidance of moral questions about technology is more a matter of allowing for easier development and implementation. Socially speaking, morality is ultimately conservative and disciplinary. And this presents a strange paradox for the progressive imaginary that characterizes utopianism. There is always an underlying morality being legislated, but it is carried along innocuously in the baggage of cultural traditions and thus often overlooked in popular ideas of utopia. In evaluating the utopian desires of revolutionary regimes, from the Jacobins in France to the Bolsheviks in Russia to the national socialists in Germany for instance, conservative and romantic cultural ideals play central roles alongside high-modernist visions of the future (Gray, 2007; Herf, 1984). In order for some ideal to be maintained, particularly the creation of biologically and morally ideal political subjects, increasingly totalitarian methods have to be employed that positively correlates with the scale of a social order. If utopians were only interested in technical efficiency, then it would be the case that perfection could be manifested solely by an assemblage of automated systems in a perfectly arranged architectural, built environment. Perfect moral functioning would simply be a consequence of perfect structural form. Even if this does represent the belief animated by certain technocratic imaginaries, such as those found in post-humanist dreams of limitless cyborg lives, it is naïve to the point of absurdity. *Social management requires managers, just as program require programmers.* Technological innovations, when implemented on
a large scale, are co-emergent with new social management techniques. The three pillars of social order exist as a coextensive assemblage. Thus, certain utopian imaginaries that rely too heavily upon abstract technical forms must also have a corresponding socio-technical capacity for, or rigid mechanisms of, behavioral regulation. The regulation of the soul (or mind) through self-regulating moral imperatives are just as important as disciplinary mechanisms that operate upon the body. As Foucault (1995) rather notoriously remarked, “The soul is the prison of the body” (p.30). This imprisonment functions most effectively because of its unquestioned, innocuous ubiquity.

The cases of the Weimar and Nazi regimes in Germany are instructive in understanding how a specific culture can embrace a politics that is hostile to its provincial customs in order to satisfy the utopian impulse for divine perfection (Herf, 1984). The institutions responsible for scientific progress and technological innovation have been inscribed since their inception with religious narrative, particularly dealing with themes of divine ascendance (Gray, 2007; Noble, 1999). Though it is crucial to note that the technocratic tendency in the U.S., even among cultural conservatives, is a rather different technological culture than the one found in Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, the underlying utopianism of each is undeniable. That progress towards some divine harmony is a constituent factor of utopianism (Gray, 2007; Berlin, 1990), makes it sometimes difficult, even analytically unproductive, to separate the utopian from the prophetic. In noting the proclivity of utopians towards systematizing, mapping and scheming, what Jameson (2007) essentially points out is that utopians are more-or-less what I would call knowledgeable prophets, who set before themselves the task of hastening the end times (or the end of history). When utopian impulses emerge from the right, they are typically
expressed paradoxically as a highly technological version of romanticism (Herf, 1984). Herf (1984) names this tendency *reactionary modernism*, and seeks to explain how cultural conservatives can embrace forms of technological progress that also challenge and undermine some of their own traditional practices. Karl Mannheim (1936) argues that this occurs because of “the fact that human beings do not theorize about the actual situations in which they live as long as they are well adjusted to them” (p.229).

Reactionary modernism plays off of conservative fears by offering certain benefits of progress (for a chosen group) as the way to otherwise keep things the same (i.e. maintain social order). “Nazi ideology”, writes Herf (1984), “was by no means an unambiguous rejection of modernity” (p.235), especially with its blatant romanticism for Roman politics, pagan ritual and occult symbolism. These cases help demonstrate the subsuming of morality within narratives of technological progress in large social systems. Poke a technologist and they will bleed like a priest. Question technological progress, and you’ll be called a heretic (Slack and Wise, 2007).

Stories of technological progress towards a utopian goal clearly have religious dimensions to them, even if it’s open for debate on how influential they are. Gray (2007) argues that this is especially true when we look at the inherited concept of a universal harmony at the end of history. Jameson (2007), however, through an analysis of Thomas More’s *Utopia*, cautions us to differentiate the utopian from the prophetic: to distinguish it from religion so that we might look at how a religious orientation modulates utopian visions. Going further, Jameson (2007) argues that utopian programs and religious prophecy tend towards being expressions of totalized, closed visions of the future, whereas the underlying utopian impulses are said to remain generative and open. Is this a
way of preserving their authenticity? Consider, for example, the many open-ended alternatives to capitalism imagined by anarchists and libertarian socialists through radical forms of participatory democracy (Spannos, 2008; Wright, 2010). The form of these kinds of anarchist utopian imaginaries, to a certain degree, undermine the totalitarian vision of a closed system found in various liberal utopias. This is by no means to idealize anarchist utopian imaginaries, especially those that are products of the left, as they are also not exempt from systemization and institutionalization. Given my own experiences in the general assemblies of OP, I’ll be considering the limits of participatory democracy in the next chapter, alongside the leftist tendency to fetishize it as a social and political solution. Anarchists can also be equally lulled by the transformative power of technology and its role in revolutionary change, even if they are seeing it as a monster to be vanquished, as in the case of anarcho-primitivists. It is rare to find a utopian narrative that doesn’t either have technology at the center or hope that technology will be banished from the center, which I believe comes from the religious view of nature as something separate from human culture. The politics of nature are inextricably linked to narratives of technological progress, even for anarcho-primitivists who argue we’ve somehow lost our connection to nature, positing as a place that is somewhere else from where civilization has developed in exactly the same manner that progressives do.

Even if it is conceded that utopian impulses play out in anarchist direct actions, in contrast to being thought of as utopian projects expressing a set of formal rules for action, it sounds more like a desperate attempt at locating something liberating in the utopian as opposed to analytically describing what it entails. I’m much more sympathetic to Michel de Certeau’s (1988) discussion of tactics, or “making do”: finding ways of using a
constraining social order to momentarily subvert it. Perhaps the utopian impulses could be said to precede tactics, but at what point is one simply playing language games? I would argue that the rebellious behavior of individuals and affinities of accomplices are better off simply abandoning the utopian altogether unless there comes a time when it isn’t mired in religious narrative and the philosophy of possible worlds.

*Urban Utopias: Mapping Existence onto Vacant, Abstract Spaces*

The main goal of utopian urban schemes is to design a new social order that overcomes certain limitations of the past, which are imagined as quasi-revolutionary programs to be carried out through the design of novel architectural forms with accompanying systems of social and political management (Fishman, 1977). The built environment of a city is imagined by utopian planners as the vessel through which order, prosperity and justice will natural flow. Function follows form in the utopian. In Western states, urban form is akin to the Platonic form, with the planner as a modern philosopher king, applying universal truths for the benefit of a multitude that is still imagined to be staring at shadows on a cave wall (Scott, 1998). Utopianism finds in the city an ideal partner, *not in crime*, but in maintaining social order. Though urban visionaries do not always view themselves as the instruments of discipline, but on the contrary as liberators, freeing entire populations from previous modes of existence (typically looked down upon as being backwards or primitive in some way, and the source of every social ill).

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32 These limitations could be seen as injustices, but their overcoming shouldn’t be seen as anything but a reluctant compromise that the state makes in the face of social unrest (Piven and Cloward, 1993).
Consider, for instance, how the messy, jumbled, haphazardly constructed medieval city would appear to any modern planner. This all needed to be replaced by a form that was geometric, predetermined from above, and possessing a highly ordered layout (Etchells, 1987). By envisioning urban space from a god’s eye view, the city can rather easily be mapped out as a vast and complex machine with a strict and efficient functioning. It is hard not to draw comparisons with the god of the Judeo-Christian Bible floating above the firmament about to create the garden of Eden, a paradise on Earth. The goal being to impose an order onto a space (regardless of what existed there previously). Legibility and simplification are instrumental as administrative ordering techniques for controlling nature and society (Scott, 1998). Cities become, in the utopian approach, a scientifically planned urban machine where only abstract, simplified human subject (recall Foucault’s concept of population) could live while following some hyper-rational program of behavior – what Scott (1998) calls high modernism. The actual needs and desires of people, just like when you look at a map, are completely absent from utopian schemes. This is why Le Corbusier, a notorious utopian figure, sought to design out of cities any opportunity for spontaneous congregation or street-based culture. If Le Corbusier had a prime directive that motivated his projects, it would be “the death of the street” (Scott, 1998). Anything that disrupts the smooth functioning of a city, be it a rebellious street culture or illegible pathways, have no place in a utopian plan because they cannot be accounted for in advance except through probability-based security measures, which is not a guarantee.

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33 See Kropotkin on the transformation of medieval cities.
Outside the uninhibited confines of utopian imaginaries, cities are, at best, a haphazard implementation of those visions: cities, as they are developed, rarely are capable of living up to their virtual modelling, and yet the remnants of various utopian imaginaries are easily discernable in the built environment (Scott, 1998; Harvey, 2000). The more fully realized the utopian plan, the more terrible daily life ends up being for the most subordinated parts of the population. This is because each urban plan has a very specific set of cultural, political and economic interests attached to it. Mike Davis and Daniel Monk (2007) note that these are more and more embodied around the world as the dream worlds of neoliberalism, from Medellín to Dubai to Hong Kong. Urban planning is always an imposition, even when shrouded in benevolent intentions and propagandized as vibrant, sustainable and locally-minded. Planned cities inflict traumas upon its residents. The degrees of which are correlative to the success of both police operations and the levels of cultural monism established through self-discipline. At the point where the built environment fails as a disciplinary mechanism, legal/juridical frameworks, policing and surveillance help to ensure the social order. However, the most alive parts of cities are full of distractions, sidestepped routes, random conversations with strangers, flirtations with rebellion and inefficient daily rituals, all of which seem to escape the imagination of most urban planners. Though even those who desire a certain kind of

34 The re-imagining of Tempe and downtown Phoenix in Arizona has recently been plagued with just such a language of benevolence despite resistance from poorer residents who are slowly being priced out of neighborhoods they have lived in for years. The Maple-Ash-Farmer-Wilson neighborhood group in Tempe has become notorious for its consistent push back against gentrification projects that the city government has been trying to make way for (in no small part the result of Arizona State University’s continuous growth and notable influence on local politics).
“vibrant” urban life imagine it happening through a restrictive, whitewashed and middle-class perspective. It could even be said that utopian urban planners aspire to prevent cultures from existing as they normally do (Scott, 1998). The social engineering schemes that planners imagine prior to development are virtual spaces occupied by oversimplified and neurotically content citizens similar to the ones found in marketing campaigns.

In response, it is important not to overdetermine culture as I would argue Jane Jacobs (1969) does in her vision of re-invigorated urban cores. Her culturally deterministic view lacks a serious engagement with how the political economy and the built environment of cities affect cultural routines. Consider Jacobs’ advocacy of mixed-use development where an analysis of how actual residents might come to change their habits and use these spaces is completely absent. Mixed-use developments did once pervade semi-urban villages and early-U.S. cities, particularly in immigrant neighborhoods where continental European housing trends were dominant. However, mixed-use development cannot be grafted onto parts of cities where the corresponding cultural life that would make it relevant doesn’t exist (typically because those people had been pushed out through patterns of gentrification). In downtown areas of Tempe and Phoenix, Arizona, where commercial spaces remain vacant, mixed-use development provides over-priced urban living spaces on top of predominantly empty store fronts. Anti-vagrancy laws, alongside corporate gentrification, have effectively chased away the local cultural life that made these patterns of development relevant. These mixed-use spaces feel sterile and contrived, attempting a nostalgic emulation of the past.

Although utopian imaginaries are never able to be fully realized, even in the most authoritarian states (Scott, 1998), the process of attempting to bring them to fruition has
created terrible and horrific places. Dystopian urban realities can be written off by utopian planners as distortions or their vision – as apologists for Marxism and capitalism similarly exclaim – only so long as they believe that it is possible in some time or place, under the right guidance and leadership, to fully implement their plan. According to Scott (1998), cities are essentially urban technological systems predicated on high-modernist, utopian planning schemes where pleasure and autonomy are very seldom found. While they were able to, people have commonly fled from the city as a state-making project (Scott, 2009). Evans (2013) argues that there is a strong connection between the emergence of cities, civilization, militarism and the disciplinary mechanisms of social order.

_U.S. Cities I: From Colonization to the Fall of Suburbia (1625-1945)_

When Europeans colonized the Americas, two “irreconcilable” ways of life clashed: indigenous Native Americans “tended to view land as a life-giving and life-sustaining force, while Europeans tended to view it as a resource, a commodity, and a source of revenue” (Dobbz, 2012, p.14). Urban development, from the very beginning, has been a conscious project that set out to domesticate a thing called nature and pre-civilizational peoples who embraced it (Evans, 2013). Colonization in North America refers not simply to the conquest and genocide of Native American peoples, but also to the transformation of an entire vast continent into public and private property that for many years seemed to have an endless Western frontier. As Andrea Smith (2005) has argued, colonizers raped not only Native women, but also the land. That one is able to speak about an ongoing history of the ever-expanding frontier of U.S. cities, from colonization through to the present day, is testament to the devastation of indigenous
peoples, first by European conquerors, then by settler-colonists. Following the birth of the
U.S., generation after generation of white settlers were empowered by the U.S.
government, both legally and militarily, to consume tracts of land as squatters until they
reached the Pacific Ocean (Dobbz, 2012) – it was their Manifest Destiny! State-
sponsored land acquisition and privatization (i.e. primitive accumulation) is not unique to
the U.S. (as I will discuss below), but rarely is it coupled with such a ruthless process of
enclosure where assimilation or eradication are the only two “options” presented to an
indigenous population. One way of life had to be destroyed, and continues to be.

Early urban development trends in colonial America mirror patterns of enclosure
in the late-1700s in England, which makes sense given that the former was a colony of
the latter. Historian Peter Linebaugh (2014) refers to these patterns as the theft of the
commons. The commons are not the same thing as public space; it refers to specific
local, customary forms of collective land and resource use, and not to publicly or
privately legislated space (Linebaugh, 2014). Enclosure is a nicer way of saying internal
colonization (or primitive accumulation), where land, resources and people are seized by
the state and prepared for the market. Common land, including the resources that can be
extracted from it, and divided up into legible and efficient grids of property. This
occurred on a genocidal scale in North America as the frontier came more and more
under the grip of an expanding U.S. state through the collaborative efforts of white
settlers, land speculators and government policies of land acquisition (Dobbz, 2012).

It must be said, plundering is never done without rebellions against it, which will
provide important examples to consider in the final chapter on subverting cities, even if
the context of each case is different. The outbreak of Luddite uprisings in England in
1812 happened alongside the plundering effects of enclosure, the first wave of industrialization, and the criminalization of poverty (Linebaugh, 2012; 2006).

The loss of the commons and the wild was felt by everyone, even affluent city dwellers who mourned its loss as a possible place to escape to from the congestion of urban life. In place of the commons and the wild, utopian dreams of garden cities emerged – as symptoms of larger political and economic forces – as an alternative to the increasingly industrialized urban cores, where a more “balanced” life could be lived (with just enough nature to soothe the soul, but nothing too wild, of course). The garden cities of utopian imaginaries translated on the ground into what we call the suburbs, and emerged in the 18th- and 19th-centuries. However, it cannot be concluded that settlements outside of urban cores are predicated on these conditions. Europeans did seek out living space in the countryside – believing it to be a source of “health, freedom and “independence” – long before the rise of industrial towns (Mumford, 1989, p.482). Much earlier exoduses from city centers that promoted suburban settlement were sometimes a matter of necessity in order to escape from epidemics (Mumford, 1989). Additionally, as Scott (2009) notes, some people fled the centralized, state-making projects of lowland, agricultural cities to maintain autonomy, even if they remained on the periphery. In moving out of the city center, whether for luxury or necessity, a desire for a better life appears as the consistent reasoning for the escape. Whether people were forced from the countryside by English enclosure laws or forced onto reservations by U.S. settler-colonialism, it was known that life was better with a commons and a wild. On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, rebellion to enclosure was widespread, though as Linebaugh (2012) has pointed out, English settlers in North America left any dreams of a return to
the commons back in England, thus making conflict with Native peoples over land and resources a matter of genocide and war.

Part of the war against the commons included the prospecting, mapping out and the development of demarcated borders and territories. Infrastructures of transportation alongside physical barriers like fences, stones walls, ditches and foliage belong to the enclosure system (Linebaugh, 2012, p.11), and act quite literally as disciplinary structures. Anyone violating the protocols of this new infrastructure would be considered a criminal, and thus constituted an attack upon the sacred regime of property. It is this logic of exclusion that prefigures the very concept of a suburb as a space with a specific purpose, reserved for those with both the ability to afford it and the appropriate cultural temperament to maintain its security. The walls, fences and hedges said “poor people keep out” without the need to actually spell that out on a sign. In England, this did not happen overnight, but over several hundreds of years of continual enclosure dating back to the 13th-century. In North America, this process was accelerated rapidly once the U.S. gained independence and Congress passed the Land Ordinance of 1785, effectively overruling King George III’s restriction on settling west of the Appalachian Mountains (Dobbz, 2012). Re-imagining land as gridded plots wasn’t simply an abstract legal formality, but as with all laws, required enforcement when anyone challenged that system.

The development of detached, single-family homes with private yards emigrated with English colonist to North America. In the burgeoning industrial towns and cities of England during the middle of the 18th-century, the modern suburb developed as a reaction to the congestion of urban cores that sought to embody a bourgeois utopian vision of
balance between civilization and its other, nature. Prior to 1750, in a city like London for example, work and residence were combined in the same house and the idea of single-use districting was unheard of (Fishman, 1987, p.7). In contrast to the continental European tenement, it was the single-family home that dominated trends in the development of early towns in England, and was subsequently inherited by its colonies in America (Etchells, 1987). Settler-colonialism facilitated the larger and more complex organization of commerce and finance in North America, given both the ability of the colonies to construct entire towns from scratch – after leveling previous indigenous developments – and the continuous demand that came from a frontier society for the manufactured products of eastern settlements (Bridenbaugh, 1964). Port towns like New York, Philadelphia and Charles Town were some of the main burgeoning sites of urban growth and commerce in the early American colonies, and encountered the standard problems of growing commercial cities via limitations of existing housing and transportation structures (Bridenbaugh, 1964). As Ealham (2010) notes, “The great contradiction of bourgeois urbanism was that it invested unlimited faith in market forces”.

_ U.S. Cities II: From Suburbanization to Neoliberal Dystopias (1945-2008)_

For many, 1945 marks the beginning of the prosperous post-war period and the height of suburbanization. Robert Beauregard (2006), for instance, names the period between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s recession “the short American Century”, where partially because of the consumption-based lifestyle of suburbanization, the U.S. became the most prosperous nation in the world. Though despite the fact that

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35 See Kenneth Jackson, (1987), Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States for a further expansion of this periodization.
Beauregard (2006) names sunbelt cities like Phoenix, Arizona as shining example of suburban-style growth, I will argue that they exemplify an entirely different trend in urban development, which is important consider in order to properly understand the context in which Occupy Phoenix existed. In contrast to the standard story of post-war suburbanization, Fishman (1987) instructs us that 1945 marks the end of 200 years of suburban development. The quintessential utopian elements of the suburb – decentralized growth; single-family homes; balance between civilization and nature; and an uncongested transportation system – original from the visions of utopian planners like Frederick Law Olmsted and later Frank Lloyd Wright. Clearly, it is not the case that cities stopped growing, especially in the development of their ever-expanding peripheries. But it is the case that urban growth abandoned the features that previously made it suburban in favor of a different logic (Fishman, 1987). One of the key features of the suburb is its reliance upon the central, urban core for employment, entertainment and commerce. Ideally, the suburb is to act as an escape from the congestion of city life without having to leave the metropolis completely. Hence the desire for a balance between civilization and nature. In the post-war period though, trends in urban development at the periphery sought to make the traditional downtown city center obsolete. In fact, by 1970, a larger percentage of the U.S. population was now living in the “suburban” periphery, and with this exodus followed manufacturing, office buildings and shopping centers (Jackson, 1985). This abandonment of the core principles of what made the suburb a suburb created an entirely new kind of peripheral zone that stands on its own as “a viable socioeconomic unit” (Fishman, 1987, p.184). Even freeway development that previously emanated from the city center shifted towards the creation of
“circular superhighways”, or beltways, where one not even need pass through the
traditional city center at all (Fishman, 1987).

Alongside the abandonment of traditional suburban development trends, it is
impossible to ignore the phenomenon of “white flight” from the urban core of U.S. cities
that began in the middle part of the 20th-century: the white middle-class leaving
established urban centers to avoid the mass migration of Blacks from the rural south.
Though it is well beyond the scope of this project, it would be very interesting to consider
the relationship between white flight – which came at the decline of suburban
development – and the establishment of multi-centered cities that were able to carve out
enclaves of social and cultural exclusion. One of the suburb’s most attractive features
since its inception has been its promise of security (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). Security
and policing is highly racialized in the U.S., and would remain uncontested only so long
as non-whites and immigrants could not become upwardly mobile and also seek re-
settlement in more affluent neighborhoods outside the urban core. The suburb’s security
(for whites) was unlikely to outlast the eventual impacts of civil rights struggles.
However, the politics of inclusion inherent to the integrationist approaches most
appealing to the U.S. state made sure that the most radical demands of civil rights
activists were watered in the promise of upward mobility for some minorities. Middle
class standing in the U.S. is inextricably linked to the politics of whiteness. While
segregation could not be maintained in many parts of the U.S., the white democracy
remained intact through the limitation placed upon political imaginations (Olson, 2004).

With the loss of most of the key features that made the suburb a suburb, it hardly
seems conceptually useful to continue referring to peripheral city zones in that way. The
suburb names a very specific kind of development that does not accurately describe the new building projects happening at the outer edges of metropolitan regions. Several alternative conceptualizations have been offered in its place: technoburb (Fishman, 1987); edge city (Garreau, 1992); exurbia; outer city. These newer, economically self-contained, peripheral zones, regardless of what new label is chosen to name them, are not suburban. Each zone represents part of what Garreau (1992) describes as a new multi-centered city – each “edge city” being a socio-economic unit of its own to the degree which someone living there would not have leave as they previously would have living in a suburb to seek out work and leisure. I believe that Fishman’s (1987) term “technoburb”, though awkward to think through, is more accurate than the others for one key reason: the areas of the city previously described by urban theorists over twenty years ago as being on the “edge” or “outer” regions often no longer exist on the periphery due to continuous urban growth that has further enclosed them in the interior of the metropolis. From my own experiences in the Phoenix metropolitan region, what used to be considered on the edge of north Scottsdale when I first moved to the area and did not have any quick access to a freeway, is now fully developed, with convenient freeway access and considered mid-Scottsdale. This development was partially facilitated by the purchase of Native land to build the loop 101 freeway. Additionally, Fishman’s (1987) “techno cities” are named partially after the communication technology industries and the communication networks that have helped establish the relative autonomy of these urban regions.

As the periphery became less and less of a periphery, while simultaneously becoming more and more diverse racially and economically, “techno cities” or “exurbs”
tried to make good on the former suburban promise of security. Media perpetuated fears of rampant crime (and terrorism after September 11th, 2001) alongside the growing congestion of previously remote areas of the city, can give the impression that nowhere is safe, even a middle-class home dozens of miles away from the poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods of inner-cities. Italian journalist Marco D’Eramo (2007) agrees “[u]ndoubtedly” that “panic about rising crime rates is and has been one of the main reasons for the boom in common-interest housing developments” (p.181). “Common-interest developments”, notes D’Eramo (2007), refer to planned communities, condos and cooperatives, and that it is the planned community that is “the most rapidly expanding sector” in cities. “If security cannot be found in location alone, perhaps in can be found in a development type – the gated community” (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). The gated community is but one way of barricading certain residences in the city, which create citadel-like spaces in the larger, somewhat open urban landscape (Marcuse, 2002).

Beyond the standard, private enclaves of affluent residents, complete with private security forces (Davis, 2006), there exists even more revolutionary developments of privatized seclusion in U.S. cities (D’Eramo, 2007). Consider, for example, Del Webb’s Sun Cities in the Phoenix area: completely privatized towns with governments, utilities, commercial centers, bylaws, taxation and regulatory standards for admittance (D’Eramo, 2007). Beyond security and surveillance, these types of completely privatized cities offer the option of creating self-contained, hyper-insulated social orders within the larger social order.

Alongside the barricaded citadel (or gated) communities in U.S. cities are development trends that promise to revitalize centrally located suburbs and downtown
areas through mixed-use zoning that emphasizes the importance of public space and “local-oriented civic and commercial facilities” (Bressi, 1994). This “new urbanism”, as it’s called, harkens back to early 20th-century U.S. cities with a mind towards public transit options, walk-ability and a more locally invigorated – though painfully contrived – sense of community that had been supplanted by sprawl and freeways. Bressi (1994) imagines urban development as driven by the automobiles in a technologically deterministic manner, whereas Fishman (1987) notes that the automobile was one of several choices available to facilitate suburban expansion. It was a strong automobile lobby that ensured public transit options were scrapped in cities like Los Angeles (Fishman, 1987), or why in Phoenix the most involved downtown trolley system in the early-20th-century U.S. was dismantled in favor of the sprawl. Describing the political economic influence of the automobile lobby in affecting patterns of urban development is an altogether different position to take than simply positing the automobile as the driving technological force behind why U.S. cities look like they do. New urbanism, despite its feigned practicality and focus on local-embeddedness, emphasize an urban form and strategy aimed at satisfying the interests of middle-class culture, particularly through its consumerist lifestyle. New urbanism attempts to revitalize certain parts of the city by creating safe spaces for middle-class culture. The “techno cities” that Fishman describes as the heirs to suburban development have some things in common with new urbanism, but without the overt emphasis on public/civic space and the fetishization of the local. New urbanist projects that target downtown areas must contend with extremely high rates of vacancy in commercial real estate and battle uphill to re-invigorate a street-level culture into sanitized and gentrified spaces.
The racialized dimensions of what constitutes middle-class culture in the U.S. are especially transparent in the patterns of gentrification in cities. Susan Christopherson (1994) argues that urban development since the 1980s in the U.S. has been driven by public-private partnerships that emphasize the importance of market-based interests (both commercial and consumer). Diversity, a central new urbanist value, is also deployed in real estate marketing campaigns to entice consumers with a lifestyle the accompanies the amenities of the actual living spaces. The public goods of environmental quality, sustainability, security and freedom are offered up in the packaging of planned housing communities (Christopherson, 1994). By purchasing or renting a space in a particular real estate development, one not only has a place to live, but also buys into an entire lifestyle as realized in the urban form itself. Though in speaking of diversity, it matters what one means by this. A diverse street culture has to first be rooted out and destroyed before enclave communities and market-centric new urbanist projects can be built.

Police play no small role in criminalizing entire cultures (of color) in parts of U.S. cities targeted for redevelopment. Despite the fact that gated communities are much obvious about their exclusionary practices, walled-in, middle-class anxieties are equally prevalent in for example, downtown, new urbanist projects: the (often empty) street-level commercial spaces offer an entire floor of protection to the residents of loft condominiums where homeless transients may be present. It should come as no surprise that police made use of anti-homeless laws in their attacks upon the Occupy movement, particularly in Phoenix. The occupations in various U.S. cities were a direct disruption to
the smooth, middle-class spaces that city officials and real estate developers had planned.36

Taken together, these trends in urban development in the U.S. since 1945 have culminated in what Jason Hackworth (2007) calls the neoliberal city. “Neoliberalism, simply defined, is an ideological rejection of egalitarian liberalism in general and the Keynesian welfare state in particular, combined with a selective return to the idea of classical liberalism” (Hackworth, 2007, p.9). Government, according to neoliberal priests like Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek, should act primarily as the guarantor of private property. In the U.S., neoliberalism, since the 1990s, has additionally been coupled with reactionary forms of social conservatism (Hackworth, 2007). Neoliberalism is not so much a process that describes the urban trends that transformed the suburbs into self-sufficient “techno cities”, but it does point to the creative destruction and disinvestment going on in U.S. inner-cities, commercial districts and downtown areas that pave the way for out-of-state investors to swoop in. The reinvestment in the urban core that follows gentrification is often animated by “mega-projects” in central districts and exemplifies what neoliberal urbanism is. The worry of some new urbanists that their plans could be easily grafted onto market-oriented projects, if anything, is understated. Downtown revitalization efforts are not driven simply by the public-private assemblage of neoliberal devotees, but also by urban environmentalists pushing “green city” campaigns (Andrew Ross, 2011). The new urbanists and

36 See also Jordan Camp, (2016), *Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter*. 88
environmentalists, despite their benevolent intentions and public-interest campaigns, remain complicit to capitalist market forces.

By the time we reach the turn of the millennium, a pastiche of utopian schemes had been partially implemented across U.S. cities. The imaginaries of Le Corbusier, Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, Robert Moses and Jane Jacobs, seemingly antithetical, have been patched together in metropolitan areas in ways that spatially and temporally help to maintain the social order and to best serve the interests of the market (and those that benefit most from it). A little bit of Ebenezer Howard’s garden cities can be seen in exurban greenbelt developments, just as Jane Jacob’s understanding of community and street life is found in the public and private marketing of downtown revitalization projects, or in the neatly ordered districting of city functions as Le Corbusier rigidly imagined. Yet all of these developments are connected by webs of freeway trade routes, and made possible through massive tax breaks for outside real estate investors alongside the administrative ordering, policing and displacement of poorer residents – both those with homes and those without. And since the 1970s, U.S. cities have developed alongside political attempts to dismantle the Keynesian welfare state. If anyone doubts that neoliberal urbanism has had a dystopian, destructive character, one need only consider the fallout in the aftermath of the 2008 housing market collapse that fomented widespread economic crises around the world. What the 2008 crash laid bare was first, the multiple ways in which financial bubbles in real estate markets were facilitating neoliberal development projects in both exurbs – as a continuation of previous patterns of urban sprawl – and through massive inner-city redevelopment projects for both housing and commerce (Hackworth, 2007). And second,
that gentrification, both cultural (Smith, 2008) and corporate (Hackworth, 2007), has played a key role in the extremely uneven patterns of development in cities that require the continued destruction and repurposing of poor and working-class neighborhoods.

*The Strategies of Dystopian Planning*

Strategies, as distinguished from tactics, according to de Certeau (1988), “seek to create places in accordance with abstract models” (p.29). Since the decline of the walled-in, disorganized medieval city and the rise of (relatively) open, highly organized capitalist cities, urban planning emerged inextricably linked to utopian visions, but in practice creating what I will call dystopian planning strategies: haphazardly applied, culturally bourgeois, utopian desires for the maintenance of social order in carefully managed cities. Utopianism, I argue, has little to do with the fulfillment of, or making space for, libertine or libertarian\(^{37}\) desires; conversely, utopianism ends up expressing an imaginary about ways to contain those desires through social management. If the strategies I’d like to outline below had to be summed up into a single protocol, it would be that of preventing a city from happening (Scott, 1998). But what does it mean to prevent a city from happening? Clearly, cities are thriving today and are home now to over fifty percent of the world’s human population. Let’s consider what dystopian urban planning strategies are seeking to prevent. Le Corbusier once declared his main goal as to orchestrate “the death of the street” – to arrest (sometimes quite literally) the mingling of different goals, different purposes, different desires from going altogether in different directions at the

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\(^{37}\) Libertarian is used here in its traditional European sense as being attached to anarchist and anti-authoritarian desires for freedom and autonomy, and not in the mangled and confused sense employed by classic liberals in the present day, following figures like Frederick Hayek, Milton Friedman and Murray Rothbard.
same time. He wanted to eliminate, as much as humanly possible, the chaos, complexity and pulsating life from city streets. As Ealham (2010) notes about Barcelona in the decades leading up to the brief anarchist revolution in the 1930s, the culture of a libertarian and libertine city sees no neat division between home life and street life. If you don’t want a revolution (or rebellion) as a city official or urban planner, then you will necessarily have to do something about controlling what happens in the streets. Beyond the fetishizing of street demonstrations and political protest, the cultural life in Barcelona that Ealham (2010) describes, while definitely not in any way opposed to directly disrupting the social order, particularly through street demonstrations, points to a way of life that isn’t reduced simply to political affiliation. Noteworthy in its mundaneness, is the fact that the front yard of homes in Barcelona was often understood as extending into the street (Ealham, 2010). The delineation between public and private space that is so acutely felt in the U.S. today – an specific example of a certain kind of dystopian planning strategy – is part of how social order is maintained through the three pillars mentioned above (by way of Foucault): legal/juridical; disciplinary techniques; and security/surveillance networks. There are several dystopian planning strategies that merit elaboration.

The first strategy is the way in which socio-political hierarchy is joined to the functional segregation of a city (Scott, 1998). Ghettos have been very clearly established in the U.S. along racial and class-based lines (Davis, 1998; Wacquant, 2008), especial in the attempt to manage the mass migration of Blacks from the rural south to large cities in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of agricultural mechanization (Piven and Cloward, 1993).
Foucault (2003) refers to this process as “internal colonization” whereby “the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power” of European colonial conquest were brought back to paternal states as a means of maintaining social order domestically (p.103). To apply the concept of internal colonization to the U.S. using Foucault’s exact characterization of it as “boomerang effects” isn’t quite possible given the fact that a significant part of the foundation of the U.S. socio-political hierarchy is built on the settler-colonization of indigenous peoples. So while civilized spaces in the U.S. are continuously subject to internal colonization, this happens as an additional layer of subordination on top of ongoing settler-colonization against surviving Native tribes. The cultural ways of life of Native Americans was and continues to be antithetical to all hitherto planning strategies in U.S. cities. Until land and resources cease to be stolen and defended as private property, their transformation into massive metropolises will continue to be the perpetuation of genocide. Beyond the horrors of ongoing settler-colonization, non-Native people living in cities are confronted with a gamut of strategies aimed at dividing and, not necessarily conquering, but unevenly distributing political privileges, goods and access to services. Non-Native people in cities are exploited and subordinated into positions useful to state capital while at the same time omitted from its benefits (Brenner, 2004). Without making too hyperbolic a comparison, the functional segregation of cities mirrors in certain troubling ways how Nazis ran concentration camps. Certain groups of prisoners in the camps, divided mainly along ethnic and political lines, were given slightly privileged roles in the management of the camps to

help maintain their smooth functioning (Serafinski, 2016). In contemporary cities, unofficially deputized individuals assume a proxy role in maintain the social order so as to help preserve their relative security within it.

The second strategy of dystopian urban planning is set towards the simplification and making legible of city spaces (Scott, 1998). The grid of wide, perpendicular streets maps an easy-to-read set of coordinates onto the Western city, which sought to erase the organic, narrow and winding streets found earlier in medieval cities. Part of simplifying space, a desire present in the imaginaries of many utopian planners, is connected with the designation of certain parts of the city to specific functions. If streets are meant for automobile travel, then kids should not be using them as playing fields and political demonstrations definitely should not be spilling out into them. The legal/juridical pillar of social order is especially useful to administrators in deploying city ordinances and zoning laws to designate just what should be happening in certain places at certain times of the day. An easily legible grid of streets, all systematically named and marked with numerical addresses, makes policing infinitely easier, especially when law enforcement officers are not familiar with specific areas of the city in a way consistent with being a local. It is here when surveillance technologies, when paired with the quest for what Deleuze (1995) calls “universals of communication”, contribute to the creation of an archive of data (visual and otherwise) that can be called up for strategic use by police departments in any (sometimes collaborating) jurisdictions. The constant communication that happens on social media websites and via social networking technologies produce a continuous stream of information that can be captured – even from seemingly private channels – and combined with law enforcement archives to target rebels and radicals.
The surveillance of constant communication very accurately describes what happened in OP as many of us came to discover through what a freedom of information grab done by an independent journalist revealed of correspondences between different local law enforcement agencies and a counter-terrorism center. Surveillance plays a crucial function in making spaces legible. Thus, contrary to the assumed benefit of, for example, filming police or advocating for the requirement of body cameras for cops, what is being contributed to in those and by all methods of surveillance is a large, strategic archive that helps make the city legible, and aids in the marking out of spaces where deviant behavior occurs.

Surveillance is an integral part of what Deleuze (1995) calls control societies, or simply the prevailing social order that functions through the collaborative assemblage of legal/juridical frameworks, disciplinary machines and security technologies.

Far less analyzed than the previous two strategies is the way in which the built environment of cities functions as an interwoven web of disciplinary machines. The more automated the functioning, the less direct policing is required to control people’s behavior, which is assisted in degree by how innocuous the built environment is assumed to be with respect to its disciplinary nature. A now somewhat infamous example from Long Island in New York City is discussed at length by Landgon Winner (1989) in an essay exploring the politics of technological artifacts. City planner, Robert Moses, designed Long Island bridges with a low clearance that would not allow buses to travel under them, with a desired effect of restricting access to his celebrated Jones Beach park.

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39 I will be exploring that surveillance in detail in the fifth chapter below.
to those with cars (generally white and affluent residents) (Winner, 1989, p.23). Winner (1989) also points to Haussmann’s redesign of 19th-century Paris, under Napoleon’s direction, to prevent the kind of street fighting that took place during the revolution of 1848. In this example, the built environment of the city is not simply considered as having certain positive or negative side-effects, but as embodying specific forms of political power, particularly those of white supremacy that knew it was poor people of color that rode public transit and would be the most restricted from accessing the beach. Consider a less conspiratorial example and think about all the ways in which cities completely restricted the movements of people with handicaps – no ramp ways into buildings or accommodation to use public transit (Winner, 1989). The social order itself is embodied in these various artifacts in cities; and their arrangement has a political function separate from their pragmatic and intended use. Moses’ bridges are at a practical level there for car travel, yet function prior to their use as a physical embodiment of racial segregation in the city. Without a challenge to these artifacts when they are initially proposed for development, their flexibility as contingently produced objects – that could be otherwise, or not at all – vanishes once the commitment is made to produce them (Winner, 1989). As accepted artifacts, they seep into the mundane background of daily life and become extremely difficult to modify or challenge on the grounds of their politicized status.

*Imagination Requires No Imperative*

Jameson’s (2007) claim that “utopia as a form is not the representation of radical alternatives; it is rather the imperative to imagine them” (416). So, a clear distinction would need to be maintained between the imperative to imagine and the act of imagining
radical alternatives in our minds, writings, actions and projects. An imperative simply refers to a duty one should observe, which is entirely separate from one’s capability of fulfilling that duty. The distinction between imperative and embodiment is what is ultimately at stake for Jameson (2007) in *Archaeologies of the Futures*: on the one hand there are the attempts at “the realization of the Utopian program”, and on the other hand there is the “obscure yet omnipresent Utopian impulse finding its way to the surface in a variety of expression and practices” (3). The anti-anti-Utopianism that Jameson suggests we entertain as a check upon complete dismissals of the utopian relates rather directly to his attempt to keep separate Utopian impulse from its reduction to failed Utopian programs. I do agree that the Utopian impulse cannot be written off by simply listing the innumerable catastrophes that have result from the implementation of Utopian programs in history. But is there a need to be an imperative to imagine radical alternatives to the present in order to ensure that we continue to imagine? Are we all so beaten down and disciplined within civilization that our imaginations need to be given over duty? In speaking of duty and imperative, there is more than just a flirtation with the language of morality; it is difficult, as a student of western philosophy not to immediately associate what Jameson is speaking of with Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. Though while Kant was an advocate of state violence, especially it’s violent civilizing mission, he abhorred rebellion and social unrest. It is strange that Jameson, also a student of western philosophy, would make use of Kant’s moral framework in trying to preserve utopianism. Imperatives exist, I would argue, as transcendental, a priori provocations that seek to influence our consciences. Jameson (2007) follows a rather similar framework – though from a much more materialist perspective – that gives a historical account of the
conditions of possibility of the “peculiar fantasies” that constitute utopian imaginaries (11). Put more succinctly, Jameson is looking to discover the specific historical conditions that give rise to the Utopian impulse, or provide the raw material for a radical imagination. He wants to argue that this comes from an imperative to imagine. Against this line of reasoning, I’d locate the impulse as emerging from within everyday moments of rebellion and violence.

When our fantasies for something else – some other place and time – become formalized into abstract models or concrete systems, it is through a discussion of emotions that we can best come to understand our imagining of something other than the current set of historical conditions we dwell within. There can be a logical consistency to any model or system, but I think it is important to understand the desires that gave birth to them if anything is going to be understood about the interests inherent to them. Are alternatives being imagined out of a desire for control or a desire for liberation? And out of a desire to control what or for liberation from what? Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin (1970) proclaims that the latter impulse is inherent to human nature, that we are “endowed … with two precious faculties – the power to think and the desire to rebel” (9).

The capacity to think, aligned with a desire for control through the establishment of a certain social order, necessarily works to discipline and deny the legitimacy of certain desires, particularly the most rebellious ones. Consider the way in which the attempts people make to liberate themselves from work in the United States is culturally demonized. Those puritanical edicts aren’t limited to capitalists, but also pervades radical leftist rhetoric of life in post-revolutionary societies. When alternatives, or even the impulse to imagine them, are presented as duties, as imperatives (Jameson, 2007),
they become easily subsumed within the prevailing social order because *duty is the moral dimension of discipline*. But why just a duty to imagine? Is the imagination put into practice always doomed to corruption? Perhaps as seen through the history of leftist political practice, which has been very much trapped in the limited imaginaries of political parties or publicly legitimized social movements, all projects would seem to be destined for failure. Part of this is due to what the anonymous author of *Desert* (2011) calls the religious myths of a global future that are argued to be so consistently perpetuated by what I’ve been calling the utopian imaginary of the left: progress, global capitalism, global revolution and global collapse. The idea being that through the progress achieved by a global revolution, capitalism and environment collapse could be overcome. The mythology, the anonymous author insists, arises in imagining a relatively totalized, global scale to capitalism, and thus the need for a correspondingly global revolution to fight it or the framing of environmental collapse as a monolithic, global event. This is achieved by over-valorizing the reach of capitalism to conceive it as having stretched its figurative tentacles across the entire planet. While capitalist markets do reach far, they by no means find a home everywhere, and will find fewer places to infect as environmental conditions on the planet worsen (anonymous, 2011). It is hard to imagine capital without any home if we think concretely through its capacity to adapt, but it will be forced to abandon the growing deserts (anonymous, 2011). The dreams of global revolution, or the primitivist dream of global collapse, are ultimately the snake-oil sold to alleviate the sickness we are all said to be afflicted with. Or to paraphrase Nietzsche: we are offered a promise of salvation to sins we didn’t even know we had committed.
But what if one were to imagine and create projects that have no patience for the left or its mythologies, and thus need no pronounced imperative and simply emerge out of rebellious instincts? Often these sorts of projects are condemned by leftist organizations as being lifestylist because they don’t scale up, and by the conservative left as being criminal for being too anti-authoritarian. A good example of such a post-leftist anarchist project would be the Maple-Ash-Farmer-Wilson (MAFW) neighborhood in Tempe, Arizona, located in close proximity to Arizona State University’s largest campus. This project was initiated as an online Facebook group by anarchists who had lived there for many years to further establish certain cultural norms in their local neighborhood. People in the group use it for a wide variety of things, from posting about stolen bikes or lost pets, to criticizing police conduct, luxury real estate developers and local politicians, to mobilizing against white nationalists. There are no community meetings; in fact, the group critiques the ambiguous use of terms like ‘community’ because of the way in which they are often invoked to speak generally about the intentions and interests of a group of people. They don’t wave flags or vote on neighborhood issues, and they constantly emphasize the transformative power of shameless leisure. Leftist political groups and social movements in Phoenix have had a notoriously difficult time understanding the MAFW project as a form of intervention because it doesn’t present an easily identifiable program or blueprint for social change – not to mention that those groups often find themselves being criticized by MAFW for their limited imaginations. Despite not being a political organization, they have mobilized numerous demonstrations, and could arguably be pointed to as the reason why Safe and Sober (Tempe’s version of New York’s Stop and Frisk) was abandoned by the city. However, it is still written off
by some local leftist groups in the city as just a “bunch of hipsters” because of its anti-work ethos and refusal to be formal.

The desire for control and management unfortunately have a very intimate relationship to leftist politics, even in its most libertarian iterations. In the attempt to guarantee and secure a future, or the conditions of an imperative to imagine it, the pillars of social order unavoidably get invoked. Moorish Corsairs, Wilson (2003) argues, had an antagonistic view towards the attempt to secure futures: “there was a clear and obvious intention to prevent political power from ossifying or even stabilizing to any significant degree. … All attempts to establish real control … were met with immediate violence” (189). It is violence that shatters representations (Thompson, 2010). In the process of picking up the pieces of neatly ordered imaginaries that have been broken apart and demystified through some destructive process, space opens where creative opportunities can be taken advantage of, or made do with – not as part of some long-term plan, but as part of how people normally come to survive in conditions that run counter to their interests and desires (de Certeau, 1988). The desire for control and security run counter to the desire for freedom and autonomy, and this is very consciously stated against the nationalist and communitarian propaganda that attempts to align the pillars of social order with the promise of freedom.42

42 It is important to note that modern civilization has largely sought to secure abstract, negative rights to freedom as opposed to creating the conditions where actual freedom is something people have the capacity to realize.
CHAPTER 3

AFFINITY, CONSENSUS & THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY

October 15th, 2011 marked the first official day of the occupation in Phoenix at Cesar Chavez Plaza. On this date, the general assembly mainly functioned as a soapbox forum of sorts where rather than using the more typical “human microphone” to relay messages, some organizers had secured a microphone and amplified sound for various people to speak about their social and political concerns. Rather than give voice to my own concerns after waiting in the long line for a chance on the microphone, I put down the microphone and entered into the crowd to remind people that, in the future, large general assemblies would need to rely upon the human microphone and wouldn’t just consist of rants (though I have nothing against a good rant). The most noteworthy use of the general assembly on the first day was to decide as a group what space would be occupied that evening in anticipation of police very likely attempting removal afterhours. Two proposals were considered by the assembly: remain at Cesar Chavez Memorial Plaza or march to Margaret T. Hance Park at 5:00pm. Rather than choosing to hold out at Cesar Chavez Memorial Plaza (which did become the permanent location for the occupation), Hance Park was somewhat informally decided after hearing several people

43 The *human microphone* is a way of amplifying a speaker’s voice within a general assembly through repetition of what is said. The active speaker says a sentence or two and those within earshot together echo what was said so that others further back can hear, and the active speaker need not be constantly yelling. If the general assembly is very large, this can be repeated in a wave-like sequence until those furthest away from the speaker have heard what was said. This slows down communication, but has the positive consequence of repeating back what someone says, an important form of acknowledgement, especially among people who may be disagreeing.
weigh in and taking a “temperature check”\textsuperscript{44} of the group. What appeared to sway many
in the assembly was the fact that Cesar Chavez Plaza had an earlier curfew than Hance
Park. My own criticisms of the move that I voiced in the assembly argued that many
people would be lost in the subsequent march across town to Hance Park a few miles
away, and that Hance park, a much larger space, would be more difficult to try and
occupy. The subsequent confrontation with Phoenix riot police in the park later that
night was both tactically frustrating and, from an anarchist perspective, revealed some of
the movement’s limitations and the uphill battle anarchists would face throughout
Occupy Phoenix. Two impromptu general assemblies at Hance Park, the first at 8:30pm
to figure out what people would do when the park closes, and the second after 11:00pm
when the riot cop line was approaching, progressively reduced the consensus process to
an anxiety-ridden popularity contest (where ready-made strategies won out over any
substantive deliberation).

A week before the first official action of Occupy Phoenix was to take place on
October 14\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, a group of anarchists met at an undisclosed location to talk about how
they wanted to intervene in the movement. Rather than get enmeshed in the long-running
debates between anarchists and leftists of different stripes, the group decided that the

\textsuperscript{44} Within the framework of the general assembly, a \textit{temperature check} typically functions
as a way to gauge the temperament of the group, and is regularly used when a particular
proposal has been deliberated on for some time to see if people are ready to try and
establish a consensus. An assembly moderator will directly ask the group how they are
feeling about putting the proposal forward for consideration. Various agreed upon hand
signals are then waved and registered by the moderator, though at this stage on the first
day of the occupation, general assembly protocols weren’t established and my guess
would be that many had no experience with decision making other than majoritarian
voting.
most important thing to do was to protect the consensus process of the general assemblies and block recuperating organizations like the Democratic Party and their various activist fronts (*MoveOn.org* for example) from coopting the energy of the movement for electoral politics. As is so often the case within left social movements, politicians and large non-profit organizations see great opportunity for canvasing and recruitment among those caught up in the energy that protests and demonstrations create. With the 2012 election season not far away, Phoenix-area anarchists suspected that Democrat strategy of 2003, where the energy of the anti-war (in Iraq) movement was funneled into the failed Kerry campaign, would be deployed again. In order to frustrate that strategy, the idea was to hold a space open in Occupy Phoenix so that individuals could get experience with the consensus process in general assemblies that anarchists have been using for years – in a somewhat optimistic way, to create the possibilities for an expansion of the political imagination in those who had little to no experience in social movements. These desires were realized rather early on in the occupation through an agreed upon proposal that insisted that people should speak only for themselves in general assemblies and not as representatives of larger groups or organizations. This alongside a generalized attack upon outside coopting organizations helped to maintain the relative integrity of the assemblies. Though, the impatient and efficiency-induced tendency to defer to voting in U.S. politics still reared its head from time-to-time in very vocal frustrations with how long it sometimes took to come to a consensus on even the simplest of movement concerns (for example, the permissibility of smoking at general assemblies). In addition, and from the perspective of past organizing experiences, Phoenix-area anarchists expressed a strong desire to block the recuperationist efforts of leftist political parties,
from the Democratic Party to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to more radical political organizations seeking to capitalize upon the energy of the movement. Anarchists in Phoenix have long memories, whether that be about the recuperationist strategies around immigrant movements that gained national attention because of the publicity surrounding Arizona state bill 1070 and the long-standing practices of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office under Joe Arpaio. Similar experiences of recuperationist efforts were reported by anarchists and radicals in the anti-Iraq War movement between 2003-2005, and a little further back during the anti-globalization movements that came into their own at the anti-WTO demonstrations in Seattle of 1999. Protecting the relatively organic organizing and decision-making processes that happen through consensus in general assemblies has meant directly opposing party politics and NGOs given their penchant for funneling passionate activists towards the voting booth, and away from direct actions like the unpermitted occupation of city spaces in central business districts.

In anarchist circles, establishing shared interests around a short-term goal, in this case protecting the consensus process in the general assemblies of Occupy Phoenix, is what’s known as the creation of an affinity group. These types of loose-knit, temporary associations are common among anarchists, especially as a substitute for traditional activist organizing efforts. Affinity avoids the burdens and surveillance dangers of more formal, permanent organizations, as well as being very practically oriented. Affinities dissolve rather organically, either when the desired goal of the group is attained or when it becomes clear that it is no longer in their interest to pursue any longer. Writing of his experiences in the New York City Direct Action Network leading up to the Summit of
the Americas mass demonstration in Québec City, 2001, David Graeber (2009) calls affinity groups “the elementary particles of voluntary association”:

The term itself derives from the Spanish grupos de afinidad which again, originally referred to clusters of friends (a common synonym was tertulias, groups of drinking buddies or young people used to hanging out together in cafés), but which in the 1920s became the basic organizational unit of the Spanish anarchist confederation, the FAI (p.288).

While a distributed network of affinity groups could form the basis of larger, decentralized organizational and political formations (Juris, 2008), what Hardt and Negri (2004) enthusiastically refer to as the multitude: “an open and expansive network in which all differences can be expressed freely and equally, a network that provides the means of encounter so that we can work and live in common” (p.xiv), I remain entirely skeptical and pessimistic on this question. Trust and friendship just don’t scale up; I don’t care what the tankies or the social media CEOs say! The affinity group as “drinking buddies” (or tertulias) is far more appealing to me than the affinity group as working unit.

While this sentiment is echoed historically in nihilist critiques of organization (Aragorn!, 2013), it is also what initially drew me to anarchism through the Beer and Revolution events hosted locally by the Phoenix Class War Council. Even though I teach Joel Olson’s book The Abolition of White Democracy in courses at the university, I was introduced to Olson by anarchists over beers in Tempe, Arizona, talking about fanaticism in politics back in 2009. Long-lasting friendships were formed in those spaces; I wasn’t “networking” or even building solidarity. Distributed networks of affinity groups can sound appealing and radically liberating when couched in the revolutionary language of the multitude, however, as Alexander Galloway (2004) argues, “power relations are in
the process of being transformed in a way that is resonant with the flexibility and constraints of information technology” (p.xix) (an issue that will be more thoroughly confronted in the fifth chapter below). In the same philosophical milieu, Gilles Deleuze (1995) didn’t think we needed to be better at communicating through networks, but that we needed to be *circuit breakers*! Additionally, at the heart of Foucault’s (2007) late lectures, is the concept of biopolitics: a description of the social management of populations in capitalist cities through the creation of docile and useful people habituated towards self-regulatory practices. I reference these often-cited trajectories of continental philosophy, not only because I find them to be making convincing arguments, but to put them in conversation anarchists in order to see what they aren’t saying to the Marxists. In the final chapter below, I will argue that it is automation which is the exemplar for technologies of control in managerial systems, whether it is functioning within social movements or in the administration of entire cities. The circuit breakers I imagine will be an affinity group of Luddites, but I shouldn’t get too ahead of myself. (Something to look forward to.) If it isn’t clear at this point, I’m with the nihilists on the question of organization. Though at the time of my participation in Occupy Phoenix back in 2011 through into 2012, I was admittedly ambivalent on this issue, and perhaps even naively persuaded by some of the possibilities of mass organizing that emerged from within alter-globalization struggles in the late-1990s.

*The Rather Obvious, Yet Consistently Overlooked, Limits of Democracy*

I wager that the thesis of this chapter might be deemed controversial for many on the left because people aren’t interested in hearing about the limits of democracy (leaving aside authoritarians, of course), especially not the limits of consensus-based,
participatory, direct-democratic governance. My point here is that *the scaling up of affinity in social movements and grassroots community groups requires social management and strategic organizing*. This has two main consequences, neither of which leads to the establishment of a radical libertarian or egalitarian society capable of replacing the republics of property. The first problem is that the state is always going to be a more efficient administrator of populations, thus while trying to develop consensus-based forms of governance in the shell of our current social order, the state will consistently out-manage and out-strategize mass movements. The second problem, and the one that most concerned me as an anarchist during my participation in Occupy Phoenix, is that any attempt to compete at the scale of governance currently present in our society requires that social movements start to see people and environments like a state does. For instance, while there are differences between city cops and movement.peace police, both are organized around a strategy of maintaining abstract social norms and moral codes (a subject explored below in the fifth chapter). Underlying both of these problems that emerge from scaling up affinity groups into social movements and political organizations is all the work involved, especially those damn meetings! The planner of a professional activist likely rivals that of a middle-manager in terms of organizational commitments.

Some anarchists have fetishized direct-democracy as the end-all-be-all of socially just decision-making that has the capacity to prefigure in the present a better future

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45 Structures of social management and strategic organizing may already be present at these local levels, which has been my consistent, though not exclusive, observation of social movement and groups in Phoenix, Arizona.
society. Imagining and dreaming that the scale of production and reproduction of civilization can remain intact – *globally even!* – through the establishment of federated systems of consensus-based governance.\(^{46}\) This sort of utopian program is one that I flirted with during Occupy; it is a seductive dream to the optimistic and hopeful, especially when one desires to be liberated from large systems of oppression and subordination: “the idea of a global movement, confronting a global present and creating a global future has many apostles” (anonymous, 2011). Writing against there being any hope in a *global* future, the anonymous author (2011) of *Desert* argues against attempts to address massive problems like inevitable climate change on a global scale because of the massively uneven, regionally-specific effects. The problem is one of framing, not revolutionary desire: “I love us, there’s so much we can do and be, but there are limits” (anonymous, 2011). My critique of direct democracy is a practical one that asks those who are drunk on hope to sober up a bit.

It has been my experience that the consensus process can serve an important function, at certain times, for people trying to deliberate on a best course of action in a socially just manner. I participated in several dozen general assemblies at Occupy Phoenix, and found it to be an important process for people to experience as a way of expanding their understanding of group decision making and conflict resolution. Anarchists made numerous interventions to protect the consensus process within the general assemblies, so that at the very least, people could experience an alternative to majoritarian democracy and expand their political imaginations a bit. For example, one

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\(^{46}\) See Bill Cooke & Uma Kothari (Eds.), (2001), *Participation: The New Tyranny.*
accepted proposal created a “progressive stack” in the assembly, such that marginalized voices were placed at the top of the speaking “stack”, which referred to the list of people wanting to address an item in the assembly. A far cry from being an alternative form of governance capable of administering a new mass society, though a helpful tool for a group operating in good faith wanting to establish best practices. The impasses within the assemblies that I experienced were often ideological: violence vs nonviolence; attitudes towards the police; role of technology; official demands of the movement. Though they were also procedural, most notably expressed as impatience, the desire to “move on”: “Can’t we just take a vote?”

The Early General Assemblies at Occupy Phoenix

After the march across town from Cesar Chavez Plaza to Margaret T. Hance park in the afternoon, numbers gradually began to thin out for multiple reasons. It is hard to discount fatigue and waning relevance as contributing factors. By the time Phoenix police began to mobilize riot gear at the far end of the park beneath the Central Avenue bridge, the number of occupiers had dwindled to an easily manageable amount. As approximately 75-100 riot cops slowly swept across the park looking to clear out any remaining occupiers, a group of about fifty people remained on the far side to the west near 3rd Avenue awaiting the confrontation. Several others lined the edges of the park in anticipation of the cops inevitable attempt to mass arrest those remaining, but who had no interest in being part of the civil disobedient spectacle. Upon seeing the approaching cops, I rushed over to the remain group from across the park who were in the process of holding a spontaneous general assembly. After waiting for my own opportunity to speak, I proposed that the group, rather than subject itself to mass arrest, get up from their seated
positions on the ground and begin a much more celebratory march around the downtown area. My thinking behind this, which I expressed in the assembly, was to frustrate the rigid strategies of the riot cops who had already spend quite some time assembling themselves for the park sweep. Despite a few nods of affinity with what I was proposing, most greeted me with negativity and the proposal was easily shot down. I implored the group that it would be far more tactically effective and interesting to use the police’s slow response against them and force them to reactively follow the group around the city, perhaps even back to Cesar Chavez Plaza. Though I could see some interest on the faces of some people, it was not enough to shift anyone’s desires from being martyred in typical leftist, mass arrest style. Here, the group defaulted to the dominant strategy of moral persuasion, hoping that a mass arrest of peaceful protesters by riot cops would incite some parts of the public to support of the overall occupation.

The Impossible, Patience

On October 16th, following the mass arrest at Hance Park the previous night, a group of spokespeople for Occupy Phoenix held a press conference back at Cesar Chavez Plaza. The professed non-violence of the movement was further reiterated, speaking to the overtly passive behavior of those arrested in the park for urban camping; in the face of fully outfitted riot police, occupiers who had committed to staying overnight in the park that first night were dragged from their seated positions in the grass one-by-one, then swallowed by the line of cops. Despite my disagreements over the unnecessary martyrdom in their civil disobedience strategies, their championing of nonviolence, and that the group was now back at Cesar Chavez after several pushed hard just the day prior to march to Hance Park, some spokespeople during the press conference made important
connections between the mass arrest and the way in which urban camping laws are regularly used to police the homeless in downtown Phoenix. The approach of attacking smaller groups at night under the premise of enforcing urban camping laws became the dominant strategy of the Phoenix Police Department to frustrate and undermine the 24-hour occupation that was establish at Cesar Chavez. (Though, I will discuss this further in the fifth chapter below.)

With a permanent presence established at Cesar Chavez, Occupy Phoenix began holding regular general assemblies to make decisions about the movement. Unlike the more spontaneous assemblies of October 15th, general assemblies now had someone (sometimes a few people) facilitating the meetings and were sometimes held twice a day to accommodate different schedules. With the originating Occupy Wall Street movement in New York already hashing through some of the procedural growing pains, other occupations were able to model their process and train facilitators and moderators accordingly. Just as in New York, many “were enthusiastic about the idea of consensus process and direct action, but few had any real experience with either” (Graeber, 2013, p.41). During the very active period of GAs at Occupy Phoenix, the relationship with time was a hugely influential (and uncomfortable) factor within the consensus process. As early as the afternoon assembly on October 18th at 5:00pm, I began hearing frustrations being expressed with the pace of the meetings and that the focus wasn’t

47 The frequency of general assemblies positively correlated with the number of people consistently participating in the overall occupation of the plaza. As participation waned, so too did the frequency of the assemblies, eventually only being held once a day on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays by the time that the 24-hour occupation was abandoned.
“direct” and “practical” enough. When solutions were offered by those expressing what I took to be impatience, it was to hold a vote. What they meant by wanting directness and practicality, I took to be an expression of a crass U.S. pragmatism that we just need to get something done – avoiding any rigorous group discussion of how that does or does not serve the interests of everyone involved. Though the anarchists who met in advance of the occupation didn’t talk explicitly about protecting the consensus process in order to unsettle impatient people, there is a very clear understanding by anarchists of the way in which rigid hierarchies strive for efficiency, especially in capitalist societies where time often is money. The Andrew Niccol film In Time (2011) captures this sentiment perfectly in its dystopian narrative where we discover currency in a capitalist economy reduced to a bioengineered clock inside every person’s arm: workers are paid by adding more time to their clock, but when the time runs out, so does their life – the worry being over what people will get up to when they have some free time.

The desire to plow forward was especially upset if anyone decided to block a proposal put forth in the assembly.

*The Limits of Direct Democracy*

Just as with majoritarian democracy and its close, complimentary pairing to technocratic systems of social control, direct democratic approaches to decision-making have their own set of consequences and limitations closely related to the group context they are used in. Consider the ease by which fascists could insert themselves into the process and stall up decision making by blocking proposals that are considered to be
beneficial to everyone but fascists.\footnote{See Thomas Frank, (2020), \textit{The People, No: A Brief History of Anti-Populism}.} That one person can block a proposal is a truly empowering thing within consensus decision making, which I also made use of in Occupy Phoenix; it essentially ensures that the majority cannot tyrannize a minority. However, unless there are stipulations or \textit{antidemocratic ruptures} in the process, all minority voices end up being considered equal, be they queer Black women or neo-Nazis. Clear enough to me, neo-Nazis wouldn’t be allowed to participate in general assemblies; whereas a queer Black woman may need to be accommodated through a progressive stack if the voices of straight white men dominate assembly conversations. Trying to guard against the “circumvention” of direct-democracy, either by saboteurs or by the inevitable disagreements that emerge in collectives is a lot of work (Vannucci & Singer, 2010). As the AK Press Collective points out in their preface to \textit{Come Hell or High Water}, “The burn-out factor in most collectives is high – even aside from the fact that collectives are frequently doing the work of sustaining small, under-funded, and independent projects and businesses (which all have their own unique set of worries), the day-to-day realities of juggling intense emotions and constant discussion can be incredibly draining” (12). This work is aspirational for some anarchists and most radical leftists in that it is said to be the building blocks of a new society in the shell of the old one. \textit{Democracy is work}, and arguably becomes that much more laborious the further people push to democratize decision-making in more and more parts of society. Of course, when authoritarians impose quick, top-down decisions upon a group for reasons of efficiency and their minority self-interest, many people end up suffering the
consequences of this approach in varying degrees. But is there a point at which the direct-democratic processes escape their work-intensive approach to decision-making? Clearly, it’s massively important to have a process that makes space for a relatively egalitarian form of decision-making. But in what way does scale weigh in on its usefulness to the individuals involved? That isn’t a utilitarian concern about measuring out units of utility or pleasure or happiness, but a question of practicality in relation to how people want to spend their time. Even among anti-statists and anti-capitalists, how desirable and sustainable is an ongoing consensus process full of meetings and human accounting? Even if there are no fascist saboteurs in sight, work still sucks, regardless of how egalitarian its structure is. Do the capitalism-with-a-human-face work-places today, where partition walls are removed from cubicles and leisure activities are infused into work, point – perhaps unfairly – to what we can expect from a new, worker-controlled, direct-democratic society?

*Blocking the Proposal for Virtual Participation in General Assemblies*

The longer things went on, the less-and-less anarchists involved themselves in the maintenance of the 24-hour occupation, general assemblies and movement organizing (though this also reflected the overall trend of reduced participation in the occupation over time). Given that I resided relatively close to downtown Phoenix at the time, and possessed a lingering desire to continue to intervene in the occupation, I consistently attended general assemblies and demonstrations into the winter of 2012. Second only to

49 See Bob Black, *The Abolition of Work* for a polemical attack upon the rootedness of work in our lives, including attempts at reorganizing societies along more politically and economically just lines (online source: https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bob-black-the-abolition-of-work).
my opposition to the politics of nonviolence that were wedded to Occupy Phoenix from
the outset, was my denunciation of proposals to accept virtual participation in the general
assemblies. The idea being that people would prospectively have been able to participate
in the decision-making process remotely as “online occupiers”. Various reasons were
given in support of the proposal, though a few of the ones I heard most regularly
expressed were the following: attending the general assemblies in-person on a regular
basis was said to be difficult for to accommodate into busy schedules; proximity to
downtown Phoenix varied greatly given the physical size of the city\(^{50}\), with some living
up to 40 miles away; being able to be more anonymous through online personas; the
importance of being physically present for the general assembly wasn’t something found
to be particularly important to being able to make decisions about the overall occupation.
Regardless of the reasoning behind deciding to not be as involved in the physical
occupation at Cesar Chavez Plaza, those who did remain committed to maintaining the
24-hour presence there became more-and-more resentful towards occasional occupiers
who would show up only for specific meetings and demonstrations. On more than one
occasion, typically during a heated movement debate, 24-hour occupiers chastised my
own intermittent presence, claiming that those who were there more had more say and
stake in Occupy Phoenix. While I disagreed with the criticism for a reason unrelated to
putting in the proper time (i.e. work), there was something to be said for being more

\(^{50}\) Phoenix clearly exhibits the characteristics of an urban sprawl, with development
trends over the past several decades tending mostly outward horizontally rather than
vertically at its cores. Though, more recently, and in concert with trends in other major
U.S. cities, its urban cores have seen a large amount of development at its urban cores,
particularly in downtown Phoenix and downtown Tempe.
involved in the day-to-day functioning of the permanent occupation if one thinks it
matters. Many anarchists saw the futility in trying to maintain the 24-hour occupation
given the persistent efforts of the police to undermine it. Sacrificing costly supplies and
at times subjecting people to arrest under urban camping laws didn’t seem necessary to
achieving certain movement goals. Trying to hold the space all day and night became
increasingly symbolic, an abstract strategy, and less a movement tactic to achieve a
declared goal. In fact, I’d argue that the slow fizzling out of energy at Occupy Phoenix
was partly due to the attempt at holding the plaza without a proper contingent of
committed occupiers. People get tired, regardless of their passions and aspirations.

Without needing to valorize material presence over virtual, mediated
participation, I objected strongly to any proposals put forward in general assemblies that
would open the consensus building process to online participation. My blocking of the
proposals wasn’t a complete rejection of virtual participation in the movement per se, but
simply an attempt to preserve the concrete form that the consensus process took as
general assemblies in the plaza. As a student and teacher, I have always felt that being
physically present during a conversation was important, and extended this sentiment to
the assemblies. I have noticed that people speak differently to each other about serious
social and political issues when in each other’s presence. The passive aggressiveness that
exemplifies many online debates is easier called out in face-to-face conversation, which
is not to say that it completely gets rid of it. Other anarchists who were involved in the
occupation also registered their rejection to these proposals to me in private conversations
as well as online in OP Facebook discussion threads. I happened to be the one who was
both available and desired to bring their concerns over it to the general assemblies. This
was at a time when other anarchists who attended the pre-occupation meeting (where we decided the importance of protecting the consensus process) were either unavailable or had ceased their participation in the assemblies.

After the 24-hour occupation had been abandoned, another proposal was put forth a final time to allow online participation in the general assemblies. As a luddite and someone who had been continually invested in the importance of the physical occupation, I stubbornly submitted a block to the proposal (to the dismay of those who had put it forth). Despite nearing the end of my own tenure at OP, I was still invested in preserving what remained of it. I would have rather seen the occupation officially announce its end than slowly dissolve into some ambiguous online entity – though it’s difficult for me to say which of those scenarios best describes how OP actually came to an end or what date in 2012 would mark that occasion. So, on a cool but pleasant desert evening, I made my way over to Cesar Chavez Plaza for the general assembly with the sole purpose of blocking the proposal to open participation in general assembly decision making to people online.

Before any criticisms of ableism are leveled against me as someone who was capable of somewhat easily making their way over to the plaza, it’s important to note that the proposal was not put forward as a way of advocating for the position of those with disabilities, nor were those defending it that evening testifying to being disabled.\(^5 \text{I am choosing my language carefully here because I am all too personally familiar with the way in which certain disabilities are invisible (mental illness or chronic pain conditions for example). Thus my judgement about intentions and positions are limited to what was professed by various participants in the general assembly that evening.}

\(^5\)
disabilities wanting to remotely participate in general assemblies. But if the proposal was presented in that form, I would have merely raised concerns about how disabled online participants would be “vetted” and the way this might bring up issues of profiling that mirrors the way states seek to make people legible. I have yet to hear of any attempts to establish online security in social movements, beyond the maintenance of anonymity over networked communication technologies, that don’t reproduce what James Scott calls the state’s way of seeing. Of course, one cannot know for sure that an occupier in physical attendance at the plaza is who they say they are, but that problem becomes exponentially more difficult to contend with once participation gets more and more mediated. It’s much easier for law enforcement to disguise themselves online than it is in person, especially when under the critical scrutiny of, for lack of a better term, a “seasoned radical”. Most of the time, at demonstrations and within social movements, cops just end up looking like parents trying to fit in at a concert with their teenage children. It’s a very specific kind of underinformed social awkwardness that more often than not sticks out like a sore thumb. Critiques of security culture aside, I felt it important to place out in the open my awareness of how ableism could be easily wrapped up in a challenge to allowing online participation in general assemblies.

Though after initially putting forward my block to the proposal and explaining my reasoning for doing so, I eventually decided to rescind my block and rest on the position of voicing a strong opposition to the proposal. In dropping the block, the proposal then passed along to be considered by the consensus of the group. I wasn’t completely confident in the decision going either way, but felt it was more important to allow it to pass through the consensus process. This was partly because of some reflection in the
moment on my own waning commitment to the occupation. I thought at the time, if this were to be one of my final significant acts of participation in Occupy Phoenix, how legitimate would it be for me to block a proposal for a social movement I may not be participating in at all in a few weeks. Reflecting on that moment now as I write this seven years later, I think I’d be a lot less inclined to rescind my block. The desire for online participation in general assemblies not only forces security culture into the consensus process, but it also avoids the most obvious solution: Why not simply host online assemblies as a separate process to address the specific concerns of virtual occupiers? There were already several break away groups within OP that addressed more particular interests. There would be nothing stopping virtual occupiers from doing this and bringing the things decided upon or discussed to the general assemblies at Cesar Chavez Plaza (those desiring an online assembly could have one and report back to the main assembly)

A bit to my surprise, as the group deliberated over the proposal, several people took my initial desire to block as something worth considering given that a block would mean I’d leave the movement because it would modify the occupation in such a way to where I would no longer want to participate. It seemed to create some serious reflection in some individuals, to which they testified as we went around the group to hear thoughts. Ultimately, the proposal didn’t pass, to the dismay of the “anonymous hackers” present that evening, who were the most vocally supportive of it.

Affinity Doesn’t Scale Up

A lot of important lessons about interpersonal and group communication are learned within the direct democratic, consensus process of general assemblies. Listening
and patience being two of the most important, which reveal the way that parliamentary
and representative democracies trade the participation of constituencies in for efficiency.
The consensus process also reveals the amount of fundamental disagreements people
have when they take the time to deliberate over the organization of their lives. At the
moment of irreconcilable difference in a consensus process, there are three notable
tendencies: compromise, factionalizing and desertion. The first allows for the scaling up
on the process at the expense of individual desires; the second, the establishment of
separate but parallel group process; whereas the third signals a return to affinity.
CHAPTER 4

PLEASE, NOT THIS DEBATE AGAIN!

We are not concerned with peace.

~ Neal Shirley & Saralee Stafford, Dixie Be Damned

The decision to engage in certain tactics may help or hinder the goals of social movements. To be able to measure the effectiveness of a given tactic in relation to movement goals requires not only a clear statement of those goals, but also a practical knowledge of the social and political conditions one must navigate while trying to achieve them. While a smashed bank window or a violent confrontation with a line of riot police may feel wrong because “violence simply begets more violence” or because corporate media outlets will only focus on those violent acts and not the larger message of the movement, those sentimental worries alone cannot negate the effectiveness of violence as a tactic in achieving movement goals. In effect, those sorts of sentimental worries are merely stating that “violence is bad” in relation to some generalized moral strategy that everyone in the movement ought to adhere to. Given that Occupy Phoenix had explicitly framed its strategic, moralistic nonviolence in Kingian terms, I also felt it was very relevant to engage with the stories being told about civil rights struggles during the 1960s. Echoing an important and critically useful distinction that sociologist Michel de Certeau (1988) establishes between tactics and strategies in his book The Practice of Everyday Life, I will be making a parallel argument here that tactics and strategies within social movements are antithetical approaches that strive towards very different kinds of goals. For de Certeau (1988), a strategy is
“the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.) can be managed” (p.36).

Strategies focus on the ability to map out a future in highly visible spaces (de Certeau, 1988). It should come as no surprise that cops, politicians, urban planners, and social managers of all stripes – including movement leaders, even in so-called horizontal organizations – take strategic approaches to problem solving. De Certeau’s description of strategy is nearly identical to how anthropologist James Scott (1998) describes what it means to see like a state, particularly the desire for a highly legible, simplified mapping of populations that need to be managed and environments that need to be tamed. Likewise, it comes as little surprise to an anarchist like myself that David Graeber (2004) would define Marxism as tending to be “a theoretical or analytical discourse about revolutionary strategy” (p.6). The strategic and managerial nature of revolutionary and reformist leftism, as political persuasions, is not very difficult to demonstrate. In complete contrast to these managerial approaches, tactics, according to de Certeau (1988), are ways of “making do”,

“It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It takes advantage of ‘opportunities’ and depends on them, being without any base where it could stockpile its winnings, build up its own position, and plan raids. What it wins it cannot keep. This nowhere gives a tactic mobility, to be sure, but a mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment. It must vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the
proprietary powers. It poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it is least expected. It is a guileful ruse” (37).

Tactics are the weapons of the weak, but not for the purpose of becoming strong in some twisted social Darwinist sense. Tactics are for unarresting ourselves from the managerial grip upon our lives, both figuratively and quite literally in certain scenarios. I am wanting to be quite specific here in making this distinction between tactics and strategies because it helps me to better conceptualize what is at stake in the debates I engaged in on violence/nonviolence during Occupy Phoenix. There is a clear affinity between what anarchists get up to and de Certeau’s understanding of tactics.

Another conceptual distinction that I want to consider for the purpose of better framing these movement debates is the one between ethics and morality, particularly because of the inextricably moral character attributed to nonviolence by its advocates. In contract to the moral foundations of nonviolent activism, anarchism “has tended to be an ethical discourse about revolutionary practice” (Graeber, 2000, p.6). While I don’t share David Graeber’s language of revolution, in this case I think it could easily be substituted for some synonymously liberating language of rebellion without losing the meaning of what is being said. Extending the affinity between anarchism and tactics to also include ethical considerations is not my attempt of providing a justification for people engaging in certain practices, but to emphasize the fleeting and contextual nature of rebellion as distinct from strategic approaches. In the sense I’m going to make use of them here, ethics are not a taxonomy for the justification of certain acts – that is how morality is operationalized. Ethics, according to Spinoza (2000), are a description of the best practices for achieving what are unique and always contextually specific goals, which
serve the purpose of increasing our capacity to act as individuals. Bowing to a general moral strategy designed by social managers – even those with the most benevolent of intentions – is going to have the complete opposite effect, and thus would be avoided by someone interested in tactical efficacy. Without generating too much of a philosophical tangent here, I’m taking what is considered to be a moral anti-realist position: meaning simply that there are no objective moral goods or evils, nor any normative facts. Writing about this distinction between ethics and morality in Spinoza, Deleuze (1988) characterizes ethics as “a typology of immanent modes of existence”, which he says replaces morality that “always refers existence to transcendent values” (p.23). In seeking to get behind the perpetual impasse of this debate, I feel it is necessary to evaluate the moral commitments of nonviolence as a movement strategy. While others have quite succinctly argued that nonviolence as a strategy is both harmful to those most rebellious in social movements (or liberation struggles) and complicit with the state’s administration of minority and vulnerable populations (Cobb Jr., 2016; Gelderloos, 2015; Ruins, 2002; Fanon, 1963), understanding why nonviolence remains such a persistent and appealing strategy could be helpful for undermining its stranglehold on people’s political imaginations. The appeal of being on the side of good against a designated evil force is extremely seductive taken separately from any actual evaluation of what constitutes the good. However, from an ethical standpoint, “The knowledge of good or bad is simply the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious of it” (Spinoza, 2000, p.233). Spinoza (2000) goes on to “call that good or bad which is helpful, or an obstacle, to us in the preservation of our being, this is which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of acting”. Or in de Certeau’s language of tactics, that which we call good is what
helps us in “making do” in spite of strategies attempting to manage our behavior. Thus, for Spinoza and de Certeau, and I would argue for anarchists as well, a practical ethics would be embodied against any attempt at domesticating it into a normative code or set of moral duties. This is intentionally frustrating for activists and organizations who want blueprints or guidance, but I imagine will be liberating for those seeking increasing autonomy in what they do.  

So, Who (or What) Exactly Makes the Movement Look Bad?  

While it seems honest, the question of who (or what) makes the movement look bad is a loaded one, wrought with assumptions that require some serious unpacking. It imagines a monolithic thing, the movement, as possessing a coherent, unified agency that could be tarnished by bad actors or bad tactics. Read with a chastising tone against certain people involved in a social movement, the question leaves unchallenged the people and organizations outside of the movement – corporate media reporters, reactionary politicians, and cops, to give but a few examples – who significantly contribute to the framing of good/bad protester narratives. The question also assumes that a social movement is best when it remains highly visible to the larger public, transparent in its activities and that it should conduct itself respectably. Otherwise, why care about how it looks to others?  

It is no coincidence that acts of nonviolent civil disobedience are intentionally performed to a larger public audience, seeking to galvanize public opinion around some social justice issue through a symbolic, sometimes even theatrical, demonstration. In the context of Occupy Phoenix, the frustrating and overdramatized mass arrest at Margaret T. Hance Park on the night of October 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2011 immediately comes to mind.
As the first official day of the occupation wore on, the initial crowd of upwards around two thousand people that had gathered at Cesar Chavez Plaza in the heart of downtown Phoenix had started to thin out a bit. Organizers and others in attendance had begun conversations about whether they would remain in the plaza that night or march to a different location. After some discussion, Hance Park was selected given its size, proximity to resources (like bathrooms at the Phoenix public library) and, most immediately, its later curfew. It was communicated to Occupy Phoenix that police would only allow people to remain at Cesar Chavez Plaza until 8:00pm, whereas Hance Park was open to the public until 11:00pm. Why a delayed confrontation with cops seemed appealing to organizers was lost on some of us, especially since numbers would still be quite high if the group was interested in occupying the plaza in spite of the police threat to kick people out. Arguably, staying at the plaza would have made for a much more interesting confrontation, even if it wasn’t successful. I imagine it also would have accelerated dissenting attitudes towards the police. But, that isn’t what happened. The several mile march from Cesar Chavez Plaza to Hance Park inevitably thinned out numbers, which wasn’t surprising as many who showed up earlier in the day saw the event simply as a day of protest. They came out, held signs, mingled with others in attendance, and then went home. Others who had made plans to camp for the night as a means of creating an actual physical occupation were definitely in the minority. After the march to the park, and as it got closer to the 11:00pm curfew, numbers continued to dwindle (perhaps about 150-200 remaining by 9:00pm), especially in response to an increasingly large police presence that was assembling at the opposite side of the park under the Central Avenue bridge. By around 10:00pm, there were at least 75-100 riot
cops in a long formation that stretched across the width of the park, clearly preparing to forcibly remove anyone remaining after 11:00pm. In trying to figure out what people were going to do in response to the police, several general assemblies took place to establish consensus within the group. In two separate general assemblies that evening, I put forward two suggestions (or propositions) for consideration: the first at an assembly around 9:00pm, sought to get the group’s attitude about self-defense in response to police violence; the second, at an emergency assembly that was called as the riot police approached the remaining occupiers, proposed that the group not simply allow themselves to be arrested in an act of civil disobedience, but instead continue to march through the streets of downtown Phoenix, forcing the cops to regroup and perhaps frustrating their efforts to end the evening’s demonstration. Both suggestions were met with overwhelming scorn, even if I did notice a few faces perk up at the idea of forcing the cops to chase us around after they had spent a few hours assembling themselves in riot gear at the park.\textsuperscript{52} Depressingly, the night ended in a voluntary mass arrest, a sit-in of sorts, with forty or so people ardently remaining peaceful, telling cops that they loved them as they were arrested.

Did this mass arrest of overwhelmingly peaceful protesters captured on camera for corporate news media to broadcast and for social media posting galvanize widespread public support Occupy Phoenix? I am unaware of any polling that took place in Phoenix.

\textsuperscript{52} It is worth noting that some of those who had vocally scorned my suggestions that first night, several months into the occupation, had admittedly come to appreciate the perspectives I tried to offer. This came after, I would argue, a sustained exposure to anarchists in the movement and through the repeated experience of police violence for simply attempting to occupy a public plaza.
that might offer a glimpse into the public’s attitude towards the movement. I can, however, testify to the fact that the number of people present at the occupation on any given day after October 15th, 2011 never came close to reaching those first two days of demonstrations. Occupy Phoenix did maintain a 24-hour physical occupation for several months, but that was a testament to the dedication of those involved in the movement and the creation of mutual aid networks by people doing outreach. The strategy of voluntarily becoming martyr by mass arrest is often repeated, but I would argue is rarely effective in reaching movement goals. If anything, it puts stress on movement resources and removes valuable people from the streets and organizing spaces. But these sorts of actions are continually celebrated, and usually based on how effective people were in remaining peaceful during them. Peacefulness may even be a more important factor in the adherence to strategic nonviolence – in spite of its arbitrary nature as a measure of someone’s activities – than how non-violent one is. As they say, “Violence makes peaceful protesters look bad!”

In movement debates, advocates of strategic nonviolence assume in advance that violent tactics will not only make the movement look bad, but that they will run counter to its long-term goals. Instead of taking the rearguard position of some radical leftists who attempt to justify violent tactics through the rhetoric of movement self-defense (a stand-your-ground-esque position), I am interested in attacking the many assumptions built into the loaded question about who or what makes the movement look bad when asked from the perspective of strategic nonviolence. The purpose of this approach is to both reveal the political, racial and colonial commitments of strategic nonviolence and to show the ways in which it is used as a disciplinary technique against certain people
within movements. This approach also refuses to fall into the moralizing trap of attempting to reframe violent self-defense as an honorable act to absolve us of feeling any shame when engaging in it. Martin Luther King didn’t reject self-defense as being necessary at certain times, and travelled with an armed guard while carrying a gun himself (Cobb Jr., 2016). Likewise, Gandhi famously declared that if cornered with no other option, one ought to defend oneself rather than be a coward. While I don’t think that avoiding conflict is cowardly – many times it is quite smart and very tactically-minded – I mention King and Gandhi’s attitude towards self-defense to show that this ground has already been ceded in the debate (at least by two of the most influential figures invoked by advocates of strategic nonviolence).

How the movement and individuals in it appear to others, the so-called general public, matters strategically and morally to advocates of nonviolence. Visibility and transparency are in a sense virtuous from this position, which is a strange thing to consider because virtuousness as a measure of something’s value is arguably predicated on its visibility and transparency. By way of Plato’s (1998) famous allegory of the cave in Republic, I think that Socrates would council us that it has something to do with being in the light. But what about those of us who prefer the cover of darkness or agree with Crito that good friends bust you out of jail (Plato, 1992, pp.43-54)?

So, What Exactly is the Debate & How Long Has It Been Going On?

The debate about proper tactics and strategies in social movements, as related to the ethics, morality and usefulness of violence versus non-violence, are traceable at least as far back as the second half of the 19th-century when Russian nihilists, insurrectionary anarchists and illegalists expressly rejected syndicalism and popular worker’s
organizations as suitable vehicles for revolutionary struggle. Some, often inspired by the
egoism of Max Stirner, went so far as to reject all forms of organization and the framing
of their actions as revolutionary. Stirner (2018) argued that

Revolution and insurrection should not be looked upon as synonyms. The former
consists in a radical change of conditions, of the prevailing condition or status, the
state or society, and is therefore a political or social act; the latter indeed has a
transformation of conditions as its inevitable result, but doesn’t start from it, but
from the discontent of human beings with themselves, is not an armed uprising,
but a rising up of individuals, a getting up, without regard to the arrangements that
spring from it. The revolution aimed at new arrangements, the insurrection leads
us to no longer let ourselves be arranged, but rather to arrange ourselves, and set
no radiant hopes on “institutions” (p.301).

Though, it was Italian anarchist Errico Malatesta who authored the concept of
‘propaganda by deed’ during the time of the split in the First International between
Marxist statists and anarchist anti-statists. The deeds that nihilists, insurrectionary
anarchists and illegalists had in mind in the latter half of the 19th- and early 20th-century
were explicitly and unabashedly violent and criminal, including things like assassination
and bank robbery. While these tendencies of anarchism don’t always converge on
intention, the inspirational value of their actions for others was generally an important
point of agreement – even if, for example, that was to try and show Russian peasants in
1881 that their rulers were not omnipotent by assassinating Tsar Alexander II.

As I noted in the first chapter, the division between organizational and
individualist forms of anarchist-communism during the 19th-century play an important
role in the way that post-left anarchism re-centered those discussions over the last few
decades. The connection between organizational tendencies, leftism broadly speaking,
and the shunning of violent tactics as counter-productive will be one that I seek to
establish through my interrogation of the violence/nonviolence movement debate within
OP. I argue that where there is a strong moral demand for strategic nonviolence in a
movement, there will also be leftist organizers colluding across a spectrum of reformist
and revolutionary goals (though tending towards the former). Admittedly, I’m making a
bold claim here, and while that has been my experience, I’ve yet to demonstrate that it is
the case more generally. First, I plan to rehash the violence/nonviolence debate that
exists historically in social movements and liberation struggles; second, I share my
experiences as an anarchist having this debate at OP against their preestablished
orientation towards nonviolence. Because OP organizers decided their nonviolent
disposition in advance, outside of the general assembly process, debating against it as an
anarchist was an uphill battle from the beginning.

Nonviolence\textsuperscript{53} is a rather specialized concept that, according to its devoted
adherents, describes a “way of life” (King, 1960). I agree with Jeriah Bowser (2015) that
it is important not to confuse nonviolence or non-violent civil disobedience with
pacifism, which he characterizes as “a platform of idealism, disengagement, and
subservience” (p.49) and “any action that complies with the requests and existing power
structures of the State” (p.51). On many occasions, I have heard anarchists and
revolutionaries who are open to violent resistance caricature non-violent actions as
pacifism. I think this reductionist approach mirrors the one adherents to nonviolence
often take when denouncing violence as using a tool of the oppressor. While Bowser

\textsuperscript{53} Nonviolence and non-violent civil disobedience (or non-violent actions) are used as
distinct concepts that describe very different things. Nonviolence refers to moral
strategies of resistance that are embodied as ways of life, whereas non-violent civil
disobedience or simply non-violent actions are describing specific events or tactics. As I
will argue, not all actions that could be considered non-violent will be in line with the
strategy of nonviolence.
(2015) rather decently navigates the nuances of violent and non-violent resistance, the historical criticisms of each, and in what situations (or stages of resistance) either is most appropriate, he still deploys love as a metaphysical force for good in the exact manner that Gandhi and King do. To speculate, I hypothesize that Bowser arrives at a faith in the power of love as a result of his mischaracterization of nihilism as a tool of oppression and due to his stated belief in “Total Liberation”. Within the larger anti-civ/green anarchist conversation about liberation struggles, the anonymous author of Desert rejects such far-reaching goals as mythology if we take seriously the scientific predictions about global warming. This criticism of Bowser isn’t on anti-aspirational grounds, but is a push for lucidity that corresponds to our capacities for rebellion. Anarchists and the enemies of social orders ought to leave the utopian dreaming to the authoritarians (as I argued the second chapter).

The debate about violence/nonviolence mainly happens in emerging social movements that have the potential for a broad spectrum of appeal and in long-standing struggles for social justice. This is partly because what is at stake in the debate is whether a movement or organization will be able to gain momentum, and this is directly correlative to its public appeal. If the actions of a movement or organization, shown in corporate media or shared widely on social media platforms, don’t appeal to the sensibilities of a significant part of those wider audiences, a public pressure campaign often fails. Acts of civil disobedience are hedged within a need to mobilize the political pressure of voters, such that governing representatives will change laws and policies in response from the demands of their constituency (especially during election years). While strategic nonviolence can include actions that break laws, it is done through a
performance of street theater to make visible an injustice and to show the heavy hand of the state in response to non-aggressive activists. The hope is to the shame the state in front of the audience, namely the general public. Adherents of strategic nonviolence argue that violent tactics make the movement, or the various participating organizations, look bad in the media and additionally distract attention away from movement goals. Corporate media reporting invariably focuses on acts of property destruction and violent confrontation with police during a demonstration, even if the majority of the people involved in the event didn’t participate in any violent or destruction behavior. If reporting is only being done on the violence of a few “bad protestors”, then proponents of nonviolence argue that the message will be lost. The certitude in it being the case that if the message can get out to enough people, then stated goals of social justice can be achieved, is rooted strongly in the examples of Mahatma Gandhi in the fight against British colonialism in India and Martin Luther King during the civil rights struggles in the United States. Not only is violence said to distract from movement goals in the media and alienate the wider public needed in political pressure campaigns, it is also condemned as one of the master’s tools – suggesting that the use of it in resistance struggles will only reproduce and prolong the structures of oppression. The truism, violence begets violence, is often invoked as a dismissive summation when others suggest that a diversity of tactics would benefit a social movement.

Before considering some of the common historical and tactical responses to the arguments made by advocates of strategic nonviolence, I think it’s helpful to engage with Gelderloos’ (2015) claim that “violence does not exist”. After participating in dozens of workshops around the violence/nonviolence debate in the 2000s and 2010s, Gelderloos
(2015) discovered that there was very little agreement in groups about what constitutes violence and that the category of violence was defined most by the reaction of our peers to certain actions. While Gelderloos took the approach in workshops of asking people to define violence (something that was never successfully done by his account), during teach-ins at Occupy Phoenix, I proposed that if the group was going to consider itself a nonviolent movement, then it ought to be able to define nonviolence (or drop this descriptor if it could not). The group couldn’t define nonviolence after taking a couple days between general assemblies to engage my proposal, but still insisted that Occupy Phoenix remain defined as a nonviolent movement. In a way, part of my goal with this chapter is to anachronistically provide them with that elusive definition of nonviolence – though I’m not too sure they would view it favorably. I will return to those experiences shortly after I finish recounting the general arguments in defense of the use of violence in social movements and liberation struggles, which can generally be divided into two categories: historical and tactical. Arguments that include the histories of struggle from below demythologize nonviolence and the leaders of nonviolent movements. Whereas tactical arguments consider the importance of having a wider set of options available when a movement is confronted higher levels of adversity.

What I think becomes evident in recounting the overall debate is that it’s a misnomer to even frame it as violence versus nonviolence. While the advocates of strategic nonviolence do characterize it that way, those who seek to defend a diversity of tactics position within social movements aren’t arguing for rampant, indiscriminate violence, they are simply trying to preserve the option for being able to choose engage in violent tactics should people in the movement decide they are necessary in a specific
context. In the context of struggles for national liberation from colonial oppression, Fanon (1963) argues that “decolonization is always a violent phenomenon” (p.35). But even in the midst of anticolonial or insurrectionary struggles, people also involve themselves in the maintenance of social support structures and mutual aid.

Many contemporary anarchists, for instance, have engaged in similar debates in the anti-corporate globalization movement since the late-1990s (Gelderloos, 2015; Ruins, 2002). For some and within the Occupy movement, this was already a tired debate that few had interest in re-hashing. Though some did get involved in this debate because of their direct involvement and consequences they faced through movement policing. Within OP, I made the decision to intervene in the debate, participating in several teach-ins, one notably alongside a trained advocate of Kingian nonviolence. Prior to any open general assemblies, OP had declared itself a nonviolent movement, thus setting the stage for confrontations with anyone advocating for a diversity of tactics or for people like myself who outright reject strategic nonviolence on its presumptions of moral authority. The importance for me of engaging in this movement debate came from a desire to resist ceding any more ground at OP to the nonviolence narrative. It not only presents a limited political imagination that constrains movement energy, but it also promotes an atmosphere of internal movement policing that too easily threatens the participation and safety of more rebellious individuals.

The politics of nonviolence, as well as apologist attitudes towards cops within Occupy (which will be examined in the next chapter), emerges from an unmistakably white, middle-class identity. As a race traitor, I remain treasonous and unsympathetic towards all expressions of whiteness. Despite being a Black leader, Martin Luther King
Jr.’s condemnation of violent tactics and rioting in response to segregation and white supremacy were directed at other Black people during the civil rights struggles (Shirley and Stafford, 2015; Russell, 2010). King’s integrationist politics of inclusion were essentially a call for Black people to behave so that they would be perceived as good citizens and accepted into the U.S. political order (Russell, 2010). Gaining acceptance in the U.S. has consistently meant assimilation for non-Black and non-indigenous ethnic groups and adherence to a politics of respectability for Blacks people.

The False Dichotomy

When social movements perpetuate the false dichotomy between violence and nonviolence, they assist the state, specifically the police, in managing them as a group (Gelderloos, 2015). When operationalized within a social movement, the violence/nonviolence binary helps mobilize dogmas such as the belief that if you’re not a staunch advocate of militant nonviolence that follows in the footsteps of King and Gandhi, then it is likely that you have the desire to participate in violent or threatening activity at all times. Because of the moral nature of the politics of nonviolence, adherents end up engaging in a process of purification that plays easily into police and media narratives about “good and bad” protesters. Out of this dichotomy, born from a whitewashed history of both the civil rights struggles in the U.S. and anticolonial struggles in India, comes an acutely moral attitude towards movement strategy. It is no longer simply a tactical choice to perform some action that is non-violent – like holding a teach-in criticizing the politics of nonviolence – but nonviolence becomes a way of life.

54 See also responses by Black power activists, Fanon and third world revolutionaries.
oriented around a moral duty to observe the universalized principles of nonviolence.\textsuperscript{55} This is no longer describing an activity or experience, but an \textit{a priori} moral law. In practical application, it looks like policing and social-behavioral management, which is why the state will always prefer negotiating with the advocates of nonviolence (Gelderloos, 2015). Crowd control detectives in Phoenix almost seamlessly integrate themselves into protests and demonstrations because of how amenable the advocacy of nonviolence is to strategies of social-behavioral management. Were it not for the interventions of anarchists and anti-authoritarians, I have witnessed, for example, the Phoenix HR cops become indistinguishable from movement leadership during immigrant rights marches in Phoenix. Everyone shakes hands, exchanges niceties, small talk and march routes, then walking side-by-side at the front of marches. When these detectives are made to feel unwelcomed or when movement leaders are made uncomfortable for their cooperation, this seamless relationship is disrupted. It doesn’t even require any arrestable actions. When anarchists and other anti-authoritarians aren’t involved in event planning meetings, just as they were absent from early OP meetings before the first action on October 14\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, an endorsement of nonviolence became the default strategic commitment. This was a tactical and ideological hurdle for anarchists from the first day through to the dissolution of the OP.

Despite exercising patience within shared educational situations, including the teach-ins and workshops I participated in at OP, it is frustrating to know that after every political demonstration that is labeled violent, the same broken-record conversations

\textsuperscript{55} See Figures A and B below for a copy of the handouts given out during a teach-in by the trained advocate of Kingian nonviolence.
challenging ahistorical views of social change, perpetuated by the mythologies of nonviolence, are necessary as counter-narratives. Within each new social movement and rebellion against oppression and exploitation, people have to learn “all over again that nonviolence does not work” (Gelderloos, 2015, p.11). I don’t think I’m alone in these frustrations, as many before me and contemporary to me have had and are having these same conversations – over and over – with the adherents of nonviolence (Gelderloos, 2015; Shirley and Stafford, 2015; Strain, 2005; Ruins, 2002). Sure, it’d be quaint if mass movements practicing nonviolence could bring down systems of oppression, as is regularly fabled about the movements led by Gandhi in India or King in the U.S., but history just doesn’t tell that story. It must be said, a large amount of the activities within social movements are non-violent and even non-confrontational in nature: general assemblies, meetings, training sessions, workshops, teach-ins and general movement conversations have little to no violent activities present in them and constitute crucial aspects of any social movement. But those movement activities are just that, aspects of a social movement that serve specific purposes. At other times, violent interventions (or the threat of it), notoriously over-dramatized acts of property destruction and escalatory tactics may be decided to be necessary. The circumstances in which we find ourselves are just as important as our own guiding principles are in determining what to do in any given moment. Thus, the frustration with nonviolence as a strategy consistently comes from its unquestionable, outright rejection of certain tactics without first evaluating the scenario they emerge in. Even the decision in a demonstration march to take the street could be framed as violent if it places the movement in a more antagonistic relationship towards the police.
As an anarchist with no reservations about violent rebellion either now or in the past – though violence is rarely a simple consideration – I was continuously reminded by other occupiers that Occupy Phoenix is a “peaceful assembly” and a “nonviolent movement” when I suggested the salience of violence in struggles against subordination and oppression. There is no shortage of insurrectionary history that highlights the central role played by violence in liberation struggles. At times, just the use of antagonistic language towards capitalists, politicians and the police, and even wearing masks was at times categorized as “violent behavior” during OP. In light of these arbitrary witch hunts for violent occupiers, sometimes the only recourse was shameless dismissal if either time or patience were in short supply.

Nonviolence does not mean ‘non-violent’. Non-violent is simply a description of someone not acting violently in a given situation. Nonviolence is a moral dogma towards social change. The linguistic distinction between the terms ‘nonviolence’ and ‘non-violent’ is a significant one, at was also suggested to me by practitioners of Kingian nonviolence during conversations at OP. Nonviolence is an ideology – perhaps better understood as a contemporary mythology – that motivates a certain way of existing in the world. It expresses clear socio-political values that inform the choices people make: a list of things one ought or ought not do. This rule-based approach to managing behavior leads me to categorize nonviolence as a moral strategy, which is quite apart from the consideration of concrete, tactical choices. Analytically, I clearly distinguish morality, as a set of generalized imperatives, from ethics, which I would describe as a context-

56 See Stafford and Shirley (2015), Testa (2015), Birchall (2010), Thompson (2010) and Fanon (1963), to name just a few that I’ve engaged with here.
specific, modulating guide to practical activity. This critical distinction between morality and ethics is greatly inspired by Spinoza, particularly his *Ethics*. Spinoza allows for an indictment of the way in which morality, duty and religious frameworks are used to create social and political imperatives like nonviolence. The use of non-violent tactics far outweighs the instances where violent tactics are chosen within social movements. The reason I would give for this would be in reference to practical and ethical concerns, and not because someone felt a particular duty to remain nonviolent. The decision to be violent is rarely simple, and it is a mistake to assume that those who participate in violent tactics within social movements haven’t thought it through. In fact, it is the adherence to nonviolence that leaves no space for critical reflection upon best courses of action: a whole spectrum of seemingly confrontation tactics are barred from consideration. Moral dogmas like nonviolence are most productively understood as the expression of managerial interests towards a group, even (and perhaps especially) when they are cloaked in a religious language of good and evil.

Violence takes on the form of something diabolical according to the advocates of Kingian nonviolence, framed as people falling prey to the devil’s game. In more secular terms, this is expressed in the popular social justice truism that you can’t dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tools; the implication being that violence is one of the master’s tools. As a good anarchist friend of mine humorously noted, the only people who could seriously accept that truism probably haven’t built anything before: the hammer has two ends, one for hammering a nail in and the other for pulling the nail out. Whether understood as succumbing to the devil’s or the master’s influence, violence is demonized and forbidden.
My interventions into the violence/nonviolence debate during Occupy Phoenix could be said to be an attempt at demystifying the conversations so as to better understand the conflicting motivations of various people involved in the movement. During the teach-ins and discussions about the movement tactics of Occupy Phoenix that I participated in, I consistently framed what I considered to be the false dichotomy of violence/nonviolence as a framing issue between situational tactics (or simply ethics) and moral strategy. Instead of talking about good and evil, I was trying to force the conversation into one about practicality versus impracticality. This was my way of avoiding what I viewed as the false alternative between violence and nonviolence, and replace it with a conversation about context-based practicality that makes no assumptions about the benevolence of the universe.⁵⁷ That violence is understood as something diabolical⁵⁸ is clearly understandable, but for those of us that flirt with or embrace cosmic pessimism, the attempt to muddy the waters with religious dogma is all too clearly seen. As the Slovenian philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek (2008) asserts, “there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably functions as a lure which prevents us from thinking” (p.4). The moral strategy of nonviolence gives us a guide so that we don’t have to think about what to do in a given situation, especially when faced

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⁵⁷ The sixth principle of Kingian nonviolence states that “The Universe is on the side of justice: Human society is oriented to a just sense of order in the universe. Nonviolence is in tune with this concept, and the movement must strike this chord in society”. A clearly missionary quest.

⁵⁸ See Arendt on the banality of evil.
with what appears to be malevolent forces personified in global capitalism and statist authority.

Žižek (2008) names three different kinds of violence that he argues must collectively be confronted if we are to seriously engage with the phenomenon: symbolic violence; objective violence; and subjective violence. Symbolic violence is something akin to metaphysical violence, or the ordering imposition of meanings and values in societies through language (an example being the civilized versus savage dichotomy). Symbolic violence excludes certain people from the protections of society by way of exclusionary categorization. Objective (i.e. systemic) violence refers to “the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems” (Žižek, 2008, p.2). Objective violence is descriptively identical with the maintenance of social order. This is why outbursts of subjective violence, acts by individuals that upset the smooth functioning of the system, are considered aberrant and irrational. Emphasizing the inherently disruptive nature of subjective violence is important because it underscores its rebellious relation to the prevailing social order. The daily, violent actions of individual cops are neither aberrant nor irrational because of their roles in maintaining social order. The purveyors of objective violence, and its cheerleading apologists, rationalize their violence to such an extent that it no longer is even considered violence, but simply as the performance of duty for the sake of protecting society.

The neutral, almost clinical media language of “police-involved shootings” are an unfortunate but excellent example of how horrific acts of violence that happen on a daily basis in the U.S. are woven seamlessly into the smooth functioning of the system. Even
when an act of police violence comes to be generally understood as an act of subjective violence, the responsible individual(s) are cast out as aberrations to the regular function of cops. Similarly, advocates of nonviolence in Occupy Phoenix constantly made arguments defending policing as an institution against a “few bad apples” who happened to be racist and violent. In Phoenix, former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio was a consistent boogieman, with the hope being that in ousting him from his position policing would return to its so-called proper – though completely mythologized – role of serving and protecting society. While simultaneously demonizing certain bad apples, the daily violence of other cops are apologized for: they’re simply following orders or trying to do their best at a demanding and dangerous job.\(^5\)

Notorious Nazi Adolf Eichmann made famous the apologist defense of people just following orders when on trial in Jerusalem, trying desperately to absolve himself of guilt using a twisted line of pseudo-Kantian argumentation (Arendt, 1994).\(^6\) While the mythology of nonviolence is far more effective when evil is portrayed as diabolical in the religious sense, and thus focused on individual acts of (subjective) violence, what Žižek’s analytic of violence helps to make visible is a smooth-functioning, blindly accepted, banal evil that is consistently overlooked by advocates of Kingian nonviolence. The outrage at the way a broken bank window will delegitimize a movement ultimately seems silly when faced with the violent consequences of anthropocentric climate change or ongoing settler colonialism in the

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\(^5\) It is important to realize that policing rarely rates in the top ten most dangerous jobs in the U.S. each year. Why aren’t roofers, a notoriously dangerous job, celebrated for their heroism? The protection of our homes from the elements is definitely an important vocation worthy of notice!

\(^6\) See also Arendt, On Violence.
U.S. Were the latter instances of banal evil, or what Žižek refers to as objective violence in his taxonomy, to be challenged, the very conditions of possibility for something like Kingian nonviolence would be undermined. Civil disobedients like King and Gandhi advocate the breaking of certain unjust laws, but never a disregard for the law in general (as anarchists would). But the law in general is predicated on the most terrible structures of objective violence. If anything truly diabolical is going on, it isn’t the individual acts of subjective violence, but the fact that the systemic violence that maintains the relatively smooth functioning of our capitalist societies “sustains our efforts to fight violence and to promote tolerance” (Žižek, 2008, p.1).

I found Žižek’s tripartite consideration of violence to be a sobering companion while I navigated through the manufactured fog of nonviolence advocates in Occupy Phoenix. The way in which police divided up people in good and bad protestors mirrored the way that advocates of nonviolence divided up police into good and bad apples. Just as the bad protestors ought to be marginalized to preserve the movement, bad apples in a police force should be punished to maintain the integrity of policing. Good protestors, alongside good cops, help to maintain social order. But what makes a bad protestors? Do they wear masks? Are they anarchists? Are they disrespectful to authority? One thing that is clear is that they threaten to or commit acts of subjective violence. The truly diabolical thing about acts of subjective violence, if one were to embrace the heretical designation, is their ability to unsettle the present with an aberrant excessiveness that

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comes from some place we know not where.\textsuperscript{62} Beyond Walter Benjamin’s much contested discussion of interventionist “Divine Violence” (Žižek, 2008), I think shameless heretics would be better to align themselves with Pierre Clastres’ (2010) consideration of subjective violence as rebellions perpetrated against the state as social manager.

\textit{Kingian Nonviolence As Social Management}

In the words of practitioners of Kingian nonviolence themselves, what is needed when conflict is “in full bloom” is \textit{management}.\textsuperscript{63} In this section I’ll delineate the six principles of Kingian nonviolence to consider their consequences to anarchists and other social movement activists who don’t adhere to the tenets. These principles outline not scenarios where one should use non-violent tactics because that appears to be the most appropriate response (as it often is, even for anarchists), but imperatives that one should adhere to regardless of the context, even in the face of bodily harm. Guidelines for Kingian nonviolence were shared widely within Occupy Phoenix, and those wishing to get training in Kingian violence could attend day long workshops conducted by individuals who were mentored by some of MLK’s followers. Workshops were not held at Cesar Chavez Plaza within the occupation but elsewhere.

The first principle frames Kingian nonviolence as a moral and spiritual “way of life for courageous people” that have a “strength of character”. Thus, it is by inference

\textsuperscript{62} See Liber Nihil.

\textsuperscript{63} See Figures A and B, handouts given to people involved in the occupation at Cesar Chavez Plaza by nonviolent activists. The content of which had been assembled from Bernard LaFayette and David C. Jehnsen’s \textit{Kingian Nonviolence: The Philosophy and Methodology}. 

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that weak people would give into their urges to be violent, much like an addict giving into the object of their addiction. The remaining five principles read as follows: The Beloved Community is the framework for the future; attack forces of evil, not persons doing evil; accept suffering without retaliation for the sake of the cause to achieve the goal; avoid internal violence of the spirit as well as external physical violence; the Universe is on the side of justice. In the context of Occupy Phoenix, accepting these principles meant a variety of things depending upon the context, but for anarchists and other anti-authoritarians who assumed a ‘diversity of tactics’ position, it meant internal movement policing and social management.

Debates ensued, both at Cesar Chavez Plaza and through social networking websites like Facebook, primarily between anarchists and a broadly liberal and moderate leftist constituency in Occupy Phoenix that identified with nonviolence. The debates around nonviolence were uphill battles for anarchists because the original organizing group had already decided that Occupy Phoenix would be a nonviolent movement prior to the first occupation and general assemblies. While many impassioned and largely dead-end debates took place on the official Occupy Phoenix Facebook page, there were several teach-in style events I helped organize that had the goal of more widely and

64 Broadly speaking, diversity of tactics, in context of social movements in the last couple decades, have meant being open to a variety of tactics, both violent and non-violent, based upon which approach appears to be the most practical and/or effective in reaching a stated goal. In conversations I had with others at Occupy Phoenix, diversity of tactics was often considered to be an advocacy of violence position even though it simply left undecided any questions about violence without a specific context to consider them in. Advocates of nonviolence at Occupy Phoenix seemed uncomfortable with diversity of tactics because it didn’t explicitly forbid violent action in advance (even if those who embrace it as a tactical framework typically end up choosing non-violent tactics).
openly exploring movement tactics. My distaste for online debates, especially on social media platforms like Facebook, and their largely passive aggressive character was further exacerbated by the fact that Occupy Phoenix was providing people a 24/7 space to assemble and hold conversation face-to-face. It has been my experience in both social movements and in classrooms that people listen more to others while in their immediate presence. For me, the most notable of these teach-ins on violence/nonviolence was a conversation between myself and a trained advocate of Kingian nonviolence (which I explore in more detail below). After numerous conversations and arguments with defenders of nonviolence, it seemed obvious, at least to myself and other Phoenix anarchists, that alternative positions like diversity of tactics and movement self-defense – particularly against the police – were greatly misunderstood and caricatured for easy disregard. The teach-ins were partially educational and partially propagandistic. In the absence of any anarchist voices in Occupy Phoenix organizing meetings, and with the presence of advocates of Kingian nonviolence, nonviolence was easily adopted at face value as the unquestionable default position for the movement. The tenets of nonviolence, despite their morally persuasive power, place a constraint upon movements in accordance with the specific social and political interests that advance them. In accepting the principles of nonviolence outside of the consensus process of general assemblies, Occupy Phoenix placed serious constraints upon its political imagination, and thus upon its capacity to engage in various situations it became confronted with as a movement.

It should be noted conceptually that violence is either perceived or actual in a Kingian framework, because nonviolence is understood here as a moral way of life, while violence is the immoral correlate. This understanding can be applied to any behavior that
is thought to go against the specific political goals for which nonviolence is a vehicle. This meant many things in Occupy Phoenix at various times, from simply wearing masks, moving a demonstration march into the street, or yelling at cops, none of which taken on their own necessarily contain things we might agree upon as being violent. Is a mask violent? If so, when? Is walking in the street or blocking traffic violent? Is yelling violent? Context in each case matters here unless we’re just categorically disallowing certain tactics, which I don’t think is the case given that many acts of civil disobedience have involved such actions. Thus, it isn’t that Kingian nonviolence prohibits certain acts at all times, but that it functions in such a way so as to discipline certain actions in a given situation morally. Cries for peaceful protest and nonviolence, day-after-day at Cesar Chavez Plaza, served as a means of managing more rebellious voices in the occupation, particularly those of anarchists. Despite the absence of any overt violent activity by anarchists until much later on into the occupation (see the anti-ALEC demonstration below), we were consistently attacked in-person and online as violent and incendiary. This was an almost laughable scenario given that the only noticeable physical presence of anarchists in the occupation besides the presence of certain individuals was in the form of a canopy setup to distribute propaganda – hardly a Molotov-making station! Though all that is really needed is the perception of a violent threat from anarchists and a moral duty to confront it.

This method of demonizing rebelliousness has an extremely long history in western philosophy, religion and politics that one finds explicated at length as far back as Plato’s Republic. In the Republic, people who rebel violently aren’t properly self-disciplined in their behavior, according to Socrates. Reading The Trial And Death Of
Socrates next to King’s “Letter From A Birmingham Jail” illuminates a plethora of affinity between the two texts, especially since both Socrates and King were civil disobedients who respected the idea of law and order despite their breaking of specific, arguably “unjust” laws. Interestingly, nonviolence is referred to by activists as a “weapon” for “combat”, but the fighting is clearly not physical and happens within the conscience of people. Even when acts of nonviolent civil disobedience subject activists to state violence, they refuse to directly combat state violence with violence of their own. Instead, they wage a nonviolent war of wills, attempting to weaponize popular opinion as a mobilizing tool. It is puzzling that the tropes of war are used to describe nonviolent activism, though I speculate that it is done with the purpose of ascribing militancy to their cause.

Kingian Nonviolence as Historical Amnesia

Alongside the deployment of principles of nonviolence in the service of training and managing the behavior of the movement, a whitewashed historical narrative claiming past victories of nonviolent struggle were also very regularly used to dismiss challenges to Occupy Phoenix’s designation as a nonviolent movement. Despite the important contributions that MLK made to civil rights struggles in the U.S. and Gandhi made to anti-colonial struggles in India, both of their moralist approaches to social change regularly marginalized more radical and rebellious individuals and groups. I quickly found that my own frustrations with the whitewashing of history by some activists in Occupy Phoenix were shared by others in various occupations throughout the U.S.

While I focused on the whitewashing of the Black civil rights struggles by advocates of Kingian nonviolence in teach-ins at Occupy Phoenix, Snekal Shingavi, an
assistant professor of English at the University Texas (at Austin), engaged in a similar pedagogical exercise at Occupy Austin given his own extensive research on the anti-colonial struggles against the British in India. While similarly trying to counteract the whitewashing of history, Shingavi wanted people to consider what knowing a fuller version of the story about historical struggles for liberation, particularly those in India against British colonialism, tells us about the politics of nonviolence. In other words, if the embrace of nonviolence is predicated on a very selective version of history, what does knowing the fuller version of the story – including the role of violence in making social change – do to the position of nonviolence? I shared the YouTube video of Shingavi’s teach-in at least half a dozen times within Facebook conversation threads on Occupy Phoenix-related groups given how succinctly he made a case against Gandhi and the politics of nonviolence. What I was specifically trying to impress upon people was the way in which historical figures like Gandhi and MLK, alongside their politics of nonviolence, are used to delegitimize violent confrontation. Given how influential Gandhi was on MLK’s approach in the struggle for Black civil rights (thus upon Kingian nonviolence), I felt Shingavi’s conversation was crucial to consider in Occupy Phoenix debates. It also importantly provided a non-white, non-anarchist, and non-western account of the unavoidable reality of violent confrontation in struggles against systemic oppression. Some white anarchists and white radicals have fetishized violent confrontation without considering the rather different experience that people of color have with authorities when they are similarly violent. The call for individual, armed self-

\[65\text{ A video of Professor Shingavi's teach-in is available online here: https://youtu.be/2m0dCAcS5vE}\]
defense that originates from rightwing libertarian and constitutionalist circles in the U.S. is emblematic of what I would call a white identity politics, which does not recognize the role whiteness has played in privileging them with the right to defend themselves while simultaneously divesting people of color of the same rights. Though not as extreme as its libertarian counterpart, the historical whitewashing that happened within the Occupy movement unsurprisingly embraced whiteness as a default position, thus ignoring a long history of violent rebellions in the U.S., notably involving the violent confrontation with white supremacy.

I personally have little knowledge of the struggles for Indian independence from British colonial rule – it just hasn’t been a subject I’ve engaged with either independently or during the course of my studies.\textsuperscript{66} My own focus in teach-ins at Occupy Phoenix were an attempt to connect my own struggles as someone treasonous to whiteness with the struggles of Black people against white supremacy. Certain advocates of nonviolence at Occupy Phoenix even claimed a direct genealogical lineage to MLK and his civil rights organizations through mentors; perhaps as a way of providing further accreditation for their positions. Neither myself, nor Shingavi at Occupy Austin, were taking a position against non-violent tactics, but were trying to historicize and problematize nonviolence presented as a universal, moral truth. Recall that the sixth principle of Kingian nonviolence assumes that the universe is on the side of justice, which, it is argued, will progressively be realized through subsequent acts of nonviolent civil disobedience by way of an awakening collective moral consciousness. Nonviolence is given a

\textsuperscript{66} See Maia Ramnath, \textit{Decolonizing Anarchism}. 

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providential certitude, whereas violence is said by Kingians to lead movements astray, ultimately resulting in their failure.

Instead of framing tactical debates in terms of a victory/failure dichotomy, A.K. Thompson (2010) suggests that violent intervention should be considered as a factor in the genesis of new forms of political subjectivity. Following Franz Fanon’s (1963) infamous polemic in favor of violent anti-colonial rebellion, and Thompson’s application of it to the context of the anti-globalization demonstrations, many in the occupy movement stood to benefit from embracing violent intervention as a legitimate tactic through an expansion of their political subjectivity. The way in which the use of a black bloc in the latter part of the Phoenix occupation at an anti-ALEC demonstration transformed the views of several people on violent confrontation will be explored below.

Opposition to violent confrontation by advocates of Kingian nonviolence at Occupy Phoenix betrayed what I would characterize as a white, middle-class identity politics emblematic of the exurban life of towns like Chandler, Scottsdale and Ahwatukee (even when those who happened to be expressing them were neither white nor middle class). As the late Joel Olson argued during a teach-in at Occupy Phoenix (“Whiteness and the

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Only someone who already accepts a position of nonviolence would interpret the desire to legitimize violent tactics as a call for rampant destruction and chaotic offensives against cops and capitalists. It is a silly and impractical caricature of what is actually being suggested. This false alternative that advocates of nonviolence put forth serves as a strawman argument to paint violence as a moral choice instead of an ontological reality that no one can avoid. Though there are also those who fetishize violence and militant posturing as the only ways to seriously challenge or smash the state and capitalism, maintaining the false alternative from the opposing position. But this is not what I mean by violence as an ontological reality: it is an unavoidable part of life, of the cosmos. It is not a mode of being that can be removed from the world, nor is it an evil that can be overcome.
the reality of having a violent confrontation with police is the norm for poor neighborhoods of color in Phoenix. The regular police patrols, harassment and racial profiling that is common in South Phoenix neighborhoods remained alien to many occupiers who took cop’s “serve and protect” mantra seriously. It thus seemed rather difficult for a lot of people participating in Occupy Phoenix whose regular interactions with police were either neutral or benevolent to understand why people of color from poor neighborhoods in Phoenix – or anarchists from working class neighborhoods in Tempe – possessed a profound disdain for cops or a more sympathetic attitude towards the use of violence. Though many anarchists are white, and do sometimes come relatively more affluent neighborhoods, it has been my experience that their political principles and actions have placed them into inherently confrontational, and often violent, relationships with agents of the state, particularly police. Aspects of their white identity politics have been lost and they have come to view nonviolence as a limiting – and not a liberating – managerial position. Embracing nonviolence is, as its advocates claim, a way of life, and not simply a particular kind of tactic that a movement might choose. From what I experienced at OP, the advocacy of nonviolence signaled the embrace of white, middle-class identity politics and the internalization of certain forms of oppression when done by a person of color.

“Occupy Phoenix Is A Nonviolent Movement!”

Prior to even the first mass demonstration in downtown Phoenix on October 14th, 2011 – and the subsequent occupation and first general assemblies the following day – the OP organizing group had decided in previous planning meetings that the movement was to be an explicitly nonviolent movement, in line with principles of Kingian
nonviolence given the participation of several. Thus, against any desire at establishing consensus in the movement through open general assemblies, certain individuals in the original Occupy Phoenix organizing group had already met and decided to restrict the tactics of the larger group to the strict, moral attitude of nonviolence. In a press conference at Cesar Chavez Plaza on October 16th, the day after the mass arrest of occupiers who refused to leave Margaret T. Hance park the previous evening, several Occupy Phoenix organizers gave a semi-formal presentation of the movement’s positions, notably their adherence to nonviolence, speaking of the way demonstrators remained passive in the face of mass arrest for simply trying to remain overnight in a park. There are descriptively non-violent tactics, but nonviolence (without the hyphen) is a moral strategy which seeks to manage behavior and categorically, but ambiguously, prohibit certain tactics. The ambiguity emerges out of the unavoidably subjective way in which moral positions get applied.

*Yes, that debate... again!*

Internal debates in social movements over positions on violent confrontation with police, civil disobedience or diversity of tactics are not new. All the anarchists I have met in the greater Phoenix region who were also active in the anti-globalization and anti-war movements have remarked that the same debates took place in the late-1990s and early-to-mid-2000s. And as Arizona became embroiled in the forefront of the national immigration debates of the mid-to-late-2000s, immigrant rights organizations such as Puente and Tone Tierra used nonviolent civil disobedience not only a strategy to achieve movement goals, but also as a means of policing the actions of other demonstrators.
during protests.\textsuperscript{68} However, for many people getting involved in the Occupy Wall Street movement across the U.S. (Occupy Phoenix being no exception), these were their first experiences with political protest. This was in no small part because the Great Recession in the wake of the housing market crash of 2008 had significantly affected not only the poor and lower classes, but also reached far into the middle class. The Occupy rhetoric of the 99% clearly included the middle class and thus included an open invitation to their concerns and interests. And despite the declining socio-economic status in the U.S. of middle-class occupiers, they generally retained “the many biases and privileges that came with middle class status in the US, and these contradictions play[ed] out in the occupy movement in ways that [anarchists could] identify” (Insurgent, 2012). The appeal of nonviolent protest, however, is not an exclusively middle class phenomenon, despite its arguable appeal to the bourgeois sensibilities towards management and social order. The cross-class appeal of nonviolent forms of protest can partially be explained by a strong correlation between the trustworthiness of procedural justice, positive judgements about police legitimacy and negative attitudes towards the use of violence by demonstrators (Jackson, Huq, Bradford & Tyler, 2013). Though as I discovered, through sometimes rather frustrating and time-consuming conversations at Occupy Phoenix, nonviolent civil disobedience is additionally seductive by way of it universal moral message that was consistently paired with a well-crafted – even if well-intentioned – whitewashing of

\textsuperscript{68} For the most notorious and unfortunate example of this in Phoenix, see the way in which the DO@ (Diné-O’Odham-Anarchist-Antiauthoritarian) bloc was attacked by cops collaborating with march organizers during an anti-Arpaio march in 2010.
historical struggles. As an anarchist, luddite and race traitor, I could not help but confront Kingian nonviolence as the managerial, moral position that it is.69

In spite of methodological criticisms made against autoethnography as an approach to conducting research, my experiences in Occupy Phoenix – and the conclusions I attempt to draw from them – fall in line with a long history of movement debates and rebellions against oppression in the U.S. From the violent revolts of plantation slaves to the urban riots by Black and LGBTQ communities during the 1960s, for example, nonviolence as a strategy has not, as is often blindly assumed, been at the center of transformative struggles for social justice in the U.S. I was consistently challenged with dogmatic assumption that nonviolence was the champion of social justice throughout the 20th-century (and thus could be the only legitimate and sensible approach for social movements today like OP). I made attempts to confront nonviolent dogmatism with mixed results because I saw a value in pursuing interventions against it. On numerous occasions I received feedback from other occupiers who were grateful for my contributions and commitment to approaching these issues in good faith despite my position being clearly and openly against nonviolence. Even if only one person ended up questioning or rejecting nonviolence, I would have counted that as a victory. My goal is never towards the galvanizing of public opinion. That is the work of advertising firms and state propagandists.

For AK Thompson (2010), writing in the defense of the violence used during anti-globalization demonstrations that began in Seattle 1999, the failure of the appeal to

69 It is my interest that in critically laying out these debates about violence that I can save people some time and frustration in the future.
nonviolence is two-fold: i) the abstract and representational approach does not deal with the ontological reality of violence; ii) acts of nonviolent civil disobedience are predicated on their guarantee by state violence (p.132). Thompson’s (2010) overall argument is built around a dialectical theory involving the relation between ontology, violence and politics: in short, that violence makes ontology political. While I am sympathetic to Thompson’s conclusions, I would avoid approaching it through Hegelian and Marxian dialectics. In the several teach-ins I participated in at OP interrogating nonviolence, my own arguments centered around an attack upon white, middle-class identity politics (Insurgent, 2012), and a more historically expansive look at the rebellions against white supremacy during the civil rights era (Stafford and Shirley, 2015; Russell, 2010; Strain, 2005). As a race traitor, pointing to the ways in which arguments for nonviolence reinforce what Joel Olson (2004) calls “the white democracy” in the U.S., were an integral part of my interventions in debates. Many advocates of Kingian nonviolence that I encountered at OP reiterated the supposed truism that acts of nonviolent civil disobedience, led by the efforts of Martin Luther King Jr., won the struggle for Black civil rights in the U.S. Clearly, they would want to claim past victories for the strategy they themselves are supporting and training people in.

“The Whole World Is Watching!”... So what?

While I’m going to talk much more extensively about surveillance networks and technologies of control below in the fifth chapter, both broadcast and social media form constituent parts of nonviolent strategy. They are viewed by those who participate in acts

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70 Race traitor politics continue to play a key role in my identity.
of civil disobedience as one of the main ways of building public awareness for their social justice campaigns. Even in consciously breaking certain laws, civil disobedient protests aren’t interested in undermining the legitimacy of the social order or its ability to legislate (Plato, 1992; King, Jr., 1963). Civil disobedients break laws that they find to be unjust, informed by some universal framework of justification. Even though the gods regularly disagree (Plato, 1992), they all ultimately believe that the universe will validate cogently formulated truths. Through public demonstration, it is believed that universal truths can be conveyed. That the whole world is supposedly watching, and assumed to be morally invested in a socially conscious and supportive way with the events they are seeing, is perceived to be a vehicle through which public pressure can be built. The hope being that through galvanizing public support for a cause, representatives will be influenced either directly or indirectly to change laws or create new ones.

_The “Cancerous” Black Bloc Appears In Phoenix_

In an article on _truthdig_ entitled “The Cancer of Occupy”, leftist activist and journalist Chris Hedges naively writes, “The Black Bloc anarchists, who have been active on the streets in Oakland and other cities, are the cancer of the Occupy movement”. Likely written in response to the very successful (and quite large) black bloc deployed in Oakland on November 2\(^\text{nd}\), 2011, as part of a larger anti-capitalist march, Hedges’ article conflated a particular tactic used in political demonstrations with the existence of an actual group of anarchists he claimed to be ideologically inspired by anarcho-primitivist John Zerzan. It must be said plainly so there is no ambiguity: the black bloc is a tactic, not an organization, and it isn’t a tactic exclusively used by anarchists.
It wasn’t until November 30th, 2011 that Occupy Phoenix had its own experience of a black bloc. Occupy Phoenix through general assembly consensus decided to endorse and participate in an independently organized set of actions over the course of a few days to “Shut Down ALEC” (ALEC being the American Legislative Exchange Council). ALEC was hosting a national meeting/conference of its members – lawmakers and corporate leaders – at the Westin Kierland Hotel and Spa on the edge of north Phoenix. The “Shut Down ALEC” organizing committee planned the largest demonstration for the morning of November 30th, 2011, as the national meeting was set to begin, with the intention of (obviously) shutting down the conference entirely that day. In preparation for the publicly announced action, Phoenix Police – in coordination with Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center – deployed a rather extensive force of its cops to ensure that the conference would go on as planned, mainly to make sure that demonstrators did not proceed onto the hotel grounds. Despite the public callout to shut down ALEC, there was no corresponding public callout for a black bloc. This call likely took place in a private organizing meeting, which I heard involved some people from Occupy Phoenix. Notably though, because the organizing to shut down ALEC did not emerge from within Occupy Phoenix, it’s Kingian nonviolence principles could not be used as pretense to counter any suggestions that a black bloc be used. Black bloc tactics do not necessarily involve violence – I have seen many black blocs happen without any acts of violence – but they never preclude it. Any negative, preconceived notions of what a black bloc is from the perspective of advocates of Kingian nonviolence didn’t matter in this demonstration because it was called for from within an independently organized action, outside of Occupy Phoenix general assemblies were its proposal would likely
have been blocked. And if I had to pick a radicalizing moment from within the gamut of
Occupy Phoenix-involved events, it would be the first-hand experiences that people had
of the black bloc that suddenly appeared late in the morning of November 30th, 2011.

Individuals involved in Occupy Phoenix made up some of the several hundred
demonstrators that came out that morning to confront ALEC, though they were also
joined by a noticeable contingent of indigenous demonstrators, including Native elders,
as well as various other Arizona-based radicals and some people from out-of-town. A
few hours before the black bloc appeared, people slowly assembled in a park a few
blocks west from where ALEC was meeting. At that point, only one person was
noticeably dressed ready to participate in a black bloc. That individual left the park about
twenty minutes before the mass march towards the hotel grounds. They were trailed by
several bicycle cops, perhaps concerned by their presence and what they were up to.
Though that individual returned to the park just as the march got underway. To dissuade
any speculation that this person may have been an agent provocateur, it was clear to me
that they had a known standing with several other demonstrators with whom they carried
out conversations before first leaving and upon returning. By contrast, cops that try to
infiltrate marches, even while masked, typically keep isolated in small groups and are
rarely seen casually talking to other demonstrators in a way that isn’t drawing suspicion.
Additionally, outside the more chaotic situation of an active street confrontation,
undercover cops tend to stick out like sore thumbs, often sporting tactical footwear and
awkwardly pieced together outfits attempting to fit in, but more looking like someone’s
parents at a punk show. Undercover cops also don’t typically make good conversation
and often simply parrot talking points that were previously set out for them to help integrate into the group.

It was not until the larger group that came from the park had reached the east entrance of the Kierland resort that the black bloc appeared carrying two large banners mounted onto reinforced wood frames and marching south down the street to meet the main group. To my surprise – largely due to the way advocates of nonviolence in OP had criticized confrontational tactics – the bloc was greeted with a great amount of enthusiasm. This support also came from within the ranks of Occupy Phoenix demonstrators present. The bloc proceeded to take a position at the front of the larger group on the perimeter of the east parking lot entrance to the resort with the large banners acting as barrier between them and the slowly forming line of riot cops.

*The Impossible Task of Defining Nonviolence*

After engaging in multiple teach-ins and debates against nonviolence, OP remained stubborn in its declaration that the movement was explicitly nonviolent. In my final attempt to intervene against the strict adherence to nonviolence, I developed a proposal through the anarchist and anti-authoritarian caucus\(^{71}\) (AAC) subcommittee at OP to submit to the general assembly. Here is the proposal as it was presented, in its entirety:

> We propose that Occupy Phoenix define *clearly and practically* what is meant by nonviolence. If the position of nonviolence is simply an attempt to impose morals upon a movement that has a diversity of tactics, then we propose that the

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\(^{71}\) The AAC subcommittee was proposed and approved at an earlier general assembly to establish a regular meeting space for anarchists and anti-authoritarians to meet and focus their interests within the movement. Its creation came partially in light of the growing interest at OP with anarchism as a result of persistent discussions on the OP *Facebook* page and the regular participation of anarchists in the movement.
blanketing and unrepresentative definition of Occupy Phoenix as a nonviolent movement be removed. However, if Occupy Phoenix is serious about its position of nonviolence and wants to stand firm on the principle of moral nonviolence, the we propose that the police (a violent, oppressive state apparatus) be removed from all references to the movement.

In response, it was proposed that OP be given a few days to develop a working definition of nonviolence and consider the proposal I brought to the assembly. The time frame was accepted and it was agreed to present its response within a future general assembly. This presentation of this proposal very much delineated the gap between those involved in OP planning meetings prior to the first actions and anarchists participating in the movement.

It felt like pushing for a concession. If I were in good faith to present the same proposal today, to a movement I was involved with only to have it uncritically rejected, it would result in my complete disassociation from that movement. At the time, I was far less inclined towards fanaticism.

The official OP response to the proposal came in a form that highlighted the abstracted, moralistic nature of nonviolence as a position. While it was openly stated that OP could not establish a working definition of nonviolence, they refused to abandon it as an official movement position. There was the expression of a heterogenous attitude towards the police, which included some expressing respect for the difficult conditions of doing that job. It is worth noting that in yearly published media reports, based upon Bureau of Labor Statistics information, being a cop rarely rates in the top ten most dangerous jobs in the U.S., despite an intense propaganda machine that contributes to the establishment of policing as a divinely heroic vocation that requires great sacrifice for the greater public good. At the very least, OP spokespeople were honest about their
difficulties with abandoning nonviolence as a movement position, which remains imprisoned by particular moral attitudes towards how one ought to behave in civilization.

Nonviolence as a way of life produces certain kinds of political subjectivities, just as the use of violence produces its own. Universalizing any subjectivity erases the validity of other people’s experiences. My issue with nonviolence as an overarching movement strategy isn’t that non-violent tactics aren’t effective ways of participating in social movements. Being involved in general assemblies, teach-ins and movement debates are all non-violent activities when threatening behavior is absent from those ways of participating. The more domineering and authoritarian one’s participation becomes, the more violence becomes a possibility. That OP couldn’t even officially divorce itself from cops reinforced my own suspicion that nonviolence as a moral strategy towards organizing and policing form a symbiotic relationship in social movements. Despite accepting the ontological nature of violence for human beings alongside every other animal species, I can very easily reject fetishized valorizations of violence found in accelerationist and apocalyptic worldviews. The rejection of dualistic thinking doesn’t favor one side against the other, but outright reject the claim of either to transcendental ascendency. I’m not forced to embrace violence by rejecting nonviolence, just as I’m not forced to embrace the Christian devil in rejecting the Christian God. It is helpful to understand how dualistic narratives work within people’s lives in order to better understand how they are practically deployed. Proselytizing for either side of a dualistic worldview deserves condemnation. However, it is the side of nonviolence in social movements which a occupies a position that reinforces the prevailing social order.
Nonviolence contributes to the production of docile and useful subjectivities by policing unruly behavior, even when not explicitly violent in nature.
CHAPTER 5
COPS, PEACE POLICE & NETWORKS OF SURVEILLANCE

A partial definition of the state could be that it is an agency that holds the monopoly on violence in society. The police are the most visible expression of this violence and have been exposed in this role over and over again during the Occupy Movement.

~ Aragorn!, “Violence & the Police”

On the afternoon of October 18th, 2011, before the general assembly had convened, I noticed one of the visible organizers of Occupy Phoenix speaking with a well-known member of the Phoenix police’s “Red Squad” towards the north side of the plaza. The so-called “Red Squad” was a name given to the Phoenix police department’s crowd control detectives by anarchists and anti-authoritarians, likening their activities to law enforcement during the red scares around the time of the Russian revolution and its second phase during the second world war. These detectives, from a naïve perspective, function as community liaisons to local grassroots organizations and protest organizers, but in practice they knowingly manage community groups by maintaining “friendly” PR relationships with leadership in order to de-fang protests, make movement activities legible and marginalize more radical demonstrators. As I got close enough to the Occupy organizer and the detective, the conversation became audible and the subject of mask-wearing was being discussed. It was noticeable by both at that point that I was listening, but I remained silent for a few more of the exchanges between them. The detective was hoping to influence the organizer on the wearing of masks within the movement, particularly noting that the wearing of gas masks as being “threatening to officers”. The
organizer seemed open to hearing the detective’s demands out and maintaining a passive relationship with cops generally, as opposed to refusing to collaborate and making that known. Rather than the cop being asked to present this demand at an assembly (an action that would be openly ridiculed), they were attempting to use a voice within the movement as a proxy. In standard form, the detective looked to divide the peaceful occupiers from anarchists who they knew were also present in the space – mask-wearing being a seemingly visual indication of anarchism. The detective proceeded to try and warn the organizer of anarchist’s penchant for violence, citing the second Inglorious Basterds Bloc\textsuperscript{72} in downtown Phoenix on November 13th, 2010. Because I was at that demonstration, I took the opportunity to chime in, catching the detective off guard, and derailing the conversation. The cops were escorting Nazis that day and a few hundred anti-fascists of different stripes wanted nothing of it. – “If the boot fits” read a sticker plastered around downtown during the event, an implicit understanding that cops are happy to defend Nazis under the pretense that they had a permit. So, naturally, a riot broke out. No apologies were given to the detective.

As I argued in the second chapter, discipline implies a use of physical force or direct coercion to control parts of a population. The police are an emblematic example a disciplinary technology. In a proxy position, a social movement organizer who collaborates with the police, and depending on what techniques they employ, could either play a disciplinary or surveilling role in the maintenance of social order. Beyond the active and conscious participation of certain individuals in systems of discipline and

\textsuperscript{72} See http://firesneverextinguished.blogspot.com/2010/10/sneak-preview-inglorious-basterds-bloc.html
surveillance, there are protocols within distributed networks for “achieving voluntary regulation within a contingent environment” (Galloway, 2004, p.7). “[I]nstead of governing social and political practices … protocols govern how specific technologies are agreed to, adopted, implemented, and ultimately used by people around the world” (Ibid). Galloway (2004) is analyzing the language of computer protocols to extend a cultural analysis of how control continues to exist in relatively decentralized parts of contemporary societies. Consider the ubiquitous use of social networking platforms like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram for mobilizing social movements and support for social justice issues. Users assent to their participation in them, being neither violently forced nor directly coerced to do so. And although the use of social networking technologies “offers all sorts of possibilities for organization”, it also allows all sorts of opportunities for “regulation” and “management” (Galloway, 2004, xix). These technologies become networks of surveillance when used carelessly without a practice of anonymity, and can be just as helpful to cops and the criminal justice system as a police collaborator within a social movement.

The attempt to manage the behavior of social movements and urban rebellions is but one aspect of the maintenance of social order in contemporary nation-states. Because of the role that the media plays in mass social movements, highly sensationalized images that capture confrontations between cops and demonstrators can give the impression that policing and surveillance is more pronounced there. While anarchists often face a very high degree of scrutiny from law enforcement, it would be difficult to argue that

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73 This has become especially clear with the Trump administration’s persistent focus on the activities of anarchists and antifascists during the anti-police brutality and
policing and surveillance are any less evident within a poor neighborhood of color, or in the daily management of homeless populations. Criminalization de-politicizes structures of oppression and subordination. In fact, during Occupy Phoenix, it was the application of “urban camping” (i.e. anti-homeless) laws that proved most effective in raids upon the encampment. Occupiers at Cesar Chavez Plaza had placed themselves in a position to be policed in the same way that homeless people are harassed and attacked every day in downtown Phoenix, which was one of processes I observed people get radicalized: experiencing first-hand the repression that others receive on a daily basis. The plaza was already regularly used by homeless in the area to sleep in at night. The disruption of the social order that was this unsanctioned and unpermitted occupation of public space, which focused its attention on some of the largest political and economic injustices of the social order, had to be dealt with. The occupation wasn’t imagined as a temporary action, but as a perpetual one, which posed certain challenges to the resources of local law enforcement. The frustration of cops assigned to police the space was increasingly palatable as the days wore on.

For anarchists, condemnation of the police is like breathing. Cops are the violent defenders of private property (capitalism) and social order (the state), the two most prominent targets in anarchist rebellions. If you come across an anarchist for whom the

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Black Lives Matter protests throughout the U.S. Attempts have even been made to classify the rallying principle that is antifascism, one that every anarchist I’m aware of is happy to embrace, as an official terrorist organization.

74 The criminalization of certain populations has long functioned as a way to erase the legitimacy of their demands for justice in the U.S. (and elsewhere in the world), particularly at the intersection of race, gender and class. See Parenti (2000), Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis.
police are not a mortal enemy, I would advise suspicion. Now, of course, cops are authority figures, thus the antagonism towards them would seem to follow in a nearly axiomatic way from a general understanding of our anti-authoritarian principles. But the hatred of police in anarchist circles stems existentially from personal experiences, and not merely on principle. These negative encounters with law enforcement are not limited to the policing of anarchists in social movements like Occupy Phoenix – and unfortunately for us, the policing of anarchists isn’t limited to the activities of law enforcement officers. Social movements often create their own internal policing protocols that reinforce what cops are already doing, sometimes even openly acting as auxiliaries (Gelderloos, 2015; Dupuis-Déri, 2014), much in the same way that various institutions in our society establish disciplinary techniques that mirror what the criminal justice system does. These “peace police”, as they were dis-affectionately named by parts of the black bloc of N30 in Seattle back in 1999, routinely debate, attempt to shout down, and even physically attack others demonstrators engaging in tactics they disagree with (Dupuis-Déri, 2014, p.71). In various Phoenix protests over the years, these peace police sometimes even get their own special security shirts (at least we know who to watch out for). Peace policing, as a movement practice, follows from the tenets of strategic nonviolence that I engaged in the previous chapter and unnecessarily places some people, particularly anarchists, in harm’s way. Anarchists are already well aware that confrontations with cops are an inevitability, and yet it can help no struggle for social justice to do cops jobs for them. I can only understand this capacity for collaboration as an expression of ignorance towards the disciplinary role that police play in society. But clearly, one needn’t be an anarchist to understand the repressive role of policing in U.S. society, especially given that the racial
dimensions of it, rooted in white supremacy, remain present today. Perhaps the
dissonance of response is a question of the attitude one takes towards police brutality
specifically and legality more generally.

Strangely enough, not everyone who is subject or witness to police discipline
takes an antagonistic attitude towards it and the state institutions responsible for it. And
even worse, many in social movements take a neutral or supportive attitude towards cops,
sometimes going so far as to become proxy cops themselves, either through complicity or
actively helping manage a group. Debates about whether or not the police were part of
the 99% came often from a class-based perspective, inherited from standard Marxist
views of police and military as members of the working class (and are thus important to
retain in the forecasted revolution). This is one of the many places where anarchists and
Marxist communists disagree, and it boils down to how much one is willing to
acknowledge the emergence of markets from states. Being anti-capitalist doesn’t address
the problems of the most subordinating institution in society, namely the statist ones, nor
does it grapple with the further problem of civilization itself (or be able to ask the
question about whether society can even exist at all without the state). As a consequence
of abandoning the left, anarchists can leave behind them a desire for social management
entirely, and can ask critical questions about how rooted policing, discipline and
surveillance are to the project of civilization itself. Thus, whether or not cops are part of
the working class is the least of my worries as an anarchist. I wouldn’t want to be part of
a working class that accepts cops into its ranks. Likewise, anarchists in Occupy had no
patience with those wanting to include them in the 99%. Thankfully (though also
tragically), the occupations provided people with an opportunity to experience how cops
treat people who defy the social order. So while bitter debates ensued within Occupy Phoenix about what attitude one should take towards the police, the inevitable negative treatment of anyone involved in Occupy by cops radicalized several, and it would be hard to argue that the presence of anarchists and anti-cop sentiment didn’t provide them with a place to turn. Additionally, a strong correlation existed between advocates of nonviolence and positive, or at least apologetic attitudes, towards the police.

**Policing Strategies**

In Phoenix particularly, during the occupy demonstrations, this surveillance received a well-documented record in a report by Beau Hodai for the Center for Media and Democracy covering the numerous correspondences of the Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC). Besides finding myself described in some of those correspondences, mainly through easily identifiable tattoos, I quickly noticed that cops from the Phoenix police department were becoming familiar with who I was. Crowd control detectives in plain clothes started cordially greeting me by name when our paths would cross at Occupy Phoenix – a slight psyop mindfuck – while simultaneouslyradioing my presence as a known anarchist to other deployed, uniformed officers. Even if the detectives appeared friendly to me in a way that could signify their overall good intentions to “serve and protect” some mythical community, “insofar as they obey orders rather than their consciences, they cannot be trusted” (Crimethinc., 2012, p.191). For example, on one occasion a crowd control detective vocally expressed appreciation for my tattoos, which seemed like some fake attempt to build a sense of rapport with me (or

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75 See Brennan Center report on policing and white supremacy.
at the very least to psychologically humanize themselves in my eyes). Despite these seemingly benevolent gestures towards myself as a known anarchist, it is impossible for me to see these actions as anything other than part of a larger strategy of social management. The Phoenix police department very consistently deploys tokenized crowd control detectives to interact as liaisons with various minority social movements. By this I mean, for example, having a Black crowd control detective on point with social movement organizers at a Black Lives Matter demonstration, or detectives from the LGBTQ community at a protest calling out a certain business for its support of anti-gay legislation. While my whiteness could arguably garner me lenience despite being a known anarchist, that discretion is statistically absent from how cops regularly deal with Black, Brown and Native individuals simply existing in their daily lives without any known radical political orientation. While I am judged a threat by law enforcement for being an anarchist or for being disruptive\textsuperscript{76}, this has a performative quality to it in that I have to show cops I’m an anarchist or have them find that out. It isn’t something I wear

\textsuperscript{76} As a teenager growing up in Niagara Falls, Canada, I had several run-ins with cops and their private, proxy security forces as a skateboarding punk. These confrontations varied from the more benign, “friendly” demand to leave a private business parking lot (almost always after its hours of operation), to elusive chases through the urban landscape because my friends and I had already been asked to move from a regular skate spot earlier in the day and we wanted to avoid being cited or detained for a repeat offense. While these at times thrilling, though scary, cat-and-mouse games of a white teenager built my own sense of disdain for law enforcement from a young age, they clearly in no way compare to the institutionalized racism practiced by cops on a daily basis in neighborhoods of color against kids my age at the time and younger. While I was worried about getting a citation or having my parents called, youth of color in the U.S. are often fearful for their lives in the presence of cops. The point being, race matters greatly prior to, and even in the absence of, the performance of disruptive behavior or signification of political dissent.
as a badge. Whereas for people of color in the U.S., their skin color acts as a badge for immediate identification as a threat regardless of their actions (Olson, 2004).

Being Against White Supremacy Means Being Against Cops

According to Shirley and Stafford (2015), it shouldn’t be assumed that a similar experience of oppression creates a shared political vision, especially when framed around identarian or identity-based calls for unity. It must be said though, given that a majority of anarchists in North America are white, that it would be extremely presumptuous to say that anarchists are profiled by law enforcement in a manner similar to how people of color are. For many white, middle-class liberal and leftist occupiers, interactions with law enforcement prior to their participation in the movement were statistically few and largely passive. Thus, it makes sense that cops would be described by them as allies who are part of the 99%, as just another group of workers simply trying to do their jobs while being exploited by the 1%. Even in the aftermath of the housing market crash in 2008, which greatly affected middle-class homeowners, whiteness remained a pervasive political identity that influenced how people participated in the occupy movement. It is for this reason that I think race traitor politics are an important position to consider, and not only because of my identification with them as a treasonous white person. Anytime whiteness is considered a positive attribute to be defended in some manner, even through the white allyship of organizations like Showing Up For Racial Justice (SURJ), it colors the rest of the world in a subordinating way. Part of this is due to the fact that middle-

77 See Stuart Hall et al., (1978), Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order.
78 See Black Anarchism/Anarcho-Blackness.
class cultural aspirations are derived from the privileges and political imagination of white citizenship. However, once certain individuals become known to law enforcement as anarchists, their activities are definitely accompanied by a sustained surveillance effort and the assumption that their presence will be the cause of disruptive behavior.

*Nonviolence and Police Sympathizers*

The longer the occupation went on in Cesar Chavez Plaza, the more frustrated cops appeared to act towards demonstrators and the more anger became present among the decreasing number of occupiers trying to hold down the 24-hour encampment. There is a clear correlation between the adherence to nonviolence as a political strategy and a sympathy (or at least an apology) for cops. The worries about being too antagonistic voiced by adherents of strategic nonviolence perfectly compliment the avoidance of confronting police violence. This rarely means that because someone is an advocate of nonviolence they therefore are ardent supporters of the police. That would be a much easier relationship to negotiate as an anarchist who opposes policing institutionally and interpersonally. Unfortunately, nonviolence walks a much more ambivalent grey area, partly because it is consistently normalized by social movement leadership as the taken for granted default attitude.

Despite the fourth principle of Kingian nonviolence demanding that one “accept suffering without retaliation for the sake of the cause”, it’s hard to deny that feelings of resentment and betrayal are going to build up in people who are consistently subject to police harassment and violence. The longer that the 24-hour occupation at Cesar Chavez Plaza went on, the more often that ardently nonviolent, pro-police activists were subject to heavy handed policing – especially when numbers were low in the middle of the night.
– the more disillusionment with the police grew. Many first-time activists were gaining
the experiences that most anarchists already had: cops don’t care how irrational their
subjective enforcement of certain laws seems, they cannot be bargained with. The
Occupy demonstrations were a disruption to the U.S. capitalist social order and were
being drug out far too long. Phoenix police became petty, consistently stealing canopies,
tents, sleeping bags, and other movement supplies when they raided the Occupy
encampment during early morning hours on several occasions. This multiplied the
frustrations of occupiers who felt vulnerable and abandoned at night, sometimes with
only one or two people holding down the space. Earlier sentiments of “they’re just doing
their jobs” were replaced by a feeling of being personally attacked for simply trying to
nonviolently struggle for social justice. With the Occupy movement often facing
characterizations in national media of just being a bunch of “dirty hippies”, I find it very
likely that cops had no problem taking out their frustrations of being stuck monitoring
occupations day-after-day. Although the plaza wasn’t excessively dark at night time:
street lights from Washington on the north side and Jefferson on the south side definitely
permeated some of plaza, police decided to place a loud, massive, generator-run spotlight
directly in the middle of the plaza. Anytime overnight occupiers would shift their
position to not be blanketed in the bright light, police would move the light to cover the
new area. This struck me as a petty psyop strategy meant to fatigue people involved in
the 24-hour occupation by forcing them to be subject to constant loud noise and bright
light. Even though sleeping was prohibited by law – you could lay in a sleeping bag or
tent, but not with your eyes closed – clearly everyone needs to sleep. Occupiers would
take shifts sleeping; those on watch could wake others up if a cop came through looking
for sleepers to arrest.\textsuperscript{79} Unfortunately, on a few occasions, everyone fell asleep from utter exhaustion, making them easy targets for a late-night police raid. Though without any judgement towards those that did, falling asleep is in no way surprising given the persistent police strategies to undermine and frustrate the occupation. Additionally, night time raids were a nationally coordinated strategy used against occupations in most cities that maintained 24-hour occupations (Wolf, 2012). The one in Phoenix outlasted many other cities in the U.S. because of the commitments of around a dozen people that consistently made sacrifices in taking those overnight shifts.\textsuperscript{80} I know of no instances during Occupy Phoenix where people lashed out at cops in retaliation, but I know that some occupiers testified that they were radicalized, in part, by their treatment by police. And though having initially rejected anarchist critiques of the police that were voiced

\textsuperscript{79} The commonly used notice of police presence was the phrase “shame on you Wells Fargo!”, which was an established protest chant given that the plaza was just south of Wells Fargo’s corporate tower in downtown Phoenix.

\textsuperscript{80} Without wanting to divert from the narrative in the main text of this chapter around policing, I think there is an important anarchist commentary on the efficacy of the 24-hour occupation, when commitments to it waned, that is worth mentioning. On one occasion in particular, I recall anarchists like myself being the target of vocal criticism by overnight-shift occupiers who would see us during the day, but rarely late at night. This was voiced as frustrations with police raids were challenging people’s limits, and their desire to have more support. In lieu of support, from a tactically standpoint, it didn’t make sense to me to try to maintain the 24-hour occupation any longer that support would allow. We could easily convene in the space during the day for assemblies and movement events, which was what eventually happened when the proposal to abandon the 24-hour occupation was accepted. But there is a key takeaway here from within the distinction I’ve been making between tactics and strategies: the desires expressed over the need to continue holding the space as a permanent occupation were now attached to a symbolic goal. Without the support and after the police raids, the tactic of occupying a public space in order to develop the movement was no longer feasible. Seeing the space as important symbolically and wanting to continue to try and hold it would have required seeing occupation as a strategy.
earlier in the occupation, those narratives were now familiar to people when they had the experiences to match them.

Negative experiences with police weren’t restricted only to people maintain the 24-hour occupation. Prior to the first Occupy Phoenix action on October 14th, 2011, there was a call to action for people to occupy Tempe on the evening of October 8th.81 A few dozen people met on the busy corner of Mill and University in the heart of Tempe, and marched up and down the busy sidewalks of the Mill Avenue shopping and bar district several times, echoing the chants one protester shouted through a bullhorn I had brought with me. From the get-go, many in the group were hesitant about appearing too anti-capitalist, too anti-American or too disruptive. These hesitant attitudes translated respectively into the expressed sentiments of anti-greed, pro-constitution and pro-cop (despite my own vocal criticisms). The individual who ended up with the bullhorn, and who was leading the chants that the rest of the group would echo back as we marched up and down the street, earlier had expressed their own reservations about anti-cop sentiments. About three quarters of the way into the demonstration, at the north end of the Mill Avenue entertainment district, the group encountered some Tempe cops directing pedestrian traffic at the corner of Mill and Rio Salado. The aforementioned demonstrator with the megaphone, upon stopping directly next to one of the cops directing traffic, attempted to reach out in a compassionate manner to the officer by placing a hand on their shoulder. Before I could extend any words of caution – knowing instinctively that this was a bad idea – the cop immediately shrugged off their hand and

81 This demonstration will be discussed further at the beginning of the next chapter. It is introduced here to highlight a particular experience with a Tempe police officer.
threatened them with arrest if they attempted to touch him again. Unsurprising to me, though alarming to the other demonstrator, the cop made it perfectly clear that he wasn’t part of the 99%. The attempt made to establish comradery with the cop during the march was completely rejected. The look on the demonstrator’s face was one of disbelief and shock. Their intentions seemed to be overwhelmingly benevolent, though were observably extended with a naïve belief that the cop would return the sentiment. Whether this experience shifted the attitude of the demonstrator at all is dependent on a mass of variables, but the look on their face was clear enough to hypothesize that the interaction registered as part of what I would characterize as a burgeoning narrative of distrust towards cops. One could hope for the loss in the ranks of another cop apologist, but at the very least, they would think twice about being overly friendly like that again.

The severance of positive relationships with police during protests, either as a result of the alienating actions of cops or conscious disillusionment, is an important aspect of the struggle against peace policing. It has been my unfortunate experience, both at OP and while participating in other protests and demonstrations in the Phoenix area, the peace policing has become a normalized behavior.

Networks of Surveillance

In order to better surveil the plaza occupation, cameras were added to surrounding buildings, though it is unclear who was actively monitoring these feeds or if they were simply recording activities for later review should it be needed. Cops were constantly parked in SUVs at the north or south side of the plaza nearly 24-hours-a-day, one would assume watching what occupiers were doing or simply signaling their ubiquitous presence. Periodically, officers would walk through the plaza like on-duty security
guards. I never observed these uniformed cops engaging with occupiers in the way that crowd control detectives did. This division of labor is intentional: so even when uniformed cops crack down on the occupation, crowd control detectives could remain at a distance and able to maintain the amicable PR status with certain people in the movement. Some people involved in Occupy Phoenix had been designated as internal security, mostly tasked with resolving interpersonal conflicts and arguments at random times during the occupation. Very early on in the occupation on October 19th, anarchists blocked the creation of a police liaison committee when the general assembly was first establishing sub-committees in OP, which could speak to the fact that individuals tasked with being movement security didn’t behave like peace police and simply attempted to resolve minor conflicts. However, “the many biases and privileges that came with middle class status in the U.S.” … were consistently embodied in assumptions and “arguments around nonviolence, the police, and questions of perception and imagery” (Insurgent, 2012). This middle class-ness, very much analogous with the assumptions that constitute whiteness, led several people participating in Occupy Phoenix to look kindly and sympathetically upon the police. Attempts to maintain a certain movement image easily digressed into calling out anarchists and threats of snitching. This overlapping assemblage of surveillance networks in OP was made all the more complex by its parallel presence on social networking platforms like Facebook, which OP regularly used to organize protest events and meetings.

*There is nothing inherently liberating about networks* (Galloway & Thacker, 2007). The very same Facebook event pages that were used to mobilize demonstrations in OP were also used by police to monitor movement activities and identity certain
individuals. The network form is taken for granted to promote the decentralization of power (CITE), the assumption being that networks inherently increase the capacity for actors with less political power to circumvent certain rigid hierarchies is spurious at best. For example, consider the use of smart phone cameras for recording and distributing video of police brutality that bypasses the role of more traditional media outlets in informing the public about social injustices. These “viral videos” take on a life of their own once uploaded to websites like YouTube, infecting people all over the world with outrage and disgust at police violence. Or consider the use of livestreaming technologies to “broadcast” social movement events to a wider audience who either locally could not attend or who may reside elsewhere. Rather than relying upon large media corporations to cover movement events (typically from a very limited perspective), activists have been using communication technologies to create their own media. Social networks do offer their own means of information distribution and dissemination that (partially) bypasses the monopoly on information produced through large news corporations. Though whether or not this more decentralized approach to information distribution is liberating is another thing entirely. Within the broader North American history of new communication technologies to have emerged since the industrial revolution, beginning with the telegraph, a consistent cultural narrative of revolutionary change has accompanied the introduction of each: whether discussing the potential of the telegraph, broadcast is a misnomer when used to describe information delivery through networks. Broadcast messages, properly speaking, begin from a centralized source and emanate out from it (a radio or television station for instance). Someone who uploads a video from their smart phone to a web server isn’t analogous to that, even if we grant that media corporations are now fully integrated into communication networks to reach their audiences better.
radio, television or the internet, a novel era is proclaimed where the new technology will lead us into a bright future. Generally absent from that narrative is a critical engagement with historical and contemporary technological cultures, leaving us with a facile understanding of particular technologies. If communications technologies like the internet are naively assumed to exist prior to, or outside of, oppressive political structures in society (Galloway & Thacker, 2007), then they will be oversimplified as neutral tools (cultural determinism) or as the drivers of entire societies (technological determinism) (Slack & Wise, 2005). The ontology of networks was surprisingly not a topic of conversation at Occupy Phoenix (sarcasm fully intended), even though I would argue such a discussion desperately needed to happen in order to better understand the important and partial affects of communication technologies (Galloway & Thacker, 2007) beyond simple truisms about progress or catastrophe. Was the nearly ubiquitous use of social networking technologies by Occupy Phoenix helpful or harmful to the movement’s political goals? Should online, virtual communications be considered equally important to those who were physically present at Cesar Chavez Plaza? What, if anything, can be liberating about the network form? In what ways are social networking technologies used as a means of maintaining social order despite the platitudes of liberation often attached to them?

Communication technologies, particularly social networking applications like Facebook and Twitter acted as both organizing tools for Occupy Phoenix and as consistent mechanisms of surveillance for cops (Hodai, 2013).\(^{83}\) It should come as little

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\(^{83}\) See literature on surveillance, capitalism, risk and hyperconnectivity.
surprise that social networking technologies played a key organizing role in the U.S. embodiments of the Occupy movement. They provide a rather easy and efficient way of creating callouts for events, whether organizing subcommittee meetings or mass demonstrations, given the proliferation of mobile personal computing devices like smartphones, tablets and laptops. It is important to note that Facebook has since put rather strong restrictions on the reach of its events, particularly through how many people can be invited to them or how visible they are when shared within the network. Ultimately, this is a way to monetize access to a larger audience given how widely the platform is used by businesses to promote themselves. Though while OP was maintaining a physical presence at Cesar Chavez Plaza, these algorithmic restrictions were not quite yet fully in place. Even the idea of a physical occupation of Wall Street in New York City was initially suggested and promoted online using the hashtag #occupywallstreet by Adbusters founder Kalle Lasn and some of his activist colleagues in the summer of 2011. After the Occupy Wall Street movement took on a life of its own in the streets of cities across the U.S. (and around the world), the online aspects of the movement – consisting of websites, Facebook pages, blogs, Twitter accounts, etc. – remained an inextricable part of it, regardless of how those of us involved in the physical occupations regarded those parts. I maintain a suspicious attitude towards closed platform, social networking technologies because I believe that they function as a means to partially automating political organizing. Their protocols are not liberating but disciplinary and profit-oriented. At times, participation in virtual forms of protest completely replaces in-

84 See David Graeber’s firsthand account.
85 See Zittrain, The Future of the Internet, and How to Stop It.
person organizing: where clicks, and likes, and shares give the feeling that something significant has been done to affect change in the world. While I wouldn’t completely dismiss the value of more people being quickly reached with information about social justice issues, I would argue that simply having information doesn’t change much at all.

Automation functions as a way of removing the agency of individuals in a given process. Rebellions against automation, most notably by Luddites, has a rich and misunderstood history that I will be engaging with more fully in the final chapter. In automating certain aspects of the movement through network communication technologies, Occupy Phoenix (and I’m sure other occupations in cities at the same time) over-valorized the organizing capabilities of those technologies while simultaneously overlooking the degree to which cops were using online communications as a means of policing the movement(s). Not viewing social networking technologies as tactically affective tools, and more as permanent strategic forms, is how I would offer a critique to the way in which social movements often approach technologies. The Arab Spring offers a helpful counterexample to the occupy movement, most especially because of the way in which the former inspired the latter. The Arab Spring of 2011 that toppled the Mubarak regime in Egypt also made wide use of social networking technologies, though arguably from a more temporary, tactical/practical approach that paralleled locally embedded social networks of affinity (Kamel, 2012). An important distinction to recall is the one between tactical/practical interventions and strategic formations. Tactics are embedded within daily practices that elude (public and private) authoritarian strategies of control (de Certeau, 1988). Aside from providing efficiency in certain production systems, automation also functions as a way to discipline workers in manufacturing (Noble, 1984),
though in virtual, consumer-based, social networks this relationship is obscured, but no less relevant. *Automation seeks to remove autonomy.* While anarchists and rebels can, in varying degrees, make-do with – in other words, *exploit* – automated systems, they remain imbued with strategic protocols that ultimately seek to manage subversive agencies. As an anarchist, the goal can never be taking control. When I see individuals or organizations interested in controlling the “means of production”, I see a reprehensible desire for social management that easily coincides with policing.

*The Banality of Policing (or Who is Brenda Dowhan?)*

The worry about the police infiltration of social movements through communication technologies is neither conspiratorial nor paranoid. The paranoia of a conspiracy theorist derives from their penchant for *erroneously* imagining the state as ubiquitous and omnipotent, with an agent hiding around every real and virtual corner, and with unlimited capacities for total domination. The beliefs of conspiracy theorists carry with them an overwhelming and arresting anxiety that leads to almost exclusively withdrawn and symbolic acts of defiance. In stark contrast, my concerns rest with the overlooked (and often mundane) ways in which cops actually do infiltrate and track the activity of individuals and social movements as a means of controlling and disciplining their behavior. While cops can be quite intimidating and invasive with their surveillance and repressive strategies, they can also demonstrate their naivety and stupidity around what is actually happening in activist circles and organizations, and all the more so as individuals make use of unconventional tactics. In the massive appendices of Beau
Hodai’s report, *Dissent or Terror*, extensive e-mail correspondences\(^{86}\) between law enforcement officials in the Phoenix area revealed a very active monitoring of OP activity.

In addition to better understanding the policing and social management strategies of states, I am also seriously concerned with the ways in which OP did the cop’s work for them, especially in naively approaching social networking technologies for organizing tasks. This is not me saying that social networking technologies must be completely abandoned in order to escape surveillance, but that social movements and individuals would be better served in being more reflective and critical in their use of these technologies for organizing.

Thanks to the work of some independent journalists, many of the non-redacted correspondences of the Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) in the lead up to and during OP were made public in a piece entitled *Dissent or Terror*. The journalists were interested in highlighting the way in which a counter-terrorism center, comprised of multiple local and national law enforcement agencies, were put in the service of corporate interests, particularly large banks that became a major target of scrutiny during the larger Occupy movement. For many anarchists in Phoenix, including myself, what was of interest in the report were the insights into police surveillance and their counter-insurgency strategies, which were at times scary and invasive, but likewise also comical and revealing of bureaucratic stupidity. At the heart of many of these correspondences was someone named Brenda Dowhan, who according to the e-mails,

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\(^{86}\) Some of these correspondences were received redacted through the freedom of information act grab due to their reference to ongoing investigations.
monitored and reported quite regularly on what Occupy Phoenix was doing online, especially through Facebook. Ambiguously referred to in the report as the “Arizona Fusion Center”, this multi-jurisdictional, inter-department police information center was used to approach Occupy Phoenix as a possible breeding ground for homegrown terrorists and political extremists.

“The Whole World Is Watching!” (Revisited)

In a time of constant and increasing connectivity through social networking technologies, people’s ability to remain outside of those networks has decreased, even when they themselves opt out of actively maintaining these connections. For instance, it did not matter that at the time of the Occupy Phoenix demonstrations in 2011/2012, I had yet to obtain my own smart phone; the occupation was filled with webcams, smart phone cameras and newly installed surveillance cameras on the top of the plaza’s surrounding buildings. Despite my lack of desire to livestream my own presence (or that of others) at the occupation, these other surveillance technologies were all perfectly capable of capturing my movements from various angles. Interestingly, the cameras put up on the tops of the surrounding buildings were viewed as surveillance (once their presence as pointed out), whereas the other web cams and smart phone cameras brought by occupiers were seen predominantly as the benevolent tools of the movement, used to keep everyone connected to what was going on down at Cesar Chavez Plaza. It wasn’t that the cameras of occupiers weren’t at times looked upon with suspicion, but that the default perspective among people at OP was that these were necessary tools for furthering movement goals or were simply unremarked upon as unquestioned and seemingly uninteresting aspects of the contemporary technological culture – fading into the background as neutral tools.
General assemblies were consistently livestreamed, as were the activities of those remaining overnight at the plaza to maintain the 24/7 occupation, which included the late-night raids by Phoenix police. One evening during the occupation, I received a text message from a friend letting me know that the plaza was being raided by cops. Quickly rushing over to Cesar Chavez Plaza just a few minutes after getting the notice, all that was left of the physical occupation was a small group of people and a shopping cart filled with the few remaining things not taken by the police, which included a laptop that was continuing to livestream. It is very likely that my friend who texted me about the raid either was alerted by someone through text, heard about it online through Facebook posts or saw it on the livestream themselves. Short of a timely mass callout to protect the occupation against the late-night raid, which would have required a likely violent confrontation with the police who were in the process of stealing multiple canopies and their contents, there was no amount of social networking technology that would have assisted in stopping the raid. Despite the constant video recording that took place during Occupy Phoenix, often streamed online in real time, it is difficult to say that the joint surveillance efforts of both occupiers and cops was anything but an effort to maintain the visibility of the occupation and its participants. I’m not going so far as to say that occupiers and cops were recording events for the same reasons. Their interests were clearly separate. I am however speaking to the overall consequences of their divergent and yet joint interests in keeping an active video surveillance of the occupation. A major consequence being that it was very difficult to remain relatively anonymous at Occupy Phoenix due to the presence of real-time surveillance networks. One had to very
consciously elude being made visible during the occupation, both online and while physically present at demonstrations or simply being down at Cesar Chavez Plaza.

*Eluding Control: The Transparent Activist vs Anonymous Intervention*

The traditional social movement belief that making more visible the behavior of authority figures will help increase public scrutiny, and therefore bring justice against bad actors, rests upon the classic liberal political value of transparency (and that more of it is a good thing). Acknowledging that transparency is an important methodological feature of autoethnographic research, it is used intentionally and in a way that is consistent with my ethical principles as an anarchist. Anonymity is an important facet of autonomy for me, especially in how it sabotages statist desires for legibility. It is a fair question to ask if anonymity remains possible living in a large city like Phoenix that is highly integrated into global networks of surveillance? I think an important takeaway from this chapter is seeing how individual make choices to participate in social movements in ways that increase their visibility, especially through the use of social media technology. The tendency to organize openly in surveilled networks is guided by strategic desires for transparency and publicness. As I argued in the previous chapter, acts of nonviolent civil disobedience are predicated on need for media coverage to help mobilize public pressure campaigns. This leads people who use those approaches to distrust anyone who might desire anonymity, especially through the obscuring identity at demonstrations.

Courageous people, we’re told, show their faces and have nothing to hide. For anyone who is familiar with the ways in which the three pillars of the social order come crashing down on the lives of the most marginalized and consciously targeted in society, it should be quite evident why they would wish to remain off the radar as much as possible.
CHAPTER 6

SEEING THE CITY LIKE A LUDDITE

*It’s not a question of worrying or of hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons.*

~ Gilles Deleuze

During the first Occupy Tempe demonstration on October 8th, 2011 – a week before the initial Occupy Phoenix march, and ten miles east of Cesar Chavez Plaza – I stood alone with a megaphone in the middle of the intersection at University and Mill Avenue attempting to call attention to the importance of occupying and obstructing the flow of traffic in the city. Before I wandered out into the intersection, the group that had gathered were having conversations expressing their worry of being perceived as anti-capitalist or against the values of the U.S. constitution. These concerns struck me as liberal-left expressions of what The Tea Party was protesting, obsessing over the problems of greed (but not capitalism) and political corruption, though absent any critique of the state. Police were said to be part of the 99%; my voice being the only one registering dissent from this position in Tempe that day. The constituency was younger than that of The Tea Party, but the populist sentiments sounded eerily similar. My decision to wander out into the intersection was in part a frustrated reaction to the tone of the conversations within the group, but it was also the embodiment of a certain way of seeing. When I look at the city, I see targets – opportunities for sabotage. Intersections are vulnerable targets and their obstruction can pose problems for the circulation of goods, people and services, in short, capital. When commerce is slowed and time becomes affectively present, discontent and antagonisms rise – a traffic jam during rush
hour caused by a car crash is a clear demonstration of this (Cole, 2013). The anxieties and alienation of work are never far below the surface in contemporary cities. *A broken circuit.* But I was in no position to disrupt flows that day. Before I even reached the center of the intersection, in an attempt to appeal to the imaginations of those resigned to the sidewalk, I could already see several Tempe cops in a nearby fast-food parking lot take notice of my presence, ready to show me just how much a part of the 99% they were! I had no expectations that anyone would follow, or even be that excited by the gesture, but I wanted them to think about it in the lead up to the following week’s larger occupation in downtown Phoenix. My desire was for Occupy to be an intervention against the republic of property, not merely a symbolic gesture for media cameras and governing officials. And in that moment, I wanted those gathered to consider that standing on a street corner with signs clearly wasn’t going to be enough to challenge any of the things they felt to be wrong with the current political economy.

City governments, urban planners, and real estate investment firms rather vividly see the city. The mundane concrete and steel artefacts that compose much of the urban built environment are all very intentionally designed, many times in ways that allow them to recede into a forgotten backdrop of daily city life. The bus stops that city workers sit at in downtown Phoenix, waiting for their express transit lines to arrive, don’t reveal their anti-homeless designs in those moments unless you were to consider the impossibility of laying down on them. If you aren’t a skateboarder, then the “skatestoppers\(^{87}\)” placed on

\(^{87}\) The term ‘skatestoppers’ is strangely both a registered trademark of the Intellicept company and the way skaters describe these innocuous but frustrating design additions to the built environment. These slightly raised pegs are placed equidistant apart on surfaces
curbs, benches and handrails throughout urban terrains would go unnoticed. Cell towers that are strewn across cities, sometimes attached to already-existing structures, sometimes even disguised to look like palm trees, are integrated into build environments with a “Security Through Obscurity” motto in mind, “a gigantic object that remains effectively invisible most of the time, at the periphery of our vision but at the center of our everyday lives” (Jones, 2020, p.10). How many of the drab, uninteresting buildings that we pass during our daily commutes house massive servers that make our virtual, online lives possible? Are the machines that make the automation on higher education possible in a building down the street from you or in another country? The difficulty in knowing where seems strategic: a way to make ensure that if mass grievances over what Noble (2002) calls automated “digital diploma mills” ever seek expression, it would be a serious task to uncover where they physically exist. I could continue to describe a list of various artefacts in our urban environments, like walls, fences and privacy hedges, that function as disciplinary mechanisms, but it is one thing to describe these artefacts (an important and useful exercise that helps make them visible), though it is another thing entirely to find ways of circumventing or sabotaging them. There are anarchist tendencies that express a critical attitude towards technology, but not so thoroughly and completely embodied as the Luddite uprisings were in parts of early 19th-century England. Anarchist critiques of technology do sometimes express what could be called neoluddism, but often

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that are likely to be used for grinds by skaters. The reasoning being that this use of the built environment causes defacement, and contributes to it appearing unsightly.

88 The primitivist, anti-civilizational and green anarchist tendencies all have a significant critique of technology that interestingly mirror the positions expressed by critical technology studies scholars such as Jacque Ellul and Langdon Winner.
target what I would call a monster named technology. The historical Luddites implicitly challenged early automated production systems, not as anarchists, but as people attempting to maintain autonomy, particularly in the control over time. I don’t think the affinity between contemporary anarchists and historical Luddites can be assumed, but has to be demonstrated, which is what I look to do in this final chapter. In order to explore how a Luddite would see the city, it both needs to be shown that Luddites would be the accomplices of anarchists and the sorts of machines and systems they would target in 21st-century cities like Phoenix based upon their activities in early 19th-century England. Once the affinity is established, an anarchist Luddism will cast disciplinary artefacts and urban technological systems into relief such that they can be eluded or sabotaged.

Urban rebellions and social movements are confronted with the ways in which automated systems are integrated into the built environment of contemporary cities for the purpose of maintaining social order and facilitating the circulation of capital in global markets. The disciplinary techniques of policing that were discussed in the previous chapter help establish what Foucault (2007) describes in his late lectures as the limits and frontiers of a territorial sovereign, and surveillance the complimentary and simultaneous production of certain forms of life, the management of populations (and nature) remains an unfinishable task. Rebellion brings the mortality of a social order into anxious relief. The state is often overwhelming, but never totalizing, even when it becomes totalitarian. What Foucault’s (2007) lectures on security and Deleuze’s (1995) quite similar description of control societies can offer to us as perspectives on cities is in their naming of circulation as a necessity, and thus also a target. While a biopolitical description of cities provides a way of understanding how social order is consistently maintained
despite the progressive growth of civilizations through the incessant flow of people and products, it also reveals that all of this happens through the careful calculating of an acceptable level of delinquency – a measurement of just how much dangerousness and change is permitted for things to remain relatively the same (Foucault, 2007). The strategies of nonviolence that I challenged in chapter four are an excellent example of an acceptable level of delinquency, if we could even grace those symbolic acts of dissent with that description. To my mind, delinquency and dangerousness invoke those ways of life through which people make do: the tactics of survival that exceed and refuse the explicit and implicit demands of administrators (de Certeau, 1988). If automation is indeed one of the primary techniques through which the circulatory system of cities is efficiently maintained, would it not be fruitful to explore tactics that have historically been the most dangerous to those it? I would like to argue that the Luddite rebellions that took place in particular parts of the English textile industry at the beginning of the 19th-century were the most significant threat raised against automation to date.89 If automation is in fact central to the functioning of urban capitalist social orders, and the Luddite uprisings offer a meaningful exemplar of rebellion against it, what would it mean then to see cities like a Luddite?

There are two main hurdles to overcome before this admittedly speculative line of thinking can be productive: first, Luddism wasn’t an explicitly urban phenomenon in its own day (Navickas, 2011), so in order to understand its relevance to the contemporary

89 This is leaving aside the very real threats posed by regional environmental collapse due to climate change or unforeseen system failures like the catastrophe at Chernobyl. While both could be argued to be the consequence of human actors, neither are approached as active projects to undermine automated systems.
metropolis, an extension of the discussion on social order and cities in chapter two is required; and second, Luddism was resurrected in the 1990s by various technological determinist neoluddites, which refers to a host of individuals as disparate as anarcho-primitivists and Ted Kaczynski to counter-culture hackers and casual technophobes, seeking to challenge the alienation endemic to modern civilization. It is not that I don’t believe Luddism could pose a serious threat to aspects of the social order in cities today (and hence to civilization). However, historically speaking, Luddism was a very particular subculture that “didn’t just arise out of nowhere” and isn’t generalizable to what Jones (2006) derides as “the false continuity of a single ‘antitechnology’ philosophy” (p.51) in neoluddism. The social histories and practices of Luddism and neoluddism are quite distinct, and thus should be considered very different subcultures (Jones, 2006). If the Luddites are going to be able to inform urban rebellions today, then their targets – and reasons for attacking them – in early 19th-century England need to be understood as part of a larger social history that can be shown to have a viscerally accessible lineage.

Despite the semi-rural/semi-urban geography of the original Luddite rebellions in England (Navickas, 2011), the physical and legal barriers they sought to sabotage during the industrial revolution in the early 19th-century pervade our cities even more so today: gridded plots of privatized and state land; single-purpose roadways; restrictive walls and fences; privacy hedges. In sum, Luddism was an uprising against a still-ongoing process of enclosure (or colonization turned inward). Far from simply seeking to destroy certain machines and industrial factories (and attack the individuals who owned them), the Luddites rebelled against any structures that challenged the commons to which they were
accustomed. Challenging purely economic histories of Luddism, Randall (2004) argues that it wasn’t just an issue of innovative machinery being forced into the production process, but that their entire way of life was being destroyed, including the social relationships that provided them with the strong sense of community from which the uprisings emerged. Underlying the direct actions of the Luddites was a desire to maintain autonomy, particularly the pace at which they lived and worked (Randall, 2004). The conditions that they challenged were in no way isolated: the Luddite uprisings in England appeared concomitantly with “capitalist incursions … upon traditional practices of communing in Ireland, North Africa, South America, the Caribbean, and North America” (Linebaugh, 2012, p33).

Re-imagining a contemporary city through the eyes of a Luddite will require some significant critical analysis of the history of Luddism from its violent emergence in 1811 through to its symbolic (though at times equally violent) resurgence in the likes of Ted Kaczynski and anarcho-primitivism of the 1990s. Ultimately, I’m going to be making a sharp distinction between the original Luddites in 19th-century England and the latter-day neoluddites, who as Steven Jones (2006) argues, emerged out of 1960s counter-culture movements in the U.S. and Europe and have really nothing in common with the much earlier machine-breaking textile workers. I’ll take the former as accomplices and the latter as well-intentioned but misguided and symbolic in their actions. Even with a critical history of Luddism close at hand, seeing the city like a Luddite requires a great deal of speculative thinking, for there isn’t a Luddite uprising going on today, nor has there been one since the English military was mobilized in 1812 to crush the rebellious army of the mythical General Ludd. Beyond this historical discontinuity, the original
Luddite uprisings happened in semi-rural/semi-urban parts of the English countryside (Navickas, 2011), and not in the emerging urban centers of the time that could perhaps approximate a less developed version of our contemporary cities. There is then no easy way to relate the activities of the Luddites of Lancashire to what a Luddite would do today in the sprawling desert metropolis of Phoenix, Arizona. This is where the theoretical work of this chapter will assist in both uncovering just what interests are at the heart of the rebellions I want to characterize as ‘Luddite’ and in providing the grounding for my political imagination about the socio-technological infrastructure of the city during Occupy Phoenix. It is my hope that I’ll be able to make the case as to why it’s important, for anarchists especially, to consider how a Luddite sees the city.

Unfortunately, criticisms of technology in anarchist circles are often either non-existent – fully embracing the socially transformative power of technological progress similarly to Marxists – or caught up in primitivist, neoluddite narratives.

*The Social Order of Cities*

Cities remain one of the primary hallmarks of what gets called civilization (Evans, 2013). In constituting what I would characterize as an assemblage of rigid structures, networked technologies and disciplinary machines, cities also *embody* the most comprehensive strategies for concentrating, ordering and managing human beings. Of note to consider, Foucault (2007) argued that control in a capitalist society is maintained not simply by erecting walls – as with the traditional medieval city of Europe – but through a more distributed and relatively subtle security network. Many of the surrounding walls that typified the medieval city had to be torn down in order to allow for
the constant movement of people, goods and services required by a capitalist economy.\(^{90}\) These movements, however, are not the unobstructed, free-for-all one would assume from reading libertarian diatribes on the wonders of markets. Quite contrary to those market fantasies, capitalist economies are strictly managed systems from the perspective of both space and time. Since the industrial revolution, automation has played a key role in disciplining people’s behavior in market societies, particularly the behavior of workers who have been progressively robbed of their autonomy, which largely relates to the control over what people are doing with their time. Workerist approaches to liberation struggles have focused almost entirely upon processes of production, though radical feminists have forced the expansion of that analysis into the processes of reproduction in daily life that undergird worker production in capitalist economies (particularly the labor of women in physically reproducing the workforce) (Federici, 2014). Though beyond where the new workforce comes from, Federici (2014) also directs us to consider all forms of ongoing primitive accumulation – or what could also be named internal and external colonization – if one is going to understand social management and subordination in the present. Not only must the subordination of women’s bodies be considered an integral aspect of control and wealth production in capitalist societies, but also the enclosure of land into a republic of property (to use Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s term). The walls one has to confront in contemporary cities are both actual and symbolic as they relate to a distributed network of physical barriers, legislative

\(^{90}\) The medieval city form, however, lives on in capitalist cities through gated, private communities. Walls are still everywhere, but it is less their physical height that restricts movement and more trespassing laws and surveillance cameras.
restrictions and self-disciplinary techniques. These are the pillars of social order, according to Foucault, that are to be contended with in capitalist cities.

Though hardly urbanites, the Luddites of early-19th century England were forced into confrontation with the technologies of enclosure at the beginning of the industrial revolution as walls, hedges, grids and roads were used to parcel up and privatize land into neat, accessible and restricted portions. The Luddites not only saw as targets to attack the disciplinary machines being put in textile mills but also the regulating barriers being erected throughout the countryside (Navickas, 2011).

Still Seeing Like the State

Against the dystopian -- yet mundane -- scheming of city officials, developers, foreign investors and urban planners, there has recently emerged a social movement of sorts, comprised of theorists and activists, that rallies itself around a demand for the right to the city. The demand for "the right to the city" is taken straight from French urban theorist Henri Lefebvre's work concerning the production of space in cities, particularly the revolutionary legacy of May 1968. Marxist geographers such as David Harvey and Neil Smith, beginning in the 1990s, have been central in resurrecting Lefebvre's work as a way to both analyze and formulate a response to neoliberalism in cities. David Harvey, in a speech at the World Social Forum in January of 2009 in Brazil, describes the right to the city as "the right of all of us to create cities that meet human needs, our needs". Following urban sociologist Robert Park, Harvey (2008) sees the city as human civilization's most lofty attempt at forging a world more after their heart's desires, which Harvey points out has, up until today, been dictated primarily by the politics of capitalism. From the perspective of the market, cities are spaces for the flow of capital.
Currently then, the right to the city is reserved for those who benefit most from current
dystopian urban schemes. Peter Marcuse (2009) wonders how a critical urban theory,
through a process of "exposing, proposing and politicizing", might help implement a
much more radical version of the right to the city, where those most deprived by and
alienated from the neoliberal city play a central role in imagining its remaking. Though
lacking an imagination about tactics, the right to the city as a critical urban theory does
uncover the way in which many social issues with strong political economic dimensions
are framed predominantly in cultural terms (Marcuse, 2009). Home ownership is
depoliticized by right-wing conservatives as a cultural value attached, of course, to the
American Dream. (Understanding this previous point is helpful in explaining the
ongoing perpetuation of single-family home development in the U.S.) When the failure
of some to achieve this dream, specifically people of color, is framed in exclusively
cultural terms, deprived groups are seen as being naturally predisposed to lower levels of
success. The political economic forces behind dystopian urban schemes are completely
left out. The question of Whose city is it?, when asked under a critical lens, re-politicizes
crucial urban issues. The right to the city as a critical framework becomes a way of
addressing why so many in (urban) civilization are discontent and yet sublimate that
discontent in more socially acceptable issues like nationalism, racism, xenophobia and
sports fanaticism (Marcuse, 2009).

For many radicals theorizing about urban revolution, the right to the city
conceptually represents the height of their political imaginations. Rightfully so, given the
way that it challenges the ongoing process of closing and securing city spaces for the
market (Mitchell, 2003). Enclosure, or the theft of the commons, is a constituent element
of capital's ability to reproduce itself by continuing to provide spaces for profitable investment (Harvey, 2008). Like Marx's famous multi-volume analysis of capital, theorists looking at the political economies of urbanization provide us with, well, a good analysis that helps further understand complex economies, particularly in cities. Though the nuances of circumventing the three pillars of social order receive, at best, scant treatment. Harvey (2012), for instance, tips his hat frequently to The Paris Commune (via Lefebvre's analysis of it) as a revolutionary instance where the city was finally afforded a significant role in shaping the goals of radicals. What we don't hear from critical urban theorists is how, from the perspective of those who barricaded the streets of Paris in 1871 to protect the commune, the built environment itself influenced the prospects of the urban revolution.

Fast-forward to just a few years ago, we must inquire why the "nihilistic and feral teenagers" (quoting from the Daily Mail) of London's 2011 riots were able to carry out the tactics they did. Harvey (2012) does not even consider this question and merely points the nihilist and feral descriptors back at capitalists and politicians for their brutal strategies of profit accumulation and social management. Either apologize (reluctantly) or demonize seems to be the only paths available to critical urban theorists when they are confronted with illegal tactics (particularly those that arise during riots) when carried out by people that are not carrying a flag or banner to identify their political allegiances. What if people aren't sorry for their insurrectionary tactics? Or that their opportunism doesn't fall in line with an abstract, revolutionary call for social justice in the city? The imaginations of critical urban theorists are not even utopian, but more-or-less resigned forms of nostalgia for a recuperated, reinvigorated radical leftist program.
Within urban riots, such as those mentioned above in the London streets of 2011, there is a plethora of desires, needs, emotions and ideas carrying people through the streets, whether they are looting stores or engaging in fights with the police. What of these ways of remaking the city more after the hearts desires? Or what of the threats these people pose to business as usual in predatory market economies? Per the analysis of capitalist urban development, the goal is to keep value (capital) in motion through continuous growth and uninhibited flows of goods and services (Weber, 2002; Harvey, 2008). Without idealizing rioting (and this is something radicals have to be careful not to do), don't riots generally obstruct streets and disrupt the flow of capital in cities? How can this obvious consequence be ignored completely -- is it because critical urban theorists simply have a very narrow understanding of urban cultural life from which they unfortunately generalize? Or are they limited by politically sectarian debates about violence, property destruction and illegality?91

The limitations of the right to the city, I argue, rest in its origins and expression through explicitly activist movements that are inspired by mostly Marxist and leftist-anarchist critical theory. According to Don Mitchell (2003), the right to the city is about struggles for public space and the ability "to remake the city in a more open and progressive light" (p. 10). It is the progressive part that I find troubling when related to the discussion of utopianism previously. Without discounting the importance of publicly liberated spaces in cities, progressive struggle has always involved the creation of a larger, managed political projects. The right to the city affirms not individual rights, but

91 Chris Hedges condemnation of black bloc tactics during Occupy Wall Street demonstrations is an excellent example of this.
a collective right, thus invoking dreams of communism, or ideas of the commons. Here enters the endless debates about organizational form on the left. Harvey (2012) and Jodi Dean (2012), along with many on the left, find the suggestions for direct democratic control that come from libertarian socialists and anarchists to be completely unfeasible if attempts were made to apply it at a city scale. Without completely siding with theorists like Harvey and Dean in this debate, there is a noticeable fetishization of direct democracy by some anarchists that involves an uncritical assumption that a federated system of communes could manage global political economic systems (and that this would be a desirable goal). The various Occupy Wall Street movements that began in 2011 in the U.S. (and other parts of the world) are a testament to the difficulty of coordinating a progressive force against capitalism under the rubric of rights, direct democracy and public space. Even though not framed as an explicitly "right to the city" movement, Occupy Wall Street had all the necessary features to be justified in describing it as a political movement concerned primarily with social justice in the city that fought for control over public space. If Occupy Wall Street is accepted, at least for a moment, as an attempt at establishing the right to the city under a different language, then the limitations of it will not be discovered in abstract debates about organizational form among leftist intellectuals. The problem with many Marxists and anarchists alike is that they are bewitched by social management schemes.

All three pillars of social order were avidly at play in the attempt to manage Occupy Wall Street demonstrations from New York to Oakland. The legal/juridical language of human rights expresses a clear politically liberal (and limited) focus of collective demands, one with a notable middle-class bent towards peaceful forms of
protest that included various levels of police collaboration (Insurgent, 2012). Occupation as a specific urban tactic was overshadowed by political economic demands that reminisced about earlier progressive eras with hopes that money might take a vacation from politics (even though it never has, ever). Leftist radical Todd Gitlin (2012) is one of many academics to provide a white-washed version of the occupations filtered through his own moral commitment to nonviolence -- complete with canonical reference to the saintly struggles of Gandhi and MLK -- and his glaring avoidance of anarchism (in favor of a tired New Left nostalgia).

*Disciplinary Machines & A Monster Named Technology*

Contemporary discussions of technology invoke a contrary set of positions: on the one hand there is a profound veneration of its saving grace; and on the other, fear and mistrust that it is overrunning our lives and turning us into automatons. Consider the host of dystopian science fiction films of the past 40 years like *Terminator, Westworld, THX 1138, Blade Runner, Equilibrium*, and more recently, *Elysium* that paint pictures of either technocratic control, technology out-of-control (Slack & Wise, 2007; Winner, 1983), or some horrible combination of both. Science fiction is an important starting point because it helps us begin to get a sense of negative popular imaginations that abounds concerning a monster named technology. Why is it so easy for us to see technology, more specifically *machines* and *mechanization*, as monstrous? For starters, they at times appear as inhuman or unnatural. But these perceptions are extremely problematic in that they hide several foundational, mythologized beliefs about nature, culture, civilization and technology that are deployed as common sense (when they are anything but that). A hurricane can be considered just as evil and dehumanizing as William Blake's "dark
Satanic mills”. Likewise, certain subcultures in human society are condemned as unnatural in the same way that Frankenstein's monster\(^{92}\) is shunned when it become uncontrollable. Technology seems to become monstrous when it no longer \textit{works} for us. Though if we are going to be precise about the monsters we've created and need to vanquish, 'technology' is much too abstract a name for them. This conceptual abstractness interestingly adds to technology's ability to appear monstrous, as something that feels ubiquitous, autonomous and overwhelming. Both technophobes and technophiles employ very imprecise definitions of technology and appear equally condemned to Viktor Frankenstein's fate.

The mythology around technology is an important part of this inquiry, but of greater concern is the history of automation and mechanization in capitalist society. This history involves the deployment of \textit{disciplinary}\(^{93}\), industrial machines that automate production and further regiment the division of labor. These machines \textit{work} very well for those who either profit financially from their introduction into the production process or who gain further disciplinary leverage over the labor force they employ (and un-employ). Unlike 'tools' or 'instruments' specific to certain trades, machines require much less mastering and human involvement (Mumford, 2010). Yet there is nothing abstract or ambiguous about an automated production process, which is why I am speaking of

\(^{92}\) See Mary Shelley's iconic novel \textit{Frankenstein}.

\(^{93}\) I am characterizing automated machinery as disciplinary in the sense that Foucault (1995) describes the 'carceral' mechanisms of the prison as disciplinary: "these mechanisms are applied not to transgressions against a 'central' law, but to the apparatus of production -- 'commerce' and 'industry' -- to a whole multiplicity of illegalities, in all their diversity of nature and origin, their specific role in profit and the different ways in which they are dealt with by the punitive mechanisms" (308).
machines as a very specific kind of technology. Machines perform very specific tasks and create clearly identifiable results, not simply evidenced by the product of the process of which they are a part, but in their modulation of the production process itself -- this includes the drastic ways in which machines alter social relations as a result of their inflexibility.

There is a feeling that something is terribly wrong, and it somehow has something to do with this thing called technology, but we aren't sure whether it's because we have too much technology or not enough of it. Unsurprisingly, most criticisms of technology remain as vague and abstract as its definitions. "There is a violence in abstraction which hides the negotiation of uses", writes Peter Linebaugh (2012, p. 24) about the avoidance of engaging more directly with specific machines. Buried, *purposely*, in our popular imaginations about technology are threats to unquestioned technological progress in the service of state capitalism. To make explicit our questioning of, let alone organizing a challenge to, uninhibited progress is heresy (Slack & Wise, 2007). So we console ourselves that at least we know there is a monster out there. We are not sure how it got there or where it came from or who put it there, but at least we have given the monster a name. To go any further in our questioning of technology will cast us permanently in the role of villain, as the antagonists of great things like progress, convenience, society, civilization and human nature. *Then villains we must be!* Because something has been terribly wrong for quite some time.

*Not All Luddites Are Against Technology*

If we go looking for contemporary Luddites, we seem to find them all over the place (Fox, 2004). This, I argue, is terribly unfortunate. The term Luddite has come to
refer generally to a whole gamut of individuals and groups that have a desire to rebel against and repress certain technologies and also those that wish simply to question the trajectory of modern, technological progress (Slack & Wise, 2007; Jones, 2006). Luddite most notably refers to the targeted attacks upon textile industry machines (and the factories that housed them) by English workers during the early 19th-century -- mainly in the counties of Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cheshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire -- under the direction of an enigmatic General Ludd. Though 'Luddite' also names the green anarchists and anarcho-primitivists like John Zerzan that emerged as a radical wing of the environmentalist movement during the 1990s, lashing out against modern civilization and global capitalism. Hackers and hippies wishing, respectively, to disrupt massive corporations and live "off the grid" also get labeled as Luddites. 'Luddite' could even name a middle-class academic who willingly opts out of using their computer and other modern amenities for the weekend in favor of spending some time out in an ambiguous thing called nature. 'Luddite' has become an equally applicable description for anyone or any group that challenges technological progress either directly or symbolically. This imprecision of what it might mean to be a Luddite today is terribly unfortunate. The term is used variably as a political cuss word to condemn terrorists that challenge progress and as a badge of ineffectual enlightenment signaling one's knowledge of the way in which a monster named technology is ruling our lives. The term Luddite is at once fear-invoking and dismissive -- a political cuss word or sorts used to slander anti-progress sentiments (Slack & Wise, 2007). (Though sometimes it rings completely unfamiliar in the ears of my younger students when I initially ask them about Luddism in classroom discussions about technology.)
This perhaps would not be such a problem if it wasn't the case of the obstinate academic on a spiritual quest that dominated our cultural imagination of what kinds of resistance is possible to the unstoppable stampede of progress. Of course, not everyone who is named by the label 'Luddite' today has limited themselves to such ineffectual gestures of technological defiance. There have definitely been many individuals over the past several decades who have considered and executed much more radical actions against various technological targets (including the people who create, manage and operate them). Ted Kaczynski, the notorious Unabomber, still remains a household name for his near two decades of terrorist bombings. I will likewise be discussing at length the neoluddite resurgence of the past few decades that manifested itself mainly through the actions of anarcho-primitivists, green anarchists and radical environmentalists. Though in taking the time below to discuss all the varying contemporary strains of neoluddism, I will notably be distinguishing them from the historical Luddites who fought and died under General Ludd's banner in the heart of England during the early 19th-century. Both Luddism and neoluddism have a history; neither were spontaneous manifestations that appeared from nowhere. I will be critically exploring both respective histories below in order to uncover the discontinuities that exist between the two in order to draw out the consequences of this break, not just on our political imaginations about technology but also on the tactics we choose to embrace and condemn in our daily, political lives. Put simply, Luddites and neoluddites choose different targets; the character of their interventions are quite distinct and worth exploring so that we can properly answer the question: What machines would Luddites smash today?
For purposes of clarity, I will be defining *Luddism* as a worker subculture of direct action against disciplinary\(^{94}\) machines\(^{95}\), and *neoluddism* as an anti-technology attitude that manifests itself through predominantly symbolic interventions against a monster named technology (sometimes also called modern civilization). Jones (2006) explains the link between Luddism and neoluddism as a mythologized one in which neoluddites mistakenly imagine themselves as allies to the original Luddites of the early 19th-century. In addition to this mythologizing process that began around the mid 20th-century, I will be exploring the history of automation (Noble, 1984), innovations in social management and worker discipline (Pollard, 1968), and the writings of the Luddites and neoluddites themselves (Binfield, 2004) to help further explain the discontinuities that exist between the histories of Luddite and neoluddite interventions. For example, where Luddite writings include threatening letters against the owners and operators of very

\(^{94}\) Most literally, and borrowing directly from Michel Foucault's (1995) discussion of disciplinary social orders, the machines targeted by Luddites were those used by managers, factory owners and early industrialists to produce certain working conditions that were detrimental to worker autonomy and leisure. Disciplinary machines are those that encourage a very devout Protestant work ethic, lending themselves easily to regimentation and performance measurement. Even though disciplinary machines make managerial surveillance of efficiency that much easier, this effect is only a secondary function of what is first a means of punishing a labor force for being too libertine in its use of time.

\(^{95}\) Mumford (2010) gives us some extremely important distinctions to consider when talking about technology that are dependent upon the level of involvement/operation by human beings. For instance, he distinguishes tools from machines because machines are described as being inflexible and suffer few, perhaps even only one, kind of use. Tools, in contrast, are used in a manner much more at the discretion of the person wielding it. Tools and machines are both considered by Mumford as different kinds of technology characterized by how they are used and the degree of autonomy they maintain from human input. The notion of autonomy will be extremely important in understanding why I am concerned primarily, following the historical Luddites, with machines and not tools or technology generally.
specific textile production machinery, neoluddite writings ruminate on things like the 
alienation of human beings from nature due to technological domination. Neoluddism is 
written through with a very pronounced politics of nature, which is crucial in helping to 
understand its peculiar social history where it maintains everything in common with the 1960s counterculture of the United States and very little in common with the worker subculture that championed good old General Ludd in early 19th-century England.

There is both space and opportunity for Luddism today as a worker subculture of direct action against disciplinary machines, but it must be divorced completely from the prevailing anti-technological attitude of neoluddism. The actions of the original Luddites themselves speaks to this. Thompson (1966) includes some excerpts from a Nottingham correspondent writing for the Leeds Mercury of December 1811 that are important to consider:

_They broke only the frames of such as have reduced the price of men's wages; those who have not lowered the price, have their frames untouched; in one house, last night, they broke four frames out of six; the other two which belonged to masters who had not lowered their wages, they did not meddle with_ (p. 544).96

Likewise, this does not mean that certain machines that we encounter in our daily lives do not deserve our anger. However, in following the lesson of the Luddites, it cannot mean hating a mythologized technological monster that is everywhere and nowhere all at the same time -- unless struggle is to be imagined as a relentless series of crash-test dummy tests. Luddism was not a historical anomaly that came from nowhere; attacking machinery and incendiariism, alongside a "varied repertoire of methods of intimidation, protest, and resistance" reflected customary local tactics used long before General Ludd

96 Italics in original.
appeared as a mythical leader of the machine-breakers (Navickas, 2011). The British
government eventually deployed 14,000 troops to finally dispatch Luddism for its
targeted attacks upon specific, highly-valued machines (Sale, 1995). Was a proportionate
threat perceived by the U.S. government when latter-day neoluddites like the Unabomber
or the ELF carried out their respective bombing and incendiary campaigns? Ted
Kaczynski’s terrorist anti-technology bombings went on for nearly two decades, though
this could perhaps be attributed to his acting alone. However, I do not think it a stretch to
hypothesize that if a rebellion of workers against automation were to suddenly appear
today in the U.S. and begin midnight attacks against specific machines, that the
government would have a much greater sense of urgency than they do with the anti-
technology neoluddites.

*Historical Luddism*

Machine-breaking and workplace sabotage existed both before and after the short
tenure of Luddite uprisings in select parts of England between 1811 and 1817 (Randall,
2004; Navickas, 2011), so it will be of importance to understand what distinguished
Luddism from other forms of worker resistance to automation in capitalist enterprises.
Any history of Luddism must take the form of a critical theory of worker struggles in
order to discern its possible relevance now. Additionally, the late 20th-century saw a
resurrection of Luddism, popularly referred to as neoluddism, which took a wide range of
forms, from the academic questioning of technology to terrorism. Of what relation are
these latter-day-luddites to the original Luddites of the early 19th-century? In looking at
this relationship, it will be my contention that there exists profound ideological and
tactical differences between the neoluddites that emerged from the 1960s counterculture
in the United States and the original Luddite uprising in parts of northern England in the early part of the 19th-century. The ideological gaps, I will explain, rest in the corresponding cultural imagination of neoluddism, inherited primarily from a religious view of technology (Noble, 1999) and an ontological misunderstanding of nature (Latour, 2004). Whereas tactically, neoluddism acts from a historical position disciplined for 200 years by the crushing force of automation. Forced into a rearguard position of technophobia, *symbolic* actions dominate the field of possible responses that are considered by neoluddites when confronting technological progress in society (Jones, 2006). These ideological gaps lead neoluddites both to misunderstand the nature of technology in society and leave largely unused the rich legacy of rebellion against disciplinary machines employed by their early 19th-century namesakes.

For the past two hundred years these villains of technology have had a name: Luddites. As Linebaugh (2012) explains,

The Luddites were active in three areas of the English textile industry: i) the West Riding of Yorkshire where the croppers (those who shear, or crop, the nap of the cloth) were threatened by the gig-mill or shearing machine, ii) Nottinghamshire and adjacent parts of the midlands where the stockingers (those who weave stockings) were being made redundant by the framework-knitting machine, and iii) Lancashire where the cotton weavers were losing employment because of the application of the steam-engine to the hand-loom (p. 8).

Named after a mythological figure, General (or Captain) Ned Ludd, who came to replace the character of Robin Hood in the English popular imagination in 1811, the Luddites led a series of direct action campaigns against workplace automation during a time later referred back to as the industrial revolution. Thousands of English troops were eventually mobilized to destroy the Luddite insurrection, which was finally ended in 1817. Despite this devastating political defeat, Luddism has come to be used by both
protagonists and antagonists of technological progressivism as the description for challenges to technology and the act of machine-breaking. Yet Luddism's actual history remains largely buried beneath slurs, mythology and partial recuperations. How might knowing the history of Luddism help us deal with questions of technology today? Questions that are largely consumed by hope and fear. And of what relevance would a critical inquiry into history of Luddism be for political practice today? Would Luddism's insurrectionary legacy cut through the religious deadlock of idolatry and fear that dominates our popular imaginations about technology?

With the Luddites, machine-breaking was given a name and mythical leader: General Ludd (Navickas, 2011). There was already a long tradition of sabotage by workers in England before the Luddites announced themselves in 1811 (Randall, 2004). It isn't machine breaking as such that defines Luddism, for that would lead us to define a wide array of labor union actions as instances of Luddism. The history of Luddism tends to be recounted as existing between 1811 and 1817 (Slack & Wise, 2007), at a time of great civil unrest that typically culminated in food riots (Thomis, 1972). Despite the similarities with radical trade unionism, Thompson (1966) advises us that the Luddite movement must be distinguished from it, first, by its high degree of organization, second by the political context within which it flourished. These differences may be summed up in a single characteristic: while finding its origin in particular industrial grievances, Luddism was a quasi-insurrectionary movement, which continually trembled on the edge of ulterior revolutionary objectives. This is not to say that it was a wholly conscious revolutionary movement; on the other hand, it had a
tendency towards becoming such a movement, and it is this tendency which is often understated (p. 553).

It is notable to mention that it was E.P. Thompson's monumental study on *The Making of the English Working Class* that re-ignited research and debate about Luddism. What Hobsbawn (1952) calls "collective bargaining by riot" isn't quite accurate given the Luddite's unofficial, insurrectionary and unabashedly illegal approach to labor struggle. Despite admiring Hobsbawn's study, Thompson (1966) argues that Hobsbawn fails to properly distinguish Luddism from the more general phenomenon of industrial sabotage in labor union history. This failure likely arises because Hobsbawn (1952) assumes trade union organizing as the default mode of worker struggle. He does, however, take the position that Luddite direct action campaigns were much more successful than they are normally given credit for in orthodox labor histories. Part of the problem for some earlier labor historians in properly understanding the phenomenon of machine-breaking came from unfortunate prejudices against property destruction and attempts to halt progress (Hobsbawm, 1952). Luddite machine-breaking and their terrorist threats do serve as an unofficial replacement for the collective bargaining found in organized labor in cities. This is partially explainable geographically: the Luddite uprisings were predominantly rural and in places that union organizing was absent (Thomis, 1972). In fact, as Navickas (2011) points out, "Luddism can only be understood within longer and deeper frameworks of social tensions and popular resistance in particular [semi-rural, semi-urban] localities" (p. 60). Categorizing resistance by 'rural' and 'urban' categories is rather anachronistic when dealing with 18th- and 19-century rebellions -- the dichotomy rural/urban is more appropriate to 20th-century protests (Charlesworth, 1991).
It is not uncommon for progressives and radicals to dismiss Luddism and machine-breaking. Marx and Engels (2008) bring up several times in *The Communist Manifesto* how attempts at maintaining "old means of production" are backwards and reactionary. Their progressive historiography in the *Manifesto* is made abundantly clear in how they lament "attacks ... against the instruments of production themselves" in what they see as an attempt "to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages" (Marx & Engels, 2008, p. 45). Even without naming the Luddites directly, Marx and Engels condemn their tactics as purely reactionary pipe dreams in the face of inevitable technological change.

The organization of production prior to the introduction of the machines targeted by the Luddites tended towards extreme inefficiency (at least by capitalist standards) and afforded workers more control over their lives -- workers dictated the pace of workflow and maintained a significant amount of autonomy as a result (Randall, 2004). This prerogative existed outside of official workerist demands from unions and socialist parties, which tended to simply reinforce Puritan work discipline in their struggles for better working conditions (Russell, 2010). Prefiguring the illegalism and insurrectionary anarchism of 100 years later, the Luddites engaged in a broad range of direct actions and political actions, particularly notorious for their written threats to industrialists and the owners of machinery and work sites that Binfield (2004) has collected into an important volume; threats that were followed up by very conscious forms of direct resistance to machines and factories, which cannot be dismissed as blind vandalism or foolish rioters (Randall, 2004). The targeted machines were introduced as labor-saving technologies,
which serves a direct labor disciplinary function in the capitalist production process.\textsuperscript{97} The Luddites acted to preserve their regional customs and haphazard network of autonomous production that existed in the arrangements of the textile industries until that point. Production in the textile industries weren't all that efficient, but efficiency is only of real concern either to those attempting to quantify costs for the purpose of extracting a surplus profit or to those wanting to maintain worker discipline. Part of the reason for distorting the Luddites from the organized labor movements of the time is that those who participated in Luddite uprisings were organized by through rural affinity groups where little to no union influence existed (Thomis, 1972); organized labor struggles have enjoyed a mainly urban constituency, owed to the increased concentrations of workers, both employed and not, pushed together into the slums and factories of growing cities during the 19th-century. Though it should not be inferred that people in cities then only organize through official left-wing political parties and labor unions. We must be careful, Randall (2004) instructs, not to play into the fallacy of maintaining an exclusive separation between the tactics of 'orthodox' trade unionism and the 'unorthodox' tactics "of intimidation, violence and riot" (p. 288). The Luddites organized outside of trade unionism largely because of the union absence from the semi-rural/semi-urban regions in

\textsuperscript{97} Labor saving machines most obviously do the work of people. However, in a society based upon wage-labor, if a machine now does your job and you are not offered an alternative position, then you will be without work, and thus without a wage. Labor saving would be more appropriately thought of as cost saving. These machines aren't providing us with more leisure, but simply making certain forms of work obsolete at the expense of someone's ability to acquire money to purchase the goods and services necessary for life.
which they were most active. This did not occlude Luddites from employing union-like strategies to resist mechanization.

The short-lived Luddite uprising was a result of a vibrant worker subculture rooted in long-standing, regional customs. Peel (1880), who provides one of the first scholarly, historical accounts of Luddism, reluctantly celebrates the Luddite direct actions as "perhaps unequalled for the skill and secrecy with which they were managed and the amount of wanton mischief they inflicted" (p. 11). As Randall (2004) points out, "this community culture had a rich tradition of protest which pre-dated mechanisation and it was here that resistance proved most sustained and implacable" (p. 8). To imagine the term Luddite as an abstract, universal category of defiance to technology, as many commentators do (Fox, 2004; Sale, 1995; Roszak, 1994), completely ignores the well-documented history that helps explain why Luddism happened in very specific parts of England during the early part of the 19th-century (Randall, 2004; Navickas, 2011; Thompson, 1966). It is crucial to the history of Luddism to understand why certain regions embraced early forms of automation in the textile industry, when other neighboring regions became the hotbeds of Luddite activity. Randall (2004) argues that both the social and economic context of West England provide us with much insight into why certain parts of the country remained so resistant to the transformation of production while other regions welcomed it with open arms.

An important aspect of the regional cultural context of Luddism is the outlaw folktale of Robin Hood, for that mythical Medieval outlaw was consciously invoked in Luddite oral histories of the time and in propaganda (Jones, 2006). Randall (Foreword, 2004), in his Foreword to Kevin Binfield's collection of Luddite writings, has us consider
the Luddite song "General Ludd's Triumph", which was meant to celebrate not simply the Luddite uprisings, but notably the ascension of Ned Ludd to the status of regional hero:

Chant no more your old rhymes about bold Robin Hood
His feat I but little admire
I will sing the achievements of General Ludd
Now the Hero of Nottinghamshire.

Ludd's mythical name offered Luddites a sophisticated\textsuperscript{98} mobilizing tool that very much confounded the authorities at the time, especially when Ludd's activities spread quickly to neighboring regions in 1812, making it at times impossible to separate Luddite activity from the general civil unrest of the time (Binfield, 2004). There existed no monolithic Luddite movement, thus allowing for many people to struggle under General Ludd's banner while acting autonomously (Randall, Foreword, 2004); this is what anarchists today would refer to as affinity groups. For Jones (2006), the fact that historical Luddites deployed a symbolic subculture as part of their machine-breaking campaigns should instruct us to examine their "vital forms of storytelling". So when neoluddism emerges from the U.S. counterculture of the 1960s (as I will argue below), it takes little-to-no inspiration from the regional cultures of early 19th-century England. The mythical lineage of Robin Hood, Ned Ludd and Captain Swing is completely detached from, for example, the San Francisco Bay-area counterculture of the 1960s. It is not that neoluddism is purely symbolic and historic Luddism is materially grounded in action (Jones, 2006), but that the mythology of neoluddism is culturally distinct and anthropologically distant from the propaganda of Ludd's original army.

\textsuperscript{98} Crass critics of Luddism that dismiss it as ignorant and misguided would do well to look at the narratives deployed in the oral histories, storytelling and propaganda of the original Luddites.
It has now been almost 200 years since the original Luddite uprisings were crushed by massive state intervention. In that time the name 'Luddite' has gone from being a description of those rebelling against disciplinary machines, to a complete slander and political cuss word to something partially embraced and partially forgotten in the more recent resurgence of neoluddism. In the next four sections I will outline the conditions of betrayal to these Luddite traditions. The betrayal, according to Noble (1997) comes not from without (for capitalists and state authorities are the sworn enemies of Luddism) but from below: by union officials, left politicians and academics. And to this list I would add neoluddites.

A Brief Social History of Neoluddism

One of the key discontinuities between historical Luddism and neoluddism rests in their drastically different social histories. By the time the 1960s countercultures emerge in North America (largely in the U.S.), the disciplining of workers by automation, management, state authorities and market forces had been relentless for the previous 150 years. Likewise, in a long stretch of sublime technological advances from the railroad in the 1830s to massive bridge and dam projects, through to the culmination of the technological sublime in the atom bomb (Nye, 1994), the U.S. public largely gaped in awe at the succession of "progressive" technological marvels. Couple this with the inheritance of devoutly religious views of technological progress and nature, and a "technological culture" emerges in the 1960s in which technology is imagined as the

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99 The term "technological culture" is used by Slack and Wise (2007) to describe their cultural studies approach to questions of technology where culture is understood as the ongoing rearticulation of traditional meanings, values and (technological) artifacts in our everyday life. Many people in North America make the mistake of considering culture as
central driving force of history (Slack & Wise, 2007) and as something ubiquitous, woven into the fabric of our lives (Jones, 2006). Though this cultural belief was not always celebrated as something benevolent. Despite the many unintended consequences that accompanied technological progress up through the 1940s, it is in atomic weaponry, according to Nye (1994), where "Americans first glimpsed the death-world that the technological sublime might portend" (p. 290). Despite the truly apocalyptic potential of the atom bomb, and people's dread of it, the technological sublime retained its power over people's imaginations (Nye, 1994). The spell of technological progress would not be broken, through it did begin to get mixed reviews and cause some to offer alternative, less intrusive visions of progress.

What do Wired magazine founder and MIT faculty-member Nicholas Negroponte, cyberpunk hackers and Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, have in common? The belief that technology is the central driving force of society; "an invisible network that could be anywhere and therefore might as well be everywhere" (Jones, 2006, p. 178). Jones (2006) wants to suggest that this ubiquity isn't simply a technophile's dream, but also a "necessary condition" of neoluddism's conspiratorial technophobic nightmares. Simply a different interpretation of the same technology-driven social mythology: whereas Negroponte fully celebrates his mythologized vision of inevitable technological progress (Mosco, 2004), cyberpunk hackers attempt to appropriate it for their own ends (Jones, 2006) and Kaczynski (2010) looks at it with utter disdain and rejects all modest something separate from technology, partly because their definition of culture does not include the material artifacts that co-constitute it. Any anthropologist or archeologist would happily remind us that without artifacts, we would know far less (in some instances nothing) about past cultures.
attempts to reform it at a cultural level. This strange, multifaceted version of technological determinism\textsuperscript{100} unites a rather motley crew of technophiles and technophobes, joined together by their underlying acceptance of technology's omnipotence and omnipresence.

Though the smaller is better (and beautiful) attitude (Schumacher, 1989) and the appropriate technology movement generally, that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, challenged the sustainability of large capitalist development projects around the world, they simply select a different pallet of technologies to stand in for the bureaucratic ones they abhor. Social change is imagined, in true technological determinist fashion, to spontaneously emerge from the implementation of certain technologies. "It is sometimes forgotten that some counterculturalists were avid technophiles who mixed do-it-yourself pragmatism with radical optimism and shared a vision of technology's utopian potential for building a new kind of community" (Jones, 2006, p. 181).

This fascination with ever smaller, convivial technology is prophetic of the Apple computer company's modus operandi today. The marketing of smaller, sterile electronic gadgets that offer us smooth, virtual spaces that transcend our bodily limitations to be everywhere at all times plays off of the counterculture's fixation on lifestyle choices. It isn't simply the case that the market co-opted aspects of another social movement, though that is partially what is going on. The other part of what is happening comes through understanding that the view of technology determining culture isn't limited to technocrats

\textsuperscript{100} "Understood in its strongest sense", writes Langdon Winner (1983), "technological determinism stands or falls on two hypotheses: (1) that the technological base of a society is the fundamental condition affecting all patterns of social existence and (2) that changes in technology are the single most important source of change in society" (p. 76).
and owners of industry. Some of the most utopian schemes for human liberation place technology in the driver's seat of history. Even people who resent the very existence of technology, do so because they believe "Technology, above all else, is responsible for the current condition of the world and will control its future development" (Kaczynski, 2010, p. 249). The only way around this predicament for the radical technophile is to "destroy modern technology itself". Even Kaczynski could be described as a technological determinist, albeit a negative one. Thus it is technological determinism which unites the technophile and technophobe because they share a common cultural experience of the technological sublime. "Paired with the sublime is the process of demonization, which also encases its object in a transcendent aura, particularly when it is applied to technology" (Mosco, 2004, p. 24). This is extremely instructive in understanding the bizarre kinship between technophiles and technophobes. In the same breath of demonizing a multinational corporation like Apple for the environmental degradation of its manufacturing process, the radical technophobe, detached from the labor struggles within Apple's various work sites around the world, wraps the company in a "transcendent aura".

So sometimes hippies embraced technological determinism -- So what?, you might say, we all know about the hippies becoming yuppies and selling out to corporate America. Many in the counterculture, Andrew Kirk (2002) points out, "did in fact reject the modern world of large-scale technological systems in favor of a simpler, more primitive, and environmentally-conscious lifestyle" (p. 353). Responding to Kirk, Jones (2006) argues that these two apparently "parallel universes" of the counterculture "are best understood as two sides of the same subculture" that both place technology at the
center of history either to venerate it or demonize it -- something like "a dispute between siblings" (pp. 184-185). Put another way, these two sides of the 1960s counterculture embrace technological determinism and therefore, regardless of what attitude they take on technology, savior or destroyer, people are thought to be rather inconsequential in the grand scheme of things. There are serious political consequences to this view, no matter which side of the subculture has contaminated the future generation (and both have).

"[D]espite its inadequacies", according to Slack and Wise (2007), "technological determinism often organizes the way people understand and act in the relationship between technology and culture" (p. 45).

The appropriate-technology ideology within the 1960s counterculture had a far-reaching influence on future technophiles and technophobes:

In the 1980s, street-level appropriated technology came together with cyberpunk science fiction to make a hacker subculture. ... The most extreme and intentionally shocking technophilic displays in this subculture -- for example, the talk about body implants and bio-hacking and mind uploads -- sounded like drug-culture rhetoric of the sixties, but arguably reflected, as if in a Dadaist funhouse mirror, a deeper, more serious ambivalence about the outer limits of technology (Jones, 2006, p. 182).

Despite the countercultural attitudes of many hackers, they are essentially post-humanist technophiles, looking to liberate digital technologies -- and the information contained in them -- from their bureaucratic and mundane uses (Mosco, 2004). They attack the system in order to liberate it from itself, setting free the true potential of technologies. This optimism about technology, if it was just set free, parallels the socialist view that labor-saving machines would actually save labor from toil once liberated from the imperative for profit. But we know that computer-automated machines are not simply profit-generators, and serve an important disciplinary function at sites of production.
Hackers, when driven by post-humanist tendencies, remain quite naive to questions of social power.

You have to decode what people mean when they describe themselves or others as being against technology. No one is really against technology in an anthropological sense; it is an impossible position to defend unless technology is mythologized as a thing separate from human society worthy of both reverence and fear.

I am going to name neoluddism as a critical, intellectual attitude against technology. This attitude is shared by a wide range of people, from academics and pacifists to anarchists and terrorists. Neoluddism is not simply ideological, as this attitude does correspond to overt political protests and covert acts of property destruction and terror over the past several decades that I will discuss. However, even when this attitude spills over into the streets or is expressed violently by, for example, anarcho-primitivists and radical environmentalists, the chosen targets remain largely symbolic and strangely abstract. Modern civilization or technological society are named by some neoluddites as the target, though apart from total destruction on an apocalyptic scale, it's impossible to imagine what strategy will make sense in achieving these more radical neoluddite goals. On the flip side, liberal and pacifist versions of neoluddism insist that the historical moment for physically destroying machines ended with the defeat of the original Luddites in the early 19th-century. Their vision for neoluddite activism is relegated to gaining some ironic distance from machines by unplugging or thinking critically about technology. These distinct versions of neoluddism share several key features: 1) a desire to return to a mythologized and deified place called 'Nature' (Winner, 1989); 2) a worry about ubiquitous technology that has overrun every aspect of life.
(Winner, 1983); and 3) a conceptualization of technology as sublime, autonomous and deterministic (Slack & Wise, 2007).

The desire to return to nature can be charted across a spectrum from say turning off your television in favor of spending some time outside, say at a park, to imagining the complete collapse of civilization and a return to hunter-gatherer type social groupings. Desires to return to nature are caught up unavoidably in beliefs about technology as ubiquitous, autonomous and deterministic. Why else would people imagine escaping from technology if they didn't believe that their lives were completely controlled by it? New Age and counter-culture visions of nature as a balanced and tranquil place that one should get more in touch with pervade neoluddism. This is an extremely selective view of nature, which has a definite politics attached to it. It leaves out the constantly occurring phenomena in the universe that make human life difficult and threaten to make it impossible. Even the entire nuclear arsenals of all states combined pales in comparison to the prospect of our sun going supernova or the massive black hole at the center of our galaxy. These forces have no intentions or interests, yet their very existence paints a radically different picture of nature as violent and destructive. The problem seems to be in attributing to nature a moral benevolence, not dissimilar to the goodness attached to deities in religious belief systems. Technology and civilization in neoluddite cosmology is evil incarnate, imagined as the antithesis to nature.

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101 See chapter seven in Langdon Winner’s *The Whale and the Reactor* for an excellent discussion of the various ways in which nature has provided political and social theorists a mythologized starting point in order to talk about society and technology.
If technology wasn't imagined as ubiquitous in our daily lives, then it wouldn't seem so suffocating and something from which we need to escape. The strong narrative of progress that pervades in the United States has contributed greatly to feelings of being overrun by some technological monster. One doesn't challenge technological innovation and therefore must accept its consequences, regardless of how historically situated those consequences actually are in decisions that could have been made otherwise in the past. Radical neoluddites possess a profound pessimism about there being any desirable changes to technology short of civilization collapsing that could reduce its ubiquity. Moderate neoluddites share this pessimism, but think they can find small spaces to get fresh air from it in, even if only for a moment -- an appropriate metaphor would be the popular image of one rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic as it sinks (complete with a dramatic, orchestral soundtrack).

Like those passengers who boarded the Titanic in awe of its sublime existence (Slack & Wise, 2007), neoluddites look upon technology as an autonomous thing to gape at for its deterministic power over our lives. It is imagined as something that can be separated from human relations in history, as if technology was at some point in time introduced itself into human history, forever changing us for the worse (Zerzan & Carnes, 1991). Technology isn't a cultural artifact in this view, but an autonomous actor -- though not in the way Bruno Latour (2007) means when he describes the nonhuman actors of a collective. Technology is the thing driving human progress and forcing us to confront ever new situations, pushing us into novel new ages (like the digital age we currently find ourselves in). All that is old has melted away and been made obsolete, unless we discover a way to destroy this terrible machine! This version of history sounds
terribly linear and progressive. And like all linear, progressive visions of history, this one also supposedly ends only with a final apocalyptic battle between good and evil that will hark in a new utopian society. It is noteworthy that only the radical neoluddites are willing to push for this final battle while moderate neoluddites are vacationing in their second homes out in the country. Despite this recognition of difference, I argue that neoluddites of all stripes are doomed by their problematic beliefs about technology. They mythologize the original Luddites through their beliefs about technology, which is why they have such a difficult time carrying on the Luddite legacy.

Some neoluddites discuss today's technological problems as if they are operating in a completely new globalized world that would be completely alien to their 19th-century Luddite predecessors. It is almost like those Luddites in England just couldn't have had the capacity to imagine a larger, global focus for their rage despite the very active processes of colonization, interstate trade, war and revolution during that time. The cleverness of Luddite propaganda and direct actions offers us some insight into their capacity for premeditated organizing. It's hard to imagine Luddites were ignorant of larger political struggles going on at the time. Yet those English workers chose very specific and surgical attacks on the machines introduced into their daily life by industrialists and capitalists. To expand the scale is to move unavoidably into symbolic territory away from direct action tactics and towards abstract, solidarity interventions.

The Luddites weren't in a declared war against the Industrial Revolution as Sale (1995) would have us believe. As great as that sounds as a mobilizing tool, that's not what the Luddites were at war with. They were at war with their bosses, with the owners of machinery, and with government authorities forcibly destroying their customary way
of life. They were at war with the police and with hired thugs helping protect the precious machines they had set about to destroy. They were at war with neighbors who gave them up to authorities. Even if we take all these people together, this still does not amount to being at war with the Industrial Revolution, and especially not with technology in general. As I have hopefully demonstrated above, no one -- in practice -- can really be at war with technology in general, though people are welcome to assume the ideological attitude that they're against technology. This position, I claim, is, however, extremely unhelpful for those looking to attack the disciplinary machines encountered in their daily lives. The belief that we live in a completely novel era where technological innovation has far surpassed our wildest dreams, and has taken root in everything and everywhere, thus necessitating theoretical attitudes to reflect this novelty, hasn't been established except as hyperbole (Doogan, 2009). The reactions to the massive computer networks of today remain almost analogous to those reactions when electricity was introduced into daily life. The same revolutionary language is deployed, yet the respective impacts of each new technology aren't pushing us into revolutionary new territory. As Foucault would say, these innovations are implemented in such a way that social order is maintained. It is not that neoluddite concerns are unfounded, however, the enemy they choose to fight is an apparition, a mythologized monster named technology. They have learned too little from their Luddite predecessors (Jones, 2006).

When authors or activists describe themselves as Luddites, typically the historical army of Ludd is mythologized in such a way so as to fit contemporary struggles against technology neatly into a lineage that harkens back to the early 19th-century. Even when people give very historically accurate accounts of the Luddite uprisings in England
during the early 1800s, the tendency is to write off part of the Luddite tradition as a sign of those former times and no longer applicable today. The dismissal of Luddite tactics, particularly the worker subculture of machine breaking, is pure conjecture based on ideological historiographies. We are never told why workers can no longer destroy specific machines that are being implemented by capitalists and managers. We are simply told that this is no longer possible. If you or I are going to figure out what Luddites would be like today, we would need to be intellectually honest about how they existed in the past. For those interested in simply recruiting the Luddite name and doing bad history -- reading the present into the past rather than seeing the past as precursor to the present -- the Luddites can be domesticated to any struggle or social movement that takes a critical attitude towards technology.

*Against Automation and For Autonomy*

If we had to name the enemy of Luddism in one word it would be automation. Mechanized instruments, or machines, with singular purpose characterize the automated production process. Economically speaking, automation is accompanied by a hierarchical division of labor that gives preference to technicians and engineers alongside work simplification (Noble, 1984), scientific systems of management (Pollard, 1968) and the loss of worker autonomy. In a capitalist society, automation is the substitution of capital for labor: rather than understanding technology as labor saving, it would be more accurate to think of it as *labor condemning*: labor saving considerations are really about cutting production costs and not about providing workers with more free time while maintaining their wages. Despite what apologists for worker displacement claim,
automation is not a "liberation of humanity from unwanted and unnecessary toil" (Noble, 1984, p. 69).

It is crucial to always remember that workers have never simply accepted being replaced by machines. The threat of sabotage has remained a main management concern amid worker militancy, especially in relation to how radical labor actions might affect national security in states of emergency (Noble, 1984). And even if automation gives preference to skilled technicians, the machines are still being run by workers, who at any time could opt for to slowdown production or toss a proverbial monkey-wrench into the machines. Automation and labor struggle uncomfortably walk hand-in-hand.

Beginning especially with the adoption of Frederick Taylor's (1947) scientific principles of management, methods of disciplining work behavior have been a central feature of the practice of modern management (Pollard, 1968). This does not simply mean surveillance or reprimanding poor performance, but writing workers into the sovereignty of the company through participation and partnership schemes (Noble, 1984). This latter method is what Foucault would describe as self-discipline through the internalization of legal and contract languages: obedience is not being maintained through direct disciplinary action, but by the voluntary decision to opt into a system of rigid hierarchy and control.

Property destruction is equated morally with violence, especially in the United States, which I think is part of the explanation for people's limited imagination around interventions against technologies. Complex technological systems are a series of unintended consequences just waiting to happen, but few want to think through the
possibility that actual people would advocate and carry out acts of property destruction
upon machinery in a calculated way with an accompanying *ethical* justification for it.

It is not necessary add ideology or poetry to the actions of the Luddites, they had
their own cultural language and propaganda campaigns that gave meaning to their direct
actions (Jones, 2006, p. 78). Luddism will resist much ideological distortion if we take
the time to appreciate its rich social histories. The Luddites did not want you to join a
union to fight for the working class. They were not crusaders for some leftist political
party. They were not trying to protect and mobilize around some ambiguous thing called
the community. And they definitely were not mounting an offensive against a monster
named technology, or trying to tear down civilization. (Though, interestingly enough, it
may have felt that way to the mill and factory owners being attacked and to the
authorities trying to hunt them down.) I am not claiming that attacks upon the social
order generally are not desirable, I am simply pointing out that those goals do not lead us
to develop good tactics. The Luddites were much more creative in both their tactics and
propaganda than today’s neoluddites. This is partially the case because their goals were
different. Many neoluddites claim that Luddite tactics in the past are relevant only to that
time and historical context. This is something worth considering -- especially reflection
on the prospect of targeted attacks upon machines at worksites in light of the security
measures in place today and the existence of a much more complacent working class
(Noble, 1997). Intellectual and academic neoluddites want to include themselves as heirs
of the Luddites without having to accept property destruction and worksite violence as a
necessary part of that tradition. If the original Luddites are mythologized to be people
who generally resisted technology, then most anyone could be a neoluddite and share in
the feeling of being resistant to the monster named technology. Anarcho-primitivists and radical neoluddites desire to write themselves into the Luddite tradition to give some historical precedence for their actions, to demonstrate that people have long been raging against the machine. Even though I definitely share an affinity with the latter group of neoluddites for their interventions, I cannot help but argue that both moderate and radical neoluddites remain very uncritical of their historical appropriation of Luddism. This is to their mutual detriment. In the former case of moderate neoluddism, the original Luddites are drained of their rebellious and interesting qualities, in the latter case radical neoluddism, Ludd's army loses its penchant for creative propaganda and tactics.

If we cast aside the neoluddite distortions of the Luddite tradition, then the question still remains: What machines would Luddites smash today? The ongoing history of resistance to industrial automation, from slowdowns to sabotage, offers some helpful insights (Noble, 1984), and points us towards labor struggles that confront disciplinary machines head on. Beyond the cases of workplace sabotage that several other commentators have thoroughly documented (Sale, 1995), I am more interested in extending the Luddite imaginary outside the factory walls to offer new ways of seeing the infrastructure of modern cities. Transportation systems, whether canals, ports or highways, are just as important to a market economy as what happens at the point of production on a factory floor. Linebaugh (2012) argues that Luddite insurrections were responses not only to the introduction of new machinery into the production process, but also to the enclosure of the commons: the destruction of shared spaces, “complex kin patterns, forms of mutuality, and customs” (p.13). He continues by noting that the “expropriation from the commons and the mechanization of labor worked upon each
other as in a feedback loop” (ibid). Important to consider, the Luddites even made use of common land to run training exercises in preparation for their nighttime raids (Navickas, 2011). As autonomous spaces and practices become folded into the social order, they are simplified and made legible, rooting out the most rebellious and delinquent parts. While the Luddites most notorious actions were directed against automated machines, factories and company owners, it is impossible to ignore that they also came into conflict with the British military, hired security officers and enclosed landscapes during some attacks. Had their uprising not been crushed within but a few years’ time, the Luddites would have had to contend with being swallowed up into massive urban social orders, spaces that have now become thoroughly riddled with their own automated systems – layered, networked and integrated into work, discipline and domestication. The ongoing process of mechanization and expropriation in cities is revealed and judged in a very particular way through a Luddite imaginary: as an (anthropomorphic) assemblage of techniques and infrastructures to be sabotaged. The technologies targeted are always intentional: those “hurtful to commonality”. Mutuality though is as much about support as it is about the way it offers individuals autonomy to pursue their own lives. Collectivists, just as much as capitalists, feed off of the remains of eroded patterns of local kinship. It is as much a mistake to reduce the commons to a collective as it is the reduce Luddism to a worker struggle at the point of production. The Luddite imaginary then, seeks to preserve local forms of mutuality by sabotaging the interrelated processes of mechanization and expropriation that threaten to erode them.
If social order in the city is maintained by its three pillars: disciplinary mechanisms, the legal/juridical and security apparatuses (Foucault, 2007), then people living in cities will first need to steal back their lives from the keepers of order, doing so, of course, without asking permission (Landstreicher, 2009). The administrators of social orders are invested with a moral legitimacy that is completely arbitrary. To disavow authority of its moral legitimacy is an extremely important step for each individual city dweller as they plot their tactics and seek to circumvent legal/juridical structures embodied in disciplinary machines and surveillance networks. This disavowal of moral legitimacy throws the first of many figurative and actual monkey wrenches into the strategic plans made by the administrators and managers of our lives. Plans can be applied smoothly across large urban spaces when “a prostate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist” compliments authoritarian and high-modernist impulses (Scott, 1998). Le Corbusier desired the death of the streets, and city planners and police, alongside national and international investment and development corporations, have attempted to heed his call. Let's return life to the streets, one moment at a time, and without shame. The emphasis on shamelessness is an important one. The most audacious people I have had the pleasure of fighting alongside have deliberately rejected that people in positions of authority have a special moral claim embedded in their demands for law, order, peace or calm. Absent the transcendental power of the legal/juridical pillar that comes from the weight of morality, the assemblage of disciplinary mechanisms and security apparatuses are laid bare both as targets of sabotage and as things to elude.
I’d like to offer a few examples of what people get up to when in cities when, for instance, the sanctity of private and public property is rejected as holding any special moral value. How are the disciplinary mechanisms and security apparatuses of social order in cities seen when stripped of legal/juridical support? When the law no longer functions as an impediment to action through the abstract, moral duty to obey it, social orders must then rely upon active policing. The law is really only as good as its enforcement. This is not to minimize or downplay the regimes of terror that are contemporary police departments, and their ongoing campaigns against the most oppressed and subordinated individuals in society. But without their façade of “serve and protect”, they become seen for what they truly are: our enemies in a perpetual social war for survival. And most of the time, that means avoiding them at all cost.

Ahead of the European Police Congress in Berlin, Germany back in 2013, an anonymous group of anarchists called for widespread participation in an urban game called “Camover”, the goal of which was to score points by destroying or disabling CCTV (closed-circuit television) cameras. The more difficult the target, or the more creative the act of sabotage, the more points one would accrue. Thus, instead of surveillance cameras throughout urban spaces being constant reminders to modify behavior because someone may be watching, anarchists in Germany encouraged people to see these parts of the security apparatus as targets. The added layer of gaming re-centering the importance of jouissance in rebellion, in contrast to the often sad, work-oriented militancy of leftism. Sabotage can be a joy. In several videos circulated on social media, small masked groups can be seen smashing or spray-painting over easily accessible cameras on public transit, and for more difficult to reach cameras, make-shift
grappling hooks are seen being used to snag and pull them crashing down to the street from second-story heights. An easily replicable tactic that makes the city less legible.

_Becoming Monsters_

The concluding section of academic projects and manuscripts tend to look forward to future research and offer suggestions that emerge in light of what has been explored. Given that much of what I’ve said above has been critical of people who make plans, and the desires that animate the making of plans, especially the largescale, social engineering ones, any of the tactics I’ve celebrated or pointed to are merely ways of _making do_, to invoke Michel de Certeau here one final time. “While anarchists are growing in number” in various places around the world, we aren’t everywhere, and in relation to other so-called radical tendencies, “we are rare” (anonymous, 2011, p.8). Part of my story has been about how I became an anarchist, but none of what I’ve offered should be taken as a “how to” guide. Instead, my suggestion would be to perpetually distrust such step-by-step programs, especially those framed by utopian impulses to re-shape the world. Anarchists are not going to be the progenitors of a new society in the shell of the old (anonymous, 2011). Perhaps we can be done with those optimistic bumper sticker slogans, and instead consider attitudes that engender more thoughtful ways of surviving (de Acosta, 2014). According to de Acosta (2014),

Another way to put this is that if our rejection of society and state is as complete as we like to say it is, our project is not to create alternative micro-societies (scenes, milieus) that people can belong to, but something along the lines of becoming monsters. It is probable that anarchy has always had something to do with becoming monstrous. The monster, writes [Eugene] Thacker in another of his books, is _unlawful life_, or _what cannot be controlled_ (p.285).
This isn’t suggested as yet another anarcho-this or anarcho-that sub-grouping, but as a serious contemplation of what it would be like to live as a nameless, unthinkable thing. If I were to think this through my involvement at OP, I would reflect upon how my participation in a social movement doesn’t require my allegiance or adherence to it. But most anarchists would likely say that. To go a bit further then, would be to reject any sense of pride or notoriety in one’s acts of resistance or rebellion. Would this mean even abandoning the art of the anonymous communique? In what ways does propagandizing somewhere that a person or group claims a certain act of sabotage or destruction, for this or that set of reasons, attempt to reconstruct a particular identity? Why try and make an act legible and understandable through a specific framework? This urge reminds me very much of the tendency within horror films to eventually relieve tensions by resolving plots, particularly through the revelation of what – by making it a ‘who’ – the monster is. While the common trope of masking monsters is used in horror films to unsettle and refuse connection to a face, masks still point towards a face that might be revealed. It is in the unknown that our minds are left to wander, confronting both endless anxiety with an inhospitable, indifferent planet (Thacker, 2011) and with ourselves. Unlawful life has no particular form, and you only come to know it through its refusals.
REFERENCES


Miller, S. (2013). The President and the Assassin: McKinley, Terror, and Empire at the


Kingian Nonviolence: Overview and Resources

Six Principles of Kingian Nonviolence
1. Nonviolence is a way of life for courageous people: Nonviolence is a weapon for people with strength of character who wage combat with moral and spiritual forces.
2. The Beloved Community is the framework for the future: The goal is not to humiliate the opponent but to win the opponent over to a new view and new pattern of behavior. Every human-being can contribute to change.
3. Attack forces of evil, not persons doing evil: The Nonviolence approach helps one analyze the fundamental conditions, policies and practices of the conflict rather than reacting to one’s opponents or their personalities.
4. Accept suffering without retaliation for the sake of the cause to achieve the goal: Willingness to endure hardship for a clearly defined cause can have an impact on the oppressor as well as on the larger community.
5. Avoid internal violence of the spirit as well as external physical violence: Our actions and the extent to which we practice the philosophy of nonviolence are dictated by our attitudes, which in turn are communicated through our actions.
6. The Universe is on the side of justice: Human society is oriented to a just sense of order in the universe. Nonviolence is in tune with this concept, and the movement must strike this chord in society.

Six Steps of Kingian Nonviolence
1. Information gathering: Becoming attuned to all the cultural, political and economic factors that influence the opponent’s behavior will increase your ability to develop a strategically effective action.
2. Education: Raise the level of understanding of the problem so that proposed solutions are logical and supportive.
3. Personal Commitment: Involves self-examining all the ways that one may have helped perpetuate an unjust situation or where one has failed to use nonviolence analysis.
4. Negotiation: Preparation for negotiation includes a thorough understanding of all sides of an issue and the possible alternatives for making a persuasive argument.
5. Direct Action: Firstly, to take responsibility to intervene in an unjust situation and second, to take direct action having concluded that negotiation has failed to resolve the problem.
6. Reconciliation: The goal of the movement is a reconciled world. Thus so that opponents and proponents can move together to tackle larger issues.

Types of Conflict
Pathway: Same overall goals, different methods for reaching them.
Mutually Exclusive: Different goals, choose to functions together
Distributive: Not enough resources for everyone (often a perception, not a reality)
Value: Different values, different vision

Levels of Conflict
Normal: Occurs as a result of normal daily life pressures. Action needed: Prevention
Pervasive: Atmosphere charged with tension and emotion: Action needed: Intervention
Overt: Conflict in full bloom. Action needed: Management


www.phoenixnonviolence.org

Received directly from Kingian nonviolence trainer at Occupy Phoenix during violence/nonviolence teach-in/debate.
APPENDIX B

PLEDGES OF NONVIOLENCE HANDOUT
Pledges of Nonviolence

From commitment cards used during the 1963 Birmingham Movement (slightly edited)

1. Remember always that the nonviolent movement seeks justice and reconciliation—not victory.
2. Walk and talk in the manner of love.
3. Think daily on the importance of dedicating one's life so that all people may be free.
4. Sacrifice personal wishes in order that all people might be free.
5. Observe with both friend and foe the ordinary rules of courtesy.
6. Seek to perform regular service for others and for the world.
7. Refrain from the violence of fist, tongue, or heart.
8. Strive to be in good mental, spiritual and bodily health.

From Veterans for Peace (slightly edited)

1. We will use our anger at injustice as a positive, nonviolent force for change.
2. We will not carry weapons of any kind.
3. We will not vandalize or destroy property.
4. We will not use or carry alcohol or illegal drugs during a nonviolent action.
5. We will not run or make threatening motions.
6. We will not insult, swear or attack others.
7. We will protect those who oppose or disagree with us from insult or attack.
8. We will not assault, verbally or physically, those who oppose or disagree with us, even if they assault us.
9. Our attitude, as conveyed through our words, symbols and actions, will be one of openness, friendliness, and respect toward all people we encounter including police officers, military personnel, members of the community at large, and all marchers.
10. As members of a nonviolent action, we will follow the directions of the designated coordinators.
11. In the event of a serious disagreement, we will withdraw from the action.

"Nonviolence is a powerful and just weapon. Which cuts without wounding and ennobles the man who wields it. It is a sword that heals."—Martin Luther King

"Nonviolence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind. It is mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of man."—Mohandas Gandhi

"Nonviolence is not inaction. It is not discussion. It is not for the timid or weak, nonviolence is hard work. It is the willingness to sacrifice. It is the patience to win."—Cesar Chavez

"You may retaliate against us with all the forces of hatred, but we will in turn respond with all the forces of love, and we will wear you down."—Martin Luther King

Suggested Readings:
Letter From Birmingham Jail, by Dr. Martin Luther King (available online)
Pilgrimage to Nonviolence, by Dr. Martin Luther King (available online)

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Received directly from Kingian nonviolence trainer at Occupy Phoenix during violence/nonviolence teach-in/debate.