Course-corrections in Rapport Management:
How Changes to Rapport Occur in One Sample of Political Discourse

by

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ABSTRACT

The ways in which human relationships are managed via language is a topic of particular interest in the area of sociolinguistics where work into the study of such topics as politeness, impoliteness, and rapport management have attempted to shed light on this phenomenon. This study examines two segments of extended discourse by President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia at the 2008 Summit of the Rio Group where he addressed a gathering of Rio Group members comprising heads of state from Latin American and Caribbean nations. Faced with serious accusations about his nation's military actions into Ecuador a few days before the meeting in question, Uribe engaged the group through two extended statements where he defended his government's actions. In these two segments of discourse Uribe changed his tone; it is this change that the present study attempts to describe in terms of modification to the effects of his discourse on the relationship between himself and the other interlocutors. To this end, an analysis is done classifying Uribe's utterances as polite, per Brown and Levinson's politeness model, and impolite, per Culpeper's impoliteness model. Additionally, Spencer Oatey's model of rapport management is used to classify Uribe's utterances according to their effect on the components of rapport. These classifications are examined alongside an analysis of factors related to rapport management such as frame, purpose of the exchange, and participants, for the purpose of understanding how these many factors work together to generate a changed effect to rapport. Of greatest significance in this study is the relationship between (im)politeness strategies and components of rapport. This dynamic provided an interesting way of examining (im)politeness in a new context, one that factored-in the effects of (im)politeness to the relationship between interlocutors.
The study, as described above, showed that Uribe's change in tone was indeed a change to approach to rapport management characterized by an initial focus on the transactional and relational goals rapport component in the first of two segments, that then changed in the second part to a focus on face and association rights.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The manner in which an individual’s discourse unfolds, through use of politeness and impoliteness strategies, through addressing of face sensitivities or wants, and with changes in tone and strategic direction, is the focus of this study. Past key work in these areas includes Brown and Levinson’s seminal work on politeness (1978), Goffman’s concept of face (1955), and Spencer-Oatey’s theory of relational work (2005). Fundamental theories such as these about what might constitute a speaker’s strategic contributions to an exchange, as well as insights into the many external factors (e.g. context, purpose of the dialog) affecting said contributions, will be tested against a sample of discourse taken from the 2008 Summit of the Rio Group where President Alvaro Uribe’s speech played a key role in the event’s main topic of discussion: the military actions of the Colombian government into Ecuadorian territory in March of 2008.

Using a theoretical model based on the works mentioned above, I will examine Uribe’s discourse as it developed during this event as a means to better understand his use of (im)politeness and to attempt to explain shifts in his discourse marked by changes in tone as well as conversational themes (topics of discussion) and language (words). These changes (described in greater detail in section 2), when paired with analysis of the factors surrounding the dialog that took place at the Summit (i.e. participants, context), provide the framework for understanding rapport management (Spencer-Oatey, 2005) as Uribe carried it out at this event.

To this end, a series of questions are proposed to describe the following aspects of the way in which Uribe negotiates his relationships with participants at the
Summit:

1. What politeness and impoliteness strategies were used?
2. Who participated in the exchange, when and where (frame)?
3. Which components of rapport were affected?
4. How was rapport managed?

I will answer these questions to attain a theory-based understanding of how a speaker can structure, and then alter their speech to negotiate social relationships in an exchange.

This study will begin with a description of the data used (section 2), then a review of existing theory and research on (im)politeness and rapport management (section 3), and then follow with a more detailed outline of the analytical model developed for this study (section 4). This model will then be applied to answer the four questions posed by the analytical framework, as briefly summarized above (sections 5 and 6), and conclude with a discussion of how rapport management seems to have been constructed by Uribe at the 2008 Summit, based on the data and insights gained in the analysis (section 7).
CHAPTER 2
DESCRIPTION OF DATA

The following description of the data used in this study will characterize the nature of the dialog and its participants. Once defined, the structure of the dialog will make clear the phenomenon that the present study wishes to better understand and around which the theoretical model is designed.

2.1 The event

In March of 2008, the annual summit of the Rio Group, an international group of leaders from Latin America and the Caribbean, took place in Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. In attendance at this event were heads of state from member countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. This event has, in the past, provided an important forum for member states to discuss and debate important political and economic issues. The 20th annual Summit, held on March 7th, 2008, was no exception, focusing on the then recent incursion of Colombia’s military into Ecuadorian territory. The opening statements made by the Ecuadorian, Venezuelan and Nicaraguan heads of state at the start of the Summit clearly pitted these nations against Colombia and thereby set the stage for the strong, and at times aggressive, exchanges that took place there. This meeting of leaders was aired over television in Venezuela where a video of the event was posted online along with extensive commentary.

2.2 The dialog

The video of this event captured most of the dialog that took place at the Summit, an exchange that in keeping with the format of the event, consisted primarily of “interventions”, or extended statements made by each head of state in
attendance. In each of these statements, the speakers expressed concerns and opinions about political issues, many of which addressed the military incursion that had taken place just days earlier. They addressed the whole group and, thus, discussed many topics and directed their statements at individual group members at different times, all in one turn. After each speaker’s extended statement, other members of the Rio Group would sometimes respond in shorter statements, often resulting in brief exchanges between speaker and hearer(s) before the dialog moved on to the next extended speech. Thus, the dialog at the Summit was composed of a series of long, complex statements, in-between which there occurred shorter, back-and-forth exchanges where particular topics addressed in the longer statements were discussed or debated by multiple participants.

2.3 Participants and audience

As stated above, the members of the Rio Group are composed of the leaders of member nations. At the 2008 Summit, the presidents in attendance included: Alvaro Uribe (Colombia), Leonel Fernandez (Dominican Republic), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Felipe Calderon (Mexico), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (Argentina), Celso Amorin (Brazil), Michelle Bachelet (Chile), Hugo Chavez (Venezuela), Martin Torrijos (Panama), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Manuel Zelaya (Honduras), and Alan García (Peru). The dialog during the Summit consisted of these individuals as participants (fulfilling the roles of speakers and hearers). In addition to these participants, a few other parties were present but with very limited or no roles in the dialog. These were chancellors from each of the participating nations and an audience physically present in the room where the Summit took place. It must also be noted that because this event was televised live in at least one
country, Venezuela, that the television audience must also be recognized as being present as the presidents, the primary speakers, were no doubt aware of their presence; this fact thus potentially influencing their speech. This last group could also be said to include the FARC, a group that plays a central role in much of Uribe’s speech, but that does not participate in the Summit. It is possible that they viewed this live broadcast, but did not, in fact, have any direct participation at the Summit. Despite the various types of participants at this event, future references in this paper to participants as “H”, or hearer, will include only the presidents participating in the dialog. It is this party that Uribe addresses directly in his discourse, thus providing clear information as to the specific rapport relationship that Uribe wishes to manage through the dialog at the Summit.

2.4 Focus of this study

Of particular interest to this study are those extended statements made by then Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. His contributions to the dialog that took place at the Summit included two long statements, one made at the beginning lasting approximately one hour and ten minutes, and the second towards the end lasting forty seven minutes. Both statements also responded to the often times critical comments and questions posed by the other heads of state in attendance, many of whom shared concern with Ecuador and Venezuela at Colombia’s recent military actions.

There is a noticeable change in President Uribe’s tone from the first to the second statement, where the first is characterized by many negative references to the

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1 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is a left-wing guerilla group in Colombia who supports reallocation of wealth to the poor and opposes the influence of foreign governments and large corporations on the country ("FARC").
armed, guerrilla group FARC, and the second marked by polite, deferential statements directed at the members of the Rio Group. Perhaps of greatest importance, however, is one of the short exchanges that takes place in-between Uribe’s longer statements. In this exchange, President Correa of Ecuador makes a comment warning other members of the group to be beware of Colombia’s military:

**President Correa:** Primero, mi querido Leonel, queridos dominicanos, tengan mucho cuidado, si el presidente Uribe cree que hay otro Raúl Reyes en Santo Domingo, viene y los bombardea. Si le queda una computadora, va a decir más encima que tú eres el culpable del bombardeo. ¡Mucho cuidado!

First, my dear Leonel, dear Dominicans, be very careful. If President Uribe believes that there is another Raul Reyes in Santo Domingo, he will bomb you. If a computer is left behind, he will also say that you are the one responsible for the bombing. Be very careful!

**President Uribe:** Llegaremos a capturarlo con la coordinación del gobierno dominicano y a través de sus policías.

We will capture him in coordination with the Dominican government and through their police.

**President Correa:** Serénese Presidente Uribe, cálmese, cálmese. Qué difícil es pedirle a alguien...

Calm down President Uribe, relax, relax. Is it so difficult to ask someone…

**President Uribe:** [Uribe laughs] No, no, no me aplique el cinismo que tienen los nostálgicos del comunismo, no me aplique ese cinismo con que engañan a sus pueblos.

Don’t, don’t, don’t engage me through the cynicism of those nostalgic for communism. [Audience begins to boo] Don’t engage me through that
cynicism by which you deceive your people.

In this exchange, President Uribe’s final comment is perceived by the audience as unacceptable, hence the boo-ing, a reaction not seen during any of Uribe’s remaining dialog. Further on in the Summit, Uribe also makes the following comment, referring to the exchange above:

“Ojalá el tono de hoy, con excepción del tono del presidente Correa y el mío al inicio, se conservara…”

Hopefully, today’s tone, with the exception of President Correa’s and mine at the start, can be conserved…

He characterizes positively the tone of the dialog at the Summit, marking his previous exchange with President Correa as an exception to this positive aspect. If, through these statements, we are to understand that Uribe is aware of the degree of impact that his comment in the short, boo-ed exchange with Correa had, then we can consider this awareness, having occurred between his first and second extended statements, as a potential factor in influencing his change in tone and manner of addressing the audience.

In other words, Uribe’s description of his actions makes clear that he recognizes the sanctioned nature of his comments when speaking with Correa, and therefore leaves us to consider whether he might have attempted to redeem himself (and if so, how) in his second extended statement by changing his tone and manner of speaking.

Through an analysis of Uribe’s two pieces of extended discourse, I hope to examine, from the perspective of (im)politeness and relational work, the manner in which President Uribe constructs his oral contribution to the discourse taking place
at this event, taking into account the ways in which he presents himself, his nation
and his government through this dialog with the Rio Group. Additionally, as stated
above, the manner in which said changes are carried-out across the two segments of
discourse will also be examined as a way of understanding how changes in Uribe’s
strategy or objectives in his contribution to the Summit’s dialog might have resulted
in changes to features of his speech such as tone and the (im)politeness strategies
used, thus, rendering a picture of rapport management as it was carried out by Uribe
at this event.
CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

Having described the data used for this study, it is now necessary to review the research and theory surrounding (im)politeness so as to establish the bases on which the theoretical model is designed. Some of the theoretical works described here have received important criticisms and suggested adaptations that render particular aspects of said work obsolete or adapt them to make them newly-relevant in today’s ever-evolving understanding of (im)politeness and relationship-negotiation through interaction. A brief overview of these criticisms and proposed adaptations are included as well. The discussion to follow will lead to a comprehensive view of face and relational work resulting in a framework, as described in following sections, within which this study will analyze the methods in which relational work is carried-out in a segment of extended discourse.

3.1 Face and the interactional content of communication

Beginning in earnest with the publication of Erving Goffman’s seminal work *On Face-Work* in 1955, theory of the concept of face and its influence on linguistic behavior has held the interest of the academic community to the present day (1967). In this work, Goffman described face as “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact,” (5). This positive social value, he explained, is defined by “approved social attributes” and is claimed through utterances\(^2\) and nonverbal acts.

\(^2\) For purposes of the present study, we understand the term ‘utterance’ to mean a “unit of speech under study” ("What is an utterance?"). In the data, this appeared as a phrase, sentence or group of sentences comprising a single idea or point made by the speaker.
that reflect the speaker’s judgment of the scenario and its participants, including himself. He also defined the strong emotional connections such as pride and honor that interlocutors have to this abstract image of self and how, through actions that display intentions such as modesty, joking, respect, or politeness, they negotiate the face attributed to them, and that of the other participants in the interaction through the use of utterances and behaviors in conversation that confirm or reject said notions of face. Goffman’s observations and interpretations of human behavior in interaction provided a characterization of the concept of face that set the stage for the study of linguistic politeness, impoliteness, and relational work.

Using Goffman’s principles of face and face-related action led to his coining the term ‘face-work’; a term that today has been abandoned by some (Locher and Watts 2005, Ruhi and Isik 2006, Locher 2006) in favor of the term ‘relational work’ due to the historical use of face-work to describe only the mitigation of particular types of face-affecting behaviors. To better understand this philosophical transition, present-day theory of relational work, and how these apply to the present study, we must first examine how politeness and impoliteness theory came to be, based, in part, on Goffman’s theory of face-work.

Having defined Goffman’s concept of face, it is important to put this idea into the context of conversation. Paul Watzlawick (1967), Gillian Brown and George Yule (1983), and Gabriele Kasper (1990) describe two aspects of all communication: an interactional aspect, or the element of an utterance that serves to create and maintain social relationships; and a transactional aspect, or the element of an utterance that contains the action-oriented information that one party wishes to impart upon another (i.e. need for information or goods, need to carry-out tasks).
(Spencer-Oatey 2008: 2; Locher 2004: 50). The interactional aspect therefore contains all of the information related to the relationship that exists between interlocutors and, as Held states, “...defines and recreates them time and again” (qtd. in Locher 51). Face and face-work, then, can be placed in the category of relational work as a means by which said social relationships are defined or re-defined in interaction through the confirmation (or not) of the positive social values that interlocutors believe they posses and wish to have confirmed by others. This idea of face-work then implies two potential uses of face-work; first, it can be used to fortify or mend social relationships (i.e. politeness), and second, it can be used to damage or terminate those relationships (impoliteness).

3.2 Politeness

The beginnings of politeness research can be traced back to the first conceptualizations of talk as a phenomenon regulated by unspoken rules of conduct and content (Grice 1975, Leech 1983) as well as an orientation to politeness based on leveraging of face wants and sensitivities (Brown and Levinson 1978, 1987). While Herbert Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Geoffrey Leech’s Politeness Principle offered valuable insight into expectations of talk such as efficiency, relevance, and courtesy/politeness (Locher 61), it is clear to see in today’s body of research on this topic, that Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory remains most prevalent, debated and adapted in accordance with the ever-evolving understanding of what politeness specifically is. A discussion of this theory follows.

3.2.1. Brown and Levinson

Just as On Face-Work marked a significant first-step in the introduction of face into linguistic study, Politeness- Some universals in language usage, by Penelope Brown
and Stephen Levinson, proposed an innovative re-examination of the concept of face as a model for identifying strategies taken in discourse to support the face-wants of the interlocutors and for mitigating those utterances with potential face-damaging effects (1978, 1987: 58). This work gave face theory an important framework from which countless subsequent studies have been carried out examining face-work through the analysis of data both at the utterance and discourse level.

Starting with Goffman’s characterization of face and related negotiating actions in an exchange, Brown and Levinson (1987) propose a concept of negative and positive face based on Emile Durkheim’s *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* as examined, in part, by Goffman (285). Brown and Levinson define negative face as the desire of interlocutors to preserve their freedom of action (61) and positive face as the desire interlocutors have to see their wants thought of as desirable by others (101). Awareness of these wants and the risk that an utterance or action can pose to face is what interlocutors leverage when choosing communicative strategies (91). For example, if the speaker needs to ask a favor from the hearer, he/she may wish to reduce the potential threat to the hearer’s negative face (freedom of action) by prefacing the request with an utterance like “I hate to be a bother but...”, or even give the hearer an “out”, or permission to reject the request for a favor, by saying “I understand if you can’t do this...” or “I know that you’re very busy,...” This type of redress becomes the perspective from which Brown and Levinson examine many commonplace utterances as forms of politeness, therefore shedding light on interactional discourse. One common example of such an utterance is “Come in”, an imperative or command, that when said as a way to invite an unexpected visitor in to a home, represents the speaker’s intention to mitigate the worry that the visitor
might have at the potential threat to negative face that their presence poses (i.e. feeling obligated to let them in) (99). The invitation, being of the bald-on-record type (most efficient with no attention to redressive action), represents what Brown and Levinson describe is “whenever S [speaker] wants to do the FTA [face-threatening act] with maximum efficiency” (99). This desire for maximum efficiency is perceived as a more aggressive or direct type of face-move, therefore expressing the strong desire of the speaker that the hearer accept the invitation. Here we see a situation where one interlocutor makes a clear move to address what he perceives to be the other’s concerns for face.

Of arguably greatest significance in Brown and Levinson’s work is a series of four principal strategies (bald on record, positive politeness, negative politeness, and off record politeness) where the above-mentioned, systematic pattern of mutually anticipated sensitivities and corresponding redressive behaviors are converted into superstrategies, strategies and outputs, creating, in essence, a system of increasingly specific interactional desires and methods by which to carry-out FTA’s through politeness (92). The authors also describe a fifth principal strategy, not doing the FTA at all, used in instances where the threat to the hearer’s face is determined to be of far greater gravity than is the desire of the speaker to express the content of the FTA (68). These five superstrategies are described in greater detail as follows:

1. **Bald on record**: Entails performing an act in the most direct way possible, without concern for the hearer’s face wants. In this case, the hearer’s face wants are not threatened due to one of three factors that render the transactional nature of the message of greatest importance: 1) the urgency or importance of the utterance (i.e. “Watch out!”, “Look!”), 2) an utterance that
strongly represents the hearer’s interests (i.e. “Try some of this.”, “Sit, make yourself comfortable”), and 3) when the speaker is superior enough to the hearer in terms of power (i.e. a boss saying to his/her assistant “Bring me a cup of coffee”) (69).

2. **Positive politeness**: Addresses the positive face wants of the hearer. In other words, the positive self-image of the hearer is confirmed through acknowledgement of membership in a common group between speaker and hearer, or through confirmation that the hearer is accepted and liked by the speaker (70). Positive politeness can be seen in acts such as seeking agreement, avoiding disagreement, offering of gifts, joking or making offers or promises (102).

3. **Negative politeness**: Recognizes the hearer’s desire for freedom of action. This attention to negative face is manifested through apologies for interruptions, hedges, deference, or with other moves that satisfy the hearer’s desire to “maintain claims of territory and self-determination” (70).

4. **Off record politeness**: Allows the intention of an act to be masked through indirectness therefore allowing the speaker to claim an alternative motive should the original intention be challenged or sanctioned by the hearer. This strategy can be seen in acts such as metaphor, hints, and rhetorical questions (69).

5. **Don’t do the FTA**: Prevents damage to the social relationship in instances where the desire of the speaker to carry-out the transactional element of an FTA does not outweigh the perceived damaging effects of the interactional element (68).
The criteria on which a particular strategy or output strategy (as described above in the examples) is chosen rests on the perceived ‘weightiness’, or degree of potential face-damage, that an utterance or action represents (76). This concept is illustrated most clearly in the first and last superstrategies where the very ‘weightiness’ of the act is determined to be either negligible in comparison to the desire to carry out the FTA (bald on record) or so great that the FTA is deemed too damaging to carry-out at all (don’t do the FTA). This ‘weightiness’ is calculated based on three factors: the social distance between the speaker and hearer (D), the power that speaker has over hearer (P), and the degree of imposition (R) said action represents in that culture (76). Once an interlocutor has taken these three factors into consideration and arrived at a judgment of weightiness of an intended action, he/she can choose a politeness strategy of proportionate weight to mitigate said act, therefore increasing the chances that their transactional goals in conversation will be met by properly addressing the interactional aspect of the dialog. The calculations involved in this sequence of judgments is illustrated by Brown and Levinson as follows:

\[ W_x = D(S, H) + P(S,H) + R_x \]

Where \( W_x \) = weightiness, \( D = \) social distance, \( P = \) power, \( R_x = \) degree of imposition, \( S = \) speaker, and \( H = \) hearer

In other words, the weightiness of an FTA is calculated by weighing the social distance between interlocutors, the relative power of each in relation to the other, and the degree to which the FTA might impose upon the hearer. This framework of superstrategies and weightiness equation form the core of Brown and Levinson’s contribution to our current understanding of politeness and, to this day, continue to
influence new theories and definitions of this phenomenon.

3.2.2 Criticisms of Brown and Levinson’s Model

Such an influential work is not without its criticisms, however. A number of authors have identified principal areas within Brown and Levinson’s work where theory does not appear to reflect reality. These criticisms and, as with some, their proposed solutions, have helped evolve the study of politeness, thus bringing about new understanding and insights into this phenomena.

3.2.2.1 Face

The most pervasive area of criticism of Brown and Levinson’s politeness model is the concept of face. Iglesias Recuero describes two specific face-related areas of criticism: face-protection as the central concern of an exchange, and the universality of the concept of face (2007: 21). The first criticism, originally proposed by Lakoff (1989), draws attention to interactions such as political debates, talk shows, and trials where “regulated rudeness”, or otherwise impolite behaviors or utterances, form part of the expected or allowed repertoire of actions. These interactions contradict what Lakoff states is Brown and Levinson’s assertion that all interactions hold as their basic objective the protection of face. Face-protection cannot be achieved through the types of rude utterances that are inherent in the above-mentioned scenarios, and yet these rude behaviors are not only sanctioned, but expected.

The second criticism, the universality of face, presents a more complex theoretical short-coming. This area of critique has received attention from many and describes a fairly fundamental flaw in the applicability of Brown and Levinson’s model.
First, Recuero cites works by Bravo (1998, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2004) where the author argues for a sociocultural definition of face composed of “affiliation-group identification and... autonomy independence” from sociocultural groups. This alternative orientation to face would accommodate, for example, notions of identity extended by Spanish culture such as originality (autonomy from the group) and close familiarity (affiliation to the group), otherwise known as confianza (21).

Similarly, Matsumoto (1988) and Gu (1998) call for changes to the definition of face per what they describe as central face-related interactional concern of Eastern culture. They argue that in these societies, in addition to and of greater value than positive face wants, there also exists a dominant concern for what Matsumoto describes as “acknowledgement and maintenance of the relative position of others” where interlocutors are expected to “understand where he/she stands in relation to other members of the group or society, and must acknowledge his/her dependence on others...[this] governs all social interaction” (qtd. in Spencer-Oatey 2008: 13). It therefore appears that if face is to have cross-cultural relevance it must account for face concerns that may manifest in ways different from the traditional definition of positive-negative face, like Matsumoto’s social hierarchical construct where interdependence is more highly valued than independence and Bravo’s autonomy-affiliation dichotomy.

Second, Helen Spencer-Oatey’s theory of rapport management, defined by the author as the regulation of social relationships, describes two additional, important face-related conceptual departures from Brown and Levinson that call into question the universality of face (2008:12). The first asserts that Brown and
Levinson’s definition of positive face is too vague, in essence overgeneralizing the types of face-sensitivities contained within the concept of positive face. The second critiques the definition of negative face as not being related to face at all (3). She addresses these concerns in her model of rapport management and, in doing so, provides solutions to these theoretical shortcomings. A brief description of how Spencer-Oatey’s model addresses these topics now follows.

Spencer-Oatey proposes a model for what she defines as the three components of rapport management: interactional goals, sociality rights and obligations, and face sensitivities. The first, interactional goals, simply comprises the interactional and transactional aspects of an utterance (14). The second component, sociality rights and obligations, is composed of two sub-categories: equity rights, or the belief that we deserve to be treated fairly by others (i.e. not imposed upon, not given orders, and not taken advantage of), and association rights, or the right to social interaction with others (i.e. not too much or too little interaction, and an appropriate degree of shared feelings or ideas) (16). Sociality rights and obligations are the component of rapport management where Spencer-Oatey places Brown and Levinson’s concept of negative face, removing it from the third component, face sensitivities. This last area she describes, using Goffman’s original definition of face, as the “fundamental social entitlements that a person effectively claims for him/herself in his/her interactions with others”. It is here that she locates Brown and Levinson’s concept of positive face (13). This is different from sociality rights and obligations in that the focus here is on an individual’s personal sense of character, capability, stature and esteem. Sociality rights and obligations, on the other hand, are more the social expectations that people have of their interaction and
nature of their relationship with others (13-14). This category is further broken down into equity and association rights. Equity rights are those rights to fair treatment (no undue imposition, not being ordered around), and association rights where we define the degree (closeness or distance) of social involvement and of shared beliefs or feelings (16). Spencer-Oatey’s theory of rapport management provides a more nuanced definition of positive and negative face, and offers an alternative model by which to examine face sensitivities and their effect on social relationships.

Thus we see in the perspectives and criticisms described above that positive and negative face, as defined by Brown and Levinson, appear disconcordant with values and face orientations of different cultures. Additionally, a potential solution to this shortcoming, as proposed by Spencer-Oatey, would require a complete re-working of the definition of face and the addition other important aspects of rapport such as interactional goals and sociality rights and obligations.

3.2.2.2 Function of politeness

Recuero characterizes as exceedingly pessimistic Brown and Levinson’s description of politeness as a tool to soften face-threats. She instead offers two alternative functions of politeness. She first cites Carrasco-Santana (1999), based on work from Kerbat-Orecchioni (1992), who argues for the possibility of a “non-selfish” politeness used by interlocutors to bolster the relationship between S and H (19). This approach removes the focus of performing politeness from solely that of mitigating face-threats.

The second proposed functions of politeness come from work by Hernandez-Flores. These functions are: mitigating, repairing and enhancing. Mitigation includes Brown and Levinson’s original and only defined function of
politeness, while the repairing and enhancing functions suggest politeness as a means to recover from a face-damaging incident (repair) and as a way to concentrate the interaction on the positive state of a social relationship (enhance) when in the absence of potential face-threats (Recuero, 20).

Both of these points do not contradict Brown and Levinson’s work, but instead offer expanded definitions of the function of politeness. With this expanded perspective, politeness regains relevance in scenarios where no potential face-threat is perceived, or where a threat to face has occurred and repair of the relationship is desired.

3.2.2.3 Indirectness in politeness

In her book *Power and Politeness in Action*, Miriam Locher sums up two of the principal themes among the critiques of Brown and Levinson’s politeness model. The first involves the classification of indirectness as the highest-ranked form of politeness. She cites work by Werkhofer (1992) and Glick (1996) that conclude that social norms and context are central to the assessment of an utterance as polite or impolite (Locher 2004: 68-69). In other words, there can be nothing inherent about an indirect statement that makes it more or less polite as this last judgment of relativity can only be made in accordance with context and social behavioral rules. This critique echoes the ideas of Holmes who states that “[t]here is nothing intrinsically polite about any linguistic form” (qtd. in Locher 2004: 69). Similarly, according to Brown and Levinson’s model, the role of context is limited to the elements of power, social distance and degree of imposition; factors that Locher states are insufficient to aptly describe such a complex aspect of communication as context (69).
3.2.2.4 Nature of politeness

Two important aspects of the nature of politeness have been criticized. First, the characterization of politeness as solely strategic (versus also prescribed) is a concept called into question by Recuero. The author cites work from various sources (Ide, 1989; Janney and Arndt, 1992; Briz Gomez, 2004; Hernandez Flores, 2003) that suggest that politeness in interaction is dictated or defined by more than just individual participant's strategic approach in a given situation. As proof they point to those polite behaviors prescribed by social norms (not by individuals) and those deemed polite in any given situation. This new dimension adds to the factors influencing the perceived polite nature of utterances and makes room for new criteria on which judgments of politeness can be made (aside from speaker intent), to include: the relationship between S and H, the relevance of an utterance, and the theme or purpose of an exchange (Recuero, 20). Once this is understood, it is possible to see why some actions that would otherwise be perceived as impolite, might be judged as polite between interlocutors with a close relationship such as friends or family. In these situations, due to the factor of familiarity, behaviors that would otherwise threaten negative face (in the case of commands like “Gimme your pen”, or “Call me!”) are seen as polite.

The second area of critique in terms of the nature of politeness centers on the limitations of this model to address the cognitive-linguistic processes undertaken by both parties in an exchange. Locher describes Rainer Schulze’s (1985: 99) assertion that “only S’s [speaker’s] cognitive apparatus is described, while H [hearer] has to contribute to the interaction as well” (69). Along this vein of criticism, Locher also mentions work by Bayraktaroglu that points out the fact that while Brown and
Levinson address the avoidance of FTA’s and the reduction of their impact, no attention is given to recovering from an FTA’s consequences (69). This shortcoming limits the insights that can be gained in the study of discourse, namely with respect to examining the dialogic or co-constructed aspect of politeness in conversation. In essence, criticisms of Brown and Levinson’s politeness model seem to focus on the theoretical and dialogic limitations of their framework, suggesting the clear need that exists to revisit the proposed implementation of said model to address a more nuanced definition of politeness (i.e. without rankings based on universal judgments of degree of politeness) and the role of both or all speakers in the creation and acknowledgement of politeness in an exchange.

Despite the varied constraints of Brown and Levinson’s model, Locher acknowledges the considerable value of the many potential strategies identified by which interlocutors can attend to face. If, as the author states, attending to face results in actions or utterances of politeness, then one can consider politeness as a form of relational work, therefore validating the use of, at the very least, Brown and Levinson’s identified strategies and output methods for politeness in the study of relational work (2004: 70). This last concept creates a very important connection between two theories whose correlation gives new relevance to the extensive strategies described by Brown and Levinson and defines the analytical approach of the present study as is discussed further on.

3.3 Impoliteness

In Impoliteness in Language- Studies on its Interplay with Power in Theory and Practice, Locher and Bousfield offer a definition of impoliteness that they state comprises the “lowest-common denominator” of the many, differing definitions that exist today:
“Impoliteness is a behaviour that is face-aggravating in a particular context” (2008: 3). It is clear to see in this definition that even at its simplest level, impoliteness theory, as it is summarized here, continues the face-centric approach of Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory.

From politeness theory have come a few models, theories and discussions of impoliteness (e.g. Bousfield; Culpeper; Mills; Keinpointner; Holmes; Cashman) of which Culpeper’s has arguably received the most attention. Starting in 1996, the author describes impoliteness as “the use of strategies that are designed to have the...effect...of social disruption. These strategies are oriented towards attacking face, an emotionally sensitive concept of the self” (350). Culpeper subsequently delineates a series of superstrategies for impoliteness modeled after Brown and Levinson’s five superstrategies for politeness that he describes as having an opposing orientation to face; instead of supporting face, these strategies attack it:

1. **Bald, on record impoliteness**: A FTA is performed clearly without room for an alternative interpretation and without any mitigation, where it is otherwise required (356).

2. **Positive impoliteness**: Face-threatening strategies intended to damage the hearer’s positive face (356).

3. **Negative impoliteness**: Face-threatening strategies intended to damage the hearer’s negative face (356).

4. **Sarcasm or mock politeness**: A FTA is carried-out using clearly disingenuous politeness strategies (356). This particular superstrategy does not have a counterpart in Brown and Levinson’s model. Instead, Culpeper includes this category to describe those actions where insincere politeness is
used to carry-out impoliteness, in clear opposition to banter (false
impoliteness for the purpose of being polite) (357). An example of this
strategy could be “Don’t worry about ME, you go right ahead” where the
speaker is sanctioning the behavior of the hearer by implying that the latter
has not taken into consideration the former’s needs (i.e. not assisting to cross
the street or jump over a puddle of water).

5. **Withhold politeness**: In instances where politeness is expected, in other
words, where social norms dictate that interlocutors should acknowledge
their intentions to establish or preserve social harmony, the act of breaking
said norms implies the absence of polite will, thus further implying the desire
to damage said social relations and therefore, be impolite (Culpeper 357,
Brown and Levinson 5).

In 2003, Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann added a few important
observations with respect to the use of this model in their analysis of a televised
documentary program where impoliteness played a central role. First, they noted that
the above-described superstrategies are rarely used alone, instead often appearing
together, a phenomenon contrary to the methods of usage described by Brown and
Levinson for their politeness strategies (Culpeper 2005: 42). Second, they criticize the
distinction between positive and negative face as inadequate when classifying
utterances in discourse. They explain that a speech act determined to be threatening
to negative face, for example “Shut up!”, may serve primarily to impede the hearer’s
freedom of action, but also has secondary implications for hearer’s positive face by
implying that the speaker has no interest in the hearer’s thoughts (Culpeper et al.
1576). In other words, a single utterance can have many implications for face,
therefore putting into question the need to have such a strong, mutually exclusive orientation to positive and negative face as Brown and Levinson’s politeness model suggests. The authors instead recommend referencing Spencer-Oatey’s model for rapport management where, as described previously, categories of the elements of rapport such as face, and sociality rights and obligations address both politeness and impoliteness as well provide an alternative concept of face such that negative and positive face concerns can be addressed simultaneously (Culpeper et al. 1576).

2005 saw yet another evolution of this model by Culpeper. Of note in this work, the author adopts Spencer Oatey’s face categories in his data analysis and also proposes a new category for the impoliteness model: off-record impoliteness. Off-record impoliteness is “performed by means of an implicature but in such a way that one attributable intention clearly outweighs any others” (44). Culpeper intends this category to replace the strategy of sarcasm or mock politeness, which is to be separated out into its own strategy. Off-record impoliteness is considered in opposition to banter where both, at the surface, are impolite, but whose implied nature is polite in the case of banter (i.e. “Wow, baking really isn’t your strong-suit is it!” referencing the hearer’s cooking skills to imply that the food they have baked is indeed very good) or impolite in the case of off-record impoliteness (i.e. “You know, they make ovens that don’t burn food...” referencing the availability of appliances that could improve the hearer’s cooking, implying that the food they baked is overcooked). Sarcasm, also termed mock politeness, then sits as its own superstrategy due to its surface appearance of politeness and implied purpose of impoliteness.

The parallels between Brown and Levinson’s politeness model and
Culpeper’s impoliteness model seem to suggest a strong, underlying common nature between face-work intended to support or damage social relationships. These connections, as we will see in the following discussion of face-work, relational work and rapport management, make possible a more holistic examination of these phenomena where relationships can be manipulated in many directions (positive, negative, neutral) by interlocutors negotiating face.

3.3.1 Criticisms of Culpeper’s model of impoliteness

Culpeper himself questions his initial definition of impoliteness pointing out that two fundamental problems exist with the assumption, as stated in his original definition, that an attack to face will result in “social conflict and disharmony”. First, no description or idea is given as to what might comprise said social conflict, he explains, and second, the definition assumes that a disturbance or imbalance of the social relationship must occur as a result of impoliteness. His analysis of discourse from the television program *The Weakest Link* clearly illustrates this second point where, given the data set, it is not clear whether a disruption in social harmony has occurred due to the guest’s lack of comment or response to the host’s aggressively face-threatening behaviors (Culpeper 2005: 38). His proposed solution to his original definition of impoliteness looks to Karen Tracy and Sarah J. Tracy who describe face attacks as “communicative acts perceived by members of a social community (and often intended by speakers) to be purposefully offensive” (qtd. in Culpeper 2005: 38). He adopts this dual-participant perspective and reformulates his definition as follows:

Impoliteness comes about when: (1) the speaker communicates face-attack intentionally, or (2) the hearer perceives and/or constructs behavior as
intentionally face-attacking, or a combination of (1) and (2).

(Culpeper 38)

This definition seems now to address the possibility that impoliteness can very likely be perceived by only one party in a conversation, if not both, and describes the co-constructed nature of this phenomenon.

Of the few that exist, perhaps the most significant critique of Culpeper’s model comes from Bousfield in his work titled “Impoliteness in the Struggle for Power” (Bousfield and Locher, 2008). Bousfield looks first at Culpeper’s, and by relation Brown and Levinson’s, use of the bald on record strategy. Culpeper’s original work uses the phrase “...shut up and act like a parking attendant” as an example of this strategy, and then proceeds to describe this utterance as comprising two baldly executed commands. Later on in the same work, this utterance is again referenced as an example of negative impoliteness as it is used to inhibit speech (Culpeper 1559). Bousfield argues that given this added function of the bald on record strategy, it could be said that all bald on record acts also pose a threat to positive or negative face. He cites work by Locher (2004), Scollon and Scollon (2000), and Terkourafi (2008) that all assert that “there is no communication without face” (137). Given this assertion, as well as study data showing that positive and negative face distinctions often appear in combined forms (Culpeper et al 2003), it can be argued that the need to differentiate between these two concepts is unnecessary, particularly when models like Spencer Oatey’s clearly demonstrate that it is possible to re-configure these two ideas of face into more complex theoretical forms (137). Bousfield concludes his argument by proposing an alternative model of superstrategies that is simpler and comprises two general methods by which to carry-
out impoliteness (Bousfield 138):

1. **On-record impoliteness**: The use of strategies whose clear purpose is to
   1) threaten the face of the hearer, 2) create an image of face of the hearer that
disrupts the social harmony or creates conflict between the interlocutors, and/or 3) ignores the face wants or rights of the hearer.

2. **Off-record impoliteness**: The use of strategies that entail indirectly
damaging the hearer’s face and doing so in such a way that the speaker can
cancel this threat through denial, elaboration or by altering the offensive
utterance. Despite this ambiguity in perceived meaning, the off-record
impoliteness strategy presents itself in such a way as to clearly indicate the
intended, impolite meaning.
   a. **Sarcasm**: Strategies whose surface can be interpreted to be polite, but
whose intended meaning is clearly impolite.
   b. **Withhold politeness**: Absence of politeness where social norms
dictate that they are required.

Bousfield’s model simplifies and reorganizes classifications of impoliteness strategies
by focusing not on their particular effects on face, which we have already seen can be
multi-faceted, but instead by drawing attention to the degree of directness with
which the speaker chooses to carry-out these strategies. The author describes this
model as functioning well in-tandem with already existing ideas of face that may
choose to emphasize particular aspects of impoliteness such as Spencer Oatey’s
focus on cultural context (2005) or Goffman’s “traditional” approach (138-139).

Despite Bousfield’s critiques of Culpeper’s model, he affirms the valid use of
the specific strategies described in work like that of Culpeper (1996), Culpeper et al.
(2003), and Holly Cashman (2006) in the impoliteness models presented (138). Like Locher’s similar conclusion about Brown and Levinson’s strategies and output methods, it seems that in the study of impoliteness in discourse, the types of acts that are possible are not in question, but instead there remains much work to be done in describing the patterns of reasoning behind the use of said strategies (and output methods) and a better understanding of the manner in which they are used, either alone or in combination with each other.

3.3.2. Comparison of Impoliteness Theories

For a final, more comprehensive examination of impoliteness theories, let us examine how Spencer-Oatey’s rapport management model compares to Culpeper’s and Bousfield’s impoliteness models (see Table 2). Spencer-Oatey proposes her model as a response to (im)politeness theories to date and encompasses both face-supporting and face-threatening behavior (2008: 13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of impoliteness</th>
<th>Components of impoliteness</th>
<th>Criteria for impoliteness judgements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bousfield (2008)</td>
<td>“...the issuing of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive face-threatening acts (FTAs) that are purposefully performed.” (132)</td>
<td>“Offensive weightings of on- or off-record varieties of impoliteness are entirely dependent upon the context in which they occur.” (149)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. On-record impoliteness</td>
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<td>2. Off-record impoliteness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2a. Sarcasm</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2b. Withhold politeness</td>
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<td>Culpeper (2005, 2008)</td>
<td>When a face-attacking act is carried out deliberately by the speaker, AND/OR the hearer interprets the act as intentional and face-damaging (2005: 38)</td>
<td>Behaviors are judged as (im)polite based on “an individual’s on-going accumulation of experiences and the cognitive representation of those experiences [that] leads to the creation of... an individual’s norms, providing a basis for expectations and salience.” (2008: 29)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Bald-on record: direct, explicit FTA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Positive impoliteness</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Negative impoliteness</td>
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<td>4. Sarcasm/mocking politeness</td>
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<td>5. Withhold politeness</td>
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<td>6. Off-record</td>
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Comparison of these three theories yields a few interesting distinctions. First, the aspect of intentionality, whether the speaker intends to cause face-damage or be impolite, is addressed explicitly in all but Spencer-Oatey’s work. Culpeper defines it as one of two possible criteria for the presence of impoliteness; the second one he describes as when the hearer interprets an act as intentionally face-threatening (2005: 38). Bousfield, on the other hand, requires intentionality in the part of the speaker in order for an act of impoliteness to be deemed as such, and further, requires the hearer’s accurate interpretation of the speaker’s intention in order for the act to be considered successful impoliteness (132). Spencer-Oatey stands alone on a second point as well, that of the role of face in the framework of impoliteness. Both Culpeper (2005: 44) and Bousfield (2008: 138) describe a series of types of impolite acts (e.g. sarcasm, on-record acts, positive impoliteness) that are defined by the type of effect that said act has on face (e.g. attacks, defines, ignores) and in the case of Bousfield, also depends on the off-record or on-record aspect of the face-damaging act. Spencer-Oatey, however, in re-conceptualizing Brown and Levinson’s notions of face, addresses face-attacks as only one of three potentially rapport-damaging acts; she also includes in her model sociality rights and obligations (where she places the

| Spencer-Oatey (2005, 2008) | “... the subjective judgements that people make about the social appropriateness of verbal and non-verbal behavior.” (2005: 97) | Rapport (harmony between interlocutors) is threatened via attacks to: 1. Face sensitivities 2. Sociality rights and obligations 3. Interactional goals (2008: 14) | Behaviors are judged to be prescribed, permitted, or proscribed based on contractual/legal agreements, role specifications, contextually based behavioral conventions, or interactional principles (equity and association). (2005: 98-99) |
idea of negative face) and interactional goals (also called transactional goals) (2008: 14). Also, and most interestingly, in terms of approximation to Brown and Levinson’s politeness model, Culpeper’s impoliteness framework is by far the closest having modeled itself quite intentionally so as to comprise categories of impolite acts that the author considers “counterparts” to the politeness model’s superstrategies (2005: 42). Furthermore, the theoretical distance that Spencer-Oatey and Bousfield create between their models and Brown and Levinson’s is important in that each one addresses a central flaw of the politeness model. Bousfield completely does away with separate notions of face, considering face as a whole concept and focusing instead, as described above, on the way in which the impolite act is carried-out, either via an on-record or off-record act (138). Similarly, Spencer-Oatey argues that negative face is not related to face at all but instead to the social expectations that interlocutors have such as fair, considerate and appropriate treatment by others (2008: 12-13). She reserves the category of face as a component of rapport for the “personal/ relational/ social value...[that is] concerned with people’s sense of worth, dignity, honour, reputation, competence and so on,” thus preserving the idea of positive face as the desire to be appreciated and accepted by others, while at the same time accommodating important critiques by Matsumoto (1988) and Gu (1998), as described previously, that call attention to the interpersonal aspects of face as seen in Eastern cultures. So we see in this brief comparison of impoliteness and rapport management models that while (super)strategies and other, more specific methods by which impoliteness is carried out do not seem to incur much criticism, their systems of classification or organization are most definitely in dispute, particularly and most importantly with respect to the ever-devalued distinctions between positive and
negative face.

3.4 Face-work, relational work and rapport management

Thus far, face and its manipulation in interaction has been addressed from the perspective of those categories of acts that support face (politeness strategies) and those which damage it (impoliteness strategies). Having explored interaction from these two camps, it is also important to examine these two concepts out of isolation from each other, and instead look at how discourse, and more importantly relationships, are defined by the combined use of face-affecting behaviors such as politeness, impoliteness, and according to some theory, ‘neutral’ or ‘politic’ behavior (a discussion of this topic will follow). A few approaches that address these issues in a common theoretical arena include:

**Face-work** (Goffman 1967): “...the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face. Face-work serves to counteract ‘incidents’—that is, events whose effective symbolic implications threaten face,” (12). Goffman hints at impoliteness later on in his work when he explains that face-work can be utilized by an individual that recognizes that this is something that others are socially obligated to carry-out. The speaker, therefore, can capitalize on this by obligating the other party in conversation to accept “unfavorable facts” about themselves while at the same time accepting “favorable facts” about the speaker himself. In doing so, the aggressor proves his superiority at “footwork” (the ability to execute face-aggravating moves) and shames the hearer. If, in turn, the hearer can respond to this aggression in such a way that he out-smarts the aggressor, it is then the speaker who loses face (24). Both of these scenarios involve interactants
causing the other to lose face; this type of face-work is opposite to that which supports a social relationship positively, therefore it can be considered a form of impoliteness.

**Rapport management** (Spencer-Oatey 2005):

“Rapport management refers to the management (or mismanagement) of relations between people... I take the management of rapport, therefore, to include not only behavior that enhances or maintains smooth relations, but any kind of behavior that has an impact on rapport, whether positive or negative, or neutral. (96). People in a given exchange will determine the impact of utterances on the relationship depending on how appropriate they are to the situation. This degree of appropriateness is, in turn, informed by interactant’s expectations based on behaviors that they believe are suggested (polite), accepted (politic/neutral), or disallowed (impolite) in their given culture or community (97).

**Relational work** (Locher 2004; Ruhi 2006; Locher and Watts 2005): “...the role which interaction plays in negotiating relationships,” (Locher 45).

Locher and Richard J. Watts further elaborate on this definition by stating that “relational work comprises the entire continuum of verbal behavior from direct, impolite, rude or aggressive interaction to polite interaction, encompassing both appropriate and inappropriate forms of social behavior,” (Locher and Watts 11). With respect to this continuum, Locher and Watts describe a third category, additional to Brown and Levinson’s (im)politeness
dichotomy, by stating that “the rankings of their strategies implies that interactants have a choice between appearing more or less polite, or conversely, impolite. Brown and Levinson, however, do not discuss a distinction in the level of relational work within politic/appropriate behavior, which we consider crucial for the understanding of politeness,” (13) These three concepts have much in common in terms of defining politeness and impoliteness as a means to a relational end, and, with respect to the last two, in describing a third area along the (im)politeness spectrum: neutral or politic behavior.

Table 1 summarizes three principal elements of the above-mentioned theories.

A brief comparison of the theories of face-work, rapport management and relational work (see Table 1) makes clear a few critical distinctions. First, Goffman’s theory of face-work describes the “work” being performed as entailing the selection of actions with the purpose of aligning one’s behaviors with face (Goffman 5). Both relational work and rapport management, however, present a drastically different orientation to the connection between actions and face in conversation. They both characterize face as being the element whose manipulation (supportive or threatening) constructs or changes social relationships (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 12; Locher and Watts 2008: 78). In other words, in the first scenario the primary objective is to adapt behaviors during an interaction so as to conform with a relatively static concept of face such that, as Goffman describes, “a state [is reached] where everyone temporarily accepts everyone else’s line...” (11).
Table 2: Comparison of three theories that address the use of face in defining social relationships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of Face</th>
<th>Description of theory</th>
<th>Method of realization</th>
<th>Components of method</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Face-work</td>
<td>Face: “The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact.” (Goffman 5)</td>
<td>Typical objectives in conversation such as carrying-out a task, solving a challenge, sharing devaluing information about others, or simply increasing one’s own face, are all performed in such a way that an interlocutor’s actions are consistently aligned with face, or the line that he has claimed for himself. This starts with the initial claim to face made by an interlocutor, and the subsequent moves made by the other participants that build upon this first move. (Goffman 11-12)</td>
<td>Moves: all that is communicated by an interlocutor during a turn. Moves are composed of: a message, a demonstration of ritual respect, face-work, communicative constraints, and framing instructions. (Manning 168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapport management</td>
<td>Face: “[Face] is closely related to a person’s sense of identity or self-concept...[in this respect] people often regard themselves as having certain attributes or characteristics...They usually perceive some of their positively...some of them negatively...and others neutrally...Face is associated with these affectively sensitive attributes.” (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 14)</td>
<td>A person determines the way in they will use (im)politeness strategies according to: 1. Rapport orientation 2. Contextual variables 3. Pragmatic principles and conventions (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 31-32)</td>
<td>The following elements comprise rapport: face, sociality rights and obligations, and interactional goals. (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 13-14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational work</td>
<td>Face: “The concept of face is central to relational work...as defined...by Goffman...” (Culpeper 2008: 21)</td>
<td>Relational work is the “work” that interactants perform to co-construct social relationships (Locher and Watts 2008: 78).</td>
<td>Behaviors that comprise relational work can be classified according to the following categories: 1. Politic/appropriate behavior (unmarked/non-polite or positively marked/polite) 2. Non-politic/inappropriate behavior (negatively marked/impolite, rude, over-polite) (Culpeper 2008: 22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This static nature of face inside a particular exchange is mirrored in Goffman’s
assertion that if an interactant drastically changes his/her ‘line’ (claimed face) or if
this line is successfully disputed, the result is confusion (12). In the latter two
definitions, it is the interactants’ ideas of face that are adapted or challenged, if not
confirmed, through actions in discourse for the purpose of collaboratively
constructing or altering a relationship. This, therefore, implies that a change in face
(or ‘line’) may not be as disorienting as Goffman claims since a final notion of face
for each interlocutor may not be attainable until an exchange nears completion and
the co-construction tasks (per relational work) are finished. Second, Brown and
Levinson’s negative and positive face distinctions are not present in any of these
theories. As seen earlier in this work, Culpeper (2008), Bousfield (2008), and
Spencer-Oatey (2008) all abandon Brown and Levinson’s notion of positive and
negative face in favor of theories that: 1) are more broad, as in Bousfield’s on-
record/off-record impoliteness where face is kept as a whole, non-specific concept, a
move influenced by Spencer-Oatey’s re-definition of negative face (137-138); 2) are
more detailed, as in Culpeper’s description of impoliteness as behaviors intended to
cause loss of face (per Goffman’s notion) in addition to loss of “freedom from
imposition or freedom of association” (per Spencer-Oatey’s rapport management)
(36); and 3) reconfigure the positive-negative face orientation, as in Spencer-Oatey’s
revised examination of negative face as not face-related at all, but instead comprising
what she terms the “equity and association rights” that interlocutors feel entitled to
(13). Bousfield even goes so far as to state “I think it might be safe to say that a pure
and unadulterated version of the negative/positive face dichotomy has almost run its
course in contemporary academic work” (2008: 137). Additionally, we see relational
work abandon Brown and Levinson in favor of a return to Goffman’s initial notion
of face. In Locher and Watts’ use of relational work in the examination of politeness theory, they describe Goffman’s face as “central to the concept of relational work” and, of Brown and Levinson, state that their idea of face is too permanent (i.e. a trait possessed by an individual across various interactions), preferring instead Goffman’s idea that face is not an innate quality across time, but instead “on loan” and collaboratively defined during a particular interaction (12-13).

The theories of face-work, rapport management and relational work provide valuable and differing approaches to describing how relationships are negotiated in interaction through the leveraging of face-affecting actions or utterances. Of arguably greatest value in all of these theories is the framework within which each provides the possibility of examining all types of behaviors (polite, impolite and neutral) in a common arena: the dialogue or exchange. The process of face-claiming or assigning (Goffman) and relationship construction/ threatening/ maintenance (Spencer-Oatey, Locher and Watts) is most times a complex exchange of negotiating moves that drive the fluctuating nature of a relationship. Given the insights into this complexity that the above-mentioned theories illustrate (i.e. the behaviors and judgments involved), it would seem that any attempt to understand the human process of relation-management must include as wide a variety of potential behaviors, strategies and consequences as possible so as to account for the entire body of ‘work’ that interlocutors invest in this process.

3.4.1 A re-examination of face

Taking into consideration the many ways in which face has been defined thus far, i.e. its components, use, and cross-cultural relevance, a brief description of this concept as it will apply in the present study now follows and will be once again
referenced in the description of methodology used for this paper.

With respect to the elements that comprise face and cross-cultural relevance, Spencer-Oatey’s description is the only one designed to accommodate differing notions of face. This ability to accommodate suggests a notion of face limited to just those aspects or categories that could be argued are universal. Anything more specific or elaborate than this and, as was seen with Brown and Levinson, there results a concept with limited applicability and from which subsequent analyses can only derive partial insight. The author’s description includes a wider range of emotional and self-evaluative concepts than Brown and Levinson’s politeness model.

Per Spencer-Oatey:

Face is closely related to a person’s sense of identity or self-concept: self as an individual (individual identity), self as a group member (group or collective identity) and self in relationship with others (relational identity). In all three respects, people often regard themselves as having certain attributes or characteristics, such as personality traits, physical features, beliefs, language affiliations and so on. (2008: 14)

She goes on to explain that these self-assigned characteristics can be viewed by the individual as positive, negative or neutral and, since “people have a fundamental desire for others to evaluate them positively”, they will want fellow interlocutors to recognize the positive traits while ignoring the negative ones (2008: 14). Furthermore, since each of these types of face (self as an individual, a group member, and in relationship with others) depends highly on self-evaluations and judgments about the groups that one identifies with, then the traits about which one is sensitive can vary from person to person and from group to group (2008: 15). This
last fact allows for similar sensitivities among groups members, thus accommodating
the previously described Eastern concepts of face as a social, communal value
instead of a personal concern about autonomy or freedom. Thus, for the purposes of
this study, face will involve opinions and/or sensitivities related to an interlocutor’s
personal traits, their affiliation with a larger group or community, and their
relationship with others in the exchange. Furthermore, it stands to reason that
Spencer-Oatey’s other two components of rapport management, sociality rights and
obligations and interactional goals, be adopted as well. These three elements of
rapport management will be used as the framework within which face-affecting acts
inside of an excerpt of discourse will be classified.

With respect to the ways in which face is used, this method has been
described as a static reference point for behavior in an interaction (Goffman 1967);
as one of three types of interests that interlocutors can affect or attack in an
exchange in order to define, affirm or change a relationship (Spencer-Oatey 2008);
and as elements of one’s being (i.e. a mask) that is claimed by the individual and
confirmed or rejected collaboratively by participants (Locher and Watts 2005). Again,
Spencer-Oatey’s model of rapport management is preferable in this instance due to
its ability to address the complexity of consequences of rapport, relationship, or face-
affecting behaviors. To illustrate this complexity, the author describes an instance
where an individual is asked to perform a duty that he/she considers inappropriate
to his/her role. If this infraction is considered minor, in other words, representing a
minor deviation from one’s perceived rights to treatment, then it can simply be
described as affecting the equity principle of one’s sociality rights. However, if this
act is considered grossly inappropriate, it could therefore constitute not only a threat
to equity principles, but also a sign that one is not held in high-regard or that one has been devalued, thus resulting in an additional threat to face (2008: 18). While the possibility that an act can pose a threat to multiple aspects of the relationship between interactants is not unique to Spencer-Oatey, her model provides a well-structured series of three concepts (the elements of rapport) from which to analyze the multiple effects of these types of behaviors. Additionally, it offers a definition of face conducive to cross-cultural and other types of sociolinguistic analyses.

Also key in Spencer-Oatey’s work is the identification of five domains within which said rapport-affecting behaviors can fall:

1. **Illocutionary domain:** relates to speech acts and their potential effects on rapport, ex: requesting a favor, thanking someone

2. **Discourse domain:** primarily involves how issues related to content in an exchange (e.g. topic choice, content organization) is handled for the sake of rapport management

3. **Participation domain:** entails elements of an exchange related to the process of communication (turn-taking, recognition or solicited participation of other interlocutors)

4. **Stylistic domain:** deals with tone, terms of address and other aspects of style

5. **Nonverbal domain:** pertains to all nonverbal modes of communication such as body language, proxemics and gestures

(Spencer Oatey 2008: 21)

These domains highlight the importance of the various methods by which one can affect social relationships, something not explicitly addressed to differentiate
between the various strategies and output methods described in Brown and Levinson’s or Culpeper’s (im)politeness models. For the forthcoming analysis of data, this form of distinguishing between different types of rapport/relationship-affecting behavior could lend an important insight into the forms, frequency and patterns of usage of acts carried-out in discourse to manage relationships.

In conclusion, the use of Spencer-Oatey’s rapport management model to understand the components of rapport and types of rapport-affecting behaviors provides the present study with a framework from which to examine acts in discourse that can alter, challenge, ignore or attend to face sensitivities and other elements of rapport. This model offers categories and concepts that capture the methods of realization and complex effects that (im)polite acts can have on face (among other things), per more modern and interculturally relevant definitions, within the overall scope of rapport management thus making possible a more precise and insightful analysis.

3.4.2 Markedness and politc/neutral behavior

In the above-mentioned example of equity rights and face-threats, Spencer-Oatey introduces the concept of degree of perceived impact or offense. This notion of degree has been the focus of many examinations of (im)politeness (Fraser 1990, Meier 1995, Escandell-Vidal 1996, Watts 1992, Kasper 1990) and is termed in these studies as markedness, or the amount that the behavior in question deviates from the expected norm. Some characterize all forms of politeness as the norm, and therefore unmarked (Fraser 1990; Escandell-Vidal 1996), an assertion that Locher strongly disputes by pointing out that while politeness is certainly expected in most situations, it is nonetheless possible to note exceptional acts that go above that which is called
for (Locher 2004: 72). Watts differentiates between marked and unmarked forms of politeness, calling the latter form ‘politic’ behavior and the former a “marked extension or enhancement of politic verbal behaviour” (1992: 69). Locher describes this extension as ‘surplus’ and its purpose as “an extra effort to signal to the hearer that an extra piece of relational information is intended,” (2004: 74) To illustrate, the author cites an example that draws from European sociocultural knowledge where it is understood that while certain acts, like helping a woman with her coat, are not required to express politeness, when performed are positively evaluated and, due to their non-required nature, are interpreted as marked (72). Thus markedness adds politic behavior, a critical nuance to the (im)politeness spectrum, that addresses the states of a relationship under negotiation in conversation (via relational work/rapport management) indicative of neither a decline in the ‘harmony’ of said relationship nor a marked improvement, but simply an exchange where communicative behaviors fall within the parameters of expected or requisite actions.

Watts proposes the following model for this spectrum of polite, politic and impolite behaviors:

![Figure 1: Locher’s description of polite, politic and appropriate behavior in marked relational work (2004: 90)](image-url)
Here we see illustrated four ways in which judgments can be made about behaviors in interaction. The first utilizes some terms that the average language speaker might use to describe an action: ‘polite’ and ‘impolite’. These terms specifically base their judgments on the perceived intentions of the speaker with respect to how “polite” they wish to be. The second set is oriented in terms of three levels of markedness: negatively marked, positively marked, and unmarked (also referred to as neutral).

Third, we have a set of terms whose focus is on appropriateness and the ‘politic’, or sanctioned nature of an act. The final set of terms is worded according to how appropriate or inappropriate an act is considered to be. When combined together, they offer a multi-faceted set of terms by which to describe behavior. For example, an utterance like “Hello” or an action like a handshake, in the proper context, could be perceived to simply meet the expected behavioral norms, but that do not seem to imply that an extra effort has been made to express a ‘surplus’ of relational good will. This type of act, therefore, would be termed as:

- **politic**- by not signaling a lack of polite intention, but instead affirms the intention to meet the minimum requirements of the situation
- **appropriate**- in that sociocultural knowledge calls for it in this particular context/event or past experience suggests that this is acceptable, and
- **unmarked**- similar to politic in that it does not indicate the intention to affect the relationship between interlocutors in a positive or negative way

In this same situation, however, if the handshake or greeting were omitted, then the absence of said action would most likely be perceived as:

- **non-politic**- by signaling a lack of polite intention or by not meeting the minimum ‘politic’ behavioral requirements of the situation
• inappropriate- in that this lack of action is not in accordance with
prescribed or allowed behaviors in the given situation
• negatively marked- or judged as damaging to the relationship between
interlocutors, and
• impolite- by implying a lack of desire to be polite

Similarly, if the handshake were carried out in such a way as to communicate
additional concern or sympathy for the recipient (i.e. a longer, sustained handshake
using both hands), or the greeting was more elaborate, like “Hello. How are you
doing... are you okay?”, such that it is clear that the speaker wishes to solicit more
personal information, assuming that this degree of intimacy is appropriate to the
situation and to the relationship between the interlocutors, then we have what could
be interpreted as a “surplus” of requisite politeness in the form of concern that
supports the hearer’s face sensitivities. According to Locher’s illustration, the
following judgments could be made about these enhanced actions:
• politic- falling within the allowable behaviors for the situation
• appropriate- called for in the given context
• positively marked- due to the strengthening of the social relationship that
these actions would likely lead to, and
• polite- by communicating genuine concern on the part of the speaker to be
polite and support the hearer’s face sensitivities (i.e. emotional needs) far beyond the
minimally required degree of attention

It is important to remember that in these examples, as in all situations, factors in the
context of the event are critical to the judgments made about the interaction. For
example, a difference in age, social status, relative power, nature of the relationship
(i.e. intimate, collegial, estranged) between interlocutors, physical location of the exchange, presence or lack of other people in the conversation, and countless others can all lead to different interpretations of these actions. Nonetheless, if the assumptions made in the above examples are entertained, we are able to see how the presence or absence, and delivery of a single behavior such as a handshake or greeting can affect a relationship based on notions of perceived intention and cultural knowledge. It is clear from these examples that there is a need to distinguish between marked and unmarked events and to abandon the (im)politeness dichotomy to facilitate the analysis of behaviors within a dialogue that do not seem to affect the relationship between interlocutors in a positive or negative way, but nonetheless serve an important communicative function, be it transactional or otherwise.

3.4.3 Context and frame

If we are to understand that markedness provides a measure for interpreting communication as either meeting, exceeding or falling short of interlocutor’s expectations, then we must understand how those expectations are formed and applied in conversation. For insight into this we turn to Locher’s characterization of context and frames in her book *Power and Politeness in Action*. She begins by citing early work by Berger and Luckmann (1966) that asserts that human experience or reality is constructed through social means (210-211). Per Locher, proof of this is seen in the fact that “people adjust their verbal behavior to the speech situation they find themselves in and help reproduce and secure the parameters of the situations they enact... [this] reproduction of situations...can also be the starting point of institutionalizing these encounters,” (2004: 46). Consequently, our previous experiences in various types of encounters form what Tannen, based on work by
Bateson (1972) and Goffman (1974), terms frames, or “structures of expectation based on past experiences” (53). Our present behavior in interaction is influenced by our past experiences and what those have taught us are sanctioned and non-sanctioned in those types of situations. Locher gives the following example:

“Parallel to the changing situations...[that people] find themselves in, they also enact different roles and negotiate their identities. A woman might enact the role of a professor, a partner and a mother among many others. While she does not cease to be a mother when teaching, this aspect of her person is (most of the time) not relevant for her students, and she will behave differently than she does at home.” (2004: 46)

Thus we see how past experiences shape our identities, which in turn affect our behaviors in future, similar situations.

In addition to frames influencing how we act in the present moment, we also turn to these ‘structures of expectation’ when making judgments about actions or utterances during a particular exchange. When we encounter behaviors in familiar events that fall outside of our frame(s), we form judgments about these actions that can serve to discover the reason for these divergences (i.e. “He/she did that inappropriate thing because they wish to anger me”). Locher offers the following judgments that can be made about these behaviors: negative or positive, marked or unmarked, appropriate or inappropriate (2004: 48). This line of reasoning therefore offers a clear, conceptual path starting with the assimilation of past ritualized or recurring experiences to the opinions of appropriateness that we form about present actions in communication, thus offering the criteria on which we can determine markedness.
3.5 Political discourse

A final and important area of study that must be addressed is political discourse. While limited in number, studies by Bolivar (2005), Rey Garcia and Rivas Nieto (2007), Fernandez Garcia (2000), Blas Arroyo (1998, 2001, 2002, 2003), and Lorenzo Dus (2011) all examine political discourse in the Spanish-speaking world. While findings from this particular, language-specific area of research do not hold direct relevance to the present study, they affirm the growing interest that exists in the academic world in political discourse.

The preceding theory and research discussed in this section has not yet addressed how particular types of exchanges can influence the content of an interlocutor’s speech or their strategic approach to interaction. To this end, I will first define political speech and draw connections to the present data set that support the labeling of the Summit’s discourse as political. I will then give a few examples of how this discourse type might define or anticipate the results of the analysis to follow.

In his 2006 comprehensive overview of political speech and persuasive argumentation, Dedaic describes political speech as “relatively autonomous discourse produced orally by a politician in front of an audience, the purpose of which is primarily persuasion…” (700). The author goes on to describe persuasion as an effort to alter people’s actions or reinforce opinions and, per Aristotle, is carried-out through three different means: ethos, based on the speaker’s credibility; pathos, that stirs the listener’s emotions; and logos, that appeals to the listener through logical argument or by proving a point (702).
It is therefore fair to define the Rio Group’s 2008 Summit as a form of political discourse given the identified interlocutors in the exchange at the Summit (all politician heads-of-state), the varied audience present (live and televised), and the overarching themes of Uribe’s discourse at the event (to defend Colombia’s military actions). Furthermore, as will be seen in greater detail in section 5, Uribe carries out his persuasive, political discourse by employing various (im)politeness strategies that attempt to capitalize on the Colombian government’s credibility (ethos) as a loyal partner in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism, that target the listener’s emotions (pathos) through attention to S’s face, and that employ logic (logos) via reasoned arguments in defense of his government’s actions.

An additional topic of interest is the exercise of power in political speech. About power, Reyes-Rodriguez says “the relationship of power established in any given community can give a certain speaker the capacity to establish, create, or alternate knowledge…those in power have the potential to reconstitute that reality” (2008, 135). Similarly, Jaworski and Galasinski characterize political debates as those where power is fought for via favorable representations of self and negative representations of others (2000, 339).

Having already defined the principal interlocutors in the present study as possessing relatively equal power given their common titles as nation presidents, it is fair then to assert that when entering a discussion where accusations are made against the Colombian government, Uribe has the requisite power to challenge the facts on which the accusations are based and, through his discourse, change those facts. Further, by rejecting or minimizing claims of wrong-doing and by making counter-claims of fault in the debated matter, Uribe protects his power among his
fellow interlocutors by exercising his right to debate information given by other
interlocutors during the exchange.

Thus Uribe’s approach to political discourse in the present study could be
expected to include proposing his own set of facts surrounding the military events in
question at the Summit, disputing the veracity of said facts presented by fellow
interlocutors, and/or presenting a favorable image of self and an unfavorable one of
his fellow interlocutors. Uribe could accomplish these actions by capitalizing on his
or his nation’s credibility, by affecting the hearer’s emotions, and by appealing to the
hearer’s logic. In a different type of discourse in a very different context, these
interactional behaviors could be perceived as rude and aggressive. However, as the
preceding facts imply, in the context of political speech, such behaviors are permitted
(Spencer-Oatey, 2005) and could thus be expected in the present data.

3.6 Selected theory for the present study

As the review of literature makes clear, any study of relationship
management, or, as we will now call it, rapport management, involves many
elements. For the purpose of the present study, and based on the preceding
theoretical review, the following concepts will form the foundation on which a
theoretical approach will be designed: face (per Goffman and Spencer-Oatey);
(im)politeness strategies (used as data labels, per Brown and Levinson and Culpeper);
domain (Spencer-Oatey); markedness (Locher), on/off-record nature of utterances
(Brown and Levinson); and rapport management (Spencer Oatey).
CHAPTER 4

METHOD

The present study will examine how rapport is managed in a sample of extended discourse. This ‘how’ will be addressed by answering the following questions, employing the selected theories discussed in the previous section (see also Figure 2):

Question 1. What (im)politeness strategies are used in discourse to manage rapport? Brown and Levinson’s politeness superstrategies, strategies and outputs, and Culpeper’s impoliteness superstrategies will be used to classify behaviors observed in the dialogue.

Question 2. Who is involved in the exchange when these strategies are employed? When and where does it take place? An analysis of frame will be done identifying elements such as power of the interlocutors and the situational/behavioral norms as they apply to the interactional situation.

Question 3. How (by which particular means) do these strategies affect rapport? Three aspects of each strategy are examined: domain (per Spencer-Oatey), markedness (per Locher), and on/off-record (per Brown and Levinson’s and Bousfield’s (im)politeness models).

Question 4. Why are these strategies used? In other words, what aspects of rapport could the speaker intend to affect through his use of specific strategies? Spencer-Oatey’s components of rapport (face, sociality rights and obligations, and interactional goals) will be used here.

Question 1 will yield insight into the variety of strategies used, as well as patterns like those strategies employed together with frequency, and those used only in isolation.
Question 2 will define the context in which rapport-management strategies are used and provide the necessary criteria for Question 3, which will address markedness, domain and the on/off-record nature from which strategies are carried out. Finally, Question 4 will describe the aspects of rapport that the speaker targets through his use of rapport management strategies.

Figure 2: Method of analysis

By examining these aspects (Questions 2-4) of Uribe’s dialog at the Summit, and when paired with a statistical analysis of (im)politeness strategies used (Question 1), it may be possible to see how the initially-observed changes in Uribe’s speech are carried-out (through which strategies) and how factors external to the immediate exchange (e.g. frame, domains, elements of rapport) influence or define these changes. An analysis of the data now follows (Question 1), after which Questions 2-4 will be addressed in Section 6.
CHAPTER 5

QUESTION 1: WHAT (IM)POLITENESS STRATEGIES ARE USED TO MANAGE RAPPORT?

The first question posed in the theoretical model concerns the actual (im)politeness strategies used. Work by Brown and Levinson (1987) and Culpeper (1996) was used to generate the labels by which (im)polite utterances were classified. Once done, trends were identified, a summary of which is given at the end of this discussion.

5.1 Data

The data analyzed in this study consisted of two segments of extended discourse given by President Uribe at the 20th Summit of the Rio Group. Responding to various complaints and accusations made by many of the heads of state in attendance at this event, and in defense of his government’s recent military actions into Ecuadorian territory, Uribe responds in two instances adhering to the Summit’s format for discussion and debate— that of an uninterrupted, extended statement addressing multiple topics and hearers in one response. The first of Uribe’s responses lasts approximately one hour and ten minutes and the second approximately 47 minutes. In each response Uribe employs a variety of the (im)politeness strategies identified by Brown and Levinson and Culpeper, as described in section 3. These utterances were isolated from their surrounding speech based on the particular strategy that they seemed to exemplify. This means that while many utterances may have been used together to demonstrate a larger point, each one represents a specific (im)politeness strategy.

5.2 On-record impoliteness
We begin first by describing the variety of impoliteness strategies identified across both of Uribe’s responses. A total of 83 impolite utterances were found, and then classified into impoliteness categories, and all on-record:

1. **Call a 3rd party names:** This category is adapted from ‘Call H names’ as was originally described by Culpeper (1996). In this case, the recipient of the FTA’s was not the hearer(s) themselves, but an entity outside of the conversation, but which both parties knew and had some sort of relationship with. This entity, the terrorist group FARC, was referenced quite frequently by Uribe and, per his comments, was not perceived by the governments of all hearers at the Summit as terrorist and had thus received varying degrees of amnesty, protection, or support by these nations.

The actual name-calling that took place included the use of adjectives (B and C) as well as nouns (A). Additionally, the idea in this category was to count the utterances by Uribe that employed name-calling. For this reason, instances like example A below were counted once even though they contain multiple names. This impoliteness strategy, newly defined in the context of its original version “Call H names”, is described further in 5.3.1.

**Example:**

A) El señor Raúl Reyes era cobarde, asesino y obstructor de la paz.…

*Mr. Raúl Reyes was a coward, an assassin and an obstructor of peace.*

B) …personaje cobarde…

*…this coward…*

C) …este verdugo terrorista…

*…this terrorist-executioner…*
2. **Condescend, scorn or ridicule:** Utterances in this category primarily included references to the hearer’s behavior or statements and directly addressed the party or parties being sanctioned.

**Example:**

D) Dejemos ese infantilismo latinoamericano de la guerra fría…

*Let us leave behind that Latin American Cold War childishness…*

E) …procedamos con criterio de adultos…

*…let us proceed like adults…*

3. **Explicitly associate a 3<sup>rd</sup> party with a negative aspect:** This is an adaptation of Culpeper’s “explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”. The negative aspects referred to by Uribe here are crimes or bad acts, all committed by the terrorist group FARC. As with “Call a 3<sup>rd</sup> party names”, this impoliteness strategy is explained in further detail in section 4.1.2.

**Example:**

F) ¿Por qué las FARC es terrorista? Porque actúa en contra de una democracia…

*What makes the FARC terrorists? Because they act in opposition to a democracy…*

G) ¡Cómo nos ha engañado las FARC!

*How the FARC have deceived us!*

4. **Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect:** Where Uribe associates 3<sup>rd</sup> parties with very specific accusations of wrongdoing and crimes (see above), he associates the hearers in his discourse with somewhat different types of bad acts.
These statements were easily differentiated from utterances directed at 3rd parties because of the specific names used by Uribe referencing members of the Rio Group, as well as the use of “usted” (you) or “ustedes” (you all) where he clearly intends to address only those members of H participating in the dialog at the Summit, the presidents of member nations. Uribe focuses on the veracity and consistency of other’s claims, thus associating H with lying (see a and e below), inappropriate or unfair behavior (see c and d), and even outright betrayal to the presumed friendly political and military relationship between H’s government and Colombia (see b).

Example:

H)  ...en mi mente va todo en la misma dirección, una presunta inmensa complicidad del ministro de Gustavo Larrea del Ecuador con estos bandidos.

...in my mind everything seems to be pointing to the same conclusion, a huge presumed conspiracy between the ministry of Gustavo Larrea of Ecuador and these outlaws.

I)  ...los colombianos sentimos dolor; con lo que usted dijo hoy, sabe que ese puntico de terrorismo de Estado no sentimos dolor. Cuando usted habla de hacer la paz, no sentimos dolor, así tengamos diferencias. Cuando usted le hace homenajes a Manuel Marulanda, sí [sentimos dolor]....

We Colombians feel pain. What you’ve said here today, you know that small point about state terrorism, doesn’t hurt us. When you talk about making peace, we don’t feel pain, despite our differences. When you pay homage to Manuel Marulanda, we do feel pain.

J)  Presidente Ortega, mire, usted que hoy habló con tanto interés de la paz en Colombia, se lo agradezco, pero ojalá lo siga haciendo en todo escenario. Ahorre insultarnos, ¿para qué?
President Ortega, what you said today about your great interest for peace in Colombia, I thank you for that, and I hope that you’ll keep saying it everywhere. Spare us the insults. Why bother?

5.3 On-record politeness

1. **Claim common ground:** The utterances falling into this strategy communicate Uribe’s desire to create agreement and collaboration between him and the group of interlocutors. Many of these utterances specifically referenced his, and what he assumes to also be H’s, desire for common ground in terms of positive, productive communication.

Example:

K) ...comparto su actitud de que no se den esos hechos…

*I share your belief that those things should not occur.*

L) Dejemos a ver si por este camino podemos seguir avanzando…

*Let us see if through this path we can continue progressing.*

M) ...nosotros no podemos trasladarle [sic] a nuestros pueblos riesgos de guerra o de hambre, eso es injusto.

*We cannot pass on to our people the risk of war or hunger; that is unjust.*

2. **Don’t coerce H:** Both instances of this strategy involved Uribe requesting that H investigate an issue whose misunderstanding left his government in a bad light. His approach in both statements is deferential and in one even provides justification for his request by citing proof that the incorrect information in question was provided by an unreliable source.
3. **Fulfill H’s want for X:** Utterances in this category consisted of formal language and recognition of the hearer’s titles and prestige.

**Example:**

P) ...distinguidos presidentes latinoamericanos…

...distinguished Latin American presidents…

Q) ...voy a disentir en algunos puntos muy respetuosamente de usted señora Presidenta…

...I am going to very respectfully disagree with you on a few points, Madam President.

R) ...yo los respeto a ustedes como combatientes de la democracia…

... as defenders of democracy, I respect you.

4. **Convey S and H are cooperators:** The single utterance makes a statement in defense of the right to protection of the Colombian people, justified by the
presumed existence of a cooperative relationship between H (“brothers and neighbors”, i.e. allies and neighboring countries) and Colombia, and the mutual assistance that said relationship might entail.

Example:

S) Por favor, por favor, piensen también que tenemos derecho a pedir que el pueblo colombiano tenga una cooperación de sus hermanos y vecinos para que no se le maltrate.

*Please, please also keep in mind that we have the right to ask that the Colombian people have the cooperation of its brothers and neighbors so that it is not mistreated.*

5.3.1 Two strategies redefined

During the course of the analysis, two types of impolite strategies were clearly present, although not exactly in the specific form defined by Culpeper. These two strategies are, as identified above, “Call 3rd party names” (from Culpeper’s “Call H names”) and “Explicitly associate a 3rd party with a negative aspect” (from Culpeper’s “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”). The frequency with which these two strategies occurred, particularly in comparison with their original counterparts, indicated an important trend. Table 3 illustrates the percentage with which these strategies occur within their larger category of impoliteness strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Redefined (im)politeness strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impolite</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call 3rd party names</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condescend, scorn, ridicule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total instances of impoliteness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polite</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim common ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convey S and H are cooperators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t coerce H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen in the table above, ‘Call 3rd party names’ occurred 19% of the time in total (21 times out of the total 83 instances of impolite utterances) across Parts I and II, making it the second most frequently occurring strategy. ‘Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect’ ranked third in terms of frequency at 15% (16 out of 83 total impolite utterances). The significance of these two strategies, both referring to a party not explicitly referenced in original (im)politeness strategies, requires further examination. How do these strategies, used frequently and specifically targeting neither S nor H, accomplish impoliteness? How do they compare to their original, H-directed counterparts? While the answers to these questions can only serve as theory, their reasoning can pose some interesting questions for future study.

We begin with ‘Call 3rd party names’. As described above, this strategy involves 21 instances where Uribe makes references to the FARC (or specific members of the FARC) and refers to them as “tenebroso” (sinister), “cobarde” (cowards), and “terroristas” (terrorists). Given the fact that none of the participants in the Summit represent the FARC, it is fair to label the referenced entity here as a third party, or at the very least somewhat removed. While it is possible that FARC members where in the television audience, their lack of physical presence at the Summit eliminated the possibility of a direct response to Uribe’s name-calling, thereby necessarily prioritizing the exchange occurring between Uribe and the Rio Group members.
Uribe draws a clear connection between the FARC and some of the Summit’s participants that he is addressing (H). Specifically, he makes reference to the support that FARC members have received from other, neighboring countries, some of which do not consider the FARC a terrorist entity. To this effect, he states:

*Muchos de ustedes no aceptan que estos grupos son terroristas, yo veo una injusticia, a uno de los actores violentos en Colombia lo llaman terroristas y a los otros no, les pido esa reflexión, para nosotros todos son terroristas porque están combatiendo un ordenamiento jurídico de una democracia.*

*Many of you do not accept that these groups are terrorist [groups]; I see an injustice here.*

*You consider one violent actor in Colombia a terrorist, but the others you do not. Think about this; I beg you. We consider all of them to be terrorists because they fight against the legal order of a democracy.*

In an even more direct statement, Uribe describes a few incidents where the Ecuadorian government acted in defense of the FARC and in opposition to the actions of the Colombian government. He concludes these descriptions with a clear, direct accusation of conspiracy (see example H above). In an equally strong fashion, Uribe criticizes the actions of President Ortega of Nicaragua by criticizing Ortega’s past verbal support of the FARC (see example I above).

Through statements like these, Uribe draws a clear connection of defense and support of a terrorist group between the governments represented by H and the FARC; the FARC being the entity that acts in opposition to the government of Colombia and who he associates with various criminal acts. An insult like name-calling, then, can be said to have some effect on H when it is directed to a party associated with them, particularly when said association is defined by S as one of
support. The precise effect, as stated previously, can only be theorized in terms of the present data but does create one interesting possibility. This use of name-calling, when paired with the supportive relationship described by Uribe, suggests a clear, implied culpability between the FARC and the governments whose support of the FARC facilitated, even if indirectly, the threats and attacks on Colombia. In other words, Uribe’s name-calling towards the FARC makes these utterances impolite to H as they deliver the face-threatening aspect of name-calling, through the implied relationships, to some of the hearers at the Summit. This category, as it manifests itself in Uribe’s discourse exclusively targeting the FARC, could then be thought of as a combination of two direct impoliteness strategies where the second (‘Call a 3rd party names’) serves as a means to accomplish the first (‘Associate H with a negative aspect’), otherwise stated as: “Associate H with a negative aspect by name-calling a 3rd party associated with/ supported by H”.

Second is “Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect”. This strategy functioned very similarly to “Call 3rd party names” in that the targeted party was, in every instance, the FARC. The ‘negative aspects’ referenced in these utterances ranged from accusations of kidnapping, assassination, and drug trafficking to violations of international human rights and cowardice. Some of the instances of this impoliteness strategy also happened to occur in the same utterances as “Call 3rd party names”, for example “…because these outlaws are not insurgents against a dictatorship but instead blood-letters against a democracy, convicted as terrorists in Europe, in Canada, in the United State and in the hearts of the Colombian people.”
This co-usage of strategies reinforced the face-threatening aspect of the utterance, thus suggesting a similar type of use to that of “Call 3rd party names”, where a third party associated with H is attacked through accusations of involvement in bad acts, therefore associating H with a negative aspect— that of a voluntary, friendly relationship with a criminal entity.

5.4 Statistical observations

Of the total 109 utterances identified in both parts of Uribe’s discourse as (im)polite, 76% fell under the impolite category and 24% under the polite category. This represents a strong preference by Uribe to employ impoliteness in his discourse which, given the main topic of discussion as described previously, seems to correlate with his defensive position in the discourse at the Summit. While this pattern seems significant in the sense of a generally preferred approach by Uribe, a comparison of strategies employed across the two separate segments of discourse that make-up the whole of the data analyzed here (referred to here as Parts I and II), as seen in Table 4, yields far more significant trends.

When comparing the frequency of (im)politeness strategies used in Part I versus Part II, we see no significant change where 54% of the total instances occurred in the one hour and six minutes of Part I, to 46% in Part II, which lasted 47 minutes. Significant changes are seen, however, when comparing politeness and impoliteness. Of the total 59 instances of (im)polite utterances in Part I, 90% are impolite and 10% are polite. This changes in Part II where of the total 50 instances, 60% are impolite and 40% are polite. Thus, we see that while impoliteness occurs with greater frequency overall, it is in Part I of the discourse where this preference is markedly stronger. Similarly, politeness strategies are employed in 40% of the
(im)polite utterances in Part II, representing a significant increase from the 10% identified in Part I.

Table 4: (Im)politeness strategies used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Part I</th>
<th>Part II</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impolite</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call 3rd party names</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condescend, scorn, ridicule</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impolite Total</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polite</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim common ground</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convey S and H are cooperators</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t coerce H</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfill H’s want for X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polite Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us examine the nature of the 83 impolite utterances identified across both Parts I and II. The two strategies used in equal and greatest numbers in Parts I and II are “Condescend, scorn or ridicule” and “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”, each occurring 28% of the time (23 of the 83 total instances). Of the remaining impoliteness strategies, “Call 3rd party names” occurred 25% of the time (21 of 83 instances) and “Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect” 19% of the time (16 of 83 instances) across both Parts. The greatest changes from Parts I to II occurred with “Call 3rd party names” and “Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect”. “Call 3rd party names” dropped 95% (from 20 in Part I to just one instance in Part II), while “Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect” dropped 75% (from 12 in Part I to 4 in Part II).

We now turn to the politeness strategies preferred by Uribe. The most frequently occurring politeness strategies across both Parts I and II included “Fulfill
H’s want for X”, occurring a total of 46% of the time (12 of 26 total instances of politeness), and “Claim common ground” occurring 42% (11 of 26 total instances). Each of these strategies saw an increase between Parts I and II. “Fulfill H’s want for X” increased 400% (from 2 instances of politeness in Part I to 10 instances in Part II), and “Claim common ground” increased 350% (from 2 instances in Part I to 9 instances in Part II).

Looking once more at the overall data across both Parts I and II, it is clear to see that the (im)politeness strategies used most frequently were all impolite and included “Condescend, scorn or ridicule”, “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”, and “Call 3rd party names”. Moreover, while instances of politeness occurred far less frequently, the increase of “Claim common ground” (from 3.3% to 18%) and “Fulfill H’s want for X” (from 3.3 to 20%) from Parts I to II were significant. Some of the statistics in the analysis, as described above, seem to point to some potentially significant trends. Before these trends can be used to answer the larger question posed in this thesis (how changes in discourse are carried-out, and thus rapport managed, in extended segments of dialog), the factors described in Questions 2-4 must first be addressed, thus providing a comprehensive picture of the larger phenomenon of rapport management in the given scenario (the 2008 Summit).
CHAPTER 6

QUESTIONS 2-4: FACTORS FOR EXAMINING RELATIONAL WORK

In order to describe relational work, as defined by Spencer Oatey, the
remaining questions posed in section 4 will now be addressed: context in which the
data appear (Question 2), method in which the work is carried out (Question 3), and
purpose of strategies used (Question 4).

6.1 Question 2: Who is involved in the exchange when these strategies are
employed? When and where does it take place?

Context, as it applies to this part of the analysis, is defined by Tannen as
“structures of expectation based on past experience” (Locher 2004) that in turn, per
Locher, affect the way in which we choose to act in a given, similar situation (46).
Locher describes two central elements of context:

1. Participants (who): gender, age, education, cultural background, personal
   history, status difference, distance, affect (2004: 47)
2. Frames (when and where): influenced by location, time or date, and the
   purpose for which the interaction takes place (2004: 57)

Of these named elements, some cannot be considered given the characteristics of the
group of leaders representing H in this study. For example, the participants (see 1
above) in the Summit included both males and females (gender and cultural
background), each a different nation (cultural background), and each from a unique
background (personal history). These many variables, when considered alongside the
fact that Uribe only addressed a specific member of H in a limited number of
instances, means that these characteristics could not have factored into a majority of
his responses as there would be no way to ‘tailor’ his response to recognize each
member’s specific gender, cultural background, or other characteristics. Instead, the
focus in this description of context, in terms of its participants, will focus on status
difference, distance and affect.

6.1.1 Participants: Status Difference, Distance, and Affect

All participants at the Summit were presidents of member-nation
governments. The discussion itself was even led by one of the group members,
therefore establishing an interactional group that in terms of official, political status
was equal across the whole group. This means that Uribe, with respect to political
recognition, could consider himself an equal to H (the Presidents of member nations
present at the Summit), and could thus formulate his responses accordingly, as if
addressing a group of equals. Uribe makes a few statements that would seem to
confirm the description of status difference above:

1. ..nosotros no podemos trasladarle [sic] a nuestros pueblos riesgos de
   guerra o de hambre, eso es injusto.

   We cannot pass on to our people the risk of war or hunger; that is unjust.

2. ...de mi parte voy a procurar mantener esto por la dignidad del propio
   colombiano que represento en esto de las relaciones extranjeras, por la
   hermandad con los pueblos que ustedes representan, por el futuro de
   nuestros países en una instancia puramente argumental.

   On my part I will attempt to maintain this for the sake of the dignity of the Colombian
   people that I represent in these foreign relations, for the sake of brotherhood with the people
   that you all represent, for the future of our nations in the face of a purely argumentative
   situation.

Both of these statements acknowledge Uribe’s view of S and H as equals with
respect to their similar degree of influence and power to affect their nations, as in number one above, and responsibilities to preserve each one’s success, as in number two.

Distance, or ‘social distance’ as termed by Brown and Levinson, is the degree of perceived similarity (or difference) between S and H in a given exchange (1978: 76). The greater the degree of difference between the two parties, the greater the perceived distance. Brown and Levinson suggest that elements like frequency of interaction and the types of goods exchanged between S and H all influence the assessment of distance in interaction. Distance is established through the evaluation of static social characteristics and is reduced through receiving and giving positive face (77). If we consider the previous interpretation of status difference as the static social characteristic on which distance is defined by S and H, then the data clearly points to a desired reduction in social distance, initiated by Uribe through the use of (im)politeness strategies. Let us examine the most frequently used politeness strategy in the data, “Fulfill H’s want for X”. This is defined by Brown and Levinson as a form of positive politeness and, thus, attends to face (102). Utterances in this category indicate a desired reduction in social distance through the acknowledgement of participant’s prestigious backgrounds and accomplishments (‘Usted, que es una jurista muy destacada’ ‘You, who are a very prominent legal expert’), and through the expression of deference through gratitude and respect (‘Yo le agradezco muchísimo…’ ‘I thank you very much…’; ‘Yo los respeto a ustedes…’ ‘I respect you all’).

Affect characterized some of the most frequently used strategies in the data as well. For example, “Condescend, scorn, or ridicule”, one of the two most
frequently used strategies overall, clearly expressed a strong negative attitude towards H (see examples D and E above). This approach to impoliteness in Uribe’s statements involved many of the elements that Culpeper includes in his description of this strategy: “…emphasize your relative power. Be contemptuous. Do not treat the other seriously. Belittle the other (e.g. use diminutives)” (1996: 358). Another of the most frequently used impoliteness strategies was “Call 3rd party names”. As is mentioned in earlier discussions, these utterances focused on the FARC and included names like “terroristas” (terrorists), “bandidos” (criminals), and “cobarde” (coward). The fact that almost every statement referring to the FARC includes name-calling communicates the very strong attitude of disrespect that Uribe has toward this group.

Affect was also present in politeness strategies, perhaps most notably in “Fulfill H’s want for X”. Some of the utterances classified under this category carried a strong aspect of deference, as in the adjective “distinguidos” (distinguished) used four times to refer to H. Another set of utterances expressed deference through references by Uribe to his opinions, such as “Yo les agradezco” (I thank you) and “Yo los respeto” (I respect you). Gratitude and respect thus characterize the aspect of deferential affect most significant in the politeness strategies used by Uribe.

6.1.2 Frame

Of the elements of frame named above, the one in this study that seems to be of greatest impact to the nature of the dialog is purpose. Other elements, such as time and location, certainly might have had some impact on the strategies used by Uribe to carry out relational work. However, upon examination of the categories in which the utterances in the present data focus (associating with negative aspects and
name-calling those third parties associated with H, condescension and scorn, and claiming common ground), it is clear that the purpose of the dialog has the greatest impact on the nature of the utterances. In other words, the strategies employed by Uribe, as well as the nature of his responses, reflect a position in conversation that would seem to point to a strong concern for making statements about relationships (name-calling, associating H and a 3rd party associated with H with a negative aspect, fulfill H’s want for X, claim common ground). As will be seen in the following examination of the purpose of the dialog at the Summit, the negotiation of these relationships form the central means by which the group realizes its work.

The purpose of the Summits of the Rio Group are described as similar to those of the Organization of American States (OAS), only the parties involved in the Rio Group intentionally exclude the United States (“Rio Group”). The goals of the OAS are “to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence” (Mejía). The purpose of the dialog that occurs at each Summit can be said, thus, to be that of solidarity, peace and justice. These elements are mirrored in the opening statement given by President Leonel Fernández of the Dominican Republic who describes the Summit as follows:

Un tipo de encuentro que nos brinda la extraordinaria oportunidad de
consolidar las relaciones entre nuestros pueblos, fortalecer las acciones de cooperación, y robustecer las posiciones de consenso. Aspiramos que nuestras reflexiones en el día de hoy tengan como base la necesidad de reforzar los valores democráticos, los principios de solidaridad, integración, respeto a los derechos humanos, desarrollo sostenible, paz y seguridad…
Nos empeñamos en realizar todos los esfuerzos necesarios para consolidar el Grupo de Río como un interlocutor valido en la promoción del dialogo político y la concertación como premisas para alcanzar la gobernabilidad democrática de nuestros pueblos.

* A type of meeting that gives us the extraordinary opportunity to consolidate the relationships between our people, and to strengthen our cooperative work as well as our positions of consensus. We seek to base our statements today on the need to reinforce our democratic principles, our values of solidarity, integration, respect for human rights, sustainable development, peace and security… We strive to make every effort necessary to make the Rio Group into a legitimate participant in the promotion of political dialog and harmonization as a means for achieving the democratic rule of our nations.

To tie this notion of purpose back to the initial assertion of Uribe’s statements about relationships among the group, we need only to look at the final statement where President Leonel Fernandez describes “dialog and harmonization as a means for achieving…democratic rule”. His statement clearly describes a dialog intended to promote collaboration and solidarity among participants by way of diplomatic dialog. Without the diplomatic dialog facilitated by the Summit’s format and structure, dependent upon the participatory relationships between member states, the group cannot realize its objectives. Thus we see how the purpose of the dialog necessarily influences Uribe’s use of strategies.

Having thus far examined the intended purpose of the Summit’s exchange, as per the moderator and the Rio Group itself, we now turn to Uribe’s statements to see if this purpose is reflected in his utterances. The following statements by Uribe demonstrate this understanding and promotion of said purpose of the Rio Group
1. Pero yo no lo digo para… que nos estaquemos en un remolino, sino para que pensemos cómo avanzar en esto si vamos a buscar salidas.

_But I don’t say this so that… we end up stuck, going in circles, but instead so that we can think about how we can move forward on this and find solutions._

2. Yo quisiera hacer la paz, tengo toda la voluntad para ello, toda la voluntad.

_I would like to make peace, I am completely willing. I am completely willing._

3. …que pudiéramos resolver eso por el diálogo, ojalá, ojalá

_That we could resolve this through dialog… hopefully, hopefully_

4. …de mi parte voy a procurar mantener esto por la dignidad del propio colombiano que represento en esto de las relaciones extranjeras, por la hermandad con los pueblos que ustedes representan, por el futuro de nuestros países en una instancia puramente argumental

_On my part I will attempt to maintain this for the sake of the dignity of the Colombian people that I represent in these foreign relations, for the sake of brotherhood with the people that you all represent, for the future of our nations in the face of a purely argumentative situation._

Through these statements, Uribe expresses a desire for the resolution of conflict or disagreement (1, 3), peace-making or positive relations between member states (2, 4) and mutual protection or defense (Example S: _"Please, please also keep in mind that we have the right to ask that the Colombian people have the cooperation of its brothers and neighbors so that it is not mistreated."_). Some of these statements are further emphasized by the use of repetition (2, 3, Example S), employing what
Locher describes as “a means to emphasize a point that he or she [the speaker] wants to make sure to get across” (2004: 101). The repeated words in the three above-mentioned phrases are: “I am completely willing”, emphasizing a cooperative stance towards making peace; “hopefully”, underlining a strong desire for productive dialog; and “please”, strengthening Uribe’s expressed desire for a mutually protective relationship among Colombia’s neighboring nations.

Additional signs of Uribe’s concept of the purpose of the exchange can be seen in statements where, through condescension or scorn, he sanctions actions and statements by H as they do not conform to said purpose. Examples of these are as follows:

1. Eso de insultar a distancia, a través de medios de comunicación es muy peligroso, es mejor tener el valor de decirse las cosas cara a cara para buscar soluciones.

It's a very dangerous thing to insult via the media, from a distance. It is better to have the courage to say things face-to-face to find solutions...

2. ¡Qué bueno sería poder hacer la paz por la vía dialogada!

How good it would be to be able to make peace through dialog!

3. …procedamos con criterio de adultos…

…let us proceed like adults…

The first two phrases demonstrate a concern for the way in which dialog is carried out, specifically in terms of H’s behaviors in conversation within the Summit (3) and in comments made outside (1) that should be addressed and resolved at the Summit itself where face-to-face interaction can occur. The second phrase emphasizes Uribe’s desire to see dialog used to make peace. The likely implication
here is particularly important as it is in this event’s particular dialog where Colombia finds itself in opposition and disfavor with many of the Summit’s members due to its recent territorial incursion of Ecuador. By expressing emphatic support of talk as a means to make peace, Uribe qualifies the mode of exchange at the present Summit as a means to accomplish this peace and thus, hopefully remove Colombia from an unfavorable position in the group.

Thus we see how Uribe’s contributions to the exchange at the Summit, ranging from repetitive and pleading to condescending or scornful, reflect an understanding of and action in accordance with the purpose of the Summit: solidarity, collaboration and peace-making.

6.2 Question 3: By which means do these strategies affect rapport?

Three factors will be examined here as a means to describe how the identified (im)politeness strategies affect rapport. The first factor, domain, will describe various aspects of the dialog as a whole. While the elements of domain cannot be explored in extensive depth, a few general observations can be made about each one and, in doing so, highlight the most prominent features of the exchange at the Summit, from the perspective of Spencer-Oatey’s five domains of rapport management: illocutionary, discourse, participation, stylistic, and non-verbal (2008: 21). The second factor, markedness, was described in earlier discussions as providing a critical nuance to the previously widely used politeness-impoliteness dichotomy: politic or unmarked behavior. The purpose of this particular discussion will not be to classify each item in the data set according to a degree of markedness, but instead to provide a few examples of possible marked or unmarked utterances. This narrow exploration of markedness is necessary as the limited scope of this study
does not grant access to the critical information needed to accurately classify utterances in terms of markedness: participant’s expectations of the exchange. Third, and last, we will examine the general on or off-record nature of the utterances that comprise the present data set. While these three factors; domain, markedness and on/off-record nature; present limitations with respect to the degree to which each can be studied, aspects of their presence in Uribe’s speech at the Summit might provide some insights into possible connections between the items (or utterances) that he contributed to the dialog, and the subsequent consequences of these contributions: rapport management.

6.2.1 Domain

Spencer-Oatey’s five domains within which rapport-affecting behaviors fall are: illocutionary, discourse, participation, stylistic, and nonverbal (2008: 21). Of these, the participation and nonverbal domains will not be examined as they fall outside the scope of the present study and require data not examined thus far (e.g. H’s utterances for the participation domain, H’s visual cues for the nonverbal domain).

Uribe’s utterances, analyzed through classification as polite or impolite, all fall under the illocutionary domain where frequently occurring speech acts included condescension and scorn, name-calling, deference (through recognition of H’s status or title), and claiming common-ground. Eight different types of (im)polite speech acts were observed and patterns in their use across two different segments of discourse demonstrated an approach to rapport management that changed direction over time (for a detailed discussion of these findings, see section 5). We see in Uribe’s speech an overall approach to rapport management, within the illocutionary
domain, characterized by impoliteness.

The discourse domain involves the choice of content in an exchange for the purpose of rapport management. Spencer-Oatey explains that in discourse, issues of subject matter and organization “need to be handled appropriately if harmonious relations are to be created and/or maintained, because the raising of sensitive topics, for example, can be rapport-threatening, as can frequent, sudden changes of topic” (Spencer Oatey, *Culturally Speaking* 21). The topic which Uribe addresses in his discourse, Colombia’s military actions into Ecuadorian territory, is not chosen by him. Instead he is responding to accusations and strong, negative statements about this event made by H at the opening of the Summit. Under this general topic, however, Uribe makes choices about specific subject matter, not directly related to the event in question, that he includes when carrying-out particular (im)politeness strategies. For example, in instances of the impoliteness strategy “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”, Uribe mentions instances where other Summit participants have, in the past, name-called the Colombian government. He also references a participant’s vocal support for a leader of the FARC that Colombia considers a threat. These two actions, name-calling and giving support, are ‘sensitive’ as they can negatively affect rapport through their impolite nature. Other examples of this manipulation of topic-choice include one instance where H’s status as a “prominent legal expert” is acknowledged by S, thus positively affecting rapport, and several instances where past bad acts by the terrorist group FARC are cited which, as stated in an earlier discussion, when combined with statements made about positive relations between H and the FARC, negatively affect rapport through impoliteness.

In summary, the discourse domain of the present data set identifies a specific event
involving the Colombian military and their actions in Ecuadorian territory as the
focus of Uribe’s discourse in the two segments of data. Within this data set, however,
we find examples of alternative topic choices (i.e. status of H, H’s support of the
FARC) made by Uribe that positively and negatively affect rapport, therefore
identifying the influence of particular utterances within the discourse domain.

Finally, the stylistic domain includes aspects of discourse such as tone, syntax
and terms of address (Spencer-Oatey, * Culturally Speaking 21). The eight strategies
examined in the data demonstrate two of these aspects very clearly: tone and terms
of address. The following types of tone can be derived from the strategies used by
Uribe:

1. Condescending or scornful tone:
   - Dejemos ese infantilismo latinoamericano de la guerra fría…
     *Let us leave behind that Latin American Cold War childishness…*
   - …procedamos con criterio de adultos…
     *…let us proceed like adults…*

2. Disdain or disrespect (towards the FARC and towards H):
   - El señor Raúl Reyes era cobarde, asesino y obstructor de la paz.…
     *Mr. Raúl Reyes was a coward, an assassin and an obstructor of peace.*
   - …personaje cobarde…
     *…this coward…*
   - …este verdugo terrorista…
     *…this terrorist-executioner…*

3. Deferential or formal, respectful tone:
• ...distinguidos presidentes latinoamericanos…

...distinguished Latin American presidents…

• ...yo los respeto a ustedes como combatientes de la democracia…

... as defenders of democracy, I respect you.

The strategies that characterize the first tone, condescension or scorn, are primarily “Condescend, scorn or ridicule” and “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”. Disdain or disrespect is illustrated by the strategy “Call a 3rd party names”. These three strategies, as they manifest in two distinct tones in the dialog, contrast with the deferential, respectful tone characterized by “Fulfill H’s want for X”, which, in the examples given above, makes X the desire for status recognition and respect. Thus we see a variety of tones employed in Uribe’s discourse within the context of an exchange whose objectives include collaboration and harmonization (as per the host, see 5.2.2.2).

Additionally, within the stylistic domain, Uribe employs formal terms of address in his speech (see 3 above). Utterances where formal forms of address are used refer solely to H, and not other, third parties. They also recognize H’s status in relation to Uribe’s as fellow leaders of Latin American nations, at times employing the additional term “distinguido(s)” (distinguished), therefore adding the aspect of deference or respect to said relationship of equals.

In conclusion, the preceding analysis of domain brings to light some of the important ways in which a single strategy, or utterance, can ‘behave’ within multiple domains, thus potentially affecting rapport from many different angles. For an example of this, let us turn to the utterance “yo venía con la disposición de no
contestarle, por sus insultos” (I had come today with the intent to not respond to you, because of your insults). Within the illocutionary domain, this is defined as impolite through its association of H to a bad act (negative aspect), that of insulting S. In the discourse domain, having already described topic choice as a rapport-affecting factor (Spencer-Oatey, *Culturally Speaking* 21), this statement represents the introduction by Uribe of unfavorable information about H. In terms of the stylistic domain, this utterance creates a tone of disdain by communicating Uribe’s intention to ignore H in the present exchange as a response to their past insulting statements, thus communicating Uribe’s perception of H as unworthy of his attention.

Therefore, from a single utterance we derive information about the (im)polite aspect of a segment of discourse (association of H with sanctioned behavior), the manner in which said segment is introduced into the dialog (through relation, or not, to the principal topic of conversation), and how this utterance can express an underlying idea or perception by S about H (S considering H’s actions, and thus H themselves, unworthy of attention).

6.2.2 On/off-record

Next, we look at the on/off-record nature of the data examined. All of the strategies examined in the present study were of the on-record type. Thus, Uribe’s chosen approach to discourse in the present study can be said to entail on-record utterances representing a variety of (im)politeness strategies within that category.

6.2.3 Markedness

The concept of markedness poses an interesting challenge due to the fact that, according to definitions of markedness as mentioned in section 3, H makes judgments about markedness based on statements or actions of S. In this study, the
data allows access to utterances by S, but not H’s reactions, particularly thoughts and opinions. A reverse analysis, however, is possible; using the data available it is reasonable to suggest potential judgments of markedness, via (im)politeness strategies, made by S about H’s behaviors. For this we look at utterances where Uribe sanctions behavior or chastises H in some way. A few examples were identified in the data:

1. Presidente Ortega… ahorre insultarnos, ¿para qué?

   President Ortega…spare us the insults. Why bother?

2. Van a tener que mantener en sesión permanente el Grupo de Río, a ver si cesan los insultos y prevalece la razón.

   They’re going to have to keep the Rio Group permanently in session, and maybe then the insults will cease and reason will prevail.

3. Esta semana deliberadamente no he querido contestar insultos a través de los medios de comunicación, lanzados desde distancia y tampoco los voy a contestar aquí.

   This week I have deliberately not wanted to respond to insults in the media, insults given from a distance and I’m not going to respond to them here either.

It is clear to see that the focus of Uribe’s statements of sanction against H center on insults. Through his use of (im)politeness strategies, Uribe expresses, among other things, his identification of insults as negatively marked, impolite, and inappropriate. This denoting of insults as negatively marked behavior is further emphasized in a related statement where Uribe says “Usted puede discrepar de mis argumentos, y usted no registra en mis intervenciones un solo insulto contra usted, no lo registra presidente Ortega” (You can disagree with my arguments, and in my responses you'll
not find a single insult against you, you won't find a single one President Ortega). In this statement, Uribe makes reference to his own behavior as exemplary, specifically when addressing President Ortega whom he sanctions in a separate statement (see 1 above). In doing so, he seemingly attempts to prove that dialog, especially when interlocutors are in disagreement, is possible without the need for insults, the behavior that he considers negatively marked and inappropriate. These examples show how communication of markedness by Uribe plays a role in the functions of the (im)politeness strategies that he employs.

6.3 Question 4: Why are these strategies used?

In answer to the question posed in this section, an exploration of possible effects to rapport will be described, using Spencer-Oatey’s three defined components of rapport: face, sociality rights and obligations, and interactional goals (Spencer-Oatey, Culturally Speaking 13-14). The purpose of this exercise will be to complete the analytical method employed in the study, as described in section 4.

A definitive correlation between an utterance and its intended effect on rapport cannot be made as the data set grants access only to the discourse of the event, and not the speaker’s opinions or thoughts with respect to the language used. However, a review of the data to derive potentially intended rapport-effects can still be of value as an exploration of possible relationships that can be defined among utterances and their strategic function as rapport management techniques. In other words, this final step of the analysis will take the data set, and the classifications and categorizations made of the data thus far, one more step. In doing so, as will be seen further on in this paper, a multi-layered set of statements about rapport management can be made; not for the purpose of declaring what is occurring in the present
analyzed discourse, but what could be. These types of more general, correlational statements are what this study hopes to experiment with, in an effort to explore rapport management through an alternative language and perspective.

6.3.1 Classification of utterances in terms of effect on rapport

In a method similar to that undertaken in Question 1 of this section, each utterance of the total 109 items in the data was examined and assigned to the component of rapport that it most likely seemed to affect. For example, a statement like “Please, please also keep in mind that we have the right to ask that the Colombian people have the cooperation of its brothers and neighbors so that it is not mistreated,” is initially classified as on-record politeness given that Uribe expresses a desired close, collaborative relationship with H (the neighboring nations represented at the Summit) and even uses the term “brothers” to augment “neighbors”, which creates an extra dimension of intimacy to said relationship. Thus, this utterance is classified as “Convey S and H are cooperators”. Additionally, this utterance makes a statement about what Uribe considers a fair expectation of his relationship with H; he considers it appropriate to expect that neighboring nations assist with defending Colombia against those entities that may wish to mistreat it. This relationship of interdependency in terms of defense suggests that a state of imbalance, or unfairness results when one nation suffers and the others do nothing about it. In other words, the above-cited statement by Uribe can be said to relate to his concept of sociality rights, those of fairness in treatment, and more specifically, to the concept of equity in terms of cost-benefit expectations where, through H’s desired behavior as implied through S’s statement, if Colombia were mistreated, neighboring nations would step-in to prevent this (the cost of said relationship) as a
means of preserving the ‘brotherhood’ with neighboring nations (the benefit of said actions).

A second example can be found in multiple statements made about insults made by H about S (see 6.2.3). All of these statements were classified as “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”, the negative aspect in this case being the sanctioned behavior of name-calling. In addition to characterizing those insults as unnecessary or inappropriate, he also offers evidence of exemplary behavior by challenging President Ortega to find a single instance where Uribe has insulted him. We also see evidence that in the present exchange, based on past behaviors by H, Uribe has placed himself above H in terms of proper interactional decorum (e.g. “yo venía con la disposición de no contestarle, por sus insultos” ‘I had come today with the intent to not respond to you’). By snubbing H, Uribe makes clear that H’s insults are unworthy of his attention. These statements elevate the image Uribe presents of himself and, therefore, protect notions of face such as identity and self-image as related to his ability to behave appropriately in dialog.

6.3.2 Results of classification

After all 109 discourse samples were categorized as described above, the following components of rapport were identified.

Sociality rights and obligations

- Association rights- Affective involvement, example: “...nosotros no podemos trasladarle a nuestros pueblos riesgos de guerra o de hambre, eso es injusto.” We cannot pass on to our people the risk of war or hunger; that is unjust.

The utterances that fell under this component of rapport were all of the
politeness strategy “Claim common ground”. Through these statements, Uribe identifies common concerns, attitudes, and desires among the participants in the Summit. In doing so, he engages H in affective involvement, thereby addressing the rights that he claims, within the context of rapport, to close association with H.

- Association rights- Interactional involvement/detachment, example:

“...distinguidos presidentes latinoamericanos…” distinguished Latin American presidents

Interactional involvement/detachment entails the degree to which two parties associate or dissociate themselves (Spencer-Oatey, Culturally Speaking 16). The segments of discourse in this section all corresponded with the politeness strategy “Fulfill H’s want for X”. During the course of Uribe’s dialog, he employs this strategy to recognize the high status of H (that of leaders of a country) and to express his gratitude and respect towards H. In terms of politeness strategies, these actions are intended to satisfy the desires that H has for what Brown and Levinson describe as “the wants to be liked, admired, cared about, understood, listened to…” (Brown and Levinson 129). By offering formal terms of address and statements recognizing particular achievements by H, Uribe (per Brown and Levinson) attempts to satisfy H’s want for recognition and admiration. At the same time, his statements impact rapport by defining a degree of interactional involvement appropriate to a relationship of respect and admiration, one where S attends to H’s needs or wants. In other words, through these actions Uribe is able to involve, not detach or dissociate, himself from H.

Equity rights

- Autonomy/imposition
The single utterance that fell under this category was classified as “Condescend, scorn or ridicule”. In this statement, Uribe justifies what he claims is his too-long contribution to the interaction (“…los he demorado mucho…” ‘…. I have kept you too long…’), by patronizingly reminding H that he has listened to them as well (“también los he escuchado, también los he escuchado” ‘although I've also listened, I've also listened’). What starts out as an apology for an interactional infraction ends with a statement where Uribe cautions H that to find fault in his actions (as he himself has just done) is unjust, as his behaviors (listening to H) have earned him the right to commit such an infraction. In terms of rapport, he has made a statement with respect to his and H’s equity rights to an appropriate degree of imposition. Despite his opening, self-critical statement, Uribe’s extensive discourse is not actually imposing excessively on H’s time as S has committed a similarly extensive amount of time listening to H. Thus, in terms of expected reciprocity, Uribe increases the appropriate range of time-commitment for listening between S and H, thereby mitigating any perceived inappropriate imposition by Uribe on H’s time due to his longer discourse.

- Cost/benefit

This category of rapport also consisted of one statement classified as polite, specifically as “Convey S and H are cooperators”. In this statement, Uribe says: “Por favor, por favor, piensen también que tenemos derecho a pedir que el pueblo colombiano tenga una cooperación de sus hermanos y vecinos para que no se le maltrate.”

*Please, please also keep in mind that we have the right to ask that the Colombian people have the*
cooperation of its brothers and neighbors so that it is not mistreated.

Here, Uribe expresses his opinion about the cost-benefit relationship between the cost of defense of the other party, and the benefits of a relationship like the one that he supposes already exists.

Face sensitivities

Face concerns represented a varied number of (im)politeness strategies: “Condescend, scorn or ridicule”, “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”, and “Fulfill H’s want for X”. According to Spencer-Oatey, face sensitivities fall into three camps: individual identity (self-worth or self-respect), group identity (reputation), and relational identity (respect from others) (Spencer-Oatey, *Culturally Speaking* 14). In these examples, Uribe addresses his face sensitivities through statements about:

- His character in the face of fallibility (self-identity)

  Two strategies were represented among those utterances affecting rapport through face sensitivities of self-identity: “Condescend, scorn or ridicule”, and “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”. Through these statements, for example, Uribe makes claims in alignment with his self-identity by defending his character in the face of potential criticism (see examples below). By expressing what he believes to be true about himself, and how he aligns his behavior in accordance with these beliefs, he introduces into the rapport relationship the self-image that he intends to portray, thus facilitating what Spencer-Oatey describes as “the fundamental desire for others to evaluate…[him]… positively” (*Culturally Speaking* 14).

- His nation’s integrity and reputation (self-identity)
Similarly to the previous set of utterances, Uribe makes statements that positively describe the nation that he represents. In this sense, Colombia’s people, government and current state serve as an extension of Uribe’s identity, one that he particularly defends in light of contradictory information or impressions presented by H (see examples below). This is accomplished through the use of the strategy “Condescend, scorn or ridicule” whereby Uribe impacts rapport by making claims about his self-identity that contradict or disprove that which has been image assigned to his nation (and consequently, him) by H.

- The way in which H has treated him (relational identity)

Throughout Uribe’s discourse, one recurring theme was the topic of insulting. In various statements, he makes clear that he disagrees with the act of insulting and considers it inappropriate. With respect to (im)politeness strategies, this position became a series of statements that fell under the category “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect” (the negative aspect here being the negatively marked act of insulting). In some of these examples, Uribe uses this inappropriate act to claim that H’s actions (of insulting him or his country) were not in accord with his concept of self in terms of his relationship with H. In other words, given the relationship that Uribe perceives that he has with H, he does not feel that being insulted is acceptable, thus injuring his face sensitivities via his relational identity. His statements to this end make claim to this injury. Additionally, Uribe provides evidence of his chosen responses to these injuries (not responding, not insulting in return); he cites past good behavior (loyalty), and also claims vulnerability (feeling pain). These strategies thus affect rapport by protecting his relational face.
sensitivities through his attributing positive characteristics (dignity) and behaviors (not reciprocating, loyalty) to himself, as well as through the magnification of H’s infraction by declaring vulnerabilities (feeling pain) that might serve to justify the claimed injury.

- His dignity in the face of the behavior of H (group identity)

In addition to individual identity, Uribe also expresses concerns for face as they relate to his group identity. Here he uses three different strategies: “Condescend, scorn or ridicule”, “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”, and “Fulfill H’s want for X”. In terms of the utterances corresponding to the first impoliteness strategy, Uribe condescendingly chastises the group for their behavior by implying that, thus far, it has been inappropriate. Uribe sanctions the behavior of the group by suggesting the model behavior that he expects them to be following (that of adults), and in this way makes a claim about his face sensitivities via his perception of self in the context of this group of which he is a member. By implying that H has thus far not behaved in accordance with his expectations per his identity as a group member, he attempts to protect his face by communicating the face-image that he claims for himself as a member of the group exhibiting appropriate, adult behavior.

The second face-claim that Uribe makes relates to message consistency. In two separate instances, he makes this claim through the use, once, of the strategy “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”, and then through the strategy “Fulfill H’s want for X”. In the first he sanctions the group for making statements (insults) outside of the discussion at the Summit, and then changing those messages during
the Summit’s exchange. This relates to his previous statements (see the section on relational identity) where he vigorously sanctions the behavior of insulting; in this example, however, he further criticizes the fact that this duplicity of behavior limits reasonable discussions to only those at the Summit. Were the insults to cease (in this case, as he suggests, achieved through a permanent session of the Rio Group), then the type of dialog that Uribe expects of the group would be possible all of the time. This concept is repeated in a second example where he characterizes H’s behavior as appropriate, even ideal, and not the norm. In this second case, the norm in politics is inappropriate behavior (this duplicity of message or behavior) and this is something that he does not agree with. Here again, Uribe makes a claim about face as a group member by describing what he perceives to be the group that he ideally belongs to (one that behaves appropriately—does not insult or change messages in different situations) and in doing so, presents to H his self-image as reflected by desired group memberships.

**Interactional goals (transactional and relational)**

Many strategies (“Call 3d party names”, “Condescend scorn or ridicule”, “Don’t coerce H”, “Explicitly associate a 3rd party with a negative aspect”, “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”) were employed to carry out transactional goals of the conversation. The primary use of these strategies was to present evidence of past bad-acts by the FARC, to scorn their actions, and to name-call as a means of characterizing them as dangerous and a threat to Uribe’s nation. Through these repeated utterances, Uribe constructs his arguments, in accordance with his interactional goals, in defense of his nation’s military incursion into Ecuadorian territory. The interactional goal achieved though these strategies is the presentation
of evidence and the mounting of a defense in response to the accusations and statements made by H that Uribe wishes to refute.

6.4 The dynamic nature of (im)politeness strategies

The discussions thus far have shed light on the dynamic nature of (im)politeness strategies in rapport management. For example, Uribe employed the strategy “Condescend, scorn or ridicule” in an exchange where the overall purpose could be described as defensive and where he, a male, leader of a nation, interacted with other individuals of similar, political status. In this context, the strategy was used frequently (23 times in total) and impacted rapport through the stylistic domain, by creating a tone of condescension, and the discourse domain by introducing into the exchange unfavorable views or interpretations of H’s actions (i.e. scorn). Additionally, this strategy managed rapport in different instances by:

1. Making claims about sociality rights and obligations in terms of equity rights (autonomy/imposition).
2. Protecting face
3. Making claims about individual identity
4. Making claims about group identity, and
5. Carrying out transactional goals

Here we see how (im)politeness strategies behaved in different forms (domains), acted within a framework of many variables (participant’s status, distance and affect; purpose of the discourse), and affected rapport, or were used to manage it, by making claims about a speaker’s perceptions in terms of their perceived rights (sociality rights) and wants (face sensitivities and interactional goals).
For a second example, we look instead at a single utterance and explore its manifestation in discourse within the context of rapport management. The term *distinguidos* (distinguished) was repeated four times in Uribe’s discourse. All four statements referred to H as distinguished leaders or Presidents, and were classified as politeness, specifically “Fulfill H’s want for X” (as stated previously, X being H’s desire to have their status recognized). Used by Uribe to refer to his colleagues and fellow Summit participants (H), these statements acknowledged H’s status and distance, created a respectful tone (affect), and influenced rapport within the stylistic domain through the use of formal terms of address. Additionally, these utterances represent Uribe’s claims to sociality rights of association whereby he involved S and H to the degree where such exchanges of formalities were appropriate.
CHAPTER 7

RAPPORT MANAGEMENT IN THE PRESENT STUDY

The preceding analyses (sections 5 and 6) have brought this study from the identification and quantification of (im)politeness strategies in discourse, to the examination of said strategies within the context of their realization (participants and frame), to the exploration of their methods of impact to rapport (domain, markedness and on/off-record), and, finally, to how these strategies might be used to manage rapport. How, then, did all of these elements result in rapport management as carried out by President Uribe in the 2008 Summit? For this, we now unify the data and analyses from the previous discussions as a means to address the primary question posed in this study. The following will provide a generalized description of the primary changes to rapport that Uribe attempted to enact via his dialog based on the classifications and analyses of data completed thus far.

7.1 Frame of Parts I and II (participants, status difference, purpose)

The elements of participants, their status difference and the purpose of the dialog at the Summit are addressed together as they do not change from Part I to II.

Uribe’s speech in Parts I and II addressed H, a group that included presidents of member nations and their chancellors, a listening audience located in the same room as the Summit panel, and a television audience observing the event’s proceeding via live broadcast. The Summit was moderated by one of the members of the Rio Group and included, almost exclusively, the participation in the dialog of only the presidents in the group. Particular utterances by Uribe demonstrated his perception of the group as that of equals in terms of status. The general purpose of the event in which Uribe participated was of building solidarity and collaboration
among member nations for the purpose of ensuring peace and progress. In particular at this event, Uribe’s discourse came after a series of statements by other Rio Group members that strongly criticized the Colombian government’s incursion into Ecuadorian territory just days earlier.

7.2 Rapport management in Part I

Part I was defined primarily by (im)politeness strategies that impacted the transactional aspect of interactional goals. Utterances affecting transactional goals in Part I represented 83% of the total 59 utterances in the data set corresponding to this part of Uribe’s discourse. To this end, Uribe focused his rapport management efforts toward the presentation of evidence that negatively characterized the FARC via use of the impoliteness strategy “Call 3rd party names” and “Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect”, therefore indicating Uribe’s priority to the transactional, in this case evidence-presenting, element of his discourse. Other strategies used to address the transactional aspect of interactional goals were “Condescend, scorn, or ridicule”, where he again negatively referenced the FARC and gave justification for the critical nature of his government’s actions in Ecuador’s territory; and “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”, through which he pointed out inconsistencies in H’s rhetoric outside and inside the Summit, implying deception on the part of H. These four strategies, in addition to their common effect to transactional goals, also defined elements of affect and social distance. Affect was characterized most by “Call 3rd party names”, “Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect”, “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect” and “Condescend, scorn, or ridicule”. The type of affect resulting from this is one of disdain or disrespect towards a 3rd party, in this case the FARC, and towards H. In terms of
social distance, these four strategies failed to attend to face, thus creating greater social distance between S and H. In conclusion, we see that Part I of Uribe’s discourse is characterized by a general focus on the transactional nature of the exchange, accomplished through use of impoliteness strategies that define a disrespectful type of affect and that create greater social distance between Uribe and the other members of the Rio Group.

7.3 Rapport management in Part II

Part II of Uribe’s discourse changed in terms of the rapport components affected most by (im)polite strategies used. Table 5 summarizes this data.

Here, face sensitivities and sociality rights, specifically association rights, represented the component of rapport affected in 74% of the 50 total (im)politeness utterances identified in Part II.
Table 5: Components of rapport affected in Parts I and II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component of rapport</th>
<th>Part I</th>
<th>% Parts I &amp; II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociality rights and obligations: Association rights</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face sensitivities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactional goals: Transactional</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociality rights and obligations: Association rights</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociality rights and obligations: Equity rights</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face sensitivities</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactional goals: Transactional</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Face sensitivities were addressed by Uribe through use of the strategies “Condescend, scorn or ridicule”, where he made various comments that sanctioned behaviors of H or that called into question the veracity of their statements, and “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”, where he repeatedly referenced insults that particular presidents at the Summit had made against Uribe and his government. The type of affect defined by these impoliteness strategies was one of disrespect (toward H) and offense or objection (to the insults directed at him and his government). These impoliteness strategies also created greater social distance between Uribe and H by failing to attend to H’s face.

Association rights were impacted through use of the politeness strategies “Claim common ground” and “Fulfill H’s want for X”. “Claim common ground” established affective involvement (versus detachment) by making repeated claims to interests and desires that S and H had in common, per Uribe. “Fulfill H’s want for X” created interactional involvement (versus detachment) through utterances where
Uribe expressed respect and recognized H's status as leaders of a nation, thus attempting to define a relationship conducive to continued interaction. The type of affect created here was of respect and deference and social distance was decreased between Uribe and H through politeness strategies that attended to H's face and that claimed commonalities between both parties.

7.4 Changes in rapport management from Part I to II

As described previously, Uribe’s boo-ed statement in-between Parts I and II of his discourse at the Summit seemed to mark a changing point in his discourse and, thus, a change in his approach to rapport management. The preceding descriptions of both parts point to important shifts in rapport management that support this theory.

Uribe’s discourse in Part II moved away from transactional goals, from 83% of (im)polite utterances in Part I affecting this rapport component, to only 22% in Part II (see Table 5). The number of (im)polite utterances affecting face sensitivities increased from 10% of the total utterances in Part I to 38% in Part II. Similarly, association rights increased from 7% in Part I to 36% in Part II.
Table 6: Rapport components, (im)politeness strategies, affect and social distance in Parts I and II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Part I</th>
<th>Part II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transactional goals</strong></td>
<td>Face sensitivities</td>
<td>Association rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary strategies affecting rapport components</strong></td>
<td>• “Call 3rd party names”</td>
<td>• “Condescend, scorn or ridicule”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Explicitly associate 3rd party with a negative aspect”</td>
<td>• “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Condescend, scorn, or ridicule”</td>
<td>• “Fulfill H’s want for X”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Explicitly associate H with a negative aspect”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affect most prevalent</strong></td>
<td>• Disdain</td>
<td>• Disrespect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disrespect</td>
<td>• Offense/ objection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social distance</strong></td>
<td>• Increased social distance</td>
<td>• Increased social distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduced social distance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words, Uribe began his discourse at the Summit primarily exercising impoliteness strategies to meet his transactional goals (the most prevalent in his speech) by explaining his military actions into Ecuador and justifying these measures in the face of threats from the FARC. Rapport was managed, therefore, through the presentation of evidence as a means to improve the relationship between S and H, a relationship that is understood to be damaged at the start given the political outcry by many members of H prior to and at the start of the Summit. The affect established through the strategies employed in Part I was primarily that of disdain and disrespect towards H and, consequently, increased social distance between Uribe and H.

After Uribe’s boo-ed statement where he, per his own comments, behaves inappropriately and unproductively, he changes his approach in Part II. In this second extended statement, Uribe again employed impoliteness strategies, only now
for the purpose of damaging H’s face in two ways. First, he questioned the veracity
of H’s claims of wrong-dong against Colombia, thus lessening his nation’s
culpability, or damaged face in the matter; and second, he criticized members of H
for their insults against him, further boosting his face as the innocent, non-
reciprocating party. These actions created an affect of disrespect towards H and
objection to their assertions. Social distance between Uribe and H was therefore
increased through these impolite means.

Additionally, however, Uribe employed politeness strategies in the second part
of his discourse to increase the degree of involvement or closeness between himself
and H by establishing common interests and respect between them. Rapport was
thus managed in the second part of Uribe’s discourse by addressing his own face
sensitivities, at the expense of H’s, and by attempting to strengthen positive rapport
through greater involvement by claiming similarities between himself and H (their
nations) and by demonstrating respect for H. Affect thus took on an additional
respectful and deferential tone, alongside the disrespectful one created through face-
affecting impoliteness strategies in this same part of the discourse.

In conclusion, if Part II of Uribe’s discourse was, as this thesis suggests,
influenced by the boo-ed statement he made, then we can say that he attempted to
repair this damage to rapport between himself and his fellow presidents by boosting
involvement between the two parties. He did this while still defending his face
sensitivities, demonstrating that he did not abandon his intention to seek redemption
for his nation’s military actions, only that he changed his approach from one of
transactional, evidence-presenting actions, to one of relational concerns focused on
face-saving and involvement.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The present study examined two segments of extended discourse by President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia at the 2008 Rio Group Summit to discover how changes in his approach to rapport management were carried out. To this end, a comprehensive analysis of the various elements that factor into rapport management (i.e. frame, participants, purpose of the dialog) was done for the given data, and Uribe’s utterances during both parts of his discourse were classified in terms of (im)politeness strategies per Brown and Levinson (1978) and Culpeper’s (1996) models as well as in terms of the particular component of rapport impacted by said utterance, per Spencer-Oatey’s (1995) rapport management model. These analyses and classifications brought to light interesting trends and resulted in a picture of rapport management that appears to have accounted well for the change in approach to rapport management undertaken by Uribe.

8.1 Effectiveness of the analytical model in the examination of rapport management

The various elements of the analytical model addressed in this study (e.g. (im)politeness strategies, rapport components, affect, social distance) proved valuable for understanding the many facets of rapport management and how (im)polite utterances factor into those many facets. For example, a series of (im)polite utterances can, together, affect a particular component of rapport, while at the same time define a type of overall affect used by S and the social distance established between S and H. Others, however, did not. The on/off-record nature of utterances did not lend any significant insight into the topic of study and an analysis
of markedness was not possible due to lack of access to H’s reactions or responses to each one or to a short series of Uribe’s utterances.

The most valuable insight into the primary question of this study (how rapport is managed) was obtained by classifying (im)polite utterances first according to Brown and Levinson’s (1978) and Culpeper’s (1996) categories, and then second by labeling each utterance according the rapport component that it impacted. This relationship between (im)politeness strategies and components of rapport highlighted some very interesting relationships among strategy use and impact to rapport. For example, the transactional goals carried-out in Part I involved use of a variety of impoliteness strategies (i.e. “Call 3d party names”, “Condescend, scorn or ridicule”) through which information unfavorable to H was presented in the discussion. This unfavorable information was central to Uribe’s defensive stance and to his argument that his nation’s military incursion into Ecuador was justified and necessary. Additionally, the dynamic between (im)politeness strategies and rapport components facilitated the identification of general trends in different parts of discourse that could then be used to explain the way in which changes to rapport management were realized. For example, in the data we saw a primary focus in Part I on transactional and relational concerns in terms of presenting evidence or information for the purpose of constructing a defensive position in Uribe’s speech. In Part II, however, the approach to rapport management via a defensive position was defined instead by addressing Uribe’s own face concerns (at the expense of H) and by establishing a greater degree of involvement between himself and H. This switch in approach explained the changes that took place in Uribe’s discourse from Part I to Part II and identified the rapport components that defined this change.
In essence, this two-pronged approach to examining rapport management gave new meaning to the static (im)politeness strategy labels used to analyze discourse, thus adding the new dimension of purpose (rapport components) to said labels. Additionally, it is important to point out here that the (im)politeness-rapport relationship is non-linear as the data demonstrated how one impoliteness strategy was used to affect varying rapport components (i.e. “Condescend, scorn, ridicule” affecting equity rights at times and face at other times), and vice versa (i.e. equity rights affected via “Condescend, scorn, ridicule” and “Convey S and H are cooperators”). In other words, we see how the same (im)politeness strategy can be used for very different rapport-affecting purposes, as well as how different strategies are used together for a common, rapport-related goal. Lastly, while quantifying the (im)politeness strategies represented by utterances in discourse can highlight potentially significant trends, the patterns identified when the analysis includes rapport components (as seen above) can create significantly greater insights into the nature or structure of rapport management.

8.2 Future studies

Based on the preceding discussion, I propose simplifying future studies of this type to an examination of utterances in terms of their corresponding (im)politeness strategy and the affected rapport component, also including, of course, a description of context (frame and participants). Depending on the type of discourse, affect and social distance may or may not be significant to the discussion as well. However, of least, if any, importance to the examination of the (im)politeness strategy and rapport component dynamic, are the issues of markedness, domain, and on/off-record nature. They did not seem to add value to
the insights used to address the primary question of a changing approach to rapport management in this study, and do not seem to be defining factors that would alter or influence another, similar investigation of the type carried-out here.

These suggestions for future studies and the preceding observations about the nature of rapport management in action serve as one small, but nevertheless important contribution to the research and study of this phenomenon. It is fair to assume that interest by the general and academic public in how discourse, political speech in particular, is utilized to alter human relationships will continue. The present study illustrates how rapport management can serve as one very interesting and effective method of accomplishing this and, with continued analytical and investigative exercises in this area, can lead to new understanding about how rapport and its successful manipulation can yield significant changes in human and political relations.
REFERENCES


