Non-Governmental Organizations in Conflict:

Case Study Analysis in Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia

by

Margaret Diddams

A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements of the Degree
Master of Arts

Approved July 2011 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:

Amit Ron, Co-Chair
Patricia Friedrich, Co-Chair
Lili Wang

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
August 2011
ABSTRACT

In countries of conflict, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often resort to humanitarian relief. A small number of peace and conflict resolution organizations (P/CROs) engage more directly, through grassroots mediation, elite negotiation and advocacy. This thesis observes the potential for implementing such direct conflict interventions in traditional relief and development organizations.

To understand current NGO activities, I examine ten case study organizations in two countries of conflict, Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia. I analyze organizations' rhetorical presentation, their society-level engagement, strategies for intervention, and responses to persistent challenges, such as security, impartiality, collaboration and evaluation. Based on conflict study literature, I make tentative recommendations for NGOs in Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia specifically. I also propose a more general system for classifying NGO peace work: five generations of conflict intervention, each more integrated, direct, and political. Rhetorical, structural and operational changes will help organizations move toward higher generation work.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE: Shattering Contemporary Heroes</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INTRODUCTION: NEW CONFLICTS, NEW ACTORS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning from the Experts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization and the Post-Cold War Era</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rise of Global Civil Society</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) defined</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions and Design</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions and Hypotheses</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Limitations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Overview of the Thesis</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CONFLICT INTERVENTION: AN OVERVIEW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pros and Cons of Conflict</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrastate Considerations</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution of Intractable Conflicts</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Peace and Justice</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 NON-STATE ACTORS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs Sidelined in a Realist Game</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Realist-Liberalist Pact</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate Paradigms in International Relations theory</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy: Tracks One and Two</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track One and a Half</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Track Diplomacy</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carving Space: An On-going Process</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 NGOS IN CONFLICT</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding NGO Opportunities</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classifying Roles</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critiques of Humanitarian Relief Work</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Strengths in Direct Conflict Intervention</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Security Challenge</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Building, Networks and Collaboration</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 CASE STUDY: COTE D’IVOIRE AND SOMALIA</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study Justification</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia: A Long History</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia: Recommended Next Steps</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire: Peace thwarted</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire: Recommended Next Steps</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6  OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS IN TARGET COUNTRIES

- NGOs Pulling Out of Conflict: 104
- Survey of NGOs in Each Country: 107
- Rationale for Organizations Selected: 116
- Comparing Internal Dynamics: 117
- Conflict Resolution as a Programmatic Strategy: 126

7  RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

- Why Rhetoric Matters: 132
- Conflict Decontextualized: 135
- 'Peace and': The Ambiguous Catch-All: 139
- Invoking Humanity: 142
- Mitigating, Managing, Resolving, But Not Transforming?: 144
- Isolated Theories of Action: 148

8  TARGET NGOS: RESPONSES TO CONFLICT

- Responses classified: 150
- Comparisons between NGOs: 163
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comparisons between Countries</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 TARGET NGOS: ADDRESSING CHALLENGES</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of Field Staff</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality vs. Protection and Justice</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Sensitivity</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Empowerment and Program Design</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborations and Cross-Sector Partnerships</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluating Success in a Complex System</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 CONCLUSION: NGOS IN CONFLICT</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire into the Future</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotheses Re-Examined</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration, Rhetoric, and the Profession of Peacebuilding</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generations of Peace Work</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating Lasting Peace</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REFERENCES

APPENDIX

A Glossary of Terms | 243 |
B Somalia Political Timeline | 251 |
C Cote d'Ivoire Political Timeline | 256 |
D Websites of Case Study Organizations | 261 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Overall Growth Rate of NGOs by Purpose: 2002-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Organizations Examined in this Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Proposed Model for Balancing Peace and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Actors in Track Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Types of Conflict Intervention Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Multi-Dimensional Model of NGO Conflict Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Intervention Strategies Expanded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Survey of 53 NGOs Currently Operating in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Survey of 30 NGOs Currently Operating in Cote d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Case Study Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Basic Facts and Figures about Target Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Values and Objectives of Target Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Comparing Activities of Care International across Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Relationship between Conflict Management, Resolution and Transformation</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Spectrum of Conflict Response</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Systems Thinking in Peace Work</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 The Security Triangle</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Map of Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Cote d'Ivoire and Its Neighbors</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Society-Level Engagement of Case Study NGOs</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Intervention Strategy of Case Study NGOs</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Society-Level Engagement by Organization</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 Intervention Strategy by Organization</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5 Relationship between Society-Level Engagement and Intervention Strategy</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6 Society-Level Engagement and Intervention Strategy by Country</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1 Operationalizing Conflict Sensitivity</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SHATTERING CONTEMPORARY HEROES

Over the past half-century, transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become a powerful force in global civil society. The number of such formalized groups of global change-makers has exploded, from fewer than 1,000 following World War II to as many as 63,000 today (Karns and Mingst 2004; “Yearbook of International Organizations” 2011). They are addressing social injustice in almost every country in the world, touching on almost every sociopolitical issue, including poverty, disease, education, contemporary slavery, minority rights, and environmental destruction.

Some optimistic observers see this era as a coming-of-age of global civil society; “public opinion has become the second superpower” (Barnes 2005, p. 13). Where revolutionary spirit was once insulated, contemporary communication technology facilitates transnational networks of like-minded radicals. Progressive, people-centered activism has increasingly demanded structural change, and slowly, institutions are beginning to listen. NGOs have acquired an increasingly prominent role, both ‘at the table' and 'on the ground', in service-delivery, advocacy, and information sharing. Through intergovernmental organizations, like the United Nations, thousands of NGOs have consultative status, attend conferences and advise on treaties (Reinalda and Verbeck 2001). Certain movements have been particularly successful, capturing international imagination and changing global policy. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines was a game changer through the 1990s, resulting in an international treaty to ban land
mines, and a 1997 Nobel Peace Prize recognizing the feat of global organizing. NGOs saw similar success in campaigns for a UN Climate Convention, the International Criminal Court, HIV/AIDS awareness, and debt reduction in developing countries (Barnes 2005).

While the growth of non-governmental organizations is certainly a positive trend, it is distressingly romantic to believe that their arrival signals the end of global injustice or the pre-eminence of grassroots democracy. As with anything formalized and commodified, the passion of spontaneous activism, once packaged in a globally competitive institution, loses much of its authenticity. The profound pluralism suggested by the sheer number of transnational NGOs crumples before the reality that the eight largest U.S.-based NGOs, including household names like CARE and World Vision, make up 80% of all U.S. aid to Africa (Anheier 1990). Far from an idealized democracy, NGOs grapple with an oligarchy of major players, external pressures from donors, governments and intergovernmental actors, as well as internal hierarchies and power struggles. NGO critic William DeMars (2005) explains, “The tendency by scholars to credit utopian premises based on mundane practices reflects the self-understanding of NGOs themselves” (p. 4). As the only significant private actors in international good-deed doing, it comes easily for NGOs to uncritically assume their work is ground-breaking and laudable.

DeMars take on NGOs mirrors my own. Though he has written numerous articles and at least two books lambasting the organizations, he also describes himself as an ardent supporter of their work, in humble gratitude to their service.
It is precisely because these organizations have so much social and political potential that is it necessary to understand and rethink the challenges and traps they face.

Many NGOs retell touching origin stories to evoke the initial energy that inspired their work. One goliath, CARE International, has perhaps the best known, most quintessentially American account. U.S. Army surplus food parcels were shipped to starving families in Europe, in a show of solidarity with Allied victims of war. As John F. Kennedy remarked, “Every CARE Package is a personal contribution to the world peace our nation seeks. It expresses America’s concern and friendship in a language all people understand.” (qtd. in care.org)

Like child sponsorships or slave redemptions, CARE packages are heart-warming but hollow, an easy way to engage donors without making any serious impact on either world peace or social justice (see Anderson 1996; Smith 2004; Bales 2005).

Fortunately, NGOs have matured since the 1950s. As other international actors recognize NGOs' presence as more than flash phenomenon, “growing concern for the effectiveness and accountability of NGOs raises questions among donors and NGOs themselves as to whether NGOs are really working to solve underlying problems, or are serving as 'Band-Aids'” (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001, p. 176). In response, organizational managers have begun strategizing for the long-term, scrutinizing broader implications of their work. Of course, there are still organizations that deliver food aid, rely on child sponsorships for millions of dollars, and fund slaves' redemption. But for the most part, NGOs have declared their resignation from humdrum service as “ladles in the global soup kitchen”
Instead, most globalized development organizations have committed to *ending* global poverty, a goal perhaps popularized by the UN Millennium Development Goals which carry enormous sway among NGO funders. A brief survey reveals widespread commitment. CARE self-identifies as “dedicated to ending poverty”. ActionAid is “ending poverty together”, while Lutheran World Relief works for “structures and policies that will address the root causes of poverty”. Oxfam joins the chorus: “We believe we can end poverty and injustice, as part of a global movement for change”.

These organizations have been in the field for several decades now. They have seen injustice and experienced the frustration of failed programs. Staff have witnessed reoccurring need, stagnant health, wilting economies, and persistent illiteracy, even in the face of seemingly effective service delivery. In many ways, through rhetoric, programming and internal research, NGOs are pursuing methods to uproot social inequalities, stopping them not just for one child, today, but for all children, forever. The poverty-alleviation rhetoric is too lofty to be believable (with 1.7 billion people in absolute poverty, the problem won't disappear tomorrow), but at least attention to long-term outcomes helps staff and donors focus on methods to achieve structural – rather than piecemeal – changes.

Nonetheless, this shift toward long-term poverty reduction has largely failed to reach the one area where structural changes are, arguably, most needed: conflict. Research is clear about the connection between poverty and violent conflict. Poverty – particularly relative poverty, or material and income inequality
between groups of people – contributes to the presence of violence (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2009). According to “Relative deprivation” theory, when people cannot meet their most basic needs, and neither government nor civil society provide an adequate peaceful outlet for expressing these needs, people become frustrated and often violent (Gurr 1968).

Similarly, violent conflict reinforces poverty. This takes no stretch of the imagination. During war, agricultural losses, disrupted markets, and human flight cause famine, dehydration and disease – indirect factors often more deadly than the violence itself (Steward 1998). Social and political structures crumble, infrastructure, such as roads, water systems and hospitals, are destroyed, unemployment rates skyrocket, and education falls by the wayside while people prioritize immediate survival. As development theorist Paul Collier (2007) quips, violent conflict is “development in reverse”, decades of aid, derailed in moments.

Thus, when NGOs resoundingly commit themselves to ending poverty, it only makes sense that ending conflict would appear high on their formidable to-do lists. Yet, basic humanitarian relief remains the dominant strategy of NGOs operating in countries of conflict (Stein 2001; Stewart 1998). This includes “airlifting food, clean water, and sanitation equipment to distressed populations, establishing shelter for homeless victims, providing repairs for salvageable structures, and the prevention, containment, and treatment of life-threatening diseases” (Aall 2009, p. 5). Organizations perform community-level triage, responding like fire fighters, focused on keeping the daily death toll as low as possible.
Far from ending violence, emergency relief exacerbates local conditions, often extending the trajectory of conflict (Abley 1997; Anderson 1996; Stewart 1998). As researchers in India and Pakistan discovered, “no matter how much NGOs tell themselves that their intervention is 'humanitarian', there is no escaping the politics of the current situation” (Butalia 2004, p. 114). Emergency aid often causes violence to spread across geographic space and social strata (see chapter 4). At the very best, relief organizations function like doctors in a boxing ring, stitching up society just enough to enable continued violence and reverse development.
CHAPTER 1: NEW CONFLICTS, NEW ACTORS

Learning from the Experts

In popular dialogue about NGOs in countries of conflict, relief is typically seen as the nobler of two options: provide aid or get out. Whether an organization remains at the scene or evacuates, it typically continues to educate global civil society about the situation, makes pleas for financial support, and urges (inter)governmental actors to 'do something'. To the average donor, distanced from the violence, unaware of the complexity of local politics, this level of action can seem brilliant, brave, even hopeful. Aall (2009) explains, often NGOs in conflict are not examined critically because if they are at least meeting some basic need, they are doing more than we could have expected, helping a population so vulnerable at so great a risk. In theory, it seems reasonable to ask, “shouldn't the rest of the world simply appreciate the effort?” (ibid, p. 24).

A small, but growing number of organizations advocate a much broader range of activities. These groups, termed “peace and/or conflict resolution organizations” (P/CROs), are as self-conscious about ending violent conflict as generalized transnational NGOs are about ending poverty (Gidron 2002). P/CROs, like the Search for Common Ground, the Carter Center, the Community of Sant'Egidio, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, or the Crisis Management Institute, focus almost exclusively on methods of conflict prevention, resolution, and transformation.

Often, actors in conflict assume an unstated division of labor: the public sector maintains responsibility for violence prevention and peace-making, while
the private sector responds to immediate needs such as disease, drought and displacement. P/CROs fundamentally challenge this assertion (Gidron 2002; Bartoli 2009). These groups raise local consciousness, open dialogue, monitor, advocate, mediate, negotiate, and facilitate reconciliation. They function like civilian diplomats, pursuing resolution and peace-building, balancing violence mitigation with social justice. Aware that ignoring political realities doesn't make them disappear, P/CROs abandon lip service to 'neutrality', and forge headlong into sociopolitical conflict.

Such organizations are in the minority, but lessons learned from their activities can be applied elsewhere. Conflicts are complex and multilayered. No magic bullet will end violence; only holistic peacebuilding, occurring at multiple dimensions at all levels of society, will produce lasting peace. As a result, there is no shortage of work to be done in the field of peace and conflict resolution and the few P/CROs cannot do it alone. Since generalized development NGOs have committed to long-term solutions for structural social change, strategic conflict transformation fits naturally among their objectives. These transnational giants bring enormous capacity to the work. In addition to trillions of dollars, they have sociopolitical resources aplenty: connections with local civil society, approval of the local government, relevant cultural and historical knowledge, established country offices and staff, well-worn systems of delivery, and vast international access to donors and advocates. To squander these resources on emergency aid is an enormous loss for the promise of world peace.

As traditional development NGOs begin to include peace work in their
repertoire of responses to conflict, they can learn from the pitfalls and success of P/CROs. This thesis will draw on such lessons, explored in a growing literature, to suggest new roles for NGOs in conflict. In the following chapters, I consider what NGOs are doing now – to what extent they are already involved in conflict transformation – and how they can expand and improve their efforts. In particular, I examine practical challenges, such as legitimacy, accountability and security, struggles experienced by all NGOs, but particularly salient for organizations 'doing' conflict resolution. These research questions will soon be elaborated in greater detail; first I define parameters and motivators underlying this research.

**Globalization and the Post-Cold War Era**

Many of the same factors responsible for the explosive growth of NGOs have also contributed to new forms of conflict and injustice (Karns and Mingst 2004). Globalization seemed at first promising to many. Economic integration would produce social and political cooperation, rendering antagonistic political allegiances irrelevant (Renner 1999). These hopes have not come to fruition. Instead, globalization has created multilayered inequalities between political elites in the global North and South, and within countries across economic classes. Because globalization “entails severe dislocation and social pain, and because it is experienced as a challenge to local control and democratic accountability, economic globalization tears at the very fabric of many societies”, a tragic phenomenon cast lightly in the witticism, “Jihad vs. McWorld” (ibid, p. 46).

In recent decades, the state has become both more and less relevant
On one hand, it has lost coercive and material power on the international stage, giving way to new global actors like intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). On the other hand, the state has more referent, symbolic power through “localization” – nationalism and xenophobia (Renner 1999). As communication and transportation technologies improve, and economic, political and environmental crises force global migrations, diverse cultures are interacting more than ever. Even while free-trade agreements permit unrestrained commerce across borders, protecting multinational corporations and the world’s largest economies, heightened border security prevents border-crossing by migrants and refugees. Such policies, coupled with exploitative economic practices, like substandard wages and natural resources extraction, have worsened both relative and absolute poverty in developing countries.

During the Cold War, stand-off between the U.S. and the Soviet Union polarized allies; conflicts were characterized by inter-state competition and non-direct engagement (Bariyo 2007). The end of the Cold War initiated what is, by all accounts, a new era of civil strife (Mawlawi 1993; Kriesberg 2009; Roucounas 2000; Gleditsch 2009). Inter-state violence, with clear enemies and explicit objectives, has been replaced by intra-state chaos. Even this distinction is muddled: when sovereignty is contested and lies at the heart of a dispute, ‘inter’ and ‘intra’ become highly contested terms (Bartoli 2009). Moreover, dynamics in each country affect neighboring countries, via trade and migration. As a result, civil conflicts quickly become regional conflicts, mired in local, national and
transnational politics. Suffice it to say that conflict has gotten more complicated. While the daily death toll hasn't necessarily increased, conflicts have become more intractable, habitually ingrained in civilians’ way of life (Mack 2008). According to Bariyo (2007), “these intra-state conflicts do not only retard development in a country, but are the biggest root causes of human suffering in Africa” (p. 28).

According to UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, conflict in Africa, with the highest density of conflicts in the world today, can be traced to political and cultural legacies of colonialism, contemporary intervention by global superpowers, “winner-take-all” political victories, abusive governance in weak states, widespread violations of human rights, high rates of unemployment, competition for land, and the international arms trade (Annan 2004). Bariyo (2007) describes a useful framework for categorizing causes of conflict. Economic factors, the first and most prominent of the four causal categories, includes large numbers of unemployed youth available to fight, frustration with inadequate government, environmental degradation, and profiteering from war, through the sale of weapons, the extraction of unguarded natural resources, or the distribution of food at exorbitant prices. These economic factors are most conducive to grassroots-level violence prevention, strategic development and (inter)national advocacy, and best addressed pre-emptively. Social factors are similarly amenable to grassroots-level resolution, but require mediation, dialogue and awareness-raising. These issues include ethnic marginalization, religious differences, and xenophobia, and can be addressed in conflict prevention if actors
are attentive to micro-conflicts, or disputes at the community level. Both political and external factors will require much higher level mediation and negotiation, at national and international scales. Political factors include repression, lack of transparency, or wasteful governance; external factors can be regional, such as border crossing of refugees and small arms, or fully international, such as exploitation by multinational corporations. In most modern conflicts, all four factors are at play, with varied importance depending on the level of society and the stage of the conflict.

While Annan and Bariyo present potential explanations for individual conflicts, Renner (1999) explains why intractable civil conflicts have increased globally. Worldwide, at least 150 million people are unemployed and another 900 million underemployed, which foments protest, instability and criminality. Growing disparities in income, employment, job security, health, and education lead to institutionalized marginalization and oppression; modern communication technologies permit heightened awareness and resentment of global disparities. These processes are further reinforced by flagrant rights violations, such as migrant detention, sex slavery, and torture, which capitalize on economic and political vulnerabilities. While environmental factors, such as poor land management and resource scarcity, have always incited conflict, environmental degradation is now much more globalized through climate change and its subsequent impacts, including natural disasters, drought, floods, famine, and disease. Local economies that depend on natural resource extraction, farming, and land ownership are generally most affected by environmental deterioration;
because the effects are disjointed from their root causes, environmentally-inspired conflict is most likely to operate locally.

Understanding the complexity of these causal factors is essential in order to appropriately respond. We are no longer faced with a 'clash of civilizations', as in World War II or the Cold War, in which ideologies divided enemies and states called all the shots. Today's peace-making means more than strategic conversation with national diplomats. The complexity of today's social dynamics requires conscious peacebuilding at all levels, along all dimensions. In the oft-quoted words of John Paul Lederach, “there is need to build peace from the bottom up, the top down, and the middle out” (qtd. in Fischer 2006, p. 20).

The sundry causes of conflict – their complexity, interrelation, and derivation from dominant forces in contemporary society – make conflict resolution seem next to impossible. States, intergovernmental organizations and multinational corporations wield enormous fiscal, military and legal power. It is easy to ask, how could NGOs, puny by comparison, without comparable legal stature or protections, possibly contribute to structural changes at this level? The question is equally valid in the negative: how could they not? Renner (1999) presents NGOs with a challenge: “At the threshold of the twenty-first century, we thus face a choice: will we be overwhelmed by an endless string of internal wars capable of devastating entire countries and perhaps even reigniting interstate confrontations, or will we build the foundations for lasting peace?” (p. 8).
The Rise of Global Civil Society

The same trends of globalization and localization responsible for magnified human suffering have also contributed to a burgeoning civil society. Formalized structures governing human behavior are complemented by a “web of social relations that exist in the space between the state, the market (activities with the aim of extracting profit), and the private life of families and individuals” (Barnes 2005, p. 7). Although NGOs are one major component of global civil society, the concept also includes loosely defined social movements, media outlets, private foundations and philanthropy, professional associations, trade unions, educational and research institutes, political parties, chambers of commerce, religious institutions, and cultural associations (Barnes 2005; Karns and Mingst 2004).

These groups emerge as a response to failures of the state and market to secure human well-being (Anheier 1990). Even while asymmetries in corporate capitalist markets exclude and exploit the global majority, states increasingly protect and default to market interests. Institutional inertia of both social structures has led many people to lose faith in their ability to provide justice. One strain of analysis suggests that citizens have reached a tipping point beyond which the magnitude of global inequalities are no longer acceptable byproducts of contemporary society. As awareness spreads about global injustice, people begin to feel “solidarity in the face of common threats” (Barnes 2005, p. 13). Through social movements, transnational advocacy networks, and civil society organizations, citizens are demanding an audience on the international stage.
This trend has positive implications for peacebuilding at both local and global scales. Private associational life supports a robust democratic process (Gidron 2002). Through discourse, political debates are removed from the domain of ideology, granted nuance and rational analysis. Civil society organizations prevent the outbreak of violence between a government and its peoples, serving “as a go-between for citizens and the political system by articulating preferences and by contributing to the implementation of policies” (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001, p. 152). Multiple, overlapping associations also smooth tensions between social groups delineated by traits such as race, ethnicity, tribe, or religion.

Norms that arise from social discourse motivate and contextualize human behavior, creating what Edwards (2004) describes as the “good society”, governed by principles such as “love and forgiveness, truth and beauty, courage and compassion” (p. 37). Civil society organizations reinforce values of service and solidarity, altruistic behavior toward one's neighbors, and goodwill among humans as a collective, confronted with universal perils of birth, death and oppression. Advocacy, person-to-person organizing, and professional dialogue have advanced theories for explaining and improving social reality. The construct of human rights, for example, has gained currency among state and interstate organizations because a collection of NGOs, activists, lawyers, and academics, among others, promoted the concept. Today, labeling a policy or practice a 'violation of human rights' carries strong moral and judicial implications. Similarly, norms about non-violence, trust and cooperation inspire, and are further reinforced by, civil peace efforts:
All throughout human history, one finds lofty rhetoric about peace, realism about the terrible impact of warfare, and skepticism about war's merits. What is different in our age is that civil society – peace movements and other citizens’ groups – appears to be playing a far more important role than in the past, trying to subject security policy to greater public scrutiny and to wrest it from the narrow control of military bureaucracies and defense intellectuals. (Renner 1999, p. 29).

Even in light of these positive moral outcomes, Edwards (2004) cautions against uncritical optimism about civil society. Criminal gangs and terrorist organizations are the most obvious proof that civil society does not necessarily promote virtuous citizenship. These marginal organizations mirror less extreme but equally self-interested groups in the mainstream. Though many associations in civil society arise in response to social inequalities, they also reproduce the same circumstances they seek to uproot. Unequal access to income and education, for example, impacts who can participate, to what extent, and with what degree of power. Discriminatory beliefs and practices, based on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or sexual orientation, are reproduced in social interaction as powerfully as they are in political and economic exchange. Even in theoretical ideal, egalitarian civil society can lead to decreased political participation and eventually, a collapse of the state, “exactly the correlation that has been observed for contemporary America, where associational life is in danger of becoming a substitute for politics” (ibid, p. 43).

Ultimately, the only truism is pluralism. For every issue, there will be voices of favor and dissent: pro-choice organizations and pro-lifers; LGBTQ rights' groups and religious conservatives; pro-immigrant groups and border security proponents; 'free'- and 'fair'- trade organizations; capitalists and socialists;
doves and hawks. This third space between the state and the market should be populated, but not romanticized. It is essential that individuals have outlets through which to associate, organize and self-express; this value of civil society cannot be denied. However, because civil society organizations are as likely to do harm as good, analysis about these organizations should be as critical and discerning as studies of the other two sectors.

**Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Defined**

The rapid proliferation of NGOs has been a dominant factor in the emergence of civil society. According to the Union of International Associations, there are at least 63,000 international NGOs in 300 countries, “in every field of human endeavor” (2011). The number of national NGOs – organizations operating within only one country – is easily in the billions. Nepal has an estimated 15,000 NGOs; Russia, 277,000; India, 3.3 million; and in Kenya, at least 250 new organizations are created every year (Hudock 2009; Lee 2010).

These organizations have immense resources and capacity. The international NGO sector rakes in over $1 trillion annually, and “employs over 19 million people, not to mention countless volunteers” (Hall-Jones 2006). Approximately 3,200 NGOs have consultative status with the U.N., meaning they can report to and advise various commissions and conferences of the IGO. While local and national NGOs exist everywhere, most international NGOs headquarter in the global North and receive funding from governments, corporations, philanthropic foundations and individuals. They form around a vast range of issue
areas, including “major social cleavages such as class, religion, region, language or ethnicity, or... progressive goals such as the environment, human rights and development, or... conservative goals such as opposition to abortion, family planning and immigration” (Karns and Mingst 2004; p. 219). Table 1.1 displays the number of NGOs by issue area in 2002 and 2003. After 'defense', 'law, policy and advocacy' is the fastest growing area of NGO activity, and reflects organizations' aforementioned commitment to ending poverty at its root.

Table 1.1: Overall Growth Rate of NGOs by Purpose: 2002-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Recreation</td>
<td>3,531</td>
<td>3,666</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3,077</td>
<td>3,212</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>12,161</td>
<td>12,387</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>2,869</td>
<td>2,925</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Development</td>
<td>6,303</td>
<td>6,434</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development, Infrastructure</td>
<td>14,880</td>
<td>15,221</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, Policy and Advocacy</td>
<td>6,713</td>
<td>7,090</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>2,945</td>
<td>3,082</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>2,780</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>57,596</td>
<td>59,003</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Many studies have attempted to answer the question, Who are these actors? Larger organizations are generally well-known, for example: the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Greenpeace International, Doctors without Borders (MSF), Oxfam, Save the Children, World Vision, or Catholic Relief Services. However, defining the boundaries of the 'NGO' label is
ininitely more challenging.

Technically, the label 'non-governmental organization' includes anything beyond the immediate control of governments. In most definitions of 'NGO', freedom from state control is the first and most rigorously explored characteristic. However, as discussed in the previous section, 'civil society' and 'NGO' are far from synonymous. There are innumerable billions of civil society organizations. Imagine trying to count all the colleges, research institutes, trade unions, churches, synagogues, mosques, political parties, music groups, book clubs, and knitting circles in the world! Civil society is a vast concept that encompasses a wide range of social activities, none of which are connected to the government.

Broader definitions of global civil society have even included multinational corporations (Karns and Mingst 2004; Reinalda, Arts and Noortmann 2001; Scherer, Palazzo and Baumann 2006). Clearly, these groups do not operate with the same principles and objectives as NGOs. Thus, 'NGO' must exclude both governmental agencies as well as profit-oriented businesses (Seibel and Anheier 1990). In literature on non-profit organizations in the U.S., the notion of a 'third sector' has become a popular descriptor for a category of fiscal activities distinct from private enterprise and government. Gulati (2001) describes the fundamental difference between these three sectors. Governments rely on public action to produce public goods, while private enterprise uses private actions to produce goods enjoyed privately. The nonprofit sector – in idealized theory – combines private action with public benefit.

Ropers (2002) adds that NGOs, by definition, must be voluntarily
associated. Membership or employment with an NGO may not be the result of de facto inclusion, as in a state or union, but must be the choice of free individuals. NGOs may not: “contribute to the professional or leisure interests of its members or target groups”, have political ties to any one party or candidate, or “discriminate against anyone on the grounds of his or her ethnicity, religion, gender, etc.” (ibid, p. 98).

All of these definitions fall apart upon closer examination. As discussed previously, civil society can work to reduce its discriminatory practices, but cannot completely escape the reproduction of discrimination and inequality so long as these factors are present in society. Similarly, to claim that NGOs lack political affiliation is like saying an object lacks color; politics are inescapable qualifiers. NGOs function to achieve sociopolitical modifications to the structure, function or condition of society. This necessarily means NGOs are political – politically motivated, affiliated and influenced (Petras 1990). Strategic NGOs pursue desired political outcomes; ineffective NGOs ignore or deny their political implications.

Defining NGOs by the exclusion of groups that serve interests of its members seems laughable in light of current trends in development work. The “weekly per-diem expenses” of international consultants, “never mind their fees, often amount to more than average annual per capita incomes” in the local community (Cooke 2004, p. 50). The “trappings” of the contemporary development worker include expensive hotels, “four-wheel drive, kits of sterile hypodermics... education, healthcare and status” (ibid). As the third sector is
mainstreamed, international development work becomes increasingly lucrative, in material and reputational terms. It is hardly possible to argue that these organizations do not exist, at least in part, to serve the interests of its employees.

Even the basic definition of an NGO – anything that is neither government nor profit-oriented business – disintegrates before classifications such as BINGO (business-friendly international NGO), BONGO (business-oriented NGO), CONGO (commercial NGO), QUANGO (quasi-governmental NGO), and GONGO (governmentally-organized NGO) (Lewis 2001; DeMars 2005). Trends in non-profit activity, such as social enterprise, the generation of revenue through traditional market-based competition, or contracted service, the delivery of social goods funded and directed by the government, further erode the illusion of an isolated 'third sector'. In practice, Seibel and Anheier (1990) explain, “third sector organizations are different in relative, not in absolute terms: they may be less means-rational and less formal, and they may put more emphasis on solidarity and direct exchanges than do other actors”, but they are still driven by universal motivators such as power and money (p. 12).

Criticism of NGOs has become a common subject of academic and popular literature. In 2001, during academics' early sobering from idealistic hope for NGOs, Reinalda and Verbeek wrote: “we reject the common idea in the literature on non-governmental organizations that NGOs are progressive, critical groups of activists who refuse to take part in common rules of the game, and who aim to fundamentally change policies in a certain field” (p. 148). Since then, criticism of NGO hypocrisy, corruption and co-optation have come from
numerous sources (Anderson 1996; Krisberg 2009; Renner 1999). Reimann (2005) identifies five common themes of critique: NGOs’ “performance and actual effectiveness; accountability issues; issues of autonomy; commercialization; and ideological and / or political interpretations of their rising influence” (p. 37). While NGOs are not inherently flawed, they face many external and internal pressures that promote hasty pursuit of warm fuzzies over measured steps toward lasting justice. Because of their tendencies and limitations, Reimann advocates for a “tempered” role of NGOs in the international sphere, in which they are neither excluded nor exclusive players in development work and conflict resolution. I agree that NGOs are problematic as currently constructed, and should never replace existing actors, but I maintain optimism that, if managed the right way, these organizations could transform social relations, leading the way to a peaceful future.

Research Questions and Design

Questions and Hypotheses

This introductory chapter describes an opportunity for NGO innovation. Over the last fifty years of growth, NGOs have reached a certain level of maturity. Many have moved beyond band-aids and soup kitchens to more aggressive strategies for poverty alleviation, social justice, and peace. Partly in response to evidence that humanitarian relief exacerbates violence, a growing body of literature has grappled with new roles for NGOs in conflict. The post-Cold War era of complex, intractable violence may be just the moment for increased NGO
involvement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, since an overview of civil society reveals that good intentions are not good enough, it is essential to critically examine: How might NGOs contribute to multilateral efforts to end violent conflict and generate long-term sustainable peace, while reducing the negative impacts of their work? This is the driving question in my research.

Lederach (2001) explains that effective conflict transformation must operate at all levels of society. However, the material and social limitations of NGOs suggest that states, IGOs and NGOs may need to divide labor in conflict response (Bauer 1990). In the absence of other international actors, as is the case in various intractable conflicts in Africa, NGOs must determine where they can be most productive, to maximize impact given their limitations. I hypothesize that the dispersion of power in society dictates the social level at which NGOs will be most effective. If power is dispersed – if a country in civil strife lacks a central government, has multiple warring factions, and violence spread over a large geographic area – I would expect to see NGO activity at the grassroots level. However, if power and conflict are centralized, primarily reliant on elite decision-making, NGO involvement would occur at the level of national elites.

Just as NGOs must choose the level at which they operate, INGOs must prioritize which conflicts demand their intervention. Many of the largest, most transnational organizations are engaged in multiple countries around the world, focused on issue areas rather than particular geographic regions. Some abiding principles must determine when and where they choose to intervene. Two factors tug at the heart. On the one hand, countries with intractable conflicts are
compellingly broken, in great need of external support. Local communities have
internalized violence through generations of trauma, and frequently, traditional
actors in the international community have abandoned these regions as 'hopeless'.
Alternatively, these intractable conflicts also tend to be the most dangerous, least
stable, and least supportive of civil society; NGOs may wish to avoid these
enormous security risks. Though both factors are worth considering, they are
reactionary, born of empathy and fear, rather than strategic planning about the
relative strengths and weaknesses of NGOs in conflict.

Rupesinghe (1995) offers another consideration. Through case study
analysis, he found that NGOs most successfully impact conflict as preventative
peacemakers, responding thoughtfully to the very earliest stages of conflict. More
than distributing aid, Rupesinghe argues, NGOs in the critical first moments of
conflict should focus on “empowerment of people to build the will and
mechanisms to hold governments and guerrillas accountable” (327). He provides
examples of NGOs’ effective early response in the Philippines and El Salvador.
Based on this research, I hypothesize that direct NGO involvement is most
advantageous in the earliest stages of conflict. Thus, I would expect to see NGOs
in early stages of conflict working actively to resolve, mediate, negotiate, and
distill violence. In violent conflicts years old, I anticipate NGOs would be more
engaged in emergency relief, rather than direct intervention.

One of the primary advantages of an NGO, at least in theory, is its
closeness to the grassroots community. Through years of service delivery or
grassroots-level peace work, NGOs develop expertise about power relations and
social conditions (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001). Typically, reports from countries of conflict provide broad brush strokes on the human condition, such as the number of deaths or the spread of disease in refugee camps. NGOs are uniquely positioned to tell more nuanced narratives about the way particular groups in society are affected. For example, Butalia (2004) suggests that NGOs can illuminate the impact of conflict on women, ensure that women are included in discussions of conflict, and build the capacity of local women's groups. This fits recent trends in international development focused on women's empowerment (Anderson and Larsen 1998).

NGOs' role in speaking for vulnerable populations in conflict may extend to other groups in society as well, including racial, linguistic, religious and sexual minorities. I hypothesize that this is the area of conflict response in which NGOs are most advantaged compared to state and interstate actors. If this hypothesis is correct, NGOs should be constantly atune to the conditions, needs and inclusion of vulnerable populations. More than empty talk or meaningless mention of minorities, NGOs should have strategic plans to support and advocate for minority populations.

Of course, not all organizations will have same priorities and decision-making strategies. The unique structure, history and social context of an NGO influence its behavior choices (Lewis 2001). No matter how carefully academic theories analyze and advance roles for NGOs in conflict, organizations will grapple with operational realities that render academic theory irrelevant. Organizational parameters, such as size, country of origin, mission, funding
sources, and external partnerships, all impact the nature of an organization's involvement in conflict. As more research investigates the relationship between these factors and conflict responses, NGO managers can better craft their organizational structure based on the functions they hope to achieve.

The diversity of organizational rhetoric is one clear reminder that NGO strategies are only loosely tied to academic theory. For example, though 'conflict transformation' has gained currency in academic literature, seen as a turning point in peace studies (Lederach 1998; Howard 2001; Lindred et al. 2008), I hypothesize that organizations continue to use older terms such as 'conflict resolution'. Rhodes (2009) argues that the practical distinction between these seemingly disparate theories is insignificant. Given that that organizations are even less connected to peace studies literature than intergovernmental organizations, I doubt the theoretical debate manifests in NGO activities.

Organizations use a wide range of terminology to describe local conditions (e.g. conflict, violence, crisis, emergency) and organizational response (e.g. conflict resolution, conflict prevention, conflict mediation, conflict transformation, reconciliation, peace advocacy, peace building). These rhetorical choices reflect: the nature of an organization's activities 'on the ground', the organization's political and social context, and its expectations about the interests of donors and partners. However, rhetorical choices are more than a metric for an organization's beliefs. They also double back on an organization, influencing how NGO staff conceive of their work, with whom the NGO connects and partners, and how future activities are selected and prioritized. In order to understand the
cause and effect of NGO rhetoric, I assess the frequency, meaning, context, and connotations of these terms, and consider how they might influence an organization's choice of activities.

Finally, to extend the analysis of organizational reality, I consider how NGOs respond to the challenges of conflict intervention. Although direct NGO involvement in conflict resolution is certainly not impossible as realist theorists like Kenneth Waltz contend (as described, for example, in Rutherford 2003), NGOs do face many limitations. Unlike external state and intergovernmental actors, few NGOs have armed forces to ensure security of their staff (Avant 2007). Incidents, such as the killing of 18 peacekeeping soldiers in Somalia in 1993 or 6 aid workers in Chechnya in 1996, have heightened anxiety about the safety of any perceived partiality in conflict zones.

Whereas state and interstate organizations have formal (or 'hard') power, NGOs' power is 'soft', based in information, expertise, and local legitimacy (Karns 2004). This means access to elite political figures must be earned, and is not immediately accessible. NGOs struggle to generate leverage internally and through international organizations in order to facilitate policy changes and negotiations (Gidron 2002). In order to amplify their power and rebuke domestic control, it is frequently observed that cooperation among NGOs, and with government and intergovernmental actors, is essential for effective service delivery, advocacy or mediation (Bakker 2001).

Finally, NGOs, in all issue areas, but particularly in conflict resolution, struggle to evaluate their work. Whereas governmental organizations have clear
constituencies, and corporations, clear objectives, an NGO must define for itself whom it represents and for what purpose. For example, there is often a balance to be struck between the value of conflict as a method of achieving social justice, and the destructive impact of conflict on individuals and society (Bariyo 2007). The complexity of conflicts' causes and actors further exacerbates the struggle to define organizational success (Karns 2004). Many peace and conflict resolution NGOs, including the Carter Center and the Search for Common Ground, have dedicated entire research departments to crafting evaluation strategies. I briefly explore the extent to which generalized transnational organizations have taken up this challenge.

Many of the aforementioned questions and hypotheses address the gap between NGO reality and potential in peace work. Using lessons extracted from the peace and conflict resolution organizations (P/CROs) and a growing body of literature on NGOs in conflict, I compare theoretical strategies and observed behavior, with suggestions for further engagement in long-term peacebuilding.

To summarize for clarity, my primary research question is:

How might NGOs contribute to multilateral efforts to end violent conflict and generate long-term sustainable peace, while reducing the negative impacts of their work?

I am testing three hypotheses:

1. The dispersion of power in society dictates the social level at which NGOs operate.
2. NGO intervention is most direct during the earliest stages of conflict.

3. NGOs prioritize the needs of vulnerable populations such as women and racial minorities.

I will explore the following four sub-questions:

1. How do organizational parameters (such as size, country of origin, mission, etc.) impact the nature of an organization's involvement in conflict?

2. How do NGOs represent their work to donors and constituents? What terms do they use to describe local conditions and their conflict responses? How do these linguistic choices shape organizational behavior?

3. How are NGOs addressing continued challenges such as:
   - Dangerous conditions for unarmed aid workers?
   - Lack of formal legitimacy as negotiators?
   - Collaboration with state and other non-state actors?
   - Balance between impartiality and defense of human rights?
   - Evaluation of effectiveness given complex systems?

4. What gaps exist between NGO reality and potential in conflict resolution? What more can NGOs do to effectively shift from emergency relief toward long-term peacebuilding?

Methodology

This study uses a comparative case study analysis to test hypotheses and explore research questions. In order to contrast relative extremes pertaining to the
first two hypotheses (highly dispersed and centralized power; fresh and intractable conflict), I examine conflict in Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire. In order to compare NGO behavior across a range of organizational parameters, I have selected six organizations from each country with diverse operational realities (see table 1.2). These organizations all engage in some measure of direct conflict intervention. The rationale behind the selection of the countries and organizations is explained in detail in chapters 5 and 6.

Table 1.2: Organizations Examined in this Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cote d'Ivoire</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontieres</td>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontieres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care International / Care UK</td>
<td>Care International / Care UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter Center</td>
<td>Interpeace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammernarbeit (GIZ)</td>
<td>Horn Relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Study Limitations

For information about NGOs' strategies, activities, and operational realities, I rely on web publications from the organizations themselves. This is advantageous for rhetorical analysis, to understand how organizations publicly explain their work. Bartoli (2009) uses similar methods of data collection about NGOs; she explains “methodologically, [this research] will draw upon material produced by the NGOs themselves as a tribute to self-representation” (p. 394). Also, because I have only selected organizations with significant online resources, the limitation is less significant than it might have been. However, no organization airs its dirty laundry; information about internal politics within staff or decision-
making blunders are not accessible, as they would be in organizational interviews. Further, I often have no knowledge about the extent of a program's impact. With the exception of direct service delivery, organizations tend to describe their work qualitatively, which means I can only speak to the breadth – and not the depth – of activities.

Both conflicts studied are actively occurring. This is a necessary provision for information availability; information about NGO activity in historical conflicts would be more difficult to access and would not reflect the cutting-edge in NGO program development. However, this stipulation complicates analysis. The conflicts are volatile and constantly changing, even over the course of my research. Since I obtain information about the conflicts second-hand – I am not living in either Somalia or Cote d'Ivoire – it is difficult to draw up-to-date conclusions about these conflicts specifically. I cannot say whether one program has been more or less meaningful to local communities. Country-specific recommendations, at best, exemplify the kind of strategic thinking useful to planning NGO interventions. Rather than mapping out an action plan for response in each country – a task far better suited to practitioners based locally – I merely strive to demonstrate trends in the divergence of NGO activity from their theorized potential.

Finally, case studies are inherently limited in their capacity for generalization. Perhaps the worst possible NGO tack would be to assign one-size-fits-all methodology for conflict response. Roucounas (2000) cautions, “we should always bear in mind that each case has its unique aspects and
generalization beyond a certain limit may often be partly deceptive” (p. 114).

An Overview of the Thesis

This introductory chapter provides a context for the discussion of nongovernmental organizations in conflict transformation. The chapters that follow elaborate on the basic assumption that NGOs, when critically engaged and self-aware, can meaningfully contribute to the realization of peace. In chapter 2, I briefly summarize trends in peace and conflict studies, including theories about conflict transformation, peacebuilding and the balance between peace and justice. Chapter 3 examines theoretical justifications for the inclusion of non-state actors in conflict resolution, including alternatives to the primal debate between realist and liberal international relations theory. In particular, I examine how NGOs might fit into theories of multitrack diplomacy. Chapter 4 discusses the history, classification and challenges of NGOs in conflict. Major themes emerge, such as neutrality, community, and coalition building. Chapter 5 introduces the case study comparison between Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia, with explanation about the country choices, a history of conflict in each region, and a survey of context-specific recommended next steps toward peace. Chapter 6 introduces the actors in each country, beginning with a survey of NGOs that pulled out of conflict and those providing only emergency relief. I describe why each target organization was selected, and consider the inclusion of peace and conflict work in their overarching objectives. Chapter 7 analyzes the rhetoric NGOs use to describe conflict conditions and responses. I explore why rhetoric matters both
theoretically and in the context of these organizations. Chapter 8, the heart of the case study, examines target organizations' responses to conflict as classified along theoretical axes, with comparisons between countries and NGOs. Chapter 9 reviews target organizations' response to the challenges of conflict intervention, including security, impartiality, legitimacy and evaluation. In chapter 10, I make tentative recommendations related to Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia specifically, as well as general suggestions for NGOs in conflict.

This thesis responds to a contemporary struggle for international peace, with new actors and priorities than in decades past. As Renner (1999) asserts, many states and IGOs today still “cling to the belief that there can be simple military solutions to complex social, economic and environmental challenges. Altering these perceptions and assumptions will be a critical task of the twenty-first century.” (p. 19) In other words, traditional conflict responders still operate on the ancient Latin adage, si vis pacem, para bellum (‘if you seek peace, prepare for war’). The growth of NGO involvement in direct conflict intervention suggests enormous potential to challenge business as usual, advancing an alternate philosophy: si vis pacem, para pacem. NGOs, a wealth of human and material capital, lacking weaponry and official power, are in a prime position to enact non-violent conflict resolution and contribute to genuine peace-building efforts.
CHAPTER 2: CONFLICT INTERVENTION: AN OVERVIEW

Hypothetically, NGO intervention in conflict should follow best practices in peace theory and praxis. Whether organizational realities match theory will be the subject of chapters 6, 7 and 8. Here, I lay the groundwork, presenting an overview of trends in peace and conflict studies. I start with a seemingly benign question, fundamental to all peace literature, especially pertinent to contemporary developments such as conflict transformation: should we work to end conflict?

I then present loose boundaries along which the vast field of conflict response has been divided – conflict management, resolution and transformation, with overlapping parallels in the 'peace' family – peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Although definitions and distinctions vary depending on the source, much has been said about the significance of and differences between these paradigms.

To cement these theories in modern circumstance, I examine how conflict intervention is affected by intrastate considerations. The interdependence of adversaries produces new forms of conflict, demanding new response. Since the case studies of Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire correspond to protracted and nascent conflicts, respectively, I touch on intractability and conflict prevention, two omnipresent themes in the literature.

Finally, the chapter ends with a debate quite similar to the question with which it started; in the pursuit of peace and justice, which social objective should be prioritized? To what extent are these ideals at odds with one another and how might they be reconciled? These questions help to identify how NGOs should
intervene, and what theoretical considerations they must weigh in their operational decision-making.

**Pros and Cons of Conflict**

The question of whether to end conflict seems obvious at first blush. Even beyond body counts, violence scars society and the individual, with legacies of psychological trauma, environmental devastation, and structural collapse. As decontextualized concepts, 'peace' and 'conflict resolution' have universal support. In context, however, people weigh violence against the alternative, the status quo. Conflict is a means to an end: a method to right social wrongs, redistribute power and resources, and cease otherwise interminable injustice. As Bariyo (2007) explains, conflict “fosters creative solutions”, “facilitates personal and social change” and spotlights intolerable conditions (p. 23). Gidron et al. 2002 explains,

In some ways, social conflicts are necessary for the stability of a democratic society. Oppressed groups create situations of conflict to spark social change. Yet social conflict can be dangerous in that when it turns violent, there is a chance that a cycle of violence will persist, sometimes for generations and even centuries, causing irreparable damage to society. (p. 8)

The idea that conflict can “turn violent” points to a critical rhetorical distinction: conflict, though used colloquially as synonymous with violence, is not equivalent. Note the difference between the terms:

*Conflict:* a controversy, disagreement or opposition.

*Violence:* physical force exerted for the purpose of violating, damaging or abusing. (Morris 1969; p. 279, 1431)
As defined, 'conflict' is neutral, a natural result of desirable pluralism; 'violence' is strictly negative. The very *purpose* of violence is to cause injury. In war, belligerents attempt to cause enough injury that their opponent assents to their understanding of the disagreement. In other words, combatants strive to “out-injure” one another (Scarry 1985, p. 89). Though self-evident, this is an easy reality to forget, mired in debates over the morality or justness of conflict.

Competitive injury is not the only method to resolve a conflict, of course. Conflicts (i.e. disagreements) can be resolved through non-violent methods: dialogue, elections, judicial procedures, media, protests, marches, rallies, demonstrations, labor strikes, etc. If adequately supported by social infrastructure, any of these methods may generate exactly the same social benefits as violent conflict: a spotlight on intolerable conditions, the production of social justice, a redistribution of resources, and so forth.

The essence of conflict intervention is to *end violence* (not conflict), promoting methods other than competitive injury to navigate controversy and disagreement. Activities such as facilitated negotiation help parties skip the injury and jump to resolution. However, if the resolution lacks support – if parties feel they could achieve better outcomes through continued violence – peace will not be sustainable. Responsible interveners help parties identify a mutually acceptable future such that violence is no longer a desirable alternative to the status quo (Rhodes 2009).

Of course, conflict intervention is not as simple as reaching an acceptable compromise. A myriad of factors complicate the matter. For example, warring
groups are not homogeneous, power struggles occur within groups as much as between, and early causes of disagreement are replaced by other motivators as violence persists (Ropers 2004; Lederach 1998; Croker et al. 2009). The following sections describe how scholars and practitioners have grappled with such concerns over the past 60 years.

**Conflict Management and Peacekeeping**

An enormous range of terms have been used to describe conflict intervention: conflict management, conflict suppression, conflict settlement, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, etc. As Kevin Clements explains, these terms “are often used very loosely and interchangeably and sometimes refer to exactly the same strategies” (qtd. in Rhodes 2009, p. 14).

Although no definitions encompass all uses of these terms, Rhodes (2009) determines that there is a substantive difference. Figure 2.1 depicts the relationship between the terms ‘conflict management’, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘conflict transformation’. Although there is overlap in the way they are used, each term connotes a different set of values and activities. Figure 2.2, produced by Assefa 1999, displays these terms along a spectrum, from low participation of parties (e.g. force) to high participation (e.g. reconciliation).
Clearly Assefa prefers conflict transformation, since he considers it both more participatory and more proactive. This reflects a general trend in the literature since the 1990s toward conflict transformation.

However, state interveners still overwhelmingly use conflict management (Kydd 2010). The strategy is closely tied to the dominant international relations theory, Political Realism which sees states as unitary, rational and self-interested (see chapter 3). Third party conflict management aims to control (but not
necessarily end) violence in order ensure the national security of the intervening country (Jandt and Pederson 1996).

The most extreme form of conflict management, farthest to the left on the spectrum in Figure 2.2, is violence suppression. According to Himes (1980), “even though conflict suppression is practiced in all known societies, it is nowhere fully supported by the dominant value system” (p. 257). Force is used to quell violence; methods include lethal attack, threats, military deterrence, arrest, “infiltration and cooptation” of rebel groups, propaganda, and strong-armed crowd control (ibid). Insurgents are given no voice, their concerns are not heard, and their underlying needs are not met. Research indicates that these methods usually fail to reduce the incidence of violence, and have been shown to exacerbate or prolong conflicts (Bar-Simon-Tov 1994).

Less repressive forms of conflict management include adjudication, arbitration, negotiation and mediation (Bercovitch and Jackson 2001). In adjudication and arbitration, a third party determines the terms of peace. Adjudication follows formal judicial procedure in the international court, while arbitration requires that parties first select a third party observer to decide the terms of their disagreement. In negotiation, parties discuss outcomes of the conflict, using tactics to push opponents toward their desired solution. Each method aims for conflict settlement, a signed peace agreement that ends conflict settlement (Ropers 2004).

Early conflict management measured success in the short-term (Bercovitch and Simpson 2010). Obtaining a settlement meant violence was over and third
party intervenors could go home. Scholars and practitioners, particularly advocates of conflict transformation, critiqued conflict management for its short-sightedness. As a result, conflict management evolved to include more long-term, multi-dimensional approaches (Lynch 2001).

Today, conflict management and conflict resolution practices have converged in their definition of success: both aim for enduring peace after settlement. Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) explain, “a major concern of each of the parties involved in a conflict is that there is no guarantee that war will not return, except for a faith that their former enemies will hold a preference for peace over war” (p. 76). Conflict resolution asserts that a quality peace agreement will guarantee the absence of war because both parties will be sufficiently satisfied with the outcomes that violence is no longer necessary. Conflict management, on the other hand, considers the sustainability of peace a question of security. From this perspective, “several factors can improve the durability of negotiated settlements, which include international security guarantees, [and] provisions for military and political power-sharing” (ibid, p. 70). Third party militaries remain post-settlement to ensure order, suppress violence, monitor elections and guarantee peace through the use of force. Once society has stabilized, troops can leave. Most scholars remain adamant that conflict management strategies “have proven less than adequate for dealing with the contemporary localized nature of global conflict” (Joyner 2010, p. 41).
Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking

Whereas conflict management emphasizes enforcing peace, conflict resolution inspires peace through meaningful agreement. The latter strategy has been defined as:

non-violent, cooperative intervention processes used by a mutually acceptable third party to intentionally understand the sources and dynamics of a problem and find a mutually acceptable, peaceful solution (Ilana Shapiro, qtd in Rhodes 2009, p. 45)

The emphasis on non-violent cooperation and mutual acceptability differ markedly from conflict management strategies that rely on force and coercion to convince parties to accept third parties, sign agreements and stop fighting. Conflict resolution also promotes values such as fairness and justice to ensure stable, equitable relations between parties into the future.

Kriesberg (2009) describes four historical periods in the evolution of conflict resolution. From 1914 to 1945, pacifist sentiment and political cynicism grew in response to the two world wars. U.S. and International branches of the Fellowship of Recognition (FOR) were established “to foster reconciliation, nonviolence, and to empower youth to be peacemakers” (p. 18). First tentative steps were made away from Realist philosophy as research on causation began to include non-rational factors such as scapegoating, displaced feelings and susceptibility to propaganda. From 1946 to 1969, the international system expanded rapidly to include a number of powerful intergovernmental organizations, like the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, intended to foster reconciliation between former WWII enemies. Meanwhile, in the civil sector, conflict resolution research centers and academic journals became more common.
and well-known.

The period of “institutionalization” from 1970 to 1989 saw the rise of social movements in the U.S. for civil and women’s rights and against the Vietnam War. These movements suggested the potential to resolve social injustice through non-violent methods. The 1970s saw landmark interest in conflict resolution both in academia and beyond. Colleges, universities, government agencies and the corporate and nongovernmental world all began to implement conflict resolution values and strategies. Finally, from 1990 to the present, conflict resolution methods became more diverse, complex, and well-developed.

“Growing adherence to norms protecting human rights” and “increasing attention to feminist perspectives” pushed conflict resolution practitioners to pay more attention to the needs of vulnerable and under-empowered members of warring groups (p. 25)

The primary goal of conflict resolution is to generate a resolution that inspires parties to keep the peace (Himes 1980). Edward Azar and John Burton explain that a “conflict may be said to be 'resolved' when all parties freely accepted a solution that has the following characteristics”:

- By joint agreement, the solution satisfies the interest and needs underlying the conflict.
- The solution does not sacrifice any party's important values.
- The parties will not wish to repudiate the solution even if they are in a position to do so.
- The solution meets standards of justice and fairness.
- The solution is sufficiently advantageous to all parties so that it becomes self-supporting or self-enforcing (qtd in Rhodes 2009, p. 28).

Reaching a resolution with such characteristics requires intensive dialogue. While disputes, “disagreements over competing interests, especially
material interests” can be settled with a single decision, as by a court of law or an adjudicator, conflicts run much deeper, and must be resolved, not settled, through an extensive process (Rhodes 2009, p. 34). Conflictual parties develop trust over time through “successive approximations of commitment and reassurance” until they feel sufficiently comfortable to express their needs, relinquish prejudices, and search for mutually acceptable solutions (Kelman 2005, p. 6). In addition to a long dialogue timeline, many conflict resolution scholars describe the various social and conflict levels at which mediators must work: global, regional, state / society, top leaders, middle-level leaders, embedded parties and the grassroots (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p. 30).

Because conflict resolution requires adherence to standards of justice, traditional notions of impartiality and neutrality are challenged. An 'impartial' mediator is *not* neutral in impact. If mediators do not alter existing power relations, the stronger party will necessarily have a bigger role in determining the terms of the peace agreement than the weaker party. Adversaries will not be equally invested in the outcome, so peace will not last. In the ethos of conflict resolution, mediators must ensure that both parties are heard, which often means supporting the weaker party (Rhodes 2009).

**Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding**

The theory and practice of conflict transformation emerged in the 1990s in response to the perceived inadequacy of conflict resolution. Terrell Northrup, a leading conflict transformation scholar, identifies and responds to four
assumptions of conflict transformation.

Conflict Resolution Assumptions:
1. Parties to conflict are rational.
2. Misinterpretation constitutes a central cause.
3. Conflict resolution principles apply across social settings (e.g. labor, international, interpersonal).
4. High value is placed on resolution.

Conflict Transformation Responses:
1. Rationality depends on cultural context.
2. Misinterpretation is too shallow a concept to represent the deep feelings associated with different world views.
3. Conflict is always in flux and different stages may require different approaches.
4. Not all parties may want peace as an outcome, but may want to continue fighting.
   (Rhodes 2009, p. 48)

Northrup's responses suggest that conflicts are more complicated – culturally dependent, deep-rooted, and variable – than conflict resolution accepts. No political peace agreement, no matter the quality, will sustain peace on its own. Northrup's fourth response alludes to the core belief of conflict transformation: as long as societies are unequal, as long as discrimination, oppression, poverty and corruption exist, there *should* be conflict (which, as identified earlier, refers to explicit disagreement, controversy, a struggle of values and interests, and does not necessarily include violence). These conflicts run so deep in society that 'resolving' them through a peace agreement only creates repressed frustration, which eventually leads to the recurrence of violence. Michelle Gawerc suggests “that conflicts are rarely solved completely, that to solve, resolve or end a conflict may be at the expense of justice, and that the best way to ensure sustainability of an agreement is to allow for higher mutual participation by the conflict groups” (Rhodes 2009, p. 53).
Conflict transformation and conflict resolution both attempt to channel conflict into non-violent dialogue. However, while conflict resolution seeks to finish dialogue, draft resolution and move on with peaceful society, conflict transformation theorists see dialogue as a constant, on-going process, one that occurs not only during violence, but also before (as prevention) and after (as peacebuilding). John Paul Lederach, a leading conflict transformation scholar, advocates for mediation rooted in a “genuine sense of participation, responsibility and ownership” shared by communities at all levels of power, from very grassroots interpersonal through elite national levels (1998, p. 242).

Attention should also be paid to the diverse social, structural, political and psychological domains of conflict (Ropers 2004). In a study of 45 communities in Latin America, Albert Hirschman found that communities felt “too much importance is attributed to large scale political changes as a means for building peace at the social level; instead, members of these communities felt that for real change in the political sphere, social, cultural and personal relationship must first be transformed” (Ricigliano 2003, p. 455). Because warring groups are not homogeneous, party leaders may agree with terms of resolutions that cause immense harm to the needs of vulnerable groups, such as women, ethnic minorities or refugees within the same political group. As long as inequality and injustice persist, such agreements do not truly 'resolve' conflict at all.

These approaches, emphasizing vulnerable or under-empowered members of society, social and psychological needs, poverty alleviation and social justice issues, remain marginalized but growing perspectives in contemporary conflict
response. Diana (2004) contextualizes the trend, as she describes:

...adherents to conflict transformation and the wider value group from which they come (culturally liberal, philosophically egalitarian, politically democratic, concerned with socioeconomic justice and unhappy about war). These values are confined to no particular culture and are universal in none, but they constitute a culture in themselves. They are in clear opposition to the universally prevalent culture of domination... to sexism, racism, and discrimination of all kinds (Francis 2004, p. 12)

**Intrastate Considerations**

The following three sections address conflict intervention in particular circumstances: intrastate, civil conflict; intractable or protracted conflict and early conflict with preventable violence. In these cases, conflict management, resolution and transformation principles still apply, but with added considerations.

The majority of today's conflict can be considered 'intrastate'. As explained in chapter one, this terminology is inherently problematic for its deligitimization of insurgent groups. Thus, Regan (1996) defines intrastate conflicts based on three characteristics: “they take place within country boundaries; one combatant is a state, one a nonstate; and opposition has the ability to offer sustained resistance” (p. 338). This points to one of the biggest challenges of mediating intrastate conflicts: the quality of parties. Since one party is a nonstate, their legitimacy as an official actor is at stake in the conflict. The government struggles to ensure that the opposing party is seen as an illegitimate intruder; often the name, status and representation of the insurgent group is a point of dispute. Roucounas (2000) describes “one occasion, when the revolutionaries were pressing a United Nations mediator to clarify their international status, they finally declared they were satisfied by his following answer: 'You are what you are'.” (p. 123).
Because intrastate conflicts pit neighbors against neighbors, psychological, social and cultural components of the conflict are much more intimate and complex. During active violence, civil conflict “debilitates the capacity of the national government to govern; it disrupts individuals and societal security and creates feelings of anarchy; it overwheels basic human rights and curtails procedures in a civil society; and it restricts access to media and communication” (Joyner 2010, p. 65). Intrastate conflicts are particularly likely to become intractable, and are most likely to require external intervention (Bercovitch and Simpson 2010). Peace agreements following intrastate conflicts demand extensive decision-making and specification about matters such as cession of territory, dissolution or empowerment of rebel forces, procedures for elections, reconstruction of the national judiciary, reintegation of refugees, and reconstruction of devastated areas. Because the agreement operates with a single sovereign entity, a range of political decisions tangential to the dispute at hand can be (and often are) addressed in agreements, including land reform, human rights protections, poverty, development, and foreign relations (Roucounas 2000).

**Resolution of Intractable Conflicts**

Conflict intractability, a common product of civil violence, occurs when conflict persists over many years – even decades and centuries. These crises become self-perpetuating, reinforced by factors far disassociated with the initial cause of the conflict (Crocker *et al.* 2009). Through the devastation of the environment, destruction of infrastructure, displacement of populations, and
disruption of trade exacerbates poverty and basic human needs. Government functions, such as courts, welfare systems, and hospitals, often weaken or collapse altogether. Predatory warlords generate ever-increasing wealth off the political economy of violence, resulting in increased power to perpetuate the conflict. Neighboring states, affected by refugees, migrating rebel forces, arms mobilization and trade relations, are drawn into the violence (this explains why today's conflicts are dispersed in geographic clusters; Buhaung and Gleditsch 2005). As the conflict persists, a new generation grows up during persistent violence; youth internalize the ethos of conflict, learn to ground their identity in hatred of the enemy and “become wedded to a logic and culture of revenge” (Crocker et al. 2005, p. 494). The failure of previous attempts at mediation make future efforts seem at least undesirable if not impossible.

Thus, intractable conflicts present an enormous challenge for third party intervenors. Numerous organizations and agencies have emerged to address these conflicts and a great deal of academic literature has been written on the subject (see Coleman 2000; Pruitt and Olczak 1995; Staub 2006; Kriesberg 1993). Crocker et al. 2009 recommends that negotiation of intractable conflicts should be reinforced with strong incentives. The cessation of violence will not seem inherently lucrative, so mediators must use all the leverage and influence they can muster to meet parties' needs and address their “vulnerabilities, insecurities, fears, and their sense of 'sunk costs' in the conflict to date” (p. 497). Once parties have reached settlement, reconciliation will be unusually difficult to achieve. Bar-Tal (2000) suggests that countries should foster and support “psychological
infrastructure”, including “devotion to the society and country, high motivation to contribute, persistence, readiness for personal sacrifice, unity, solidarity, determination, courage and maintenance of the society’s objectives” (p. 353). Work across the levels of society (grassroots, middle level, national) and domains of conflict (political, social, economic, structural) will be more important than ever to heal wounds deep and ingrained in the fabric of personal and cultural identity.

Conflict Prevention

In some ways, conflict prevention and intractability are flip sides of the same coin; as violence in intractable conflicts becomes latent, or “abeyant”, preventive strategies can capitalize on the moment of non-violence to create lasting peace (Crocker et al. 2009, p. 90). However, conflict prevention, in both theory and practice, has taken on a life and culture of its own. Conflict prevention has obvious appeal: compared to conflict management, resolution or transformation, prevention is infinitely “less costly in social, economic, and human terms” (Carment and Schnabel 2003, p. 1). It has particularly attracted Realist theorists and state leaders who perceive conflict prevention as a sound investment both for national security and the military budget (John 2005). As Carment and Schnabel (2003) write, “there is no lack of rhetoric on the necessity of conflict prevention, but serious attempts to give organizations the tools, procedures and means to put global and regional preventive systems into place are modest at best” (p. 2).
Since 'preventive diplomacy' has innate appeal from diverse political and philosophical perspectives, its advocates and practitioners range greatly in their methods and objectives. Prevention may include “confidence-building, fact-finding missions, early-warning networks, preventive deployment and demilitarized zones” (Ackerman 2003, p. 340). The use of force as a preventive deterrent has been labeled 'new military humanism', which John (2005) critiques as an oxymoron – violence used to stem the tide of violence, he argues, is far from humanitarian.

Preventive activities can be categorized as 'light' or 'deep', 'operational' or 'structural'. Both light and operational prevention refer to activities only address immediate causes of the conflict. Methods include “monitoring missions, negotiation, mediation and the creation of channels for dialogue among contending groups” (Ackerman 2003, p. 341). Deep, structural prevention, on the other hand, has a more long-term approach, similar to the ethos of conflict transformation. Social structures, power relations, and human rights are all addressed as potential sources of emergent violence. These methods often look identical to existing human rights and development work; the only real difference is a sensitivity to and prioritization of the potential for violence.

While deep prevention has inherent value and should be done whether conflict is imminent or not, operational prevention, particularly through the use of force, is sometimes interpreted as hegemony. An interevenor, especially a third party state focused only on international stability with little concern for internal dynamics or social conditions, may impose unwanted resolution. Conflict (not
violence) is necessary to a healthy society; John (2005) argues, it is not the place of an external mediator to suffocate conflict in order to prevent violence. As expressed elsewhere, conflict serves the interests of the dominant party; to intervene through preventive deterrence necessarily sides with the powerful in the status quo.

**Between Peace and Justice**

The potential for hegemony in an activity as seemingly benign and universally desired as conflict prevention is one example of an uneasy and persistent juggling act between peace and justice. Conflict transformation perspectives suggest that stable peace first requires justice; conflict management contends that justice comes only after peace. In practice, the balance between peace and justice is nowhere nearly as simple as a chicken-and-egg debate. Both sides have legitimate concerns. “For example, punishing severe justice violations may alienate actors who are needed in building peace. Yet peace without justice may fail to gain public support and legitimacy and thus fall apart” (Albin 2009, p. 581).

To some commentators, the question of post-conflict justice seems as black and white as law: the guilty should be punished in order to establish trust, fairness and order. However, the Geneva Convention requires that parties, post-violence, “endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in armed conflict” (Protocol Addition to the Geneva Convention 1977, Article 6). Furthermore, law throughly fails to address innumerabe
instances of injustice, as Milner (2002) describes:

What is it about the rule of law that is supposed to save these people from starvation? The government of Senegal demonstrated its notions about the rule of law by selling out to the lettuce companies, bringing in the police, and no doubt defining the sanctity of private property... Where exactly in the international legal order is there an effective forum for dealing with the plight of starving people chased off their land while Americans in Cleveland get inexpensive salad fixings all year round? This is a problem that far transcends the rule of law, and advocating it even as a partial solution smacks too much of the historically misplaced faith the West has had in bringing order to an unruly world. (p. 626)

In Table 2.1, I propose one tentative method to distinguish between peace-inhibiting and peace-affirming justice. As Milner's example depicts, international law has limited value in complex, globalized conflicts. Likewise, all discernible meaning of 'criminal offense' disintegrates before the chaos of intrastate violence. Thus, I propose that reconciliation efforts should focus on social, rather than criminal, justice. Joyner (2010) distinguishes between retributive justice, the standard model in most Western countries, which uses punishment for deterrence and revenge, and an alternative, restorative justice, which derives outcomes not on the basis of abstract legal principles, but on the needs of the victim and offender.

In the context of conflict, restorative justice may include “critical self-reflection, admission of responsibility, genuine remorse and compensation” (p. 42).

In the back-and-forth quibble, Albin (2009) identifies some grey area. Pursuit of “perfect justice” is likely to make negotiation impossible, but certainly negotiators can work with an eye toward “impartial justice”, with values such as mutual gain, proportionality, and voluntary consent (582). Both Joyner (2010) and Albin (2009) ultimately conclude that the most healthy, sustainable justice emphasizes future needs rather than past wrongs. They propose that justice should
be a cooperative, optimistic process, focused on designing a fresh society, with strategies to reduce inequality, chip away at poverty, erode discrimination, and create structures that support both justice and non-violence.

Table 2.1: Proposed Model for Balancing Peace and Justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace-inhibiting Justice</th>
<th>Peace-affirming Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retributive, punitive</td>
<td>Restorative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming</td>
<td>Problem-solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on wrongs of belligerents</td>
<td>Focus on needs of vulnerable populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero-sum, competitive</td>
<td>Positive-sum, cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfect, absolute</td>
<td>Imperfect, a work in progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backward-looking</td>
<td>Forward-looking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter documents how conflict intervention has evolved, from frightening societies into non-violence, to more nuanced responses to the complex causation of conflict. Questions of justice play an increasing role in conflict theory, and peace practice is slowly catching up:

We are currently at a critical moment in the development of the peacebuilding field. Organizations working to build sustainable peace and development must now think and act in more integrative ways that work across traditional boundaries – such as official and unofficial actors – and across such diverse fields as humanitarian relief, conflict resolution, development, human rights, and environmental protection. (p. 445)

As conflict intervention becomes more dynamic, non-violent, multi-dimensional, multi-faceted, and long-term, NGOs have a growing role to play. However, their participation in conflict intervention is often questioned by more traditional actors. Thus, I examine, in the following chapter, theoretical justifications for the role of non-state actors in conflict response.
CHAPTER 3: NON-STATE ACTORS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION

NGOs Sidelined in a Realist Game

Until very recently, up to the last ten to fifteen years, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were almost universally celebrated as a positive addition to the international community. Theorists and practitioners from all ideologies and political perspectives expressed satisfaction with this new, amorphous group of non-state actors. DeMars (2005) explains:

It is curious that ringing endorsement of the growing influence of NGOs in world politics emanate from widely distinct points on the ideological spectrum. From the right, neoconservatives praise NGOs for taking over many of the functions of shrinking government bureaucracies. From the moderate left, political liberals laud NGOs as a democratizing force, holding governments accountable by representing societal rights. Farther left, some radicals look to NGOs to incubate a counter-hegemonic project that could eventually yield revolutionary change. (p. 34)

This early enthusiasm belies fundamental disagreement about the roles of NGOs in international relations. Clearly, NGOs cannot be everything to everyone. They cannot simultaneously distribute apolitical aid, deferring to governments for direction and purpose, and radically alter hegemonic social structures, including the very same states and interstate organizations that purport to control them. As NGOs proliferate, international actors have begun to realize vast sociopolitical ramifications of their existence. The involvement of NGOs often challenges traditional expectations about both the who and the what of international relations. Nowhere has this been so true as in the realm of conflict resolution.

Navigating peace and conflict has always been the singular duty and
domain of states, from what Mapendere (2001) describes as “the remote annals of humankind” (3). Official diplomats, representing states, stripped of personal identity, deliberate under formal conditions, with an eye to deterrence and defense. They use carrots and sticks, trust and deception, to out-smart the other in a jostling for peace (Montville 1987).

This preference for state actors in conflict resolution, and even international relations more generally, results from the dominance of Political Realism. This philosophy, prevailing throughout history, made explicit by Hans J Morgentau in the 1900s, asserts that states are the primary actors on the international stage (Bariyo 2007). Neorealists even suggest that “non-state actors do not matter” (Weenink 2001, p. 80). Even while transnational, non-state actors gain resources, power and legitimacy, they remain marginalized by the predominance of Realist thought. In a survey of leading introductory textbooks on international relations, Gotz (2008) found that NGOs are only mentioned in passing, typically under a single chapter about transnational actors, a catch-all for the unimportant non-states, ranging from loosely associated activists to multinational corporations. Even the term NGO – nongovernmental organization – speaks to the ascension of the state. NGOs are linguistically cemented to the negation of that which is important – the state (ibid). Though methodologically cumbersome (as explained in chapter 1), the term persists because an NGO's distance from the government remains an essential feature of its presence in a state-centric world.

According to Realist theory, individuals are “power seeking”, moderated
only by the rule of law, which protects civility within state boundaries (Karns 2004, p. 45). Beyond the state, there is only anarchy. Like individuals, states are seen to “act in a rational way to protect their own interests” (ibid). They are considered unitary actors, a view enshrined in idiomatic speech. When journalists say, 'the United States declared war', they really mean 'an individual or group of individuals, who claim to represent the interests of a diverse domestic constituency, have ordered another group of individuals, namely the military, to use violence'. Abstract conceptual entities cannot declare anything (just as they cannot ponder, lust, or cry), a truism obscured by the conventional conflation of Realist philosophy with irrefutable truth.

According to Realism, violent conflict is an inevitable human experience, a product of biological determinism and international anarchy. States that intervene as third-parties to a conflict strive for short-term or regional peace to ensure their own national security. These efforts rely on a carefully balanced power struggle between states, with an emphasis on “competitive processes of conflict resolution: power-based, adversarial, confrontational, zero-sum, win-lose approaches” (San dole 1993, p. 4).

The Realist-Liberalist Pact

The rise of intra-state conflict further erodes state-oriented Realism. Governments are no longer the only ones declaring war, causing violence, or appearing at mediating tables. Uganda and Sudan, for example, can have all the talks they want, but without inclusion of the Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel force
of violent civilians, there will be no peace settlement. As transnationalism
connects civilians economically, socially and politically across national borders,
states become less and less relevant.

Political Liberalism, the age-old nemesis of Realism, attempts to
approximate these new realities. For liberals, individuals are the primary unit of
analysis; “states are the most important collective actors, but they are pluralistic,
not unitary” (ibid, p. 37). Neoliberals make space for transnational actors,
particularly multinational corporations. Today, neoliberal ideologies drive the
steady decline of the state in deference to the market.¹

Whereas Realists describe violence as inevitable, Liberals believe that
humans are basically good, and violence arises as a “learned response to
frustrated goal-seeking” (Sandole 1993, p. 5). As a result, neoliberal mediators
use “cooperate processes of conflict resolution: nonadversarial,
nonconfrontational, non-zero-sum (positive-sum), win-win approaches”, and
believe that with ample effort, world peace is obtainable (ibid). NGOs are an
important component of liberal philosophy. According to A-M Slaughter, the very
existence of relief organizations supports the triumph of liberalism over realism:
since “stopping massive human rights violations or feeding the hungry does not
enhance national power”, humans must have motives beyond rational self-interest
(qtd. in Bariyo 2007, p. 11)

While the rise of (neo)liberalism has thwarted (neo)realist supremacy,
jockeying between the two philosophies leaves little room for alternate

¹This underscores the distinction between liberalism in international relations
theory and in the U.S. political spectrum; neoliberalism most closely fits what is
known in the U.S. as conservative or libertarian politics.
paradigms. From liberalism, we have at least found space for NGO existence, and even NGO participation in conflict response. However, we still lack explanation for NGO action beyond basic service delivery. Why would NGOs bother with political advocacy if peace requires only citizen training and economic growth? Likewise, liberal / realist characterizations of humans as good (altruistic) or bad (self-interested) fail to explain the diverse, conflicting interests at play in modern conflicts. A collection of marginalized, 'post-positivist' theories grapple with these concerns (Hall 2011).

Alternate Paradigms in International Relations theory

Alternatives to liberalism and realism can be classified in two categories: constructivism and critical theory. Constructivism, a common analytical tool in postmodern social critique, asserts that “the behavior of individuals, states and other actors is shaped by shared beliefs, socially constructed rules and cultural practices” (Karns 2004, p. 50). Human behaviors, like conflict and violence, stem not from objective truths about the human condition, but from subjective ideas that flux in power and currency. Thus, NGOs can influence behavior – reduce violence, inspire reconciliation, spur policy change, or simply convince donors to contribute money – just by promoting ideas (Gao and Zhao 2009). In fact, this is an underlying assumption of all nongovernmental organizations; as voluntary associations, NGOs' resources, power and membership depend largely on their ability to convince others that their ideas matter.

Whereas constructivism emphasizes that reality is socially constructed, a
diversity of critical theories posit sources of conflict and injustice that cannot be reasoned away. This collection of theories includes Marxism, neoMarxism, dependency theory, world systems theory, and feminism (Karns 2004). Marxism, the oldest and most well-known critical theory, explains that the hierarchical global system is a by-product of capitalism, wherein “developed countries have expanded economically... enabling them to sell goods and export surplus wealth... [while] developing countries have become increasingly constrained on the actions of the developed” (ibid, p. 53). This inequality, present at both global and local scales, creates social unrest leading to violence. In order to create lasting peace, mediators cannot simply talk their way through pithy settlements (as in liberalism) or scare warring parties into silence (as in realism). Instead, political and social leaders must restructure society, creating new systems for economic justice and equality.

Constructivism and Marxism begin to answer concerns posed above, such as the role of advocacy and the complexity of conflict. Advocacy is effective because changing ideas changes behavior. Service delivery alone is inadequate NGO strategy because it operates within and supports the status quo, and is less than explicit about its long-term objectives. Theories like Marxism reveal that societies are not homogeneous groups of equal individuals. Oppression along economic necessitates the use of strategies like advocacy, education, outreach, and direct conflict intervention in order to challenge unjust social structures.

While Marxism theorizes about oppression based on class, other critical theories explain oppression along other lines. There are a range of such theories
for every form of social discrimination: feminism describes gender oppression; critical race theory, racial oppression; queer theory, sexual oppression, and so forth. One generalized theory functions well for understanding NGO involvement in conflict. Sandole (1993) describes what he calls “Non-Marxist Radical Thought” (NMRT), a strikingly unradical belief that peaceful societies meet their citizens' basic needs (p. 8). Put simply, NMRT suggests that people cannot think about peace when they are hungry or imprisoned. Human needs, including both physical requirements, like shelter, and psychological components, like respect, are biological in nature, innate to human existence. NMRT combines aspects of both realism and liberalism. Like realism, NMRT maintains that violence is biologically determined; when biological needs are not met, and individuals do not have adequate sociopolitical avenues to express these needs, violence is a likely result. However, the theory agrees with liberalism that peace is possible and will be obtained through cooperate processes of conflict resolution. Finally, NMRT parallels Marxism in the sense that structural – not just cognitive – changes are necessary to instill peace. Whereas Marxism calls only for economic restructuring, NMRT urges structural changes to all social, political and economic institutions.

While Non-Marxist Radical Thought is not specific about forms of discrimination or methods of conflict resolution, it is easily linked to aforementioned peace and conflict theories. Whereas conflict management attempts to reduce violence, and conflict resolution, to end it, conflict transformation seeks to alter social structures (sources of injustice per NMRT) in
order to build toward perpetual peace. Peace work across horizontal and vertical constituencies allows for redistribution of material and social resources to meet people's biological needs and enables cooperative conflict response. Finally, because these processes require both cognitive and structural changes at local and national levels, it is essential to engage both state and non-state actors.

**Diplomacy: Tracks One and Two**

Despite the implications of alternate paradigms like constructivism and critical theory, realism remains the dominant perspective in international relations, with liberalism in close second. Precisely the same pattern can be observed in 'tracks' of conflict resolution – concepts that dictate actors and roles in mediation and dialogue. What is known as 'Track I diplomacy' corresponds, both in prevalence and theoretical substance, to realism, while Track II best matches liberalism. 'Track 1.5' and 'Multi-Track' diplomacy, like constructivism and critical theory, are marginalized but growing trends in conflict resolution. These latter theoretical frames have contributed enormously to the inclusion of NGOs in direct conflict intervention. Multi-track diplomacy, in particular, has been described as “the single most successful concept for creating a legitimate space for the work of civil society organizations” (Reimann and Ropers 2005, p. 33). These theories will be explored in greater detail below. First, I examine the starting block, what remains, to this day, the mainstream approach.

Track I diplomacy refers to official, state-to-state negotiations, an obvious parallel to the state-centric Realist paradigm (Chataway 1998; Mapendere 2001).
Participants in mediation all represent states: both belligerents and mediators are formal officials whose every word – whether at the negotiating table or in casual conversation – is taken as a legal promise by the country represented. Certainly Track I diplomacy has its advantages. Negotiators can use carrots and sticks to bend other actors to their will. Their official status heightens expectations and demonstrates a serious commitment to the negotiating process. When, in the end, negotiators reach an agreement, the decision becomes legally binding for all parties involved.

The officialdom of Track I actors – the finality of their decisions, the gravity of their presence, the confidentiality of their work – is both their strength and weakness (Mapendere 2001). Officials cannot freely babble about their fears and frustrations; they cannot hypothetically entertain possible solutions 'just to see'. Even when professional diplomats follow established principles of trust, honesty and cooperation, these guidelines are applied gingerly, with attention to their first allegiance and priorities as representatives of states.

Other drawbacks to Track I diplomacy suggest the need for alternatives (ibid). The concentration of unchecked power yields enormous potential for corruption, a gamble too risky for stakes as high as peace. Governments of intrastate conflicts do not represent all parties; under such circumstances, state-to-state meetings negate, and therefore, frustrate, non-state combatants. Elite officials are often disconnected from the needs of local communities. Even if they were perfectly informed, excluding other parties disempowers the grassroots, thereby exacerbating inequality and conflict. Finally, when officials are elected
political leaders, they operate with attention to election cycles; they push to complete their agenda before the big E-day. When replaced, established personal connections, essential to successful resolution, are lost.

Any track of diplomacy will have its limitations, and of course, the disadvantages of states as mediators should not deter their efforts. However, it is a common misconception that states are necessarily superior to other actors in conflict intervention. The term 'diplomacy' is so often conflated with Track I peace work that the 'track diplomacy' frame inherently forces unconventional thinking. Track diplomacy defines and delimits conventional methods (Track I) and then asks, 'What if this method is just one among dozens of possible ways to accomplish the same goal?'

With the evolution of the international system, from “one centered only in the actions of sovereign states, to a more complex reality of sovereign and non-sovereign actors”, standards and assumptions about diplomacy are changing (Kuchinsky 1999, p. 7). In 1987, Joseph Montville coined the term 'Track II diplomacy', which “engages individuals and organizations from outside the government in the complex task of conflict resolution” (p. 162).

Where Track I diplomacy emphasizes official state action, Track II diplomats, like the local leaders with whom they collaborate, are independent from any government action (Gidron 2002). Rather than laws and treaties, Track II mediators deal in ideas and relationships. A realist would have no reason to value track II mediators, and might even consider them “in the way” (Chataway 1998, p. 271). However, a constructivist would argue that Track II mediators
produce essential changes in the cognitive and emotional position of antagonistic parties. In NMRT terms, Track II mediators can also help to elucidate citizens' unmet needs, underlying drivers of the conflict.

As Barnes (2005) explains, it can “take time before the ideas, relationships and personal changes that develop through these processes manifest into social and political change” (p. 19). Track II mediators must be ready for the long-haul. However, peacebuilding theorists, like John Paul Lederach, emphasize that conflict transformation is an on-going process anyway. Peace settlements that emerge from official mediation efforts can be deceptive; they are merely one step in the right direction, a starting point from which to launch years of peace work.

According to Joseph Montville, Track II diplomacy can be classified in three distinct processes: facilitating problem-solving seminars; changing public opinion; and promoting “cooperative economic development” (p. 163). In the former process, third-party citizens, individuals or NGOs, bring together leaders of conflicting parties to develop personal relationships, promote understanding of the conflict from multiple perspectives, and ultimately, “develop joint strategies for dealing with the conflict as a shared problem” (ibid). According to Track II methodology, none of the attending members may officially represent a state. As a result, decisions made in these seminars are only hypothetical, not legally-binding. This allows parties to test out ideas under the guise of “academic discourse” (Chataway 1998, p. 275). A Track I diplomat explains, “it is always helpful to have workshops. But [the conflict] will not be settled until the government settles it” (ibid, p. 277).
While seminars and workshops more closely resemble traditional mediation, the latter two processes of Track II diplomacy involve generalized work at the grassroots, “to shape the overall political environment so that [state] leaders might be encouraged to take positive steps toward resolving a conflict” (Montville 1987, p. 167). When public opinion is fiercely divided, with ingrained beliefs on both sides of a conflict about depravity of the 'enemy' and victimhood of their own community, conciliatory mediation becomes politically dangerous. Track II peace workers can rehumanize and empower both parties.

Track II diplomacy has some obvious advantages. Mediators are not inhibited by allegiance to one state, and they have no fear of losing their constituency since they are not beholden to anyone. They have the freedom and independence to be creative, hypothetical and emotional in ways that official diplomats cannot match. Because Track II diplomacy emphasizes working with grassroots and middle-level leaders, local communities are empowered and heard. If Track II workers are strategic, they can select participants for workshops and economic development in ways that support vulnerable groups. Finally, Track II diplomacy eases the transition from violence to peace since track II diplomats can continue exactly the same activities through conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding.

One of the biggest concerns with Track II diplomacy is the potential for duplicated, haphazard or piecemeal work. To be effective, Track II requires long-term planning, strategic integration, and an enormous web of strong personal relationships built on trust and commitment. If diverse NGOs flood a conflict
zone without communicating, or if they dabble in this or that activity without attention the the big-picture impact, the overall result could be more negative than positive. Local communities in violent conflict are wary, unsure of who to trust; breaking the trust of local leaders makes it just that much harder for future peacebuilding. Some Track I diplomats advocate for a formalized mechanism of collaboration between the many Track I and II actors, but most agree that this would undermine the biggest source of Track II effectiveness – their independence and informality (Chataway 1998).

**Track One and a Half**

The inclusion of Track II diplomacy as a legitimate form of conflict response pushes NGOs into the peacebuilding picture. However, the track still limits civilian organizations in the range of activities they can pursue. Bartoli (2009) describes several rare cases of “Track I processes in which state actors, international organizations and nonstate actors, claiming political space and recognition, used the mediation services of NGOs” in official negotiation (p. 392). Thanks to theorist Susan Nan, this type of citizen activity is now called 'Track One and a Half' Diplomacy. The cumbersome terminology (imagine a social movement mobilized by '1.5'!) reveals both the difficulty of translating between reality and theory, and the novelty of NGOs in official mediation.

Track 1.5 has been described as “hybrid diplomacy”, a bridge between Tracks I and II, any “public or private interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments or political entities such as popular armed movements,
... facilitated or mediated by a third party not representing a political organization or institution” (Mapendere 2001, p. 10). Table 3.1 distinguishes between diplomacy Tracks I, 1.5 and II based on the actors involved.

Table 3.1: Actors in Track Diplomacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Track</th>
<th>Mediator</th>
<th>Adversaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Track I</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1.5</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track II</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ‘Citizens’ may include either individuals or organizations.

This form of conflict response may be new, but it is not without precedent. Bartoli (2009) describes four successful cases of Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations (P/CROs) that successfully applied Track 1.5 diplomacy to end conflict. In 1992, the Community of Sant'Egidio, a religious NGO based in Rome, successfully mediated a peace agreement in Mozambique that ended violence after a 30-year war of independence and a 16-year civil war. This agreement did not materialize overnight; it came only after ten years of dialogue and relationship-building. Because the agreement grew authentically from long-term peacebuilding, Mozambique has since, seen low violence and has minimal chance of conflict recurrence.

The Carter Center, perhaps the most well-known Track 1.5 mediator, has had lasting impact on conflicts in Korea, Yugoslavia, Burundi, Haiti, Uganda, Sudan and Liberia. Importantly, the organization stresses that “war-torn countries... may be more receptive to [NGOs]... that have already provided them
with humanitarian or development assistance" (Bartoli 2009, p. 400). This perspective has motivated the Carter Center's involvement in international health. It also suggests a powerful mandate for relief and development organizations. Whereas large development NGOs may argue that conflict mediation is beyond their area of expertise, the relationships that they cultivate through long-term development actually make them prime candidates for Track 1.5 work.

The advantages of Track 1.5 diplomacy draw on the strengths of both Tracks I and II. Citizens, particularly in development NGOs, have knowledge, experience and relationship with the grassroots level, especially if engaged in Track II work, that they can bring to the negotiating table. Track 1.5 mediators have freedom to be confidential as in Track I, or public as in Track II. While states may not necessarily participate in open, humanizing dialogue or hypothetical problem-solving, third party citizen mediators can bring these perspectives to the table, making themselves vulnerable in order to create space for conciliation, apology and compromise. The “face-saving ability of Track One and a Half Diplomacy is facilitated by characteristics of third parties such as non-partisanship, political prominence, trustworthiness, lack of real political power, respect for, and by, both parties, and honesty” (Mapendere 2001, p. 17). Because states are present, decisions are binding and real peace agreements can be signed and enacted through NGOs' work.

Track I, state-to-state diplomacy operates within limited cognitive frames. As Joseph Montville (1987) explains, “the institutions of state, diplomacy, the military and intelligence are engaged for the most part in deterrence and defense”
When NGOs approach mediation, they have significantly different priorities and perspectives. Though chapter 1 emphasized that NGOs are far from angelic, they are more prone to openly advocate for values such as peace, cooperation, truth, love and forgiveness. Thus, the inclusion of nonstate actors in conflict resolution, through Track 1.5, entails not just a change of cast, but a total cognitive shift in what it means to 'do peace'.

**Multi-Track Diplomacy**

Despite its many advantages, Track 1.5 diplomacy, on its own, is not likely to generate lasting peace. In fact, no single diplomacy track can stand alone (Joseph 2003). This realization inspired 'Multi-Track' Diplomacy, the theoretical development of Louise Diamond and John McDonald (2001). They advocate for systems thinking in peace work: both the parts and their interactions contribute to the whole. Whereas Track II diplomacy supports and creates the space for Track I, multi-track diplomacy lacks hierarchy; no track is more essential than the other. Instead, tracks are described as components in a circle, each reinforcing the others. Multi-Track diplomacy breaks down conflict resolution work far beyond the simplistic state / non-state binary. The “multipolarity of the new global order” suggests increased influence of smaller actors and the increasing importance of collaboration between them (Mawlawi 1993, p. 392). Thus, Diamond and McDonald identify nine tracks in all: government (track 1), nongovernmental professional (track 2), business (3), private citizen (4), research, training and education (5), activism (6), religion (7), funding (8), and communication and the
media (9) (2001, p. ii). As the international system changes, conception of Multi-Track Diplomacy must also evolve to include new actors and interactions.

The innovation of this methodology extends beyond a list of actors. Diamond and McDonald also suggest new ways of conceptualizing and categorizing peace work (see Figure 3.1). In chapter 2, peacebuilding was seen as an alternative framework to peacekeeping. Here, all three strategies – peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding – are considered essential to peace work and can be accomplished by any one of nine actors. Certainly, some actors seem more suited to particular roles than others. Track 5, research, training and education, for example, is most likely to educate and build peace, but they may also advocate to make peace. Likewise, Track 6, activism, clearly fits best in an advocacy role, but may also use education or service-delivery to accomplish long-term strategic objectives. More generalized actors like nongovernmental professionals can easily transition between all three forms. This “captures the ideal of pluralism and overcomes the ‘zero-sum’ game so often associated with resource-based conflict” (Rupesinghe 1995, p. 11).

Figure 3.1: Systems Thinking in Peace Work

Advocacy -keeping
Action -making
Education -building

Source: Diamond and McDonald 2001, p. 16

The complexity of Multi-Track Diplomacy has many implications for how
NGOs should proceed in conflict work. First and most basically, NGOs should be present, directly engaged in conflict response; if any of the nine spokes of the wheel are missing, peace will not take off. On the flip side, while NGOs are critical participants, they are not exclusive. NGOs must be humble about the limitations of their role, and work to build the capacity of other actors. Finally, NGOs should leap at any opportunity to collaborate with other tracks; interconnected spokes operate far more effectively than isolated rods. This cooperate-or-fail plea permeates third sector literature, and is far easier said than done. Methods of enhancing collaboration are further explored in chapters 4 and 10.

**Carving Space: An On-going Process**

If theorists accept only Realist propositions about international relations, NGOs have no place in conflict response. Even beyond conflict, NGOs, according to Realism, are irrelevant to international power dynamics. However, the fact that NGOs have had enormous impact on policy, social structure, and the human condition discredits mainstream Realist thought.

The rest of this chapter offers alternative theories that open the door ever wider for NGO intervention in conflict. Liberalism recognizes the potency of non-state actors and validates nonconfrontational conflict resolution methods. Constructivism helps to explain how NGO advocacy and education can be meaningful in conflict transformation. Critical theories, including Marxism and Non-Marxist Radical Thought, underscore the value of NGO conflict response
aimed at alleviating poverty and generating social equality. Finally, the various diplomacy tracks (II, 1.5 and 2-9) expand the definition of conflict resolution from one state-to-state model, to a complex web of interacting actors and diverse activities. In sharp contrast to the Realist belief that states are solely responsible for peace, Multi-Track Diplomacy makes it everyone's responsibility.

From a theoretical perspective, it becomes clear that NGOs have a big role to play in resolving conflicts. Although alternate theories presented here remain marginalized in contrast to dominant beliefs like Realism and Track I Diplomacy, new paradigms are gaining traction. As NGOs continue to test new methods and work beyond their comfort zones, academic theory will shift to reflect the emerging capacity of these citizen mediators. In the following chapter, I look beyond the theoretical to real-world challenges experienced by nongovernmental conflict-responders.
CHAPTER 4: NGOS IN CONFLICT

Understanding NGO Opportunities

The last two chapters opened with traditional perspectives on international peace work: conflict management and Political Realism. Because these approaches emphasize militarized force, rational incentives and official, state actors, they do not leave much room for NGO involvement in conflict. More contemporary theories, such as conflict transformation and Non-Marxist Radical Thought, contextualize NGO conflict intervention. Nonetheless, for traditional conflict intervenors, such as states and their diplomatic representatives, NGO involvement presents an enigma: just what can NGOs do?

This question has been the object of peace scholars' investigation for several decades. A range of case studies, surveys and typologies document the breadth of potential activities. In order to suggest the wide diversity of activities – to indicate the enormous potential missed by excluding NGOs from conflict intervention – I have included a (far from comprehensive) list of activities. These are not merely hypothetical roles but methods used by existing NGOs either before, during or after existing conflicts (see Aall 2009; Barnes 2005; Bartoli 2009; Blum 2001; Butalia 2004; Gidron et al. 2002; Kuchinsky 1999; Ropers 2002; Steward 1998).²

Addressing Immediate Needs

- Airlifting food, clean water, health care supplies, and sanitation equipment

² These activities are bulleted here in order to facilitate quantitative analysis of NGO activities, presented in chapter 8.
Constructing shelter for homeless victims

Repairing salvageable structures

Providing emergency shelter for refugees

Treating life-threatening illnesses and injuries

Enhancing Local Capacity for Self-Help

Supporting the healthy functioning of markets through coordination, monitoring, subsidies, cash flow, etc.

Building the financial, technical and social capacity of local civil society organizations – NGOs, trade unions, religious organizations, research and education institutions, etc.

Lending microfinance credit to non-combatants for small enterprise

Training conflict-stricken communities in alternative livelihoods, such as new forms of agriculture and marketable goods production

Promoting Short-Term Security

Creating zones of peace, areas declared outside the purview of war, through negotiation with armed forces

Monitoring protests and demonstrations to ensure they remain peaceful

Training community leaders in peaceful violence de-escalation

Reducing Conflict at the Grassroots; Problem-Solving with Civilians

Mediating discussion between middle-level leaders of warring groups in
order to develop trust through 'successive approximation' and identify conflict solutions

- Promoting grassroots dialogue between members of diverse ethnic and religious groups
- Training grassroots community and local civil society organizations about conflict resolution and non-violent strategies of social change
- Organizing and supporting individuals and communities in opposition to war / the use of violence
- Institutionalizing an ethos of peace and nonviolence by coordinating government agencies and educational programs
- Creating 'next-generation' peace program such as youth camps, intercultural schools etc.
- Raising awareness about alternatives to violence through art, concerts, demonstrations for peace processes and protests at the use of militarized force

_Urging Action by Other Members of the International Community_

- Testifying before government committees, IGOs and NGO coalitions regarding local conflict conditions, interests of warring parties, opportunities for a peaceful future, or instances of human rights abuse
- Alerting states, IGOs, and other NGOs about conflict potential ('early warning')
- Publishing information (via organizational reports, public service
announcements, news alerts, etc.) about on-going conflict situations, including body counts, areas of need, changing power relations, and human rights violations

- Advocating for non-violent methods of state and IGO conflict response
- Encouraging multinational corporations to use conflict sensitive employment practices, to end resource extraction, or to pull out of the country

**Mediating Conflicts with Party Representatives**

- Conducting confidential, legally-binding negotiations with top officials of each party
- Facilitating informal problem-solving workshops with national-level leaders
- Implementing non-Western ('traditional African') methods of conflict resolution with representatives

**Advocating for the Needs of Vulnerable Populations**

- Collecting and disseminating information about the experiences and perspectives of vulnerable groups (women, children, refugees, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, etc.)
- Pushing states and IGOs to incorporate the needs of vulnerable groups in peace agreements
- Pressuring the host government to create infrastructure to meet the needs
of local populations

- Insisting on forward-looking justice in the peace settlement process
- Rallying local communities for participation in protests and demonstrations for human rights

_Promoting Psychological Healing_

- Running grassroots-level talking circles to help individuals and communities overcome the experience of trauma
- Using media (radio, television, newspapers, etc.) to humanize both parties and instill optimism about a future of peace
- Organizing cooperative economic development or environmental restoration across current or former opposing groups to encourage collaboration towards mutual goals
- Coordinating peace commissions for fact-finding, apology and forgiveness

_Supporting Infrastructure for a Functioning Democracy_

- Supervising elections (including campaigns and post-election inauguration) to ensure a nonviolent, fair, inclusive process
- Monitoring and supporting judicial function
- Protecting freedom of speech through independent media

_Assisting in the Rehabilitation of Post-Conflict Populations_

- Reintegrating, housing and educating refugees
Training former military personnel and rebel forces
- Facilitating weapons-for-work programs
- Sustained involved in reconstruction and conflict sensitive development

Classifying Roles

As the inexhaustive list above depicts, NGOs in conflict have enormous potential for intervention. More than anything, this brief survey of activities suggests the surprising number and diversity of intervention strategies NGOs can and have assumed. No particularly compelling framework has emerged to categorize NGO interventions (Ricigliano 2003). Scholars and practitioners continue struggling to move away from 'a la carte' style programming to more holistic, integrated approaches.

One common approach is to classify activities by organizational form. For example, Aall (2009) describes five types of conflict intervening NGOs (see Table 4.1). These prototypes include no overlapping activities: humanitarian NGOs provide immediate relief; human rights organizations report abuses and demand adherence to international norms; capacity building NGOs support local infrastructure and civil society; conflict resolution NGOs mediate, negotiate and promote dialogue; and conflict monitoring organizations brief other international actors on imminent, existing and former conflicts. Ropers (2002) takes a similar approach. However, the fact that he identifies six organizational categories, different from Aall's classification, suggests that this typology is not self-evident, and practitioners do not necessarily classify their activities based on these
categories.

Table 4.1: Types of Conflict Intervention Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>CARE, Save the Children, Oxfam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Peace Brigades International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Open Society Fund, National Democratic Institute, National Republican Institute, ICNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Carter Center, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conflict Management Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Monitoring</td>
<td>International Crisis Group, International Alert</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aall 2009, p. 6

Beyond the lack of consensus, such organizational typologies also create false divisions of labor between actors. As explained in chapter 1, organizations handicap themselves when they approach large, complex issues, like civil violence, with only one methodology or “theory of action” (Ricigliano 2003). Instead, organizations should be attune to the diversity of factors – needs, fears, values, and interests of innumerable actors – that contribute to the production of violence or injustice. NGOs should select interventions based not on predetermined organizational identity or donor RFPs (requests for proposal), but rather on greatest potential impact. A conceptual model is needed to drive this decision-making process.

Kuchinsky (1999) presents a multi-dimensional model for classifying peace work (see Table 4.2). Engagement entrance refers to the moment at which an organization intervenes. For example, a traditional development NGO that later transitions to relief work would be classified as having engaged 'pre-conflict'. Intervention aim, a related factor, also deals with the conflict timeline, but refers
to the specific activity at hand, rather than the whole organization's duration in the
country. What Kuchinsky calls 'society-level engagement' is most commonly
known as a 'vertical constituency', i.e. engagement across social hierarchies
(Lederach 1997; Ropers 2002). 'Horizontal constituency' is the theoretical
counterpart: engagement at the same social level but across warring parties. The
'intervention strategy', the most useful component of Kuchinsky's model, is
expanded in Table 4.3. Like others, Kuchinsky emphasizes that most NGOs today
continue to prioritize human needs over indirect or direct efforts.

Table 4.2: Multi-dimensional Model of NGO Conflict Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement Entrance</th>
<th>Intervention Aim</th>
<th>Levels of Conflict</th>
<th>Society-level Engagement</th>
<th>Intervention Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-conflict</td>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Sub-national</td>
<td>Grassroots</td>
<td>Human Needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In conflict</td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Indirect Efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>Rehabilitation</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>National Elites</td>
<td>Direct Efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Post-reconstruction / development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kuchinsky 1999

Table 4.3: Intervention Strategies Expanded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Needs</th>
<th>Indirect Efforts</th>
<th>Direct Efforts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relief and survival; Initial economy-sustaining programs; Trauma need; Combatant reintegration.</td>
<td>• Community reintegration projects • Capacity building • Conflict resolution education; • Human rights education; • Post-conflict rehabilitation and development; • Election monitoring.</td>
<td>• Negotiation; • Mediation; • Advocacy in local setting; • Advocacy in constituent setting; • Human rights monitoring; • Support of mediation processes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kuchinsky 1999
One significant flaw in the model is the failure to distinguish between advocacy and action. When an organization observes a particular need – such as mediation with national elites, local security, or inclusion of women's issues in negotiation processes – the organization can either respond directly to the need or urge another international body to act. These are two vastly different strategies which require different skills and position an organization differently, both with international actors and local communities.

Although incomplete, Kuchinsky's model best captures diverse dimensions of decision-making in NGO conflict intervention. As I analyze organizational activities in chapter 8, I use this model to consider trends, gaps and opportunities in organizational activity.

**Critiques of Humanitarian Relief Work**

Perhaps the most elementary function of the categories and models presented in the last two sections is a visual demonstration that NGOs can do far more than humanitarian relief. This is especially important as NGOs seek roles beyond the emergency aid they are accustomed to providing. Numerous sources agree that humanitarian relief (or, in Kuchinsky's terms, 'human needs intervention') often exacerbates suffering more than it solving it (Anderson 1996; Diprizio 1999; Hendrickson 2002; Lischer 2003; Okumu 2003; Stein 2001; Stewart 1998; Vogel 1996).

Humanitarian aid contributes resources, funding and infrastructure that facilitates warfare and supports warring factions. Food and supplies stolen from
aid caravans are sold on the black market, perpetuating the political economy of violence. Even when relief reaches its intended recipients, it still functions as a weapon of war. Any real or perceived inequality in resource distribution can exacerbate resentment between warring groups. Combatants compete to maximize their population's access to aid and deprive their opponents'. In order to deliver aid, NGOs have to obey guidelines set by warring groups, thereby legitimizing insurgents.

Short-term relief functions like a bandaid on a bullet wound: other actors tend to neglect local conditions because they assume NGOs have it covered. Local governments are less likely to emphasize infrastructure and economic development, communities, dependent on NGOs, are less likely to hold their government accountable:

When foreign grain is dumped in an African marketplace, it's more than likely that hungry children will be better fed for the next month or two. But when African farmers go bankrupt and leave the land, then foreign grain has had a very different effect: destroying local agriculture to create a permanent dependency on food from abroad. (Mark 1997, p. 12)

Because humanitarian NGOs focus on basic needs, the political structures responsible for ensuring social inclusion and justice are under-emphasized. Internationally, humanitarian assistance alleviates concerns about humanitarian crises; where foreign observers may have otherwise advocated for conflict resolution, they are instead content to sponsor NGOs' relief work.

Even in terms of immediate reduction in civilian deaths, emergency aid is often counterproductive. According to Stewart (1998), shipments of food are associated with “rising death rates during conflict... caused by diminished markets
and social entitlements, often combined with increased infection as a result of population movements and concentration” meant to centralize food recipients (p. 562).

Several attempts have been made to operationalize more responsible humanitarian aid. The most well-known attempt, called 'the Do No Harm Project', (DNH) was created in the early 1990s by humanitarian relief scholar Mary Anderson and the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA), a coalition of American NGOs. Today, DNH operates in 41 countries and advises some of the largest and most active humanitarian relief organizations. The project advocates for a “Seven Step Plan” of conflict analysis and program design, with emphasis on exploring the range of possible interventions:

- Understand the context of the conflict;
- Analyze 'dividers' and 'tensions';
- Analyze 'connectors' and local capacities for peace;
- Analyze the assistance program;
- Analyze the assistance program's impact on dividers and connectors (using the concept of resource transfers and explicit ethical messages);
- Generate programming options;
- Test options and redesign program.

(CDA 2004)

A similar effort, called 'the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium', strives to inform aid workers, as well as peacebuilding organizations, IGOs, and multinational corporations, about the importance of operating in countries of conflict with attention to the sociopolitical implications of their actions. They provide materials such as conflict assessment frameworks, a “conflict-sensitive poverty reduction strategy”, and methodologies on early warning and response (conflictsensitivity.org).
The underlying message of these projects is that humanitarian aid must be understood as a political action, a force for both benevolence and harm, with real and symbolic effects on conflict. Relief workers are learning that chaotic, volunteer-based, unprofessional, ad hoc aid delivery will not suffice. Fortunately, this trend toward conflict sensitive relief is also paralleled by a growing interest in more direct conflict response.

**Relative Strengths in Direct Conflict Intervention**

NGOs are not the most obvious actors in conflict resolution. They cannot threaten states with military occupation or economic sanctions, they have very limited ability to reward cooperative parties, and they do not have legal authority. Instead, their strengths lie in other areas. Bartoli (2009) describes six types of power: “reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, referent and informational” (p. 395). NGOs lack reward, coercive and legitimate powers, but they have strong expert and informational power derived from experience and connections. As value guardians, particularly when values such as peace, cooperation and egalitarianism are strongly reflected in their work, NGOs also have strong referent power.

In direct conflict intervention (mediation, negotiation and advocacy), NGOs have at least six significant advantages relative to other international actors:

*Lack of Coercive Power*

NGOs' unofficial status, their inability to apply typical measures of force
and coercion, can play largely in their favor. Just as workers more freely chatter with colleagues than with their boss, local leaders are more able to explore hypotheticals and express psychological needs with NGOs than with states or international bodies.

**Impartiality**

Unlike combatants, who are directly involved, or other states, which have implicit preferences and priorities, a “trusted impartial non-governmental mediator may advance proposals that the parties find acceptable, but which they could neither initiate themselves nor accept if proposed by the opposition or by a less disinterested party” (Malawi 1993, p. 399). Anderson (1996) proposes that impartiality is most effective if NGOs promote adherence to higher values such as non-violence, conflict resolution, and equality of opportunity in the mediation process. Several scholars emphasize that it is impartiality – and not neutrality – that facilitates effective negotiation. According to the Oxford Dictionary (1998), neutrality means “not helping or supporting either of two opposing sides”; impartiality means “treating all sides in a dispute, etc., equally; unprejudiced; fair”. An impartial (fair) NGO is not a doormat and certainly does not have to refrain from political participation, but rather strives to function as a moral compass, biased towards standards of justice, without preference for either warring group per se.
Flexibility and Creativity

Independence from states and constituencies allows NGOs the freedom to pursue untested strategies, to change tactics at the last minute, and to say things governments could not say. Because NGOs rely on people power and moral authority rather than positional power, they can use “innovate, creative, noncoercive strategies to persuade people to engage in peaceful processes based on dialogue and deliberation” (Barnes 2005 p. 5). In circumstances in which official actors would be unable to act “often related to mandates, lack of political will or the implications conveyed by the official status”, NGOs can intervene to reduce tensions and question expectations about roles and vulnerabilities.

Local Knowledge and Connections

Most NGOs – both international development organizations and national organizations – engage with a country pre-conflict. By the time conflict starts, these organizations have developed expertise about local culture, conditions and areas of need. Most importantly, they have established connections with local leaders, civil society and the government. If these organizations maintain ethical standards and work toward participatory development during pre-conflict stages, they are likely to generate trust in the community, enabling relational peace work (Bartoli 2009). Local knowledge also makes development NGOs prime candidates for early warning and response.
Established Systems

Similarly, previous experience in a country gives an NGO the advantage of existing organizational structures for response (Bakker 2001). Field staff are already 'on the ground', with offices, transportation and equipment. Programs of development can be slightly modified for conflict sensitivity and continued without reinventing the wheel. Set procedures for communication and goods delivery, specific to the country of interest, have already been practiced and honed.

Long-term Commitment

All three models of conflict response (management, resolution and transformation) agree that long-term engagement is a necessity for quality conflict intervention. States are often limited by political will and election cycles, while interstate organizations, with a mandate to ensure security all over the world, have enormous pressure to get in, get out and go elsewhere. By contrast, “NGOs can invest time in establishing credibility with disputing parties, gaining familiarity with the issues and psychological factors behind the conflict” and they can stay long after the peace agreement is signed to facilitate reconciliation, reconstruction and the implementation of justice.

NGOs rely on 'soft power' – credible information, expertise, moral authority, flexibility and ties to local groups (Karns 2004). In order to preserve these advantages, NGOs must deliver on their promises, remain accountable to the values they espouse, and learn to work adaptively with diverse actors,
standards and expectations. Bartoli (2009) adds NGOs must maintain confidentiality to build trust with national elites, but an argument could also be made that public mediation helps to build trust at the grassroots. Whichever method NGOs select, they should remain consistent, both in rhetoric and action.

The Security Challenge

Safety remains a constant challenge for NGOs in violent conflict. It is easy to forget when planning from afar that the principal reality of war is competitive injury. NGO staff have been caught in accidental fire, killed by land mines, taken prisoner by armed forces, and conscripted into combat. Many organizations pull out of conflict for fear of harm to staff, and the perception of increased risk is one factor preventing more NGOs from engaging in explicitly political conflict resolution.

Some organizations have begun to hire private security in the absence of available peacekeeping forces (Stein 2001). This helps to protect staff in the short-term, but reduces the quality of impact NGOs are able to have. Even if security companies are hired for 'good' (i.e. to protect relief workers or mediators), their very presence still threatens local communities and warring groups. Recent studies found that as “foreign troops have moved into conflict settings to protect aid workers with arms, they have provoked hostility among local warring factions that see those forces as another contender for power” (Anderson 1999, p. 63). Civilians are less likely to stop for tea or hold informal meetings at an NGO's office if located in isolated facilities, surrounded by barbed wire, with camera
surveillance and armed guards. Staff that arrive in fancy, bullet-proof sedans with a cadre of uniformed men carrying big rifles probably will not convince local women to participate in trauma recovery sessions. Many of the advantages listed in the previous section – lack of coercive power, unofficial status, adherence to values of non-violence, connection and closeness to local populations – disappear in the presence of private security. NGOs are no longer equals, colleagues in the pursuit of peace and justice, but rather elite do-gooders from afar.

Avant (2007) proposes a framework for decision-making about NGO security, what she calls the “Security Triangle” (see Figure 4.1). Management should balance acceptance (that some level of risk is inevitable), protection and deterrence. Rather than emphasizing the central importance of protecting NGO staff at all costs, Avant advises organizations to frame protection in terms of the mission. For example, if an organization seeks to alleviate poverty, then any form of violence is necessarily counter to the ultimate goal of the NGO. She explains, “rather than developing categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, identifying ‘threats’ and ‘enemies’, or defining issues over which a community is willing to use violence, this approach sees violence as the overall threat and uses the language of security to find ways to resolve conflicts without the use of violence” (150). Part of an NGO’s security is maintaining its moral authority as an impartial value guardian of peace. This conceptualization enables both staff safety and successful conflict transformation.
Avant also advocates for the use of more traditional security measures, like rigorous personnel management and high surveillance facilities, as well as institutionalization of security procedures so that safety is not just left up to the “skills and gumption of NGO personnel” (151). However, these practices do not gracefully coexist with either the mission-oriented Security Triangle or characteristics of successful Track II and Track 1.5 mediation – flexibility, constant innovation, freedom from bureaucratic delays, vulnerability in expressing psychological needs without threat of violence, accessibility to locals, and egalitarian downward accountability. Just as clashing priorities of 'national security' and 'human security' limit conflict management strategies, so NGOs are limited when they begin to prioritize their own security over adherence to their values. Organizations continue to seek balance between these competing objectives.

Coalition Building, Networks and Collaboration

After 'peace', one of the most common words in the field of NGO conflict resolution is 'collaboration'; scholars and practitioners pay constant lip service to the need for integrated resource and information-sharing across NGOs, between
sectors, and within the host country. Benefits are obvious: more rapid early warning and response; more strategic programming; greater capacity for intervention; stronger moral and legitimate authority in initiating mediation; fewer instances of working at cross-purposes; and less chaos (Barnes 2005; Ropers 2002; Rupesinghe 1995).

In spite of all the rhetoric, it comes as no surprise that the field is far from a united front. NGOs have enormous pressures against cooperating with each other (Reimann 2005). They compete for the same funding sources, the same collection of government bureaucracies, foundations and individual donors. While RFPs often require that NGOs 'collaborate' (a stipulation that produces forced, paper-thin partnerships), in reality, limited resources yield tough competition. In order to demonstrate their productivity, organizations use short-term, quantitative metrics; the qualitative impacts of collaboration, such as trust, moral authority and long-term strategy, are devalued. In order to improve collaboration and promote more sustainable approaches to peacebuilding, it is critical that organizations develop better evaluation techniques to include qualitative, long-term measures.

Organizations also approach conflicts from completely different world views. Each agency brings its own perspectives about what's good for a conflict; organizational culture and inertia prevent NGOs from rapidly evolving to incorporate alternate views (Karns 2004). Relief organizations have theories of humanitarian action and mediators have theories of mediation, but very rarely do any actors step back to consider how the whole process might work together (Ricigliano 2003). This is an essential activity for an integrated approach to
conflict transformation. In order to generate meaningful collaboration, NGOs must be prepared to *mediate between themselves* to develop a mutual understanding of roles, strategies, causes of conflict, prioritized solutions, values and approaches (Reimann 2005).

Ricigliano (2003) proposes a “Network of Effective Action” (NEA), a loose coalition of organizations working in conflict (p. 457). He emphasizes that the network should not be formalized nor have specific requirements about methods of collaboration. “Central planning” and “formal hierarchies”, he explains, only detract from the flexibility and independence of NGOs; “more simply, an NEA is essentially a communication network with a common goal” (ibid).

Cooperation with governments are hampered by internal pressures on states and IGOs, including political mandates, confidentiality, legal restrictions, election cycles, traditions, and standards of operation. Internal competition within the UN, EU, or government bureaucracies distract state and interstate actors from long-term integration. Relationships are further strained when governments try to use NGOs to hide their direct involvement in a country of conflict (Bartoli 2009).

In hopes to increase NGO-state collaboration, McDonald (2004) surveyed diplomats working with NGO conflict intervenors. He heard repeatedly a great sense of frustration with the ineptitude, lack of professionalism and ignorance of NGO staff. Diplomats’ “anecdotes often present NGOs as being demanding, impatient, stubborn and overly aggressive on their single issue” (xiii). Of course, NGO staff could probably tell similar 'horror stories' about diplomats. The point is
not the flaw of one or the one group, but rather the lack of communication and understanding between the two sectors. Certain tips may help organizations to work more effectively with officials. Per McDonald's findings, organizations should: know the timelines, election cycles and personal priorities of politicians and help them meet their goals; respect diplomats’ time and convey information only as needed when needed; and build personal relationships, rather than relying solely on more distanced forms of advocacy like letters and emails.

Finally, collaboration within the host country – i.e. 'downward accountability' – should be paramount to all other partnerships (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001). 'Vertical' (across social rungs) and 'horizontal' (across warring groups) constituencies should be fostered to counter traditional “war constituencies” (Ropers 2002, p. 116). NGOs have been least successful in cultivating diverse vertical constituencies because few organizations maintain contacts at multiple social levels. Generally, organizations develop habits of interaction – the Carter Center, for example, works with national elites while the Crisis Management Institute works at the grassroots (Bartoli 2009). Organizations should learn to be flexible in their procedures and operations in order to support build coalitions across social classes.

The field of peace and conflict resolution, especially among civilians acting independently for higher values, is strongly motivated by the notion of a 'social movement'. Many participants in peace work are eager to create powerful coalitions of passionate civilians in order to restructure society in comprehensive and fundamental ways (Ropers 2002). However, institutional and organizational
realities inhibit effective collaboration. Thus, individuals (staff, representatives, leaders, etc.) have to develop systems, incentives, procedures and traditions that promote integrated peacebuilding. Ricigliano (2003) cautions against simple answers: “The alternative to these entrenched, though sometimes counterproductive practices, is not to replace them with another preset division of labor or to make the practice of peacebuilding even more chaotic” (p. 456). Instead, diverse international actors should continue to struggle with and work through dynamic relations, constantly seeking opportunities for mutual understanding.

This chapter has presented numerous challenges: the categorization and modeling of NGO activities; the harms and unintended consequences of humanitarian relief work; the narrow distinction between impartiality and neutrality; the need for security without compromising organizational values; and the struggle to collaborate within the confines of a competitive international system. In the case studies that follow, I examine how organizations today are addressing such challenges in two countries of conflict, Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire.
CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY: SOMALIA AND COTE D'IVOIRE

Case Study Justification

In order to examine NGOs' activities in countries in conflict, I consider six organizations in each of two conflicts: Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire. Both countries are considered among the least peaceful in the world. High intensity violence in both countries is contextualized by extreme poverty. Response is urgent, local conditions are dire, and the needs of these countries fit NGO objectives to help the vulnerable.

In both countries, conflicts are presently occurring, an important practical consideration in order to examine NGOs' current responses. The conflicts are widespread, not limited to a single region of the country. This means no organization can feasibly ignore the existence of conflict. Either NGOs leave, provide humanitarian assistance, or engage directly.

Both Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire have low international visibility. Neither appears frequently in newspapers of developed countries nor is considered significant for international political or economic concerns (Lacey 2001; Desbarats 2006; Szabo 2006). While Somalia of fifteen years ago was labeled a 'terrorist threat' by Western democracies, it has since taken a back seat to other North African and West Asian countries; no U.S. or UN peacekeeping forces have occupied Somalia since 1995 (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/). Cote d'Ivoire has some international support, including UN occupation since 2004. However, the shock and awe that keeps states and international donors and media involved

---

3According to the 2010 Global Peace Index, Somalia is the 2nd least peaceful country and Cote d'Ivoire the 32nd. Since then, Cote d'Ivoire has become increasingly violent following post-election conflict in December 2010.
with Somalia has not been a factor for Cote d'Ivoire (Convergence of Cultures 2011; Gray 2011). In both cases, international neglect, coupled with the high incidence of violence, suggests a strong mandate for NGO action.

Finally, despite the prevalence of violence, both countries still have a relatively active civil sector. Whereas closed societies, like North Korea or Burma, would not permit NGO activity, NGOs can and do operate in both Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire.

Two major differences distinguish conflict in these countries: dispersion of power and duration of violence. Power in Somalia is dispersed between multiple warlords and clans governed by almost no central authority, while Cote d'Ivoire has a strong central government with conflict rooted in imminent state collapse. This tests hypothesis #1 that the dispersion of power in society dictates the social level at which NGOs operate. In Somalia, NGOs will be more effective at the grassroots level, while NGOs in Cote d'Ivoire may operate more at the level of civil society or national elites. Second, Somalia’s “intractable” conflict has lasted for decades, while overt violence in Cote d'Ivoire only surfaced in December of 2010. This tests hypothesis #2 that NGOs intervene most directly in the earliest stages of conflict.

In this chapter, I provide a brief history and analysis of each conflict, as well as an overview of recommendations in the literature about how the international community should respond. It is important to remember that these accounts, like any historical or political narrative, are inherently biased, not some apolitical record of facts. The way a conflict is described determines which
solutions appear 'obvious'. A conflict history in military terms would seem to require a military response; in humanitarian terms, a humanitarian response. Likewise, the traditional exclusion of civilians, women, children, minority groups, and rural populations from prevalent narratives about conflict results in their exclusion from peace agreements and reconstruction efforts. (This suggests one important role for NGOs: conflict monitoring and reporting from the grassroots perspective.)

In the following overview, I attempt to balance traditional (i.e. political / military) accounts and the less readily available histories focused on grassroots conditions and abstract conflict drivers. These descriptions contextualize NGO activities and suggest opportunities, but should not be considered complete. For an NGO operational in either Somalia or Cote d'Ivoire, it is critical that staff have far more extensive local awareness.

**Somalia: A Long History**

*A Brief Overview of the Country*

Located in the tumultuous Horn of Africa, Somalia has been a site of 'intractable conflict' since 1991, and is ranked #1 in the 2010 *Foreign Policy* Index of 'State Failure'. Famine, disease and widespread violence have caused immense human suffering and displacement; violence between national elites distracts the international community from assisting with local recovery.

Before colonization, independent subclans occupied distinct, but unofficially demarcated geographic areas (Gutale 2008). Rather than top-down
governance, they relied on xeer, or informal rules of social order, to govern intra- and inter-clan relations (Abdillahi 1998). The consolidation of clans under one centralized government was a product of European colonization: Britain claimed Somalia in the 19th century, and in the 1940s, Italy challenged Britain for control. The resulting territories were divided into British Somaliland and Italian Somalia. After World War II, the areas were rejoined and the Somali Republic began a long struggle for independence, which it finally achieved in 1960.

Today, numerous clans, sub-clans (sub-sub-clans, etc.) and family networks dictate most power relations in the country (Gettleman 2007). Control of the central government, operating out of the capital, Mogadishu, remains the leading manifest cause of conflict. Two regions of the country, Somaliland and Puntland, have existed as semi-independent units, removed from the heart of Somali violence (see Figure 5.1). People in these regions experience less emergent chaos than their southern counterparts although violence between Somaliland and Puntland emerged in 2007, regarding disputed territories at their mutual border (“Analysis on...” 2009).
In comparison to its neighbors, Somalia is more ethnically and religious homogeneous. Most are Sunni Muslim and 85% of the population is Somali. Yet, some observers maintain that conflict in the region has religious and ethnic roots. For example, al-Shabaab, an opposition group that controls two-thirds of south and central Somalia, seeks a stricter version of Sharia law (Inside Story 2010).

Somalia is home to an estimated 9.3 million people, of which 2.8 million live in the capital. According to recent estimates by the UNHCR, about 1.5 million people have been displaced by conflict and drought (MacDonald 1992). Little progress has been made in the country toward the UN Millennium Development Goals. There is no reliable data on income in the country, due to widespread violence and pastoral nomadism (www.mdgmonitor.org). However, 940,000 people are known to be “in a state of acute food and livelihood crisis” and at least 43% of the population is in immediate need of humanitarian assistance (“Somalia: Persistent...” 2011; www.dfid.gov.uk/). According to UNICEF, the primary school enrollment rate falls below 23%. Girls, nomads and
rural children are the least likely to receive education (Moyi 2010). Similar
gender gaps exist in employment, health care and governance (Abdillahi 1998;
Gutale 2008). Human rights violations, violence against women and children, and
the persecution of minorities have become commonplace occurrences (Kimenyi et
al. 2010). However, in national governance and international intervention, such
issues take a back burner to persistent political chaos.

*Current Political Landscape*

The dominant explanation for Somalia's conflict relates to the current
power struggle between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the
insurgent opposition, al-Shabaab. United Nations Special Envoy for Somalia
Ahmedou Ould Abdallah summarizes this perspective:

The conflict in Somalia... is neither a liberation struggle, nor an ethnic or
religious war. It is also not just a struggle for power among the clans, as
many believe. The frequently shifting allegiances between and within
clans demonstrate that other factors are also responsible for the continued
instability of the country. Within Somalia, warlords, activists, and their
private militias have perpetuated the chaos and violence for their own
benefit. Overall, a small group drawn from various backgrounds and
driven by lust for money and power is fighting to fill the political vacuum.
Some do not want peace at all. (2007, para 2).

This narrative, about the influence of corrupt, power-seeking elites,
derlies the bulk of Western dialogue about Somalia. Two other buzzwords are
frequently used in association with the country: 'piracy' and 'terrorism'. Whether
true or exaggerated, these loaded words implicitly delegitimize opposition groups.
Looting along the Somali coast is often seen, by Western democracies, to pose a
grave threat, when in fact it is nothing more than a “distraction from the tragic

Gutale (2008) adds that even if groups like al-Shabaab are corrupt, lusting for money and power, and flagrantly violating human rights, these groups also have strong public support: “individual subclan members are expect to amass wealth while they have power and are required to share that wealth with the rest of kin” (p. 46). Similarly, these political rivalries are only the surface, manifest causes of conflict. To demonstrate the complexity of conflict causes, Gutale includes a chart listing 11 different regions in Somalia, each with dozens of clans and at least three different drivers of conflict, such as: land ownership, religious differences, resource abundance, water shortages, and deforestation.

Several observers, including scholar Ahmed Samatar and the International Crisis Group, agree that a “disproportionate amount of international media attention [focuses] on Mogadishu and the grim stories of violence and TFG dysfunction, [which] distracts from the positive developments and remarkable peacebuilding and state formation processes now under way in central and northern Somalia” (Abdi 2011, para 7). It is true that Somalia has not had stable governance for at least twenty years. However, at the local level, administrators and civil society organizations have been able to produce areas of relative peace. Although death rates remain high, humanitarian needs (hunger, lack of water, health care, etc.) go unmet, and centralized (i.e. European-style) government has failed, Samatar protests the widespread international belief that Somalia is hopeless. Instead, he contends that hope lies with grassroots leadership, region by region.
Somalia: Recommended Next Steps

The International Crisis Group advocates for a more decentralized alternative to the corruption and violence of the national government. “Since independence, one clan, or group of clans, has always used control of the center to take most of the resources and deny them to rival clans. Thus, whenever a new transitional government is created, Somalis are naturally wary and give it limited, or no, support, fearing it will only be used to dominate and marginalize them” (“Somalia: The Transitional Government” 2011, para 2). States, like Somaliland and Puntland, have already broken free, and others, like Jubaland, seem to be on the same path. In the absence of national infrastructure and compelling leadership, communities continue to root their identity in clans and local geography. Fragmentation, or at least sub-national empowerment, may be key to achieving non-violence and forward-looking justice.

However, few in the international community embrace this perspective. For example, UN representative Ahmedou Ould Abdallah considers three, and only three, possible actions: proceed as usual, pull out of the country, or increase political and security measures – Track I negotiation with national elites and military assistance to the African Union (Security Council Meeting 2007). None of these options represent a shift away from major warring sub-groups.

From this local-national debate, many recommendations have emerged for peacebuilding in Somalia. NGOs may be dominant or primary actors in any one of these activities:
• Support economic development in relatively peaceful regions such as Somaliland and Puntland (Abdi 2011);
• Extend humanitarian and development assistance to “areas recently recovered from armed groups”, particularly focused on job creation for the young unemployed (“Somalia: UN Conference” 2011; Kimenyi et al. 2010);
• Build the capacity of local administrators in order to strengthen decentralized governance and support structures of justice (“Somalia: The Transitional Government” 2011);
• Hold peace negotiations in Somalia – to instill a greater sense of local ownership for agreements reached – with TFG and rival forces, especially al-Shabaab (Stevenson 2007);
• Promote mediation, negotiation and reconciliation “with 'states' [Jubaland, Puntland, etc], regional authorities, civil society and the diaspora” (“Somalia: UN Conference” 2011);
• Monitor the TFG and advocate for: transparency, cooperation with other clans, security reform, “anti-corruption efforts”, and “meaningful restructuring” (“Somalia: The Transitional Government” 2011);
• Work to end “piracy, human smuggling, illegal fighting and the dumping of toxic waste” (“Somalia: UN Conference” 2011);
• Interrupt the flow of small arms trade and “disarm the population” (Kimenyi et al. 2010);
• Implement grassroots education, including literacy skills, citizenship
training and peace education in order to “promote the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values... that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural” (UNICEF, qtd in Elmi 2009).

**Cote d'Ivoire: Peace Thwarted**

*A Brief Overview of the Country*

Unlike Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire has not had consistent violence since its independence and is not dominated by clan-based rivalries. On the contrary, Cote d'Ivoire initially experienced strong economic growth following independence, with political stability in the central government. During the economic downturn of the 1980s, tensions began to rise between the mostly Muslim north and the mostly Christian south (Little 2011). Both the capital, Yamoussoukro, and the country's largest city, Abidjan, are located in the south, nearer to sea ports, where positions of power are held mostly by 'pure' Ivoirians (see figure 5.2). The north, by contrast, is home to many immigrants and people of mixed-heritage. This has been the basis for strong ethnic and religious tensions. By 2002, full-out civil war divided the country; an unstable peace resumed in 2007. In December of 2010, post-election violence resulted in the “most serious humanitarian and human rights crisis in Cote d'Ivoire since the de facto partition of the country in September 2002” (Amnesty International “Six Months” 2011). The emerging situation has elicited international response, as hundreds of civilians are killed and thousands flee to neighboring countries.
Approximately 21.6 million people live in Cote d'Ivoire, representing more than 60 ethnic groups, including Baoule, Senoufo, Bete and Lagoon (World Bank; “Ivory Coast Society” 1988). The country's conflict is contextualized by poverty and stagnant development. Extreme poverty is not as prevalent in Cote d'Ivoire as in Somalia, although the percentage of Ivoirians living on less than $1 a day has steadily increased since the 1990s (United Nations 2010). The lowest quintile makes up a shrinking proportion of national consumption, from 7% in 1993 to just 5% in 2002. Undernourishment, infant mortality and disease (HIV / AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis) are endemic problems, exacerbated by violence. While the country has a relatively high rate of employment (81.2% of eligible males work), the gender disparity in employment, as in education, is enormous. Amnesty International reports consistent human rights violations, including media censure, systematic rape, arbitrary detention and torture, even during periods of relative peace from 2007 to 2010.
Current Political Landscape

Since the arrest of former President Laurent Gbagbo, overt political conflict has subsided. For many in the international community, this is an immense sign of hope, a turning point in the history of Cote d'Ivoire. However, violence by armed forces continues and tensions remain high. A flourishing arms trade persists in Abidjan and the empty houses of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are frequently looted (“Cote d'Ivoire: Reluctant to Return Home” 2011). Thousands of people remain displaced, suffering immense physical and psychological trauma. Moreover, as the splintering of the pro-Ouattara groups demonstrates, historic divisions between the geographic north and south linger in the hearts and minds of the people, in spite of the seemingly stable democracy.

Bariyo (2007) identifies four main causes of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. Political competition, the most obvious cause, has continued since 1990, with periodic mutinies of government soldiers. Both social and economic factors drive tensions between the north and south. There has been an uneven distribution of development. Since the south has major cities, oil refineries and coastal access, it proves far more lucrative to corporations and foreign governments. Socially, ethnic and religious clashes between the north and south have been reinforced by decades of ivoirité policies. Immigrants and mixed-heritage residents of the north are “denied passports and even national identity despite being citizens” (p. 31). Ideological differences between Christians and Muslims have been linked to existing inequalities, producing a sense of irreconcilable identity. These internal
factors are further amplified by external conditions in the greater West African region, where “ethnic tensions and rivalries, political instability, disputes over the control of natural resources, natural disaster, poverty, food insecurity, and the imperatives of development have all resulted in significant population displacement” (Jessice Wyndham, qtd in Bariyo 2007, p. 32). As people and arms migrate across borders, the resources and motivation for violence are shared between neighboring countries.

The case of Cote d'Ivoire exemplifies the messiness of terms like 'conflict prevention' and 'reconstruction'. One might argue that the period from 2007-2010 was merely “abeyant intractability”, conflict suspended in the presence of a cease fire, but not resolved (Crocker et al. 2009). Interventions in the early months of 2010 might thus, be explained only as ongoing 'conflict transformation'. The more prevalent narrative about Cote d'Ivoire maintains that peace was achieved in 2007 and the violence of 2011 represented a new conflict (Inside Story 2011). From this perspective, intervention in 2010 would be considered 'conflict prevention'. Whether the causes of conflict remain constant across distinct instances of violence in the country, for NGOs the conflict of 2011 can pragmatically be considered 'conflict prevention' since the interim reduction in violence permitted three years of peace-like socio-economic development.

Cote d'Ivoire: Recommended Next Steps

The success of peacebuilding in Cote d'Ivoire over the next year will be critical for the future of the country. Relative stability under President Ouattara
suggests an opportunity for comprehensive reconciliation and restructuring. As with Somalia, any of the following recommendations could be undertaken by national or international NGOs:

- Continue / resume economic development, with an eye toward equal outcomes in both the north and south; since the south is currently more prosperous, this may mean extra attention in the north (Bariyo 2007);
- Promote fact-finding efforts, truth commissions, reconciliation, and public negotiation for transitional justice (Affa'a-Mindzie 2009; Yabi 2011);
- Emphasize traditional methods of reconciliation, using techniques of positive-sum mediation, reintegration and atonement (Bariyo 2007; Zartman 2002);
- Support President Ouattara in his effort to re-establish the rule of law, and “bring to justice” those individuals responsible for serious war crimes and human rights abuses (Amnesty International “Video” 2011);
- Support the development of a stronger, more independent and credible election commission (Affa'a-Mindzie 2009);
- Encourage both sides to respect the cease-fire (“Cote d'Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?” 2011);
- Hold peace talks between RHDP (Ouattara's party: Union of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace) and LMP (Gbagbo's party: The Presidential Majority); include local civil society leaders (ibid);
- Work to reintegrate massive numbers of returning refugees (ibid);
- Implement programs of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration,
with equal emphasis on both major armed groups (Bariyo 2007);

- Use national media sources to foster public support for a peaceful and unified future (ibid);
- Include Cote d'Ivoire in international media to increase stakes for peace in the country, and to hold Ouattara's government more accountable (Gray 2011).

Recommendations offered for Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire demonstrate that NGOs have numerous opportunities for intervention, despite intractability in the former and elite politics in the latter. In the following chapter, I provide an overview of organizations working in the countries, from withdrawal, through strategies of basic humanitarian relief, to direct conflict intervention. With six target NGOs in each country, I compare internal dynamics, such as funding and structure, and assess their level of engagement with conflict resolution as a programmatic strategy.
NGOs Pulling Out of Conflict

Despite the magnitude of need in Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire, there are not as many NGOs in these countries as in impoverished but peaceful locations such as Bangladesh or Haiti. When need is most intense, i.e. when violence erupts, deteriorating the social, psychological, economic, political and institutional components of society, many NGOs evacuate. The cause is not hard to discern; organizations must be concerned for the safety of their staff and the unintended political implications of their work. Intergovernmental organizations and international financial institutions, like the UN and World Bank, respectively, tend to cut back on all activities in the country other than peacekeeping. As a result, NGOs lose both funding and operational support (d'Almeida 2011). Finally, international NGOs (INGOs) have to consider the opportunity costs of working in conflict. If an organization intends to end poverty worldwide, they may not view conflict intervention as the most efficient use of their time and resources.

According to AlertNet, a self-identified “humanitarian news site”, the Cote d'Ivoire civil war saw a dramatic decrease in NGO involvement over a three week period following an rash of escalating violence (2004). Relief agencies evacuated staff and recuperated what they could of their damaged equipment. The same pattern of rapid evacuation has occurred in response to recent post-election violence. For years, Handicap International had been providing health assistance to disabled refugees. The organization evacuated pre-emptively in 2009. Similarly, the Norwegian Refugee Council had been doing development and
reconstruction work since the civil war of 2002. In 2010, the organization explained, “Due to the insecurity linked to the post-electoral crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, NRC has suspended most of its field activities.”

Secours Catholique, a French NGO, seeks to implement principles of the church: “the dignity of the human person, justice, solidarity, brotherhood, reconciliation, peace, the best option for the poor, integrated development of the human person, subsidarity, the universal destination of goods, the indivisibility of rights”. Despite stated objectives for long-term change, the organization still pulled out of Cote d'Ivoire in 2010. The organization's mission commits to “fighting against the causes of poverty”, which certainly include conflict. With $210 million and 65,000 volunteers, Secours International even had substantial capacity to provide its own security and experiment with new conflict interventions. Like many others, they removed their field staff, initially provided monetary assistance to NGOs that stayed, and later, disconnected from the country altogether.

Kouassi (2011) observes that INGOs “suffer from the current disinformation campaign portraying them as logistical supporters for pro-Ouattara forces”, the internationally recognized government (para 1). As a result, INGO staff are more frequently killed by pro-Gbagbo troops. AlertNet suggests this may be because warring groups have grown accustomed to the UN, which engages in both military and humanitarian activities (2004). Combatants learn to distrust humanitarian aid workers. In Abidjan in particular, this means local NGOs are forced to take up the slack where international organizations left off (Kouassi
Unsurprisingly, local NGOs do not have the financial, staffing or informational capacity to assume all the duties of INGOs.

Another example of NGO evacuation demonstrates a shocking case of missed opportunity. Africare considers itself a “leader in development assistance and humanitarian aid to Africa” with work in more than 36 countries on the conflict-ridden continent. The organization touts its “unparalleled knowledge of the continent, its challenges and opportunities”, and has well-established “relationships with key figures ranging from community leaders and traditional authorities to presidents and prime ministers”. In other words, Africare describes itself as a textbook example of an effective Track 1.5 mediator: it has developed knowledge, trust and relationships over a long period of time at multiple levels of society. Africare could be a pioneer in the resolution of Ivoirian conflict. Instead, the organization “ceased activities” in 2005 due to “civil disturbance”.

Similarly, Africare had been working in Somalia in the 1970s. While the country underwent widespread famine in 1975 and the Ogaden War in 1978, Africare provided emergency relief to refugees and IDPs. When conflict subsided in the 1980s, the organization was even able to initiate development work, with programs for agriculture and environmental sustainability. After the outbreak of civil war in 1991, Africare attempted to provide humanitarian aid, but eventually gave up and left in 1994. Even the world’s oldest and largest African-American development organization, with a firm commitment to ending poverty, has avoided Somalia for the past 17 years.

NGOs leaving Somalia are not as easy to trace as in Cote d’Ivoire since
conflict did not begin as recently. However, many of the organizations still working in Somalia report the absence of their peers. Trocaire, an international development organization, explains that it is “one of the few remaining NGOs operating in Somalia”. This begs the question: if it is so dangerous that the majority of INGOs have evacuated, what inspires some to stay? The persistence of certain organizations seems to be motivated by a commitment to the particular needs of the country’s people which cannot be calculated in terms of opportunity costs or efficiencies elsewhere. Sarah Omwane of Save the Children UK explains, “It is very simple. We can maintain our program in Somalia and children can live. Or we can leave, and children can die.”

Survey of NGOs in Each Country

While it is concerning that so many organizations have left Somalia and Cote d’Ivoire when they were most needed, dwelling on their absence is also problematic. Organizations that stick around begin to seem heroic despite mundane activities. Is Save the Children UK really securing a better future for Somali children via food aid and basic education? The question is at least worth investigating.

Table 6.1 lists NGOs operating in Somalia by activity; the same can be found for Cote d’Ivoire in table 6.2. Both of these tables were generated through haphazard selection for an overview of organizations in target countries. These are neither complete nor representative samples. For Somalia, I began with the listing provided by the Somalia NGO Consortium and added additional organizations via
snowball sampling (known organizations identified others). The same method was used for Cote d'Ivoire, starting with the UN NGO database and the Doha International Institute. This sampling method helps to capture organizations with more integration, and thus, power within the NGO community. (The ten case study organizations have been excluded from this brief survey.)

Table 6.1: Survey of 53 NGOs Currently Operating in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food aid</td>
<td>ACT Alliance; Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED); Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA); Agency for Peace and Development; Burhakaha Town Section Committee (BTSC); Concern Worldwide; Cooperazione Internazionale; Danish Refugee Council; Integrated Development Focus (IDF); International Medical Corps; Islamic Relief Worldwide; Medair; Oxfam Novib; Social Life and Agricultural Development Organization (SADO); Save the Children UK; Solidarites International; Youth Organization for Relief and Development (YORD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other forms of emergency relief</td>
<td>ACT Alliance; Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA); American Friends Service Committee; Bani' Adam Relief and Development Organization; Burhakaha Town Section Committee (BTSC); Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo del Popoli (CISP); Cooperazione Internazionale; Danish Refugee Council; Family Empowerment and Relief Organization (FERO); International Aid Services; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); International Medical Corps; International Rescue Committee; Jubba Foundation; Medair; Oxfam Novib; Relief for Africa; Relief International; Social Life and Agricultural Development Organization (SADO); Save the Children UK; Solidarites International; Trocaire; WASDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. distribution of water, buckets, blankets, hygiene supplies; immediate health care; latrine construction in refugee camps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational development</td>
<td>Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA); African Educational Trust (AET); African Rescue Committee (AFREC); Comitato Internzionale per lo Sviluppo del Popoli (CISP); Concern Worldwide; Family Empowerment and Relief Organization (FERO); International Aid Services; Integrated Development Focus (IDF); Jubba Foundation; Norwegian Church Aid; KISMA Peace and Development Organization; Relief International; Save the Children UK; Swedish African Welfare Alliance; Trocaire; World Concern; Youth Organization for Relief and Development (YORD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care development</td>
<td>Action Africa Help – International; Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA); African Rescue Committee (AFREC); Comitato Collaborazione Medica; Family Empowerment and Relief Organization (FERO); International Aid Services; International Medical Corps; Intersos – Organizzazione Umanitaria per l'emergenza; Islamic Relief Worldwide; Jubba Foundation; Doctors of the World UK; KISMA Peace and Development Organization; Relief International; Swedish African Welfare Assistance; Swiss-Kalmo; Trocaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment assistance</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED); Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA); African Educational Trust (AET); African Rescue committee (AFREC); Bani' Adam Relief and Development Organization; Comitato Internzionale per lo Sviluppo del Popoli (CISP); Concern Worldwide; Family Empowerment and Relief Organization (FERO); Integrated Development Focus (IDF); Intersos – Organizzazione Umanitaria per l'emergenza; Norwegian Church Aid; Oxfam Novib; Relief International; Veterinaires Sans Frontieres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development with particular vulnerable populations</td>
<td>Family Empowerment and Relief Organization (FERO); Handicap International; Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth Committee (HAVOYOCO); Handicap Initiative Supporting And Networking (HISAN); Youth Organization for Relief and Development (YORD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building of local civil society</td>
<td>American Friends Service Committee; Integrated Development Focus (IDF); Nooleeynta Naruurada Mustaqbalika; Oxfam Novib; SaferWorld; Swedish African Welfare Alliance; Somali Family Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and reconciliation at the grassroots</td>
<td>African Rescue Committee (AFRECI); American Friends Service Committee; Family Empowerment and Relief Organization (FERO); Intersos – Organizzazione Umanitaria per l'emergenza; Norwegian Church Aid; KISMA Peace and Development Organization; SaferWorld; Somali Family Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. peacebuilding workshops; trauma dialogue; psychosocial assistance; social integration across warring groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy directed at national or international institutions - for human rights, protection of vulnerable populations, or peace</td>
<td>Family Empowerment and Relief Organization (FERO); Handicap International; Jóbba Foundation; Oxfam Novib; Youth Organization for Relief and Development (YORD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental conservation: African Rescue Committee (AFREC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict / human rights monitoring: IREX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee legal aid: Danish Refugee Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Confiscation: Mines Advisory Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: Survey of 30 NGOs Currently Operating in Cote d'Ivoire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food aid</td>
<td>Action Against Hunger; Helen Keller International; International Committee of the Red Cross; Merlin; Oxfam International; Solidarites International; SOS Children's Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other forms of emergency relief</td>
<td>Action Against Hunger; African Child Care Foundation; African Progress Foundation; Espoir Tiers Monde; Helen Keller International; International Committee of the Red Cross; Oxfam International; Save the Children UK; Solidarites International; SOS Children's Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. distribution of water, buckets, blankets, hygiene supplies; immediate health care; latrine construction in refugee camps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational development</td>
<td>African Progress Foundation; Espoir Tiers Monde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Examples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care development</td>
<td>e.g. funding and resources for existing clinics; construction and building rehab; doctor and midwife training; community health education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Child Care Foundation; African Progress Foundation; Center for Communication Programs; Doctors of the World UK; Population Council; Population Services International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment assistance</td>
<td>e.g. adult literacy programs; vocational training; food or cash for work; microloans for small businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Progress Foundation; Doctors of the World UK; Ecumenical Microfinance for Human Development (ECLOF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development with particular vulnerable populations</td>
<td>e.g. handicapped adults; street children; single mothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scolej Orphanage Home; SOS Children's Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building of local civil society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance Internationale pour les objectifs de Millenaire; Centre feminin pour la democratie et les droits humains en Cote d'Ivoire (CFEC); ONG Femme Active de Cote d'Ivoire (OFACI); Population Services International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and reconciliation at the grassroots</td>
<td>e.g. peacebuilding workshops; trauma dialogue; psychosocial assistance; social integration across warring groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children's International Summer Village (CISV); Convention de la Societe Civile Ivoirienne; ONG Femme Active de Cote d'Ivoire (OFACI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy directed at national or international institutions - for human rights, protection of vulnerable populations, or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Rally for Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO); Association Africaine de Defense des Droits de l'Homme (ASADHO); Centre feminin pour la democratie et les droits humains en Cote d'Ivoire (CFEC); Observatory for a New</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intervention strategies of these organizations can be divided into nine categories: emergency relief; educational development; health care development; employment assistance; development with particular vulnerable populations; capacity building of local civil society; peace and reconciliation at the grassroots; advocacy for peace or human rights; and a miscellaneous 'other' category, including conflict monitoring, weapon confiscation, and environmental conservation. This covers only a very small range of activities relative to theorized NGO potential described in chapter 4. In particular, none of the surveyed organizations indicate any involvement in conflict mediation, negotiation or arbitration, either on Track II (with civil society) or 1.5 (with state leaders).

The most obvious difference between tables 6.1 and 6.2 is the number of organizations: there are far more in Somalia than in Cote d'Ivoire, even taking into account the haphazard sampling method. Although Somali conflict has been going on for longer, it is still more compelling than Ivorian plight. Save the Children UK explains, Somalia “is synonymous with pirates, militia and shattered buildings”, an icon of extreme poverty, conflict, anarchy and human desperation.
For a conflict-intervening organization, Somalia is the first natural choice.

Notably, Somalia also has more international NGOs (e.g. ACT Alliance, Concern Worldwide, Relief International), whereas Cote d'Ivoire has more national NGOs (e.g. Centre feminin pour la democratie et les droits humains en Cote d'Ivoire; ONG Femme Active de Cote d'Ivoire). The Alliance Internationale pour les objectifs du Millenaire mentions the lack of international organizations working in Cote d'Ivoire in comparison with other similarly impoverished African countries. This fits the observation by Kouassi (2011) that INGOs have left Abidjan (CI) in the hands of local NGOs.

Organizations in Somalia are heavily weighted toward emergency relief over advocacy or peace work. This parallels a common note in literature that relief remains the dominant strategy of NGOs in conflict (see chapter 1). Cote d'Ivoire is also weighted toward basic needs provision, but not as far skewed as Somalia. This is probably because local NGOs – with more independence and fewer resources than INGOs – are more prepared for advocacy than service delivery.

Surprisingly, 16 of the 53 organizations surveyed in Somalia still use food aid, despite overwhelming evidence that distribution of basic food stuffs causes more harm than good (see chapter 4; also: Barrett 2001; Blouin and Pallage 2009; Kirwin and McMillan 2007; Murphy 2008; Rivera and Conn 2006). As though to mask the simplicity of the task, organizations refer to the distribution of sustenance as anything but ‘food aid’. Terms like “emergency food security”, “nutrient-rich biscuits”, “emergency feeding”, “nutrition services in the context of
emergency relief”, “hunger alleviation”, and even “disease-preventing nutritional interventions” all describe the same elementary activity. No amount of theorizing seems to diminish the appeal of easy and immediately gratifying food distribution.

Several organizations described the trajectory of their activities throughout the conflicts. In Somalia, International Medical Corps proudly advertises that it was the first group to enter the country following the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991. However, their activities have since remained static. The Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), on the other hand, explains that, while initial interventions consisted of emergency and relief work, today, the organization incorporates rehabilitation and development activities, including “health, water, education, road development, institutional capacity building and food security”. While International Medical Corps’ strategy suggests adherence to a strict mission, the shifting priorities of ADRA suggest it is a 'learning' organization.

In Cote d'Ivoire, several organizations describe the opposite shift. Whereas ADRA learned to incorporate more long-term development strategies over the course of the Somali conflict, groups like Save the Children UK exchanged development activities for emergency relief upon the outbreak of violence. The organization, Islamic Relief Worldwide, left the country and explains that it has “emergency teams on standby for deployment”. This begs the question: who will determine when to deploy these teams and how will they know? In the past five months, Cote d'Ivoire has seen hundreds of deaths, flagrant violations of human rights, mass displacement, starvation and disease. IGOs and NGOs alike are
crying for more international support. While Islamic Relief Worldwide waits, it continues “conflict monitoring” and urges the international community to “do something”. The organization seems to believe that while it can do something (teams are ready and waiting), it is somehow less suitable actor than states or IGOs.

These organizations grapple with the politics of their geography. Due to the level of violence in the country, many Somali INGOs have “local” offices in Kenya. This seems to be an effective strategy for security, but isolates organizational field staff from local communities. Some NGOs indicate operations only in Puntland and Somaliland. They are careful to explain these “states” declare themselves independent, but are not officially recognized by the international community. In this way, they walk a fine line, neither affirming nor rejecting their independence. This may help organizations to remain impartial and trusted by the community. However, organizations' failure to embrace Somaliland and Puntland as fully independent states weakens Somalia's strongest shot at peace: relative stability in these autonomous territories. In Cote d'Ivoire, most NGOs operate in the south and headquarter in Abidjan. For tactical ease, this makes sense; as the biggest port city, Abidjan facilitates travel and communication. However, as a peacebuilding strategy, it runs counter to logic presented in chapter 5. Northern Cote d'Ivoire is less developed, more impoverished, and more ethnically marginalized than the south. In order to reduce inequality and resentment between halves of the country, NGOs should focus more on the north than the south.
Rationale for Organizations Selected

In order to examine organizational programs and principles more closely, I analyze six NGOs from each country. Five considerations motivate selection. First, on a practical level, the studied organizations must have well-developed websites so that I can access information and understand, with some degree of specificity, what they are doing. This limits the study to transnational or large, national organizations.

Second, organizations must have some explicit involvement with the conflict mitigation in the target country. Any reference to conflict resolution, conflict prevention, conflict mediation, conflict transformation, reconciliation, peace advocacy, or peace building satisfied this requirement. However, if an organization spoke generally of conflict resolution, but listed no such activities in the target country, it was excluded. For example, Oxfam International lists arms control and peace advocacy among its organizational objectives, but only provides emergency relief in Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia, and so cannot be included in the study.

Further, studied organizations must be engaged in some way 'on the ground'. Because I wish to identify NGOs' roles within countries of conflict, watchdog organizations that inform and motivate other international actors have been excluded. For example, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group could not be considered directly engaged in conflict resolution even though they indirectly contribute to violence reduction.
Among selected organizations, I sought diversity in size, funding structure, and founding mission. For example, the Carter Center was initiated to prevent and resolve conflicts, while Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) originally set out to deliver medical humanitarian aid. Both organizations have experienced 'mission creep'; their objectives are more similar now than when they started. Today, the Carter Center includes medical relief, and MSF engages in peace advocacy. Nonetheless, I hypothesize that organizations will interpret their responsibilities quite differently drawing from their divergent founding missions.

Finally, I sought at least two organizations present in both countries in order to draw interstate comparisons with a constant organization. These selection criteria lead to the following set of organizations (same as table 1.2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.3: Case Study Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontieres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care International / Care UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontieres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care International / Care UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interpeace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn Relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing Internal Dynamics

One advantage of studying such a small number of NGOs is the ability to scrutinize diverse, competing internal and external factors that influence organizational decision-making. There is a constant “tensions between lofty aspirations and the multiple external pressures that relief and development NGOs are experiencing” (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001, p. 31). Table 6.2 outlines the
structure, size and funding of target organizations.\textsuperscript{4}

Table 6.4: Basic Facts and Figures about Target Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Headquarter country</th>
<th>Number of staff</th>
<th>Annual Operating Budget*</th>
<th>Funding Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care International</td>
<td>International confederation</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>Individuals, government, IGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas Internationalis</td>
<td>International confederation</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>440,000</td>
<td>~5,500</td>
<td>Primarily individuals; also: foundations, corporations, IGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter Center</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>175 staff; 116 interns</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Individuals, foundations, corporations, IGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)**</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>15,760</td>
<td>2,079</td>
<td>79% government; 21% corporations and international financial institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn Relief</td>
<td>National organization</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Individuals, foundations, NGOs, and governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee (IRC)</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>39% government, 31% IGOs, 30% individuals and foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpeace</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>97% governments and IGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{4} This data is self-reported, from organizations’ websites.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)</td>
<td>International federation</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>22,462</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>International federation</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Reported in millions of dollars for fiscal year 2009/10. For some organizations, like MSF, the dollar amount is an estimated conversion from euros.

**GIZ is a merger of three organizations as of January 1, 2011: DED, GTZ, and Inwent. The numerical data on the organization (staff, budget, percentage from each funding source) refers only to GTZ, however, which is the international development branch of the entity.

Four kinds of organizations are represented here: international confederation, international federation, international organization and national organization. A confederation is a loose coalition of similarly-minded groups. In the case of Caritas Internationalis, there are over 165 different Catholic development organizations that are guided by the same principles. A federation, or NGO “family”, is a group of NGOs with a strong central authority, but with independence in certain affairs, such as raising funds, marketing or setting program priorities. Unlike a confederation, a federation usually has only one member organization per country. An international organization is a unitary entity. There may be regional or local offices, but they answer directly to the
international headquarters. Finally, a national organization operates in only one country. This is not quite as easy a distinction as it sounds; Horn Relief still has offices in Nairobi, Kenya and depends on international contacts for financial and advocacy support. Additionally, the organization has programs in Somaliland and Puntland, which may or may not be separate states (this dilemma explains why the organization is called 'Horn Relief' and not 'Somali Relief'). However, the purpose of the organization's existence is to improve conditions in one (formerly unified) state. As a result, Horn Relief's goals and perspectives will be very different from a large federation, like World Vision.

International federations have the most fiscal and social capacity at their disposal. They “get economies of scale and efficiency through central support services” and develop “a strong global identity and scale because of the resources they can amass” (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001, p. 144). Through central planning, these federations hone standards of operation that define their brand identity. Whether people encounter MSF France or MSF Japan, for example, they can expect to find the same commitment to neutrality and emergency trauma care. IGOs, governments and local communities encounter federations more frequently and learn to trust and respect the organization's standards, knowledge and capacity. These are essential ingredients for peace advocacy and conflict resolution. Federations are more apt Track 1.5 mediators; their international presence increases the stakes for mediation.

The advantages of size and reputation can also be debilitating, inhibiting flexibility, creativity and growth. To maintain their trust and uniformity,
federations have to act jointly, what becomes a substantial collective action problem. They have more of a reputation to defend; in order to change, they have to convince both regional branches as well as donors that the change is a good idea. This explains why the largest relief and development organizations have moved so slowly away from direct service, at most devoting just 10% of their resources to advocacy (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001). By contrast, national organizations can more rapidly adapt their programs and priorities to accommodate changing conditions in the field and experiment with new interventions.

An NGO's headquartering country also influences its decision-making. An organization in the U.S., for example, is likely to receive money from USAID, along with the political priorities of the development agency. Similarly, Caritas Internationalis, operating out of the Vatican City, is explicitly tied to the politics of the Catholic Church. Donors in the U.S. tend to seek service delivery over advocacy; the reverse is true in many European countries (ibid). NGO literature speaks frequently of the Northern / Southern divide: NGOs in the global north generally have more power and resources, and use their 'partners' in the global south as contract workers, rather than egalitarian collaborators. Because Northern NGO staff have the freedom to pick up 'Third-world' social problems at will, their work functions as more of an occupation, compared to locally originating Southern NGO staff, who are more likely to 'live' the conditions they struggle against. Southern NGOs tend to be more frequently self-identify as 'social movements', compared to more project-oriented organizations in the global north.
Similarly, an organization’s funding sources influence the how and what of their conflict intervention. Medecins Sans Frontieres, for example, makes a special effort to limit their government funding (to just 12% of their income) in order to maintain independence and impartiality. On the other end of the spectrum, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammernarbeit (GIZ) accepts almost 79% of their funds from the German government. GIZ considers itself a mission-driven, non-profit corporation that implements principled development “on behalf of” the German government, as well as IGOs, foundations and companies. Rather than an independent entity with its own priorities and perspectives that others fund, it functions with almost total deference to its donors. World Vision receives most of its funding from private individuals through ‘child sponsorships’. This enables independence from government, but limits the organization in other ways. Sponsorships, in theory, go toward specific, pre-determined expenses for a single child. Changes to political, economic or social structures may be essential for the livelihood of a child, but do not fit within the short-term objectives of sponsorship.

These ten case study organizations range widely in size and capacity. On one end of the spectrum, Caritas Internationalis, with $5.5 billion and 440,000 staff, has the financial and personnel resources of a small government. Since Caritas is a loose confederation, these organizations do not centralize their financial or human resources management. Despite is dependence and virtual anonymity on the international stage, GIZ also has enormous – and very
centralized – capacity, with nearly $2.1 billion and 15,760 staff. World Vision is a close contender among these development giants. By contrast, the budget of Horn Relief is less than 0.2% of Caritas (even this is large for a national organization in the global South). Interestingly, the two peace-focused organizations – the Carter Center and Interpeace – have the fewest staff. Hypothetically, peace organizations working across vertical and horizontal constituencies should require as many staff as any service-delivery organization. The small number of staff may be locking these organizations into one type of intervention: either working exclusively with national elites or participating only in short phases of the entire conflict timeline.

Although these organizations were selected for their involvement in some form of conflict-resolving activities, they range widely in their overarching goals. Table 6.5 outlines the principles and programs of each organization.

Table 6.5: Values and Objectives of Target Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Mission / Vision Principles</th>
<th>Program Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care International</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Social justice; ending poverty; self-help; economic opportunity; advocacy</td>
<td>Agriculture; youth development; economic development; education; emergency relief; health; HIV / AIDS; nutrition; water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas International</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Human dignity; sustainable development; peacebuilding; emergency relief</td>
<td>Peace and reconciliation; emergencies; economic justice; climate change; HIV / AIDS; women and migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter Center</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Alleviate human suffering; prevent and resolve conflicts</td>
<td>Democracy; human rights; conflict resolution; disease; agriculture; mental health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Human rights; dignity; rule of</td>
<td>Rural development; political reforms; environment and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Focus Areas</td>
<td>Programs/Activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>für Internationale Zusammernarbeit (GIZ)</td>
<td>law; market-based economy; peace and security</td>
<td>Pastoral livelihoods; sustainable peace and development; youth development; women's empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn Relief</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Resource management; participatory education and skills training; peace and human rights; food security and livelihoods; emergency relief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Anti-trafficking; child soldiers; economic recovery; education; violence against women; governance and rights; humanitarian aid; immigration; post-conflict development; protecting children; reproductive healthcare; resettling refugees; water and sanitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpeace</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Conflict research and analysis; facilitated negotiation; dialogue across society; creating sustainable institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontieres</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Emergency medical assistance; neutrality; impartiality; bearing witness and speaking out; dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Emergency medical assistance; advocacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid to communities in transition from disaster, economic</td>
<td>Agriculture; children; civil society; climate change; conflict and war; disability; disaster risk reduction; displacement; economic development;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only two of the organizations are explicitly religious – Caritas International and World Vision. Their mission / vision statements tend to reflect religious principles. Beyond mention of Jesus and God, they also emphasize human dignity and aid to the most vulnerable. World Vision in particular tends to operate on the “Starfish Model” (a philosophy of service based on an old parable: a man tosses beached starfish back to sea; when a friend asks, “you can't possibly toss them all back, why bother?”, the man picks up another starfish and replies, “it matters to this one”). Individual impact is prioritized above changing long-term social structures. While Mercy Corps has no explicit religious affiliation, its principles, activities, and even its name are often mistaken for religiosity. The organization asserts its commitment to vulnerable people, to empowerment of the needy, and to compassionate peace.

As a semi-corporate, semi-governmental organization (something of a GONGO / BONGO fusion), GIZ has absolutely no religious ties. Instead, its support of national security, the rule of law, and the market-based economy mimic
state priorities. Surprisingly, despite its funding structure and contract model, GIZ has developed extensive reports about its perspectives on how to achieve social objectives like political reform, women's empowerment and universal healthcare.

Of the ten organizations, five provide generalized relief and development: Care, Caritas, GIZ, Horn Relief, Mercy Corps, and World Vision. Their activities are not exclusively related to conflicts or emergencies, and they are most connected to development frameworks, philosophies and networks. Conflict intervention is only one small component of their work. The other four organizations focus only on intervention in crises: Carter Center, International Rescue Committee, Interpeace, Medecins Sans Frontieres. For the IRC and MSF, the term “crisis” includes any emergency, including armed conflicts, disputes, and natural disasters. Medecins Sans Frontieres strives to deliver medical relief to anyone in immediate peril; all other activities are secondary, meant to support their primary relief mission. The International Rescue Committee primarily serves refugees through international processing and eventual resettlement in other countries. Their involvement in conflict transformation and peacebuilding is an extension of their work with refugees, meant to reduce the flow of migrants in need. Only the Carter Center and Interpeace focus exclusively on intervention in human-caused conflict. While the Carter Center has begun to expand its activities to include medical care, disease contamination and agricultural support, Interpeace works solely towards political and psychological peace.

Conflict Resolution as a Programmatic Strategy
Two organizations make ideological opposition to war and violence a central tenet of their identity. These are not the peace-oriented organizations, as one might expect, but rather, the International Rescue Committee and Caritas Internationalis. The IRC justifies a commitment to long-term peacebuilding:

Modern wars no longer take place on the battlefield. In the wars of the 1950's, the death rate of soldiers to civilians was 9 to 1. Today, the reverse is true: for every soldier killed, nine civilians die... The root causes of today's conflicts will not be quickly extinguished; conflicts will be long-term, with lasting consequences. In modern warfare, countries are not only physically destroyed, but the human capital and social fabric are torn asunder.

Rather than a single programmatic category, peacebuilding and conflict transformation activities and ethos fit across multiple areas of the IRC's work: post-conflict development, youth protection and development, emergency response, and public advocacy. The IRC takes three approaches to post-conflict development: social interventions, such as health, education, gender-based violence; economic intervention in the sustainable livelihoods framework; and governance programs to create responsive democratic institutions and robust civil societies. Similar priorities are applied to children in conflict, with more emphasis on immediate needs such as family reunification and psychosocial care.

Emergency response teams deliver humanitarian relief, with the assistance of “specialists who focus on human rights protection, the special needs of children in crisis, the prevention of sexual violence, and aid for rape survivors”. Finally, the IRC advocates for international intervention in “forgotten” crises, in order to protect refugees and other “vulnerable” and “oppressed” populations.

Whereas the IRC is fundamentally driven by the plight of refugees, Caritas
works for international development. Conflict intervention is a major component of the organization's work because it sees war as the “mortal enemy of development”. Caritas speaks strongly against war: it “can wipe out years of progress in a single bomb blast to a school or hospital... [and] cause a lifetime of anguish with a rape of a woman or killing of a child”. The confederation supports trauma work to address the psychosocial effects of violence, promotes reconstruction for physical and institutional recovery, and facilitates “inter-religious dialogue” to “create spaces where trust, respect and solidarity can flourish”. Caritas, like the IRC, works at the grassroots to rebuild peaceful social relations.

The Carter Center and Interpeace spend more time celebrating positive peace than disparaging violence and war. The Carter Center's peace programs are strongly rooted in values of democratic governance. Staff monitor elections and promote legal principles, such as justice, human rights and the rule of law. It rejects the debate between peace and justice, and instead advocates for “peace with justice” which it implements through long-term efforts beyond the moment of elections to “build an inclusive democratic society that respects human rights and laws, administers justice fairly, and encourages full citizen participation in government”. As an influential diplomat and former president, Jimmy Carter's involvement with the organization blurs the line between diplomacy tracks; “the traditional distinction of mediators as individuals, states and organizations is somewhat challenged by the emergence of organizations that are deeply connected with one founding figure” (Bartoli 2009, p. 393).
In comparison to the Carter Center, Interpeace was created much more recently, an outgrowth of a UN peace project initiated in 1994. The organization works to build peace in “war-torn societies” following five principles of action: local ownership, cross-societal inclusion, trust at all costs, long-term commitment, and holistic solutions. Interpeace stresses that peace will not result from modest efforts:

Strengthening the foundations of a society that has been torn apart by conflict is not business as usual. Mistrust tends to be deeply ingrained. Every major issue is explosive, political and urgent. Because of this urgency, the tendency is to bring technical solutions to [complex] problems.

Interpeace works with local institutions, involved at the grassroots and with civil society leaders. Its history with the United Nations makes it an effective go-between for NGO and IGO collaboration.

Relative to all other organizations studied, Medecins Sans Frontieres has a very specific mission: helping people with one particular need (medicine) during one particular time (crisis). They aim to relieve medical need. Ending conflict is merely a side effect, what staff feel to be a moral obligation to “bear witness” to, and “speak out” about “violence, atrocities and neglect”. In this way, MSF has had a significant role in international advocacy. However, its hands-on involvement host countries remains exclusively relief-oriented.

Horn Relief falls somewhere in between conflict intervention and generalized development work. Somalia, the Horn Relief's only country of operation, experiences constant violence which the organizations strives to end. However, its strategies for achieving violence de-escalation include youth
leadership, women's empowerment, environmental protection and poverty alleviation, what might be described as conflict sensitive development work.

The peace and conflict work of GIZ spans various themes, including “good governance” and “security and reconstruction”. The organization approaches governance from a utilitarian perspective: “in the United Nation's Millennium Declaration, the international community reached a consensus that good governance is not only an aim in itself but also a key factor in attaining human development and in successful poverty reduction and peacebuilding”. GIZ interprets security and reconstruction as a two-pronged activity: peace development and emergency relief.

World Vision aims to end global poverty, but does not explicitly connect concomitant forces of poverty and violence. Although many of its programs are conducted in countries of conflict, they are not driven by any stated philosophy about its role in conflict intervention. Nonetheless, the organization's commitment to relief, development and advocacy can be applied to conflict response: community empowerment, capacity building, resilience, and welfare.

Mercy Corps is slightly more vocal about its response during conflict, and contextualizes “peaceful change” as one of thirty-four different objectives. While Caritas and the IRC express clear disapproval of violence, highlighting the pain and destruction of war, Mercy Corps considers violence only one of various causes of poverty. As a small component of their work, staff strive to “[engage] potential adversaries in productive dialogue”.

Care International also excludes peace and conflict awareness from its
mission and vision statements, and does not discuss a theory of peace work. The organization's only mention of conflict in its description of its work is in reference to emergency relief, “including food, temporary shelter, clean water, sanitation services, medical care, family planning, reproductive health service, and seeds and tools”. Care also implements development strategies in post-conflict environments to support rehabilitation efforts. Nonetheless, the organization does not mention any intangible programs aimed at emotional or political growth, such as mediation, reconciliation, or dialogue.

Much to its credit, Care highlights that it is “not a single-issue organization because people do not live single-issue lives”. In other words, Care does not focus exclusively on one segment of the population, one type of intervention, or one form of injustice. Its development work is holistic, although its conflict response leaves much to be desired. Care's own logic supports the argument for integrating peace and development work. Development organizations like Care should promote conflict transformation because communities at war cannot achieve holistic well-being.

The preceding two sections have documented internal and external factors that influence organizations' conflict intervention. In the following chapter, I examine the extent to which these ten NGOs rhetorically engage with theories like “conflict transformation” and “peacebuilding”. This provides some insight to their awareness and esteem for trends in peace and conflict studies, and has implications for clash and collaboration with other members of the international community.
CHAPTER 7: RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

Why Rhetoric Matters

Since NGOs do not have legitimate or coercive power, their strength lies in their ability to promote ideas. When a 'humanitarian' NGO distributes blankets to refugees, for example, its lasting impact is not in the number of blankets it distributes, but rather in the implicit statement that no human being should have to suffer the cold. The stronger the symbolic value of an action, the greater and more enduring the impact. In an analysis of Medecins Sans Frontieres and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Dechaine (2002) finds that “[NGOs’] influence is felt both at the level of political action and, importantly, at the level of symbolic action, in their ability to persuade and mobilize constituencies to take action on specific issues, and in their proclivity to rhetorically ‘craft’ a new ethos of global community among various publics” (ii).

Organizations must be attentive to their discourse in order to cultivate donors, mobilize local constituencies, garner organizational partners, and inspire the trust of governments and IGOs. These are tasks critical even for an organization's continued existence. For an organization to render significant structural change, as many scholars have suggested is necessary to produce peace, NGOs must create a message so compelling that people not only engage with the organization, but change their behavior in other areas of their lives.

Rhetoric, what I use here to mean discourse or word choice, delineates divisions and connections between and within social groups. Transnational advocacy networks, like International Campaign to Ban Land Mines or the
“Global Campaign for Women's Human Rights”, depend on rhetoric to coalesce loose alliances and identify blurred objectives (Karns 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998). A single persuasive phrase can be the linchpin in the consolidation of a movement. The notion of “violence against women”, for example, merged diverse actors working to stop women's abuses ranging from systematic war rape and sexual slavery to female genital mutilation (FGM) and domestic violence.

Without the concept “violence against women”, these efforts were isolated and impotent; a rhetorical link was needed to propel the movement to the next level.

In the movement against contemporary slavery, terms such as 'victim', 'survivor', 'trafficker', 'prostitute', and 'sex worker' have been relentless sources of debate and fission among advocates and political actors. In the United Nations' various committees and commissions on the issue, the definition of 'slavery' has been debated, written and rewritten more times than thought possible, consuming decades of international attention (Miers 2003). Why should powerful political figures waste years of their lives with definitions and details? Reimann (2005) contends that such debates are critical: “social actors constitute the social reality through engaging in discussions about the meaning of activities, interactions, ideas and perceptions” (p. 30, emphasis added). These rhetorical practices – both the use of conclusive terminologies and the process of debate to arrive at these terms – generate “collective identity” among participants (ibid). Advocates today can claim, quite rightly, to be part of the 'anti-slavery movement' or the 'movement against violence against women'.

In peace work, terminologies are not yet as cemented. 'Peace movements'
of the 1960s and '70s caught fire, but within a limited group of people, with a limited set of actions, predominantly through government-directed activism. State diplomats remained largely untouched by this rhetorical community, continuing their work for national security (Kriesberg 2009). The recent emergence of NGOs directly intervening in conflict has begun to connect the rhetoric of peace activism with the actions of conflict intervenors. However, as the brief overview in the previous chapter reveals, organizations still draw on all kinds of different terms and ideologies – 'rule of law', 'free markets', 'social justice', 'human dignity'. They all tend to cite 'peace' as some relief and development holy grail. Yet, as Friedrich (2007) notes, “we have grown accustomed, but also somewhat desensitized, to the word peace” (p. 4).

NGOs in conflict (what can we call them? conflict resolution NGOs? humanitarian NGOs? peace NGOs? each term comes with its own baggage and inadequacies) need to work together to find common rhetorical ground. Rhetoric particularly matters in the framing of conflicts. While conflict transformation scholar Terrel Northrup rightly reminds us that conflicts are not merely reducible to misperception, there is some role of communication strategies in the persistence or resolution of conflict; “establishing jargon is a way for NGOs to influence how negotiations and observers perceive various issues and proposals in a negotiation” (Gotz 2008, p. 238).

In particular, the range of terms presented in chapter two – conflict management, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and so forth – represent vast divisions in the theoretical understanding of peace work. Yet, their definitions, like their
impacts, remain fuzzy, infringed by caveats and operational realities. The presence and esteem of relatively new terms like 'conflict transformation' represents a positive step for multi-track, positive-sum, 'peace with justice' approaches. As “Hannah Arendt once observed... giving a stray dog a name greatly increases its chance of staying alive” (Keane 2003, p. xiii). It also matters who names the dog; theorists can speak endlessly of 'conflict transformation', but without the buy-in of practitioners, the term has little value. Fortunately, Hugh Miall observes that NGOs have begun to follow conflict transformation principles more closely, staying in conflict during longer periods of time, working with people at different levels of society (Rhodes 2009). These are positive signs, but would have far more potential – more permanent and widely embraced – if accompanied by a common discourse.

Scholar Frank Dukes laments, “the field of conflict resolution, whose study so clearly reveals the costs of distorted communication, does not itself have a shared language” (quoted in Rhodes 2009, p. 14). In this chapter, I examine the rhetoric used by NGOs to describe local conditions (e.g. conflict, crisis) and NGO responses (e.g. peacebuilding, conflict transformation). I find an overwhelming disagreement among actors about suitable word choice, and propose rhetoric as a space from which NGOs can increase collaboration.

**Conflict Decontextualized**

Conflicts are inherently political. Whether about resources, ideologies or goals, conflicts – i.e. disagreements or controversies – involve contested power.
Parties seek new sociopolitical futures: resources and authority in new hands, justice manifested in new ways. Surprisingly, many of the target organizations decontextualize the political nature of conflict. It is quite frequently described as synonymous or equivalent to natural disaster, an unprecipitated occurrence beyond anyone's control. CARE documents its response to “four regions of Puntland that were affected by drought, civil strife and floods”; violence is sandwiched between the twin villains of too much rain and too little, as though conflict poured haplessly from the sky. Medecins Sans Frontieres “provides aid... to people whose survival is threatened by violence, neglect or catastrophe”. Caritas speaks of “disaster”, lumping violence and natural tragedy together, and soothes, “we're the place you go for safety, the neighbor who organizes food and blankets, and the coalition of the good that pulls together global resources to support you”. World Vision provides “emergency assistance to those affected by natural disasters and conflicts”. GIZ describes the “crises, conflicts and disasters” riveting the world. This common association may contribute to the misconception that emergency response, appropriate in a post-flood or hurricane-struck region, is also an adequate solution to politicized violence.

The distinction emphasized in chapter two between 'violence' and 'conflict' is sometimes, but not always, acknowledged by these organizations. The use of terms like “armed conflict” or “violent conflict” suggest that some conflicts can be non-violent or un-armed, an organizational awareness that conflict is not inherently destructive. GIZ speaks carefully of “crisis prevention”, a strategy for managing conflict (dissimilar from violence) in order to prevent its escalation into
violent chaos. However, phrases like “preventing conflict”, “resolving conflict”, “ending conflict” or even “post-conflict work” reflect a lapse in agreement with the aforementioned idea that conflicts are endemic to any unjust society. By the logic of conflict transformation, conflicts do not end, and until utopia, there is no “post-conflict” period, only a transformation in the methods of negotiating conflict, from violent aggression to non-violent communication.

Mercy Corps, using the framework that conflicts, like natural disasters, fall from the sky, describes “innocent civilians caught in this conflict”. Here, conflict is used synonymously with violence (what Mercy Corps means to say is that civilians were caught in the destructive impacts of conflict, the competitive injury aspect of war). But, since conflict is not synonymous with violence, the organization deligitimizes the conflict itself, as though it were only a product of elite power struggles and military might. While violence may be a military problem, conflict results from more holistic societal dilemmas. The carelessness of this rhetoric unintentionally silences grassroots perspectives.

Most of the organizations shift between various words for conflict, what seems to be motivated purely by discursive variety, rather than strategic communication, per se. Whereas theorists spend volumes discerning between “dispute”, that which can be adjudicated or easily resolved, and “conflict”, deep issues that run to the core of social identities, most of these organizations seem to use the terms interchangeably. Care works to “[resolve] local disputes”, “manage communal violence” with a “community-based approach to conflict mitigation”. The IRC contends that “disputes can be resolved”. Interestingly, the new era of
complex conflicts seems to have made more traditional terms like “war” or “civil war” outmoded. A few of the organizations use the term, but only rarely. In fact, Interpeace was initially called “War-Torn Societies Project” and changed its name in 2006 to “reflect the new scope of its work”.

Perhaps the most common word used to describe local conditions is “crisis”. The International Rescue Committee addresses the “world’s worst humanitarian crises”; Mercy Corps confronts “ongoing conflict and crisis”; World Vision “recognizes that even in the midst of crisis, the destitute have a contribution to make”; the Carter Center seeks to intercept “minor crises” before they cause “deteriorating societal and political stability”. The word “crisis” conveys urgency, immediate need. The term is compelling, a useful tack for cultivating donors and inspiring international action. Yet, urgency that becomes haste inspires rapid, unilateral decision-making and easy answers – exactly the opposite of what countries in conflict need. Conflicts are crises, but they require long-term responses, with multiple actors, deep integration and complex solutions. Moreover, organizations use relief-focused modifiers when speaking of crisis. Mercy Corps describes a “food crisis”; World Vision and Horn Relief speak of “humanitarian crises”. The way a problem is stated directs the answer that appears obvious; a “food crisis” compels food aid and a “humanitarian crisis”, humanitarian aid. In my observation, none of these organizations speak of “political crises” or “crises of justice”. If the goal is to mobilize more political, long-term, justice-oriented solutions, we should perhaps seek similar words to describe the problem.
Finally, the organizations occasionally fall into the trap of fatalistic
discourse. Care describes Somalia as a case of “chronic complex emergencies”:
chronic, like a disease that can never be cured, only dulled, treated for the
symptoms. Cote d'Ivoire, according to Care, rests on the precipice of “state
failure, ethnic violence and disorder”. These words connote anarchic devolution
into a condition so helpless that political, strategic work would not be worth the
while. Caritas works in “violence-prone” countries, while Mercy Corps responds
to “conflict-stricken” zones. These phrases describe permanent states of being: a
proclivity for violence, catching violence like the plague. Organizations could
certainly select more conscientious rhetoric to reflect the value of conflict, the
distinction between conflict and violence, the potential for transforming conflict
into non-violent form, and the reality that no society is ever stuck in one
permanent state of being.

'Peace and' : The Ambiguous Catch-All

Medecins Sans Frontieres and the International Rescue Committee focus
on aspects of destructive conflict: medical emergencies and refugee displacement,
respectively. As a result, the rhetoric of these two organizations is almost
exclusively problem-focused, speaking to “violence”, “abuse”, “violations”, and
“injustice”. The other eight organizations, on the other hand, constantly evoke the
promise of “peace”. The Carter Center and Interpeace are perhaps the farthest on
the solution-side of the spectrum, describing “peace programs”, “a world at
peace”, “a peaceful future”, “peacemaking initiatives”, “peace implementation”,

139
and “vital peace function”. These two peace-centric organizations are also the most involved in conflict mediation, negotiation and reconciliation processes, and the least engaged with humanitarian relief. This suggests that invoking hope of a peaceful future generates more long-term strategic planning, relative to crisis-oriented rhetoric.

This sentiment is echoed by a story from a field staffmember of an INGO in Mary Anderson's book *Do No Harm*:

> Every time I relax with my local staff, I ask them to tell me about their war experiences. The more horrible the story, the more riveted my attention. I commiserate, and together, we relive the horrors of war. What if I asked them instead to tell me about their relationships with the 'other side' before the war? What if we spent more time talking about people they like and trust from the other side? What if we dealt with what we would like their future to be? I just realized that I am reinforcing their negative experiences and attitudes with my questions. I seem more interested in how bad things are than in how to improve them. What kind of example am I setting? (1999, p. 62)

> It makes sense that organizations would want to describe the horrors of war in their websites and publications. In order to compel donors, activists and partners, NGOs must state the problem, reeling in their observers to generate support. This is at least the prevailing marketing strategy. However, the Carter Center and Interpeace, in accordance with Anderson's story, demonstrate that the opposite strategy may actually be more effective for long-term prospects in the country. Counterintuitive as it may seem, these observations suggest that in order to end violence, we must speak, not of bloodshed, but of peace.

> Frustratingly, the term 'peace' seems to evade meaning. In its slogan, Interpeace explains that it “builds peace that lasts”. Lasting peace necessarily refers to peace in the negative sense, the absence of violence. What Interpeace
means by its shorthand is that it creates conditions such that the absence of violence persists after peace agreements are signed. By contrast, Caritas describes “just peace”, “a haven of peace”, referring, instead, to positive peace, the presence of justice and equality that becomes inherently self-perpetuating.

The word is also lumped with a wide range of other concepts. The Carter Center considers “conflict prevention... a bedrock of peaceful and just societies”; peace and justice go hand in hand. Caritas works toward “the long-term project of building peaceful, stable communities”. Although, perhaps, both are desirable states, stability and justice are often at odds with one another. A corrupt leader may hog power, inflict human rights abuses, and repress the voices of the impoverished. Such a society could maintain stability for some time, without any significant disturbance, but it would certainly not be a just society. The same dichotomy reappears in the distinction between the “peace and human rights” of Horn Relief and “peace and development” of the International Rescue Committee. Several organizations link “peace and reconciliation” or “peace and reconstruction”, as though 'peace' were merely a time-period indicator, a moment beginning upon the enactment of a cease-fire.

The word peace cannot mean all these things at the same time if it is to be a useful discursive tool. As it is, peace refers to such a wide range of concepts that it might best be defined as 'goodness' or 'desirability'. In this sense, phrases like “working for peaceful solutions” become absurd; of course everyone desires 'desirable' solutions. In order to avoid this tautological pitfall, organizations might strive to articulate their particular understanding of peace. Better yet, NGOs could
use the process of defining peace – both in concept and in localized application – as a point of collaboration. Such discursive democratic practices draw attention toward solutions rather than problems, and demand organized and political thought.

**Invoking Humanity**

In order to generate widespread support for activities, inspire action by people distant and disconnected from the problems at hand, and cultivate the kind of unconventional forgiveness and non-violence necessary for peace processes, NGOs need big ideas. They need to demonstrate that their work supports universal values, yields progress towards new and brighter futures, and even satisfies moral obligations to the well-being of the international system or the human rights of the suffering underdogs.

These are no small tasks; nothing less than the weight of “humanity” culls such authority. In his analysis of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Robert DeChaine (2002) observes:

The ICBL network calls upon the name of ‘humanity’ to serve as a basis for the assertion that its anti-landmines activism is representative of a ‘global community’, united against ‘the scourge of landmines’... In today's world, the invocation of the discursigraph 'humanity' signifies a bundling together of particular claims to moral conduct with universal claims to the inherent dignity of all human beings... 'Humanity' gains cultural capital through its incorporation of other discursigraphs ('freedom', 'justice') and by means of powerful metaphors which construct a line between the humane and the 'inhumane', the 'good' and the 'bad', the 'just' and the 'unjust'. (p. 280)

Every organization in this case study uses the same “discursigraph” (a web of rhetorical concepts) to legitimize its work. Care and Caritas respond to
“humanitarian emergencies”. The International Rescue Committee works to provide “humanitarian assistance”. Horn Relief conducts “innovative humanitarian projects in pursuit of a peaceful, self-reliant and greener future”. In fact, this concept to the heart of many of these organizations. MSF exists to distribute “medical humanitarian aid”. World Vision self-identifies as a “humanitarian organization”. Carter Center believes it has a “humanitarian mission”. Only GIZ begins to unpack this vague attribution of 'humanity’: “the transition from humanitarian aid to sustainable development cooperation is... becoming increasingly blurred”.

“Humanitarian”, what the Oxford English Dictionary defines as “concerning the promotion of human welfare”, is not used by these organizations to simply mean the well-being of humankind. Many things can promote human welfare: a quality health care bill, an international court ruling in favor of indigenous rights, a shift in global economic policy, a just redistribution of land between rival tribes. But these are not the kinds of actions meant when NGOs use the term “humanitarian”. In every instance that the ten studied organizations use the term, it refers to short-term relief: blankets, food, water, emergency medical care, emergency shelter, immediate safety from physical harm. The word always appears under the programmatic category of “emergency relief”. Serving 'humanity' has become synonymous with providing short-term aid.

We have seen in previous chapters that this so-called humanitarian relief may actually do more harm than good, is certainly not the most proactive intervention, and is least likely to achieve transformative peace and justice. But if
Emergency relief is seen as the only 'humanitarian' action, if it has the sole claim on 'humanity', what kind of message does this send about more 'political' work? Activities couched in politics, i.e. struggles for power, issues at the heart of any conflict or controversy, are demoted to something less than 'humanitarian'. Politics, preference, and partiality are seen as unprofessional, inappropriate roles for NGOs. But if these modes of intervention result in nonviolence, justice, reconciliation or development, should they not also be 'humanitarian'? If engaging politically somehow increases the well-being of humankind, it seems to deserve equal invocation of the action-mobilizing term 'humanity'.

**Mitigating, Managing, Resolving – But Not Transforming?**

Scholar Hugh Miall seems to be right in saying that NGOs are increasingly attentive to the principles of conflict transformation: Mercy Corps seeks “solutions to issues fueling violence”; Caritas emphasizes “post-conflict reconciliation”; and Interpeace explains that local “participation is key as active interaction transforms relationships”. Almost all organizations talk about the value of “lasting”, “sustainable” or “permanent” peace. However, the term 'conflict transformation' itself does not seem to impact the way most organizations think about their intervention strategies.

Of the six peace and conflict terms mentioned in chapter 2 (conflict management, resolution, transformation; peace keeping, making, building), 'peacebuilding' is by far the most frequently used. Care, an organization that stresses women's empowerment, believes “peacebuilding and gender equity are
intertwined”. GIZ sees “peacebuilding” and “crisis prevention” as similar efforts, both intended to stem the outbreak, escalation or persistence of violence. For the Carter Center, “peacebuilding” is a follow-up activity to “implementing peace agreements”. Organizations seem to apply the term rather vaguely to refer to any activities that cultivate peaceful conditions across multiple actors in society. The construction allegory is frequently used beyond the term ‘peacebuilding’: “building trust”, “building capacity”, “building a future”. These idioms imply processes conducted over a period of time, beginning with basic foundations, slow steps, working up to social structures. Phrases like “from the ground up”, “the root causes of poverty”, “communities have deep roots” underscore the importance of mastering foundations of the process. This allegory certainly has value for promoting long-term solutions and grassroots attention, but organizations should be cautious not to take it too far. Unlike a house, peace requires effort at all levels at once, at the grassroots, civil society and national elites, at the underlying causes of the disagreement, and at the superficial level of immediate violence. Just as states should not content themselves with only working with elite diplomats, so NGOs should not relegate themselves only to the grassroots.

The name Interpeace is short for “International Peacebuilding Alliance”; the organizations speaks of ‘peacebuilding’ as a central organizing principle of its work. In particular, Interpeace states that it works “with local peacebuilders”. As an occupational status, the term legitimizes peace work, compels conflict sensitivity, and allows people to define their identity by their commitment to
peace. Rather than simply volunteering for a relief and development organization, even more than “development worker”, the label “peacebuilder” helps to propel international conflict intervention toward the movement side of the profession-social movement spectrum.

In most cases, organizations seem to shift fluidly between peace and conflict terminologies with little regard to their ‘branded’ meaning. According to Care, “it is widely recognized that resolving local disputes is a prerequisite to national reconciliation” (emphasis added). Only a paragraph later, the organization describes its work to “mitigate and manage communal violence”, tossing around the terms “conflict mitigation” and “conflict prevention and management”. Under the Carter Center “Conflict Resolution Program” heading, it describes its work on “dispute resolution”. Even while Mercy Corps merged with the “Conflict Management Group” in 2004, it still contends that “conflict resolution can help avoid tomorrow's wars and other crises”. Chapter 2 highlighted a vast theoretical difference between between conflict (deep disagreement that must be transformed over time) and dispute (a minor controversy that can be quickly decided); between conflict management (scaring or manipulating parties into peace) and conflict resolution (crafting a mutually satisfying peace agreement). NGOs do not appear invested in these distinctions, using terms more in their colloquial sense than as significant discursigraphs, linked to a web of theory.

The same fuzzy application of the word 'transformation' prevents any clear discussion about the need to support and sustain conflict (controversy) through
non-violent methods. World Vision uses the word quite frequently, although never in accordance with the peace and conflict field. The organization “believes that true transformation comes when each of these needs are addressed simultaneously”; here, World Vision references a development framework, the socioeconomic renewal of community livelihoods. Elsewhere, World Vision affirms that “the need for transformation is common to all”. This speaks more to the organization’s religiosity, a belief in the potential for redemption of the human spirit.

Surprisingly, the rhetoric of GIZ consistently demonstrates that it is the most connected to current conflict transformation literature. As it describes “conflict prevention”, GIZ mentions “conflict transformation and peace development”, “designed to gradually break the vicious circle of escalating violence”. The organization highlights that it is alleviating the structural causes of violent conflict”. In its sections on education and economy in conflicts, GIZ equates “peace education and conflict transformation”, explaining that “education is a precondition for peacebuilding and crisis prevention”. In certain cases, GIZ veers from conflict transformation theory. For example, it lists a timeline of conflict intervention – “preventive measures, emergency aid and reconstruction” – reverting to immediate relief during conflict. Nonetheless, GIZ tends to self-publicize in the rhetoric and principles of conflict transformation more than any other studied organization. I can only speculate why this is so, but perhaps, since GIZ is tied to the government and thus, clearly values traditional forms of legitimacy, it also hires academic consultants for thematic design.
Isolated Theories of Action

What this rhetorical analysis reveals, more than anything, is a disconnect between NGOs working in conflict intervention. Each organization approaches peace and conflict work from its own perspective. The Carter Center uses governance rhetoric, Caritas uses religious rhetoric, Care, international development and women's empowerment rhetoric, and so forth. They are neither speaking the same language nor operating under the same theories of action.

Ricigliano (2003) explains that “an organization first defines its goals and strategies based on its theory of action, and if collaboration can help it achieve these goals and strategies, the organization will pursue one or more collaborations with other intervenors” (p. 451). Certainly these ten organizations share similar goals; they would all like to end violence and suffering in Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire. Yet, they speak about these goals, and methods of reaching these goals, in such different ways that they are handicapped in efforts to collaborate. Without a common language, organizations are less effective at implementing cooperative projects, and cannot rise above the piecemeal, isolated service delivery model to a more holistic and integrated social movement.

In order to maximize collaboration, generate a movement-oriented ethos, ensure long-term commitment to complex and nuanced strategies, and contextualize conflicts within their political realities, NGOs should work towards more self-conscious rhetoric. The meaning, theory and implication of peace and conflict terms should be a topic of constant struggle, a space for growth,
integration and participatory management, both internally, within organizations / organizational families, and externally, with donors, partners and other NGOs.
CHAPTER 8: TARGET NGOS: RESPONSES TO CONFLICT

Responses Classified

The project-based structure of most NGO interventions makes it challenging to systematically classify organizations' activities. With the exception of Medecins Sans Frontieres which almost exclusively distributes emergency medical relief, all of the case study NGOs have multiple programs dedicated to diverse areas of social, political and economic need. Even organizations with narrow focus on long-term peacebuilding, like the Carter Center and Interpeace, still engage in an enormous range of activities, given the complexity of peacebuilding.

Within the wide range of mission-driven objectives, organizations tend to report activities project-by-project. A given number of staff completed a certain task in a particular region: for example, fifteen Care staff distributed water to 20,000 IDPs in the northern Puntland region; two Carter Center staff met with a group of election officials and civil society leaders in Mogadishu. This project-based approach facilitates upward accountability. Donors (governments, foundations, private individuals, etc.) generally rely on organizations themselves to self-report impact. It sounds far more impressive for an organization to report involvement in emergency relief, education, health care, employment, local civil society, governance, and human rights advocacy, than to mention activities in only one area. External observers cannot know the depth of organizations' involvement in these activities. In some cases, NGOs attempt to quantify their work, but only certain types of activities can be meaningfully quantified. Though critical to
conflict transformation, the impact and scope of trust-building, dialogue-oriented peace work is not easily represented in organizational materials nor easily communicated to organizational donors.

It is essential to remember from earlier chapters that 'doing good' is not good enough. All of the organizations examined here have excellent programs that serve people in need. However, long-term changes to the human condition will require more discerning evaluation. Are organizations completing the activities that best meet local needs? Are they duplicating services provided by other organizations, or ignoring areas of need across geographic space or level of society? Are the activities of organizations in the country, taken as an integrated whole, the most effective, strategic methods to achieve peace and justice?

Models for classifying NGO conflict intervention help to answer some of these questions; they can demonstrate gaps and duplications in NGO work for certain characteristics. However, the complexity of conflict intervention means that no model will capture all the relevant characteristics of strategic, multifaceted peace work. In this section, I attempt to apply some of the classification systems presented in chapter 4 to the activities of the ten case study NGOs.

The bulleted lists below uses the same hypothetical intervention categories as in the first section of chapter 4. I record programs from each of the ten organizations, representing activities in both countries. When a single program fits multiple categories, I include it only once under the category it best approximates.\[5\]

\[5\] Parenthetical abbreviations identify NGOs: Medecins Sans Frontieres = MSF; Care International = Care; Carter Center = CC; Caritas Internationalis = Caritas; International Rescue Committee = IRC; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Addressing Immediate Needs

- Rehabilitation of water sources, water trucking, non-food items distribution (HR/S)
- Drinking water and latrines (MC/S)
- Child-friendly centers for safety and education (MC/S)
- Child-friendly spaces for safety and trauma recovery (WV/S)
- Provision of shelter, blankets, cooking pots, clean water, sanitation (WV/S)
- Disease treatment and containment (WV/S)
- Emergency health care to refugees, including emergency evacuation (IRC/CI)
- Emergency water delivery and sanitation system repair (IRC/CI)
- Drop-in centers for women facing immediate violence (IRC/CI)
- Emergency medical treatment, disease containment and water distribution (MSF/S)
- Primary and secondary medical care, including mobile clinics and capacity building of hospitals (MSF/CI)
- Emergency distribution of food, water, shelter, cash and non-food items to “disaster-stricken” households (Care/S, CI)
- Disease treatment and containment, especially malaria and tuberculosis (Care/CI)

Zusammernarbeit = GIZ; Interpeace = Ip; World Vision = WV; Mercy Corps = MC; Horn Relief = HR. Letters after the dash represent the country of operation: S for Somalia, CI for Cote d'Ivoire.
Enhancing Local Capacity for Self-Help (Empowerment-focused Development)

- Cash for work programs (HR/S)
- Grassroots education in natural resource management, animal health, human health, literacy, business, leadership development (HR/S)
- Environmental rehabilitation to support economic development (MC/S)
- Cash for work programs (MC/S)
- Technical assistance to government for water and sanitation (MC/S)
- Teacher training to improve local educational quality (MC/S)
- Vocational training, social and health education of unemployed adults (WV/S)
- Training in sustainable agricultural practices (GIZ/CI)
- Private partnerships to enhance local economic development (GIZ/CI)
- Rural economic development via micro-projects and national park conservation (GIZ/CI)
- Training of midwives and doctors (IRC/CI)
- Monitoring children's educational progress (IRC/CI)
- Community training on water sanitation, safety and hygiene (IRC/CI)
- Capacity building of local NGOs working on water, agriculture and the environment (Care/S)
- Capacity building of local health care providers, public awareness to improve maternal health (Care/S)
- Food and cash for work programs to improve public sanitation (Care/S, CI)
• Support for natural resource management and animal health services
  (Care/S)
• Vocational training and education for “disadvantaged youth” (Care/S)
• Teacher training, management and support to improve educational systems
  (Care/S)
• HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention (Care/CI)
• Disease eradication, especially guinea worm (CC/CI)
• Programming for health esp. HIV/AIDS, education, water, sanitation, environmental restoration, micro-credit, and employment (Caritas/CI)
• Support to local infrastructure and public construction projects
  (Caritas/CI)

Promoting Short-Term Security

• Security management support to international and national NGOs (Care/S)

Reducing Conflict at the Grassroots; Problem-Solving with Civilians

• Capacity building of women’s organizations (HR/S)
• Peace education (HR/S)
• Awareness campaigns on human rights and governance (HR/S)
• Mediation services to resolve local clan disputes (MC/S)
• Sporting events for community reconciliation (WV/S)
• Forums for local discussion about Somali peace and conflict (Ip/S)
• Capacity building to media and civil society organizations working on
“peace, reconciliation and good governance” (Care/S)

- Reconciliation efforts tied to “concrete material incentives” for cooperation (Care/CI)
- Capacity building of local peace and women’s groups to promote peace and conflict prevention (Care/CI)

_Urging Action by Other Members of the International Community_

- International awareness campaigns about violence against civilians (MSF/S, CI)
- Regional advocacy with West African institutions “on peace and justice issues” (Caritas/CI)

_Mediating Conflicts with Party Representatives_

- Support to national, regional and local authorities for mediation processes (Ip/S)
- “National meetings” with government, NGOs and civil society leaders on peace and reconciliation (Care/CI)
- Meetings with election officials, party leaders, civil society leaders, and others in the international community regarding elections and transitional justice (CC/CI)
- Dialogue with National Civil Society Convention to promote peace and reconciliation (Caritas/CI)
Advocating for the Needs of Vulnerable Populations

- Environmental protection of land for pastoral livelihoods (HR/S)
- Advocacy for the inclusion of women in mediation process (Ip/S)
- Local awareness campaigns about violence against women (IRC/CI)
- Advocacy and local outreach to decrease the prevalence of FGM practices (Care/S)
- Outreach about children's rights (Care/S)
- Advocacy and outreach against child labor (Care/CI)
- Meetings with national elites about child labor and abuse (Caritas/CI)

Promoting Psychological Healing

- Psychosocial trauma recovery for IDPs (MC/S)
- Counseling and psychosocial healing for survivors of violence (IRC/CI)
- Counseling and reconciliation across local communities (Caritas/CI)

Supporting Infrastructure for a Functioning Democracy

- Governance and resource management in pastoral communities (HR/S)
- Monitoring compliance with peace agreements (Ip/S)
- Civil society outreach to promote electoral participation (Ip/S)
- Capacity building of Somali national government and infrastructure (Ip/S)
- Train justice personnel at the national level (GIZ/CI)
- Judicial reform measures introduced and discussed (GIZ/CI)
- Enhancing efficiency and transparency of local police (GIZ/CI)
• Monitoring elections for open transparency (CC/CI)

Assisting in the Rehabilitation of Post-Conflict Populations

• Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (GIZ/CI)
• Vocational training, education, micro-credit and food for work projects for returnees (Care/S)
• Reconstruction and resources for schools in returnees' communities (Care/S)
• Vocational training, education, micro-credit for returning youth (Care/S, CI)
• Reconstruction and rehabilitation of returning IDP communities (Care/CI)

The first obvious trend in the distribution of organizations' activities is the preference for relief and development work over any other form of conflict intervention. Every organization, with the exception of Interpeace, has programs in these two categories. Although response to immediate needs remains a staple of organizations' work, recent attention to long-term impact seems to manifest primarily as a shift towards more structural development. Unlike short-term aid, development activities are meant to sustainably increase the material or economic conditions of local communities. These programs certainly may help to alleviate underlying causes of conflict rooted in poverty and inequality. However, few of the organizations mention transformation or resolution of conflict as a motivator for their development work.
Scarce attention is given to programs that promote short-term security, such as negotiating zones of peace, monitoring protests for non-violence, or training community leaders in violence de-escalation. Such activities would not ensure long-term peace, but would promote short-term safety, and communicate a deviation in popular opinion away from an ethos of violence. The only security-related activity reported by any of the organizations is a NGO training program organized by the Somalia NGO Consortium which instructs staffmembers from multiple NGOs on how to navigate dangerous field conditions.

NGOs' work on grassroots problem-solving seems to exist primarily as a conflict-sensitive outgrowth of more traditional development activities. The Track two approach to cooperative economic development, a strategy promoted by Joseph Montville and described in chapter 2, is a popular tack among these organizations, especially the environmental restoration model. Unlike human-centered development, environmental work demands that communities focus on communal goods, something 'bigger than themselves', forcing grassroots adversaries to see their goals as mutually entangled. Multiple international NGOs also emphasize capacity building of local peace and women's organizations working on grassroots dialogue and community-level reconciliation. This may be a product of the development trend toward local empowerment, or may simply be a strategy of convenience – easier to support the people already doing the work than to reinvent the wheel. Certainly the effort is laudable in theory, but more information is needed to determine whether the material and technical support of INGOs substantially increases the impact of local organizations.
Organizations make surprisingly little reference to international advocacy; none highlight international advocacy as a programmatic category. Of course, most of the organizations present information on their websites, continually monitoring and reporting on local conditions, but they tend not to offer opinions about what the international community should do. Occasionally, organizations plead for more financial support or, vaguely, more involvement from the UN, but even this is rare. Moreover, organizations do not defend particular policy choices, advocate for peace agreement outcomes, or even push for the existence of a settlement. Despite their unique, transnational position as local knowledge centers and international conduits, organizations overwhelmingly shrink from statements more political than the mere acknowledgment of suffering.

Meetings with party representatives typically assumes a Track two or unofficial approach. NGOs offer support to mediation processes, facilitate inter-sector dialogue between government and civil society, and work with election officials and commissions to establish post-settlement electoral procedures. Organizations contextualize their activities as informal gatherings meant to build trust, rather than formal decision-making events aimed at the eventual signing of a peace agreement. These Track two approaches are largely initiated by Carter Center and Interpeace, the organizations with peace-driven missions. This makes sense considering that elite-level mediation differs greatly in strategy, skills and participants from traditional grassroots-level development work. Organizations cannot gradually slide their way into national peace work, but must have explicit, objectives for long-term peace.
While organizations are minimally involved in international advocacy, half of all target organizations include local advocacy for vulnerable populations. The needs of three groups were represented, women, children and pastoral communities, particularly in three areas: violence against women (domestic abuse, female genital mutilation, rape, etc.), child labor, and rural economic development. In most cases, this local advocacy was described as the capstone to a related development project. For example, Horn Relief’s advocacy for environmental protection for pastoral livelihoods is connected to its direct service programs on environmental restoration and partnerships with pastoral communities. Care International’s human rights work in Cote d’Ivoire against child labor is part of a larger development project in support of the country’s cocoa farmers.

Similarly, psychosocial healing tends to be described with other emergency relief activities, contextualized more as an effort to stabilize individuals than to produce nation-wide reconciliation. For example, under the heading “providing emergency support”, Mercy Corps lists distribution of drinking water, creation of child-friendly safe spaces, and “psychosocial services to help trauma victims recover”. This reflects an awareness of complex psychological and emotional needs, but a disconnect from the communal and political levels at which these needs can operate.

Support for governance and democracy seem to take three forms: monitoring of government activities, training of government personnel and technical / financial capacity building. Three organizations particularly dominated
this area of operation: Interpeace, the Carter Center and GIZ. For the former two organizations, public infrastructure is a means to peace, whereas GIZ seeks good governance as an end in itself.

Finally, NGOs' post-conflict reintegration of communities mostly focuses on refugees and IDPs. In Cote d'Ivoire, these projects were conducted prior to the election violence of 2010, while in Somalia, they were geographically confined to Somaliland and Puntland. Rather than a nation-wide campaign to reintegrate returnees, either with or without government cooperation, these rehabilitation projects are done piecemeal, community by community.

In order to capture overarching trends in NGOs' activities, I assess organizations' activities using two axes from the model created by Michael Kuchinsky (1999; see chapter 4). Each of the programs bulleted above I classify by society-level engagement and intervention strategy (see figure 8.1 and 8.2). For example, provision of shelters, blankets cooking pots, clean water and sanitation is clearly a grassroots-level activity, while capacity building of Somali national government and infrastructure is an activity at the level of national elites. Likewise, training of midwives and doctors supports basic 'human needs', while mediation services to resolve local clan disputes is a 'direct effort'.

Organizations' objectives were divided into programs based on their own representation. This is somewhat arbitrary; what one organization presents as a single program could easily be four separate programs to another group. Therefore, this analysis is not meant to be viewed quantitatively. However, relative distributions across both axes are so skewed that qualitative conclusions
can be drawn with some certainty.

Three important lessons can be extracted from this analysis:

- NGOs spend more time working at the grassroots than with civil society or national elites.
- NGOs tend to prioritize basic human needs over direct or indirect efforts to transform conflict.
- Although many choose not to, NGOs are capable of operating at the national level and engaging in direct conflict intervention.

These conclusions fit previous observations that organizations in conflict still overwhelmingly provide emergency relief. Theoretical criticism about organizational short-sightedness has produced more long-term development
strategies focused on communities' material needs. However, organizations less frequently pursue structural changes to society, the politicized redistribution of power and resources, or a holistic resolution / transformation of conflict.

Such trends fit a Liberal division of labor between states as conflict mediators and NGOs as agents of grassroots relief (see chapter 3). They also reflect the continued dominance of Track one (state-centered) diplomacy over Track two (unofficial mediation with civil society) over Track 1.5 (official mediation conducted by civil society).

Since some organizations do have programs that work with national elites and intervene directly in conflict, these are evidently viable strategies. However, cognitive and practical impediments continue to limit organizations' involvement in these areas.

**Comparisons between NGOs**

Literature on NGOs emphasizes that organizations are not unitary, rational actors. Instead, they are complex, collective actors influenced by a myriad of internal and external factors. Organizational decisions and activities, generated through dialogue and power struggles, do not necessarily reflect the convictions or theories of action of any of the organization's staff. Dynamics such as management style, internal structure, size, mission / vision, stated goals, funding source, and headquartering country all influence NGOs' programming. In order to maximize an organizations' impact, managers and observers alike should understand what makes an NGO in conflict behave as it does, what factors cause
an organization to veer away from 'rational' strategies (i.e. strategies through which the organization most effectively achieves its stated goals).

Comparing the activities of the ten case study NGOs reveals wide variation in activities. Using the same methodology as above, I assess NGO society-level engagement and intervention strategy (see figure 8.3 and 8.4).

Figure 8.3: Society-Level Engagement by Organization

Although Figure 8.1 depicts a strong overall trend toward activities at the grassroots, organizations actually vary widely in the level of society at which they engage. Care, Caritas, Horn Relief, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, MSF and World Vision all have significantly more involvement at the grassroots than at any other level of society. In fact, the last four relief and development organizations are so strongly skewed towards grassroots activities that they alone may be responsible for the overall preference for grassroots interventions.
Activities of GIZ and the Carter Center are almost evenly dispersed across all levels of society, with slight preference to intervention at the level of national elites. As noted in chapter 6, these organizations are both very governance-oriented missions: the Carter Center emphasizes democracy as a means to peace, and GIZ, governance for its own sake. Thus, it makes sense that they emphasize national elites based on their frame for evaluating the needs of a country.

Interestingly, Interpeace is the only organization with no work at the grassroots, with the most dedication to national elites and civil society. This conflict-oriented organization uses 'peacebuilding' as the conceptual organizing frame for its work. Its interpretation of peacebuilding emphasizes more traditional conflict resolution methods (mediation, negotiation, etc.) than conflict transformation, which requires operation at all levels of society.

Interpeace is not the only organization to exclude entire levels of society altogether. Horn Relief, the IRC and Mercy Corps exclude national elites; MSF excludes civil society and World Vision excludes both civil society and national elites. Only four of the ten organizations work at all three levels of society. This is concerning in light of John Paul Lederach's assertion that successful peacebuilding requires integration across horizontal and vertical peace constituencies. However, the observation is not surprisingly; as mentioned in chapter 4, other studies have noted NGOs' tendency to operate only at one level of society. The skills and principles required for community-level work do not translate well to work with national elites, but to be maximally effective, to generate trust, local knowledge, credibility and holistic conflict transformation,
organizations are going to have to learn to be flexible across boundaries of social status.

Organizations with strong government / IGO funding – GIZ and Interpeace – tend to operate more at the level of national elites. By contrast, organizations with strong reliance on individual donors – the IRC, MSF, World Vision, Caritas – tend to operate more at the grassroots. There are several plausible explanations for this correlation. Governments may be more familiar with state-level interventions and thus more comfortable supporting such interventions. Governments also tend to fund organizations based on RFPs and grant applications, whereas organizations have mere seconds to capture the attention and interest of individual donors. Thus, organizations may find it more difficult to communicate the importance of long-term, national strategies like mediation, dialogue and trust-building; service delivery to the grassroots makes a more compelling donor plea. Finally, the observation may also just be an artifact of organizational history: GIZ was created by the German government and Interpeace emerged from a branch of the UN. The organizations may be responding more to internal tradition than to donors' wishes. Most likely, these explanations are all correct in part, cementing the distinction between the organizations' perspectives and strategies.
Like society-level engagement, intervention strategy varies widely between organizations. Multiple organizations emphasize human needs almost exclusively: the IRC, Mercy Corps, MSF, and World Vision. Care International engages in all three forms of relief, but with less involvement in direct action. Horn Relief and GIZ work almost equally for human needs and indirect efforts, and Caritas and the Carter Center have programs equally distributed across all three areas. Only Interpeace is skewed towards more direct intervention strategies.

Despite the similar, peace-oriented missions of the Carter Center and Interpeace, the organizations differ widely in their propensity for direct intervention. Religion may be a factor influencing World Vision to work more for human needs. I hypothesize this is the case based on a conservative manifestation of Christianity that promotes charitable service without major structural changes to society. However, this does not seem to influence Caritas.
Interestingly, all U.S.-based organizations – Care, the Carter Center, the IRC, Mercy Corps and World Vision – are either entirely or largely skewed towards meeting basic needs. Even the Carter Center, which was initially started as a conflict resolution organization intended for direct intervention, has shifted to include more needs-oriented work. This trend parallels observations in NGO literature that organizations from the U.S. tend to prefer service over advocacy, relative to their European counterparts (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001).

It would make sense to observe some correlation between organizational size and intervention strategy (for example, larger organizations might have more material and reputational capacity to intervene directly through advocacy or mediation). However, case study NGOs do not display any consistent correlation in this regard. Similarly, there is no significant correlation between the organizational funding source and intervention strategy.

Perhaps most notably, there is significant overlap in the organizations' tendencies in both society-level engagement and intervention strategy. This is understandable since most relief and development work occurs at the grassroots, geared towards meeting human needs. However, this need not be the case; direct efforts – mediation, advocacy, etc. – are just as applicable at the grassroots, and, conversely, national elites are quite capable of implementing programs for basic needs. Strong similarities between Figures 8.3 and 8.4 indicate that organizations tend to compartmentalize: grassroots work meets human needs, national work signifies direct conflict intervention. In other words, organizations conceive of these axes as parallel, when in fact they should be perpendicular (see figure 8.5).
Because organizations operate as though grassroots and basic needs provision were synonymous, NGO case study activities tend to fall in quadrants I and III of Figure 8.5B. Organizations are engaged in some indirect efforts at the grassroots (e.g. reconciliation, psychosocial trauma recovery) and occasionally, direct efforts (e.g. outreach and public advocacy against FGM) – activities that would fall under quadrant IV. However, these are exceptions to the rule. For holistic conflict transformation, with meaningful engagement across peace constituencies, organizations need to consciously strive for more activity in quadrants II and IV: basic needs provision through national elites, and direct conflict intervention at the grassroots. Quadrant II activities might include structural changes to national education policy, redistribution of land rights at the national level, or agricultural training programs implemented through national bureaucracy. Quadrant IV activities might include community forums about the future of peace, negotiation between communities about conflict issues, or advocacy for village-level protection of the rights of vulnerable populations.
Comparisons between Countries

Chapter 5 contrasted conflicts in Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire. The countries are both undergoing immense and forgotten suffering, but numerous factors differentiate between the two local conditions. Somali conflict is more dispersed and has lasted for decades, while conflict in Cote d'Ivoire is nationally centralized and only (re)surfaced in the last few months. The conflicts are rooted in different social, political, and economic factors, including colonial histories; disparities in development across geographic areas; unmet material needs driven by extreme poverty, famine, drought, etc.; clashes between religions, ethnicities and clans; influence by and tensions with unstable neighbors; intervention and political interests of international actors. Each of these factors differ between countries and require unique, country-specific interventions. In order to examine how NGO activities differ by country, I assess society-level engagement and intervention strategy of NGOs' programs by country (see figure 8.6).
Figure 8.6 shows the same general trend observed in Figures 8.1 and 8.2: grassroots-level interventions and strategies for human needs are prioritized over other intervention methods in both countries. In Cote d'Ivoire, there is slightly more attention to intervention strategies at the national level, while NGOs in Somalia spend slightly more time working with civil society. This fits my initial hypothesis that Cote d'Ivoire, as a centralized power struggle, would require more intervention at the level of national elites, compared to decentralized conflict in Somalia.

Aside from this minimal deviation in society-level engagement, there is generally very little difference in NGO strategy between countries of conflict. The 1-3% difference in program characteristics between one country and the other is far from significant (especially considering that this analysis, derived from semi-
arbitrarily divided programming, is meant to be qualitative). The most supported conclusion is a null set: there is no substantial difference in NGO programming between these two countries.

Two of the case study organizations operate in both Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia: Medecins Sans Frontieres and Care International. MSF uses the same strategy everywhere it works: medical humanitarian relief coupled with efforts to 'bear witness' when necessary. In both Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia, MSF is treating refugees, IDPs and victims of violence. Its publications on both countries include information about episodes of violence, victim testimonies, and international intervention strategies.

As a more generalized relief and development organization, the intervention strategies of Care International are a little bit more difficult to assess. In both countries, Care provides emergency relief, has cash-for-work and food-for-work programs, conducts vocational training and other reintegration efforts for returnees, builds the capacity of local civil society, and advocates for the rights of women and children.

Using the same methodology as presented above, I assess the society-level engagement and intervention strategy of Care International across both countries (see table 8.1). Percentages listed horizontally across the table are virtually identical, never more than 11% deviance, even considering the small sample size (total number of programs < 25).
Table 8.1: Comparing Activities of Care International across Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society-Level</th>
<th>Care – Cote d'Ivoire</th>
<th>Care – Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Elites</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Strategy</th>
<th>Care – Cote d'Ivoire</th>
<th>Care – Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Needs</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Efforts</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Efforts</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers are reported as percentages of total programs conducted by Care in this country.

Both comparisons overall (figure 8.6) and within the same NGO across different countries (MSF and Care, table 8.1) demonstrate that NGO activities do not differ substantially between countries. In other words, organizations are using one-size-fits-all strategies for conflict intervention rather than politically sensitive, context-dependent approaches. Although programs like the Do No Harm Project and ConflictSensitivity.org push NGOs to alter their strategies based on local realities, this research suggests that organizations make programmatic decisions based on other factors external to the country of conflict. For example, organization may be more influenced by donors' interests, organizational structure, internal organizational politics, their original founding mission, or a particular theory of action. Organizations may also see context-dependent programs as overly political. Human needs remain consistent across all countries (everyone needs health, education and employment), but direct interventions in issues such as resource distribution, territorial disputes, historical trauma, lack of official recognition require local awareness and political engagement.
CHAPTER 9: TARGET NGOS: ADDRESSING CHALLENGES

The challenges facing an NGO in conflict are often as cognitive and symbolic as they are material. The chaos, violence, and destruction of a warzone creates unstable ground for intervention, putting the staff, tangible resources and reputation of an organization at risk. For traditional relief and development organizations, accustomed to conditions of relative peace, conflict inspires fear and uncertainty. Organizations want to minimize their risk, to move on to other locations where they are more comfortable and have more certain impact.

Rational albeit counterproductive fears of flubbing up, looking dumb, or getting hurt drives much decision-making in conflict. These are legitimate fears; if an organization errs in conflict, where the stakes are higher and the activities less familiar, it loses legitimacy among local communities, the international community, donors, IGOs, governments, partner NGOs, and even its own employees. Thus, organizations continue basic relief and development work because it is familiar and safe, almost guaranteed to produce goodwill among constituents. Nonetheless, pursuit of global peace and justice will require no less than the most innovative, directly engaged strategies.

In this chapter, I examine how the ten case study organizations have responded to challenges such as field staff security, the balance between impartiality and justice, and the need to measure abstract objectives. More than a set of operational procedures, I find symbolic and rhetorical principles, statements that affirm organizations commitment to nonviolence, belief in human rights and certainty that peace is everyone's responsibility. As with activity, NGOs'
success with direct conflict intervention – their security, legitimacy and efficacy – depends less on what they do, and more on how they frame their decisions.

The completeness of this analysis is limited by information availability. Some organizations more fully detail their principles and methods than others. In the case of Horn Relief, for example, this is merely an artifact of organizational capacity; an $8 million organization cannot devote as much time to website design as one with $6 billion. However, in other cases, the absence of information is as significant as its presence. For example, the IRC describes the death of a staff member, but does not use the tragedy to detail and reinforce its security strategy in Cote d’Ivoire. It downplays issues of organizational safety, and focuses instead on organizational opportunity. While certain organizations, such as Interpeace and Care, describe evaluation strategies associated with particular programs, most of the NGOs do not even mention how they measure success, a difficult process in such a complex environment.

**Security of Field Staff**

Staff safety remains one of the biggest concerns of organizations operating in conflict, motivated either by political or personal concerns. Many of the organizations document incidences of staff threatened or killed, often with reaffirmed commitments to ensuring security and neutrality, balancing imminent danger with the urgent short-term needs of local populations. For example, David Gilmore, the CARE country director, explains:

The safety of our staff is paramount to our operations. These kinds of targeted and public threats ultimately force us to choose between the
safety of our colleagues on the ground and our commitment to deliver aid
to hundred of thousands of Somalis who are in desperate need of
assistance. We take security threats of this nature very seriously... The
situation in Somalia is extremely tense, with dozens of civilian casualties
every week, periodic abductions and killing of aid workers. Since the
beginning of 2008, at least 24 relief workers have lost their lives, while 10
remain hostages.

Perhaps the biggest fallout from these security threats is organizations'
inability to work strategically toward long-term conflict solutions. With bullets
flying – or, more realistically, with news reports mounting in the aftermath of a
staffmember's death – NGOs must respond urgently, minimizing risk, putting staff
in harm's way only when absolutely critical. From this panicked perspective, it is
far easier to see carnage, disease and famine as essential areas of focus rather than
weakened trust and shattered relationships. Yet, conflict resolution and
transformation theories underscore that long-term trust-building is of primary
importance for any shot at peace.

It seems likely that many of the case study organizations have developed
technical solutions to conflict, such as armed guards, private security companies,
and facility surveillance. However, these are not the solutions that organizations
advertise, perhaps because organizations wish to de-emphasize their similitude to
military interventions.

Instead, NGOs most frequently describe geographic adaptations to
security; NGOs limit where they operate for the sake of staff safety. Care
International and Horn Relief conduct the majority of their Somali development
work in nearly peaceful Somaliland and Puntland. These regions do need
development work, and many analysts agree that capacity building in these semi-
autonomous states will do much to reduce piracy and general instability of the entire east African horn. However, post-conflict reconstruction in these northern states does not directly contribute to resolution or transformation of concurrent violence in Somalia proper.

Rather than treating sick or injured patients in the field, Medecins Sans Frontiéres urges victims to approach their clinics. When MSF vehicles do go out in search of the wounded, staff follow strict protocol, bringing patients back to the secured clinic, triaging patients for priority surgery. Remote rural areas of Côte d'Ivoire remain beyond the purview of the organization: “We don't know how many people are still hiding in fear in the Ivorian bush, or what levels of violence they may be currently exposed to, but the horrific stories we have heard from people are cause for alarm. We increased our mobile clinics up to 12 to reach the most vulnerable, but it still remains too insecure to access the deepest bush to assess needs.”

The International Rescue Committee in Côte d'Ivoire works in the buffer zone between the “northern-held rebel territory and the government-held south”. Much like operating from a neighboring country, the buffer provides a sideline safe haven, from which the IRC can access civilian victims without operating in the line of fire. Peace agreements mandate cease fire across the buffer, and French and UN peacekeepers enforce the agreement. The IRC does not discuss its access to vulnerable populations from this region; one can only guess that communities in the far north or south of the country would have less access to the IRC’s help. However, compared to many organizations setting up camp in Abidjan, the IRC’s
buffer position at least does not favor either the north or south. Like MSF, the IRC explains that it generally sets up base, then allows locals to approach on their own. As a result, the IRC does not have to worry as much about the dangers of looting and attack en route to communities in need. On the other hand, “the presence of militias and harassment at road blocks also makes it more difficult for survivors and others to access healthcare services”.

From observation of the case study organizations, standard approaches to security seem to include as much risk minimization as possible, political neutrality and abstention from conflict, coupled with international and national advocacy for peace enforcement. For example, the IRC advises that “Ivorian authorities must urgently restore security and rule of law, effectively monitor the armed forces, and work toward easing political and ethnic tension in communities.”

The Carter Center offers an alternate, more mission-oriented strategy for promoting security. The first part of the strategy relies heavily on preventive communication. Through election observation in Cote d'Ivoire, the Carter Center works directly with the government to ensure safety of foreign observers. It clarifies in its “Declaration of Principles for International Election Standards”:

An international election observation mission therefore should not be organized unless the country holding the elections takes the following actions: issues an invitation...; guarantees unimpeded access to all persons concerned with election processes...; guarantees freedom of movement around the country for all members of the international election observer mission; ...guarantees that no governmental authority will pressure, threaten action against or take any reprisal against any international or foreign citizen who works for, assists or provides information to the international election observer mission.
By now, June 2011, the legitimacy of President Ouattara's rule has almost unanimous international support, so there are fewer concerns about privileging the accepted government. However, unilateral government support a year prior would not have been as apolitical or straightforward. Because the legitimacy of power and identity are often central to civil conflict, the Carter Center's de facto support for the status quo government yields security and stability, but may not necessarily produce justice. If a minority faction arises in response to repeated human rights violations or unchecked oppression, it may not be in the best interest of a humanitarian-minded organization to stabilize pre-existing conditions.

The Center's preventive security makes up one prong of Avant's Security Triangle, usually accompanied by deterrence and acceptance (see chapter 4). The organization also follows the core of the security approach: mission comes first. In exchange for the government's agreement not to injure or impede intervenors, the Center agrees to abide by an explicit Code of Conduct. The code includes such principles as “respect for sovereignty and international human rights” and “respect [for] the laws of the country and the authority of the electoral body”. By drawing on international standards such as 'human rights', the 'rule of law' and democracy, the Center justifies its intervention and identifies higher grounds on which to make decisions. Even if the Center acted in opposition to the government based on known human rights violations, the government would, hypothetically, still have a contractual obligation not to injure election observers.

**Impartiality vs. Protection and Justice**
The Carter Center's Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct are a perfect example of the struggle between impartiality and justice. On the one hand, the Center maintains the value of principled intervention, given human rights violations or disrespect for the rule of law. On the other hand, the organization compels staff to “maintain strict political impartiality at all times”. Clearly there is a limit to how impartial or un-opinionated NGOs deem to be acceptable, otherwise organizations would not intervene (or even exist) at all. The term 'political', a frequent modifier for unacceptable forms of partiality, seems to hold the key to understanding this balance. The Carter Center elaborates: “[Election observers] must not express or exhibit any bias or preference in relation to national authorities, political parties, candidates, referenda issues or in relation to any contentious issues in the election process.” Here, the Center prioritizes the democratic process over outcomes; even if a leader violently oppressed minority populations, but was elected by majority vote, the Carter Center's principles demand acceptance of the leader.

In its Declaration of Principles, the Center declares, “No one should be allowed to be a member of an international election observer mission unless that person is free from any political, economic or other conflicts of interest that would interfere with conducting observations accurately and impartially...” Is it possible to be entirely free of conflicts of interest? Organizations depend on financial support for continued existence from particular countries, particular people with political views. Even the Center's blatant support for human rights is a bias. What does it mean to accurately observe elections? Is it relevant, for
example, that countless war crimes were committed by either side during the post-election violence? That hundreds of civilians were killed, many detained, beaten, raped, abused. Amnesty International, an explicitly political human rights organization, speaks extensively on these violations (see for example “Video: Cote d'Ivoire Forces”). By contrast, the Carter Center does not mention anything about the human rights violations. Each organization chooses the extent and conditions of its impartiality. All approaches may be equally moral, equally effective, but they are independent decisions along a spectrum between total non-intervention (a political decision in support of the status quo) and direct military support for one side. Organizations fall at different places along this spectrum. If they fail to acknowledge their particular, politicized understanding of partiality, organizations will find it difficult to collaborate, and even more challenging to build the trust and transparency necessary for successful mediation.

In general, organizations seem most willing to take political sides in a conflict when rooted in less controversial values like the rule of law, rather than minority rights. All of the six NGOs in Cote d'Ivoire have expressed support for Alassane Ouattara, since the international community accepted his presidency as the legitimate outcome of the election. For example, MSF places blame with former president Gbagbo for the conflict, “The worst of the fighting that broke out earlier this year ended in late March, several days before the fall of the regime of Laurent Gbagbo, the former president whose refusal to accept his electoral defeat triggered the violence in the first place”. It is unclear whether this support is genuinely based on a principled belief that democracy is the highest value or the
knowledge that partiality of this kind would not be frowned upon by the international community.

Other instances of advocacy suggest that organizations are at least influenced the general consensus in the international community. The case study organizations support for minorities is restricted to the least politicized groups – women, children and pastoral nomads. Controversial minority affiliations by ethnicity, race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or profession (sex workers, beggars, etc) do not have universal international support. Advocacy (i.e. partiality) on behalf of these vulnerable groups, though equally critical from a human rights perspective, is not as safe an organizational strategy. The issues on which organizations advocate also tend to be less internationally disputed: especially, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, and child labor. Organizations confront social problems that require cultural changes, education and outreach, rather than changes at the level of national policy.

Finally, many organizations take the stance that violence itself is wrong, that neither warring group is inherently right or deserving of power. Instead, organizations push both groups to work to end the violence. This involves outspoken advocacy against violence, documenting abuses, or in the language of MSF, “bearing witness”, without placing blame. Medicins Sans Frontieres has published numerous stories of the wounded, killed and abused: “Boy, 17, village near Pehé, western Ivory Coast. May 2011”, “Man, 26, Western Ivory Coast. April 2011”. In a video produced by the IRC, survivors of violence place their hands over their eyes and report abuses. On one hand, the video is a powerful problem
statement, communicating the sentiment that *something* needs to be done to stop the violence. On the other, the video does not say what that 'something' is, what kinds of interventions should be taken, how international actors should behave, and the focus on past traumas distracts from forward-looking optimism about a future of peace.

**Conflict Sensitivity**

The think tank and NGO consulting agency, Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, defines “conflict sensitivity” as:

The ability of [an] organization to: understand the context in which [it] operates; understand the interaction between [its] intervention and the context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts. Note: the word 'context' is used rather than 'conflict' to make the point that all socio-economic and political tensions, root causes and structural factors are relevant to conflict sensitivity because they all have the potential to become violent. 'Conflict' is sometimes erroneously confused with macro-political violence between two warring parties.

Organizations conflict interventions should be rooted in local contexts. Figure 9.1 demonstrates the cyclic and multi-layered process: first organizations “monitor and evaluate” the context, then plan programs, implement pilot programs, re-evaluate, plan again, and implement a modified program, constantly observing and adapting to diverse conflict causes, dynamics and actors.
Almost all of the ten organizations seem to have internalized these recommendations at least to some extent. The Carter Center, for example, justifies its programs in Cote d'Ivoire based on the country's politicized peace processes: “free, open, transparent and democratic elections are a central component of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), established between the government of Cote d'Ivoire and rebels known as the Forces Nouvelles”. By evoking the commitments of the peace agreement, the Carter Center roots its programs in local decision-making, albeit at the national level.

GIZ also references the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, what has been considered the most successful phase of the Ivorian peace process. The GIZ outlines a history of the country's unrest: “Since September 2002, Cote d'Ivoire has experienced a several political and economic crisis and this has divided the country geographically and politically...The situation began to improve when the peace treaty of Ouagadougou was signed.” Given the organization's assessment
that violence in Cote d'Ivoire emerged in response to political and economic crisis, the organization's activities for governance and rural development make a lot of sense.

The IRC demonstrates sensitivity to complex dynamics and unequal power relations within grassroots communities. The organization describes a village in “west-central” Cote d'Ivoire “whose population is majority Bete – the same ethnic group as former president Gbagbo”. Since political tides have shifted, particularly in the south, against Gbagbo and his supporters, the ethnic group, even civilian members, now face “reprisal raids by unidentified armed groups allegedly looking for hidden weapons”. As a result, “seven people were killed... and many more have been threatened, had their livelihoods destroyed and their savings stolen. Because males are being targeted, some men are hiding out in the forest, leaving behind vulnerable women and children.” The violence is neither so simple as attack of one clearly marked military against another, nor rampant, indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Ethnic groups and genders experience the violence differently, producing uneven needs – both in terms of immediate relief and reconciliation.

Although one might easily fall into the trap of oversimplifying the Ivorian conflict as a case of political violence, Bariyo (2007) makes it clear that presidential control is only one small aspect of the conflict (see chapter 5). The IRC acknowledges the deeper complexity of the conflict: “What we have now is an explosive mix of political, economic and ethnic tensions that's boiling over into incidents like the killing in Duekoue.” This awareness seems to influence IRC
programming, with its emphasis on economic development and advocacy against violence against women. However, the organization has done little to address political or ethnic components of the conflict. Clearly, awareness of the conflict context is not enough, only one step of the process of operationalizing conflict sensitivity.

One of the contributing factors that Bariyo (2007) identifies as a cause of Ivorian conflict is the disparity in development and poverty of the northern and southern regions of the country. Many scholars and organizations suggest more development work in the less economically advanced, more culturally marginalized north, in hopes of reducing inequality on either side of the cease fire line. None of the case study organizations apply this advice. The Carter Center does most of its work in Abidjan supporting election processes and meeting with government officials. Its field office is also based out of Abidjan, and while the organization has expanded some of its voter identification efforts into rural areas, it remains primarily focused on high urban density in the south. Care also works primarily in southern cities, including Man, Daloa and Bouake. Although GIZ underscores the cross-ethnic nature of its programs, its main hub of operations are in the south-west regions of the country, especially in and around the Tai National Park, a conservation area near the Liberian border. As mentioned previously, the IRC operates from the buffer zone between the two regions, surprisingly, the closest any of the organizations come to geopolitical sensitivity. The organizations' tendency to emphasize the south makes sense for many reasons: it has access by sea and air, better security, better roads, access to government
officials and national government, the highest density urban populations, better communications technology, and so forth. But all the same reasons that make southern Cote d'Ivoire operationally simpler also make work in the north that much more important.

Interestingly, organizations in Cote d'Ivoire seem to spend much more time talking about the political context of the conflict than organizations in Somalia. Aside from the blogs of its field staff, Mercy Corps publishes one sentence on Somalia: “In a failed state, small successes go a long way toward building self-reliant communities.” World Vision makes no mention of either particular clans, political leaders, political parties or past peace agreements in Somalia. Instead, the organization focuses on the anarchy and struggle in the country: “With a mostly arid landscape and scattered settlements with nomadic traditions, Somalia has experienced prolonged humanitarian crises with the absence of a functioning central government since 1991.” Organizations universally condemn Somalia as a ‘failed’ state, a ‘state-less’ territory, a region of chaos and turmoil. As a result, organizations are less discerning in their conflict sensitivity; they less readily assess causes of conflict and instead describe the problem in terms of human needs.

Many organizations, particularly in Cote d'Ivoire, apply the process-model to conflict intervention: assess, test, try again. GIZ is currently in in pilot phase of a project to reintegrate ex-combatants. Once it tests and modifies training curriculum for its staff, GIZ will implement “a second phase in which the training activities are expanded and a service center set up”. In its first phase of a rural
development and biodiversity program, GIZ quite usefully discovered that
“development measures are possible even during a crisis, provided adequate
attention is paid to the specific context.” World Vision similarly describes its pilot
and future planned phases of its sports programs for local reconciliation and youth
development.

In 2008, Care spoke of plans to “launch an 18-month project to field test
and promote a practical community-based approach to conflict mitigation,”
implemented in three phases: conflict assessment, tentative reconstruction and
reconciliation efforts, followed by national and international discussion about the
methods, advantages and opportunities of the projects. These discussions
“contribute to the national policy dialogue and framework for peace and capacity
building of national networks”. As a step-by-step procedure, this seems a brilliant
approach to organizational growth and new programming: the (inter)national
discussions allow staff an opportunity for debrief, give Care management a
chance to reassess from a bird's eye view, and helps to integrate Care within an
international conflict-responding community. The dialogue, following only a short
phase of implementation, positions Care not as an instructor, but a collaborator
with a shared interest in growth towards more conflict sensitive interventions.

Local Empowerment and Program Design

The most effective ways that NGOs gain legitimacy as third-party
mediators is through trust and relationship-building over the long-term. Trust or
accountability comes in multiple forms: commitment to organizational rhetoric,
upward accountability to donors, adherence to higher values, and downward accountability to local needs (Lewis 2001). As Interpeace emphasizes, peace requires “local ownership”; communities must have reason to believe not only that organizations will do what they say, but also that they are guided by the needs and interests of the community. Citizens must feel that peace was their idea, and that solutions depend on everyone.

In a small way, Medicins Sans Frontieres introduces a local empowerment approach to emergency relief. More than a process or activity, MSF’s impact on grassroots capacity depends on its standards of intervention. The organization’s doctors do not just treat diseases, but patients. An MSF new report describes “As Dr. Ledecq does his ward round between two operations, he spends a while with every patient. No need to pick up the clip-board as he knows their name, the status of their treatment”. Although the organization delivers only primary medical care, its strives to maintain an ethos of respect for local knowledge. Dignifying patients with communication, permitting them to be the expert in their own lives, in their own physical pain, and modeling (but not preaching) peaceful human interaction helps to restore “the value of a human life”.

Other organizations describe more direct efforts to include local communities in program design, training, dialogue and decision-making about peace work. Care, in particular, frequently emphasizes local partnerships and decision-making, perhaps as an outgrowth of the organizations’ focus on women’s empowerment frameworks in non-conflict development. Many models exist for reintegrating returnees; the process of rebuilding a community requires so many
different interventions that any number of approaches might be beneficial – emergency cash distribution, arms-for-work, education, vocational training, trauma care, conciliatory mediation, and so forth. Rather than selecting methods arbitrarily, Care explains that its programs to “reintegrate returnees” were designed based on “the most commonly requested assistance articulated by refugees and returnees; priority needs identified by Somaliland Ministry of Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration; pressing needs identified in interview with government ministers; priorities identified by local governmental 'plans of action', mayors and one governor”. As with all effective peacebuilding, the program seeks long-term structural changes over short-term care. The process of consensus-building and opinion-gathering across multiple social groups takes time, but is a critical component of empowering reconstruction.

Care also writes extensively about its collaboration with local NGOs. In an emergency cash distribution project, Care elicits the support of local organizations for delivery systems. Through collaboration on emergency relief, Care develops rapport with these organizations that allows them to collaborate in developing “more holistic understanding of the constraints faced by the affected families and identify appropriate, long-term interventions”. What Care describes is nearly an ideal partnership. Trust is developed gradually through a series of approximations working towards increased collaboration; programs begin with basic needs and work towards more long-term solutions; and both parties are respected for having critical knowledge and resources to contribute. To determine whether the programs are executed as cleanly as they sound would require more field
investigation, but at least in theory, the partnership seems to be a model of local inclusion. By contrast, Care describes another program of emergency relief in which Care Somalia only observes, holding local NGOs accountable, offering technical and financial assistance, while “most of the activities [are] carried out by Somali NGOs”. The diversity of programming quality within a single organization points to the influence of mitigating internal factors preventing purely rational decision-making.

The latter Care partnership is more representative of relationships between case study INGOs and local / national organizations. Lewis (2001) explains that most partnerships tend to be “passive” in character, “with resource-based origins, primarily to gain access to funds” (p. 159). For partnerships to be empowering, and thus peace-generating, they should be “active”, with “clear purpose, roles and linkages”, “negotiated, changing roles” and “activity-based origins, emerging from practice” (ibid). Instead, organizations overwhelmingly cite technical and financial capacity building. Care Somalia, Care Cote d'Ivoire, Medicins Sans Frontieres, Interpeace, the International Rescue Committee, Horn Relief, GIZ and the Carter Center all have programs to enhance the material capacity of local NGOs. Of course, these local organizations work on a diversity of issues, ranging from basic emergency relief to governance to grassroots reconciliation. However, INGO involvement in these north-south partnerships is the same: resource-driven.

IRC consultant Lina Abirafeh explains that this type of capacity building peace work is “in vogue”, particularly to address “gender-based violence”, supporting local women's organizations (2011, p. 1). Abirafeh worked with the
IRC in Sierra Leone to analyse national capacity, assess the work of local organizations, and evaluate the impact of IRC's support. She found that technical and financial capacity building can either “help or hinder service provision”, depending on the quality of the partnership (p. 3). Even a resource-driven collaboration between INGOs and national NGOs must be rooted in long-term solutions to conflict, as well as a long-term investment in holistic, measured growth of the local organization. Abirafeh chides NGO staff who mistake capacity building for a simple strategy to achieve peace, development or local empowerment:

Capacity building is not a box to be ticked in order to satisfy a donor but a long-term process that requires significant resources. Most of all, it entails a willingness to let go, trusting that those whose capacity is being strengthened have the ability to be flexible and to continue to make a difference long after international agencies and their funds have moved elsewhere. (p. 2)

**Collaborations and Cross-Sector Partnerships**

Beyond partnerships with local organizations, it is also critical that INGOs engage with other sectors in the country, with other members of the international community, and with each other. As Interpeace says, peace work is not “business as usual”; a lasting cease fire and a holistic peace will take the total commitment and coordination of numerous, diverse actors unaccustomed to working with each other, with vastly differing world views, theories of action and spheres of influence. In order to achieve meaningful conflict transformation, these bridges must be strong.

As an inter-sector organization itself, a cross between government (70% German funding), private sector (a self-described corporation) and non-profit
(mission-oriented international development), GIZ is unsurprisingly the most successful at implementing cross-sector coordination in its programs. Its work to support the economic stability of cocoa-producing communities manifests a series of public-private partnerships for cocoa sustainability certifications. As a result, West African producers have greater access to the growing international market for cocoa. GIZ has also engaged national organizations in the project, “such as the Ghanaian state-owned cocoa marketing board”, with the aim to ensure lasting development of the cocoa farmers.

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, along with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, commissioned a similar, market-driven economic development program called the African Cashew Initiative. GIZ provides trains cashew farmers on agricultural techniques and business practices. Three other NGOs work on the project under GIZ’s lead: “the African Cashew Alliance, an international platform of public and private partners involved in the cashew value chain, FairMatchSupport, a Dutch non-profit organization, and the US-based NGO for rural business, TechnoService”. The terminologies used, the types of organizations involved and the specificity of contracts underscores the business-like nature of conflict intervention and development, what many have called the “aid industry”.

Finally, GIZ also works closely with national governments, implementing similar programs across multiple countries, and collaborating across vertical constituencies. The aforementioned judicial training program in Cote d'Ivoire is also implemented in Sierra Leone and Liberia. GIZ ensures “a lively exchange of
experiences between experts from the three countries”, particularly with a mind
toward “networks... established for future case-related regional cooperation in the
justice sector”. In Cote d'Ivoire, GIZ works with the Ivorian Institut National de
Formation Juridique to design and implement the program. Almost as a tack-on, a
symbolic component of the program, the judicial program also includes grassroots
legal assistance “particularly in remote areas without access to out-of-court legal
assistance.” Through a single program, GIZ promotes greater interdependency
between national governments of three countries, national officials, and local
communities. Even if the actions have more symbolic than practical value, the
program is at least a significant example of Track II peace work, helping diverse
social groups to see their mutual goals.

Just as GIZ is mostly connected to corporations and national governments,
the Carter Center forms most of its partnerships where it is most comfortable,
with IGOs and other INGOs. Among its human rights programs, the Carter Center
works closely with the UN High Commissioners for Human Rights and the
Brookings Institution's Managing Global Insecurity Initiative. To monitor
elections in Cote d'Ivoire, the Center collaborates with the Electoral Institute for
the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA). The partnerships of the case
study organizations overlap so little because each organization exists within a
different peer community, with different terminologies, methodologies and
priorities.

Consistent with the pattern of organizational expertise, Care's cross-sector
collaboration takes form as cooperative development projects. For example, its
“Diaspora Partnership Program” builds the capacity of local “NGOs, government agencies, private sector organizations [and] community-based organizations”, implemented in cooperation with “NedSom, a Netherlands-based Somali NGO”. Care collaborates with the World Food Program (WFP) on food aid to Somali communities; with ICRC, CONCERN and ADRA to deliver emergency water; with Save the Children UK and the BBC World Service Trust to provide basic education services; and with Save the Children US and Vetereinaires Sans Frontieres Suisse to support natural resource management among pastoral communities. Within the Care International family, national branches collaborate on a project-by-project basis. For example, the Care International Gender Network in Somalia includes Care Norway and the Care Regional Management Unit for East and Central Africa. Care Somalia, Care Kenya and Care Ethiopia cooperate to enhance pastoral livelihoods.

Several organizations, including Care and Mercy Corps, mention working with OCHA, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Care explains in a project proposal, “Care and the partner NGOs will regularly report the progress of the activities and the humanitarian needs to OCHA’s emergency coordination meetings”. The office works to make emergency relief more coordinated, systematic, predictable and efficient by “assessing situations and needs; agreeing on common priorities; developing common strategies to address issues such as negotiating access, mobilizing funding and other resources; clarifying consistent public messaging; and monitoring progress” (ocha.org). While structures like OCHA help to coordinate relief and programs
like the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium coordinate conflict-sensitive development, very few mechanisms, either formalized or informal, help to coordinate multiple actors in direct conflict intervention (mediation, negotiation, advocacy, etc).

**Evaluating Success in a Complex System**

Organizations depend on evaluations to foster organizational growth, create and improve projects, and demonstrate impact to donors, partners and future employees. For the most part, organizations tend to report their successes in quantitative metrics: the number of people served, number of items distributed, number of organizations supported. This preference for numerical success fosters overly simplistic, reproducible strategies, rather than long, variable, context-specific processes. While it may be relatively easy to measure and communicate the value of emergency relief and even certain development projects, “projects which aim primarily at the promotion of processes rather than products, and which target critical yet intangible objectives such as good governance, participation, and peacebuilding, are particularly challenging to evaluate” (Menkhaus 2002, p. 11). Indicators of abstractions like “good governance” are inadequately defined; conditions in conflict, characterized by violence, urgency and distrust, impair transparent and open dialogue about project effectiveness; and complex causality troubles any links made between NGO activities and progress toward peace.

For many of its projects, Care identifies objectives by which it plans to
evaluate its work. In most cases, these are quantitative goals (e.g. “By the end of 2006, the project will have distributed over 2,500 tons of food and will have assisted over 16,590 vulnerable people with food and nutrition education”). However, there are several instances of qualitative objectives. For example, Care lists “expected project outcomes” of an IDP and refugee reintegration program: “peace constituencies are fully functioning and are fully effective; sustainable social cohesion and inter-community dialogue is ensured; dignified and sustainable reintegration of IDPs is ensured; living conditions of youth and women have improved”. No explanation is offered for the process by which Care assess its completion of these outcomes. On another project, Care explains that it conducts information sessions, dialogues and participatory workshops with its field offices and partner organizations to periodically assess and modify its programs. This follows the process-oriented form proposed by the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, but does not necessarily ensure the inclusion of local perspectives.

World Vision, by contrast, describes a very informal, locally driven evaluation process. Its publication “Small Feet, Deep Prints”, for example, “documents lessons learned” from children's involvement in peace work in East Africa. Evaluations and conclusions are based on qualitative interviews with members of the community affected by the projects: youth participants, parents, grassroots community leaders, and local civil society. Evaluators sought to document the program's impact on “children's perceptions of peace”, “children's perception of militia” and “children's perception of their role in peacebuilding”.

197
While the interviews do not capture the depth and breadth of the impact, they at least demonstrate significant community buy-in. For example, one grassroots leader draws a contrast between conflict problem-solving before and after the project:

The children have served as a bridge towards minimizing differences between communities. People used to fight over water catchment, grazing pasture and the like. But ever since the children began to interact and socialize with children in other communities, communication lines have been opened. We are able to talk openly and hence resolve our differences. We no longer fight, we dialogue!

Of all the organizations, Interpeace has the most publicly available records on its evaluation methods and outcomes. The organization's focus on academic conflict assessment, as well as its history with the UN, both likely contribute to its rigorous attention to impacts. In many cases, the organization hires consultants to do external evaluations. For example, in 2002, political science professor Ken Menkhaus evaluated the “Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development” and found that most of the project objectives were met, with even additional value added. Nonetheless, Menkhaus documents continued challenges, such as communication and cooperation between field and headquarter offices, financial management, and staff time management. These conclusions were drawn based on three weeks of site visits: 7 days in Nairobi, 13 days in Somaliland and 2 days in Geneva. A total of 55 people were interviewed, including staff in field and headquarter offices, project participants, government officials, civic leaders, donors and staff of international aid agencies.

Ideally, evaluations should reinforce local autonomy and empowerment, enhance interagency communication and collaboration, and contribute to a
professional body of knowledge on the do's and don't's of conflict intervention. This requires big picture thinking, accepting that evaluation processes will take time and resources away from imminent needs provision, while ensuring more effective interventions in the long-run. In order to move towards direct conflict intervention, NGOs are going to have to prioritize and advance qualitative evaluation methods. Menkhaus observes the challenge with which NGOs are confronted: “Ironically, at the same time that aid agencies are called upon to promote more intangible, process-oriented development goals, they are also under growing pressure from both internal monitoring procedures and external donors to produce 'measurable outputs'.” Particularly, dialogue for peace, including mediation, negotiation and advocacy at all levels of society, does not easily translate to measurable results; however, to justify their work and legitimize their role as Track II or Track 1.5 mediators, NGOs must test and improve strategies to evaluate and communicate intangible outcomes.
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS: NGOS IN CONFLICT

Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire into the Future

The presence of numerous national and international NGOs operating in Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire discredits assertions that these war-torn countries are too dangerous for civilian intervention. Case study organizations are conducting a wide range of activities in both countries, including emergency relief (e.g. food and water delivery, shelter, emergency medical care, drop-in centers for women and children) and long-term development (e.g. improvements to education and health care, employment and micro-finance, environmental restoration and public infrastructure). Some organizations also work to mediate and heal, promoting dialogue, advocacy and awareness at multiple levels of society for different purposes: recovery from psychological trauma, reconciliation of historical divisions between social groups, protection of vulnerable groups, and discourse meant to guide warring parties towards peace agreements. Organizations’ diverse interventions reveal that NGOs are more flexible, pioneering and capable than many governments and IGOs acknowledge.

Nonetheless, organizations demonstrate a limited capacity for context-specific intervention. Analysis of organizations' society level engagement and intervention strategies suggests that organizations are more inclined to apply one-size-fits-all methods (see figure 8.6). Ideally, organizations would assess a conflict, design strategies, implement pilot stages, reassess and modify the program, constantly working to maximize impact given the complex and unique sociopolitical, cultural, economic and geographic circumstances. While
organizations' activities in both countries are virtually identical, there is significant variance from one organization to the next. From this we can reasonably infer that internal organizational dynamics, such as funding, management structure, mission, vision, headquartering country, and organizational history, play a bigger role in NGO decision-making than the conflict itself.

The disparity between actual organizational interventions (chapter 8) and context-specific approaches with relative consensus in academic literature (chapter 5) further reinforces the conclusion that organizations are not as 'conflict sensitive' as they could be. For example, the bulk of literature written about Somalia wrestles with the resolution of intractable conflict. There are numerous books, academic journals, research centers and think tanks on intractability, and Somalia is their poster child. Yet, NGO programming in Somalia rarely touches on the subject; when NGOs describe the country as a 'failed state', the term is used to justify short-term strategies of relief and material development, rather than political negotiations or advocacy. Crocker et al. (2009) advises that negotiation of intractable conflict should be reinforced with strong incentives; NGOs certainly have ample capacity in this regard, able to use material and relational bait to coax parties into peaceful discourse. Bar-Tal (2000) emphasizes the psychological nature of intractability; civilians and combatants alike develop a persistent ethos of violence. Through public outreach, education, and media, NGOs can reinforce “psychological infrastructure” such as “truth, which requires open expression of the past; mercy, which requires forgiveness for building new relations; justice,
which requires restitution and new social restructuring; and peace, which underscores common future, well-being and security” (p. 356).

Both political scientists and watchdog organizations, like International Alert (IA), express consensus about Somalia's TFG, or Transitional Federal Government. Currently, it may be the country's best hope for a stable, centralized government, but it is also corrupt and abusive. I found no mention of this reality by any of the case study organizations. NGOs could quite easily work to monitor the TFG; their local presence lends some authority to their reports. Without taking a side or actively advocating against the government, NGOs could certainly disseminate factual information about the activities of the government, including positive efforts to include other clans and increase transparency, as well as destructive instances of corruption.

Politicized power struggles occur in the country between more than just two major groups. Observers have noted resentment among excluded clans for the power concentration of the TFG. Within the TFG itself, there is splintering along historical divisions. Much of the violence in the south-central region of the country results from the insurgent group, al-Shabaab. Thus, mediation, even at the elite national level, requires multi-layered approaches to generate peaceful dialogue within and among each of these groups. Organizations that wait for government invitation, like the Carter Center, are immediately at a disadvantage, since they are able to respond to only one of many warring parties. NGOs should also be careful not to fall into the trap of calling al-Shabaab a ‘rebel terrorist group’ or assuming the rightful authority of the TFG. Supporting the powerful for
no reason other than tradition and stability falls nowhere on the scale between impartiality and justice, and is simply not an effective long-term strategy.

Meanwhile, as organizations monitor and mediate at the national level, they might also work to support regional governance, building the capacity of local administrators. Many scholars agree that centralized governance, imposed by colonialism, simply does not make sense in the highly pluralistic, clan-based society. One organization, Horn Relief, has started down this path, bolstering the management capacities of pastoral leadership. Their efforts could be expanded geographically, to other rural and even urban communities, and substantively, to include more than just resource management, but also community development and social inclusion. Horn Relief certainly could also use the support of larger international NGOs.

The separation and self-declared autonomy of Somaliland and Puntland is another political tension aching for reconciliation. Organizations are clear about identifying Somaliland, 'the region', excusing themselves from any statement that might either recognize or delegitimize the state's independence. This may help organizations access vulnerable populations in the short-term, but does little to instill healthy communication between the three Somali states. Instead, organizations might promote mediation and negotiation through Track II methods - problem-solving seminars, public outreach and education, cooperative economic development – or Track 1.5, dialogue with government representatives from the TFG and official leaders of Somaliland and Puntland. Compared to violence between the TFG and al-Shabaab, the border dispute between Somaliland and
Puntland, like the conflict between Somalia proper and the northern states, is relatively peaceful. This is a perfect opportunity for NGOs to intervene, build trust and prevent further violence through open channels of communication in what is otherwise an abeyant conflict.

Finally, case study organizations are currently doing little to address lawlessness, such as “piracy, human smuggling, illegal fighting and dumping of toxic waste” (“Somalia: UN Conference” 2011). This reflects an unspoken division of labor between governments/IGOs and NGOs. Because these issues involve security concerns, have historically been addressed through military and police force, and relate to the rule of law, NGOs likely perceive these problems as beyond their purview. However, organizations committed to peace, justice and poverty alleviation certainly have a reason to push for solutions to these social ills. One approach scholars recommend is economic development along the eastern coast of Somalia. While case study organizations have implemented development programs in Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland (in the north, northeast and southwest, respectively), they do not report much activity in other regions, particularly in the southeast, along the coast where most of the piracy occurs. For development to be an effective, stabilizing antidote to piracy, it must be geographically strategic. Organizations might also work to disarm civilian populations in Somalia to reduce the prevalence of illegal fighting. None of the case study organizations reported such a program, although the Mines Advocacy Group, one of the 53 NGOs surveyed in Somalia, has a weapons confiscation program that might be used as a model for other INGOs working to demilitarize.
There are also models for NGO response to human trafficking, even in violent conditions. Several organizations in Cote d'Ivoire have programs related to child labor, including public outreach, national and international advocacy, and alternative livelihoods. These strategies could be modified to address human trafficking in Somalia.

In Cote d'Ivoire, one of the biggest underlying causes of conflict, underscored in almost all historical accounts of the country, is the policy of *ivorité*, privileging citizens with two Ivoirian parents. This pits the north, home to many immigrants and mixed race minorities, against the south. The concentration of urban centers, technology, communication and trade in the south has produced resentment, fueling much of the violence over the past decade. Case study organizations make surprisingly little mention of the north-south divide, neither in terms of development disparity, ethnic tensions, nor militarization. Bariyo (2007) urges the international community to support development in the north with an eye toward equal outcomes in the South. More organizations should be working in the north, even though security, transportation and communication may be more difficult. NGOs should also advocate for policies that support poverty alleviation to soothe some of the tensions and resentments. Framed as a component of post-conflict reconciliation or forward-looking justice, the agenda might be approached with more urgency than otherwise. Finally, organizations might work toward grassroots mediation and healing, across the cease fire line, between immigrant and native communities, between supporters of Ouattara and Gbagbo. The International Rescue Committee has begun this work, with
counseling and reconciliation for survivors of violence. This should be extended to include all communities, and focused not only on the trauma of violence, but also, on deeper issues, related to resources, history, identity, and belief systems.

On International Alert's website, the country profile of Cote d'Ivoire has an icon of a dove, to symbolize recently achieved peace. To many observers, the capture of former President Laurent Gbagbo in late April was a national victory. The democratically elected President Alassane Ouattara now holds office and pro-Gbagbo troops have markedly demobilized. However, this does not guarantee lasting peace and stability. For NGOs, this should a critical moment; violence has subsided to the extent that organizations can operate with fewer security concerns, and the country's future depends on the quality of transitional justice today. As Amnesty International reports, Ivorians have endured immense suffering over the past six months, including death, disease, displacement, and, particularly, war crimes and mass human rights violations. In order to facilitate healing and prevent future violence, NGOs should promote fact-finding missions, truth commissions, reconciliation and public negotiation. Here, they will need to apply the careful balance between peace and justice, moving away from retribution and punishment toward restoration and protection. At the level of national elites, this might manifest as dialogue between the existing Ouattara-led government and Forces Nouvelles, and within the splintering pro-Ouattara coalition. However, this post-conflict work should also traverse vertical constituencies; organizations should make an effort to integrate government, civil society and grassroots, fostering communication despite boundaries of social status, custom and power. The Carter
Center has initiated this effort; “national meetings” gather political and civil society leaders. However, these have been predominantly election-focused. Since the violence in December 2010, the Center regressed to monitoring and observation. Now, the Center, along with other NGOs in the country (for whom peace and mediation should be equally concerning), should resume dialogue for a peaceful transition. Post-conflict discourse might also be accompanied by demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Even though pro-Ouattara groups emerged victorious in the election, DDR programs should equally emphasize both armed groups so as not to exacerbate animosity of pro-Gbagbo supporters.

Now that the crisis is over, it is easy for Cote d'Ivoire to slip out of the international spotlight. To ensure that peace sticks, that wrongs during the months of violence are acknowledged, that the material and psychological needs of populations are met, and that the government is transparent and inclusive, NGOs should push to keep Cote d'Ivoire in the media. Specifically, they should report on human conditions, governance, peacebuilding efforts, and policy needs. When advocating for the needs of communities beset by violence or famine, it is inadequate to urge international actors to 'do something'. NGOs' advocacy during conflict too often takes form as vague petitions for support. Instead, organizations should capitalize on their local expertise and reputation for upholding values, stating precisely who should do what.

These country-specific recommendations are limited by research methods. Organizations' websites and publications indicate how organizations view and
present themselves, but do not provide adequately thorough information about organizations’ activities and impacts. More research is needed from scholars operating in-country, able to evaluate first-hand the range, scale and efficacy of NGO conflict interventions, with specific attention context sensitivity, direct peace efforts, and persistent challenges such as security, cross-sector collaboration and evaluation.

Hypotheses Re-Examined

Chapter 1 introduced three hypotheses to begin to narrow in on the question, what can NGOs do to end violent conflict and create long-term sustainable peace, while minimizing the negative impacts of their work:

1. The dispersion of power in society dictates the social level at which NGOs operate.
2. NGO intervention is most direct during the earliest stages of conflict.
3. NGOs prioritize the needs of vulnerable populations such as women and racial minorities.

The actions of case study NGOs do not fully support any of these hypotheses. Pertaining to hypotheses 1 and 2, organizations’ activities do not differ greatly from one country to the next. Although this was not the expected conclusion, it is still significant, because it suggests that organizations are less context sensitive than they should be, applying strategies based on internal organizational dynamics, rather than local conditions, such as the dispersion of power in society or the stage of conflict. Overall, organizations spend more time
working at the grassroots than with civil society or national elites, with no correlation between the dispersion of power in society and the societal-level of NGOs’ intervention. Direct NGO intervention, mediation, negotiation, and advocacy, is rare; organizations are more comfortable with meeting basic needs. I found no clear correlation between the stage of conflict and the use of direct intervention.

Nonetheless, theoretical literature and the reports of think tanks like International Alert, the Do No Harm Project and the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, all support the normative version of hypotheses 1 and 2, that organizations should engage at the level of power dispersion in society and intervene most directly in earliest stages conflict. Observers advocate elite mediation in Cote d’Ivoire, where power is concentrated in the national government, but emphasize local administrators and civil society in Somalia, where power is decentralized across clans and regions. Similarly, observers underscore the importance of conflict prevention, early warning and early response, where violence is low, and communities have not yet internalized an ethos of violence. The discrepancy between normative conclusions in support of hypotheses 1 and 2, and NGO activities which do not reflect either hypothesis, suggests and opportunity for NGO growth. In order to maximize their effectiveness, organizations should: design conflict interventions with most attention to the level of society at which power is most concentrated and focus their efforts during the very earliest moments of violence.

Case study analysis partially supports the third hypothesis: NGOs are
certainly out-spoken advocates for vulnerable populations, but they choose their beneficiaries with caution. For example, organizations support women, but not lesbians or sex workers; children, but not the disabled; pastoral communities, but not ethnic minorities. The frequent inclusion of women's issues in conflict intervention is a fortunate carry-over from women's empowerment development frameworks: capacity building of women's organizations, support for girls in school, microfinance programs for women, vocational training, local awareness campaigns about violence against women. Only Interpeace follows the advice of Butalia (2004), advocating for the inclusion of women's voices and issues in mediation processes.

As Non-Marxist Radical Thought explains, the needs of vulnerable populations – ethnic, racial, tribal, religious, or sexual minorities, refugees, IDPs, and the extremely impoverished – are often at the heart of conflicts. Their oppression perpetuates resentment, spurring violence. Yet, case study organizations tend to prioritize impartiality over protection, siding with the status quo whenever the treatment of vulnerable populations intersects with central conflict issues. This strategy only serves short-term basic needs, not long-term peace or justice. When the behaviors of warring parties or the policies of a particular political leader produce or reinforce inequalities, NGOs should be active advocates, calling for non-violent solutions to social exclusion.

**Collaboration, Rhetoric, and the Profession of Peacebuilding**

Theorists and NGOs alike agree that collaboration is an essential precursor
to peace. Donors – foundations, corporations and governments – further reinforce
the organizations' commitment to cooperative program design, preferentially
supporting NGOs that can demonstrate instances of collaboration. As a result,
case study NGOs have formed numerous partnerships with local civil society,
international NGOs, the host country government, other foreign governments, and
corporations. However, these partnerships often seem to be “alliances of
convenience”, based on resource sharing and a strict division of labor (Last 1995,
para 25).

Case study NGOs form collaborations based on their comfort zone, with
other actors who share their own theory of action. GIZ partners with Western
governments and multinational corporations. The Carter Center aligns with IGOs
and other INGOs. Care cooperates with other relief and development agencies, as
well as local civil society focused on women's empowerment. Interpeace partners
with other academic-cum-practitioner agencies specializing in peace. NGOs need
to push themselves to work beyond their comfort zones, to generate collaborations
across sectors, at different levels of society, and with actors with different
priorities. Chapter 8 identified at least 50 INGOs / large national NGOs actively
operating in each country; there is no reason why these organizations could not all
collaborate. The Somalia NGO Consortium has had some success in this regard,
gaining recognition for NGOs' peace work, providing collective security for
organizations. However, this Consortium is still primarily focused on
development work (rather than direct conflict intervention). Its activities remain
project-driven, and there are few reported instances of staff at different member

211
organizations meeting for critical discussions in person.

I agree with the conclusions of Ricigliano (2003) that organizations need a loosely defined network or regional body for coordinating conflict interventions. In particular, organizations might form a network for direct conflict intervention: mediation, negotiation and advocacy. OCHA, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action, already works to synchronize emergency relief efforts. Its existence champions humanitarian relief as an adequate response to conflict. A similar agency is needed, not only to generate integrated, strategic and collaborative peace work, but also to legitimize and advance the idea that NGOs can work directly to instill peace.

Because direct conflict intervention does not fit either Realist or Liberalist ideals about NGOs’ roles in conflict, such a network may face significant resistance from the international community. However, NGOs' interventions are supported by increasingly accepted alternative theories, such as Track diplomacy (Track 2, Track 1.5 and Multi-track), constructivism, critical theory, and non-marxist radical thought. Moreover, enough organizations have begun the work of civilian diplomacy, operating on the margins but achieving successful outcomes, that there is ample evidence for the value of NGOs in direct conflict intervention.

As Ricigliano advocates, this regional body should not be a source of added rules, institutionalization, or established procedures. As seen in chapter 4, most of the advantages of NGOs comes from the fact that they are not official, not institutionalized, with set procedures of operation. Instead, organizations should use the regional body as an informal mechanism to promote dialogue.
Organizations need conversations to identify, in each country of conflict, what is being done, what needs are met, what gaps exist, what works and does not. NGOs should not have to reinvent the wheel, learning how to be sensitive to the specific country context, how to evaluate or provide security given local conditions. Communication would generate collective knowledge, and thus, more strategic responses.

Further, organizations should also dialogue about discourse itself, acknowledging that the rhetoric they use both reflects and impacts the choices they make and the way they view the problem. Although case study organizations ostensibly share goals – peace and poverty alleviation in Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia – it does not take extensive analysis to see that they are literally speaking different languages. The terminology associated with rhetorical peace and conflict families (peacekeeping, conflict management, etc.) is used to refer to a range of activities. These 'branded', technical terms link into extensive theory and networks of professionals. However, when organizations use the terms in their colloquial sense (e.g. 'transforming conflict' without implying 'conflict transformation' theories, per se), they fail to precisely communicate their strategies and priorities.

In many instances, organizations use technical terms interchangeably, unintentionally muddling the needs and prerogatives of the peace process. For example, conflict transformation, compared to conflict resolution, emphasizes the critical role of dialogue, policy and service provision to solve underlying inequalities driving the conflict; this does not make conflict transformation synonymous with grassroots development. Similarly, 'conflict', the value-neutral
expression of discord between groups in society, should not be mistaken for 'violence', a uniformly destructive product of unhealthy conflict, or 'dispute', a disagreement, less complicated than 'conflict', which can be readily resolved through dialogue.

Academic literature over the past two decades has trended toward conflict transformation theories, promoting on-going dialogue, discourse across vertical and horizontal constituencies, with attention to the diverse social, structural, political and psychological domains of conflict. Regardless, organizations continue to use 'conflict mitigation', 'management' and 'resolution', approaches which numerous scholars have identified as outmoded, blunt tools that do not yield sustainable peace. Based on the range of activities with which organizations associate these terms, there does not seem to be a very clear understanding about their meaning or significance. Interorganizational conferences on conflict transformation rhetoric, theories and methods would help to: clarify the distinction between branded and conventional definitions (e.g. 'transformation' in the economic and religious sense), promote social justice-minded approaches to conflict work; encourage organizations to work collaboratively on conflict intervention and generate a collective identity for the profession.

Beyond the peace and conflict family of terms, two important rhetorical changes are necessarily to legitimize and advance NGOs' direct conflict intervention: 'humanitarian' does not mean emergency relief, and 'political' does not mean self-aggrandizing. The invocation of 'humanity' is a powerful ideational tool for NGO activity, generating collaboration and cementing social movements.
Chapters 1 and 4 underscore the idea that emergency relief is not the ticket to long-term social good. Thus, if organizations are to achieve peace, poverty alleviation or justice for humanity, they will have to be more aggressive, calculating and political. We might, for example, begin to speak of 'humanitarian mediation': facilitated negotiation driven by an external observer with no intrinsic preference for either party, but with explicit adherence to values of non-violence and social equality.

Interpeace offers a rhetorical link that might be consciously advanced as a way to coalesce conflict transformation and politicized peace work as a profession. The staffmembers of the organization are 'peacebuilders'. A brief survey of other organizations indicates that the term is gaining ground. Organizations like No Women No War, UNOY (the United Network of Young Peacebuilders), and the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders have all begun to self-identify with the term. Many organizations in conflict only self-identify with relief and development terminology, indicating a lack of conflict sensitivity. A professional rhetoric and identity of peace would help to instill conflict sensitivity to all development interventions, whether during war, or as conflict prevention / reconstruction. The direct conflict intervention regional network or the interorganizational conflict transformation seminars are both excellent spaces to solidify the identification of conflict intervenors as 'peacebuilders'.

Generations of Peace Work

To reinforce ideas presented elsewhere in a format more conducive to
discussion and application beyond theoretical work, I propose a categorical classification for peace intervention, five 'generations of peace work'. This categorization, like Assefa's analysis in Figure 2.2, values proactive, long-term approaches to conflict intervention. Each generation is successively more desirable for the pursuit of peace, with Generation 5 the ideal form:

1. Emergency relief.
2. Project-oriented development work.
3. Collaborative, integrated, empowering development work.
4. Development work, coupled with mediation, negotiation and advocacy.
5. Advocacy, service delivery and dialogue that is flexible, integrated, collaborative, locally driven, and conflict sensitive, intended to address underlying needs, transform conflict into productive discourse, end violence, and promote structural changes across all levels of society.

One argument against NGO involvement in generation 5 peace work says that NGOs cannot do everything (Walsh 1996). If an organization is focused on medical care to refugees, for example, they should not also try to intervene in rural housing or advocate for minority rights. This argument relies on the false, albeit common belief that social issues can be isolated, “hermetically sealed from influencing each other” (DeMars 2005, p. 6). In reality, social issues interact in various, complex ways. The idea that NGOs can singularly specialize in one issue area, without attention to or flexibility in other areas, is an illusion born of post-
industrial capitalism, useful for assembly-line widget production, but not so functional for achieving social objectives like poverty alleviation.

Case study NGOs offer many examples of generations 1-4 on a program-by-program basis; an organization does not necessarily operate at one generation. For example, Horn Relief delivers water and non-food items – generation 1 work. It also has project-oriented cash-for-work programs (generation 2), grassroots education in natural resource management, human health, and leadership development, in partnership with local women's organizations (generation 3), and advocacy for environmental protection, coupled with governance and resource management in pastoral communities (generation 4). Some organizations tend to work at a particular generation. World Vision, for example, works primarily in generation 1 (although it has programs in generation 2 and 3 as well). By contrast, Caritas International spends most of its time in generation 4. While some programs trend toward generation 5 work, no organizations might be so classified. Fifth generation peace work requires integration or 'big picture' thinking, with seamless collaboration and strategic cooperation, rather than an arbitrary division of labor. Thus, no single organization can achieve generation 5 peace work alone.

In order to move toward generation 5 peace work, I tentatively conclude that organizations should:

*Cultivate Impartiality, but not Neutrality*

NGOs and scholars alike underscore the importance of maintaining impartiality as third-party mediators. Preferential treatment toward either party is
a sure recipe for mistrust, breaking lines of communication that might otherwise facilitate peace. Undoubtedly, organizations must tread cautiously, so as not to lose their only source of legitimacy – moral and intellectual expertise.

However, the imperative for impartiality should not be – and too often is – confused with neutrality. Impartiality means organizations should harbor no inherent preference for either candidate in an election, or warring party in a battle. This does not mean they should act without opinion as to the events and outcomes of the conflict. Organizations should be adamantly biased in favor of peacefully conducted conflict, justice and the rule of law, and biased against violence, abuse and violations of human rights. Impartiality requires adherence to 'higher' values, over political parties. It does not excuse an organization from pursuing social progress and speaking about injustice, either active abuse, such as rape or child enslavement, or passive violations, such as the failure to meet the needs of the famished.

_Promote Security through Adherence to Mission_

Impartiality over neutrality is not only a programmatic approach, but also a security strategy as well. Adherence to values without political preference makes an organization predictable and consistent; it enables honesty and transparency. An organization with explicit and well-publicized values can more easily facilitate negotiation, and its presence reduces, rather than amplifies tensions. The organization can demand – and itself obey – a principled nonviolence, a separate and unrelated matter from the underlying issues in
conflict. NGOs can communicate: ‘we acknowledge that both sides have valid concerns and we should continue this conflict through dialogue, but as an organization, we will do everything our power to stop this violence, not because we necessarily disagree with the cause of the instigating party, but because we stand against the destruction and suffering wrought by violence itself.’ In this way, communities learn to trust organizations, certain that they will never be harmed by the NGO regardless of political affiliations or preferences. As long as NGOs are persistent in this message and similarly reflect this message in its actions, neither civilians nor combatants will have a reason to harm the organization or its staff. To do so would merely shame the party at fault.

Avant (2007) advocates for mission-driven security as a centerpiece to a three-pronged approach of acceptance, deterrence and protection. Like Avant, I agree that organizations should make security decisions based not on safety of their staff, per se (they would certainly be safer at home), but on the optimal realization of the mission. Moreover, I contend that deterrence and the pursuit of peace are not mutually compatible activities. An unarmed staff member walking into a community where it has developed trust and local connections will be infinitely safer than an armed organizational crew, protected by private security guards, driving in a bullet-proof vehicle, unknown by the community because the organizational headquarters is isolated and under surveillance. Communities must be able to trust that the NGO will always reject violence and promote peaceful dialogue regardless the circumstances. Carrying a gun is no way to convey a principled abstention from violence. In order for this security strategy to work,
organizations have to be absolutely certain to abide by their own principles, never resorting to violence, or even militarized deterrence as a mechanism for securing their staff.

Promote Non-Violent Methods of Navigating Conflict

Abstaining from violence is only half the work, only negative peace. Positive peace, the presence of social justice and inclusion, requires more than principled non-violence. Societies also need alternative methods to work through conflict, an inevitable and healthy byproduct of the reality that no community is utopian. Organizations should promote non-violent methods of conducting conflict. Standard, institutionalized methods include elite dialogue, elections and judicial procedures. Many organizations, like the Carter Center, Interpeace, GIZ and Care, are engaged in monitoring and supporting these processes. However, these processes often exclude marginalized populations and rely on representative, rather than discursive democracy. Thus, organizations should also support more grassroots methods of working through conflict non-violently, including rallies, marches, protests, demonstrations, labor strikes and free, active, public media. Although these activities are often suppressed during war for fear of amplifying violence, they are part of a solution, rooted in the belief that pluralism, disagreement and discourse are vital to a peaceful society.

Develop Context-Specific Responses to Conflict

One frequently absent component of NGO conflict intervention is a well-
developed, clearly communicated sensitivity to the context of the conflict. Currently, organizations tend to describe local conditions as a play-by-play of major events: battles, attacks, body counts, official mediations, and peace agreements. These are important considerations and a certain step above blind imposition of aid without concern for political context. However, the exclusion of minority needs, rural perspectives, or civilians' stake in the conflict produces an oversimplified view of conflict causes; noncombatants may be 'innocent' in the sense that they do not wield guns, but they rarely lack opinions about the outcomes of the disagreement. Understanding of the causes of conflict are often reported in terms of historical imperatives (e.g. Somalia has always been a place of clan-based anarchy) or national elections (e.g. people resent that Gbagbo has overstayed his term). Conflicts, particularly contemporary intrastate, intractable conflicts, are far more complex, with numerous competing and mutually reinforcing causes, further exacerbated by the persistence of violence, the accumulation of resentments and the devolution of productive dialogue and structures for public welfare.

Depending on the situation, context-awareness might also include culturally appropriate strategies, such as traditional conflict mediation. Zartman (2002) explains that most traditional mediation practices follow the modern third party conflict mediation form, but with a strong emphasis on inclusion and integration. Responsibility for conflict is placed not on the perpetrators – one side or group – but on the whole society for engendering conditions that led to conflict. Mediation occurs through the normative force of the community, based
on a universal desire for the wholeness of the social unit; justice is served only as a “compensation for loss, not a retribution for offense”. This might be an opportunity for two-way training, wherein NGOs educate the community on conflict resolution methods and human rights, and conversely, the community trains the NGO in local customs and mediation methods, to generate more egalitarian partnerships.

Work at Quadrants II and IV

Figure 8.5B (see below) presents the distribution of potential interventions over perpendicular axes of society-level engagement and intervention strategy from basic needs to direct efforts. Ideally, organizations' activities should be evenly distributed across all four quadrants, addressing basic needs and intervening directly at all levels of society. However, case study organizations tend to operate only in quadrants I and III, either meeting basic needs at the grassroots or intervening directly at the national level. Organizations should work to fill the gaps, increasing their involvement in basic needs provision at the national level (via policy, infrastructure, training) and direct peace work at the grassroots (e.g. community-level mediation, public outreach and advocacy).
Barnes (2005) suggests that elite mediation might seek grassroots input for more multi-layered peace work (across quadrants I and IV). NGOs might survey individuals, with particular attention to traditionally silenced subgroups, asking: “what needs to change for you to enjoy full and abundant lives in terms of country, community and individual?” Similarly, NGOs might ask each warring party to identify what they stand for, what they hope for, and what they envision in the future, rather than what they are against. All this begins to develop common ground from which future negotiations may proceed. These kinds of conversations can occur during service delivery, as well, integrated basic needs and direct efforts. The quadrants do not have to be mutually exclusive. All activities, whether focused on material needs or long-term peacebuilding, have the potential to build trust and social integration if conducted with a sensitivity and awareness to the multi-dimensional process.

Educate Donors about Direct Conflict Intervention

Organizations' activities vary greatly depending on internal dynamics. Based on qualitative analysis of case study organizations, there seems to be a
strong correlation between the country in which an INGO headquarters and the societal level at which the organization engages, and between an organizations' primary funding source and its intervention strategy. Organizations headquartering in the U.S. are more likely to work to meet basic needs than organizations headquartering elsewhere. Similarly, organizations with strong government funding are more likely to operate at the national level, while organizations heavily reliant on individual donors are more likely to act at the grassroots. In other words, donors and constituencies back home have a big influence on organizational decision-making. Although not the most rational state of affairs in terms of conflict response, this is not a surprising result; organizations depend on donors for their continued existence.

However, if NGOs are not careful, organizations' priorities can be co-opted by donors' whims, both real and perceived. Programs that meet basic needs are more compelling and easier to sell in two-sentence sound bites than complex, politicized, locally sensitive strategies for long-term peace and justice. This is almost certainly a contributing factor to the current organizational preference for basic needs provision (generation 1 and 2 work). In order to move towards generation 5, organizations cannot pander to donors' wishes, cannot rely on 'upward accountability', but instead must pursue higher values and rational theories of action. They should proactively educate donors about the importance of direct conflict intervention. They need to develop snappy ways to market peace dialogue, gather heart-wrenching stories to engage observers, and hone methods of qualitative evaluation to demonstrate the impact of process-based activities.
Get Political

One of the reasons many organizations shy away from direct conflict intervention is fear of the 'p' word. Case study NGOs describe their work as humanitarian, impartial, principled, inclusive, respectful and disciplined, but never 'political'. It is true that organizations acting as impartial third-party mediators should not seek to influence election outcomes or preference one party or candidate, but as an ethos of action, politics are imperative for long-term impact. This means organizations must be willing to engage with the controversial, take sides on social issues, and participate in discourse about the just distribution of power and resources. They should advocate for the needs of all vulnerable populations, not just the ones that are internationally recognized and politically safe to defend. When petitioning action by the international community, NGOs should be specific; generic calls for intervention (the 'do something' plea) are not compelling and do not maximize NGOs' potential as local experts and moral ambassadors. In order to achieve any mission related to peace, justice or poverty alleviation, NGOs must promote forward-looking justice through positive-sum, cooperative mediation processes, guided by clear values and expectations. As Interpeace proclaims, “Strengthening the foundations of a society that has been torn apart by conflict is not business as usual”. The manifestation and preservation of peace requires only the most aggressive, outspoken, honest and principled work an organization can possibly muster.
Creating Lasting Peace

This thesis theoretically justifies a political role for nongovernmental organizations in conflict, explores approaches to the major challenges these organizations face, and analyzes public data from ten large NGOs in two countries of conflict. I draw tentative conclusions about trends, tendencies and gaps in NGO conflict intervention. A larger case study sample would produce more verifiable conclusions and would illuminate different models and approaches. Organizations vary so greatly in their strategies that generalizations and tendencies are only useful to a point. As this research demonstrates, an organization's internal reality has more impact on its decision-making than field conditions.

While this research assesses organizations' public self-presentation, in-person interviews would be needed to capture motivations behind organizational decision-making and the local and international impact of projects and programs. Particularly, interviewees should include NGO staff members, both in the field and in headquarter offices, donors, local partners, staff of IGOs, and individuals from affected communities. Academics in either peace and conflict studies or transnational NGO management might take interest in such research. In particular, I believe there is greatest need for more sophisticated models to classify NGOs' role in conflict, and more precise, universal rhetoric for describing the kind of proactive, holistic strategies crucial for peace.

One critical perspective beyond the scope of this particular thesis is the importance of advocating for changes in transnational society. Here, I discuss how NGOs might produce peace and justice within a singular country context.
Realizing world peace will also require efforts at the international scale to redistribute power and resources, right transnational injustices and stem human rights violations caused by IGOs, multinational corporations, and socioeconomic systems beyond the purview of any one government. As Albin (2009) writes, “The international community is at times portrayed too narrowly focused on containing conflict in and stabilizing particular trouble areas without working to reduce global inequalities on which peace ultimately depends” (p. 580). Although I do not discuss this role for NGOs in this thesis, it should not detract from the significance of this type of civilian peacebuilding.

Within the singular context of a country of conflict, I hope to see NGOs following through with their lofty rhetoric, really “getting to the root of the problem”. The complex and numerous conflicts of today's hyper-pluralistic society are not to be fixed with food aid or primary education or even project-based mediation. Instead, organizations need to design innovative, dynamic strategies, integrated collaborative, and conflict sensitive interventions that address poverty, human rights violations and violence simultaneously, with explicit recognition that these forces are concomitant and mutually reinforcing. This level of complex analysis in an aid industry driven by sound bites and heart-wrenching pictures necessitates a change of pace.

As constructivism offers, “humans are capable of changing the world by changing ideas” (Karns 2004, p. 50). The most powerful impact of an NGO is not in items it delivers, the wound it heals or the children it educates, but in the symbolic ideas it promotes, in the implicit messages its actions convey.
Organizations must be astutely aware of the symbolic implications of their work: when they enter and leave a country, what weapons they wield, what words they use, and with whom they interact. NGOs are not a uniformly welcome presence in global civil society; competition for resources, short-sightedness, and corruption plague these organizations as readily as any other international actors. Yet, if constantly attentive to the political implications of their conflict intervention, NGOs can be a powerful force for peace and justice.
References


Elmi, Afyare Abdi. Possibilities for Peacebuilding: Challenges and Responses to


<http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/abidjan-local-ngos-overwhelmed>


MacDonald, Flora. “Somalia; Letter from the 'end of nowhere'; Relief work is being hampered by a lack of resources and an unclear mandate for the UN.” The Ottawa Citizen. 10 Nov 1992, Tuesday final edition: A1.


Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict

238


Rivera, John and Conn Hallinan. “Food Aid or Band-aid?” *Foreign Policy in Focus*. 2006.


Rupesinghe, Kumar. “Non-Governmental Organizations and the ’Agenda for


“Yearbook of International Organizations”. *Union of International Associations*. 241

Advocacy: the promotion of a cause, with intent to inspire action by an individual, government, intergovernmental organization (IGO), corporation, or informal association. As Lindenberg and Bryant (2001) explain, “advocacy work entails moving beyond implementation programs to help those in need, to actually taking up and defending the causes of others and speaking out to the public on another's behalf” (p. 173). While this has typically been a marginal activity in comparison to direct service provision, NGOs are increasingly engaged in advocacy, with activities including research, education, outreach, consciousness-raising, public dialogue, lobbying, and policy change.

Arbitration: a method of conflict settlement in which warring parties select a third party arbitrator, usually a tribunal of international experts. Once guidelines of the arbitration have been negotiated, the arbitrator listens to both sides and stipulates terms of a peace agreement (Bilder 2007). This differs from mediation, in which a third party facilitates negotiation but provides no solution, and juridical settlement, in which adjudication follows procedures established by international law through an existing international court.

Conflict: explicit disagreement between two or more parties. Although the term is often conflated with violent war, conflict, as defined here, can be either violent or peaceful (non-violent). Examples of peaceful conflict include labor strikes, political protests and social movements. Theories have been developed to explain both the causes of conflict, and the evolution from peaceful conflict to violence.

Conflict management: action, usually by an intergovernmental organization
(IGO), in response to the outbreak of violent conflict. Lepgold (2003) identifies three methods of conflict management: “multilateral diplomacy, peacekeeping, and multilateral enforcement” (p. 12). Only multilateral diplomacy seeks to resolve violence peacefully; the latter two methods employ coercive force to reduce violence.

**Conflict prevention**: efforts to avert the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. Activities can be classified as “operational prevention”, strategies to stem the tide of violence, or “structural prevention”, strategies to resolve underlying causes of conflict (Barnes 2005, p. 12). Bakker (2001) makes a slightly different distinction, between “light prevention”, diplomacy to forestall violence, and “deep prevention”, building domestic or regional capacity to respond to conflict. Prevention activities may include grassroots-level conflict mediation, consciousness-building, healing and restoration of social tensions, human rights monitoring and advocacy, and development work aimed at equality and justice.

**Conflict resolution**: a method of reducing violence through constructive deliberation. At least three core ideas have emerged from the field: all conflicts can be cognitively reframed as problems with mutually tolerable solutions; third party mediators can help warring groups reach peace settlements; and effective mediation is a learned skill, not an innate personality trait (Kriesberg 2007).

**Conflict transformation**: a process in which conflict is replaced with “positive relationships, such as satisfaction, cooperation, empathy and interdependece between parties” (Zartman 2007, p. 13). John Paul Lederach contends that conflict transformation is a more holistic approach than conflict
resolution, “concerned with broader social structures, change and moving toward a social space open for cooperation for more just relationships and for non-violent mechanisms for handling conflict” (qtd in Rupesinghe 1995, p. xiii).

*Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR):* one of the many objectives of post-conflict peacebuilding, DDR includes collecting and repurposing weapons, splintering armed forces, and reintegrating combatants to peaceful roles in society (Bariyo 2007). The 'R' in DDR may include resettlement, employment, education or counseling. It is a dynamic and challenging task; “the demobilized person [is] not merely a soldier to be disarmed or restrained, nor a person with psychological needs, but a person on a journey to seek restoration and healing, embedded in a society that is seeking the same” (Lederach 1998, p. 245). Often, disarmament and demobilization are predicated on promises of reintegration never fulfilled (Faltas and Paes 2005). Lederach (1998) considers this a fatal mistake, and contends that reintegration may be the most essential component of peacebuilding efforts.

*International Governmental Organization (IGO):* an organization, formally created under international law, with at least three member states and multiple states of operations (Karns and Mingst 2004). Examples include the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the World Bank. The *Yearbook of International Organizations* estimates 250 IGOs as of 2011.

*International Nongovernmental Organization (INGO):* a nongovernmental organization (NGO) operating across multiple countries, usually with
headquarters in the global North and activities in the global South. Many INGOs
are structured as organizational 'families', with an international branch that
oversees a variety of country branches (e.g. Care International, Care UK, Care
France, etc).

*Intervention:* third party involvement in a dispute or conflict within or
between countries. This is a catch-all term for diverse forms of conflict response,
ranging from humanitarian relief and development to conflict resolution and
peacebuilding. Chapter 4 will outline three categories of intervention strategy as
declared by Kuchinsky (1999): response to basic human needs; indirect efforts
including education and capacity building; and direct efforts such as mediation
and advocacy.

*Intractable conflict:* episodic bouts of violence that reoccur and defy
efforts to settle through a peace process. Civilians are often the main targets of the
violence and armed forces have the autonomy to “pursue their unilateral
objectives free from considerations of cost or risk” (Crocker, Hampson and Aall
2009, p. 493). In addition to the initiating causes of a dispute, intractable conflicts
self-perpetuate through aggravated poverty, polarized civil society, habitual
violence, and failure of previous efforts at peace. Abeyant intractable conflict, a
similar concept, describes conditions in which violence has been suspended, but
underlying causes of conflict remain unresolved.

*Mediation:* a method of third party intervention in conflict, in which a
mediator (an individual, state, IGO, or NGO) facilitates conversation between
clashing parties. Mediators strive to direct parties toward an agreement that will
allow for peaceful coexistence. However, mediators, unlike arbitrators, cannot promote one solution above another (Bariyo 2007).

**Nongovernmental Organization (NGO)**: a voluntary, formalized association of citizens working outside the state and market to achieve sociopolitical objectives (see previous section for more detail). This refers to any such organization at the local, national or international level.

**Peace**: desirable conditions in society; the existence or continuation of social life without violence. Friedrich (2007) distinguishes between negative peace, or the absence of society-level violent conflict, and positive peace, which “relies on respect for human rights, ecological concerns, education and economic well-being” (p. 5). Negative peace is achieved through conflict resolution and peacekeeping, while processes of conflict transformation and peacebuilding aim to generate positive peace.

**Peace advocacy**: citizen advocacy, including research, education, outreach, consciousness-raising, public dialogue, lobbying, and policy change, meant either to prevent, stop or reduce violence, or to promote social justice. This is the primary activity of peace and conflict resolution organizations (P/CROs), a counterpart to mediation and peace-oriented service provision.

**Peace and Conflict Resolution Organization (P/CRO)**: a marginal type of NGO characterized by direct intervention in conflict with the aim of ending violence and promoting lasting peace. These organizations may focus on “consciousness-raising, changing attitudes regarding the conflicts,” reaching out to the 'enemy', advocacy, mediation, or dialogue (Gidron 2002, p. 5). Service
delivery may also be a component of their work, but only when used deliberately as a strategy to secure peace.

*Peacebuilding:* a post-conflict process intended to lay the foundations for sustainable peace through reconciliation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of forces (DDR), transitional justice, human rights monitoring, and poverty alleviation. Lederach (2001) explains that peacebuilding should occur at all levels in society: at the grassroots (“local peace commissions, grassroots training, prejudice reduction, and psychosocial work in post-war trauma”), middle (“problem-solving workshops, training in conflict resolution, peace commissions, and insider-partial teams”), and national level (“high-level negotiations, cease-fire, highly visible, single mediator”) (p. 844). Whereas peacemaking and conflict resolution focus on the moment of settlement, peacebuilding approaches peace as an on-going pursuit, mutually entangled with social justice.

*Peacekeeping:* operations conducted by UN peacekeeping military and civilian forces intended to ensure the cessation of violence. Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998) describe twelve categories of peacekeeping missions: observation, collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian assistance during conflict, nation building (restoration of law and order), pacification (forcibly separating belligerents), preventive deployment, arms control verification, protective services, intervention in the support of democracy, and sanctions enforcement.

*Peacemaking:* efforts to end conflict and secure a peace settlement through non-violent means, such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration or adjudication.
The term peacemaking is generally used in reference to action by the UN and is considered a political or diplomatic counterpart to peacekeeping.

Reconciliation: a cognitive change, produced through negotiation or mediation, such that warring parties no longer rest their identities on the negation of the other. Reconciliation requires “a revision of each group's narrative so that it can accommodate the identity of the other” (Kelman 2007, p. 78). Ideally, groups will build “positive interdependence”, such that both parties view each other as beneficial, even essential, to their own identities.

Rehabilitation: a process of restoring and improving psychosocial conditions of a country post-conflict. Rehabilitation primarily refers to grassroots level work, including education and employment of combatants, resettlement and reintroduction of refugees, trauma-sensitive care for people victimized by war, and unification of opposing parties through mutual interests, such as local governance or environmental restoration (Kuchinsky 1999).

Security: safety from violence or physical harm, used in reference to third party agents (such as UN peacekeepers or NGO staff), or to conditions of society at the local, national or global scale. Renner (1999) adds that “human security”, security at the societal level, must be common and comprehensive. For one party to feel secure, all parties must feel secure and in all aspects of life, including “non-military factors such as social inequity, poverty, environmental degradation and migratory pressures” (p. 48).
APPENDIX B

SOMALIA POLITICAL TIMELINE
1960: Independence from colonial rule; creation of an optimistic new democracy.

1963: Border dispute with Kenya over northern regions of the country largely inhabited by Somalis.

1964: Border dispute with Ethiopia over Ogaden territory formerly seized from Somalia during WWII (see figure 5.2). Relations tense with the West, inspired largely by their support of Ethiopia and Kenya.

1969: Siad Barre of the Darod clan, assumes power after military coup; declares Somalia a socialist state. “Widespread corruption fueled by a large influx of foreign aid, arousing the envy of other clans” (“Somalia Conflict History” 2008, para 1).

1974-75: Severe drought and famine causes great human suffering and attracts international attention. International aid fails to reduce suffering; support government corruption (Abley 1997).

1978-79: Ogaden War (violent conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia); influx of Western aid agencies help with Ethiopian refugees into Somalia.

1980s: After the Soviet Union build up relations with Ethiopia, U.S. seeks to foster alliances with Somalia through the use of military and economic aid.

1987: Economic collapse and repression leads several clan-based groups (including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the United Somali Congress (USC)) to violent rebellion lasting four years (Elmi 2009).
1991: Siad Barre overthrown, forced into exile, resulting in a anarchic power vacuum. Thousands of civilians killed in conflict between rival clan leaders, Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Somaliland declares independence from Somalia.


1995: Second UN mission in Somalia withdraws. A series of peace talks between warlords begin, and last for the next five years.

2000: Arta peace agreement: Abdikassim Salat Hassan appointed president as a Transitional National Government (TNG). Fuels violence by clan-based leaders who protest the decision for the next two years.

2002: Cease fire achieved by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); peace talks initiated.

2004: Parliament constructed of representatives from each clan.

2006: Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed elected president; prime minister Ali Muhammed Geedi appointed => Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a fragile peace divided with the president and prime minister on the one side, and the parliamentary speaker and a coalition of faction leaders on the other.
Fighting breaks out between the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the TFG, with the U.S. supporting the UIC. By June, a cease fire is declared; in July, Ethiopian troops enter in support of the TFG which creates resentment among UIC. By December, the TFG and Ethiopian troops defeat the UIC; power politics become clan-centered again.

2007: African Union initiates a peacekeeping mission; seen by UIC leaders as enemy forces. A new faction is formed, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). When Ethiopian troops are reinforced, hundreds protest; Ethiopian troops “fire on protesters and radio stations [are] later closed in crackdown on media” (“Somalia Conflict History” 2008, para 8).

2008: UN-led peace talks begin between TFG and ARS; Djibouti agreement mandates cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. Both ARS and TFG independently fragment. An Islamist militant group al-Shabaab begins to gain power in the southern regions of Somalia.

2009: Ethiopian troops leave, inspiring “celebration in the streets” (Inside Story 2008). Many see this as a turning point, yet violence in Mogadishu continues to escalate. Fighting intensifies between the African Union and al-Shabaab.

2010: Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam insurgents begin “a new offensive to topple the TFG” (“Somalia: Stop War Crimes” 2011). The TFG on a growth plan with the international community, with objectives to reduce corruption and increase power-sharing with other clans.

2011: Violence continues between the African Union and al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. Fighting also intensifies near Kenyan and Ethiopian borders;
1960: Independence from French colonization; stability and economic growth in the first twenty years of the new democracy had people talking about “the Ivoirian miracle” (Little 2011). Influx of immigrants from neighboring countries, including Liberia, Burkina Faso.

1980s: Economic decline and growing political tensions.

1993: New president, Henry Konan Bedie, introduces policies of ivoirité, which distinguish between citizens of Cote d’Ivoire and immigrants

1995: Bedie wins an election boycotted by two main opposition groups: the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) led by Laurent Gbagbo and the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) led by Alassane Ouattara

1998: Corrupt governance leads to the suspension of economic aid from EU, World Bank, and IMF

2000: Supreme Court rules many candidate ineligible for election: Ouattara (per ivoirité) and Bedie (unable to “prove his mental and physical fitness”); after Guei declares himself winner, FPI stages protests; Guei flees and Gbagbo takes office (“Cote d’Ivoire Conflict History” 2010).

2001: Failed coup attempt two months into Gbagbo’s term; Gbagbo continues “Bedie’s ivoirité policies, favoring largely-southern, ‘pure’ FPI supporters at the expense of largely-northern, mixed-heritage supporters of the RDR” (ibid)

2002: Violent rebellion breaks out, splitting the country in two: northern region controlled by Ouattara’s RDR, Southern half controlled by Gbagbo and the FPI; the opposition group MPCI (Patriotic Movement of Cote d’Ivoire)
found responsible for the initial attacks; open fighting between the MPCI and the government continues even after a cease fire is signed; two new youth movements emerge, which consolidate efforts as Forces Nouvelles (FN).

2003: Paris peace accord seeks to de-escalate violence and address underlying issues rooted in policies of ivoirité; government of national unity includes both FPI (with Gbagbo as president) and MPCI; nonetheless, political tensions rise, and violence continues.

2004: Violence continues, high civilian casualties; Accra III agreement sets “a timetable for political reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration”; tensions over rebel disarmament cause further violence (Bariyo 2007).

2005: As violence continues, elections scheduled for 2005 are postponed, and Gbagbo's term is extended.

2007: Peace agreement signed between Gbagbo and FN leader, Guillaume Soro includes “demilitarization and disarmament, political amnesties, and moves towards new presidential elections” (“Cote d'Ivoire Conflict History” 2010); Soro named prime minister; buffer zone lifted between the north and south.

2008-09: Relative peace; elections postponed, waiting on completion of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

2010: On October 31, elections held between fourteen candidates produce no clear winner (Gbagbo 38%, Ouattara 32%); run-off elections on November
28; “both parties allege fraud, intimidation” (“Crisis Watch” 2011); clashes between riot police and Ouattara supporters; curfew imposed; insurgent troops deployed from the north.

2011:

January: Electoral Commission rules Ouattara the leader; pro-FPI Constitutional Commission rules Gbagbo the leader; the international community recognizes Ouattara as the rightful leader; more than 170 people killed; at least 15,000 refugees flee to Liberia; reports of human rights violations, alleged mass graves, threats of civil war.

February: Gbagbo still refusing to step down; at least 260 people killed; UN deploys 2,000 additional peacekeepers for a total of 11,000 troops; “allegations that armed forces, militia groups are recruiting, arming respective ethnic groups” (“Crisis Watch” 2011); international community fears decline into civil war or genocide (AFP 2010).

March: Gbagbo still claims power; FPI (supporting Gbagbo) and FN (supporting Ouattara) clash in Abidjan; an estimated 38,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs); AU panel meets confidentially with Gbagbo and Ouattara.

April: Violence escalates between FPI and FN, use of “heavy weaponry... in densely populated civilian areas” (Inside Story 2011); “reports of sexual violence, summary executions, individuals burnt alive and heavy fighting across the country” (“Crisis Watch” 2011); new Ouattara-led opposition force FPCI (Forces Republicaines de Cote d'Ivoire).
May: FPCI troops raid Gbagbo's home and arrest him; Ouattara “orders all troops to... end attacks, restore stability” (ibid); “signs of split in pro-Ouattara coalition... between mainly northern FPCI and Abidjan-based” troops.
APPENDIX D

WEB SITES OF CASE STUDY ORGANIZATIONS
Care International     http://www.care.org/
Caritas Internationalis www.caritas.org/
Carter Center          www.cartercenter.org/
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
                      http://www.giz.de/en/home.html
Horn Relief             www.hornrelief.org/
International Rescue Committee www.rescue.org/
Interpeace              www.interpeace.org/
Medecins Sans Frontieres www.msf.org/
Mercy Corps             www.mercycorps.org/
World Vision            www.wvi.org/