Heterotopias of Power
Miners, Mapuche, and Soldiers in the Production of the Utopian Chile
by
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ABSTRACT

Drawing from Foucault's notion of heterotopias, my dissertation identifies and examines three distinct but related events that resignified (re-imagined) Chile during 2010, the year of its Bicentenary, namely: the Rescue of the 33 Miners trapped in the San José mine, the Chilean Military Parade performed in celebration of Chilean Independence, and the Mapuche Hunger Strike of 32 indigenous people accused of terrorism by the Chilean State. My central hypothesis states that these three events constitute heterotopias with strong performative components that, by enacting a utopian and a dystopian nation, denounce the flaws of Chilean society. I understand heterotopias as those recursive systems that invert, perfect or contest the society they mirror. In other words: heterotopias are discursive constructions and material manifestations of social relations that dispute, support, or distort cultural assumptions, structures, and practices currently operating in the representational spaces of a given society.

In addition to following the six heterotopological principles formulated by Foucault, these case studies have performance as the central constituent that defines their specificity and brings the heterotopias into existence. Due to the performative nature of these heterotopias, I have come to call them performance heterotopias, that is, sets of behaviors that enact utopias in the historical world, the place in which we live, the site in which “the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs,” as Foucault puts it. Here, performance would act as the interface, the point of interaction, and suture between the conceived, the perceived and the representational spaces each heterotopia articulates. Thus, a performance
A relevant aspect that emerged from my research is that heterotopic places not only mirror, contest, and compensate their own host society, but also refer to, and intersect with other contemporaneous heterotopias enacted in that society. In my conclusion I suggest that such interactions also happen between heterotopias that emerge in different countries and cultures. If so, the mapping of utopias enacted in the macro socio geographies of Latin American countries could offer new perspectives to understand the sociopolitical processes that are underway in the region.
DEDICATION

To my wife Liliana and my adorable daughter Mariana.
Para mi querida esposa Liliana y mi adorable hija Mariana.

A mis padres Néstor Alberto Bravo y Nelly Goldsmith.
Para mis suegros Mirna Ducommun y Alex Salazar.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

I saw the Aleph from every point and angle, and in the Aleph I saw the earth and in the earth the Aleph and in the Aleph the earth; I saw my own face and my own bowels; I saw your face [...] a point where all points converge [...] where all places are [...] and whose center is everywhere and circumference is nowhere.

(“The Aleph,” Jorge Luis Borges)

Introduction

Drawing from Foucault’s notion of heterotopias—those real sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of society (Foucault 24)—my dissertation identifies and examines three distinct but related events that resignified (re-imagined) Chile during 2010, the year of its Bicentenary, namely: the Rescue of the 33 Miners trapped in the San José mine, the Chilean Military Parade (MP) performed in celebration of the Chilean Independence, and the Mapuche Hunger Strike of 32 indigenous people accused of terrorism by the Chilean State.

My central hypothesis states that these three events constitute heterotopias with strong performative components that, by enacting a utopian and a dystopian nation, present a perfected, deceptive, or critical version of Chilean society in a specific historical moment. Thus, the Chilean Military Parade is not an accurate reflection of reality, but a constructed, convenient representation of “reality,” staged according to the ideological agenda of the government in place.
Subsequently, the MP produces and presents to its audience the Chile that could be as if it already were. The Hunger Strike in turn, articulates a heterotopia of deviance that demonstrates the extremes of the situation of oppression the Mapuche are actually experiencing in their communities, and makes it visible for a national and international audience. Accordingly, this enacted dystopia reflects the nation as it is, while fostering a nation as it should be, at least according to movements for indigenous autonomy in Chile. Finally, the San José heterotopia enacts a utopian Chile through Camp Hope, which was an ideal and transitory “city-state,” conceived, and produced by its own political authorities as a place where incompatible political, ideological, and socioeconomic systems and views are harmonized in a way that is not seen in the everyday Chile.

My research is also an attempt to test and further the notion of heterotopias that Foucault schematically formulated in a lecture he gave in March 1967, and that later was published by the French journal Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuite in October, 1984 as “Of Other Spaces.” There, Foucault formulated the idea that in any given society it is possible to find places that resignify structures that can be found in the larger system of that society. He defined heterotopias as:

[…] real places - places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society - which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented,
contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. (24)

Heterotopias would be then regarded as recursive subsystems within a larger social space, which although still keeping a relation to their original model, they invert, perfect or contest their source. In other words, heterotopias are constructions and material manifestations of social relations that dispute cultural assumptions, structures, and practices currently operating in representational spaces of a given society.

Using Henri Lefebvre’s triad model implied in the social production of space, heterotopias also can be understood as utopian conceived spaces that are materialized into representational spaces. According to Lefebvre, when human interactions bridge a perceived space (the material space, “real” space that is perceived through the senses) and a conceived space (the imagined space), it gives birth to a representational space; a space that is “directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’…” (Lefebvre 39). This lived space is then relationally constructed, and therefore it cannot be reduced to either of the former separate conceptions. So conceived, the space would be a social construct where the social is spatially constructed (Massey 3). Accordingly, conceived spaces that reach their materialization in the three dimensional perceived space, become “lived spaces” when experienced by human beings in the practice of their everyday life. If these conceived spaces remain in the realm of the imagination, or stay expressed as representations of space, then they could be categorized as sites with no real
place,¹ and therefore sites where the exercise of power cannot take place. Foucault calls these unreal spaces, “utopias,” which he describes as “sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of Society” (Foucault 24) but that, ultimately, are “unreal spaces.” When actually enacted, however, those utopian spaces come to constitute distinctive real and localizable places that have the quality of representing, contesting or inverting “all the other real sites that can be found within the culture” (Idem). In contrast to utopias, Foucault calls these distinctive sites “heterotopias,” which as any other real social space would be lived through performance and be implicated in questions of power.

**Performance Heterotopias**

Lefebvre entangles the concept of performance with his notion of representational space when he states that the theatrical space (which is representational) implies “a representation of space –scenic space–corresponding to a particular conception of space” (188, italics in the original), that is actually materialized through performance: “The representational space, mediated yet directly experienced, which infuses the work and the moment, is established as such through the dramatic action itself” (Idem). Now, if the representational space is produced through the dramatic action itself, heterotopias, which are themselves

¹. Whereas Giddens differentiates between “space” and “place” in terms of absence-presence, defining the first as the site that fosters “relations between “absent” others, locationally distant from any given situations of face-to-face interaction” (18), and the second as “the physical setting of social activity as situated geographically” (Idem), Foucault, in the context of his essay “Of Other Spaces,” uses the terms “space” and “place” as interchangeable, and so I do.
representational systems within grand representational spaces, should be also produced through performance.

Foucault addresses the role of performance in the production of heterotopias when he illustrates, for example, the third heterotopic principle, which is the capability of any heterotopia of “juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (25). There, Foucault illustrates this property with theatre, which he says “brings onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole series of places that are foreign to one another” (Idem). Since the basic way theatre juxtaposes and weaves a polyphony of sites on stage is through performance, then performance should constitute the building blocks that structure heterotopias. If so, heterotopias can be studied as performance, and although they could be, for the sake of differentiation, framed or defined as being cultural performances, social performances, or social dramas, I maintain that in the society of spectacle none of them fail in presenting, to some extent, self-conscious acts delivered to a self-conscious audience, as any cultural performance does. This axiom is especially true in the three heterotopias under analysis, as all of them are framed within spatio-temporal occurrences where human interactions take place. More specifically, and following Milton Singer’s characterization of cultural performances, my three case studies possess a “limited time span, a beginning and an end, and organized program of activity, a set of performers, an audience, and a place and occasion” (xiii). Also, these heterotopias satisfy another key characteristic shared by any performance, which is that all of them have previously been rehearsed or performed, either partially or in their
entirety (Schechner). The most evident case is, of course, the Chilean Military Parade, which is a cultural performance staged annually following a (conceived) script that minutely prescribes what should happen in front of the audience. But it is also applicable for Camp Hope and the Mapuche hunger strike; social dramas that not only followed the four phase structure of social dramas described by Victor Turner –breach, crisis, redressive action, and re-integration– but also were structured to entice the gaze and the ear of a virtual “spect-audience” that witnessed the event through the media. In Camp Hope the government authorities, direct family members, rescue teams, and the miners were all conscious performers performing for the cameras, which were broadcasting the event live or deferred, 24 hours a day. The strikers also wanted their actions to be perceived by a national audience and catch its attention, and although they were unable to personally reach the gaze of the audience, they did it through surrogates² that staged protests in the streets or mirrored their behavior by fasting themselves in support and solidarity of the strikers.

Performance studies regards and validates performative structures as not only a set of iterative behaviors that, when analyzed, can shed light on their producers, but also as a lens, a metaphor, and a theoretical model to understand sociocultural patterns. As the three sites I will analyze encompass a polyphony of collective and individual embodied practices, actions and behaviors characterized as being ephemeral, previously rehearsed, and deliberately (consciously) or

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² These surrogates were other Mapuche activists, families of the strikers, and other citizens who performed public actions on behalf of the Mapuche prisoners,
unintentionally (unconsciously) displayed (Schechner), the events contain, subvert or perfect the sociocultural environment that shelters it. Thus, these three heterotopias could be regarded as both “embodied praxis and episteme” and “as a way of knowing as well as a way of storing and transmitting cultural knowledge and identity” (Taylor 17). My three case studies intersect in many ways as they evolved synchronically in a cultural setting marked by the Chilean Bicentenary. They directly or indirectly create trialectical conversations with each other that illuminate and even helped to shape the other, and ultimately share the same performative three-fold functions, which were: to mark or change identity, to make or foster a particular imagined national community, and to persuade or convince a national audience, certain performers or government authorities of an ideological project (Schechner 38). Thus, while the Chilean government touted a homogeneous and horizontal imagined community (Anderson) through Camp Hope and the MP, the strikers talked about autonomy for the Mapuche people, and imagined a tolerant nation with two related but independent peoples. While the MP portrayed the Mapuche as an assimilated and dispersed people, and Camp Hope attempted to tout the idea of a solidary and peaceful country, violence pervaded the Mapuche land, and Mapuche activists were incarcerated, invisibilized and abandoned to their fate. And even though these three heterotopias were enacted in three different places, they came together in the media and through the media. Hence one day it was possible to see a picture of the miners in the upper part of the main page of a mainstream newspaper and another of the Mapuche protestors being violently repressed by special police
forces in the lower part of the same page. In the videosphere, the media became the site for juxtapositions, for the deconstruction of the binary of Mapuche/soldiers and miners/hunger strikers. In this sense, the media became the site in which the three heterotopias were performed over and over again. Thus, the events were re-performed, for example, in the semiological space of a picture, the page number where it was posted, the prestige of the author, and the adjectives attached to the events: hope, faith, and courage for the miners; violence, terrorism, and illegality, for the Mapuche; honor, patriotism, and loyalty for the marching soldiers.

Another analytical gain by approaching these three heterotopias as performances is the contextualization and understanding of past *scenarios* these enacted utopias recall, recount, or reactivate in their specific locations (Taylor 29). The scenarios of war, conquest, and battles recalled during the MP not only include victories against foreign armies, but also against the very citizens of the same country the soldiers had sworn to protect. The scenario, for example, of the so-called “Pacification of the Araucanía” was a genocidal action perpetrated by the army at the end of the 19th century against the Mapuche people, who were Chilean citizens. Today, scenarios of repression have been reactivated through the Antiterrorist Law applied against Mapuche activists. By not derogating the Antiterrorist Law, created to defend the Pinochet regime against the internal enemy, the democratic government left the door open to reiterate the past they

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3 The new Chilean State gave, unilaterally, the status of Chilean citizens to the Mapuche soon after obtaining independence from Spain.
swore would never happen again. Thus, a document signed by Pinochet on May 16, 1984, allowed, 26 years later, the same dictatorial practices to happen again, dramatically demonstrating that the archive engendered the repertoire as much as the repertoire produced the archive (Taylor).\(^4\)

Finally, the theoretical matrix I am proposing for my study also includes the notion of gender as a category produced through performance, so that it cannot be understood outside a process of iterativity (Butler). This concept is key to understanding the operation of imagining the nation that these three sites articulate. If gender identity is something that individuals achieve (Higate), then the construction of nationhood—that imagined political community of individuals—necessarily entails specific notions of manhood and womanhood (Yuval-Davis, Hall).\(^5\) Therefore, gender and nation must converge in the matrix not as

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\(^4\) Diana Taylor, after recognizing that the archive and the repertoire “exist in a constant state of interaction” (21), uses the terms “archive” (the set of stored documents, maps, literary texts, letters and other items “supposedly resistant to change”), and “repertoire” (the system of embodied memories through actions, or human behaviors that are not reducible to language) (28) in the context of her critique of the tendency scholars have to privilege archival informational sources over ephemeral living memories. Taylor thinks of these embodied expressions as an important and unique way people produce and transmit cultural knowledge, as well as invaluable informational sources (24).

\(^5\) When theorizing on gender and nation as interrelated categories I am drawing from both Nira Yuval-Davis, and Stuart Hall. Yuval-Davis’s relational model analyses of how the construction of nationhood involves “specific notions of both ‘manhood’ and ‘womanhood’”(1). The interplay between gender and national identities will also be informed by Stuart Hall’s 1996 key essay “Who needs ‘Identity’?” compiled in his book Questions of Cultural Identity. There, he states that “identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks…[that identities] can be constructed.” (4)
independent, but as interrelated categories (Connell). If the former premise is correct, then hegemonic military masculinities, for example—and the gender order they prescribe and reinforce—would play a role in the process of imagining—constructing—the Chilean nation where the ideology of a hegemonic masculinity prevails. The same operation must be at work in the conceptions of national identities that the Camp Hope and the Mapuche heterotopias enact.

Heterotopias of Power

Since human interactions cannot take place outside space (a notion that is complicated by virtual reality), understanding the way in which human activity is enacted in space is crucial to the analysis of social and cultural life, and to the ways in which power is manifested in society (Giddens). Since space “is fundamental in any form of communal life,” as Foucault states, then “space is fundamental in any exercise of power” (Foucault qtd. in Mahon 30). Consequently, both institutional power and discursive power will ultimately be exercised and performed spatially.

As with all social constructions, heterotopias are constituted in and through relations of power that, ultimately, are exercised and reified spatially through performance. In my three case studies the Chilean State played a pivotal role in constraining and enabling social actions which were enacted and expressed through space. The hunger strike emerged in a scenario where apparently two antagonist geopolitical perspectives were in play. While the state regards the Mapuche as assimilated Chilean citizens in an integrated national territory, the Mapuche see themselves as different people who demand the right to exercise
control over their own political institutions, land and economic development within the framework of the State. Even though the Chilean State has ratified the Convention 169 that granted those rights, in practice the State still opposes abiding by the Convention, and insists on exerting colonialist practices and the use of coercive force and the legal system to stop Mapuche revindications. To the Mapuche protests the State has responded with repression and the incarceration of Mapuche leaders through invoking Pinochet’s Antiterrorist Law. In that scenario, the hunger strike functions as a metaphor of the historical displacement and confinement into reductions of the Mapuche people as a whole.

In contrast, the San José heterotopia was produced by a combination of coercion and consent. First, the government imposed its authority by taking over the rescue operation and removing the San Sebastián Company, the owner of the San José mine, from any participation in the rescue process. Second, the government established a new order based on technocratic and political procedures that ended up being docilely accepted and celebrated by not only the direct participants in the event, such as the miner’s families, but also by all sectors of the citizenry. It was in this climate of total consent that the San José heterotopia was materialized through Campamento Esperanza (Camp Hope), a perfect little village, a mediatized hamlet emplaced in the Atacama Desert, whose territory was dramatically extended by broadcasting an idealized Chile, 24 hours a day, to the world.

Whereas ideological state apparatuses regard human individuals as subjects endowed with agency and distinctive personal identities, repressive state
apparatuses mold individuals to match their behaviors as a homogenized entity (Althusser). The Military Parade is the public spectacle Chilean society provides to demonstrate, once a year, that when interpellated by the superior political authority of the country, the soldiers will respond, in unison, with unconditional subjection to the voice of command. This ceremony is meant to give proof to the citizens that institutions that specialize in violence will act in favor of the ruling class when required. Such a function became crucial for the four centre-left democratic governments Chile had after the Pinochet regime\(^6\), and at least until 2010 when a right-wing coalition, usually supported by the militaries, won the presidential elections. As a heterotopia of power, the MP displays the instruments of coercion and violence to a national audience that attends or follows the event on TV. Conveniently, the MP offers an instance where the Government and Armed Forces and Order shake hands and show their unity while the common citizen passively watches. Most importantly, the MP provides a space where Chile is performed as having a united and harmonic society. In that sense, the event functions as a space of illusion where sites that are in the “external” world incompatible, here are put together without clashing or conflicting. That is the case of, for example, the Mapuches, which in the context of the MP are presented as docile and assimilated Chilean citizens paying tribute to the civil authorities.

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\(^6\) The 1973 Chilean coup d'état was performed on September 11, just eight days before the Military Parade would take place. There were several strategic and political reasons why the leaders of the coup decided to overthrow Allende’s government that day, but the fact that Pinochet would have had to be present in the event, sharing the dais with President Allende himself and publicly demonstrate his allegiance to him, was an important factor.
and militaries while, in sharp contrast, in the southern part of the country the Mapuche are repressed and their territories militarized. In sum, the MP heterotopia is an illusory, deceptive place where the Armed Forces and the Police are presented as guarantors of peace and order, and fully integrated in Chilean society, even though they actually serve as an instrument of repression and brutality in the hands of the state and the government in place.

**Finding Heterotopias**

Foucault hypothesized that there is no single culture in the world that fails to constitute heterotopias (24). Perhaps a good way to check such a hypothesis is using an inductive approach by searching for these atypical social spaces in your own surroundings, the places you live in. So, I began to look around in Arizona where I have lived since 2006, and I found some that, at first glance, seem to satisfy heterotopic principles: the border gateway of Nogales if we encompass the environs of both sides of the border regulated by US-Mexican checkpoints, and the checkpoints themselves. The Mormon Temple located in the city of Mesa, sets apart for religious ceremonies, rituals and proxy work that link the living to the dead; the Casino of Arizona where the notions of day and night do not make sense; and, of course, the ASU Tempe campus, this glocal village, this space of transit where while I am accomplishing the manifest purpose of studying the field of Performance Studies, which also kept me out of the job market (and thus helping to reduce the rate of unemployment in my own country, Chile). Then I turned to my country, and quickly several spaces came to my mind, although this time accompanied by a sense of certainty of one who has played in that society
not as a visitor, but as a local. The Grand Chilean Military Parade was one of them.

I had been interested in the Chilean Military Parade for a while because I thought it provided a unique lens to look not only at the process of construction, promotion, and maintenance of hegemonic notions of gender and nation in contemporary Chile, but also because it elicited a plethora of historical and sociopolitical commentaries. The MP allows me to study the interaction of dissimilar sites and protagonists the event reunites, at once in one place: the political ruling class, the ruled class, especially members of the working class, millions of viewers that follow the event in their TV sets, indigenous groups that perform themselves paying tribute to the authorities, peasants performed by ABC1 citizens, and of course, the soldiers – who are cast as the true progenitors of the Chilean nation. The sense that a kind of micro version of Chile was somehow performed in the event haunted me for a while, and I thought that perhaps Borges’s fantastic notion of the Aleph expressed well such an idea: “…a point where all points converge […] where all places are […] and whose center is everywhere and circumference is nowhere” (Borges).

Then the collapse of the San José mine came about and a town with peculiar characteristics suddenly flourished in the Chilean desert; a village that even though was built around a tragic event, ended up performing and touting to those who wanted to watch a utopian version of the country. And then, the

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7 According to the socioeconomic segmentation adopted in Chile, the initials ABC1 classify upper class individuals.
Mapuche hunger strike began to break the walls of misinformation, disinformation, and silence that the government shed over the protest; thus, a counter heterotopia began to be visible. The hunger strike had begun two weeks before the mine collapsed, but few were informed of the protest, the reasons behind it and its purpose. As the fasting progressed, the strike began to morph into a symbol of the historical Mapuche struggle over their ancestral lands and the prison where the protesters were held became to signify the repressive state; while the body became the site of resistance. No few were able to realize the ethical contradiction of a nation that on one hand was investing millions of dollars in rescuing 33 miners, and on the other was leaving 32 Mapuches to die. If the San José heterotopia, by enacting a utopian nation, denounced the precarious conditions of the actual Chile, its juxtaposition against the Mapuche strike revealed the hypocrisy of the political authorities and the crisis of the political and legal system in regards to giving back what belongs to the Mapuche people.

I was dialectically thinking about these two opposite sites, and trying to triangulate them with Borges’ text, when I came across the ideas of the socio geographer Edward Soja, who was linking his Thirdspace theory to Borges’ “The Aleph” and Foucault’s Heterotopias. The finding gave me the necessary insight and encouragement to attempt to test these three sites as they were heterotopias, or better -- as performance heterotopias, as all they were all charged with theatricality, performativity and dramaturgy. Finally, it was in a discussion with my dissertation chair, Tamara Underiner that I closed the gestalt between
Foucault’s Heterotopologies, Borges’ Aleph, performance theory, and the social phenomena I was about to analyze.

**Heterotopologies**

Interestingly, Foucault himself, who was interested in Borges’ work and cites it in several of his books, had already linked Borges’ utopias to his notion of heterotopias. Foucault, in his book *The Order of Things*, published in 1966, a year before his lecture of “Of Other Spaces,” states:

> Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold, they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical. *Heterotopias* are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names.[…] This is why utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; *heterotopias (such as those to be found so often in Borges’ work)* desiccate speech, stop words in their track, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences. (xviii, Italics added)

Foucault’s notion of real enacted utopias seems to have been inspired by the reading of Borges’ “The Aleph”, and another short story “The House of
Asterion,\(^8\) where the author again defines a pluridimensional place, a place that recursively contains all places:

Each part of the house repeats many times, any particular place is another place. There is not one cistern, courtyard, drinking fountain, manger; there are fourteen (infinite) mangers, drinking fountains, courtyards, cisterns. The house is the size of the world; better said, it is the world (“The House”)

The value of Foucault’s theory is that he realized that those utopian places described by Borges could be found, enacted, in the social space of society.

Moving forward, he identified some cases and elaborated upon a “systematic description,” a six-principle matrix for inquiry that he called heterotopologies. I am using heterotopologies as my central methodology to identify, describe and analyze the three case studies of my dissertation. In this respect, the premise is simple: any system that satisfies the heterotopic principles will constitute a heterotopia.

Briefly, and according to Heterotopologies, heterotopias are characterized by six principles: 1) They are ubiquitous and contingent to any culture 2) they are historically contingent as they function according to society’s needs; 3) they have the capacity to juxtapose in a single space a plurality of other places (even incompatible sites) found in society; 4) they exist synchronically but they have the capacity to overlap other (historical) moments in time; the past and a possible

\(^8\) In “The House of Asterion” (1949) Borges presents the monologue of Asterion (probable the Minotaur himself), who lives in a house with an infinite number of open doors (the labyrinth), and that is like no other on the face of the Earth.
future are represented in the present; 5) they regulate the access into the system; and 6) they either enact an utopian version of society, a dystopian one, or enact a deceiving version of reality. (Foucault 24-27)

Types of Heterotopias

Along with these six principles, Foucault identifies several types of heterotopias that can be found in contemporary societies. First, there are *Heterotopias of deviation*; places in which individuals whose behavior are deviant from established standards of behavior or required norms are placed. Transgressors of some societal norms are removed from society, and forcefully deterritorialized from their original place to be reterritorialized in another. These other places could be prisons, psychiatric hospitals, or even another country where an individual is cast out for reasons of State. During Pinochet’s regime the government, with incredible sophistication, produced several of these sites where political enemies were placed: hundreds of torture and detention centers outside the judicial system, islands, clinics, colonies, and navy ships. Today, a new place for individuals whose behaviors are deviant from required norms has emerged: Catholic retirement homes where priests accused of pedophilia are sent to dedicate their life “to prayer and penitence,” while removed from their religious work in the community. Also, with the declared “war against delinquents” the current government is “fighting,” public prisons have become the preferred sites of reclusion for citizens regardless of the seriousness and category of the offense. Thus, a young man who was caught selling pirated DVDs in the street could be sent to the same prison, and share the same cell with a rapist. Prisons are the
heterotopic place where Mapuche activists were placed for 18 months of “preventive detentions,” and where the hunger strike took place in 2010. Second, there are heterotopias linked to the accumulation of time, archival heterotopias like museums and libraries which “enclose in one place all times, all epochs, all forms, all tastes, the idea of constituting a place of all times that is itself outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages” (26).

Opposite to these archival places, are what Foucault calls temporal heterotopias or chroniques (Idem), which are characterized for being transitory events in the mode of festivals and fairs. The Military Parade, and its yearly staging, fits into this category whereas Camp Hope and the hunger strike are ephemeral one-time-only events. Nevertheless, their transitory nature does not prevent them from also constituting a place where the accumulation of time is manifested. In some way, the MP acts as a living museum that abolishes time through the reenactment of traditional military narratives, historical characters, emblems, and music. The same can be said for the Mapuche hunger strike, which signifies and compresses in one act the ancestral resistance against colonialist powers and the Chilean State. Camp Hope is another example, wherein millennial religious symbols and a long history of tragedies mix with contemporary commercial iconography, rhetorical tones and nationalistic discourses of unity that are iterations of presidential messages already heard in the mouth of past presidents and numerous authorities.

Finally, there are heterotopias of illusion (26), and heterotopias of compensation (27). The first masks and perverts a basic reality (Baudrillard 368),
like the MP does when presenting the Mapuche as assimilated people, without cultural identity, while in reality they are struggling for recognition. The second creates an alternative reality, another real space, “as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled” (Idem). This is the case of Camp Hope, which produces a Chile without the functional fissures, social injustices, and inequalities that characterize the real one. There is no internal resemblance between Camp Hope and the Chile it supposedly represents; Camp Hope is pure simulacrum (Deleuze 299).

**Research Strategy**

In relation to the Military Parade, my research strategy is informed by a direct, first-hand observation of the Parade as it was performed on September 2008, in Santiago de Chile. Audiovisual records of the event performed in 2009 and 2010 helped me to analyze how it was framed and ideologically articulated during the official broadcast. Also, I gathered valuable information from other related events performed during the proto-performance phase (i.e. competitions, rehearsals). From the aftermath of the MP, I documented pictures, press releases, and official declarations over the event.

I followed the Camp Hope Heterotopia and the Mapuche Hunger Strike through different national and international media sources. I did a close reading of online news daily, contrasted official versions to alternative ones, and crisscrossed

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9 I have available additional audiovisual materials and press releases from previous Parades performed the last 30 years that helped me to contrast the way the event has changed through time and how military narratives have been presented to the audience in different historical contexts.
multiple references to come up with a synthesis, that by no means I present as be politically neutral. Among the most recurrent online sources that I consulted were: *El diario Mercurio de Santiago, El diario La Nacion, El diario La Tercera y El diario La Segunda*, all of national circulation and editorial approach favorable to the government. On the other side of the aisle, I worked with the electronic newspapers *El Mostrador, The Clinic, El Ciudadano, Ciper* and *El Quinto Poder*. Specifically for the Mapuche case I visited Mapuche websites such as Askintuwe, País Mapuche, Mapuexpress.net, and the website of the NGO *El Observatorio Ciudadano*, specialized in the Mapuche struggle and with a more academic approach. I also followed live reportages on TV online (TVN, Canal Trece, ChileVision), and compiled and analyzed hundreds of Youtube videos uploaded by different national TV channels, and independent professional and nonprofessional filmmakers that covered the incidents of both events. Finally, I reviewed more “objective” accounts of the events made by international agencies and online newspapers. *The New York Times, CNN, Times, The Washington Post, the BBC*, and *El diario El País de España*, played an important role in my research.

Finally, I analyzed thousands of pictures and several YouTube videos portraying the events. Most of the time these pictures were collections that framed the events without captions or interpretative narratives; others were integrated in articles, analysis and daily news. Even though the hunger strike and the San José heterotopia run parallel for almost the same period of time (August-October 2010), the audiovisual and news coverage were overwhelmingly discriminatory
against the first. Actually, I was able to retrieve only four pictures of the Mapuche involved on the strike, none of them in the prisons in which they were held, only in the hospitals where they were referred due to their deteriorated health condition. Most of the hunger strike pictures and video images I analyzed were taken outside of the detention centers and during the protests. In such circumstances, my understanding and analysis of the event relied on declarations and narratives that were filtered and published by the alternative press, and opinions given by families and Mapuche leaders from their NGOs. Interestingly, in none of the three heterotopias was the voice of the political opposition heard with conviction and force. The impeccable rescue process and the impressive media montage created by Piñera’s administration shielded the government against any criticism. To go against a successful operation like that of San José, which also was selling a positive image of the country to the world, was suicidal. In the Mapuche case, the opposite parties did not have a voice either, because part of the problem, specifically the application of the Pinochet Antiterrorist Law, was inherited from their own previous governments. Besides, during the last 30 years (if not during the last two centuries), the Mapuche have learned to distrust the political parties from the right, center and left, since none of them, when in power, were able to promote a definitive solution to their demands. Historically, Chilean politicians have regarded the Mapuche political agenda for self-determination as a unilateral demand that would erode, from within, Chilean sovereignty. Consequently, politicians have systematically avoided to debate on the issue with
Mapuche representatives, to whom they consider the cause of the problem and not part of a possible solution.

**The Sites of Performance**

Although the three heterotopias under scrutiny have strong performance components, the doses of theatricality and forms vary considerably among the events. In one extreme is the MP, which has been conceived, rehearsed and staged as public spectacle where the main performers perform themselves in a stylized fashion: the soldier, the minister, the general, and the president amplify their presence following a highly choreographed score. The O’Higgins Park is used as a thrust stage with the audience flanking the central esplanade where the soldiers march. Nationalistic isotopies\(^\text{10}\) make up the manifest central theme the performance portrays: a united, disciplined nation in eternal debt to the true progenitors of la Patria, the Chilean soldiers. Such a trope works in tandem with the main purpose of the MP, which is to reify the sense of belonging to an (imagined) community that reiterates the gender order of Chilean society.

At the other extreme is the hunger strike, which at first glance does not have space for an expression of theatricality. Essentially realistic, the strike counts on the levels of engagement and identification that the protest raises in the general–virtual–audience. In order to empathize with the audience, the striker’s

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\(\text{\textsuperscript{10}}\) After Greimas: repetition of a basic semanteme (a minimal distinctive unit of meaning); such repetition, establishing some level of familiarity within the narrative, allows for a uniform interpretation of it. In the context of the MP, words like ‘patria’, ‘soldiers’, ‘forefathers’, and other recurrent terms help to weave the alleged notion that Chilean militaries and *la patria* constitute an indissoluble identity.
body, the center of the struggle, must be visible, seen by the audience. Without a visible suffering body there is neither credibility nor persuasion by appealing to audience’s emotion (pathos). In a hunger strike the showing of the body in pain is fundamental to reaching an eventual understanding (logos) of the motives behind such a radical option, and to gather support and provoke actions to end the dramatic situation (Scarry). But the government knew about the impact that the showing of the body in distress would provoke in the audience and proceeded to invisibilize it. Because of that, the theatricality was vicariously performed by outsiders, namely, Mapuche leaders and family members of the 32 imprisoned Mapuches. Consequently, the audience was sensitized through verbal accounts, articles, protests, and imaginings of what was happening inside the walls of the prisons. Two strategies were recurrently used by the outsiders: first, the constant juxtaposition with the San José heterotopia, stressing the effort deployed to rescue the 33 against the indifference of the authorities for the life of the 32; second, time. Some newspapers began to publish a counting up of the days the Mapuche existed without ingesting solid food. The more days that passed without eating, the more dramatic and critical the situation of the protesters --more days mean being closer to death. Paradoxically, the media also kept a record counting down the days for the rescue of the 33 miners; here more days mean being closer to life. A hunger strike is about time and the performing of that time by a quiet, suffering body.

The Camp Hope heterotopia turned a tragedy into a popular international spectacle followed by millions of spectators worldwide. The script was a classic
one: 1) 33 miners are buried 700 hundred meters under ground, and we do not know if they are dead or alive; 2) To find them, we put together a team of experts with different skills, who are the best in their specialty; 3) A desperate search begins; it is a national task. Time is an important issue -- we need to find them before it is too late; 4) We find them; they are all alive. It is a national celebration; 5) Now, we need to rescue them and give them back to their families, but we do not have too much time; 6) Meanwhile we introduce secondary plots, what we know about the life of the main characters, their families, their virtues and flaws, and we stress the human side of the story; 7) Finally, in a 24-hour operation we successfully rescue them, one by one, capturing their tears, their thanks to God, their emotive encounters with their children and wives. The world explodes in cheers -- The End. Before the credits, some snippets of the most beloved characters and their current life: one got married as he promised when he was underground; another opted for his mistress; and another has a stellar appearance in Letterman’s show where he sings Sinatra. Another, el futbolista del grupo (the soccer player), inaugurates a soccer game in London, and the chief of the rescue team is said to become the future presidential candidate of the government’s coalition. Then, the viewers return to their messy lives.

The San José tragedy offered that trite, but effective script, and the government bought, staged it, and capitalized on it by making a reality show that ended up with one billion viewers in its last chapter. The cinematographic staging of the rescue process was not meant to be performed before a live audience, the two thousand that lived in the utopian Camp Hope, but for the audience that
inhabit what Debray calls “the videosphere” (69). The San José episode really happened; it was a race against time and the perils were real too. All the characters existed; the Chilean President was supervising the rescue process, and Golborne, the Minister of Mining, was a pivotal figure in the operation, but all of them, including the miners, performed for the camera under the direction of the Secretaría de Comunicaciones del Gobierno (Secom). As Debord pointed out, “in societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacle. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation” (7), and the San José heterotopia was no exception.

Chapter Outline

Chapter 1: Camp Hope Heterotopia: Chronicle of a Disaster Foretold.

In this chapter I contend that the collapse of the San José mine was not an event impossible to anticipate, it was not an outlier that “lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility” (xxii) as Nassim Taleb would put it. On the contrary, it was a disaster foretold that happened out of entrepreneurial greed and lack of governmental control. But what really could not be anticipated was the skillful instrumentalization the government made of the event, which went from being a tragedy to a happy reality show that performed and broadcast a perfect utopian Chile to the world. Actually, the three-month operation mounted in the desert location of San José was not just about rescuing the 33 miners, but about consolidating the image (and installment) of a new government
by showing its efficiency, effectiveness, criteria, opportunity, governability and success. This chapter then is aimed at showing the conception and the staging of a utopian Chile embodied in Camp Hope -- the micro nation created around the zero zone of the original accident. Here, I analyze how Chile was resignified to become a temporal heterotopia of compensation that ultimately shows the economic, political, and ethical fissures of the real Chile.

Chapter 2: The Mapuche Hunger Strike.

For two hundred years the Chilean state has been refusing to address the issue of cultural differences within the boundaries of the nation state. The criollos considered the territorial unification of the new country as a way of reaching a cultural unification, so they reified the Western paradigm that sustains the idea that a nation state cannot harmoniously contain another nation without falling apart. The precept of one nation, one cultural system has surfaced again in the mouth of contemporary legislators and is the base of the current conflict between the Chilean State and the Mapuche people. In this chapter I analyze how a heterotopia of deviation, the prison, became the site of subversion for a group of 32 Mapuche that, as the judicial system finally recognized, were unjustly imprisoned by the state. The 85-day hunger strike performed by the Mapuche in 2010 changed the way the Chilean state was dealing with the Mapuche, and it probably became a positive turning point in the relentless Mapuche struggle towards autonomy.

Chapter 3: The Military Parade.
I close my study of this triad of contemporary Chilean heterotopias by analyzing the Chilean Military Parade, a cultural performance the Chilean state is currently using to enact an illusory nation. The parade would not be a reflection of reality, but a constructed and convenient representation of “reality,” staged according to the ideological agenda of the government in place. The MP produces and presents to its audience the Chile that could be as if it already were. As an official performance, the MP works as a space of illusion (Foucault 26) where sociopolitical and geopolitical conflicts such as the Mapuche struggle are invisibilized, harmonized or even idealized and where abridged versions of national histories are presented sanitized and amnesiac, erasing from memory the trauma and the wrongdoings the military have perpetrated in the distant and recent past. In this chapter I also argue that, just like in the Araucanía, the MP still functions as an autocratic redoubt that enacts ideologies inherited from the Pinochet regime, and that it should be deactivated in the path for a more democratic Chilean society.

Concluding Chapter

In the preceding chapters I analyzed three case studies as systems that contest, neutralize, or invent the set of relations in Chilean society that they happen to designate or reflect. Also, I defined how each one satisfied, in its own way, the various heterotopological principles. My concluding chapter discusses the relations of complementarity, opposition, or deflection these heterotopic places sustain with each other. My analysis focuses on the commonalities these
heterotopias share, and their points of intersection, especially those related to their performative characteristics.

To clarify the set of relationships these spaces hold, I also propose a comparative table that summarizes the ways each heterotopia meets the five principles. I close this chapter discussing the challenges of identifying equivalent heterotopic places in other societies, and the importance of mapping those sites to explore, by juxtaposing them, the ways they work in tandem to imagine Latin American identities.
CHAPTER 2
CAMP HOPE HETEROTOPIA: CHRONICLE OF A DISASTER FORETOLD.

On October the 12, 2010, a nowhere place suddenly became a temporary utopia as a global audience witnessed the rescue of the 33 Chilean miners. Since the tunnel had collapsed two and a half months earlier, the desert surroundings of the San José mine had become the scenario of a fascinating transformation, as the site began to be populated by families of the trapped miners, government authorities, rescuers, clerics from different religious denominations, politicians, soldiers, soothsayers, clowns, vendors, and more than 1,600 journalists from all over the world. The early pilgrimage to San José exponentially increased once it became known that the 33 miners were alive, an incident which shifted tragedy into *kômos* (festivity) with the promise of a happy ending.

The demographic explosion in San José demanded the authorities to ask the social engineers to reconceive the raw perceived geographical place as a transitory village capable of hosting a projected population of more than two thousand residents, and a floating population of hundreds. In the mind of the planners, a peculiar city was conceived, represented with the help of computer-aided design tools, and finally materialized into a small but perfect and functional city in the middle of the Atacama Desert.

San José was discursively imagined by multiple protagonists, and even though the whole world seemed to share in the miners’ liberation if only for a day, the production of the San José heterotopia, like the Military Parade, was articulated by the government, which owned and controlled the event from its
very beginning. For almost three months, San José was produced as the place where an exemplary Chile was performed for a national and international audience, micro-managed right down to the smallest detail by controlling the timing of the event, orchestrating its *mise en scene* and broadcast, the entrance, actions, and exit of the authorities involved, and filtering and concealing backstage key information about the episode that could have tarnished the perfect script and its dramatic arc.

From the government’s point of view, the production of the San José heterotopia was never just about rescuing the 33 miners, which obviously was the manifest, public purpose, but it was also about demonstrating that the Government “can do things right,”\(^{11}\) and that it is capable of “doing great things” (Piñera: Cuando Chile). Camp Hope provided and was articulated as the perfect setting to consolidate the installment and the image of the new government by showing its efficiency, effectiveness, acumen, opportunity and success in the face of difficult times.

In Camp Hope, President Piñera–like Machiavelli’s Prince– exerted his technical and political skills in a calculated manner: He earned honors by completing a great feat of rescuing the 33, and he did not get frightened in adversity. He also was loved, but at the same time “feared” (by repressing

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\(^{11}\) On February 9, the day President Piñera announced his first Cabinet, he declared the purpose of establishing a “new way of governing” characterized by “doing things right..” That purpose was reiterated innumerable times during his first year in office, and especially during the rescue of the 33. After the successful rescue, the phrase morphed into the now popularized saying “do it the Chilean way” (Piñera promete).
Mapuche protesters in the “other” Chile), and he kept his word of doing
everything in his hands to save the miners. Having total control of the event, he
was able to rule this little country without any kind of political opposition, legal
bureaucracy, or long congressional deliberations. Finally, Piñera was able to
govern Camp Hope doing something that Machiavelli was against: by being an
overly generous Prince. Actually President Piñera spared no money and time in
the endeavour. The transitory nature of the event allowed acting without being
afraid of the exhaustion of economic resources, and the investment paid off,
politically speaking.

Addressing the question of why the government decided to intervene in
the rescue process, Laurence Golborne, Minister of Mining, said that from a
political point of view it was not a rational resolution, and that it was taken due to
the inexperience of the new government. A more logical answer, he says, would
have been to keep the government on the sidelines (EFE). Golborne’s perception,

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12 President Piñera’s leadership has been characterized, even by members of his
own political sector, not only as being highly personalistic, but also as
micromanagerial, of both contingent situations and collaborators, by paying
extreme attention to small details instead of looking at great design. In a recent
article, Genaro Arriagada, a Chilean political scientist, describes Piñera as a
“24x7 president ( 24 hours, seven days a week),” who “does not empower his
subordinates, and discourages their decision making “because they are at constant
risk of being contradicted or disavowed.” (Arriagada)

13 After the last miner was rescued, President Piñera addressed the crowd and
said: "We faced up to this rescue united as a country. We did it the Chilean way,
which means the right way." Since then, the phrase “do it the Chilean way” has
become internationally popular and is currently used as the official slogan the
Fundación Imagen de Chile is using in its campaign to promote Chile abroad
(Sebastián Piñera).
however, sounds a little naive if we consider what has been the watermark of Piñera’s government in its first ten months in office: a technocratic neoliberal government that has based its executive decisions on business mentality and scientific pragmatism that have baffled the political coalitions from both sides of the aisle.$^{14}$ As a matter of fact, Piñera did not appoint to his Cabinet any of the expected politicians from the Alianza por Chile, the coalition that helped him to win the Presidential election, but instead appointed a body of highly competent professionals mainly with expertise in the field of engineering and economics (64%), and with no political background. Also, 73% of his Cabinet comes from the Universidad Católica de Chile (El primer gabinete), an institution with strong neoliberal stances, and the alma mater of the Chicago Boys, the team of technocrats which in the 1970s implemented in Chile one of the purist free market economies in the world.$^{15}$ With this technocratic ethos, it is hard to think that President Piñera—a successful business engineer himself—would have assessed his decision without weighing the total expected costs against the total expected benefits of the enterprise, to finally adopt the most expedient option.

$^{14}$ Another characteristic of Piñera’s government in the “real” Chile is that it has been reacting to critical events after they burst into the national political scenario: first the problem emerges, and then the government solves it, usually through the direct, visible intervention and mediation of the president Piñera himself. The Camp Hope event, which could have been prevented from happening, was not the exception, and neither was the Mapuche hunger strike.

$^{15}$ Currently, the Ministers of Economy, Finance, Education, and Secretary General of the Presidency are all business engineers (Ingenieros Comerciales) who graduated from the University of Chicago with degrees in Economics.
San José offered the ideal place for rehearsing Piñera’s technocratic approach to governance, which until the politically poor handling of the Mapuche hunger strike and the Magallane’s fiasco\textsuperscript{16} professed to be an apolitical adaptation of technical expertise to the task of governance blended with high doses of presidential personalism (Fischer 18). Thus, although not in the original plans, the San José heterotopia also provided a safe rehearsal room for training the team of technocrats to become “political technocrats” (Camp 1985), that is to say those professionals in positions of power and influence with the government who, even though they “make decisions on the basis of rationality and efficiency,” do not underestimate “the need to consider questions of human relations and politics” in their work (Grindle 402). As a matter of fact, San José was the place that put Mining Minister Laurence Golborne in the limelight of new right-wing political figures.

\textsuperscript{16} On December 29, 2010, the directory of Empresa Nacional del Petróleo (ENAP, National Petroleum Company) decided to increase the price of the natural gas by 16.8\% in Magallanes, a region situated in the southern extreme of the continental Chilean territory, whose extreme weather conditions make gas essential for survival. In response to the measure, the citizens of Magallanes organized an indefinite strike that paralyzed the two main cities of Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales for 20 days. The government, which at first supported ENAP’s “technical and rational” decision of raising the prices, finally deposed its stance and suspended the measure on January 18, 2011. The government’s inability to foresee the consequences of making decisions solely based on technical criteria, demonstrated that Piñera’s pure technocratic approach of governance was, in this case, not enough for policy making, and “ineffective” in detecting and satisfying the necessities of the population. As a consequence, Piñera decided to change part of his original Cabinet and introduced two experienced politicians (Andrés Allaman and Evelyn Matthey) and Laurence Golborne, the Minister of Mining who was the star in the rescue of the 33 of San José, as a Bim minister of Mine and Energy.
Unlike in the outside world where the government cannot control all the sociopolitical variables in play in current Chile, the setting of San José provided a site where the miners were passive victims waiting to be rescued, not deliberate or unpredictable individuals with agency to change the effort and decisions made on the surface by a team of technocrats. The miners could not act upon or change the developments (as the Mapuches were doing in their protest); they only could be acted upon. And having the technical factor under control, the informational factor— a key element to tout Camp Hope to a massive audience—could also be controlled.

Thus, the government started catalyzing a trialectic of space, knowledge and power (Soja 15) and enabling a site that, in the living, soon would surpass the manifest purpose of rescuing the miners to become something else; a temporal heterotopia (Foucault 26) that would resignify, through performance, a utopian Chile. Jill Dolan says that “Theatre can move us toward understanding the possibility of something better…and fuel our desires in ways that might lead to incremental cultural change” (Madison 521), and uses the term “utopian performative” to describe “moments, which through their doing, allow audiences to experience, for a moment, a sense of what utopia would feel like were the claims of social justice movements realized” (Idem). I use the term “performance heterotopia” to refer to the set of behaviors that enact utopias, not in theatre, but in the historical world, the representational space (Lefebvre) in which we live, the site in which “the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs” (Foucault 23). A distinctive characteristic of the heterotopias like those I am studying in this
dissertation is that the performers are performing the self through their “real” social roles. In San José President Piñera performs President Piñera, as the soldiers in the MP perform (in a stylized way) their military identity, and the Mapuche their ethnicity. By the same token, the spectators situate themselves in the heterotopian space as witnesses more than traditional spectators, as they know they are participating in an event where the performer’s decisions have material “real” consequences on their lives and on the lives of others. But in a sense, performance heterotopias blur the traditional distinctions between cultural performance, social drama, and social performance (Victor Turner), as they cannot be reduced to each other, but they cannot be considered as separate either.

As the San José heterotopia was produced as a new location in the social space of Chilean society, primary performers, as well as the material space performed, both became the signifiers of allegorical characters. Thus this site became the stage that brought together psychomachical characters such as Hope, Efficiency, National Unity and Social Equality, that were embodied not only by specific authorities such as Golborne, Piñera, or the Minister of Health, but also through the staging of, for example, the never-before-seen egalitarian communion between the political elite and the working class that lived in the camp, or through a generous, efficient and solidary right-wing omniscient government who

17 Here I borrow the term that makes reference to the allegorical characters of autosacramentales, which combined elements of medieval mystery and morality plays.

18 One example would be the Minister of Mining living in a tent and establishing horizontal relationships with the families of the trapped miners.
served this heterotopian country by adopting a socialist economy where the state provided for all the necessities of the people, or through a body of cooperative and obedient citizens that shared the same goal of their political leaders, which was to rescue the 33. Also, San José became the embodied manifestation of the rebirth of the Chilean nation, the pater-patria created, again, by men in the symbolic year of its Bicentenary. In this view, the toponym “Campamento Esperanza” (Camp Hope), the name given by the authorities to the place, is telling, because it not only expressed the expectation of rescuing the miners alive, but also the longing to live in a country as it should be, as it were, while actually it is not. In that sense, Camp Hope was not a heterotopia of illusion as was the Military Parade, but a heterotopia of compensation (27), compensation of what Chile is actually lacking.

Foucault defines temporal heterotopias as enacted utopias that are not oriented toward the eternal, but “linked to time in its most fleeting, transitory, precarious aspect, to time in the mode of the festival” (26). But it is not only the transitory nature of Camp Hope that allows the enactment of the utopian Chile, but also its isolation and location far from any city, the relatively small number of people involved, and the clear definition of the operation. In theatrical terms, Camp Hope satisfied three fundamental neoclassical rules: unity of time, unity of place and unity of action. First, the dramatic action evolved and was accomplished in the shortest time possible (sign of efficiency and effectiveness). Second, the action was restricted to one locale, Camp Hope. Third, the action used a relatively small group of protagonists performing one central story: the
rescue, which actually is a subplot of the latent plot to establish the governance of the new government in terms of its effectiveness in decision-making, and administration.

**First Act: Chronicle of a Disaster Foretold**

Mine accidents are common in Chile, especially in small and medium-size mining where, in the last decade, an average of 60 workers died annually. Nevertheless, most of those accidents go unnoticed by the public as they happen far from the city centers, and the mining companies deter the news from reaching local newspapers. But San José\(^\text{19}\) was a different case; the magnitude of the accident made it impossible for the owners of Minera San Sebastián Company to keep a low profile on the event or impede the news from spreading like wildfire, attracting the attention of the national press and the social networks on the Internet.

The mine’s engineers knew that the tunnels of the San José mine sooner or later would collapse. It was not an event impossible to anticipate; it was not the *outlier* that Nassim Taleb referred to in his Black Swan theory. On the contrary, it was a probable event, a “White Swan” that owners of the mine, workers, and authorities in charge of preventing accidents of these kind knew will occur. Since March 2004 and July 2010 the company had received 42 fines for breaching safety regulations, and three cave-ins provoked three fatal

\(^{19}\) The San José mine was a medium size copper-gold mine that belongs to the San Esteban Primera Mining Company, founded in 1957 by Hungarian immigrant Jorge Kemeny. Currently the company is owned by Kemeny’s son, Marcelo, in partnership with Alejandro Bohn, who is also its Chief Executive Officer. The mine’s annual production surpasses 20 million U.S. dollars per operative year, and produces more than 600 tons per year (Derrumbe).
accidents in the mine. In the same period the mine was closed and reopened four times without complying with the safety regulations demanded by the inspectors of the Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería de Chile. On July 3 Gino Cortés lost his leg in another collapse of the mine, and it was shut down again (El largo historial). The report of the Labor Inspection of Copiapó, dated July 9, 2010, pointed out the lack of proper fortification of the roof, lack of permanent and visible signs posted in areas of danger, among other indications. The document also charges a fine of six thousand dollars the Company should pay for its negligence (Mery). The mine reopened its function two weeks before it collapsed again on August 5, trapping the 33 miners.

The day after the rescue took place, Daniel Hanninger, Deputy Editorial Page Director of the Wall Street Journal, wrote in his Thursday column, “It needs to be said. The rescue of the Chilean miners is a smashing victory for free-market capitalism” (Hanninger). The rationale behind such a crowing statement was simple: the miners would not be alive if not were for all the technological innovations used in the rescue, and created under the logic “profit = innovation dynamic” followed by private companies from different parts of the globe.

To support his argument, Hanninger asserted that only in an open global economy could the drill's rig have come from Schramm Inc. in West Chester, Pennsylvania, the super-flexible fiber-optic communication from Japan, and a cell phone equipped with a projector from Samsung of South Korea. Then, he dramatically closed his daring hypothesis saying that “If those miners had been trapped a half-mile down like this 25 years ago anywhere on earth, they would be
dead.” Although it may be true, what Hanninger was missing in his free-market
celebration is the fact that the same profit-oriented attitude that generates
technological innovation in one sector of the economy, also provokes economic
crisis with global consequences (the collapse of the US housing bubble),
ecological disasters (the Gulf of Mexico oil spill), and abysmal social and
economic inequalities – and the collapse that necessitated the rescue in the first
place. The plethora of technological innovations that helped to save the 33 miners
were part of the solution of a problem rooted in an unscrupulous owners’
management that profited from the mine’s exploitation without investing in their
workers’ safety. As a matter of fact, and as I have said before, the San José
copper-gold mine was a money-making private company that in the last six years
had received 42 fines for breaching safety regulations.

At any rate, Hanninger’s thesis also fails in not considering an important
datum in the felicitous outcome in the San José accident: Camp Hope was
organized as a socialist utopia, not a capitalist one. Here the economy was
centralized and performed at its purest. The government acted as a paternalist and
controlling entity that solved all the problems of this little happy country, and did
it in such a way that would enrage Milton Freedman by just thinking about it.
Anyway, to be fair, I would say that Piñera used the best of these opposite
economic concepts and, dialectically, he arrived at a synthesis that does nothing
more than to prove that the enacted utopia of Camp Hope satisfies the third
heterotopic principle: “The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real
place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (25). Here
a market economy coexisted with a planned economy in a script that allowed that such a hybridism be staged by a neoliberal entrepreneur and right-wing politician, Sebastián Piñera. Heterotopias are bizarre systems.

Today it is clear that not only the owners of the mine were aware that it was in imminent risk of collapsing, but so were the high officials of Piñera’s government. Javier Castillo, President of the Confederation of Workers of Copiapó, has declared that on July 1st, 2010 the Minister of Labor, Camila Merino was informed of the unstable condition of the tunnels:

We had a meeting with Minister of Labor (Camila) Merino where we expressed our concerns about the risks of the San José mine, and we questioned the fact that despite the number of accidents, deaths, and cave-ins, the authority always reopened it arguing the necessity of keeping jobs at the expense of the lives of workers.

(EFE Gobierno)

Castillo also said that the Minister of Mining, Laurence Golborne, had been informed in the same terms, and that following the accident of Gino Cortes, who lost a leg, they tried to talk again with Golborne, but that they were intercepted by the Chief of Staff of the Minister, who took notes of their demands. “We informed her about the accident (Cortes’s), and that it was imperative to monitor the San Esteban Company, which owned the San José mine, because the cycles of accidents were becoming more frequent” (Idem).

Two days before Castillo’s declarations, on October 19th, the Labor Minister Camila Merino had offered the following statement: “We had some
evidence of safety problems and should have acted in advance” (Ministra Merino), which corroborated Castillos’ testimony. The Labor Minister’s statement was rewriting the script followed by the government until now. The short line uttered by the minister shifted the course of the play by recognizing a second culprit in the plot, which ended up being the hero that came to the rescue, government itself. This twist in the plot suggested then two other important motives for the opportune government’s intervention and control of the event: to control damages that could jeopardize the honorable endeavour and the political image of the government, and to prevent eventual profit-sapping lawsuits in case those controls did not work. With such possible scenarios, the government proceeded to eliminate from the script the unexpected new line, and only a few hours later the Minister of Labor retracted her declarations (Idem).

For the story to develop without dimming its dramatic interest, one villain was enough, and the mining company was deservedly fulfilling that role. The very day of the accident the miners that were laboring inside the mine warned the Chief Operating Officer that there was noise in the mine and asked for permission to leave the tunnel, but the request was denied (Cisternas). Four hours later the cave-in occurred, leaving the 33 miners trapped approximately 3 miles from the mine entrance. Immediately after the accident the miners tried to escape through a ventilation shaft system, but the company had failed to install a portion of the escape ladders which had been specified as a condition of reopening before the accident (Trato). When all the information that incriminated the owners of the San José mine reached the press, the government took the lead in going after them.
The Minister of Mining and the Minister of Labor where the first in crying out: the former declared that the culprit would be prosecuted and added that in the labor system there are always “good and bad employers,” while the latter said that in this case, “There will be neither mercy nor trepidation in relation to this case. Here, there will be no impunity for those that are responsible for the accident” (Equipo Radio Universidad de Chile). The president also intervened saying that in this matter “there will be no impunity” and stressed that the government “already began criminal and civil investigations to identify and punish those who have responsibility in the accident” (Idem). When you are the owner of the theatre, the director, the dramatist, and the main character in the play, you have the possibility to manage the production according to your convenience, and the government did the same.

**The Production of Camp Hope**

The day after the rescue the nearly three thousand residents of San José began to leave Camp Hope, the transient Babelian city that emerged in the middle of the Atacama Desert. Left behind remained prayers inscribed in the sides of big rocks, remnants of memorials, the remains of the improvised shrines the families of the 33 filled with crosses, pictures and religious figures, and some frayed Chilean flags on the top of the rugged hills that surround the mine. “Be strong, mining brothers,” reads one of the inscriptions, summarizing well the existential *communitas* the event ignited in the heart of millions of people around the world.

Around 300 miners worked in the San José mine. All of them alternate their lives between their homes in different villages of Copiapó city and the mine,
where they work four to ten days in a row, in return for the same or fewer numbers of rest days. A satellite view of the mine’s surroundings shows that it is placed in the West side of a rocky and narrow valley that goes from South to East, whose bed serves as the main road. The facilities of the original camp are situated in two different centers 0.17 miles far from each other, and consist of containers adapted as offices and a couple of larger structures for accommodations for the employees. The entrance of the mine is located just 90 feet from the South hub, and would constitute the ground zero around which the village would eventually grow.

The cave-in occurred on August 5, 2010, around 2:30 pm. The day after the collapse, the human geography of San José began to change drastically, as an unexpected number of people started arriving to the place. Along with 26 rescuers from GOPE and Firefighters, family members of the trapped miners were the first to get there, seeking reliable information about the fate of their loves ones. Although the Company did not make public the news and inform the Emergency National Office (ONEMI) authorities about the incident, five hours after the accident, personal phone calls spread the news like wildfire among the families, who rushed to the mine. Not having a place to stay, the families began to set up improvised shelters close to the mine’s entrance; thus, an unlikely village gradually began to grow up to reach its peak the days before the rescue took place on October 12-13, 2010.

The very night of the accident ONEMI contacted Minister of Mining Laurence Golborne, who was visiting Colombia as a part of an official retinue
presided by President Piñera. According to the information received by Golborne, about 34 miners were trapped. Uncorroborated sources said that Piñera considered that the number of victims was too high, and that the government should intervene, proceeding to send Golborne back to Chile to evaluate the situation *in situ*. The minister arrived to the mine on August 7 at 3 am, to coordinate the rescue process.

The first official assessment of the situation indicated that tons of rocks “sat” on the tunnels and the access ramp in the level 350 (which is located about 2300 feet below the ground), leaving the 33 miners who had just started their shift trapped. At that moment there was no way to know if the miners were able to survive the collapse of the mine.

On August 7 the first rescue attempt through the ventilation duct failed as a new rockfall sealed the access. After being informed of the situation, President Piñera declared, “We will do everything within our reach, all what is humanly possible to rescue them alive. Nevertheless that is not only in the hands of men, at this point it is also in the hands of God” (Presidente Piñera interrumpe) and announced his decision to suspend his visit to Colombia and travel to Copiapó to analyze the situation with his ministers and then to head to the mine. Piñera arrived to San José on August 8 and held a meeting with the families of the 33, reiterating the commitment of his government to rescue them.

Initially, the cave-in only attracted the attention of the local press, but once President Piñera and his ministers arrived at the site and took over the task of finding and rescuing the miners, a retinue of journalists hovered around them.
From that moment on, the news began to get a prominent space in newspapers and TV channels, especially in those media that were adherent to the government. The opposition media, on the other hand, also began to inform and discuss the event but under a different light: while the government’s media praised Piñera for his initiative and direct involvement in the rescue process and focus its interest in the task itself, the independent media concentrated their attention on the cause of the tragedy, the responsibilities of the owners of the San Esteban Company, and the malfunction of an economic system that privileges productivity and financial gains over the safety of the workers.

These two different perspectives in tackling the event are perhaps well epitomized by narratives that considered the miners as “victims” of a predatory economic system on one hand, and as “heroes” that reflected the “unbreakable spirit”20 of the Chilean nation on the other. While the first approach prevailed in the first stage of the rescue, when nobody knew whether the miners were alive or not, the second characterization gained ground during the rescue process itself, becoming the mainstream narrative that was finally adopted by practically all the world press.

Once the rapture provoked by the successful rescue began to settle down, the real dimension of the accident regained importance again. Thus, after the

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20 References to the “unbreakable” Chilean spirit are common in official military discourses or in speeches given by the political authorities of the country. President Piñera used that common trope in the United Nation podium at the 65th United Nation General Assembly 2010: “A country with an indomitable nature, but with an unshakable will and resilience.” (Presidente Piñera)
rescue Néstor Jorquera, president of the Chilean mineworkers union, CONFEMIN reminded that “The miners are not 'heroes,' as they have been called around the world for surviving underground for over two months, they are victims…and after the rescue of our coworkers we are going to go after the culprit as it should be” (Elk). In the same vein, Franklin Lobos, one of the trapped miners, shared that perspective saying, “We are not heroes, we are victims. I am a victim of bad employers who are lining their pockets without investing a penny in the safety of their workers” (Caric). And although this last formulation also implies saviors, it has the merit of focusing in the causes of the tragedy and the poor working conditions of the miners, which reflect the current conditions for many Chilean miners.

One of the factors that helped to make the heroic version of the event prevalent was the unexpected positive turn the plot took when one of the probes sent into the mine reached the refuge finding the miners alive. When the mining tragedy came to light, the dramatic question that immediately emerged was whether the miners were alive or not. In a way, the whole rescue operation carried out in the first stage was aimed at answering this central question, which can be expressed in a laconic binary of yes or no. In this phase the dramatic question was exacerbated by the press through speculation, unashamed melodramaticism, and spectacularly building up the required tension to get high levels of rating. Thus, the covers of the newspapers were populated by pictures showing people crying and praying for their loved ones, especially women and children. The TV specials spent more time interviewing and showing whimpering women, concerned
fathers, and heartbroken children, than reporting on the progress of the operation.
The traffic of pain and the commercialization of sadness were periodically
nurtured by dramatic statements the authorities in charge of the rescue made to
the press and families. An emblematic case was that of Laurence Golborne who
after one early rescue attempt failed, and only four days after the tragedy of San
José (as the press called the accident), told the miner’s families, “The chances of
finding them (the miners) alive are slim” (Piñera Enderezó), and then he cried.
The way the newspaper *La Tercera* explained the scene well illustrated the
melodramatic tone adopted for most media at that time:

> While the crew escaped from the jaws of the mine, Golborne
> thought everything was over. "The rescuers wept in fear and
> helplessness, as he also did," said one of his close collaborators. A
> few minutes passed and the minister put himself together as best as
> he could, and prepared himself to give the bad news to the
> families. To avoid a new emotional break down, he stared at a non-
> existent point. But when he was rebuked by the miner’s relatives,
> he averted his eyes only a second, the exact time to meet with the
> silent cries of the bereaved mother of one of the missing. Then, he
> broke down and cried. Something inside him had begun to
> crumble. (Vergara)

Golborne’s brutal and laconic declaration raised angry reactions from the miner’s
families, but for the national audience that followed the events from their homes,
the evaluation was positive as they recognized an honest and humble man who
was able to express his emotions and somehow empathize with the despair lived by the families.

An editorial of the influential electronic newspaper *El Mostrador* marked this episode as the moment that catapulted Golborne’s political career:

In an environment marked by the uncertainty, regret, and impatience of the miner’s families, Golborne broke the paradigm of the right of not being able to connect and empathize with the people and, in particular with miners who are traditionally associated with the left.

After failing the first rescue attempt, Golborne’s pessimistic view and trembling voice angered miner’s families, but produced a strong sense of identification with the viewers. He was a minister capable of showing off his suffering. (Pérez)

Four (isn’t it three?) days after the collapse, on August 8, “Golborne, unshaven and with his pants covered in dust, was applauded loudly by the families of the miners” (Vergara) soon after informing them of the progress made with the drillings. Suddenly, the technocrat became the technocrat politician with high levels of popularity, and no few proclaimed him as a possible presidential candidate for the next presidential elections. Others speculated that the growing influence of Golborne among the families was due to the belief that homonymy
between his name (Laurence) and the name of the miner’s *patrono* “San Lorenzo” was a divine sign.\(^{21}\)

It was through Golborne’s figure that the government began to reap the first fruits of its investment in the risky adventure of the rescue. And it is precisely in this moment when the media paraphernalia began to be activated and minutely articulated by the government. The newspapers began to show pictures of Golborne drinking *mate*, a popular soft drink in Chile, with members of the miner’s families in their tents. As the TV news showed the Minister in the field, working hand in hand with the rescuers, and showing personal concern for the victim’s families, the new politician began to consolidate his image while showing a country where the traditional gap between the rulers and the people does not exist any more.

**First Climactic Moment: “Estamos bien en el refugio los 33”**

\(^{21}\) Between sectors two and three, under an open white tent, there was an altar where the figure of the miner’s saint, San Lorenzo, was placed. The image was brought in a religious procession celebrated on August 10, which is the official day the miners commemorate the saint San Lorenzo. Some people in the camp believed that the saint’s name and the first name of Golborne, Laurence, was not mere coincidence, but a sort of sign of a positive outcome of the search. Night and day hundreds of people went there to pray and make vows to the two and a half feet tall image, dressed in a red robe, embroidered with a golden cross in his chest, a red miner helmet, and a gas lamp hanging from his right extended arm. The hundreds of candles that were placed inside and around the tent-altar were lit in the night, as the devotees went to pray on behalf of their beloved who were trapped underground. The official altar was not the only place to adore and ask for God’s blessings; crosses, candles, and religious images were found everywhere, inside the tents, the hills and in little shrines members of the family built with rocks that some day were taken from the depths of the same mine as their husbands, fathers and sons who were now waiting to be rescued.
Act One, “Finding the 33”, reached its climactic moment on August 22, when President Piñera answered the dramatic question announcing that the 33 miner were all alive. This turning point morphed tragedy into komos (festivity) with a promising happy ending that would culminate two months later when the 33 were actually rescued.

“Estamos bien en el refugio los 33” (We are OK in the refuge the 33) says the note that Sebastián Piñera read after announcing that the 33 miners trapped in the San José mine were alive. Minutes later, thousands of Chileans took to the streets waving flags and blowing horns in celebration, while others fell on their knees thanking God, and presidents around the world sent their greetings and congratulations to their counterpart in Chile. Suddenly, images of the happy event became ubiquitous. It was Monday, August 22, 17 days after the cave-in.

For a country that had been ravaged by a massive earthquake a few months before, the news of the miners became a celebration of life, a sign of hope and national revival. With that typical heroic and poetic tone that Chileans used to use in times of triumph (and despair), many allegorized that the rescue of the 33 from the depths of the earth was but the very padre-patria that was about to be born again, thus reiterating the founding myth that makes men as the central progenitor of the Chilean nation. Cristián Warnken, for instance, with his elegant prose told us that the rescue was not merely a rescue but a re-genesis of the nation:

It is the land that will give birth to 33 men. But in fact we are they who will be born, for we were sleeping and dead. An earthquake
was not enough to wake us. We needed a Great Myth, to group around it: and this is not "news" anymore, but a myth born of the unconscious of the Chilean people. As if the republic would be born again, as if these 33 miners were its prodigal sons about to return. And until they return, Chile will not yet exist. (Warnken)

According to Warnken the dream from which Chile should awake is that of a country that "has reneged on its own light to copy and dazzle itself with the spotlights, cameras, celebrities, the event, and the ‘reality show’” (Idem), that is to say, from the Debordian dazzling light in which we are sunk, and where social relationship, the face-to-face, is mediated by images and the game of representation. Warnken’s critical assessment of a Chile that had been spectacularized and seduced to perform for the camera was precisely what the current government was doing with the San José event to tout Piñera’s technocratic model of governance, engender new political figures, and throw over the national stage a smokescreen to camouflage the social conflicts that Chile transpired at that time, such as the Mapuche hunger strike.

Yet, it seems that we, Chileans, prefer to believe in the cathartic trope created by Warnken however illusory it might be, for the simple reason that on the surface of our imagined community, things are far from Edenic, and we know (although almost never acknowledge) how urgently are the needs of a renewal, a purification, a kind of full stop law that could end all the problems, conflicts and injustices that Chile still carries on its back in the year of its Bicentenary. Perhaps it is this desire for expunction which prompted, for example, the Provincial
Governor of Bío-Bío, Jacqueline Van Rysselberghe, to declare that "God sent the earthquake to make us stronger, because the region was relentlessly falling during the past 30 or 40 years" (The Clinic) or the Chicago Boys, 35 years ago, to talk about the necessity of implementing a process of "creative destruction" to begin executing the purest neoliberal experiment that has existed in the world's economies.

The media paraphernalia built up around the mine incident caught the attention of the national audience at a level comparable only to that obtained by the participation of Chile in the recent World Cup and the earthquake. If anything characterizes Chilean mass media, it is their selective search for news with the potential to be exploited to the point of nausea and the more melodramatic or tragic, the better. Thus, the San José event occupied the front pages of newspapers and the central section of informative radio and television during the rescue process and beyond. It was as if suddenly the searchlight was focused on San José, and the rest of the nation remained in the house, in the darkness.

At dawn on August 22, the rescue team knew that the miners were alive. President Piñera, who was in Santiago, was notified immediately. However, the news was kept secret, even from family members, for nine hours, until the President jumped onto the stage to give the news to the families and the world in person. Before the announcement, a rumor that the miners were alive had already spread throughout the camp. According to the families, one of the operators of the probe had told them that the last section of the probe came out with inscriptions and letters attached to it. Instead of confirming the good news, the Secretaría de
Comunicaciones de Gobierno (Secom) opted for containing it; at 2:39 a Secom officer on the ground cushioned the information indicating that there was not an official report on the matter and that they would have to wait for the authorities’ announcement:

The Government is aware that (the families) have spent hours of anguish and uncertainty. There is still no official information ... we hope with all our heart, God willing, the news be positive, but we need to wait for the official version the minister is going to give in the coming hours. Let's keep calm because there is still no official version.22 (TVN)

The fact that the government delayed the release of such important news to the families shows the level at which the government was micro-managing the event to get the highest possible communicational effect on its audience, ultimately. If the government was “aware that (the families) have spent hours of anguish and uncertainty,” as the Secom officer declared, then the logical procedure would have been to forward the information immediately to the families, and then announce to the rest of the community. However, the Secom opted for prioritizing the staging of the climactic moment to provoke the greatest impact through the media. And it worked wonderfully.

22 In the 24 hour news transmission, National Television of Chile showed a Secom official trying to contain the leaked information that the 33 trapped miners were alive. The following video posted on YouTube shows the moment: http://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=-RFx7IVFPok&feature=related
At 3:15 pm, President Piñera, surrounded by the ministers of Interior, Mining, and other authorities, stood in front of the families, the press and the cameras and proceeded to display a note in red ink that read “Estamos bien en el refugio los 33” and offer a 10 minute speech: “This came today from the bowels of the mountain [...] from the depths of the mine [...] and is the message of our miners who tell us they are alive, who are united and are waiting to see the light of the sun and hug their families…”23, the president began, and then went on to highlight the efficiency of a government that keeps its promises, linking the incident to the bicentenary celebrations, praising the courage and faith of the miners and their families, and the exemplary union demonstrated by the Chilean people in a time of crisis.

From the point of view of its theatricality, the announcement made by the president was impressively well constructed. The president came out from the rescue zone surrounded by his ministers uniformly dressed with their characteristic red coats that only high officials of the government are authorized to wear. The entire camp gathered together in front of a raised platform where the president stood to give his celebratory speech. In his left hand he brandished the now famous letter from one of the miners saying they were all alive. The prop contained the answer to the first dramatic question, also became an objectified metaphor of the rescue process whose digital image reached the world in seconds.

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Grammatically incorrect\(^{24}\), the piece of paper profiled the low educational level of the miners which forced them to find jobs where, in general, technical literacy is not a requirement. In the President’s hand the paper represented a government that worked on behalf of the worker class, the most dispossessed, which is one of the tropes that the governmental rhetoric has been reiterating from the beginning to debunk the extended belief that Conservative parties privilege the rich over the poor.

**Second Act: Camp Hope**

With the successful and happy outcome of the first act the government gained political momentum as the managerial capabilities shown in San José favorably impacted the public perception. The polls released at the end of August demonstrated that the popularity of President Piñera skyrocketed ten percentage points, and the stardom of the minister Laurence Golborne was consolidated at a 91\% approval rate for his work. Best of all, a high rating for the second act “Rescuing the 33” was assured, as a global audience was now interested in following this social drama until its dénouement.

With a global audience interested in following the event, the migration to San José also began to intensify, especially with a host of journalists coming from all over the world to cover the developments. The sudden demographic explosion obliged the government’s planners to reconceive San José and make it sustainable for an expected population of three thousand, where no less than 60\% were

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\(^{24}\) The phrase “Estamos bien en el refugio los 33” should have had a comma after “refugio” to convey the idea properly.
reporters and journalists. The reconceived space materialized into what became known as Camp Hope; the top cosmopolitan and exclusive Chilean city in which to live, and the designated site where a utopian Chile would be enacted.

Camp Hope was divided into three sectors that roughly hosted the three main groups visible in the camp; the miner’s families, the press, and the government with its techno-politicians, rescue teams and the police.

The first sector, which was the entry point to the camp, sheltered most of the journalists and miner’s family members that arrive just for the day. In this sector there was the kitchen, a “supermarket,” a collective dining room that was open 24 hours a day, a motor home that sold fast food, and a classroom and playground for the children.

Sector two was reserved for the families of the 33, and provided individual tents for each one. The space was fenced and two policemen were guarding it to avoid intruders, especially the press. By the precinct there was a parking lot for the families and satellite television equipment.

Just 30 feet from the 33 tents, a checkpoint marked the beginning to the third sector, where the only entrance to the mine was and the rescue machinery began to be emplaced. To the original infrastructure of the mine, were added a meeting room for the authorities (about 20 in situ), and a dining room for the more than 200 police and soldiers in service. A provisory prison was emplaced here too.

The spine of the camp was a street which connected all three sectors as a long avenue. This public space was usually full of people that came and went
during the day, and it was common to see a swarm of journalists around government officials in charge of keeping them informed.

With a possible successful rescue on the horizon, the government reengineered its communicational strategy and began to plan the staging of the climactic moment of the rescue. One of the first measures taken by Secom was to reinforce the check points and access to the camp, limiting the entrance only to those who were properly accredited by the authority. Also the government tightened the control over the press’s access to the sector where the families of the miners were staying, and isolated the zone of the drillings. Thus, Secom took control of what the press was informed, and prohibited members of the rescue teams, Armed Forces, operators and other members of the government to talk to the press about what was happening behind the fences where the rescue would take place. From now on the briefing would be limited to the press conferences given by the only
authorized personnel in the camp, which were the Minister of Mining, Laurence Golborne; the Minister of Health, Jaime Mañalich; and André Sougarret, the Rescue Chief.

The measures were welcomed neither by the press nor by those involved in the rescue: “I'm very disappointed with what is happening beyond the check point” one member of the rescue team lamented, off record (Alvarez). “They put a gag on us, it's incredible ... We are wasting an opportunity to publicize the technology at work in this rescue. There are so many innovations in this operation, and the public has no idea” said another (Idem).

President Piñera is not afraid of over exposing himself in the media; on the contrary, he seems quite diligent, seeking opportunities to be framed by the cameras. With his personalistic style, the president wants to be everywhere, like an omniscient entity that knows everything and is everywhere. Thus, Piñera can be one day in London smiling with the Premier Minister, and the next in a village in Southern Chile inaugurating a project, and in the night of that very day arriving to the San José Mine to inquire about the progress made in the rescue. TV broadcast, online newspapers using Twitter and now their own TV programs, and radio stations are the ideal mediums to convey that sense of presidential ubiquity, urgency and dynamism Piñera wants to imprint on his leadership.

Since the beginning of Piñera’s mandate there has not been a single day without his image appearing on TV. Mainstream media concentration, plus an aggressive communicational strategy by Secom, have been key in such an accomplishment. Also, the repetition of the news during the day in the different
local and national news, multiply the presence of the president in the homes of those that tune in to the four main public TV channels in the country. Rafael Gumucio, a columnist of The Clinic, said that Piñera belongs to the “specie of the Sarkozy, the Bush, and the Berlusconi” (Gumucio) and that he is not interested in using the TV to promote his ideas, but to televise his political agenda according to the demands and formats of the TV in the same way sponsors and advertising agencies use this medium. Thus, Piñera would usufruct from the TV, Internet or Twitter, or,

[…] anything that you can see on screen, anything that is live, anything that does not require convictions, meditation, patience. Deeply superficial (superficial in a profound way), he knows that nothing is better suited to his character that the speed and noise; the show. (Idem)

Under this perspective the imagined political community seems not to be constituted by citizens anymore, but by (tele)spectators that get their sense of communion through, in this case, monopolistic audiovisual media which selectively put together particular versions of events that can be used to suit specific discourses of national identity.

In a mediated community, emotional responses are a prominent component in all articulations of reality. Emotions are the active ingredient that catalyzes and prompts transfixed audiences to absorb the message, bypassing their

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25 TVN, the state television; Chile Vision, which Piñera was the owner until last August 2010; Canal 13, which is in the hands of the conservative Adrónico Luksic; and Megavision.
critical thinking. In the videosphere the sense of communion is cemented by the impression that others are feeling the same as I feel. And if that is true, the deactivation of emotional responses to avoid identification could also be necessary, as it happened with the hunger strikers.

The Camp Hope event, due to its dramatic structure, constituted an ideal vessel to convey and trigger basic emotions in the tele-audience, and pity, sadness, fear, and happiness were articulated to interpellate them and to provoke emotional responses and identifications. The message Piñera gave at the mine the day the rescuers made contact illustrated the case:

[...] Today Chile is weeping with joy and emotion.

[...] I feel more proud than ever to be Chilean, and to be President of Chile. Prouder than ever for our people.

[...] because this has been something that reflects what a united country can achieve.

[...] But the thrill, the joy that today I am sure has penetrated every household, is something that fills me with emotion, and fills me with joy. (Declaraciones)

Complementary, the images the TV stations and newspapers selected to be published and broadcast followed the same tone. The faces the media showed were never serene or calm, but bodies and faces in distress, pain, or happiness, and always playing between the convention of realism and melodrama: ‘telenovelas’ on a national scale. Indeed, the events in Camp Hope were presented by the media in a format of a long-running serial, that included themes such as
Jonny Barrios’s mistress, Esteban Rojas’ marriage proposal to his sweetheart Jessica, the crying of Minister Golborne, and other instances that provided the narrative with certain dynamism, sensationalism, and most of all, emotional interest.

The top-down production of San José as a heterotopic place, recognized and instrumentalized (objectified) one of Debord’s maxims, which is that “the spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by images” (7). The political revenues for the government came quickly, and the utopian Chile enacted in the social space of Camp Hope served the state, “as a means of control, and hence of domination/power” as Lefebvre would put it. The benefits harvested by the government were many: the “San José effect” helped to increase the popularity of the president in seven different categories of personal and political power in the months of the rescue. The Adimark poll of October 2010 showed that Piñera’s approval rating went up: His “ability to deal with crisis situations” has become his strongest attribute with an 81% approval rating, followed by "active and energetic" at 80% and the "ability to solve problems of the country" at 76%. The attributes of "authority" and "leadership" had ratings of 75% and 73%, maintaining the positive trend shown since August 2010, and were closely followed by the attributes "respected" (71%) and "loved by the Chileans" (68%) (Evalúación).

Media emphasis on the “human side” of the story, and the uncovering and exploitation of the emotional would be exacerbated even more in the second stage.
of the rescue process, and would reach its climax in the *mise en scène* of the rescue on October 12, 2010.

In this act, the central work of the engineers consisted of broadening some of the drilling sites to create a safe way out for the miners, using a capsule specially designed to carry them to the surface, one by one. The Gantt chart for the job estimated four months to accomplish the rescue, so the miners would be liberated some time in December 2010.

Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable, and Camp Hope would not be the exception. Even though the physical access to the village was now restricted to only those with proper accreditation, global spectators walked the little city led by the hand of TV presenters and journalists. The cameras entered into the private space of the miner’s families to show their daily routines, opinions, and moods and brought those images into the private worlds of the viewers. Camp Hope became a sort of reality show that was broadcast 24 hours a day for a national and international audience.

In a rare phenomenon that recalls Joséph Svoboda’s theatre experiments with real time video images at the end of the 1950s, the self-same protagonists of the San José show were able to watch themselves broadcast on a big digital screen placed in the camp, or on their own televisions inside the tents. Thus, in a sort of closed audiovisual circuit the protagonists’ behaviors were affected by their own images, which operated like an immediate feedback of their own life. The subjects reproduced by the images were produced by the images of themselves. They
woke up each morning knowing that they could be framed by the still, TV and movie cameras, and then dressed and behaved accordingly. The digital mirror allows that the subjects of the camera-eye can watch themselves, and become consumers of their own image.

But now that the dramatic question shifted to whether and when the miners could be actually rescued from the mine, the narrator(s) of Camp Hope began to focus on the miners themselves, and the opinions of the family member lost their luster, although they became key players in closing deals with producers from all over the world about future exclusive interviews, books rights, films, travels and invitations to the miners once they were rescued. Once the communication through private letters was authorized between the families on the surface and the miners underground, the negotiations and commercial agreements of these deals were closed, using “palomas” (“doves”), five-foot-long plastic capsules sent through the probes (Rescatados pactaron). Practically from the very beginning the miners not only began to receive fresh air, water and balanced meals through the umbilical cord that connected them with the surface, but also succulent commercial offers-- man does not live on bread alone.

If before the contact the main action happened in the surface of the camp, after the first spectral image of the miner appeared on video, a new spatial dimension was added to the plot as the audience’s interest shifted to knowing what was happening inside the mine, and the media turned their attention to the miners themselves. Nevertheless, the miners always had been the main characters of the event, the structural element around which the fabula was built. Everything
that was said and done in the rescue process had to do with the miners (although, as I have shown so far, it has been actually about the government and their political figures). During the first act, and because the character(s) could not be placed directly before the spectator, the narrators “showed” them through surrogates that talked to and emoted about them (as with the Mapuches). Thus, the woman and the boy in the image were presented to the viewers as the wife and the son of such and such miner, otherwise irrelevant without such a connection. Also, iconography of the miners sprouted in the camp side by side religious icons placed in high places. The disembodied faces of the 33 were reproduced by the media recalling their presence in their absence. Interestingly, the pictures almost never showed the subject full body, recalling the iconography used by the families of the detained-disappeared during Chilean and Argentinean dictatorships.

Nevertheless, once the cameras reached into the mine, the space of Camp Hope expanded sub-terra, and the absent body was emplaced before the audience through washed out color images in real time, although not as an open signal available to everyone. The government kept a tight grip on the stream of information that came out from the mine and what the world saw and heard was what Secom wanted us to see.

With the attention shifted to the miners, the accounts began to revolve around how the miners managed to survive during the 17 days before contact, whether they had interpersonal conflicts, and their anxieties. The miners interacted with the outside world through two umbilical cords, one exclusively devoted to audiovisual content and the other to cater them with water, food,
clothes, and all the necessary material and equipment to help in the rescue process. Through the communication shaft the miners received psychological support from a team of psychologists and experts from NASA who lent their expertise in long stays in reclusive conditions. The nurturing shaft also provided entertaining material to alleviate the long wait, and religious items among which were Bibles, and 33 rosaries personally blessed by the Pope.

The climactic moment of the second and last act happened sooner than expected. On October 12, 2010, when Chile celebrated El Día de la Raza (Columbus Day), and after 69 days underground the miners began to emerge from the mine. After all, it seemed that Warnken’s masculine revival of the foundational myth of the nation appeared magically aligned with another foundational moment, 518 years ago. At any rate, it was the moment with the highest dramatic tension we all were waiting for, and the day Piñera said he had dreamed of: the setting, the lights, the music, and the cameras were ready to cover the moment when the land was to give birth, and the “accoucheurs” were waiting to receive the first born, Florencio Avalos.

The government’s live video feed opened its broadcast with a panoramic of the rescue zone shown from afar: against a rocky background a five legged structure that supported a large wheel above the shaft through which the rescue capsule, the white, red and blue Fenix 2, would be lowered down nearly half a mile, bringing miners back to the surface. Multiple fixed and mobile cameras were placed to cover the event from different angles. Stage left was the area reserved for the Chilean President, his wife and ministers who, along with the
miner’s wife and children, would greet the miner as each emerged from the Fenix 2. A large Chilean flag flanked the authorities’ sector. Stage right was the spectator area where the miners’ coworkers and other members of the families were located. On the front left of the rescue area there was a triage medical station ready to receive the miners and check their health condition.

At 11:19 PM the rescuer Manuel Gonzalez was lowered down to the mine to instruct and to help the miners undertake the journey back to the surface. Fifty minutes later, at 12:11 a.m., the first miner reached the surface, accomplishing a rescue that would last 22 hours to get the 33 miners and the six rescuers that descended into the mine back.

Once a miner get out of the capsule he was greeted by his wife and other members of his family of his choice, then he was welcomed by the president himself, who remained in the rescue zone during the 22 hours that the rescue lasted. During that period of time he received calls from several presidents and celebrities from different countries: British Primer Minister David Cameron and U.S. President Obama, among others, and salutations via Twitter by Ricky Martin, Sarah Palin, and even from Commander Doug Wheelock, who sent his congratulations for the successful rescue from the Expedition 25, from the International Space Station, which orbited 220 miles far from the earth. Millions of people from all over the world watched the event from their televisions, Internet and cell phones. In the U.S. more than 10 million people were watching CNN, Fox News and MSNBC as the first of 33 miners was rescued (Mackey). Mike Rowe, the host of the reality show “Dirty Jobs” on the Discovery Channel,
told CNN’s Larry King, “Whatever it is we call reality that passes for TV is nonsense compared to what really is happening right in front of us” (Stelter). The rescue in Camp Hope, however, was not pure actuality but the assembling of the real, a mise en scene, an audiovisual device in action that put together a version of reality. In that sense, the event followed the structure of the reality television genre. It is true that the miners were trapped, and that they were not actors, but once the cameras arrived into the mine and broadcast was made possible, the miners began to perform actions and activities for the camera, ergo for an audience. They knew that they were being monitored 24 hours a day, and soon after they were found alive they learned that outside they were considered celebrities, and that their story was catching the attention of the world.

In turn, the Chilean government also knew that it was an opportunity to project the image of the country to the world, and capitalize on it politically and economically. The government blurred news and entertainment into each other. Here the real was artificially produced as real and become “hyperreal”, pure simulacrum (Baudrillard), where the real protagonists, the victims, immersed in a real and dramatic situation, become performers of their own story, but according to the version of the owner of the event, the producer-director, the government. The anesthetization of the tragedy, and the staging of everyday life in Camp Hope gave rise to a version of Chile that it is not, but the heterotopic version of a perfect Chile projected into the videosphere.

According to Foucault, one of the roles of heterotopias is to create “a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged
as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled" (27), and that is the case of San José. During the 69 days of its existence Camp Hope remained in the margins of all spaces that commonly animate Chilean society, and although geographically situated in the periphery, this improbable city suddenly became the center, the spotlight around which the life of Chilean society revolved for a while, transforming the rest of the country situated in its outer limits. This inversion was accomplished by the staging and broadcast orchestrated by the government that knew how to attract the attention of local and international media and summon the gaze of millions of spectators toward this mirage in the middle of the desert.

The attempt of finding those responsible for the tragedy, the time for accountability of entrepreneurial greed, and governmental negligence, were surprisingly postponed, or perhaps irremediably forgotten behind the urgency of rescuing the victims. It was as if the whole mechanisms of justice that society has to go after the culprits could not operate simultaneously to the effort of finding the miners. Chile was put on tenterhooks for two months under the spell of the spectacle that the government and its strategic ally, the mass media, started to stage on day two. At this point, Debord’s third formulation, which sounds surprisingly similar to the heterotopian property of being in systemic relation with all the other sites of society (Foucault 24), comes out pristine:

The spectacle presents itself simultaneously as all of society, as part of society, and as instrument of unification. As a part of society it is specifically the sector which concentrates all gazing and all consciousness. Due to the very fact that this sector is
separate, it is the common ground of the deceived gaze and of false consciousness, and the unification it achieves is nothing but an official language of generalized separation. (Debord 7)

And with my gaze exclusively focused on San José, I witnessed not only how the Chilean President, one of his ministers, and eventually the 33 themselves got onto the stage to become world celebrities, but also how this spot in the middle of the desert grew to the extent to become a kind of Tierra de Jauja, a mirage where the proverbial Chile was exemplarily enacted. Suddenly, Camp Hope became a model against which it was possible to juxtapose the other Chile, and so, to appreciate both its accomplishments and shortcomings.

Thus, unexpectedly, Camp Hope became an enacted utopia where a centralist government provided and satisfied all the necessities of its citizens, while beyond its borders the income difference ratio between the richest 20% and poorest 20% of Chileans stands at 14 to 1, persists one of the most unequal distributions in the hemisphere. In Camp Hope the health system was free, and the very Minister of Health was the GP of the miner’s families and the trapped miners themselves. In the other Chile, in contrast, long waiting lists prevent people from being timely attended to in the public hospitals, while the private clinics offer opportune but costly services. In Camp Hope policemen, instead of violently repressing people and shutting down legitimate protests, played soccer with the children while smiling to the camera. The Minister of Education in person inaugurated a colorful classroom for elementary school students, giving free education to 100% of children living in Camp Hope, in just one afternoon.
Meanwhile, across the mirror the educational system is still in crisis. While in the Land of Jauja (the neverland of milk and honey) food, housing, education, public lighting, communications, TV transmissions, Internet, and transportation were all free of charge for everyone who lived there, the economic neoliberal model continuously was legitimizing exploitation and favoring the owner of the capital. Camp Hope was eco-friendly, while beyond its boundaries thermoelectric plants are authorized to operate in nature sanctuaries. If in Camp Hope there were neither ethnic or class conflicts, nor crime, and the only jail remained empty all the time, the dystopian Chile criminalizes the indigenous people, accuses them of being terrorists, and incarcerates them using laws cooked up during the Pinochet regime. The penitentiary system is collapsing because of overpopulation, and the number of people behind bars is the highest in Latin America. The plenipotentiary and efficient socialist/technocrat government that ruled in Camp Hope, contrasted with the conservative and populist government that privileges private companies that put utilities over the well being of their workers, as the case of the tragedy of San José and its 33 victims testifies.

Camp Hope accomplished its double purpose of rescuing the 33 and revamping the government. We lived our utopia for three months, and in that time, nobody died in Camp Hope, and there were no homeless and no beggars in its one and only street. Yet, the enactment of a temporal utopia has its double edge: by showing what a perfect Chile could look like, the spaces that remain, that is to say the Chile situated in the periphery of Camp Hope, are exposed. Interestingly, some people did not want to leave Camp Hope with all its
fascination, but as it happens with the feast of fools and the carnival, transitory heterotopias vanish, leaving us with our everyday messy world. For Piñera, also, the time of celebration was left behind as four months after the rescue his popularity is lower than ever before. But, what about producing a new one? It is tempting.

Camp Hope was more than a narrative that addressed utopia; it was a materialization of a utopia. Camp Hope existed and literally took and perfected the social spaces and the institutions that operated and defined Chilean society at that moment. Without doubt there is an enormous value in that accomplishment, and Piñera’s government demonstrated that its team of technocrats can do things right, make wise decisions and meet the goals they set. In Camp Hope the government showed governance, and that is an objective, irrefutable datum. The problem is that once the production was done, and even during the performance stage of the heterotopia, the same characters that gave life to the story, gave answer to the dramatic questions, and solved the conflict—the president, the ministers, the policemen—play reversed characters in the everyday Chile. It is the political cross-dressing that becomes evident when juxtaposing Camp Hope to Chilean society that is questionable. Perhaps the true scandal resided in presenting an official site as a place where the “hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions” (Bakhtin 10) were all suspended or inverted for the participant, while outside, in the spectator’s space, the “existing hierarchy, the existing religions, political, and moral values” (idem) and norms remained unchanged. Camp Hope was, to some extent, the official feast presented as a carnival, a place
where the authorities performed their official roles following a political script impossible to replicate on the main stage. In sum, it was a carnival for the temporal enjoyment of the ruling class, while the rest of us watched the feast, transfixed by our TV screens.
CHAPTER 3

THE MAPUCHE HUNGER STRIKE: A HETEROTOPIA OF DEVIANCE

Just 700 miles from San José, in the southern region of La Araucanía, a “heterotopia of deviation” was underway. While the 33 miners were carefully rationing their food in order to survive as long as possible, 32 other men – all incarcerated indigenous Mapuche activists – were staging a hunger strike. At issue were millions of acres of ancestral lands, which had been expropriated by the Chilean government in the 18th century – an all too familiar tale in this hemisphere. Neither the national mass media nor the government paid attention to the strike, until massive street protests in support of the 32 began to explode in different parts of the country, and the international community began to demand the intervention of the Chilean government in the matter.

The geopolitical conflict between Mapuche people and the state stems from the two different spatial conceptions held by the counterparts: while the Mapuche’s mental spatiality considers the usurped ancestral lands as still theirs, the state recognizes the current private Chilean settlements as the legitimate owners of the land. Without political representation in Congress, Mapuche organizations organized protests and proceeded to occupy some farms and sabotage part of the infrastructure of mega factories located in the region. The government answered by militarizing the zone in order to protect capitalist interests and to repress Mapuche mobilizations. Invoking an Antiterrorist Law created by Pinochet in the 80s, the previous and current democratic governments incarcerated Mapuche leaders, accusing them of being terrorists. In doing so, the
state reactivated a heterotopia of deviation, a space “in which those whose behavior is deviant from ‘required’ norms are placed” (Foucault 25), a spatialization that has its roots in the marginalization and cornering of the Mapuche since the 18th century.

An emaciated Felipe Huenchullan poses in front of a camera smuggled into the hospital of Victoria on September 201026 where he was rushed after a decompensation.27 The image shows an eroded body after 65 days of fasting. He knows that his picture is important for the cause, as it will be the first hunger striker’s image to reach the alternative media (it was never printed in the

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26 At the moment of the picture, Felipe was around his 65th day of fasting, and his body was in starvation mode, a state in which the body mines the muscles and vital organs for energy, the body temperature is lowered, disturbances in heart rhythm and neurological and psychiatric symptoms, including hallucinations and convulsions, can began to appear, among other symptoms (The Merck Manuals).

27 According to the he American Heritage Medical Dictionary a decompensation is a “failure of the heart to maintain adequate blood circulation, marked by labored breathing, engorged blood vessels, and edema”.

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mainstream newspapers), and will be spread out through the internet, becoming a visible proof of the protest. He probably knows that the hunger strike cannot be effective if the actions are not publicized and do not reach the intended national and international audience.

Like others Mapuche activists, Felipe was detained on October 2009, tortured (Relato de tortura), and accused of participating in the burning of a truck and an assault on a toll gate, crimes that have been classified within the Antiterrorist Law. Unarmed against a body politics that criminalizes their demands as a people, the activists give urgent voice to their demands by refusing to eat solid food; pitting their bodies against the political body represented by the state. The hunger strike is charged with bearing the burden of political exclusion, and eating would jeopardize the protest in rejection of that exclusion. So, Felipe stares at us as if waiting for an answer, demanding a response to the fact that he is determined to die for a cause, and that for such a cause he put himself in the process of dying by starvation. By exposing his body in a convincing way, and allowing himself to be photographed, and looking so pointedly back at the viewer, Felipe positions himself as a subject to be seen, scrutinized by an unknowing reader who, motivated by the image, will read the picture’s caption and the narrative that explains who he is, and why he took this extreme measure for a legitimate cause while decrying the illegitimacy of the jailer. So, in posing for the camera Felipe demands that we, the spectators, make a decision, to take a political and ethical stance that cannot be resolved by doing nothing. Inaction makes us accomplices to his suffering and possible death. As Felipe presents his body in
hunger to us, and the photographer stages that body within the camera frame, capturing it in an immaculate white shroud, as wrapped for burial, we are held responsible for his final destiny.

Although strictly speaking political hunger strikes are not previously rehearsed but spontaneously written as they are synchronically experienced by the strikers, they also reenact past scenarios performed by other protesters. In that sense, the script is already written, but the setting and characters and aims are situationally and historically contingent (Taylor 28-30). Felipe’s picture becomes a signifier among other signifiers—the picture of the Cuban dissident Guillermo Fariñas, the Tamil militant Rasaiah Parthipan, Ghandi, and others— that build or add to an ongoing narrative, which could be called: “The exhibition of hunger strikers through the eras,” as Barthes puts it in his *Mythologies* (82).

Through Felipe’s performance we are able not only to get into the close, controlled space of the prisons, and so to know about the condition of the other 31 strikers, but also we are able, or invited, to gain knowledge of their political motives and tactics to accomplish their objectives in a non-violent way. For us, this is an opportunity to see the Mapuche activist devoid of that violent image of ferocious terrorist that the press constructs for its audience, giving a path to the image of an individual that will fight for his cause peacefully, in a non-violent way. It is through a concerted hunger strike that the prison, the heterotopia of deviance par excellence, became a place where the confined “indio prohibido” (Hales, prohibited Indian) – that one who rebels against the neoliberal multicultural politics sponsored by the state– gets the chance to contest the
prejudices and to be heard by the political body. Thus, while in the Military Parade performed in the capital, the government openly exhibits “el indio permitido,” (permitted Indian) -- who would passively accept, without questioning, the neoliberal politics of the state towards the Mapuche -- the incarcerated prohibited Mapuche, those who have been accused of perpetrating terrorist acts, also contest that idealization by peaceful means.

**Mapuches and Pinochet’s Antiterrorist Law**

Prisons –gender-segregated and controlled spaces where those individuals whose conduct transgresses criminal laws are confined by the respective repressive state apparatus of a given society– are institutions par excellence of the heterotopia of deviation. Their function is historically specific and operates according to what society defines as criminal conduct.

Thus, in Chile for example, between 1973 and 1989 prisons were not only used to incapacitate offenders for their criminal behavior, but also to seclude individuals who sustained political ideologies that were contrary to those of the autocratic government in place. At that time, political ideologies situated to the left of the political spectrum (i.e. communism, socialism) were proscribed through the summary promulgation of laws that criminalize such ideologies and sanction their adherents. A case in hand is the Law-18.314 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional), also known as the Antiterrorist Law (AL), which was promulgated by the government of Augusto Pinochet on May 16, 1984. Minutely crafted, the AL contains articles that are sufficiently broad and ambiguous to typify as a terrorist
act actions and behaviors that otherwise could be qualified as misconducts to be seen in a civil and not a military court.

For instance, the 1st and 2nd Article state what will constitute a terrorist crime:

1st Article, Section 2: The offense is committed to force unwanted resolutions from the authority or impose demands over it,

2nd Article, Clause No 3: The attempt of murder or actions against the physical integrity of the President of the Republic, or other political, judicial, military, police, or religious authority, or individuals with diplomatic immunity, because of their official position.

2nd Article, Clause No 5: The act of conspiracy when it is oriented to commit crimes classified as terrorists in Article No 1.

Typified in that way, throwing a shoe against a judicial authority could be labeled as a terrorist act, and concocting to do so, could also fall into that category.

Besides the crimes enumerated above, the LA’s list of possible terrorist crimes are the following: murder; mutilation; infliction of wounds; kidnapping; arson; hostage-taking; derailing of trains; sending explosive substances; hijacking or attacks on ships, planes, trains, and buses; the detonation of explosive or incendiary substances that endanger life; and illegal association to commit any of these crimes.

Perhaps, the most flexible, and so controversial crime included in the list is “arson”, which is arguably the most common terrorist charge against Mapuche
activists. As the Human Rights Watch report (2004), devoted to study the strategy employed by the Chilean government to quell unrest sparked by land conflicts in the Araucania, states:

The most questionable crime included in this list is precisely the one most frequently applied to the Mapuche—that is, arson, including its less serious forms. Offenses under the anti-terrorism law include setting fire to uninhabited buildings and “woods, cornfields, pasture, scrub, fences, or fields (Art.476 (3) of the Criminal Code). The anti-terrorist law in force during the Pinochet era made no reference to arson. (22)

Since one could be accused of perpetrating a terrorist act for practically anything that the authority could interpret as such, it was necessary to devise a mechanism to ensure that a military trial will ratify the “presumption,” and the ruse adopted was the legal figure of the “witnesses without face,” that is to say a “witness” who can testify against the accused without revealing her/his identity, or even be physically present in the trial. The legal figure of the “faceless” witnesses, as it has been crafted in the AL, opens the possibility that the witnesses “can bear false testimonies, as it actually has happened, without risking punishment or be brought to trial. It can be a person who deliberately lies, even under the incentive of monetary payment made by the public prosecutor,” as Sergio Aguiló, member of the Human Right Commission of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies has pointed out (Scheuch). Aguiló’s concerns stem from the systematic use of false witnesses who testified in the trials against the 32 Mapuche strikers, (idem). In such
circumstances, it is not possible to ensure a fair trail to any individuals accused under the AL.

The AL was one of several legal tools that the Pinochet regime devised to not only detain, incarcerate and punish political adversaries, and repress social subversion, but also to incriminate innocent ones to hide crimes against humanity committed by the regime itself.

I go into such detail about the law under Pinochet because, unbelievable as it may seem, it is the same law that has been invoked by democratic governments against Mapuche activists in the last ten years, and especially during the government of Michel Bachelet (2006-09), which resulted in the imprisonment of the men on the hunger strike that is the subject of this chapter. The government’s delegitimization of the Mapuche political movement at the end of the 1990s led to its radicalization and the progressive adoption of different forms of protest and actions. Thus, Mapuche organizations as the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM)\(^\text{28}\) and the Consejo de Todas las Tierras (CTT) began in 2000 to perform symbolic and effective seizures of ancestral lands now occupied by mega industries, mainly private forestry companies. The symbolic seizures consist on taking over, for a short period of time, former Mapuche lands. Following the state occupation, the participants claim ownership of the land, and leave the place.

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\(^{28}\) The Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM) is one of the Mapuche organizations whose activism claims the right of repossessing Mapuche ancestral lands. CAM leaders have been systematically persecuted, imprisoned and accused of terrorist acts by governments of the center-left political coalition that ruled Chile during 20 consecutive years after the Pinochet era, as well as the current government of Sebastián Piñera, which is supported by the same parties that supported the dictatorial government of Augusto Pinochet.
some way, symbolic seizures are preparatory acts for permanent seizures that Mapuche organizations, like the CAM, perform as a process of revindicación and land recovery. Usually, occupations are made in response to unanswered requests to buy the respective estate by authorities. Permanent occupations last until the occupiers are forcibly expelled by the special police force deployed in the territory. The government’s unrestricted defense of capitalistic interests favor the property rights of the companies instead of that of the Mapuche. To defend the land occupied by the companies, the government proceeded to militarize the Araucanía (the ancestral Mapuche territory) and, through implementation of the AL, to criminalize the activists’ actions, which means to criminalize the activists themselves. Repression, harassment, persecution and detentions of Mapuche leaders and “comuneros” escalated as the clashes between special police forces, private guard and Mapuches began to increase. Today, the effort to get their land back is about more than retaking the physical territory that belongs to them, it is also a question of recovering the ancestral territory before it becomes totally depleted of the natural resources it still contains. The voracity of the private Chilean companies and transnational is eloquently described by Diamela Eltit:\(^{29}\)

> [...]The voracious implementation of hypercapitalism has re-set, at a global scale, the prolonged (and epic) resistance of native peoples against territorial occupation, to the extent that the expansion of capital is based on environmental degradation and

\(^{29}\) Diamela Eltit is a novelist and a leading Chilean intellectual. She is currently the Distinguished Global Professor of Creative Writing in Spanish at NYU.
requires the expropriation of territories allocated to the various communities.

And in this new and powerful attack against indigenous peoples—to once again remove them from their lands—the Mapuche people has been protesting and protecting themselves against this new form of mass invasion, this time on the part of large national private companies and transnational corporations. A relentless invasion like this one is based on the exaltation of consumerism or eviction (with the complicity of the Chilean state) to establish mega industries that have been already provoking irrecoverable health damage to the inhabitants as well as the irreversible destruction of flora and fauna in their territory. (Eltit)

In this scenario and in defense of capitalist interests the government, and with the constant pressure of the Conservative parties on its shoulders, began to invoke the AL, accusing Mapuche leaders and even the average Mapuche person of being terrorists. The terrorism paranoia and over-dramatization reached its peak in 2008-09, when the right began to cry that in the Araucanía they had lost the rule of law, that it was in “flames,” and accused the CAM and CTT of being associated to the ETA30, the FARC31, Chavez, and even to radical Islamists in Iraq and Iran. Unfortunately, the Chilean government of Bachelet bought the claim,

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30 ETA – *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (Basque Homeland and Freedom) is an armed Basque nationalist and separatist organization.
31 FARC – *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla organization based in Colombia.
and in February 2008, tried to sustain the thesis with more solid evidence by asking help from the U.S. Government, as the following document published by Wikileaks shows:

4. As had Secretariat General of the Presidency Minister Viera-Gallo the week before, Perez Yoma raised with the Ambassador GOC concern with the "Mapuche issue," Chile's largest indigenous group and one that has over the past several months seemingly taken a turn to radical and sometimes violent action. While intelligence is unclear, funding of the Mapuche by the FARC "and Chavez" is possible although, he noted, he wasn't sure some of the monies aren't being funneled off to other activities since Mapuche radicals remain "weak and disorganized." Potential Mapuche ties to ETA are also possible. "I would like," he said, "your help in following the money." RAO Chief noted his agency is working with Chilean colleagues to identify FARC and ETA actors outside Chile who might have potential links to Mapuche radicals. Legatt added that the FBI is coordinating with the Carabineros to assist in identification and potential prosecution of actors within Chile.

5. (C) Perez Yoma said he would appreciate drawing on the broader experience of USG experts on indigenous issues. E/Pol Counselor replied the Embassy is currently coordinating
internally on how to best provide assistance to the GOC.

Besides intelligence sharing, we are considering how to use public diplomacy assets. The U.S. has experience at both national and state levels on the integration of indigenous peoples into the broader U.S. society. We want to identify and share with the GOC what has and hasn't worked for us.

Perez Yoma suggested the Embassy work closely with Deputy Secretary Felipe Harboe on this issue. (Note: Embassy has an excellent working relationship with Harboe on other law enforcement issues) [Gallego-Diaz]

In this rarefied and volatile climate of suspicions, speculations, and paranoia more than fifty Mapuches were detained and held in custody starting on October 2009, and seventeen of them were accused of "terrorist conspiracy" and attacking the prosecutor Mario Elgueta. According to Elgueta’s version, the ambush took place on October 16, 2008 in the rural area of Tirua, VIII Region, when a group of about 15 masked men with shotguns attacked him and his retinue of militarized police. Nobody was injured in the attack. Elgueta accused ex-leader of the CAM, Hector Llaitul, as the mastermind behind the attack. On December 19, 2010, the military tribunal acquitted Llaitul of several charges including robbery and intimidation, attempted murder, illegal possession of firearms and terrorist conspiracy for allegedly participating in an Oct. 15, 2008, ambush of Elgueta. Nevertheless, a civil trial for Llaitul and other 16 mapuche activists is still pending for the same charges.
As the military trial began in November 2010 the inconsistencies of the accusations and the witnesses without face began to emerge. Pedro Cayuqueo, Mapuche journalist and Editor of the newspaper *Azkintuwé*, ironized the absurdity of the whole situation:

[…] the profile of the Mapuche that have been incarcerated is different from the “dangerous terrorists,” the State claims they are. These are in fact young farmers, men of effort and selfless parents. We are not talking about bearded Afghan Mujahideen. Neither of Iraqi militants addicted to the Quran and the AK-47 who are fighting a holy war against infidels and *winkas* (non-Mapuche person) of an apostate Chilean state. Nevertheless, there is someone who believes so; the young prosecutor Cruz, head of the investigation against the Mapuche. And to prove it he has used all kind of means, even the Pinochet Antiterrorist Law. It was reported that 36 “faceless witnesses” and more than 100 police officers and the PDI will be summoned to give evidence to support his feverish thesis. After two weeks of trial, everything seems to go smoothly for Cruz and company. So far, their witnesses and experts have been untiringly talking about a planned “ambush”, which would be “like the typical tactics employed by FARC’s”. They talked about the existence of highly trained “riflemen” (although ballistic tests ruled out the use of weapons ... “rifles without rifles”). But, most surprising of all, they
testify of obscure connections between pro-Mapuche websites and Iraqi computer servers. In Iraq! (Cayuqueo)\(^{32}\)

Irony could be a good means for an acerbic critique of the legal scaffold and presumptions mounted against Mapuche activists and commoners, but although the trial is laughable in many ways, the charges are serious, and the Mapuches are risking possible sentences as exorbitant as 120 hundred years in prison. Unable to resolve the Mapuche conflict (as it has been labeled by the government) politically, the government opted to use the trials and the prison system as a deterrent and incapacitation, and the AL has been instrumental in those purposes. The 17 Mapuche accused of terrorist conspiracy were among the 32 that later started the hunger strike. By demanding the derogation of the AL and claiming they be considered political prisoners, they are targeting to dismantle the traditional way the \textit{winka} has been dealing with the Mapuche people, that is to say, by coercion instead of negotiation. Interestingly, it is within a heterotopia of deviation the Chilean state is using to stop Mapuche activists from furthering their ideals, and in this same heterotopia–the prison–where the Mapuche struggle would gain momentum in 2010. To understand this seemingly contradictory state of affairs, it is necessary first to look at the history of Mapuche/state relations in Chile.

\(^{32}\) It is important to point out that since 1999 the Comando Hernan Trizano (Hernan Trizano Commando), a paramilitary group organized to defend the land from “the Mapuche aggression”, operate, with total impunity in the Araucania region. It is believed that this command has staged several attacks on the same properties supposedly they defend, as a strategy to incriminate Mapuche activists and organizations in the crimes. (Burdiles, Cayuqueo)
The Automatic Naturalization of the Naturals

The binarism Chilean/Mapuche, which is the basis of the current conflicts in the Araucanía, was artificially resolved early in the Chilean Republic. In 1819, the Supreme Director Bernardo O’Higgins promulgated the executive order 4-3-1819, which gives the indigenous people the status of Chilean citizens:

[...] Therefore, I declare that [the natives], hereinafter called Chilean citizens, free people like any other inhabitant of the Chilean State. They will have equal voice and representation, and be able to perform any kind of contracts, to be legally defended in their civil causes, to marry, to trade, to choose the arts according to their will, exercise any profession in the letters or in the army according to their skills. Also, they are free from taxation. As a consequence of their equality with all citizens, even as not be expressed in the decree, they should assume their responsibilities in supporting and defending the motherland.

Santiago, Chile, March 4, 1819 - Echeverría O'Higgins. (Contreras 65)

Giving, unilaterally and by decree, citizenship to the “naturals” of the land, the Chilean State paved the way to exert eventual control over the territory already conceived as a continuous space from an undefined point somewhat north of Copiapó (lat 27° 22’ S) to the Estrecho de Magallanes in the South. The syllogism was simple; if the occupiers of a land are Chileans, then the land they inhabit is Chilean. The territorial discontinuity that the Mapuche territory meant for Chilean sovereignty will be actually erased through the military occupation of the
Mapuche land and its consequent incorporation into the Chilean state at the end of the 19th century. For the dominant Chilean culture territorial integration and naturalization of the Mapuche in the 19th century implied cultural assimilation, which made it impossible to think of them as an autonomous people, a socio-political conception that has been carried on until today. As I discuss in the MP heterotopia, the ongoing process of *chilenización* of the Mapuche is well illustrated in the Military Parade 2010, where the Mapuche were portrayed as lonely characters integrated in a sea of other Chilean characters. Here the Mapuche were represented as forming part of a stock of characters defined by the economic role in Chilean society, such as a worker, a student, a soldier, a professor, or a doctor. This functionalist envisioning of the Mapuche resists the notion of regarding them as a distinctive human group with the aspirations “to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the framework of the States in which they live” (C169) as the Convention 169 preambles. Instead of distinguishing them from other sections of the national community, the government chose to atomize, and “mimetize” their presence, forcing an image that has been undermined? Disavowed? by the ongoing conflict in the ancestral territories of the Araucanía.

For two hundred years the Chilean state has been refusing to address the issue of cultural differences within the boundaries of the nation state. The imagined community the criollos conceptualized for Chile, which is still in place today, considered the territorial unification as a synonym for cultural unification
that ensure the physical and symbolic boundaries of the nation and protect its sovereignty. In other words, they believed that the very subsistence of the Chilean republic depended on the precept that to one nation corresponds only one, homogenous, cultural system. Thus, a people that inhabited the land before the arrival of the Spanish conqueror, and that subsisted for three hundred years without being subdued by the crown, was “integrated” in three stages and strategies: first, by legally and unilaterally naming them “citizens” of the new Chilean republic; second, by militarily invading, usurping and colonizing their land; and third by implementing a capitalist system that exploits and erodes the land of their ancestors, and negatively impacts the remnant land, called “reductions” by the owner of the logos, where the current Mapuche live today.

These three stages mark a process of cultural and territorial seizure that rests upon the systematic exertion of coercive–never hegemonic–power by the Chilean state. Getting what the state wants by force, the ruling class never felt the necessity of knowing the Mapuche culture. There was no reason for doing that in the past, and still it is not necessary in the present. An illustrative example is that the only “winkas”33 interested in learning mapudungun, the Mapuche language, are detectives and policemen deployed in the zones of conflict to spy the rebels in their own territory (Eltit).

On the contrary, the Mapuche have been relentlessly learning, by experience and precept, about Chilean culture and society; they learned Spanish

33 In Mapudungun, the Mapuche language, the term “Winka” or “wingka” refers to a non-Mapuche person.
without forgetting mapudungun. They learned how the political and judicial systems work, and how the dominant culture regards them. The current Mapuche leaders learned about Chilean idiosyncrasy and arrogance by both dealing with and experiencing the dominant culture in the space of interdiction (Bhabha), and by gazing on it from within, especially by studying in their schools and at Chilean universities. As a matter of fact, the generations of Mapuche leaders that are currently leading the protests, squatting, forcing the governments to negotiate with them, and to recognize and compensate the historical pillage sponsored by the Chilean State against the Mapuche people, are mostly a generation of professionals graduated from Chilean universities as lawyers, social workers, sociologists, teachers, and journalists.

These enlightened Mapuche leaders were forged in the eighties during the dictatorship, and entered the stage in the 1990s, when the first democratic government after Pinochet attempted to establish a new deal with the Mapuche via a Constitutional Reform that formally would recognize the indigenous people of Chile, and create a mechanism of restitution of ancestral lands (Bengoa 184). To make it possible, then-recently elected President Patricio Aylwin constituted the Comisión Especial de Pueblos Indígenas (CEPI), which with the presence of ten indigenous leaders prepared a draft law that were representative of the aspirations of the indigenous people.

In September 1993, the Senate promulgated the Indigenous Law, which was a shadow of the original bill prepared by the CEPI. The Senate argued that the concept of “pueblos indígenas” endangered the cohesive character of the
State, opening the way for future indigenous separatist movement. José Aylwin, Director of the Institute of Indigenous Studies of La Universidad de la Frontera, enumerates the factors that lead to the miniaturization of the original project in the following terms:

Among the main objections that right-wing parties made to these projects in the parliament are those which opposed to the use of the term “indigenous peoples,” because they considered the term as a threat against the unity of the state, and a potential incentive for future separatist movements […] that could mean the establishment of special benefits for indigenous, which would contradict the constitutional right of equality. (Aylwin 12)

The precept of one nation, one cultural system surfaces again in the mouth of contemporary legislators that were not able to visualize the peaceful and productive coexistence of different people within the boundaries of the nation, so they say:

[…] at unison, that in the Constitution the concept of “People” was ambiguous and that it was inconceivable the possibility that there were two or more peoples. They said that within the Chilean territory there was only one people, and therefore only one Nation and State, which represented all Chileans. (Bengoa 199)

Unable to think outside the paradigm, or at least redefine its prescribed limits, the legislators in the Congress used almost the same argument to question and delay the ratification of the C169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention for 20
years (it was finally ratified in September 2009). Paradoxically, by blocking laws that were in tune with the legitimate demands of the Mapuche and other indigenous people such as the Rapa Nui, the State unleashed a new indigenous insurrection they thought they were preventing.

The first major Mapuche uprising occurred in 1997 when the government of Eduardo Frei began the construction of the Represa Ralco (Ralco Dam) which would leave under water the land of dozens of Mapuche families in the communities of Ralco Lepoy and Quepuca Ralco. The government bypassed the opinion of Mapuche organizations and the affected communities who questioned the project and the land swaps it proposed for relocating the families. In doing so, the government disavowed the very Indigenous Law that had been approved during the previous government and that, although insufficient, constituted a step forward in political terms and a ground for future negotiation between the government and the indigenous people. The Ralco case ended destabilizing the precarious political balance between the State and Mapuche:

In August 1989, the government ended a period of relations between the State and indigenous peoples, particularly the Mapuche people. The Mapuche communities became aware of it. Suddenly, the institutional framework that with much hope and effort had been built between the government and the indigenous community was broken ... Malleco communities, Arauco and Cautin began new protests, ignoring any obligation contemplated in previous agreements with the government...Thus emerged a new
generation of young leaders who did not participate or did not feel bound by the covenant signed during 1980s. (Bengoa Historia de un conflicto 215)

Since 1989, this literate generation of Mapuche has been organizing and raising awareness in their communities about the Mapuche struggle, their rights as an indigenous people based on international laws that speak of autonomy, self-determination and symbiosis in which the state they live. Also, they have been theorizing about their cause, making alliances with Chilean intellectuals and historians, and performing actions to bring about the needed political, social and environmental changes to reposition themselves as people. Rallies and protests against the government and the mega industries that occupy and usufruct of their ancestral lands have resulted in the reactivation of the repressive state apparatus against them.

Back to the Hunger Strike

On July 15, 2010, two weeks before the tunnel collapsed in San José, the 32 Mapuches confined in prisons scattered in different points of the region began a coordinated hunger strike demanding the suspension of the Antiterrorist Law, the demilitarization of the territory, the recognition of their status as political prisoners instead of terrorists, and the organization of a negotiation table to resolve the dispute over land and Mapuche autonomy. The Mapuche territory,

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34 The 32 Mapuches were held in five different prisons located in the southern cities of Concepción, Lebu, Angol, Valdivia and Temuco. They communicated with each other through spokespersons chosen by Mapuche organizations to be the official representatives of the Mapuche in each prison. Also, family members that visited them served as liaisons to the external world.
which is already a place out of place within the country, was somehow relocated and spatialized in those small cells, and it is in this carceral space that the body/bodies? of the 32 becomes the site of the insurrection and a means of pressure and negotiation. The body-territory of the 32 was secluded and restricted, as the land of their ancestors was likewise stolen and reduced. Unexpectedly, the hunger strike became a symbol of the Mapuche cause over their land and rights as a nation. Hector Llaitul, the leader of the protest, expressed well the Mapuche struggle:

> In the Mapuche territory there are laws that do not operate in the rest of the country. Where are the militarized lands? Where are they prosecuting political activists? [...] In what other place is the Antiterrorist Law invoked? To our knowledge, it happens only in the Mapuche land, which allows us to say that we live under a dictatorial state. Hence, for us the expressions of resistance and self-defense are legitimate, especially if all political channels have been closed [...] in such circumstances our body is the only thing left to protest. (Héctor Llaitul)

Thus, this heterotopia of deviation became a counter-space of Camp Hope with all its media paraphernalia and narratives of success and rebirth, because while the government was investing millions of dollars in rescuing the 33 miners, 32 Mapuche men were left to die.

> Without doubt a hunger strike is an extreme and extraordinary measure to take, although an entirely legitimate form of protest in a democratic system where
dictatorial laws still operate. For while Chile is celebrating its Bicentenary as a free and independent nation, citizens are still imprisoned, invoking an Antiterrorist Law that was hatched during the Pinochet regime.

Foucault clarifies that the disappearance of public executions “marks a slackening of the hold on the body” by the penal system (Foucault 1998, 10), and becomes the instrument “to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property” (11). Heterotopias of deviance, like prisons, are produced then to suspend the rights of those individuals whose behavior departs from the required norms prescribed by a given society, but without inflicting physical pain, which would be “no longer the constituent element of the penalty” (Idem). In such circumstances, the decision of the 32 to target their own body/bodies by fasting represents a protest that undermines the economy of Chilean prisons which are obliged, at least theoretically, to monitor the health and welfare of individual inmates, and to ensure that proper procedures are pursued to preserve life.35

Interestingly, the subversion of the function of the prison system, which legitimizes punishment by the deprivation of liberty, but that does not authorize corporal punishment, echoes in a reverse sort of way that of Caupolicán, a Mapuche leader who legendarily maintained a personal sense of liberty in the face

35 On September 2, 2010, the Supreme Court Prosecutor, Monica Maldonado, recognized that Mapuche political prisoners were being physically punished, by using methods and techniques prohibited by Chilean law and international treaties. According to her, the inmates were placed in solitary confinement and subjected to light deprivation to undermine their position. Maldonado also said that the torture procedures were applied with the consent of the authorities (Leiva).
of horrifying corporal punishment: Impaled by the Spaniards in 1558, who made him sit on a stake and then pelted him with arrows, he is famous for having met this torture as a bridegroom would his bride.

Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga describes Caupolicán’s penalty in the following terms:

He was nude, uncoiffed, and barefoot, dragging two thick chains as fetters, with a rope around the neck, and knotted, which the executioner twisted, fenced around with arms, and stared at by the gaping common rabble, who were doubting what their eyes saw, so impossible a happening.

In this way he gained the platform, from the fort a bowshot’s distance, from the ground reared half a pikestaff, visible from all directions.

To the pole of execution came he, where the atrocious sentence was to fall, his face contemptuous, smirking at the jowls of horror, saying: “Since my star is baleful, and prepares this bitter banquet, let it come, for it I hunger! Stingless is the woe that’s final!”

[…] Meekly then he let them set him on the sharp, vindictive stake-point.

Not the sharpened shaft incisive tearing through his frame and entrails was sufficient to compel him to surrender to his torment: with serene, heroic aspect, twitching not a lip or eyelash,
placid he remained, as if he on the bridal couch were seated.

(Lancaster 305)

Public torture operates with a double purpose: first, it is implemented to satisfy the requirements of justice by punishing the culprits for their deviation of the norms hold by those that impart the penalties, and second, it seeks to “re-educate” the audience by expurgating their desires to act against the desired political order by which the executors of the punishment abide. The people who can’t help but watch the exemplary execution of the Mapuche leader are caught in the circuit of theatricality that has been created for them. The Spaniards seemed to know well how to proceed to get the most from the spectacle of torture to purge, through catharsis, the desires of rebellion from their captive audience, and the absent ones that would know about the episode by hearsay:

When man fails [. . .] in his virtuous behavior as he searches for happiness through the maximum virtue, which is obedience to the laws--the art of tragedy intervenes to correct that failure. How? Through purification, catharsis, through purgation of the extraneous, undesirable element which prevents the character from achieving his ends. This extraneous element is contrary to the law; it is a social fault, a political deficiency. (Boal 32)

36 According to Ercilla, the news spread like wildfire in Araucanía land. “With alacrity, winged Rumor spread afar the grievous tidings of that ignominious murder never dreamed of, stirred rebellious hearts to weep. Mobs unrelenting ran with agonized disturbance” (Lancaster 304).
But, and if Ercilla’s poetic accounts are accurate, the coercive and exemplary function of the horrifying spectacle could have failed in this case, and in fact have produced the opposite effect. How so? According to Ercilla, Caupolicán would have stoically resisted the impalement, behavior that erodes the very essence of torturing someone publicly, which is to display the pain of the offender: “Not the sharpened shaft incisive tearing through his frame and entrails was sufficient to compel him to surrender to his torment: with serene, heroic aspect, twitching not a lip or eyelash, placid he remained, as if he on the bridal couch were seated” (303).

Ercilla’s pen was not indifferent to the negative “political” backlash of Caupolicán public execution, which instead of purging the desire for rebellion redoubles bellicosity and animadversion of the Mapuches against the Spaniard invader: “Not the untimely death outrageous executed to affright them, nor the...
loss of such a warlord whereon all our hope was founded, terrified or cowed the
people, who, provoked by the injustice, thirsted for cruel satisfaction, filled with
hotter rage and anger” (304).

Likewise, and almost five centuries later, the body of the 32 Mapuche
became the site of the insurrection, the territory where the Mapuche struggle is
resumed by subverting the system, and becomes a valid means of pressure and
negotiation. With this political maneuver, the strikers subverted the system and
amplified “the injustice”, the arbitrariness inflicted by the state, criminalizing the
legitimate protest for the ancestral lands.

Perhaps that is one of the reasons why the government first invisibilized
the protest, and then when it reached public view, it tried to delegitimize the act.
President Piñera himself was in charge of discrediting the protest, saying that:
“[…]In a democracy, a hunger strike is an illegitimate instrument of pressure”
(Romero).

However, in a confrontation in which the body is more powerful than the
disembodied logos, the strategy of verbal disqualification articulated by the
government did not work. The hungry body is a body in pain, which “not only
resists language but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to
a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before
language is learned” (Scarry 4). The body in hunger is a place where words cease
gradually, reducing the movement and muting cry. In such circumstances, the
government's rhetorical maneuver aimed at delegitimizing the protest loses its
meaning; it feels inappropriate, empty.
On September 15, seven days after Piñera’s declarations, and 66 days into the strike, the discourse of the government changed. Addressing the Congress in a plenary meeting to commemorate the Bicentenary, Piñera said something unprecedented: “[...] we can not ignore the fact that for decades, perhaps centuries, we have denied our communities of indigenous peoples the necessary opportunities for material and spiritual progress for full integration into our Republic” (UPI). The fact is that the discourse of the body changed the national conversation about Mapuche claims, and this shift is visible even in the political masterminds of the republic. Shortly before the president spoke, Alejandra Sepúlveda, Speaker of the House of Representatives, emphasized the debt to the Mapuche people and the rightfulness of their demands, saying, “We owe it to our Mapuche brothers. They have known war and violence, and we believe it is time to seek progress and deeper reforms to resolve the just demands of indigenous people,” and concluded her message with a surprising and unprecedented, “I apologize a thousand times if necessary, for the lack of dialogue and understanding in these 200 years of Chile” (Idem). Thus, it seemed that the body in pain began to rewrite the dominant narrative that has placed the Mapuche as a subaltern subject.

Like the San José tragedy, the Mapuche hunger strike has a dramatic question too. Nevertheless, it somehow reverses the first: we know they are alive but do not know if any of them will soon die of starvation before the government complies with the strikers’ demands. The conditions imposed by the Mapuche to depose their strike are reduced to meet four specific demands: 1) Repeal the
Antiterrorist Law, 2) Ensure a fair civil trial and not a military one, 3) 
Demilitarization of Mapuche territory and 4) The creation of a bargaining table 
with the government. After 66 days fasting, there was no doubt that the 32 were 
committed to persevere with their endeavor until the end. Everything indicates 
that, at that time, the ball was in the hand of the government and legislators.

The Mapuche hunger strike represents a political problem that has the 
virtue of actualizing the ancestral Mapuche struggle as a people. As Bengoa 
posits, “In human history there were no people who have awareness of being 
people that give up its right to govern themselves, to decide what their priorities 
are, and to determine their own needs, and use their own methods for doing so” 
(Bengoa 232), and the Mapuche are no exception. Even though the immediate 
causes that fueled the strike had to do with the application of the Terrorist Law 
against the strikers and the demand of a just civil trial and not a military one, the 
protest was also against more than a century of injustices, discrimination, 
genocide, and usurpation carried on by the Chilean state and its institutions. 
Piñera’s government, like the previous democratic governments, was not prepared 
to face and solve a problem of such a magnitude and historic transcendence. It 
was not Camp Hope where technical decisions prevailed over any other 
consideration. If we wanted to find and free the trapped miners, then it was 
necessary to send probes, do calculus, use and adapt existent rescue technologies, 
and work with skillful technicians, knowledgeable engineers, and a portion of 
good luck. Also, and as I said in the chapter devoted to the San José heterotopia, 
the miners were passive victims waiting to be rescued, not deliberate or
unpredictable individuals with agency to change the effort and decisions taken on the surface for the rescue team. The hunger strike, however, offered a total different situation; it entailed a historical-political problem that, to be solved, demanded complex political negotiations and legal solutions instead of calculated decisions supported by hard data. Here the “human factor” was not under the control of the government as the protesters were taking initiatives, acting upon a situation they considered one of oppression and injustice, and which the current government had direct responsibility and the last word to solve it.

In terms of the informational factor in play, even though the government still had the advantage of controlling national media, and interpreting the event at will, it opted for invisibilizing the strike instead of discrediting it from the start, until its strategies ultimately failed and it was forced into the difficult position of redress without losing face. The governmental communicational strategy was to block the informational flow from the penitentiaries where the 32 Mapuche were held, and limiting press coverage of the case in the main newspapers and TV stations/channels under its fief.

With the exception of the weekly magazine *The Clinic*, and some independent Mapuche websites, national media began to cover the strike around a week after the breaking news that the miners were alive, that is to say 45 days after the strike started. The construction of reality that the national press privileged during the first stage of the miners’ rescue successfully concealed the hunger strike and its purpose. Like mainstream newspapers, open TV channels were also reluctant to include news about the strike. On 11 August, for example,
no major news television channels reported the important agreements reached between representatives of the strikers and the Human Rights Commission of the House. In view of this, Mapuexpress, a Mapuche news agency, decided to file a complaint before the Consejo Nacional de Television, accusing Television Nacional, Chilevisión, Megavisión and Canal 13 UC (Denuncian Censura), the main public TV channels, of intentionally silencing the Mapuche case.

It is forbidden to photograph the strikers in jail. The body, which is the last trench of resistance, is censored, disappeared. Disembodied, it is difficult for the national audience to identify, empathize, and has emotions and solidarity with the protesters. In the society of spectacle, those bodies that are not mediated by television do not exist, or at best are just an abstraction. In such circumstances, the spokesmen and relatives of the strikers have no choice but to lend theirs to vicariously embody the absent bodies of their loved ones and comrades. Thus, it is common to see families of detainees outside the prison, protesting (and being violently repressed by the police force) in the streets, always willing to give their opinion and mark their presence in front of the media.

The government’s disengagement from the Mapuche case during the first 50 days of the strike became untenable when one of the strikers was in critical condition and had to be rushed to the hospital. As the news broke, a chain of events were put in motion: street protests in support of the strikers stormed cities across the country. Two young people under 18 joined the strike in early September (the press began to talk of the 32. Four members of the House that were allowed to visit the strikers in the jail of Temuco city decided to join the
strike and refused to leave the precinct. The body in pain, the living presence that breaks through and becomes visible to the deputies is what triggered such a supportive response. But it could not be tolerated that four well known deputies showed solidarity with the 34 intangible Mapuche, and were soon forcibly removed from prison: you cannot break the rules of the prison system which is created/imagined for the deviant; visitors in transit do not belong to this heterotopia. The European Parliament sent an open letter asking the Government of Chile to intercede on behalf of the Mapuche. Chilean writers like Pedro Lemebel and nonagenarian poet Nicanor Parra also decided to join the hunger strike. Student associations, trade unionists, human rights defenders and Lonkos (Mapuche leaders), and Catholic priests began fasting, in solidarity, in different parts of country. The body in pain of the strikers is mirrored in the body of others, multiplied by hundreds, making it visible through surrogates.

By September 21 (day 71 of the strike) the Mapuche case now had a more prominent place in local newspapers, and Piñera's government decided to push a bill to reform the AL and to avoid its application to the Mapuche on strike. It was not easy for the government to take the initiative, and it has not been without criticism from the opposition since August 13, 2009, when Piñera himself, then presidential candidate, had accused the government of Michelle Bachelet as inefficient for not applying the AL. In that opportunity Piñera said “In the Araucanía have been committed acts of terrorism, and the government has applied the Antiterrorist Law on only two occasions. Because the government is not doing
its job, a handful of delinquents have the whole country on its knees” (Pérez Yoma).

Among the couple of delinquents that Piñera referred to, and that “the whole country on its knees” were the now 32 strikers. Trapped in his own words, Piñera could not negotiate with the protestors, so the government figured out a way to solve this catch-22 situation. The way out was sending a bill to amend (not repeal) the Antiterrorist Law, but at the same time appear to not be giving in to the strikers’ demands by asserting that the government will not constitute a bargaining table to resolve the conflict until the Mapuche stop the strike. Since the strikers did not stop their strike, the government’s strategy shifted to involve a third party, a mediator. The role fell into the hands of the Catholic Church, which through the Archbishop of Concepción, Ricardo Ezzati, sat down with the Mapuche representatives and tried to convince them to stop the strike. But this did not work either; so on September 17, the day before the bicentenary celebrations, President Piñera spoke for the first time, to implement a multi-party dialogue that would include representatives of evangelical churches, Catholic, government officials and members of the Mapuche community (without specifying who). However, he made it clear that this table would exclude the spokespersons of Mapuche prisoners as they were still negotiating, in parallel, with Archbishop Ezzati. Two days after, in the flagship event of the bicentenary celebrations, the Military Parade, the Mapuche were portrayed as assimilated Chileans marching within a sea of stock characters representing the Chilean labor force. Was it the staging of a desire? The representation of a schizophrenic nation unable to discern
reality? A blatant negation of reality? Or, a reassurance that the state will persevere in its traditional policy of exclusion, denial and coercion of the Mapuche to impose an imagined homogenous Chile? Whatever the reasons, the juxtaposition of these two sites, made them clash, and perhaps showed that the Western thesis of one nation, one system is falling apart.

On 14 September, two of the strikers were released, demonstrating the falsity of the allegations of conspiracy and terrorism against them. On September 30, the Chilean Senate unanimously approved the reform to the AL. The package of measures considers, among other modifications, the possibility of cross-examination of protected witnesses, the exemption to apply the AL to under age individuals, and the differentiation and reduction of sentences for the burning of pastureland and arson. Additionally, the government gave its word that it would withdraw the application of the AL against the Mapuche on hunger strike, and redefine the norms under the ordinary criminal law, and promised to reform the Military Code of Justice, so that civilians be tried in ordinary courts.

On October 2, 2010 Archbishop Ezzati presented the government’s resolutions to the Mapuche and the strike was ended after 81 days of fasting, and ten days before the rescue of the 33 miners took place in Camp Hope. What followed was that the Military Justice exculpated the 17 Mapuches to whom the AL was applied from all charges, and the ordinary justice system could now proceed with the same accusations. The Government also kept its word, and on February 16, 2011, the government prosecutor, Guillermo Leyton, called for the downgrading of the charges of “terrorist offenses” to “common crimes.”
February 22, 2011, the court acquitted 14 of the 17 accused. Although the entire trial was based on the implementation of the AL, the oral hearing of the Tribunal of Cañete did not apply the legal concept against the Mapuche prosecuted for the attack on the prosecutor Mario Elgueta, among other developments since 2005. Nevertheless, four of them, including Héctor and Ramon Llaitul Llanquileo, alleged to be the leaders of the CAM, were convicted of armed robbery and attempted murder against the Public Prosecutor. The presiding judge said that while there is conviction that the events described by the Attorney General are of a terrorist nature, they could not prove that the accused (Hector and Ramon) were related to what happened. Observers and lawyers that defended the Mapuche have criticized the verdict against the Llaitul brothers, alleging that the entire trial was based on evidence gathered through the testimony of witnesses without face the AL allowed. According to Paula Vial, the Public Defender assigned to represent the 17 Mapuche, a civil trial “would not have relied on tools that create imbalance” as the military trial did. In fact, she added “military justice, which we criticized for being a justice system that generates arbitrarinesses and does not respect standards of due process, compared to the same facts, these same people were acquitted. Because among other things, I had the possibility of using faceless witnesses, that puts you in a defenseless position” (Schnitzer).

Even though the hunger strike paid off by modifying the AL, starting to balance the conversation between the Chilean nation and the Mapuche nation, and establishing the ground for further advancements toward the eventual recognition of the indigenous people (and not only the Mapuche, but also the Rapa Nui,
Aymara, Hulliche and others), the shift paradigm from the *one nation, one cultural system* to a plural one (how the Camp Hope heterotopia showed in economic terms), will probably take some time. However, the celerity of social and political changes that the new technologies of communication are eliciting, plus the social awareness that popular movements such as those of Egypt and Tunisia have set as an example, can shorten the process toward a diverse Chile.

The irony is that 250 years before the Independence from Spain, the Spanish Crown had recognized the Mapuche as an independent nation.\(^{38}\) So, strictly speaking, it was not the conquistadors who took possession of the Mapuche territories during its 300 years of colonial rule (even though it tried unsuccessfully to do so), but the Chilean republican government, which after a military occupation of the Araucanía, proceeded to usurp 10 million hectares, relegating the Mapuche only 5% of its original territory (Aylwin 2000 280). In this sense, the colonization of the Mapuche people is a phenomenon that is ongoing.

Interestingly enough, contemporary discourses of Mapuche resistance and liberation against the Chilean state use the example set by the Spanish Crown in recognizing the Mapuche as a nation to stress the paradox of being subdued by those that once adamantly fought against the same colonial power.

\(^{38}\) In the treaty of Quilín, held on January 6, 1641, Spain recognized the independence of the Mapuche nation, setting the Bio-Bio River as the borderline between the two nations (Bengoa 1985 33).
In an interview with the weekly magazine *The Clinic*, Hector Llaitul, one of the leaders of the CAM and who lead the hunger strike, expresses the claim of Mapuche in the following terms:

[…] The aim is either to integrate or annihilate us as a culture, as a nation, so we can no longer be what we are. Just look at the law, it only operates as a means of assimilation and permanent colonialism. The truth is that we are an oppressed people, with an invaded territory. And this dispossession has been endorsed by all the laws and institutions of the State. (Cayuqueo)

Going further, in 2009 the CAM mimicked the independence rhetoric the patriot used against Spain:

[…] Finally, we reaffirm our conviction to continue on the path of our ancestors who offered their life for the cause of justice and dignity of our beautiful and heroic Mapuche Nation. The CAM is stronger than ever in its struggle of taking back the Mapuche territory and its autonomy.

While poverty and misery still exist in the Mapuche land—as a result of state policies that legitimize territorial dispossession—the CAM will persevere in its cause.

With the strength of our Futa Keche Kuifi and Weftun (rebirth of the New Warriors), which germinate and multiply throughout the WALLMAPU (the Mapuche land) our endeavour becomes a sacred cause. ¡MARICHIWEU! (CAM)
This temporal juxtaposition is more meaningful since the Chilean patriots instrumentalized the Mapuche’s successful resistance against the Crown to inspire their own independence movement. The rejection of the legacy of Spain needed a model, a national myth, to start building upon a sense of identity different from that of its progenitor. Collier says that such a national myth “was waiting for them on the doorstep, in the form of the Araucanýan (Mapuche) Indians, ‘the proud republicans of Araucanía’, as Simon Bolivar called them in his Jamaican letter” (Bengoa 1985 139).

No sooner said than done, the words written by Alonso de Ercilla in his epic poem La Araucana (1569) about the warrior spirit and heroism of the Mapuche people became instrumental in the attempt to raise the alternative myth and inspire the patriots in their fight against the royalists:

Chile, fertile province, famous in the vast Antarctic region, known to far-flung mighty nations for her queenly grace and courage; has produced a race so noble, dauntless, bellicose, and haughty, that by king it never was humbled nor to foreign sway submitted.

(Lancaster 33)

The recycling of Ercilla’s poem, which in the XVI century served to exalt, by contrast, the bravery and accomplishment of the conquerors themselves–because what kind of honor and glory could be found in subduing a weak adversary–was now used to empower the patriots and to create a fictive, but politically productive, “ancestral” link between the criollos and the indigenous people:
[...] A Chilean should not think but in living for the posterity without tarnishing the glory of its ancestors.

[...] What are the Demi-Gods of antiquity along side the Araucaníans? Is not the Greek’s Hercules, in every point of comparison, notably inferior to the Caupolicán or the Tucapel of the Chileans? (Amunátegui 94)

It could sound delirious to put Mapuche leaders in the pantheon of Greek demi-gods, but the outcomes of such literary devices were important: As Collier puts it, the creoles as a result “regarded themselves as the true heirs of the Araucanains. Freire could speak of ‘our fathers, the Araucaníans’, Francisco Calderon could toast the Chileans as ‘the sons of Caupolicán, Colocolo and Lautaro’” (212). And if Ercilla inspired Lope de Vega’s auto sacrametal La Araucana and his tragicomedy Arauco Domado, he also inspired the politician Bernardo Vera y Pintado, who wrote the revolutionary play El triunfo de la Naturaleza, where the captain of a symbolic ship named Lautaro, informs the Indians of the liberation of Chile and prophesies a day when Chileans and natives “shall form a single family together,” the native’s ferocity will be soften, and “Araucaníans will then taste the fruits of trade, the arts and sciences, Agrarian laws will regulate her fields.

39 Ramon Freire, one of the heroes of the Chilean Independence and President of the Chilean Republic in 1927.

40 General Francisco Calderón Zumelzu, Chilean Congressman who served in the Parliament between 1823-1830.

41 The play was performed in Santiago de Chile, on August 1819.
Industry, and those connections which bring pleasure and wealth, will replace rusticity and indigence” (215).

Yet, almost two hundred years after such wishes of good will were made, in 2011, the prophesied united family constituted by the “barbarian” Mapuche and the civilized Chileans still lives in the utopian sphere, and the promised fruits of trade even in a vigorous free market economy do not drop into the Mapuche land benefiting its inhabitants. Interestingly, the current official discourses still chew on the nice and profitable idea that current Chileans are true heirs of the indomitable Mapuche race (as it is shouted in the MP each year), and talk about being one, indivisible family as it did during the first third of the 19th century. Nevertheless, the hard facts show that an increasing number of descendants of the mythic Mapuche heroes self-identify as different from the Chileans, and want to have “the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development” (C169 Article 7:1).

Panopticism

In Chile the monarchical practice of torture as a public spectacle was in full force even after the independence, and prevailed as a mechanism of social control and political legitimacy until 1843. The libertarian political project proclaimed by the new republic was in blatant contradiction with the cruel punitive practices of the old regime. The process of reconceptualization of disciplinary practices targeting the body and the adoption of a new criminal law
system inspired by the works of European philosophers and jurists such as Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, whose theories about proportional punishment, abolishment of the death penalty, and rehabilitation of convicted criminals were well known by Chilean partisans of penal reform.

It was not until 1843 that Chile began to implement a new penal system, the European new “theory of law and crime, a new moral or political justification of the right to punish” (Discipline 7), which shifted from targeting the body as the site of punishment to an economy of suspended rights of the individual. Thus, the subjects are taken apart from society, deprived of their liberty and put into a system that minutely controls their actions according to the codes ruling a citadel prison. To hold those individuals, a new building with peculiar characteristics emerged in the city; a space that, although it belongs to the city, is another space outside all places, one where the social unfit would live hidden from public view, a place where “those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed” (24). If before punishment was implemented in plazas and opened to public view, now it would happen within the walls of the prison compound and so is invisibilized. The exemplary mechanism of punishment that used to rely on spectacle is changed to one that makes the culprits disappear into a building designed to assure constrains and privations, and that signifies the power of the state to take away the freedom of those who do not abide by the law. In 19th century Chile, prisons were not built outside of the city, but in its very heart, so that these buildings could stand as a visible and perennial, silent and immovable monument that reminds the citizens of the consequence of
breaking the rules. Andrés Bello, who was Jeremy Bentham’s secretary (Leon
418) and helped to propagate Bentham’s panopticism in Chile, stressed the
deterrent function of the building as the first Penitentiary was inaugurated in
Santiago in 1847:

If the accents of pain ripped off by the scourge of the law would
hurt humanity too much, just consider the walls that hide the
unhappy beings doomed to a long, or perhaps eternal separation
from society for crimes that have outraged and polluted by
example; those walls will speak, in their silence, a pedagogical and
threatening language, and their image, their memory, will serve
youths as a constant reminder of how they should behave. (Bello
45)

Figure 3. Panopticon. Plan of the Santiago Penitentiary. (Ulloa I)
Designed following Bentham’s concept of panopticon, the first Chilean penitentiary then was built not only to keep the deviant apart from society, but also as a means of observing the outsider, the “normal” citizen, the rest of us. This panoptical inversion acts as a good analogy of what heterotopias in general and heterotopias of deviance in particular actually allow, to oversee the very society that creates them by contesting, inverting, and presenting alternative versions of it. In their functioning, heterotopias bring the possibility to assess the functioning of society.

28 of the 32 Mapuche who were in the hunger strike have so far been declared innocent of the charges against them. Four of them were condemned after a trial that used procedures legitimised by Pinochet’s AL. Based on those facts, the penitentiary system turned out to be a device to detain innocent people, and specifically targeted Mapuche. The Mapuche were incarcerated not because they were guilty of breaking the rules, but because they were Mapuche. The drama staged by the strikers revealed that truth; it made visible what should have remained hidden and silenced within the walls of the prison compounds. By so doing, the Mapuche brought the system back to the time when punishment was a public spectacle to make visible the injustice. Echoing the claim, President of the Supreme Court, Milton Juica, at the opening of the Judicial Year 2011, declared that “In Chile the penitentiary system is in a state of complete collapse, and serious disregard for the rights and guarantees of those deprived of liberty, which requires an immediate solution for those who are obliged to do so” (Armaza), and
in the same ceremony the Minister of Justice Felipe Bulnes said that the “human rights agenda begins in places of reclusion …” (Idem).

Through the hunger strike heterotopia the “deviants” demonstrated that what was really crooked was the judicial system itself and the policies of assimilation sponsored by the state. Because when the State offered an image of the Mapuche as terrorists; the “terrorists” answered back with non-violent protest. When the system offered accusers without face; Felipe and hundreds of sensibilized protestors in the streets offered theirs, openly. When the State staged the “Mapuches permitidos” in the MP, portraying them as disaggregated and assimilated people, the Mapuche counter-performed a perfectly coordinated hunger strike in five different prisons, and mobilized thousands of their “hermanas y hermanos” to go out in protest, marching together while waving their own national flag and chanting in mapudungun. Finally, while the State can not see outside the paradigm that conceives only one people for one nation, the Mapuche demand the right to be autonomous and proclaim a horizontal coexistence with the Chilean nation state: two or more nations within one country.
CHAPTER 4
THE CHILEAN MILITARY PARADE: ENACTING THE ILLUSORY CHILE

If contingent one-time heterotopias like that of San José and the Mapuche have the potential to temporarily destabilize the culture in which they emerge, so do those temporal heterotopias that are already inserted and established in a given society as cyclical events, in the mode of festivals, fairs on the outskirts of the cities, parades, and traditional national ceremonies, and vacation villages (Foucault 26). These local heterotopias are not the hard-to-predict events that are beyond the realm of normal expectations in history, but cyclic events that have been going on for a while, sometimes for centuries, and dynamically evolving to functionally respond to the demands and necessities of the society and, more specifically, to the necessities of those that organize or sponsor the events. Some examples of these “chronique” heterotopias (Idem) that can be found in Chilean society are *La Fiesta de la Tirana*, a religious festival in honor of Virgen del Carmen, annually held in the locality of La Tirana in Tarapacá region of northern Chile; and the *Tedeum*, which is a two hundred year-old religious ceremony in which religious leaders and political authorities come together to celebrate a thanksgiving mass in commemoration of the Independence. And, although vacation resorts are a relatively new phenomenon, secure “drug villages” have emerged in Santiago city in the last 20 years. These peculiar towns function
like little independent states, and are organized and controlled by members of Chilean drug cartels.\footnote{An interesting case to research is La Legua de Emergencia, a five-block town in Santiago City. The town is controlled by the narcos, who have “oficinas” (offices) where the drugs are processed, distributed and sold. This site functions as a place out of all places in the sense that it has its own, alternative economic, political and (para)military system. For more information see Villarrubia’s article “La dictadura de los narcos que se adueñaron de la Legua.”}

One prominent example of cyclical heterotopias in Chile is the Military Parade (MP), an official cultural performance sponsored and organized by the state since 1832 to commemorate Chilean Independence and glorify the role the Chilean Army played in that patriotic endeavour. The MP is a heterotopia because it satisfies the principles of heterotopology: it is historically contingent as it functions according to what the acting government wants to promote in terms of social discipline and social cohesion in a specific moment (Bristol 212); it has the capacity to juxtapose in a single space a plurality of other places found in Chilean society, as the performance enacts the various ranks, institutions, and functions of society (the military, the political and religious rulers, the cultural diversity, etc); it exists synchronically, but it also has the capacity to overlap past scenarios—battle scenarios, historical characters, key historical events—with enacted future convenient scenarios, such as the disappearance of the Mapuche conflict. The MP is also a segregated space where the repressive apparatus regulates access into the event. Finally, the MP enacts a convenient image of Chilean society, while distorting some aspects of the sociopolitical reality (Foucault 26-27).
Heterotopias like military parades are not exclusive to Chile, but can be found in practically all Latin American countries. Their ubiquitousness, besides being a palpable demonstration of the first heterotopic principle, which states that heterotopias can be found in any given society, offers a site to explore and compare how they respond to their own culture, and to what extent they sustain relations of similitude with parades in other countries (26).

According to Jorge Larraín, since the time of independence from European colonizing states, Latin American identity has been articulated alongside national identities. A shared history of colonial domination, a common language\textsuperscript{43} and religion, the independence wars fought in tandem by local and multinational criollo armies, and other socioeconomic, political and cultural factors have contributed to define a sense of belonging to a larger imagined South American community inextricably linked with national identifications. (1)

The interplay between local and regional identities has become apparent as most South American countries are preparing to commemorate their respective bicentenaries during 2010 and 2011. As in Chile, performances of essentialist military narratives emerge everywhere in the form of MP, battle re-enactments, and TV shows, to remind their denizens that South American soil and soul were forged in the heat of heroic battles, marking our beings forever. The instrumentalization of foundational military stories by national governments to

\textsuperscript{43} Certainly, in South American countries there is a plethora of indigenous languages spoken by their inhabitants, nevertheless here I am alluding to the “common” languages imposed by the colonizers, in this case Portuguese and Spanish.
create a sense of local and regional unity and common destiny goes hand in hand with the iteration of abridged versions of national histories, which are presented in sanitized and amnesiac form, to erase from memory the trauma and the wrongdoings the militaries have perpetrated in the distant and recent past.

With such an ideological maneuver, events such as national military parades performed in solemn mode to commemorate historical milestones, become ideal vessels to re-tell a sterilized functional past in order to build community in the present, and reinforce the existing pattern of social relationships (Bakhtin 686). For the same reason, a critical study of such cultural phenomena could not only shed light on the ideal or illusory image a particular nation is touting to its citizens and the concomitant erasures, but also has the potential to open the understanding of the interconnectedness between the national and the regional in the Latin American context.

In Chile the MP offers a privileged site to enact a utopian Chile made in the image and likeness of the imagined nation by the current government. Also, it constitutes a paradigmatic site that materializes, articulates, promotes and sustains dominant ideas of cultural identities, a specific social order, and versions of Chilean history; it does this by presenting a deceptive, illusory image of Chilean society. The Parade is not a reflection of reality, but a constructed and convenient representation of “reality,” staged according to the ideological agenda of the government in place. The MP produces and presents to its audience the Chile that could be as if it already were.
As I said before, heterotopias can change in function and meaning over time, according to the synchrony of the culture in which they are found (Foucault 25). The MP is a live example of such adaptation. Although the score of the performance and its basic structure do not change much from one performance to the next, what does change each year is the verbal narrative that underscores the performance. Uttered in a flamboyant prose style, the script reflects and conveys the government’s political perspectives, trying to fix meanings and particular worldviews in support of their own idea of nation and political project. In some way the performance operates as a canvas ready to be painted on at will.

During the Pinochet regime, for instance, the MP showed the military ideology at work as never before. The national representational space was literally taken by the Armed Forces, so that the repressive state apparatus and the Executive fell in the same hands (when both coincide, you get a dictatorship). Thus, it is not surprising that in the parades civilians were removed from the podium, and the event became an egotistic soliloquy where soldiers were paying homage to soldiers, and an occasion to celebrate a new Chilean independence gained, on the battlefield.\(^{44}\) According to Pinochet’s words, on September 11,

\[^{44}\] The Pinochet dictatorship claimed to have fought a literal battle against Allende’s paramilitary forces. They call the clashes “The Battle of Santiago.” Nevertheless, such a battle never existed as the political bases of Allende’s government, and the few that resisted the coup, were killed, captured, neutralized or decimated practically the same day as the seizure of power. The hyperbolic name “Battle of Santiago” is used by Pinochet in chapter VIII of his book *El día decisivo*. 
1973, the Patria was liberated again, thus repeating the scenario of Chilean Independence, this time from the Marxist dictatorship.  

Cultural performances are snapshots of identity narratives that have been foregrounded at specific historical conjunctures, and the MP began to stage a threefold military version of national identities. The first is the insistence on the role that war and the warrior spirit of the ancestors played in forming Chilean identity (Larraín 145). Phrases such as “a warrior’s nation” and “warrior race” are not only commonly repeated in the context of the parade, but also in official discourses. For example, when President Piñera spoke in the United Nations Assembly in 2010, he defined the country as “A nation of warriors and heroes that nevertheless has enjoyed unbroken peace during the last 130 years” (Presidente Piñera en su primera). Contemporary Chilean historians such as Mario Góngora have helped to validate and reinforce this version of Chilean identity stating that Chilean identity was forged in the battlefield: “[…] It was through the Independence Wars, and a series of successive victorious wars that took place

45 On July 9, 2010 President Augusto Pinochet gave a speech in Cerro Chacarilla, in commemoration of the Batalla de la Concepción, symbol of the courage and resistance of the Chilean soldier. Here he reiterates the notion that, like in times of the Independence, the soldiers once again liberated the nation from a foreign enemy:

Just recently, the Chilean people reenacted, during three years, the heroic struggle against the imminent threat of communist totalitarianism [...] Listening to the anguished call from our citizens, the Armed Forces and Police decided to act on 11 September 1973, and again our land received the blood of many of our men who fell fighting for the liberation of Chile. [...] Today, we again face an unequal struggle against a foreign action of diverse backgrounds and colors, which sometimes takes the form of straight aggression, and at other times exerts pressure masked as a friend (Pinochet “Discurso de Chacarillas”).

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during the 19th century, that a nationalist awareness, and a sentiment of
‘Chileaness’ were created” (38). This military version of identity seems to be so internalized into the society that Chilean politicians from all parts of the spectrum frequently use words like “battle,” “war,” and “surrender” to figuratively explain their public policies. Thus, for example, the Minister of Education said, “The President said that education is the mother of all battles, and the battle for development will be won or lost in the classroom. Therefore the emphasis of the Ministry of Education budget for 2011 will be invested here” (Lavín). President Piñera asserted that “One of the major commitments we made as a Government was to win the battle against crime and drugs” (PDI), and the Minister of Health, Jaime Mañalich, after sacking the Subsecretary of Health, declared “I firmly believe that the struggle, the battle for better health for our patients produces casualties, it is a battle that produces casualties” (Mañalich).

The MP performance also marks identity (Schechner 38) by gendering the space in ways that reinforce patriarchal hegemony. The state assumes top–down stances in selecting, articulating, and reifying certain identititary narratives (while defusing or displacing others), and operates as an anti-entropic mechanism aimed at preventing the dissolution of the nation-state, or in other words, at keeping the imaginary boundaries of the nation in place. MP carries on and displays a specific gender regime, which replicates the gender regime of the Chilean Army and reifies the essentialist discourse of hegemonic masculinities: a defining trait and a core value of the military. One way in which the military constructs its hypermasculine subjectivity is by adopting a stance of disidentification from the
feminine (Burin 130); it is because of this that women soldiers in the MP perform marching scores using the same techniques and styles that men soldiers have been using for more than a century, as well as wear the same uniform. In spite of the Army’s declaration that cross-dressing erases gender differences and symbolizes equality among soldiers, it is still valid to ask why identification preferences opt for masculinizing women and not for, say, feminizing men.

During the Pinochet regime, the military government, true to its core values, opted for re-masculinizing the nation to recover the traditional patriarchal values supposedly lost during Allende’s socialist government, and the MP reflected and helped that endeavor. After the return of democracy, the successive governments began to question traditional patriarchal values and opened up spaces of participation for women. The high point of that project was reached during the government of Michelle Bachelet, who promoted a more egalitarian gender order. Unfortunately, the right wing government of Sebastián Piñera has repositioned the patriarchal discourse in Chilean society.

Military values such as rectitude, discipline, obedience, bravery, and order began to be repeated in all presidential discourses, and exacerbated in the context of the Parade, becoming isotopies that have their equivalent in the physical score performed by the soldiers. In other words, the system of values the military holds becomes attached to the series of signifiers made up of sounds, costumes, and principally by body techniques that stress verticality, linearity, uniformity, symmetry and synchronicity in the collective as well as the individual behavior of the soldiers.
How those straight, rigid, and symmetric behaviors have become synonymous with the set of military values is not an easy question to answer. The current scores performed in the MP were initially adopted by the Prussian way and style of parading at the end of the 19th century when the Chilean Army hired Emil Körner Henze, a Prussian captain, to train the troops. So, the process of turning the system of values into embodied signs is something that has been going on for a long period of time. Nevertheless, in order to keep alive the link between signified (values) and signifiers (the score) in the signifying practice of the interpreters (the audience), the event must have some kind of mechanism to make explicit the relationships between meanings and signifiers. Perhaps that is one of the functions of the narrator (always a man) who, throughout the event, iterates univocal meanings on the basis of specific stage signifiers. Actually, the narrator does not describe any of the formal aspects of the performance, its structure and the mechanisms that somehow justify, complement and support the ideological commentaries the verbal narrative is performing. What he does is to utter a series of statements that insist on placing the militaries as the catalytic element of national identity and the main engine of Chilean history.

Even though many of the concepts uttered by the narrator are ideologically charged, inaccurate and unsupported by historical facts, they do not seem out of place, but on the contrary they work organically with the performance. It seems that the people gathered around the event are not disturbed by statements that homologue soldiers with common citizens, or that praise the courage and military capabilities of pre-Independence Mapuche while repressing and condemning them
in the present. It bewilders me how it is possible for such tendentious and reactionary material to be broadcast with the consent of the present authorities. I have never found a press analysis, commentary, or criticism about the script uttered during the performance. Transcripts are not published, so they are not available for analysis and criticism. Perhaps the staging of the performance is so visually powerful that it relegates the verbal narrative to an almost subliminal background. Perhaps the audience does know what is being said, and want to participate, at least for a moment, in the illusion this heterotopia is meant to convey.

As I said before, the MP is like a canvas to paint on with the preferred ideological colors of the government in place. The MP is a plastic tool the state uses to convey, reproduce, and reinforce the ideology of the ruling order in a specific historical moment, fulfilling its “precise and determined function within a society” from year to year and administration to administration (Foucault 25).

In 1972, for example, the central theme of the MP orbited around Salvador Allende’s “transition to socialism.” It was, of course, in a pre-dictatorship time when the army was still regarded as close to the people and as a non-deliberate institution subjected to the civil authority (a certainty that will soon be demonstrated to be naïve). The following description, made by Pío García in the magazine Chile Hoy a few days after the MP was celebrated in 1972, shows the sense of communion that existed between the army and civilian citizens at that time: “On September 19, Army’s Day, the people of Santiago, mobilized by the Unidad Popular parties, greeted the military on the streets expressing their
sympathy to our Armed Forces, and assuring their unwavering support for the President of the Republic, and its Government” (13).

In a perverse historical counterpoint, in the MP 1974 Augusto Pinochet celebrated the purification of the nation from the “intrinsically perverse” Marxist ideology. Presiding at the MP performance were the four commanders in chief of the four branches of the Armed Forces and Order (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police). Their uniformed presence occupied the same spot that President Allende, now dead, occupied in 1972. In this context the MP was a clear statement that the repressive state apparatus was obedient to the new political authorities and ready to act in their support against the internal enemy.

Figure 4. President Michelle Bachelet (right) and her Minister of Defense Vivianne Blanlot, presiding the Military Parada. 2006.

In 2006, Michelle Bachelet, the first woman president of Chile, presided over the MP along with her Minister of Defense, Vivianne Blanlot. That year, the
press stressed the unprecedented historical fact that two women reviewed the troops: “An image that will undoubtedly go down in history: Two women, President Michelle Bachelet and Defense Minister, Vivianne Blanlot, in a military jeep leading a ceremony that has traditionally been marked by men” (Bachelet). The moment was also politically significant as the military regime had killed Bachelet’s father, and tortured her and her mother. Bachelet named a Cabinet that was equally composed of women and men, and assigned women ministers in positions that were traditionally held by men. In 2006, the stage of the MP, a stage dominated by men, became a space where the traditional gender order of society was contested.

In 2010, President Sebastián Piñera synchronized, in one rhetorical brushstroke, the San José and the Parade heterotopias, capitalizing on the zeitgeist created by the first. In the podium, the absence of women is again noticeable. The MP is a weathervane, a revolving pointer that shows the ideological direction of the rulers. Highly controlled, the vane almost always works according to the desires of those exercising political dominion.

But although the MP, as an official site controlled by the state, constitutes a malleable political instrument employed “to dispel social discordance and conflict” (Bristol 213), to resignify society, to show governability, or to impose hegemonic views, it also is a place for contestation, a site whose fissures allow acts of subversion, as the following episode shows.

In 1990, Patricio Aylwin, the first president democratically elected after 17 years of dictatorship, talked about the “transition to democracy,” and the
soldiers showed their discomfort with the idea. The MP itself begins after the president authorizes it, answering the request made by the Jefe de la Fuerza. Following the protocol the officer asks the president: “Ms/Mr President, we ask for permission to start the Great Military Parade in honor of the Chilean Army.” To which the president replies: “Authorized, General…”, saying the name of the general. This simple performative utterance is understood as an expression of subjection by the Armed Forces to the civil power which, following Austin, needs to be a felicitous one to be effective.

Being episodic in its essence, the MP does not follow a classic dramatic structure. Nevertheless, if we want to identify a climactic moment, it happens when the Chief of the Forces asks for permission to proceed with the parade. One of the reasons why the military coup took place on September 11, 1973, only eight days before the MP, was the fact that the military wanted to avoid performing such a public ritual, which would have shown allegiance and obedience to whom they were about to overthrow. In 1990, after 17 years of dictatorship the first MP presided by a democratically elected president took place. The occasion was surrounded by a series of rumors about a new coup, terrorist attacks, or planned expressions of disobedience against the president. It was precisely during the ritual of permission where the Army showed its disagreement with the new civil order. General Parera, the Chief of the Forces,

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46 Transcription of the authorization protocol followed in the MP 2000 (See http://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=qzYCvqOSyRg).
blatantly avoided uttering the proper words to the president. The infelicitous act is described by Alfredo Joignant in his book *El gesto y la palabra*:

According to the protocol, the commander of the garrison of Santiago (in this case, Army Brigadier General Carlos Parera) should approach the dais to request authorization from the head of state to kick off the parade. Uttering the question: “Your Excellency, I ask your permission to open the 1990 Parade,” to which the President of the Republic answers “authorized, General.” Nevertheless, and although Brigadier General Parera actually went to the dais and made the traditional salute to the authorities, he refused to ask the expected question to the President and the parade went on without official authorization. (192)

Since that episode, the protocol that rules the constitutional subordination of the Army to the civil authority has become a kind of thermometer to measure the state of the military-civil relationship.

Heterotopias, Foucault says, are sites capable of juxtaposing several spaces in a single real place, several sites that are in themselves incompatible (25). I have already shown how Camp Hope is a tolerant space where conflicting ideological systems can coexist. One of the functions of the current military parades is to show the integration between civil and military worlds. If there was a time in Chilean history when the military and the civil world felt and expressed mutual respect and support, it was broken after the military coup in 1973. It is safe to say, however, that even after the return of democracy Chilean citizens still
perceive the military as belonging to a different sphere, far from the worries, practices, and idiosyncrasies of the civilians. There are concrete reasons for such a sentiment, as the militaries have their own welfare system, judiciary system, schools, and their own segregated spaces of socialization. As a matter of fact, the MP is one of the few instances when the soldiers leave their quarters to “interact” with the civil world in a shared space. As Patricio Meller points out, in practical terms the army still operates as “a ‘state within a state’ with its own rules and a cultural and operational logic” (Meller 71).

It was during the 17 years of dictatorship (1973-1989) that an already existing gap between military and civil worlds deepened even more due to the overtly repressive role the military exerted upon citizens. Through the years and as the autocratic regime advanced its political and socio-economic agenda by force, a growing number of citizens began to talk back through massive protests, civil disobedience and violence against the instigators. In this volatile social climate, and as the distrust and hatred between military and civilian(s) increased, the authoritarian government found itself forced to negotiate a political solution to put an end to an unstoppable social unrest. In 1988, the government called a national plebiscite to decide the cessation or continuation of the regime. The opposition won the referendum with 55.99% of the cast votes, and democratic elections were settled for 1989.

The schism between civilians and militaries still persists today, although not so pronounced due to an aggressive and systematic public relation strategy trying to reverse the negative image of the Army earned during the dark days of
Pinochet’s regime. Thus, heroes and military stories are the topics of special TV programs, series, competitions, and reality shows. Famous Chilean battles have begun to be re-enacted each year on their original battlegrounds, and military bands perform stylized multimedia concerts with lighting and special effects. The mantra of “El ejército de [todos] los chilenos” (“The Army of all Chileans”) has been carved in official websites and banners and repeated insistently in public discourses. The military school offers unprecedented ethics and human rights classes, while opening its gates for tourism. Regiments all over the country have followed the same “open door” policy, demolishing their fortified exterior walls to make the precincts more accessible and transparent to the people. Women are now allowed to progress in the military hierarchy and eventually become generals (a promise yet to be fulfilled). Part of this strategy comprehends the unparalleled spectacularization and glamorization of rituals, ceremonies and events the army traditionally performed in a more formal fashion, the MP being the most prominent example of this trend.

There are, however, some worrying signs that the changes the Army is touting are more a superficial makeover than a truly structural transformation. A close reading of these military performances shows how they all still cluster around the traditional masculine tropes of misogyny, patriotism, honor, loyalty, control, “violence, aggression, rationality, and a sense of invulnerability,” among other military values (Higate 29). Even more problematic is the fact that the

47 See for example the following YouTube video: http://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=hO2KNmKK-Iw.
military insists—as it did during the Pinochet regime—that such a set of values should constitute the model to be followed by the civil community. As the Director of La Escuela Militar Bernardo O’Higgins made clear in a statement released in 2009, the mission of the entity is to “[shape] a citizen of such a character that at all times can be a model for the whole community” (Oviedo, emphasis added).

Indeed, the “softer, gentler” military man the army is portraying through the media and performances contrasts sharply with the climate of violence it is possible to observe in Chilean society today. Violent police repression has been directed against students when protesting against the government for a better education. As I demonstrated in the last chapter, the Antiterrorist Law, promulgated by the military Junta in 1984, is still in place and has been repeatedly invoked against leaders of the indigenous movement in the southern part of the country during the last decade. Homophobia is as rampant as usual, now expressed through acts of increasing violence and even killings of gay people. Gay police couples have been removed from the force and lesbian teachers have been expelled from their schools after declaring their sexual preferences. Studies have demonstrated that structural and direct violence have systematically increased in Chile since 1973, and this tendency has not been reversed during democratic regimes (Valenzuela 221). During 2008-2010 more than 260 women were been brutally murdered by their male partners, and the number has since grown (Femicidios). The phenomenon has begun to be labeled as “femicide,” and in 2010 it was necessary to typify the crime as such, and promulgate a law to
penalize the act.\textsuperscript{48} There is a consensus among sociologists and psychologists that these statistics are but the tip of the iceberg.

The success of the public relation strategy is shown in an analysis about “brand worth” made by Young & Rubicam Latam in 2009.\textsuperscript{49} According to the study, the index of “Esteem” of the brand “Chilean Army” has increased from 55 to 70 percentile points in the last 8 years (Cavallo). Although the index shows that the public perception of the Army has improved, it does not mean that the opposite is also true (that the Army has come to esteem the public). As a matter of fact, as recently as 2009, on several occasions the Army has manifested its dissatisfaction with how the civilian judicial system and civil rights organizations have treated them during the prosecution of pending cases on human rights violations and the embezzlement of public funds. The fact that military men and women think of themselves as a special type of Chilean increases their perception of civilians as different from them, which helps to catalogue outsiders as an “other.” Soldiers believe they are heirs of a special caste of warriors born by miscegenation between the Spanish conqueror and Mapuche warriors, and forged in the crucible of successive and successful wars. This narrative is taught in history classes in the Military School, repeated in official discourses, and can also

\textsuperscript{48} On December 13, the Law 20.480, which typifies the killing of women as femicide, was promulgated, so modifying the Penal Code and the Domestic Violence Law (Piñera y Ministra).

\textsuperscript{49} From time to time the Chilean Army and other branches of the Armed Forces surprise the public opinion with corruption scandals that have a negative impact on the institutional image. In January 2011, for example, the newspapers informed of a fraudulent bid for the acquisition of a mechanic bridge used during the recent earthquake.
be heard in the narratives that are voiced during the Military Parade. “They are the legitimate heirs and custodians of Chilean traditions and glories we celebrate today.”

The *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, published in 1989 by the Estado Mayor del Ejército, for example, valorizes this peculiar interbreeding, which: “was forged in the crucible of war. [And] thus, it gave rise to a spirit of race, which inherited the Chilean military virtues. This process helped to unify Chilean nation” (qtd in Larraín 147). This military-racial version of the Chilean identity that the military men identify with has led to the monopolization of terms such as patriot, honor, courage, discipline, and other tropes linked to military masculinities. By owning these traits, the military thereby denies them to outsiders, and by this means they increase the sense of uniqueness and differentiation (and hence superiority) in relation to non-soldiers.

As the MP is the most enduring and visible public event the Armed Forces, and particularly the Army, have to sell their image, it is not surprising that they depict it as the locus where civil and military worlds meet together in a gesture of mutual goodwill. In its Official Web Portal the Army states that the MP is: “A time when civilians strengthen their ties with the Armed Forces and Police, linking the ideals of a glorious past to those of a promising future… [...] The military parade is a traditional ceremony that unites civilians with their Armed Forces” (*Ejército* 15).

At first glance, the event seems to accomplish such a purpose, as an impressive number of more than 50,000 people attend the performance each year,

50 Transcript from the MP 2007.
while millions more follow its route on their home televisions. Nevertheless the mere attendance at the event does not guarantee that the claimed sense of communitas is actually reached among the participants.

First, not all who attend the event are actually watching it. Approximately one third of the people who gather around the performance are eating, playing, or simply contemplating the instance as a recreational moment to share with their families. Of those who do watch, a great portion is there only to see their military and political relatives perform (as I explain below in more detail).

Second, the way the performance is set drastically separates the stage from the audience. The performance stage is separated from the audience by fences and a line of police men and women deployed every thirty feet in order to keep the attendees in their boundaries. The inviolability of the performance space is granted also by an extensive surveillance deployed among the spectators. The physical distance between the audience and the performers clearly divide civil and military worlds and never actually amalgamate them, as the military organizations want.

During the event there is a peculiar instance where the general population shares, at least in a surrogate way, the same space as the soldiers. This happens when traditional folk characters, dressed as “huasos” and “chinás,” a stereotypical representation of country men and Chilean peasants, enter the stage

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51 The term “huaso” denotes a Chilean country man and skilled horseman. The term “china” refers to the peasant woman with eyes reminiscent of those of a Chinese woman (a common trait among mapuches and mestizos).
in order to give a gift to the maximum authority of the nation, the President of the Republic. The voiceover presents them as the common Chilean that in the time of the Chilean Independence “left the plow in order to take up arms and fight for the Chilean emancipation…” and then seals the heroic figure reiterating the military “soul” that can be found in every Chilean country man with a curious distributive trope: “Huaso and soldier, soldier and huaso.”52 Thus, like in ancient Greek theatre where the chorus subrogated the people on stage, the Chilean people are vicariously represented by a group of folk characters whose identities are interchangeable with that of the soldiers and vice versa, as if saying: “we are all soldiers.” Removed from the stage, the “real” Chileans are taught, through these folk surrogates, that not only was the Chilean nation forged in the heat of innumerable battles as the official Chilean history tells, but that those also shaped their personal identities.

What the MP shows in placing an imaginary fourth wall that separates the performers (soldiers) from the audience (civilians) is precisely the disconnection between these two different and sometimes antagonistic worlds. The lack of reciprocity on the part of the militaries toward the people that go to salute and celebrate with them the day of las Glorias del Ejército represents a graphic evidence of the abyss that separates them. On the other hand, the deference the army shows toward the authority illuminates to whom the army owes allegiance, and whom it really serves: the State and its representatives. Consequently, and as a key component of the state apparatus, the army will be ready to act against the

52 Chilean Military Parade 2010.
people (again) if required by the state. As I said in the introductory chapter, the Military Parade is the public spectacle the government provides to demonstrate, once a year, that when interpellated by the superior political authority of the country, the soldiers will respond, in unison, with unconditional subjection to the voice of command. This ceremony is meant to give proof to the citizens that institutions that specialize in violence will act in favour of the ruling class when required, and so it has been since the formation of the Chilean state until today. As a heterotopia of power, the MP displays the instruments of coercion and violence to a national audience that attends or follows the event on TV.

This reading of the MP is not expressing a groundless personal fear out of paranoia. The showing of loyalty and respect to authority is not uncommon in military parades anywhere, but it is somewhat jarring in this case due to events in living memory left by the Pinochet regime. As a matter of fact, the very public relations campaign I talked about above is a response to the lingering fears produced during the dictatorship. At any rate, the authorities themselves openly confirm the instrumental value that the repressive state apparatus had to their governments. As a recent example I quote the words of President Piñera, who in April 2010 and just one month after assuming office, declared “We're also going to restore respect for police authority. We will be relentless in going after those who attack or abuse them. A policeman feared and respected fulfills his role more effectively” (Águila).

Nevertheless, the separation between civilians and militaries during the event was not always so drastic. Historical records show that in early military
parades, civic battalions and professional soldiers jointly marched and played mock battles in front of thousands of spectators. Peralta confirms the active involvement of civilians in an event that took place on September 19, 1831, saying, “Along with regular soldiers, different groups of civilians participated in the military drills, among which were four battalions, and four squadrons of civic guards.” (Peralta 175)

The festive tone and the degree of participation of the spectator in the early decades of the event were far more active than the contemporary audience could imagine. *El Araucano*, a periodical of that time, chronicles the closing part of the event as follows: “After fifteen minutes of sham battles, the soldiers reassembled to then march in column and returned to their barracks, while surrounded and followed by an immense concourse of people on foot, horseback and in all types of carriages that had decorated the training field” (Idem).

The original military parades were closer in spirit to the ancient *ditirambo* (dithyrambs sung in honor of the god Dionysus). They were a celebration in which all could participate freely and the division between performers and spectators was blurred. Then, some drastic division took place as the communal stage morphed into a reserved space for just a few performers. In Boal’s words:

First came the aristocracy and established divisions: some persons will go to the stage and only they will be able to act. The rest will remain seated, receptive, and passive; these will be the spectators, the masses, the people. And in order that the spectacle may efficiently reflect the dominant ideology, the aristocracy established another division: some actors will be
protagonists (aristocrats) and the rest will be the chorus—symbolizing, in one way or another, the masses. (ix)

The second heterotopic principle states that heterotopias can change in function and meaning over time, according to the synchrony of the culture in which they are found. In the nearly 180 years since the first public military exercises were staged in the new republic, the performance has become more and more structured and less and less participatory. In the dawn of the republic there was not a professional army, but it was formed by those *criollos* of different social strata that believed in the patriotic cause. At that time, the trope of “every Chilean a soldier” was a truism. In the first half of the 19th century, Chile was in a permanent state of war: the last confrontation against the Spanish Army was in 1826 and those against the last rebel groups continued until 1832. Then the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation War began in 1836 and lasted until 1839. The warlike climate that permeated the Chilean society made it necessary that the governments of the time count with the support of the civilians who, ultimately, ended up voluntarily joining the constant military campaigns. Consequently, in the nineteenth century the military parades were functional and instrumental to that warlike climate and reflected the engagement of the civil world with the military one. Somehow the spirit of communion and familiarity between civilians and militaries survived until the late 1960s. I remember going to watch the parade when I was a child and sitting on the ground close to the performers. No fences, no military policemen restricting the access, and no class segregation among the attendees. The democratic space drastically ended in 1973 with the military coup.
The first MP of the Pinochet regime showed a space under surveillance, classist and highly segregated. The National Security Doctrine and its star notion of the internal enemy were fully enacted in the esplanade of the O’Higgins Park. This new space conception inaugurated during the Pinochet era remains almost intact until today.

From above, the space where the MP is performed has the shape of an ellipse of 290,000 square meters crossed in the middle, from North to South, by a paved esplanade 64 x 610 meters long. This paved esplanade is used as the stage of the event. The audience is arranged at both sides all along the performing space. More than 50 thousand people gather together around the MP each year.

Following Valentine’s cultural performance analysis spheres, the audience at the MP can be classified in three main categories: 1) central audience, 2) bystander audience, and 3) implied or cultural audience.

The central audience is made up of “those members of the culture who are physically present and who directly influence, and are influenced by” the performance (Valentine 74), that is to say those that are actually watching the performance. Placed on both sides of the esplanade, it is possible to distinguish two different types of attendees. Situated in the middle of the West side of the stage there is a 5,000 m² roofed sitting area where authorities, important guests, and family members of the civil and military authorities are placed. To the left and right of this sitting area, the space is populated by around five thousand standing accredited spectators. Generally, this group of spectators is made up of family members of lower rank officers and sub-officers from the four branches of
the Armed Forces. The East side of the esplanade is reserved for the general public, which observes the performance standing along the stage, sitting in provisory platforms located by the esplanade, or from the slopes situated at the back of the ellipse. Unlike those spectators from the West side, the audience of this sector is made up of families whose sons and daughters are performing as conscripts serving in the force. The rest of the audience comprises families and individuals of popular social extraction who are not related to the militaries but who enjoy watching the event and participating in the festive atmosphere built around it.

As the description above makes clear, the audience space is highly segregated according to the social status and family liaisons the members of the central audience hold with the performers and the political authorities. The political affiliation is also an important factor in having or not having access to the authorities’ area. It is expected that this group of attendants show unconditional support to the current authority through constant cheers and applause. The official TV broadcast privileges images and sounds that show the positive emotional responses of this “captive” audience, leaving out any discordant manifestation that could come from dissident audiences. Accordingly, only general and distant panning is reserved for the rest of the audience.

In proxemics terms, it could be said that in the MP the closer the audiences are to the president, the more their partisanship to the government, and the closer their family ties with the present members of the higher military and political hierarchy. Conversely, the popular masses are physically situated far
from the hegemonic powers, here literally at the other side of the aisle.

Noteworthy is the fact that during the performance the security forces located on the authorities’ roof, are pointing their guns towards the audience in front of them, that is to say, against those allocated in the East side of the ellipse: the general public. Also, a large number of mounted and on-foot policemen and military police are deployed among the general audience, marking a presence that cannot go unnoticed by the attendees.

The demographic profile of the general audience is mostly people that belong to the working class who come to the event with their extended families. Thus, the age bracket is varied among them, with a balanced presence of women and men. The group emplaced in the tribune of the authorities consists mostly of middle class men holding positions in the government, high-ranking military officers, and some members of the clergy. Women are the minority, and it is more common to see them seated at the upper part of the platform. In spatial terms, the closer the members of this audience are to the president, the more likely they are to be men. On the other hand, and contrary to what was a common practice until the beginning of the 20th century, members of the upper class do not attend this event (Larraín 267), and their absence can be sensed in any part of the field, except in the authorities area where families of the Armed Forces high commands, and VIP audience are located (Larraín 267). Actually, they prefer to celebrate the fiestas with their families in their houses, or flee the city or the country during the long holiday, rather than attend or even follow the event on TV.
From a demographic point of view then, the MP can be conceptualized as an instance where the political oligarchy meets the people in a shared but highly hierarchized and segregated space—and never mixing together. The absence of upper class citizens at the event enforces the concept that the MP constitutes a popular celebration where the traditional distance between the ruling class, the military, and the people is temporarily shortened. Such a notion, however, is one of the “illusions” this heterotopia enacts for a national audience. Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable (Foucault 26), and the MP is no exception. Besides displaying ranks and categories present in the social structure of Chilean society, political affiliation is also an important factor in having or not having access to the authorities’ area. The official TV broadcast privileges images and sound that show the positive emotional responses of this “captive” audience, leaving out any discordant manifestation that could come from dissident spectators.

A close reading of the way the troops perform their march sheds additional light on the deep gap between the civil and military spheres.

Before and after entering and exiting the center stage zone, the military performers unfold their actions as if the audience were not present watching them, or from the spectators’ point of view, as if they were watching the performance from behind an invisible “fourth wall.” Nevertheless, when the performers enter center stage they break this “fourth wall” to interact with authorities and guests on the stands. This is done by the soldiers shifting their regular march to a “paso de parada” (a reduced form of the goose-step, with the boot point at knee height),

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while turning their heads, at unison, to the right after a check pace. The parade leader does the same while saluting with the right arm raised so the forearm is placed at a 90° angle, while pointing at the temple. The only exception is the right marker of each row, who must stay looking to the front, to keep the platoon in a straight line.

In my view, this peculiar behavior of the performers reflects well the actual separation between the military and the civilian worlds, and also the symbiotic relationship the militaries keep with the state and its representatives. More specifically, the selective double standard that shapes a differentiated treatment of the attendants shows the distance between the militaries and the popular world. Historically, Chilean military officers have been closely related to families that belong to the economic and political oligarchy. During the 19th century most military officials belonged to wealthy families, which also held key positions in the government. Even though such family ties to the oligarchy gradually ceased during the 20th century, new cadets are still recruited predominantly from the middle and upper classes. The cadet recruiting process is highly selective, and targets young men and women that belong to the bourgeoisie. A thorough genealogical research is performed to discard any applicant having disreputable family political affiliations (i.e. communists) or Mapuche ancestors (Cayuqueo, A proposito). Social class is also a factor to get

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53 The discriminatory (unwritten) policy that the Chilean Armed Forces have against Mapuche soldiers is clearly seen in the current composition of the high commands of the forces: in 2011, none of the 141 member of the Armed Forces High Command are of Mapuche origin,
into the Military School, so applicants that come from the lower class are usually rejected or persuaded not to apply by the high amount of security deposits the future students need to pay before entering the school. Individuals with Mapuche surnames and low-income families are more probably accepted into the Escuela de Suboficiales.\(^5^4\) Classism and racism are enthroned in Chilean military culture, and even though the public discourse denies such a reality, in practice, discriminatory criteria are still in place.\(^5^5\) This selection bias sharply contrasts with the situation in the U.S. where military recruits are more often than not cajoled from the lower classes with promises of social advancement through college and job benefits. I was actually surprised when after taking the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test (ASVAB) in 2010 my 18-year-old daughter, a high school Latin American student living in the U.S., was approached by recruiters from the Navy to enter the United States Naval Academy.


\(^5^4\) Military School for Non Commissioned Officers (all ranks between Private First Class and Lieutenant).

\(^5^5\) The situation of a police officer who was not allowed to marry a non commissioned officer, due to her “low cultural extraction” recently came to light. The official letter of prohibition states that the low sociocultural status of both the woman and her family are “incompatible with the condition the wife of an officer should have”, and therefore, such marriage “does not contribute to the prestige of the officer and the Chilean Police Institution” (Carabineros).
The military culture and its endemic classism reflect and register striations that mark Chilean society as a whole, where your surname, your skin color, the social strata you belong to, your age, gender orientation, and even the place where you live play an important role in getting a job, a scholarship, and a political office. The ideological maneuver the MP reifies consists of discursively representing those inequalities and prejudices that operate in Chilean society as fallacies, and make them disappear. As a matter of fact, the verbal narrative broadcast during the event repeatedly indicates that the Armed Forces are systems open to anyone, without discrimination of any kind. Nevertheless, the segregated physical emplacement of the audience, authorities and performers, the differences in the dress uniforms wore by the cadets and the NCO, the skin color and names of the authorities and generals, and the order the different military schools perform in are a loud contradiction to what is being said.

Joseph Roach in his *Cities of the Dead* reminds us that one important strategy of performance research is “to juxtapose living memory as restored behavior against a historical archive of scripted records” (11). By overlapping these two epistemological systems, we expect to make apparent the erasures and the absences that “scripto-centric” hegemonic accounts somehow hide, censor, marginalize, or leave out from their constructs. The verbal narrative that threads the three-hour-long MP does nothing but repeat what the military version of Chilean history has carved in schools’ history books. The audience knows military narratives by heart; they form part of our personal inner landscape, engraved in our collective unconscious. Indeed, they are so strong that even
though the repertoire conflicts with the scripto-centric account, it seems that nobody cares.

A close reading of the redundant set of semantic categories that the narrator articulates his speech shows at least two key elements that may help us to understand the ideological maneuver the MP entails.

First, the recurrent references to military values like discipline, obedience, honor, and courage conforms a verbal isotopy that somehow ends up corresponding with the demanding and monotone physical score the soldiers perform on stage.

Second, the reiteration of phrases like “Chilean history,” “Chilean nation,” “birth, creation, formation, of the nation,” “a glorious past”, “making history,” and “soldiers that made our nation” provide the spectator with an obvious path for interpretation: the Chilean history and military history are one. As a matter of fact, such a statement is made during the performance, literally, when the narrator says that “Chilean history merges with that of the soldiers.”

Thus, the narration becomes the through-line that guides our reception and vectorization of the performance.

The military doctrine that is present in the military version of national identities is neatly shown in the first image the Museo Histórico y Militar de Chile (Chilean Historic and Military Museum) offers to the visitor: a 16-foot-long panorama that shows a timeline entitled “Cinco Siglos de Historia” (Five Centuries of History). The visual artifact presents, in chronological sequence, a

56 Transcription MP 2010.
collection of printings, paintings and photographs that illustrate key moments of Chilean History.

The visitor will see that practically all the selected images used in the panorama show soldiers, military episodes, battles and weaponry, at the same time that it excludes the presence of civilians and women. The chosen images follow each other harmoniously, fading in and out with their antecessor and predecessor, so conveying the impression that all the historical events portrayed flowed without gaps or interruptions. Thus, this chrono-graphic representation offers a convenient, compact, and oversimplified version of Chilean history that postulates the militaries as its main protagonists.

A striking aspect of this visual narrative is that it abruptly ends in 1960, so that there is no Chilean history after that time. This erasure is replicated in the MP too, where all is about a distant, incorruptible past and a promising future, but nothing is said about the recent traumatic Chilean dictatorship. The erasure of an important portion of contemporary Chilean history has to do with the uneasiness that the Army feels when dealing with the dark days of the Pinochet regime. Unable to justify the crimes against human rights committed by the dictatorship, the Army, which has traditionally shown excessive pride and self-satisfaction

Figure 5. “Five Centuries of History”. Chilean Historic and Military Museum
about its role in building the nation, has never recognized its wrongdoings. Their unjustifiable violent acts, still fresh in the collective memory of the nation, make it impossible for them to articulate a narrative that favors the military institution. So, in this hopeless scenario the institution has opted for the alternative of simply erasing this inconvenient truth and instead looks further back at a romantic, idealized past, like the soldier in the panorama does. This is the archive held in another heterotopia, the museum, where the slices of time are gathered together, overlapped, and sometimes juxtaposed based on a criterion that sustains the ideological maneuver the Army plays with its version of Chilean history. The MP enacts this panorama making it dynamic and alive, and by doing so it enacts the same old military ideology we have swallowed and integrated in our selves, bypassing the critical zone of our brain and operating as a perfect “percepticide” (Taylor Disappearing).

The example above demonstrates how two different heterotopias, the MP and the Military Museum intersect each other and engage in a dialogue that brings more “evidence” to the metonymical military thesis that Military history equals Chilean history. These interactions and intersections among heterotopic sites bring me back to an axiom I laid out in the Introduction: It is possible to triangulate different heterotopias in a given society. If a heterotopian place is, by definition, a place where a plurality of other places of society are somehow represented, then another heterotopia produced in the same society could be reflecting some of the same societal sites, which allows for points of intersection:
“Our epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations among sites” (Foucault 23).

The Chilean government, together with the Army, has been diligent in finding other sites to enact military ideologies and keep nurturing the metonymical maneuver of coupling Chilean history with military history. In my elementary and high school time, all my generation read the military version of national identity from the same history book: *El Manual de Historia de Chile*, by Francisco Frías Valenzuela, which is still mandatory in most public Chilean schools. Today, targeting the new generation of students requires more imagination and enticing means, specially the new technologies. Thus, in 2008 and 2009, and as a part of the celebrations of the Bicentenary, the government through its Ministerio de Educación and the Ejército de Chile, organized a history contest called “El Ejército de los Chilenos: Concurso de historia de Chile” (“The Army of the Chileans: Chilean History Contest”), which was oriented to high school students throughout the country. A website designed specially for the event was instrumental in drawing the attention of thousands of students and teachers from every corner of the country, and keeping them active and connected with the project through an open blog, attractive advertisements, and good rewards. Although the title of the competition somehow teases that the event is about the Chilean Army in Chilean history, the official rules of the contest described it as a site devoted to “analyze, understand and value the history of Chile by researching key historical milestones and personalities that marked the formation of our Republic, specifically during the nineteenth century” (Concurso). In other words,
and regardless of the appellative of the contest, this historic literary competition would actually be about Chilean history and not specifically about the Army. Nevertheless, a later paragraph in the document redefines the goal of the contest, stating that it seeks to “create a participative instance that allows teachers and students to learn about our Chilean history and the role the Army played in it …” (Idem). Nevertheless, when we turn to the set of themes the students and teachers are challenged to research and write about, we notice that 100% of the listed topics are related to military heroes, military milestones, and battles. So, after all, the competition does happen to be about military affairs, not about a more inclusive progress narrative.

I assert that this ambiguous way of presenting the purpose and themes of the contest by the organizers of the event, is not casual but is in fact a thoughtful articulation by the organizers, and particularly by its main promoter: the Army. Actually, coupling military history with Chilean history operates as a discursive maneuver that can be observed in practically all the fronts where the Army has the opportunity to present its view of Chilean history as one homologated to the history of the Army.

Such a discursive maneuver can be clearly expressed in the following remark that the Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, General Oscar Izurieta Ferrer, made during the closing ceremony of the event:

Each nation has a history defined by unique characteristics. Chile’s history is mingled with that of its army and the latter, with that of its people.
[...] This is the Army of all Chileans; mixed up with its people and the nation's history, with its days of glory and its fateful moments.

The purpose of the contest, then, was to stimulate the interest of middle school students in the Chilean history of the nineteenth-century, through research of major landmarks and characters linked to the Army, which marked the formation of our country. (Izurieta 8)

Izurieta’s post-mortem statement does nothing but confirm the implicit truism that the rules of the contest also insinuate, that is to say, that Chilean history becomes somehow indistinguishable from that of the Army. Izurieta’s word choice when saying that Chilean history “se confunde” (“is mingled with”) with that of the Army, instead of saying, for instance, that it “forma parte de” (“forms part of”) Chilean history, seems an attempt to build a relation of equivalence between these two histories rather than one of inclusion into a larger narrative.

Interestingly, in the MP of 2010, President Sebastián Piñera used a similar narrative in its inaugural discourse:

So in these days, when Chile celebrates with great pride its first two centuries of republican life, Chileans turn their eyes, their minds, and their hearts toward our soldiers, to our men and women in arms, for the history of the Chilean Army is indistinguishable from the very history of our Republic. (Piñera, Italics added)
The way the mass media and school bulletins presented the competition to their audiences corroborates the effectivity of the discursive maneuver of coupling the military history with the Chilean one. Yasna Provoste, Minister of Education, officially announced the contest in the following terms: “[The contest] will allow our youth to develop investigation, critical thinking, and documentation of an important stage in the history of our country. We encourage all Chilean students to participate in the contest, so contributing to keep our history and Republican spirit alive” (Mineduc y Ejército). In the same press conference, General Izurieta added:

We want many young people to understand the roots of our country, to know how it was formed and consolidated into a republic so they can better understand Chile today. To address the 21st century it is essential to have a generation of young people with a clear national identity and value system. (Idem)

In the schools the event was publicized in similar terms. For example, in the Instituto San Lorenzo de Rancagua, the site devoted to the event pointed out that its objective consisted of “encouraging knowledge and critical reflection on the major milestones in the history of twentieth-century Chile (The Republic), by promoting values such as respect for diversity among our students, and helping them to build a comprehensive view of our history” (Concurso nacional). The Catholic TV channel Canal 13, one of the main sponsors of the event, summarized the experience in the following terms:
The history contest “The Army of the Chileans” was a total success. It created a new instance of learning for thousands of middle school students.

One of its most remarkable accomplishments was to unite students around the history of the country, and give them a sense of belonging, just in time as we prepare to celebrate Independence Day.

In total, over 150 thousand students participated in the contest, from Parinacota to Tierra del Fuego.

[...] “The Army of the Chileans” became much more than a contest; it was a way to teach, to understand and to experience Chilean history. (Teletrece)

Maybe more telling that any written account about the contest and its attempt to tout the military version of Chilean history to thousands of students and the general public is the image shown below:
Taken during the closing award ceremony, this picture shows a female high school student surrounded by historic military figures and contemporary soldiers. The background of the proscenium theatre is painted with the colors of the national flag, and is flanked on both sides by cadets in parade uniforms. Apart from the student, there are no civilians on stage. Two formations of soldiers representing troops from Independence times and the Pacific War expand the stage by invading the audience space. The audience, the civilian world, is a mere spectator of the scene and stands applauding the staging. The image reifies the traditional military narrative of Chilean history where male soldiers occupy center stage, and where the civil world, women, and indigenous people are utterly underrepresented, invisibilized or relegated to the condition of mere spectators.

Even though, as Alun Munslow reminds us, every time history is written there are new interpretations of the same set of facts and data, the militaries have
demonstrated a notable capability to consistently engage with Chilean past in a reductive, partial, and convenient way, show their contribution to Chilean history. History “is never just about the past, it is always about itself in the present”(5), but due to the fact that in Chile there have been no wars with external sovereignties in the last 120 years, the army does not have history in the present. At least it does not in the way they selectively see history, that is to say, as a handful of battles and conflicts compressed in a lineal narrative that presents them in a continuum where they always win. Because of that, the militaries are reiteratively looking back, to a far mythical past that they embellish, trying to bring credibility into the present. Because of that they are able to wipe the discontinuities and the dirty spots from their accounts as they did, for example, with the “lost” days of Pinochet. It is in this scenario that heterotopias of power, such as the MP are important sites for the military, because there, and under the umbrella provided by the government, and the weight of the tradition, the Army can retell a convenient functional past that justifies its existence in the present.

Another illusion the MP performs is the relationship between the Chilean state, the Armed Forces and the Mapuche. Let me offer a telling example of the type of official discourses the Army presents to the public and that is reiterated in the MP ad nauseam. The next paragraph is an excerpt from the message given by the Commander in Chief of the Army, Oscar Izurieta Ferrer, to students and high government authorities during the closing ceremony of the High School National History Contest “El Ejército de los chilenos,” on September 12, 2008, just seven
days before the next MP. The ceremony was broadcast on TV for the national audience:

[…] Consequently, when we speak of the Chilean army, we are referring to an organization that serves all Chileans, which throughout history has been integrated by patriots, regardless of their race, ethnicity, geographic location, gender, and religious or political beliefs. In this regard, and well into the Republic, the Army received waves of young Mapuche who joined its ranks. There they were treated as equals, and had the opportunity to progress in their positions as NCOs, and even officers, excelling in the wars with their patriotism and endurance.

I can assure you that the army has never practiced any kind of discrimination against the indigenous who have served in its ranks. On the contrary, all of them feel Chilean, proud of their origin, and happy to belong to the Institution. And this pride is mutual, and it is reflected in military units that bear the surname of indomitable Araucanian warriors, or the name of places of their exploits. Because the Army is a plural institution where individuals with diverse social, cultural and ethnic background are amalgamated by the love of Chile, the only proofs of nobility required to belong are virtue and patriotism, just as O'Higgins thought it should be. The greatness of the Army is to integrate rather than separate. (Izurieta, Italics added)
One cannot help but chuckle reading such a cluster of false or gratuitous statements made by General Oscar Izurieta Ferrer, today’s Under Secretary of Defense of Piñera’s government. I will not develop here a counter argument to Izurieta’s words since I am addressing the issue of how the Chilean State and the Army have historically dealt with the Mapuche people in the last 160 years in the chapter devoted to the Mapuche heterotopia. Suffice it to say that while the MP portrays the Mapuches as fully assimilated in Chilean society, by staging them as lonely characters integrated in a sea of other Chilean characters, it is without mentioning the militarization and repression that is going on in La Araucanía, their ancestral Mapuche territory.

During the Pinochet regime the Mapuche did not have physical presence in the Parade, and any reference to them was through the typical tropes remembering the mythical Mapuche heroes, and the miscegenation between the Spanish conquerors and Mapuche warriors, which gave rise to the Chilean race according to the national myths. In 2002, however, the MP included, for the first time, a delegation...
of Mapuches. Led by a lonco\textsuperscript{57}, the Mapuches enter stage chanting and dancing traditional dances, and then proceed to pay tribute to the president. Although the narrator presents them as legitimate representatives of the Mapuche people, they actually belong to one urban Mapuche family that does not maintain a relationship with the main indigenous organizations of the country. Thus, their presence in the parade has been criticized by leaders of Mapuche groups who consider that they are honoring and legitimizing the Chilean State and the Army—institutions that have historically persecuted and killed their people and stolen their land.

Interestingly, during the 2010 Parade, and as a reaction to the Mapuche hunger strike, the government reconfigured their performance in the Parade, atomizing their presence by placing four of them scattered among a stock of two hundred national characters. These “assimilated” Mapuches were all carrying Chilean flags as a token of their unconditional integration.

Linked to slices in time (Foucault 26), the esplanade of the O’Higgins Park has been the stage for more than 180 military parades, which have been palimpsestically scribbled on its surface. The narrator of the parade repeatedly reminds the spectators that the same space has been populated by previous generations of soldiers, tracing a genealogical line that goes back to the day of the Independence and the Founding Father of la Patria. The Parade embodied this heterochrony showing, for example, the president arriving in the same horse

\textsuperscript{57} In mapudungun, the mapuche language, lonco means head, and it is the title given to a mapuche tribal leader. In 2010 the lonco Paineman Parada, who led the mapuche delegation, was appointed as the director of the Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (Conadi), which is the governmental Bureau of Indian Affairs. After nine months in this position, Parada was relieved from office.
carriage that was used in the First Centenary, and presenting soldiers marching with uniforms, flags, and weapons from the Independence Wars.

The narrative uttered during the performance also works palimpsestically through a particular rhetorical feature that is also present in practically all official scripts, speeches, and historical accounts: a flamboyant prose style reminiscent of that of the romantic liberal historiography that prevailed until the mid 19th century in Chile.

There are two aspects that I want to stress on this matter. First, it is interesting to notice that the poetization of military discourses mismatches the toughness, the pragmatism, the rigid and lineal structures, and the institution’s ultimate raison d’être and defining attribute, which is to exert extreme violence and to kill when required. As Higate posits it, “the authority to kill lies with the military: it is its institutional prerogative” (29). At the inaugural speech of the Día del Arma de Infantería in 2008, for example, the Division General Guillermo Castro remembered the Toma del Morro de Arica (the Siege of the Morro of Arica [June 7, 1880]) in the following terms:

There, our soldiers surprised the enemy, which even though offered heroic resistance, lost its strongholds. For the courage, audacity, and singular bravery of the First, Third and Fourth Line regiments, along with the Lautaro battalion, obtained the glory in just 55 minutes, producing the admiration of all Chileans, and also the world. (June 6, 2008)
The excessive embellishment of the military prose makes me suspect a sort of functionality that it could be accomplishing. There are several hypotheses that come to mind when trying to make sense of the predilection that the militaries have in using this rhetorical style. I think for example, that in doing so they align themselves with military heroes from the past who have been characterized by some historians and chroniclers as having portentous rhetorical skill to create beautiful and encouraging phrases in both the battle and political fields. Thus, since flamboyant prose would have become a distinct characteristic of the hero, adopting such a style creates a kind of identification between the officer that utters it today and some prominent member of the military pantheon.

Mauricio Rugenda’s painting “El Presidente Prieto llegando a la Pampilla” [“President Prieto Arriving to the Pampilla” (left, 1837)], and Ernest Charton’s “18 de septiembre de 1845” (right), show the Independence Day celebrations as they used to be enacted each September 18th at the “Pampilla” or “Campo de
The images show a popular open feast that marked a temporal suspension of all hierarchical ranks, norms and privileges. At that time the professional army and the “guardias cívicas” (militias) marched together, signifying effective integration between the civil and military spheres. In the origin of Chilean military parades the lived space was conceptualized and enacted as a circular, concentric stage where the action happened in both the center and the periphery. This original environmental stage gradually evolved into a segregated and hierarchical space through the 20th century, but it still remained as a relatively open space until 1974, when the first MP of the Pinochet regime took place. During the autocratic regime the presiding authorities and the performers of the MP were both soldiers, and the performance was not formally different from any military review that could take place in exclusive military settings. For the first time the spectators attending the event became subjected to constant surveillance, replicating what was happening in Chilean society as a whole. The MP exacerbated the military image of authority to function as a political tool employed “to dispel (any) social dissonance and conflict” (Bristol 213) in a time when the repressive state apparatus coincided with the state. The segregated space imposed by Pinochet has surprisingly remained almost unaltered during the democratic governments that followed. Although the spaces in Chilean society have been gradually democratized and have become more participative in the last 20 years, the MP space still remains as authoritarian as in Pinochet’s time.

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58 Later La Pampilla will become known as the Causiño Park, and in 1974, during the Pinochet regime, it was renamed “O’Higgins Park”, after Bernardo O’Higgins, one of the heroes of the Independence and a Chilean military icon.
Perhaps the restoration of civilians on the podium has allowed for more sympathy and identification between the spectators and their political authorities, and charismatic personalities like Michelle Bachelet have helped to shorten the distance, but the MP heterotopia has failed to show a more democratic and participative space for the audience. The climate of festivity that was somehow still felt until 1972 seems to be forever gone and the MP remains a redoubt for ideological indoctrination and a space of reproduction of the ideology of the ruling order. The event is an official performance that works as a space of illusion (Foucault 26), which allows the government to invisibilize, harmonize, and even idealize sociopolitical and geopolitical conflicts such as the Mapuche struggle, and also to enact abridged, sanitized, and amnesiac versions of national histories, erasing from memory the trauma and the wrongdoings the militaries have perpetrated in the distant and recent past. In this space, the always-complicated civil-military relationship is smoothly performed while the National Security Doctrine learned in the School of the Americas is still haunting in the Military School classrooms.

As long as massive public cultural performances sponsored by the State, like the MP, continue to be monolithic authoritarian spaces where a hypocritical Chile is enacted, Chilean democracy will never match the idealistic democratic rhetoric we proudly pronounce in the Senate Chamber. Events like the MP are not only thermometers of society, but also its fever.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

What do a prison located in Temuco City, a copper mine in the desert of San José, and the O’Higgins Park esplanade have in common? Nothing obvious, at least until these three perceived spaces began to be transformed into particular representational locations where “all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted;” (24) that is to say, until they were transformed into heterotopias.

Following Foucault, heterotopias are places where structures found in society are reformulated in order to contest them by suspecting, neutralizing, or even inventing anew the set of relations among them. That reformulation is precisely what my three case studies show: In Camp Hope the class structure, the economic system, hierarchical societal rankings, and the political modus operandi that prevail in current Chilean society was temporally suspended and ideationally performed by the government. In the MP the ongoing geopolitical conflict between the State and the Mapuche was sanitized, and the always-tense relationships between civil and military spheres softened by endorsing the military version of Chilean identity as the official narrative. Finally, in a coordinated hunger strike staged in five prisons situated in the Araucanía Region, 32 Mapuche activists accused of perpetrating terrorists acts, resignified those prisons as spaces of resistance and defiance against the Chilean state and its judicial system, and by so doing they created a scenario that successfully
allegorized the ancestral Mapuche struggle for constitutional recognition and autonomy as a people.

Foucault offered a model to study heterotopias, a methodology he called Heterotopology. Consequently, I approached the phenomena by using the six heterotopological principles as methodological lenses through which I described and analyzed them. In the end, I found the three heterotopias under study to satisfy those principles and to fall into some of the categories or heterotopic types described by Foucault in his “Of Other Spaces”. The following comparative table summarizes the ways each heterotopia met those requirements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heterotopia</th>
<th>Camp Hope</th>
<th>Mapuche Hunger Strike</th>
<th>Military Parade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived space</td>
<td>San José (Atacama Region)</td>
<td>Five prisons in the Araucanía Region</td>
<td>The O’Higgins Park (Metropolitan Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Official Performance heterotopia/ Temporal heterotopia of compensation (enactment of an utopian Chile)</td>
<td>Heterotopia of deviation / Temporal Counter heterotopia</td>
<td>Official Performance heterotopia/ Episodic heterotopia of illusion/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producer</td>
<td>The State</td>
<td>Mapuche prisoners/ The State</td>
<td>The State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>66 days, once</td>
<td>85 days, once</td>
<td>Three hours and a half hours, annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd principle (Function)</td>
<td>To convince and persuade/ To mark identity/ To foster community/ To demonstrate governance and technocratic effectiveness</td>
<td>To convince and persuade/ To mark identity</td>
<td>Subversion of the carceral system by targeting the own body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd principle (Juxtaposition)</td>
<td>Reflects in a perfect way all main structures</td>
<td>Juxtaposes the “allowed” Mapuche with the</td>
<td>Juxtaposes civil and military spheres/ Oppressors with</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
operating in Chilean society: State apparatuses, current and past economic systems (i.e. neoliberal and centralist), a softened version of the repressive state apparatus, etc. “prohibited” Mapuche. Reenacts past scenarios of public torture against the purported state policy of not targeting the convict’s body.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4th principle (Heterochronies/Chroniques)</th>
<th>Chronique: Camp Hope transitory heterotopia, financially sustainable just for a short period of time.</th>
<th>Chronique: Transitory heterotopia, constrained for the time the human body can live without solid food.</th>
<th>Heterochrony: Live military museum: Reiterate past scenarios of war, victories and farewells/ Palimpsest of Chilean presidents and military heroes/ Preserves the pseudo poetic military rhetoric.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th principle (open/close system)</td>
<td>Physical access is restricted, but accessible through the media</td>
<td>Restricted. Access must be granted by the carceral institution. Close family and lawyers have limited access.</td>
<td>Open, although the space is under constant surveillance/ Space is highly hierarchized/ Access through the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th principle (Compensation/Illusion)</td>
<td>Heterotopia of compensation. Camp Hope enacts what Chilean society lacks.</td>
<td>Counter heterotopia/ dis-illusion. This heterotopia presents subordinated identity and historical narratives that contest and subvert official versions.</td>
<td>Heterotopia of illusion. The MP offers a deceptive version of Chile, by purposely distorting reality and erasing competing national identity narratives and history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenarios</td>
<td>Disaster/ Foundational myths, Public torture, oppression, and deracination</td>
<td>War, conquest, farewells, and victories.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9. Heterotopias: Comparative Table

**Performance Heterotopias**

Performance studies recognizes embodied practices as both an episteme and praxis and, given the performative characteristics the study cases offered, I considered it pertinent and useful to approach them as performance. A key element that helped to catalyze these heterotopias was the presence of spectators that directly, or through the media, witnessed the events. The complaints issued by Mapuche activists about the lack of media coverage for the protest in the first
sixty days of the strike had to do with the fact that it was impossible to raise
awareness and gain support from an absent audience. Without a national and
international audience the protest could not succeed, and it was not until the
mainstream media began to inform the world about the critical medical condition
of some of the protestors that massive rallies began to emerge in different Chilean
cities, mounting pressure on the government and forcing it to intervene and
resolve the demands of the strikers.

As much as the government was interested in invisiblizing the Mapuche
protest, it was willing to make visible the search and rescue of the 33 miners in
San José. Certainly, the process of rescuing the miners could have been a sober
technical endeavour that could have taken place outside the media paraphernalia.
Nevertheless, the government opted for producing, as a spectacle, a reality show
that ensured the maximum number of spectators possible for its performance, and
built the perfect stage to captivate them: Camp Hope. With the audience in
position to watch the event broadcast 24 hours a day, the government produced
reality playing the double role of directing the staging of the event, and
performing in it. First, with Secom in the control room, this non-fictional event
was conveniently articulated using all the “fictive” elements at disposal in any
audiovisual broadcast: the use of telephoto or wide-angle lenses which squeezed
or amplified the site of the rescue; the use of live editing to make time contract,
expand, or become rhythmic, and the extensive use of an expositional strategy
that privileged and exploited the emotional moments, the tension, and euphoria of
the miners, their families and the authorities present. Second, on the stage, the
authority performed as themselves, so stylizing their behavior for the camera. This conscious acting is also seen in the MP, where the behaviors of the authorities and the militaries are highly ritualized and framed within a rigorous script and pre-set protocols.

The strikers also adjusted their behaviors to fulfill the public expectations of what a hunger striker should look like. It is known the protestors took energy drinks enriched with proteins in order to delay physical decay and survive 85 days without ingesting solid food, but to be effective and persuasive the protestors needed to add a dose of acting to their actual condition. In other words, the strikers not only needed to actually be fasting, but also to look like they were fasting. That performative behavior was determined by the presence of spectators.

To say that the presence of spectators determined the behaviors of the all main protagonists involved in the three events, allows me to formulate that in these case studies the production of heterotopias could not have been possible without the space-spectators-performers triad. I concur with Peter Brook’s remarks that any (“empty”) space can become a representational space by eliciting such a triad: “I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage. A man walks across this empty space whilst someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theatre to be engaged”(9).

Brook’s statement assumes that there is a preexistent, independent space that can be taken by someone who has the power to both name, and intervene (modify) such a space by placing actors and spectators in communal relationship. Thus, the Newtonian absolute space (the empty stage) would turn into a
conceived Leibnizian relational space (actors will be placed in relation to spectators) to, finally, become a Lefebvreian lived space of representation where the performance takes place. In other words; a perceived space, and a conceived space are bridged by eliciting human interactions in the “combination or mixture of the ‘real’ and the ‘imagined’” (Soja 10), giving origin to a representational space, or space that is “directly lived through its associated images and symbols” (Lefebvre 39). This lived space is then relationally constructed, and therefore it cannot be reduced to either of the formers. So conceived, space would be a social construct where the social is in turn spatially constructed (Massey 3).

Now, the existence of a representational space is a necessary but not enough condition to constitute a heterotopia. As I stated in my study, heterotopias are recursive subsystems that not only emerge within representational spaces, but also satisfy heterotopological principles. The San José mine, for example, was at first a mapped material space (San José), which after being conceived as a zone devoted to the exploitation of minerals, then transformed into a lived space. In other words, it was only when this particular geographic space was intervened and modified by the flows of labor, technology, money, and information that it became a representational site. Nevertheless, this representational space became a heterotopia only when, after the accident, the government decided to enact here a utopian Chile, that is to say; Camp Hope.

The fact that Camp Hope, as well as the other two case studies, were conceived and enacted for an audience is what gives these heterotopias another particularity that, perhaps, adds another kind of heterotopia to the typology
conceived by Foucault: Camp Hope, the Hunger Strike, and the MP were consciously performed. Thus, the performative nature of these heterotopias is what I have come to call performance heterotopias, or heterotopias that are enacted through performance. Heterotopias like that of San José, the Mapuche hunger strike and the MP not only show a trialectic of power, knowledge and space, but also reveal, as Soja would put it, “the simultaneity and interwoven complexity of the social, the historical, and the spatial” (3). It is in this matrix of relations that performance would act as the interface, the point of interaction and suture between discursive narratives and the real space.

Interestingly, none of the three cases failed in following a sort of dramatic structure. Camp Hope is perhaps the most Aristotelian of all three. The rising action of this event was incidentally triggered by the collapse of the mine, and escalated to an intermediate climactic moment that is reached when the miner are found alive, which also answered the dramatic question of whether they were dead or alive. Such a discovery became the incident that rushed the action to a second and final climax when the miners were rescued, and the question of whether they could actually be rescued was also answered. The denouement is still in process, as the parties ultimately responsible for the tragedy, the owners of the San José mine, are still in a legal limbo, and there is no clarity about whether they will be held accountable for their negligence. The dramatic arc of the tragedy of San José was functional in presenting and demonstrating the effectivity of Piñera’s technocratic approach to governance. Camp Hope was produced as a heterotopia of compensation, where a perfect Chile was governed by the same
technocrats that were directing the other Chile, the social space in which the Chileans outside of San José live, that which “draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs” (Foucault 23). In that sense, Camp Hope was instrumental in showing government’s efficiency and effectivity, and the successful rescue of the 33 was the crowning event of such endeavour.

If in Camp Hope the government was the main protagonist, in the hunger strike heterotopia the government was the antagonist the strikers were targeting with their protest. The main goal of the protestors was to persuade the government to yield to their central demand of ceasing the application of the Antiterrorist Law and be tried by civil courts, and they used fasting as a means. As in Camp Hope, time was the crucial factor that accelerated the involvement of the government and forced it to negotiate; the longer the fasting lasted, the more likely the possibility some of the strikers could die. The dramatic arc began to reach its summit when three of the protestors suffered severe health problems after sixty-five days of fasting, and the national and international community began to pressure the government to act. The conflict was resolved just six days before the rescue of the miners took place in Camp Hope, and after 85 day of fasting.

Although the MP has been conceived as a cultural performance from the start, currently it does not present a traditional dramatic structure, except through its narrative, which recounts several milestone war episodes in a colorful way. However, during the first parades after the Pinochet regime the dramatic question revolved around whether or not the militaries would use the event to stage acts of
disobedience to the civil authorities, and the tension was built around the moment
the General in the field asked for permission to start the MP, and to dismiss the
troops immediately after the performance. Nowadays, those two key moments are
still considered a thermometer of the state of the civil-military relationships.

Intersections

Heterotopias are real sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted
analogy with the real space of Society (Foucault 24). It is in the functional
property of reflecting societal spaces that different heterotopias intersect. For
example, while in Camp Hope racial markers are erased, and in the MP those
markers are discursively and performatively homogenized, in the Mapuche protest
racial differences are stressed. If in Camp Hope an egalitarian society is enacted,
and in the MP a hierarchical and unequal society is performed as a cohesive one
without social conflicts, the hunger strike heterotopia denounces a repressive
state, racism, and a lack of egalitarian access to justice. These cross-references
between heterotopias offer, then, alternative versions for the problems or conflicts
a given society has.

In my study I have shown how a single heterotopia is able to juxtapose,
and even reconcile, a series of incompatible sites: In Camp Hope a centralist
economy working in tandem with a hypercapitalist one; in the MP repressors and
repressed harmoniously sharing the same space; and in the prison, place that
reifies the economy of suspended rights, and not the site to inflict physical pain
(Discipline 8-9), the prisoners opt for self flagellating their bodies through a
prolonged fasting. Such internal juxtapositions show not only the subsisting
contradictions and discontinuities that operate in society but also the ideological contradictions of those that conceived and produced a determined heterotopia.

Now, after studying these three apparently discrete heterotopias, and seeing how they intersect and cite one to each other, I visualize the importance of juxtaposing them to get a sense of the forces that play in society in a specific moment. Thus, for instance, by juxtaposing Piñera’s declaration about starting a new deal with the Mapuche people with the portrayal of assimilated and atomized Mapuche in the context of the MP, one cannot but question his true intentions.

Heterotopias then should be scrutinized inward but at the same time outward, and in relation not only to the society that they reflect, contest or invert, but also in relation to other heterotopias.

**A Last Reflection**

As they change according to the synchrony of the culture in which they occur (Foucault 25), it is possible to say that heterotopias are always in process of becoming. This is an important realization; because their dynamism assures that they are an actualized system whose informational thickness and meanings (conveyed through discourses and performances) are synchronically produced alongside the events unfolding on the stage of a given society. When I began to follow the event in San José, and the hunger strike in the Araucanía, I felt the frustration of not be able to translate into words the whirlwind of new developments that were happening in those spaces. Like theatrical performances, heterotopias are always transitory real places that mutate even on a daily basis, simultaneously, and in multiple levels and directions. This distressful ephemeral
quality helped me, however, to regard and value actuality and history as fluxes, instead of a series of non-concatenated solidified moments. It is heterotopias’ simultaneous dramaturgy what fascinated me the most, and made me rethink myself as a participant-scholar interested in studying the flux of history as it unfolds itself in the moment, while engulfing me in its un-seizable movement.

Four of the 32 Mapuche that, after the trial shaped by the Antiterrorist Law, were found guilty, began a new hunger strike on March 15, 2011. Perhaps this new protest will become a new heterotopia, but one that will be palimpsestically built on not only the previous hunger strike and other equivalent episodes of Mapuche history, but also on the *winka* official heterotopia of Camp Hope and MP and their discourse of unity, assimilation and tolerance. The “reading” of the new protest will be also dyed by the events in Rapa Nui, the Chilean Pacific island known as “Easter Island” to much of the rest of the world. In this microcosm situated, literally, outside of all places, another ethnic insurrection with geopolitical connotations persists, and in response the State has activated its preferred antibodies: invisibilization and repression. Then, how it is possible to move forward the announced government’s pro-indigenist agenda favoring the Mapuche people if the same problematic is been solved through repression in the island?

As it becomes clear that space is fundamental in any exercise of power, emerging and traditional heterotopias constitute an entry point to recognize, study, and understand the ways hegemonic and subaltern groups (with their subjugated knowledge) instrumentalize them for their own political ends. Heterotopias may
not only reflect, contest, or improve what a society is in a given moment in history, but also, by performing imagined versions of that society, become an active and transformative agent that has material consequences in it. Therefore, heterotopias can be instrumental in rehearsing the new spaces society needs to change. Lefebvre said that to change life, we need to first change space:

“Absolute revolution is our self-image and our mirage –as seen through the mirror of absolute (political) space” (190). As “new social relations demand a new space, and vice-versa,” (59) to change society we need to start producing an appropriate space. But, if transforming social relations demand new spaces, then new societies need new heterotopias.

Finally, I wonder what happens with heterotopias that are already being enacted, or in process of emergence in other societies, other Latin American countries, like the bordering nations of Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. Are those heterotopias talking to each other? Do they have points of intersection? How can a set of Latin American heterotopias, in their dynamic synchrony with their own hosting societies, shed light on, for example, the slippery hemispheric imagined identity we talk much about, but that we cannot satisfactorily grasp in its perpetual becoming? Is it possible to map and juxtapose twin performance heterotopias such as the military parades performed in, for example, Peru and Chile? How the current geopolitical conflicts between these two countries and their history of wars, are enacted and referred to in those military parades?

Heterotopology has been useful in studying local heterotopias, micro-geographies that were transformed into enacted utopias, and perhaps it could be
fruitful to expand its application to analyzing heterotopias located in the Latin American macro-geography, and adopting a hemispheric perspective.
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