Problematizing Service in the Nonprofit Sector:

From Methodless Enthusiasm to Professionalization

by

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ABSTRACT

Over the past forty years the nonprofit sector has experienced a steady rise in the professionalization of its employees and its operations. Some have argued that this trend is in large part a reaction to the requirements foisted upon the nonprofit sector through the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. While some scholars have detailed a number of unintended consequences that have resulted from this trend toward professionalization, in general scholars and practitioners have accepted it as a necessary step along the path toward ensuring that service is administered in an accountable and responsible manner. I analyze the contemporary trend in professionalization of the nonprofit sector from a different angle—one which seeks to determine how the nonprofit sector came to problematize the nature of its service beginning in the early twentieth century, as well as the consequences of doing so, rather than reinforce the existing normative arguments. To this end, I employ an “analytics of government” from an ethical and political perspective which is informed by Michel Foucault’s conception of genealogy, as well as his work on governing rationalities, in order to reveal the historical and political forces that contribute to the nonprofit sector’s professionalization and that shape its current processes, institutions, and norms. I ultimately argue that these forces serve to reinforce a broad movement away from the charitable impulse that motivates individuals to engage in personal acts of compassion and toward a philanthropic enterprise by which knowledge is rationally applied toward reforming society rather than aiding individuals. This movement toward institutional philanthropy and away from individual charity
supplants the needs of the individual with the needs of the organization. I then
apply this analysis to propose an alternate governing model for the nonprofit
sector—one that draws on Foucault’s exploration of ancient writings on love, self-
knowledge, and governance—in order to locate a space for the individual in
nonprofit life.
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CHAPTER 1: THE END OF METHODLESS ENTHUSIASM

Introduction

Over the past forty years nonprofit organizations have experienced a steady rise in the professionalization of their personnel and an increased rationalization of their management and administration of services. Prominent nonprofit scholars like Peter Dobkin Hall (1992) and Peter Frumkin (1998) argue that this trend is in large part a result of the requirements foisted upon the nonprofit sector through the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Since the passage of this legislation, a number of scholars have detailed some unintended consequences (both positive and negative) that have resulted from this trend toward professionalization and rationalization. As a whole, however, the nonprofit sector seems to have accepted it as a necessary step along the path toward ensuring that service is administered in an accountable and responsible manner (see Schambra, 2003) and as part of maintaining a complex relationship with the state.

This dissertation analyzes the contemporary trend in the professionalization of nonprofit personnel and the rationalization of nonprofit management from a different angle. Rather than analyze whether these trends are inherently good or bad for nonprofits or why they developed, this dissertation seeks to determine how these particular discourses emerged and became

1 As will become clear through the course of this dissertation, I take the view that the terms benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, and nonprofit each hold a distinct meaning. For the purposes of this introduction, however, I will use the term nonprofit so as not to create any confusion as I seek to situate my research question within existing literature.
constituted as authoritative and powerful. More specifically, this dissertation examines the following: (1) how those with authority came to problematize the nature of how we care for and aid others beginning in the nineteenth century; (2) how rationalizing service and professionalizing the personnel of nonprofit organizations solves the problem posed; and, (3) how these discourses ultimately implicate a particular form of government for contemporary nonprofit organizations and their constituents, and for what I call the practice of benevolence.

To this end, I use what sociologist Mitchell Dean (1999) calls an “analytics of government” to examine the discourses related to the professionalization and rationalization of nonprofit organization management. I employ this methodology from an ethico-political perspective afforded by historian and philosopher Michel Foucault’s conception of genealogy (Foucault, 1984), as well as his and others’ work on government rationality (e.g., Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996b; Burchell, Gordon & Miller, 1991). In the end, this dissertation will not only help to illuminate the historical and political forces at work in the professionalization and rationalization of nonprofit organizations and the practice of benevolence, but it will do so utilizing a powerful framework for analysis that is rarely implemented in nonprofit studies.

**Professionalizing Nonprofit Service**

In December 1969, President Richard Nixon signed into law H.R. Bill 13270 (Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 1970). This law is most commonly known as the Tax Reform Act of 1969, and while it sets forth a myriad
of reforms encompassing income tax law, it holds special provisions pertaining to foundations. More specifically, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 sought to remedy purported abuses of tax exempt status by private foundations by defining very clearly the limits and obligations of their activities. Critics had alleged that private foundations abused their status in a number of distinct ways, namely through self-dealing between foundations and private donors, inadequate distribution of funds to other nonprofit organizations, ownership and control of for-profit enterprises, market speculation, and misuse of foundation funds for non-tax-exempt activities (Smith & Chiechi, 1970, pp. 44-45). Accordingly, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 prohibits self-dealing between contributors and foundations, sets a standard for the minimum amount of income a foundation must distribute to other nonprofit organizations, limits foundations’ holdings in private businesses, and taxes foundations’ activities that might jeopardize its tax-exempt activities, including lobbying or any other related political activity. In addition, the law explicitly requires that private foundations implement administrative procedures for governing organizational and personal conduct related to the successful execution of the provisions set forth in the law. These include maintaining appropriate financial documentation and filing it with the Internal Revenue Service on an annual basis.

While the measures laid out in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 specifically deal with private foundations and not all nonprofit organizations, prominent scholars of the nonprofit sector like Peter Dobkin Hall (1992) and Peter Frumkin (1998) view the passage and implementation of the law as the commencement of
a period of enhanced professionalization of the nonprofit sector (cf. Popple & Reid, 1999; Skocpol, 2004).\textsuperscript{2} Indeed, as Smith and Chiechi (1970) contend, nonprofit organizations in general were alarmed at the law’s imposition of administrative rules and the corresponding demands these posed for the staffs of private foundations. At that time, very few of them engaged paid employees; many were operated by small volunteer staffs. Ultimately the Tax Reform Act of 1969 served to dial up the level of vigilance with which the Internal Revenue Service regarded nonprofit organizations of all types, especially as it relates to the granting of tax-exemption and the oversight of financial administration. In response, all nonprofit organizations were forced to raise their own managerial standards. No longer would “‘methodless enthusiasm’”\textsuperscript{3} suffice to keep nonprofit organizations going in the face of increasingly complex reporting requirements and funding restrictions (Hall, 1992, p. 91). Now more formality and complexity—indeed, more professionalization of staff and of standards—is required in order to demonstrate financial responsibility to both the Internal Revenue Service and the American public.

\textsuperscript{2} It is important to note here that nonprofit scholars tend to make a distinction between the professionalization of the nonprofit sector and the professionalization of charitable work. For instance, while Hall (1992) contends that the professionalization of the sector commenced with the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Wagner (2000) notes that the professionalization of charitable giving occurred in the early part of the twentieth century with the formation of a number of professions (e.g., social work and public administration) and the increased rationalization of charitable work through the establishment of foundations and community chests. This issue will be addressed further in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{3} This phrase was initially popularized by historian Robert Luther Thompson to describe the early years of the implementation of the telegraph in the United States. See his \textit{Wiring a Continent: The History of the Telegraph Industry in the United States, 1832-1866}. 
The Mechanisms of Professionalization

In order to appreciate the myriad ways in which professionalization has impacted the nonprofit sector, we must first understand what professionalization entails. While a number of scholars (e.g., Caplow, 1954; Goode, 1957; Larson, 1977; Wilensky, 1964; Willbern, 1954) disagree on some of the finer details of what the processes of professionalization entail, they tend to agree on a number of fundamental themes, all of which can be found working simultaneously in the nonprofit sector beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century. First, there is the process of exclusion. That is, in the process of professionalization, members of an occupation must determine who is qualified for inclusion, namely who possesses the ability to perform the work of the occupation “correctly,” and exclude those who are not worthy of inclusion. For nonprofit organizations, this has involved delineating the paid employee from the volunteer in the management of the nonprofit organization. Those who are employees have been deemed more professional, while those who are volunteers are well-intentioned amateurs (Hwang & Powell, 2009).

Of course, determining those who are qualified versus those who are unqualified requires developing a formalized knowledge base through training and development programs—the second principle upon which scholars concur. Without the ability to formalize an occupation’s base of knowledge, a unified professional approach to the performance of tasks cannot be established. This has certainly been the case with nonprofit organizations, as professional training programs for managers in the nonprofit sector began to take hold in the 1980s in
the United States after the establishment of the Mandel Center at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland (see Billis, 2005). Nonprofit management and training programs based primarily in America’s universities continue to proliferate with the establishment of MBA, MPA, and MSW programs with an emphasis on nonprofit management, as well as undergraduate and graduate nonprofit-specific degree programs (Mirabella & Wish, 2000; see also van Til, 2000). In addition, scholarly journals like *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* and *Nonprofit Management & Leadership*—neither of which existed prior to the 1970s⁴—serve to solidify this knowledge base by disseminating information produced by and for graduates of these programs and their colleagues.

Scholars also concur that with the development of professional training programs also comes the establishment of professional associations which prescribe particular modes of acting through either the establishment of implicit norms or the institution of formalized codes of conduct for members. In the nonprofit sector this process began amongst fundraisers with the establishment of the National Society of Fund-Raising Executives (now the Association of Fundraising Professionals) in 1960 (Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2010, p. 3), which developed an extensive set of rules for ethical behavior in fundraising, as well as corresponding punishments for breaches of these rules.

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⁴ *NML* was established with the founding of the Mandel Center in Cleveland, which still oversees its publication. *NVSQ*, which was originally titled the *Journal of Voluntary Action Research*, was established as the journal of the *Association of Voluntary Action Scholars*, now the *Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action*, in 1971—the same year as the founding of the association (see http://www.arnova.org/?section=about&subsection=history).
Professional associations grew thereafter through the establishment of the Council on Foundations, the Council for the Advancement and Support of Education (Salamon, 2005, p. 95), the Association of Voluntary Action Scholars, and more.

Finally, scholars agree that there must be ongoing political activism on the part of a profession to win favor from established authorities and thus perpetuate the longevity of the profession. In the nonprofit sector, we can see this development through the advancement of a nonprofit press corps (Salamon, 2005), which includes trade publications like *The Nonprofit Times*, *The Chronicle of Philanthropy*, and *Nonprofit Quarterly*, and national federations (Trolander, 1987) such as Independent Sector. Collectively, the trade publications and federations provide a fairly unified voice for their members and for the nonprofit sector as a whole.

*Charting the Consequences of Professionalization*

Although there is debate as to whether nonprofit management (or management, in general) can be deemed a fully realized profession, there is little doubt that the professionalization of the nonprofit sector’s personnel and occupational ethos has affected its mode of service. In fact, according to organizational scholar W. Richard Scott (2003), professionalization cannot help but have a profound effect on institutional environments:

More so than any other types of collective actors, the professions exercise control by defining social reality—by devising ontological frameworks, proposing distinctions, creating typifications, and fabricating principles or guidelines for action. They define the nature of many problems—from
physical illness to economic recession—monopolize diagnostic techniques as well as treatment regimes. They underwrite the legitimacy of providers as well as the practices. (p. 213)

In the case of the nonprofit sector, a number of scholars (e.g., Hwang & Powell, 2009; Frumkin, 1989) contend that the more professionalized managerial core which developed after the passage and implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 ultimately defined the social reality of benevolent service through its application of rationalist ideals.

Organizational rationality involves “the extent to which a series of actions is organized [so] as to lead to predetermined goals with maximum efficiency” (Scott, 2003, p. 33). In this model of organization, rationality equals efficiency (Denhardt, 2004, p. 75). The process by which organizational goals are efficiently implemented is defined by goal specificity and formalization. First, organizations define specific goals as a conception of the ends it would like to achieve. By making them specific in their detail, goals hold “unambiguous criteria for selecting among alternative activities,” which is necessary to set up clear “preference orderings among alternatives” to fuel “rational assessment and choice” (Scott, 2003, p. 34). Such a rational system of choice assumes a formalized organizational structure. An organization is formalized “to the extent that the rules governing behavior are precisely and explicitly formulated and to the extent that roles and role relations are prescribed independently of the personal attributes and relations of individuals occupying positions” within the organization (Scott, 2003, p. 35). This serves to make individual behavior within
the organization predictable. In other words, individuals become unified in their orientation toward organizational goals, and thus both the organization and the individuals within the organization become more predictable in their decision making and their subsequent actions.

Organizations and their operations become rationalized through the processes of *institutional isomorphism* (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). One form\(^5\) of institutional isomorphism is normative isomorphism, and it is fueled primarily through the professionalization of the members of a particular organizational or occupational field. Professionalization leads to isomorphism by way of formal education and training and through networking or collaboration between members. More specifically, through formalized training programs, members acquire a shared body of knowledge that has been agreed upon. This knowledge is then implemented in organizations through the establishment of organizational norms. These norms spread throughout the organizational field when members commune with one another and share ideas, oftentimes through meetings of professional associations. Frumkin (1989) argues that this occurred in the nonprofit sector as foundations established a number of professional associations, which themselves fueled the spread of rational, bureaucratic approaches to

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\(^5\) The two other forms of institutional isomorphism are coercive isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism is the result of “formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Similarly, mimetic isomorphism—defined by its modeling behavior—emerges in an uncertain environment in which an organization feels threatened by a lack of knowledge, environmental ambiguity, or symbolic uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 151).
fundraising, grant management, and organization management.

While a rationalized approach to organization management seems to have been generally accepted by nonprofit scholars and practitioners over time, its effects on organization management and the administration of services remains an area of critical scholarship. Indeed, a number of nonprofit scholars have been quick to point out both the positive and negative consequences of a more rationalized approach to benevolent service. On the one (more positive) hand, rationalized service allows organizations to be shrewder and more practical in their approaches to fulfilling their organizational missions (Everett, 1992). It also increases accountability and responsibility in the provision of service (Leat, 1990), which helps preserve nonprofits’ legitimate status as organizations that exist to serve the public good (see Berger & Neuhaus, 2001; Smith & Lipsky, 2001). In addition, rationalized management approaches serve to sustain larger social movements (Staggenborg, 1988) by making formerly disorganized, chaotic processes more formalized and cohesive.

On the other (more negative) hand, critics of professionalization and rationalization note that one of the trend’s greatest drawbacks in the nonprofit sector is the imperiling of the special relationship that exists between nonprofit organizations and the public through the increased risk it runs toward depersonalizing relationships between nonprofit managers and their organizations’ constituents, whether they are donors, clients, or the general public (Alexander, 2000; Hall, 1990; Parsons & Broadbridge, 2004). Prominent nonprofit scholars like Lester Salamon (2003) have noted that nonprofit
organizations are involved in some of the most profound and intimate areas of human life. They provide services to respond to unmet needs; advocate on behalf of individuals and communities to bring problems to public attention; act as an outlet of personal expression; build communities and serve to facilitate social capital; and, guard collectively held organizational and societal values (Salamon, 2003, pp. 11-14; see also Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). All of these elements tend to generate a great deal of personal meaning for those involved in the sector. Professionalization and rationalized approaches to management and service, however, tend to generate depersonalized relationships by way of a uniformly trained managerial core who can act to homogenize services and programs (Froelich, 1999) and marketize fundraising techniques (Eikenberry, 2009b; Wirgau, Farley, & Jensen, 2010). So, while increased professionalization within the sector has provided some benefits, it also risks separating the nonprofit manager and her organization from those who seek meaning through interaction with the organization.

This critical viewpoint in nonprofit studies supports a larger argument regarding the role of professionals and professionalization in the public sector in which some scholars express concern (e.g., Cigler, 1990; Golembiewski, 1984; Willbern, 1954) over the likelihood that one can be both a member of a profession and a public servant. For instance, Willbern (1954) debates whether professional standards can mesh well with the interests of the public:

The thing that makes a profession is that it is something different, that it is based on a special lore which must in some measure be esoteric and not
available to any Tom, Dick, or Harry. The status or social esteem which
professionalization brings depends upon difference, on separatism. (p. 16)
In other words, what makes one a professional is what separates her from
others—in this case, members of the public. The argument follows that one is less
able to respond to the will of the public if one distances herself (at least socially)
from the public.

**Examining the Unexamined Consequences**

This is the account of events that nonprofit scholars and practitioners have
composed over the past forty years to explain how the nonprofit sector became
professionalized and more rationalized in its approach to management and
service. Alarmed by the opacity of foundations’ activities, the state enacted
greater regulation of their management. These regulations eventually led to the
greater professionalization and rationalization of nonprofit organizations *en
masse*, which has had both positive and negative consequences for benevolent
service. The narrative unequivocally lays the responsibility for the unfolding of
these processes and their corresponding consequences at the feet of the state by
pinpointing the genesis of the nonprofit sector’s professionalization and
consequent rationalization at the passage and implementation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.

Three separate yet interrelated consequences have resulted from this
narrative, and they have thus far remained unexplored. First, the narrative
indicates a particular relationship between the state and the nonprofit sector. In
short, the relationship is complex and—in some ways—uneasy (see Saidel, 1989;
Salamon, 1987). While many nonprofits have come to rely on the state for funding (see Lynn, 2002) and for legitimacy (primarily through legislative oversight, but also through the devolution of program responsibility), there is also a pervasive sense of resentment toward the state for the regulation that has resulted in the transformation of the nature of service that nonprofit organizations provide and which scholars assert makes them a unique part of the public landscape (e.g., Cohen & Ely, 1981; Kerri, 1972; Langton, 1981; Mendel, 2003).

This sentiment also informs the nature of the relationship between the nonprofit sector and the public. Contemporary nonprofit theory generally holds that nonprofit organizations exist either to correct the marketplace when private enterprise and/or Government6 institutions fail to provide public goods and services in an efficient and effective manner (e.g., Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 1975; Young, 2001) or to act as a third-party venue by which democratic spirit is nurtured and exercised (e.g., Eberly & Streeter, 2002; O’Connell, 1999). Such a viewpoint suggests a sense of institutional autonomy—that the nonprofit sector is operating outside of the normal mechanisms of the marketplace and the Government in order to act in the best interests of the public when the market or the state fails to do so. By intervening in the processes by which nonprofit organizations provide service to the public through legislative regulation and oversight, the state has not only altered these processes, but also the level of autonomy with which the nonprofit sector is able to act. And without a certain

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6 Here I use Government to refer to the state and its institutions in an effort to conceptually distinguish it from the Foucauldian concept of government, which I will explore in Chapter 2.
level of autonomy, the nonprofit sector cannot truly act in the public’s best interest. To a certain extent, the relationship between the nonprofit sector and its public has been corrupted.

Finally, there is a sense in which this transformation of the sector and of the nature of its service and its relationship with the public is self-evident. In other words, the state’s regulation of the nonprofit sector and its cascading effects of professionalization and rationalization have come to constitute the nature of the sector’s reality in a way that is incontrovertible. While some scholars have noted the downside of professionalization and rationalization, the sector’s scholarly journals, trade publications, professional codes of ethics, and academic and professional training curricula are all infused with rhetoric advocating and describing rational approaches to organizational governance. And even calls for finding solutions to the negative effects of professionalization and rationalization assume that the trends cannot be wholly undone (e.g., Salamon, 1999). As such, the narrative that the nonprofit sector has composed and which serves to define its contemporary state of being is one in which the nonprofit sector and its constituents must “go along to get along,” especially where the state is involved.

Clearly this narrative has played a role of paramount importance in shaping the nonprofit sector over the past four decades, yet few scholars or practitioners have critically examined its effects on the nonprofit sector and the nature of its service. This includes the nature of the relationships between the nonprofit sector and the state, and the nonprofit sector and the general public. Instead, the sector’s research has focused attention on finding ways to either
counter or accept the growth of professionalism and its accompanying rationalized forms of governance, ignoring the significant consequences this narrative holds with regard to the construction of meaning and identity within the sector.

The seeming lack of critical engagement with the prevailing narrative of professionalization in the nonprofit sector is part and parcel of a larger issue at work in the study of nonprofit organizations and the role(s) they play in larger society. As Roelofs (1987) has observed, scholars rarely seem to employ a critical framework to examine the nonprofit sector, and thus “the liberal view is widely accepted in all quarters: that the private non-profit sector enhances pluralism and provides balance between business and government” (p. 39). As previously noted, general popular and scholarly opinion of the nonprofit sector holds that the prevailing role that nonprofits seem to play—whether in economic, political or social circles—is that of an aide. They correct the marketplace when private enterprise (Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 1975) and/or Government institutions (Clark & Estes, 1992; Ferris, 1998; Young, 2001b) fail to effectively serve the public. They act as a trustworthy source for the provision of public goods, even to the most disenfranchised consumers in the marketplace (Billis & Glennerster, 1998). They fill a creative void in the hearts and minds of ideological entrepreneurs (James, 2004; Young, 1983). And they provide a third-party venue through which members of a democratic society can not only learn about their civic duty, but also exercise it (Abzug, 1999). In sum, nonprofit organizations exist to provide balance in a political, economic, and social landscape that has
become unbalanced and—even more frightening—unpredictable. Without the presence of these organizations, we are left unable to truly know whether all members of society will be able to participate in either the marketplace or in normal democratic processes.

Even the most critical of scholars in the field tends to affirm these assumptions about the nonprofit sector and assert that nonprofit organizations and the work in which they are engaged is generally good for larger society. While they might argue that these good organizations and their good work have been coopted and marketized\(^7\) over time by neoliberalism (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Nickel & Eikenberry, 2006; Nickel & Eikenberry, 2010) or by the “non-profit industrial complex”\(^8\) (see INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence, 2007), they also maintain a belief in the inherent ability of nonprofits to do good in the world and in the “transformative potential of philanthropy” (Nickel & Eikenberry, 2006, p. 5) itself. Furthermore, they contend that nonprofits can thwart the forces of neoliberalism and capitalism—not only to reassert their own “goodness,” but

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\(^7\) Lester Salamon (1997) first argued that the nonprofit sector was being marketized, that is, adopting the values and approaches of the marketplace. See also Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004.

\(^8\) Rodriguez (2007) defines the nonprofit industrial complex (NIC) as “the set of symbiotic relationships that link together political and financial technologies of the state and owning-class proctorship and surveillance over public political intercourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements, since about the mid-1970s” (pp. 21-22). More specifically, the NIC is comprised of private foundations who—through their donations to nonprofit organizations—seek to maintain the elitist status quo established under the auspices of capitalism (e.g., Arno\(\text{v}\)e, 1997; Roelofs, 1987; Roelofs, 2003; Silver, 2006; see also Arno\(\text{v}\)e, 1982; Faber & McCarthy, 2005) and the state which seeks to do the same through funding and regulation (see Sutton & Arno\(\text{v}\)e, 2000).
also on behalf of the public at large—by providing spaces to facilitate “counterdiscourses” to the more dominant marketized discourses (Eikenberry, 2009a) and by openly calling into question the influence of the nonprofit industrial complex (e.g., Ahn, 2007; Burrowes, Cousins, Rojas, & Ude, 2007; Tang, 2007) on charity, social justice, and individual and community well-being.

Asserting such a viewpoint tends to signify less of a critical stance toward the nonprofit sector and its corresponding activities and instead represents more of a critique of the state and of the marketplace and their collective (negative) influence on the nonprofit sector. In this viewpoint the nonprofit sector maintains its position as the proverbial good (albeit fallible) guy while the state and the market play its nemeses in an old-fashioned tale of good versus evil. As such, the prevailing notions of the nonprofit sector are reinforced rather than critiqued. By simply accepting the assumptions upon which we base our understanding of the nonprofit sector itself and the nature of the public service in which it is engaged, we risk oversimplifying both the opportunities and the limitations to serving the public which can be afforded by nonprofits. As Kohl (2010) has observed, nonprofit organizations can open up spaces for enacting social change while at the same time acting to constrain or govern⁹ the conduct of others. If we understand nonprofit organizations solely as entities that are governed by the state and by the market, then we fail to understand them and the roles that they play as governors in larger society. Accordingly, we fail to fully comprehend the impact that

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⁹ Here the term government is understood in the Foucauldian sense of the term (see Chapter 2).
nonprofits-as-governors have on the construction of meaning and identity for the nonprofit sector’s constituents which include employees, volunteers, donors, regulators, beneficiaries, and more.

Our common understanding of the professionalization and consequent rationalization of the nonprofit sector falls directly in line with the prevailing assumptions we hold about the nonprofit sector, the nature of its service to the public, and its relationships with the state and the marketplace. In fact, it actively reinforces them and thus serves to constrain our understanding of the nonprofit sector. This dissertation seeks to interrogate our common understanding of the professionalization of the nonprofit sector in a manner that avoids unwittingly upholding the very foundational assumptions it seeks to question so that it provides a more critical—and thus broader—assessment of the contemporary nonprofit sector itself and the nature of its service, as well as the impact it has on the construction of meaning and identity for those involved with the sector. Therefore, this dissertation operates from the viewpoint that nothing is inherently good or bad, only dangerous (Foucault, 1997, p. 256, cited in Dean, 1999, p. 40), including our assumptions about the nonprofit sector. In other words, the position of this dissertation is that all discourses which are constituted as authoritative and powerful have real, concrete consequences (sometimes widespread and life altering for many individuals), and should be examined with a

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10 The full quotation is, “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.”
correspondingly critical eye. This includes our prevailing understanding of professionalization in the nonprofit sector.

So, rather than maintain the normative position that the professionalization of the nonprofit sector and rationalized governance has been good (or bad) for the sector and its constituents and rather than pursue by rote questions of why professionalization of the sector occurs or whether professionalization and rationalization are good (or bad) developments, this dissertation focuses on analyzing how these discourses became constituted as authoritative and powerful. Furthermore, it seeks to understand the consequences these discourses hold for our systematic care and aid of others (what I call the practice of benevolence). As such, this dissertation pursues the following research question:

- How can we understand the nature of the practice of benevolence in light of the contemporary trends toward the professionalization and rationalization of nonprofit organizations?

More pointedly, this dissertation aims to answer the following:

- How do we currently understand the nature of the practice of benevolence, and how has that understanding changed over time?
- How do we understand the relationship between nonprofit organizations and the practice of benevolence?
- Why did those with authority come to see the practice of benevolence as a problem in the early twentieth century? How do the discourses of professionalization and rationalization answer this problem?
• By what means did professionalization and rationalization become constituted as powerful and authoritative discourses in the practice of benevolence? What role do laws like the Tax Reform Act of 1969 play in these processes? What role does the state play in these processes? What role does the market play in these processes?

• What forms of knowledge, meaning, and identity does a professional, rational practice of benevolence seek to constitute?

• Can we realize a practice of benevolence that is not professionalized and rationalized?

By engaging in an examination of questions such as these, we are better able to understand the role the dominant discourses of professionalization and rationalization have played in constituting the practice of benevolence, and the relationships it holds with nonprofit organizations, the state, the market, and the public at large. In addition, by framing the questions in such a way, we are better able to critically engage with our preconceived notions and, thus, are less tempted to tender a grand judgment of the present state of affairs (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996a, p. 4). This method of inquiry runs counter to the notion of a universal truth (Rabinow, 1984, p. 4)—a position which better enables us to question seemingly unquestionable motivations and experiences (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996a, p. 6). In doing so, we allow ourselves to engage in a different kind of analysis that is “concerned with the limits and possibilities of how we have come to think about who we are, what we do and the present in which we find ourselves … [and thus] inaugurate a critical engagement with our present … to diagnose its practical
potential and constraints” (Dean, 1996a, p. 210). In other words, in changing the method by which we inquire into the nature of events, we find that we might not only increase our understanding of our object of study, but also create an opportunity to change what is possible to say about the nature of benevolent service. And when there is an opportunity to change what is possible to say, we also create an opportunity to “change what is possible to do, to think, or to be” (Cruikshank, 1999, p. 21).11

**Organization of the Dissertation**

I have employed a form of discourse analysis to examine the research questions posed in this dissertation.12 Therefore, Chapter 2, *Employing an Analytics of Government*, will explore the selected form of discourse analysis. It includes an overview of the theoretical approach which underpins the analysis and the methods used for analyzing the selected texts. Chapter 2 also contains the following: (1) a discussion of Dean’s (1999) analytics of government; (2) definitions of key terms, such as genealogy, problematization, government, and

11 This constructivist view of language and its role in generating meaning is taken from the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) who viewed language as a toolkit and emphasized its practical, active use.

12 Given the nature of the research questions that are explored in this dissertation, a qualitative approach such as discourse analysis is more suitable than a positivistic, quantitative one. This dissertation does not seek to predict or control behavior or situations—the primary aim of inquiry with quantitative methods (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 194). In addition, a qualitative approach is simply more suitable to the nature of the research question, for as Denzin and Lincoln (2005) describe it, “Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality ... and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is created and given meaning” (p. 10, emphasis in the original). And it is this search for meaning—rather than prediction or control—by which we can better (if not fully) understand the human experience.
governmentality; (3) a presentation of the particular ethico-political perspective the analytics of government takes in this dissertation; and, (4) a description of the analysis of discourse undertaken.

Chapter 3, *Problematizing Benevolence*, develops my conception of a practice of benevolence. More specifically, in this chapter, I chart the continuities and discontinuities of our understanding of the systematic care and aid of others from the nineteenth century to the present day. In doing so, I explore not only how those in authority came to view as a problem the nature of the practice of benevolence in the early twentieth century, but also how this problem of benevolent service was answered through the constitution of a philanthropic norm. Moreover, I demonstrate how the historical and political forces at play in liberal and neoliberal governing rationalities have worked to inform these developments over time.

In Chapter 4, *Strategic Governance*, I explore in detail our contemporary understanding of the practice of benevolence. In particular, I analyze the forms of truth, knowledge and expertise, ways of seeing the world, and identity that the contemporary form of benevolence seeks to enact. Ultimately I argue that neoliberal governing rationalities have created a market for benevolence, which has in turn led to the *strategization* of the benevolent domain such that it places paramount importance on mitigating the risk nonprofit organizations face while in competition with one another. This development places the nonprofit organization at the center of concern for the practice of benevolence, making the individual of only secondary import.
Finally, in Chapter 5, *Caring for Self/Caring for Others*, I propose an alternative governing model for the practice of benevolence to counter the contemporary organization-centric model. More pointedly, I propose a governing model which draws on what Foucault (1990/1984) calls the practices of the self. I draw in particular on his writings that explore ancient notions of love, self-knowledge, and governance—a practice of the self which he calls the care of the self (Foucault, 2001). I contend that within the notions of the care of the self, we can find space to reassert—at least to some extent—the importance of the individual within the practice of benevolence.
CHAPTER 2: EMPLOYING AN ANALYTICS OF GOVERNMENT

True and Power/Knowledge

In the AMC television series *Rubicon*, the main character Will Travers works as a data analyst for API, a shadowy, New York City-based intelligence agency. In an early episode, Travers and Truxton Spangler, the inscrutable head of API, travel to Washington D.C. to meet with a panel of legislators and members of the National Security Council in a desperate effort to convince them that a move toward direct Congressional oversight of API’s analysis of intelligence data would be a mistake. Spangler makes his argument by presenting a scenario in which he trades opinions with the panel chairman’s wife regarding the chairman’s necktie selection. Spangler asserts that the chairman cannot trust his wife’s opinion of his tie—even if she gives it a glowing review—because her opinion is inherently biased. He says:

> Maybe she has some fond memory of another time you wore it … a sentimental attachment. Or perhaps she knows your tie collection, and she’s simply glad you didn’t choose one of the ties she dislikes. Perhaps she just sensed you were feeling a little fragile—she felt like bucking you up a bit. (Robbins & Podeswa, 2010, minute 30:10)

No such issue exists, however, with the opinions of Spangler and Travers.

Spangler continues:

> Now, imagine for a minute you sit down here with us, and *I* say to you how much I admire that tie. Instantly you have another opinion of it, but *you don’t know me*. There’s nothing personal between us. We have no
sartorial history, no emotional attachment. Whose judgment are you going
to trust—mine or your wife’s? The gentleman to my right [Travers] is a
remarkable intelligence analyst. … [B]ut in truth, his greatest asset for you
is that you don’t know him, and he doesn’t know you. He doesn’t … care
… about you or your feelings. He just knows what your tie looks like. You
can trust him. (Robbins & Podeswa, 2010, minute 30:58)

In other words, with his analogy Spangler is arguing that Travers’ lack of
intimacy with his overseers engenders objectivity in his assessment of intelligence
data. Objectivity, in turn, can lead to (at least) a close approximation of the truth.
The closer we can get to the truth, the better able we are to act with certainty. And
in matters of life and death, acting with certainty is paramount.

Of course, Travers is neither a remarkable analyst nor a valuable asset to
the intelligence community simply by virtue of his lack of intimacy with his
overseers. I am also not on intimate terms with the National Security Council, yet
it is highly unlikely they would give credence to my opinion on intelligence data,
let alone ask for it. Implicit in Spangler’s argument is the notion that his
overseers—not to mention, we as members of the public—can trust Will Travers
because he is an expert in analyzing intelligence data. In other words, Travers’
opinion carries weight by virtue of the knowledge he has acquired over time.
More pointedly, his opinion is valued more than others’ in these circumstances
because it has been rendered impartial through the acquisition and application of
knowledge. In this viewpoint, both Travers and his expertise are value-free, and
as such, he (and his expertise) holds power.
The viewpoint is a widely held one, yet historian and philosopher Michel Foucault contends that such a viewpoint is indefensible. He argues that even though prevailing opinion holds that experts possess an inherent capacity for impartiality by way of their acquisition of knowledge, in actuality there exist a whole host of forces that ceaselessly act on us to inform how we think, how we act, and how we view the world and all the objects contained therein. More specifically, Foucault contends that individuals are subject to power relations that operate everywhere in society and in nearly every context. Individuals cannot escape from power and its effects because it “is employed and exercised through a net-like organization” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98), which—in effect—subjectifies us. In other words, power actively works to make us who we are and how we perceive the world.

Power relations subjectify individuals, in part, by way of discourse. As Hall (1997) points out, through everyday discourse, we as social animals come to learn the ways in which certain objects in society, including individuals, institutions, norms, and values, “can be meaningfully talked about … [and]”

1 In contrast with more widely accepted notions of power by which power is seen as a commodity, a force, or an ability that allows for the influence and control over others (e.g., Dahl, 1989; Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959; Pfeffer, 1992), Foucault (1990a) contends that power is a productive and not necessarily negative force from which no one is immune.

2 Generally speaking, there have been two distinct camps with regard to defining discourse. The first camp follows a narrow conception of discourse as speech and writing, while the other camp encompasses a wider range of societal phenomena (see Howarth, 2000). These approaches focus on discourse as talk and talk in context, and discourse as a system of representation, respectively. For our purposes here, the latter approach to discourse is utilized, for it is in keeping with the Foucauldian framework for analysis which is presented.
reasoned about … [as well as] how ideas are put into practice … and used to regulate the conduct of others” (p. 44). Through the operation of discourse, the objects of our knowledge are created. In other words—to borrow Cruikshank’s (1999) phrasing—knowledge is not born; it is made. And according to Foucault, knowledge is irrevocably tied to power. He unambiguously states that “power produces knowledge … [and] power and knowledge directly imply one another … there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1995, p. 27). To be clear, this does not mean that power is knowledge, or that knowledge is power (a familiar mantra in self-help circles). Rather, what Foucault conveys is that knowledge is not free from the forces of power relations and that knowledge which has been constituted as authoritative in turn produces effects of power. Power and knowledge exist in a complex relationship that is irreducible.

So, when viewed in relation to the power/knowledge complex that Foucault presents, the presumption that an individual can achieve a state of impartiality becomes rather suspect. In Foucault’s eyes, our Will Travers is not simply influenced by forces outside of his control, he is in fact constituted by them, as is the knowledge which he seeks to objectively apply in his analysis of intelligence data. This of course presents something of an ontological quandary, to say the least. If one cannot truly be objective in the course of analyzing information, how then is one to go about the process of analysis? More to the

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3 Cruikshank’s (1999) original phrase is “citizens are not born; they are made” (p. 3).
point, if one cannot attain objectivity, how then can one discern the truth of our reality? And if one cannot discern the truth of our reality—or even closely approximate it—how then can we act with any kind of certainty?

Much to the great consternation of many a scholar, the solution to this conundrum is to simply avoid making any claim to the ability to discover a universal truth. Like many so-called postmodernists, Foucault contends that one can engage in an empirical project that has all the trappings of a fully realized scientific enterprise while simultaneously denouncing the existence of a universal truth which is knowable. As with all other objects of our knowledge, the “truth”—or more accurately, the truths—by which we define ourselves and our world is contingent upon discourse. At the same time, though, we must find ways to operate in and engage with the world in which we find ourselves. As Veyne (2010) states in his account of Foucault and his work:

[The scientific enterprise from a Foucauldian frame of reference] can lead to detailed conclusions on ancient love, madness and prisons that are both scientifically established and perpetually provisional and revisable, just as are discoveries made by other sciences. Sooner or later someone will do better than Foucault and people will be amazed at his short-sightedness. But, for him, it was enough to dispel the four illusions that, as he saw it, were correspondence, the universal, the rational and the transcendental. (p. 83)

This suggests that we can pursue and know truths so long as we know and understand that they are provisional rather than universal. In other words, instead
of seeking to answer the question, “What is the truth?” the Foucauldian analyst seeks to determine, “How have the truths as we know them come to be, and to what end?” (see Veyne, 2010, p. 110).

The Analytics of Government

Of course, such a statement logically leads one to pose another challenging question, which is, How exactly does one go about investigating the processes by which the truth has come to be accepted and (in some cases) authoritative? Here we can turn to the analytic toolbox set forth by sociologists Nikolas Rose and Mitchell Dean for answers. Their approach to analyzing regimes of truth is called an analytics of government, and it is distinctly Foucauldian in its approach. It not only draws on the insights afforded by Foucault’s body of work, but it also actively pursues the historical and political underpinnings of contemporary truths in an effort to expose and critique them. In general terms, an analytics approach to empirical analysis of phenomena is “a type of study concerned with the analysis of the specific conditions under which particular entities emerge, exist and change” (Dean, 1999, p. 20). An analytics of government in particular “examines the conditions under which regimes of practices … or, routinized and ritualized way[s] we do things in certain places and at certain times … come into being, are maintained and are transformed” (Dean, 1999, p. 21). Certainly professionalization—the process by which a technically-based system of knowledge and set of norms for behavior in the workplace comes to be systematically applied by an exclusive occupational group (see Wilensky, 1964; see also Abbott, 1988)—qualifies for such an examination.
An analytics of government operates from a particular understanding of the term *government*. It assumes a concept of government that moves beyond the commonly held state-centric notion. Working from a Foucauldian perspective, we come to understand government in a much broader sense—as “the conduct of conduct” (Gordon, 1991, p. 2). As Foucault (1983) clearly states, this broad understanding of government must include “not only … legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action … which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern … is to structure the possible field of action of others” (p. 221). Here Foucault conjoins our traditional sense of government with broader themes of power and authority, and also reconciles it with his own notion of power as a productive and not solely dominating force (see Foucault, 1990/1976, pp. 93-95). As Foucault describes it, government is a form of power. An analytics of government, then, equips us with the ability to understand how and by what means we exercise this type of power in various attempts to constrain our own and others’ behavior.

An analytics of government begins with identifying what Foucault (1990/1984) deems *problematizations*. Problematizations involve “the identification and examination of specific situations in which the activity of governing comes to be called into question, [and] the moments and the situations in which government becomes a problem” (Dean, 1999, p. 27) rather than simply the study of “behaviors or ideas,” or “societies and their ‘ideologies’” (Foucault,
Problematisations infrequently occur, and thus “should be treated as something relatively rare, as arising in particular circumstances, at certain times, in specific locations and having particular purposes” (Dean, 1996a, p. 214). When they do arise in history, they are pursuant to questions regarding “not only how to govern but who should govern and who has the right to govern,” (Ibid) and thus implicate that forces are at work on the nature of the self and on individual identity. This work on the self and identity becomes recognizable through the “questions it puts to aspects of conduct, the techniques it encourages, the ‘practices of the self’ framing it, the populations it targets, the goals it seeks and the social struggles and hierarchies in which it occurs” (Dean, 1996a, pp. 214-215).

A problematization is also a methodological approach by which the researcher interrogates her own contemporary position in the world, especially as it relates to her engagement in examining a historical problematization (see Alvesson & Sandberg, in press). By engaging in such an activity, one is in essence re-problematizing the historical problematization: “[She] engages in an activity which dismantles the co-ordinates of … her starting point and indicates the possibility of a different experience, of a change in … her way of being a subject or in … her relation to self—and so also, of a change of others’ selves” (Burchell, 1993, p. 277). Such an approach does not deny the reality of the social phenomena which the researcher is examining or the social situation in which the

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4 As part and parcel of the arguments advanced here, I contend that the practice of benevolence was problematized in the early twentieth century. The elements of this argument are fully explored in Chapter 3.
researcher exists, however. On the contrary, a problematization shows “it was precisely some real existence in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. … The problematization is an ‘answer’ to a concrete situation which is real” (Foucault, 1999, cited in Deacon, 2003, p. 75).

Clearly an analytics of government differs from more modernist approaches to the examination of phenomena. It gives preference to “how” questions rather than “why” questions in an effort to reject an a priori understanding of government and identity, and thus makes it possible to avoid global and utopian statements about power and the truth. An analytics of government can be employed from a number of ethical and political perspectives (see Dean, 1999). For the analysis of the professionalization of the nonprofit sector which is presented here, a perspective which marries Foucauldian genealogy with issues of government and liberalism is employed. The framework for this methodological perspective is drawn from a series of studies commenced by Foucault himself as well as his colleagues in the 1970s (see Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991), and from a number of scholars who have taken these studies as inspiration for their own work (see Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996b). The next section describes the tenets of genealogy and provides an overview of the concept of governmentality. The governmentalities of liberalism and neoliberalism, which are integral to the analysis presented in this dissertation, are discussed in great detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
Writing “Effective History”

Foucault’s “effective history” or genealogical analysis complements the analytics of government, for not only does it describe how things came to be, but it also affords us possibilities for action by demonstrating how history’s processes are not predetermined (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 225). The main tenets of genealogy can be found in Foucault’s (1984) seminal essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in which he argues that traditional histories hold at their cores the notion that time is linear, that one historical event flows logically and causally into the next, forming a pattern which in itself holds inherent meaning (McNay, 1994, p. 88). As historical events occur or are studied, historians place them in the appropriate pattern so that the overall unity of history is maintained—a unity which Foucault (1984) argues is false: “The world we know is not this ultimately simple configuration where events are reduced to accentuate their essential traits, their final meaning, or their initial and final value. On the contrary, it is a profusion of entangled events” (p. 89). Yet, not only do traditional historians underestimate the complexity of events, but they also unwittingly promote a pervasive historical sense of destiny, which has resulted in the veneration of “high points of historical development” (Foucault, 1984, p. 94), the perpetuation of a singular identity which cannot be dislodged (p. 95), and a will to knowledge whose pursuit cannot be deterred (pp. 95-96). In other words, traditional historiography privileges its own accounting of events and actively seeks to affirm it—so much so that alternate explanations find little more than suppression.
By contrast, Foucault’s conception of genealogy does not rely on a linear conception of time, and thus does not privilege a particular accounting of events. Instead, a genealogy approaches history in this way:

It begins with the problematization of an issue confronting the historian in society, and then seeks to examine its contingent historical and political emergence. The genealogist thus seeks to uncover the “lowly origins” and “play of dominations” that produced the phenomenon, while also showing possibilities excluded by the dominant logics of historical development. In this way, the genealogist discloses new possibilities foreclosed by existing interpretations. (Howarth, 2000, p. 73)

Consequently, a genealogy “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’” (Foucault, 1984, p. 77). According to Foucault (1984), a pursuit of the origins of events is a fool’s errand, one that is a metaphysical “attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities” (p. 78), despite the fact that events themselves have no real essence. The only essence possessed by a historical event is that with which we imbue it “in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms” (Foucault, 1984, p. 78). Thus, the genealogist ultimately seeks to “dispel the chimeras of the origin” (p. 80).

That is not to say that the genealogist is unconcerned with the transpiring of historical events. On the contrary, the genealogist is charged with uncovering the methods by which historical events become imbued with a particular essence over time. The genealogist interrogates the present through an examination of our historical past in order to chart the development of meaning. Foucault (1984)
argues that this notion is not a search for origins, but rather an investigation of an event’s descent and emergence⁵ (p. 80). An “analysis of descent” allows one to be free from the urge to synthesize events into a cohesive and (faux) meaningful whole (Foucault, 1984, p. 81). For “the search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself” (Foucault, 1984, p. 82). Such a feat is accomplished by seeking “to identify the accidents, the minute deviations … the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to the things that … have value for us” rather than mapping “the destiny of a people” (p. 81).

Of course, such a framework for analysis implies an active role for the genealogist, for she “recognizes the impossibility of avoiding … questions” regarding “the values of truth, knowledge and meaning” (Howarth, 2000, p. 72). In other words, one must be critically engaged in the examination of the present in order to uncover and chisel away at the calcified foundations of meaning that historical forces have developed and produced. This view of the genealogist’s critical role in analysis underscores Foucault’s assertion that power is and has been integral to the production of the discourses which constitute meaningful events in history: “Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces

⁵ In his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault (1984) distinguishes between the terms Ursprung, Enstehung, and Herkunft, all of which have alternately been translated as “origin.” In order to make his argument that an analysis of descent and emergence differs from a search for origins, he asserts that, “we must attempt to reestablish their proper use” (p. 80).
warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination” (Foucault, 1984, p. 85). Thus, while the analysis of descent charts the accidents and errors that inform an event’s occurrence, an examination of an event’s emergence follows the play of these forces against one another. Foucault (1984) warns that we should not see the emergence of an event as the final occurrence in a long chain of events, but rather as “the entry of forces … their eruption, the leap from the wings to center stage,” (p. 84), for “the eye was not always intended for contemplation, and punishment has had other purposes than setting an example” (p. 83). Forces struggle against one another throughout history and constantly produce events, none of which are culminations of meaning, but rather installments in the constant play of dominations over time.

Recognition of this role that power plays in the production of discourses through the course of time acts, then, to strip traditional historiography of its constants—no longer can one declare that events in history are marching toward an ultimate destiny from a categorical origin. Observers of the present who produce traditional histories risk reinforcing society’s dominant discourses, rather than engage in documenting the history of conflict and domination that has served to constitute individuals, institutions, and discourses (Foucault, 1980, p. 117; see also Howarth, 2000, p. 72). The ultimate pursuit of genealogies is to counteract this process, and “to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of
a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 85).

No doubt this pursuit constitutes the “effective” in “effective histories.”

**Governing Rationalities**

While Foucault’s genealogy provides us with the ethical foundation upon which to deploy an analytics of government, Foucault’s (1991) concept of government rationality, or governmentality, provides us with the means for gaining critical purchase (Dean, 1999). The work generated in this arena—not only by Foucault himself (1991), but also scholars such as Donezelot (1979), Dean (1996; 1999), Rose (1996a), Pasquino (1991), and Cruikshank (1999)—provides an enlightening framework with which we can begin to trace the descent and emergence of the professionalization of the nonprofit sector.

The term governmentality is not simply a neologism. It has, rather, two broad meanings in the literature (Foucault, 1991a, pp. 102-103; see also Dean, 1999). First, it broadens our general understanding of the operation of government as a form of power. It is:

A way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced. (Gordon, 1991, p. 3)

The second understanding of governmentality entails a specific, historic accounting of the processes of government at work from the sixteenth century
onward, which have been documented by Foucault and his colleagues (see Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991 for a preeminent collection of essays).

Within this second, more specific context, Foucault (1991a) argues that governmentality as a concept emerged in the West as an “art of government” when contemporary literature—taking cues from Machiavelli’s *The Prince*—began to focus on discussions of government not in relation to the sovereign and his authority, as had previously been the norm, but in relation to the management of the state itself and as a particular type of practice. Specifically, the art of government concerns itself with matters of order within the state—not necessarily with the sovereign who exists outside and independently of the state—and seeks to find the most productive method for establishing “a continuity, in both an upwards and downwards direction,” between the three basic forms of government: government of the self, government of the family, and government of the state (Foucault, 1991a, p. 91). Within this conceptual framework, the government of the family acts as the linchpin, for the art of government is fundamentally concerned with finding a way to introduce into the government of the state “the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family … and of making the family fortunes prosper” (p. 92). This process of managing families is also known as economy. Thus, the art of government has

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6 Foucault (1991) asserts that the politics Machiavelli espouses in *The Prince* are underpinned by the notion that “the prince stood in relation of singularity and externality, and thus of transcendence, to his principality. The prince acquires his principality by inheritance or conquest, but in any case he does not form part of it, he remains external to it” (pp. 89-90). As a result, the bond the prince has to his principality is an artificial one, and it remains eternally fragile.
ultimately been concerned with initiating practices of economy into the management of the state.

This inauguration of economic practices into the government of the state is predicated upon and characterized by the materialization of a number of heretofore-unimagined concepts. These are the manifestation of population; the fusing of sovereign and disciplinary power with government into a triangle of authority, which targets the population; apparatuses of security that support this formation of power; and, the governmentalization of the state, which serves as the culmination of the three antecedent concepts (Foucault, 1991a, pp. 99-103; see also Dean, 1999, pp. 19-20). First, the notion of population—as revealed over time by the increased utilization of statistics—is absolutely crucial to understanding the development of the art of government, primarily because it allows for the removal of the family unit from the central position it had occupied in the spectrum of applied models of government:

Statistics … gradually reveals that population has its own regularities, its own rate of deaths and diseases, it cycles of scarcity … [and] a range of intrinsic, aggregate effects … such as epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, ascending spirals of labour [sic] and wealth … [as well as] specific economic effects. (Foucault, 1991a, p. 99)

The advent of the notion of population, then, allows for a new interpretation of “the governed,” one that is constituted through a twofold image: one of “living, working and social beings, with their own customs [and] habits,” who are no longer simply subjects of the sovereign (Dean, 1999, p. 107), and one as members
of a “species body” (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 139) about whom one can have specific biological knowledge, especially through the application of statistical models (Dean, 1999, p. 107). Such a conception is not reducible to the family unit. Consequently, population begins to subsume the family, whereby the family unit eventually becomes an instrument of government rather than the model of it (Foucault, 1991a, p. 100). As such, population replaces the family as the object of government (p. 100), a development profound enough to herald the possibility for this new conception of the art of government.

The advent of population as the object of government accordingly necessitates a new understanding of the forces at work in society, for the rise and development of the art of government ultimately represents the transition from a solely sovereign form of rule over subjects to one in which management of the state is manifested through management of the population. In effect, we must come to understand that a new state of affairs such as this requires a more complex grid of authority, if individuals as subjects, as consumers, and as biological beings are all to be successfully managed, and managed in such a way as to achieve a “government of all and of each” (Gordon, 1991, p. 3). In this scenario, successful management of the population is successful management of the state. Fortunately, we can understand this process of transition by recognizing what Foucault (1991a) details as a new triangle of authority, one which is made manifest through the fusion of sovereign power, disciplinary power, and government, and which coalesces conclusively at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
A sovereign society assumes the presence of a transcendent ruler who exercises power over a specific territory through legal and juridical apparatuses (Foucault, 1980, p. 103; see also Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 136; Dean, 1999, p. 201). This sovereign power is embodied primarily through “the right to take life or let live,” and is exercised by the deduction or seizure “of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself” (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 136, emphasis in the original). Disciplinary power, on the other hand, involves the exercise of power not over the subject, but through [italics added] the individual, especially through one’s body (Foucault, 1995/1975), a process which is highly dependent upon “a tightly knit grid of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign” (Foucault, 1980, p. 104). It is essential to managing a population “in its depths and its details” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 102). In other words, disciplinary power involves regulation and order, while sovereign power concerns the exercise of authority. When the techniques of both disciplinary power and sovereign power are joined with those of government, however, what emerges is a new conception of governance. As this triangle of authority coalesces over time, sovereignty becomes “democratized and anchored in the rights of the legal and political subject;” discipline takes the form of a “generalized mechanism for the production of docile and useful subjects;” and, government entails the conduct of “the processes of life and labour [sic] found at the level of populations and in which the subject is revealed in its social, biological and economic form” (Dean, 1999, pp. 102 – 103).
This triangle of discipline, sovereignty and government “has as its primary
target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security”
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 102). In essence, the modern art of government has become
obsessed with the security of the state, for “security … embraces the future …
[and] implies extension in point of time with respect to all the benefits to which it
is applied” (Bentham, cited in Gordon, 1991, p. 19). Consequently, the modern art
of government is preoccupied with refining the techniques involved in managing
the population. This obsession becomes embodied through the devotion of much
of its effort towards establishing, maintaining, and growing prosperity, which is
“a necessary condition of the state’s own security … [and] in itself … nothing if
not the capacity to preserve and hold on to, and where possible even to enhance, a
certain global level of existence” (Gordon, 1991, p. 19). Prosperity is made not
only possible, but also more probable through the application of particular
apparatuses “whose function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena,
economic processes and the intrinsic processes of population” (Foucault, 1978,
cited in Gordon, 1991, p. 19). Generally speaking, these apparatuses present
themselves in the form of the armed forces, police forces, spy agencies, public
welfare and educational systems, *laissez-faire*-style market regulators and
standards, and more (Dean, 1999, p. 20). In short, we find that the object of the
modern art of government is the development and cultivation of technologies and
knowledge that will ensure the health, wealth and safety of the population and,
thus, the longevity of the state itself.
Foucault (1991a) deems the process by which these technologies and knowledges have come together over time to cement a definitive practice for the management of the population as the governmentalization of the state. More specifically, the governmentalization of the state is defined as “the long-term trajectory by which the exercise of sovereignty comes to be articulated through the regulations of populations and individuals and the psychological, biological, sociological and economic processes that constitute them” (Dean, 1999, p. 210). Its emergence is the consequence of the integration of population, the discipline-sovereign-government triangle of authority, and apparatuses of security, and it is a necessary historical development for the eventual formation of modern forms of governmentality like liberalism and neoliberalism.

**Discourse and the Search for Meaning**

The professionalization of the nonprofit sector emerged—and continues to operate—during a time in the United States when the governing rationalities of neoliberalism proliferate. As such, employing an analytics of government to examine the rise of professionalism in the nonprofit sector from an ethico-political perspective which is animated by critical work on power, government, and liberalism is appropriate. Not only this, but it is also key to understanding how the nature of nonprofit service was problematized in the early twentieth century, and the subsequent effects of doing so.

To fully employ an analytics of government from this critical stance in examination of the problematization of nonprofit service, one must explore the discourse which is associated with professionalization within the sector. Here the
conception of discourse utilized is gleaned from Foucault’s later work. Within the genealogical framework, “the discursive and the material are linked together in a symbiotic relationship of the power-knowledge complex” and, as such, “discourse, or a particular discursive formation, is to be understood as an amalgam of material practices and forms of knowledge linked together in a non-contingent relation” (McNay, 1994, p. 108). Foucault (1980) refers to this notion as a dispositif, which is:

A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. … The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. (p. 194)

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) contend that Foucault’s notion of the dispositif can be viewed as both a methodological instrument of the analyst, designed to bring together disparate practices into a grid for the purposes of analysis, and the practices themselves, which act to constitute subjects (p. 121; see also Howarth, 2000, p. 78). The concept of the dispositif, then, allows the genealogist to place discursive formations within a larger framework for analysis, and offer up a critique of them in relation to broader elements. More specifically, by examining the dispositif of nonprofit professionalization, we can illuminate the conditions under which the regime of practice associated with nonprofit service was transformed in the twentieth century.
In practice this process involves assessing texts produced by and for the nonprofit sector with regard to the processes of professionalization. Using Caplow’s (1954) and Wilensky’s (1964) frameworks of professionalization of an occupation as guides, the texts selected for analysis include those that facilitate the creation of a body of knowledge for the nonprofit sector, especially as it relates to engendering a common norm or sense of understanding of what constitutes appropriate and ethical individual and collective behavior in the provision of service. This includes examining the nonprofit sector’s leading domestic scholarly journals, *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly (NVSQ)* and *Nonprofit Leadership and Management (NLM)*. Texts including articles, tables of contents, and abstracts were examined from *NVSQ* for years 1972 to 2010 and from *NLM* from 1996 to 2010. While the years of documents examined from *NVSQ* represent all years the journal has been issued, data from the first six years of *NLM* (1990-1995) were not available for examination. Analysis also included examination of nonprofit training programs. Using Seton Hall University’s census of nonprofit management programs as a source (Seton Hall University, n.d.), curricula from universities and colleges offering Master’s degrees in nonprofit management were examined. Given the diversity and quantity of nonprofit-related degree programs available, only those universities

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7 From a discourse analytic perspective, texts are analyzed as a proxy for discourses. As Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004) state, “discourses cannot be studied directly—they can only be explored by examining the texts that constitute them” (p. 636). Studying texts, and the production and consumption of bodies of texts, allows us examine the relationships between discourse and social reality, including the ways in which particular discourses become imbued with meaning and authority.
and colleges that specifically offer nonprofit management graduate degrees were selected for analysis. In all, I examined the curricula of twenty-one Master’s programs.

In order to highlight the processes by which the gap between the academic community and the practicing community is bridged, texts from a number of other sources were also assessed. First is the code of ethics and accompanying user guides which influence the actions of members of the Association of Fundraising Professionals (AFP). Founded in 1960, AFP is the first professional association that operates at a national level specifically for individuals working in the nonprofit sector (Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2010, p. 3). Second, the contents of the sector’s leading domestic trade journals, namely The Nonprofit Times and The Chronicle of Philanthropy, have been analyzed. Texts including articles, tables of contents, and abstracts were examined from The Nonprofit Times for years 2000 to 2010 and from The Chronicle of Philanthropy from 1998 to 2010, which are the years for which data were available for examination. These texts were analyzed primarily to determine the methods by which the service ideal that is promoted in both the academic community and in the AFP’s code of ethics is supported. Finally, those universities and colleges that offer graduate degrees in nonprofit management also sometimes offer professional development programs to practitioners in the sector. The curricula associated with these programs were

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As opposed to those that offer an MBA with courses in nonprofit management; an MBA in nonprofit management; an MPA with courses in nonprofit management; an MPA in nonprofit management; or, an MSW with courses in nonprofit management (see Mirabella & Wish, 2000). In addition, I excluded any graduate certificate programs and doctoral programs.
analyzed as well. In all, I examined curricula from seven professional development programs.

The discourse contained in these texts was analyzed in order to locate the meaning associated with professionalism in service. More specifically, the study of the discourse of professionalism in service includes locating the following elements, as set forth by Hall (1997):

- Statements about “professionalism” which engender a certain kind of knowledge about a shared system of norms in service;
- The rules which “prescribe certain ways of talking about these topics and exclude other ways—which govern what is ‘sayable’ or ‘thinkable’ about” professionalism;
- Individuals who personify the discourse—for instance, the professional or ethical manager;
- The methods by which knowledge of professionalism acquires authority and begins constituting “truth”;
- Institutional practices for dealing with those subjects “whose conduct is being regulated and organized according to those ideas”;
- Acknowledgement that another discourse will supplant the current one and open up new discursive formations (pp. 45, 46).
Locating these elements allows us to focus our attention on the mechanisms\(^9\) that are involved in constituting the contemporary regime of practice that is associated with service in the nonprofit sector.

**Validity and Reliability**

The methodological approach utilized here to analyze the discourse associated with the professionalization of the nonprofit sector is an informal one (Peräkylä, 2005). More specifically, there was no reliance on a predefined protocol in executing the analysis. Such an informal approach is not uncommon with qualitative researchers who work exclusively with written texts (in this study, this includes scholarly articles and abstracts, course curricula, editorials, trade articles, and a written code of ethics and its accompanying user guides). The analytic approach consisted of reading and rereading the selected texts to identify key themes to “draw a picture of the presuppositions and meanings that constitute the … world of which the textual material is a specimen” (Peräkylä, 2005, p. 870). As such, greater emphasis is placed on theoretical underpinnings that concern the world from which the texts were gleaned rather than on predefined procedures.

Since the method of analysis is qualitative in nature, there is little concern regarding the issue of the reliability as it relates to the approach utilized here (see Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). The approach is distinctly postmodern in that it assumes that the social world is comprised of multiple, changing realities. Thus, replication

\(^9\) In an analytics of government, the mechanisms that constitute regimes of practices of government are referred to as the *techne*, the *episteme*, forms of visibility, and processes of subjectification (see Dean, 1999). Each of these mechanisms is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
of the results here is neither a likely nor practical assumption. In order to inspire confidence in readers that a right interpretation (not the right interpretation) has been achieved, however, and that strong efforts have been made to gather and produce credible data, the issue of validity must be addressed. The validity of this analysis is informed by Richardson’s crystal-as-metaphor approach:

The central imaginary [for the validity of postmodern textual analysis] is the crystal, which combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach. Crystals grow, change, alter, but are not amorphous. . . . What we see depends on our angle of repose. Not triangulation, crystallization . . . Crystallization, without losing structure, deconstructs the traditional idea of “validity” (we feel how there is no single truth, we see how texts validate themselves); and crystallization provides us with a deepened, complex, thoroughly partial understanding of the topic.

(Richardson, 1997, in Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 208)

Utilizing such an approach to the validity of the texts which have been analyzed allows us to uncover and—to some extent—overcome the hidden assumptions inherent in traditional views of validity. Not only this, but it is also entirely consistent with a Foucauldian framework for the empirical analysis of worldly phenomena.

**Conclusion**

Unlike the Truxton Spanglers and Will Travers of the world, the analysis in which we are engaged here is one of partiality rather than objectivity. It is
distinctly and forthrightly critical in nature. And ultimately the truth pursued is not a universal one, but rather a provisional one. So, what does this afford us in terms of understanding the professionalization of the nonprofit sector? Currently, much of the literature that discusses the professionalization of the nonprofit sector or professionalism in general simply serves to reinforce existing normative positions on the issue. Professionalism has become synonymous with providing service in an accountable, responsible, and competent manner, and while a handful of scholars have noted some of its adverse consequences, few advocate for service provision that is a return to what Hall (1992) calls “methodless enthusiasm.” This is a scholarly stance which has in turn influenced practitioners in the field to strive to be the most accountable, responsible, and competent administrators of services that they can be. Such a process holds consequences with regard to the construction of meaning and identity within the nonprofit sector that have yet to be explored.

The critical approach employed here offers the nonprofit sector, and its scholars and practitioners an alternative framework for viewing the professionalization of the sector, its organizations, and its personnel—one that focuses squarely on the construction of meaning and identity in the nonprofit sector, at least as it relates to professionalization. Rather than simply working to reinforce existing normative positions with regard to professionalization, an analytics of government affords us the opportunity to inquire into how we think of ourselves and the world in which we live (Dean, 1996a). More specifically, the approach of this analysis allows nonprofit scholars and practitioners to view the
mechanisms by which they have come to think of themselves as professionals in
the sector—as well as the corresponding consequences—for a different lens.
An analytics of government “removes the ‘naturalness’ and ‘taken-for-granted’
character of how things are done,” (Dean, 1999, p. 38), and in doing so,
demonstrates how things can be different. Without engaging in such critical self-
examination, nonprofit administrators, institutions, and scholars might not return
to “methodless enthusiasm,” but they might run the risk of engaging in
“perfunctory professionalism.”
CHAPTER 3: PROBLEMATIZING BENEVOLENCE

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I asserted my intention to engage in an examination of the professionalization and rationalization of the nonprofit sector utilizing the alternative framework afforded by the analytics of government. Here I begin my analysis by situating the “foundation problem”—the series of events involving private foundations which nonprofit scholars contend led to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969—as an issue of government. This involves not only recounting the events which led to the passage of the legislation, but also understanding why those in authority, namely the Congress, journalists, and the public at large, came to see foundations and their mode of operating as a problem. I contend that the “foundation problem” arose as the result of historical and political forces forcing a movement away from a more charitable mode of caring for and aiding others and toward a philanthropic mode of service. I also argue that in the late twentieth century, the state—through the passage of laws like the reform of the tax code which pertains to tax-exempt organizations and the Tax Reform Act of 1969—normalized this philanthropic mode of service to others in order to create a “market for benevolence.” This market for benevolence serves to reinforce and promote the values of the marketplace, including entrepreneurialism and competition, in accordance with neoliberal governing rationalities.

An Issue of Government

In the early twentieth century, private foundations assumed (albeit reluctantly) the mantle of the proverbial bad guy in American society. It was a
position that they would maintain into the early 1970s. Public opinion soured on foundations when it became clear that there existed a fundamental disconnection between the reality of foundations’ activities and the much loftier manner in which the public regarded the nature of benevolent service in general. Popular discourse held that all organizations engaged in benevolent service, including foundations, should employ a philanthropic approach to their activities, by which they worked to solve society’s problems through the rational application of knowledge (see Gross, 2003). In actuality, foundations’ activities were much more opaque and unpredictable—so much so that both journalists and special Congressional committees launched investigations to determine what foundations were doing by way of the public’s goodwill. These efforts revealed that foundations were not actively engaged in serving the public interest, at least not to a degree which accorded with public expectations. In fact, more often than not they were working in their own best interests rather than those of the public. According to contemporary nonprofit scholars, it is this disconnection between public expectations of benevolent service and the organizations that provide it, and the reality of foundations’ activities in the early twentieth century that provided the impetus for the formulation and passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969—a law that ultimately forced all benevolent organizations to reform their organizations and methods of service provision.

The popular accounting of the “foundation problem,” its genesis, and its consequences is very straightforward. Indeed, the chain of events seems perfectly linear: Foundations breached the public’s trust by not actively and enthusiastically
engaging in the promotion of a philanthropic approach to benevolent service; therefore, the Government regulated their activities to reform their behavior and to make them worthy of public trust once again. However, when the unfolding of events surrounding foundations in America in the twentieth century is viewed as an issue of government, indications of a problematization begin to emerge from the narrative. To recall, a problematization\textsuperscript{1} involves a situation in which the ways we govern and the ways in which we are governed are called into question. More pointedly, those with authority begin to question—\textit{to pose as a problem}—the ways in which we conduct ourselves as well as the conduct of others. This particular problematization involves journalists and Congressional representatives calling into question the manner in which foundations provided benevolent service. Not only this, but—because foundations failed to actively engage in the expected philanthropic approach to benevolent service—the conduct of the recipients of foundations’ services is by proxy called into question as well. This includes both individuals who received direct services from foundations and other benevolent organizations that received funds from them.

As an issue of government, the “foundation problem” poses a rather complex set of analytic issues. First and most importantly is the emergence of the problem itself. How did the public, journalists, and the Congress \textit{collectively} come to think of foundations’ activities as a problem? A philanthropic approach to service was clearly expected of foundations, but why? Then there is the resolution of the problem. How has the problem of foundations been answered?

\textsuperscript{1} For a more in-depth overview of problematizations, refer back to Chapter 2.
Contemporary nonprofit scholars have consistently pointed to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and its cascading effects of professionalization and rationalization as the answer. However, this fails to address the role this legislation plays in making a philanthropic governing rationality the dominant rationality in contemporary nonprofit discourse. Indeed, this viewpoint does not address at all how philanthropy came to play such a significant role in benevolent service.

In order to gain greater understanding of the emergence of the “foundation problem” and the manner of its resolution, “the questions [these] authorities ask[ed] concerning how ‘governors’ … conduct themselves and how ‘the governed’ conduct themselves” (Dean, 1999, p. 27) need to be addressed. In other words, we must endeavor to understand how the popular conception of benevolent service and benevolent organizations emerged and then informed norms, values, and codes of conduct for both the governors and the governed. Then, we must consider how the reality of benevolent service in the early twentieth century conflicted with these prescribed modes of acting in and seeing the world. Finally, we must examine the emergence of the discourse that constitutes the contemporary nonprofit sector and illustrate the manner in which this discourse works to solve the problem that foundations initially posed in the early twentieth century. Only by examining both the emergence of the problem

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2 Here the governors are understood to be those who found, oversee, and manage foundations, while the governed are those who are recipients of foundations’ services. This is said, however, with the caveat in mind that it is oftentimes very difficult to distinguish between the governing and the governed in a problematization (see Dean, 1999, pp. 27-28).
and its answer can we begin to understand how benevolent service is implicated in our own and others’ government.

**The Problem with Benevolent Service**

Even though the drumbeats of public discontent could be heard as early as 1915 (see Hall, 1992), benevolent organizations did not really become the object of public scrutiny until the 1930s. The scrutiny then lasted through the 1960s and into the early 1970s. During this time, members of the public, a number of their Congressional representatives, and journalists questioned the loyalty of benevolent organizations and their purpose in American life. During the latter half of the nineteenth century and continuing through both world wars, the United States witnessed not only an unprecedented proliferation of foundations and other tax-exempt organizations, but also the reliance upon these organizations by the federal Government to provide much needed social services (Hall, 2003, p. 370). The Congress passed a number of key pieces of legislation to better enable individuals and corporations to receive tax breaks in return for contributing to tax-
exempt organizations.\(^5\) This—coupled with legislators’ inability to streamline the tax code so that it did not allow wealthy individuals to take advantage of every loophole contained therein to funnel their personal wealth into tax-exempt foundations—led to the establishment of a number of tax-exempt institutions whose public purpose was dubious at best (Hall, 2003, p. 370). In addition, the federal Government funneled increasing amounts of responsibility and public dollars to these organizations to achieve programmatic objectives.\(^6\) At the same time, however, very few regulatory mechanisms were established by which the public could monitor how these funds and opportunities were being put to use in everyday life. As a result, many saw the tax privileges enjoyed by those who could afford to make monetary contributions and the growing wealth of benevolent organizations as unfair and unreasonable (Hall, 2003, p. 371).

None of these organizations drew public and Congressional ire more than foundations, however. While many individuals viewed all benevolent organizations with a somewhat jaundiced eye in the early twentieth century, foundations were viewed with the most suspicion and, ultimately, the most outrage. Muckraking journalists—exerting little effort to temper their scathing

\(^5\) Key legislation includes the passage of a universal income tax in 1942, which was steeply progressive for both individuals and corporations and which created powerful incentives to make deductible donations to benevolent organizations (Hall, 2003, p. 364).

\(^6\) Of paramount importance is legislation associated with the New Deal (Hall, 2006), but also the GI Bill, which spurred growth in new institutions of higher learning, and legislation establishing the National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation, and expanding Social Security and public social and health insurance, all of which provided funds for the establishment and growth of private organizations with a public purpose and their programs (Hall, 2003).
opinions of foundations and their founders and activities—made them the subject of a number of investigative efforts (e.g., Coon, 1938; Keppel, 1930; Laski, 1966; Lundberg, 1946, 1968). Not only this, but the Congress also made foundations the subject of inquiry in no fewer than six special committees within a sixty-year timespan (see Hall, 1992). The goal of each committee was to investigate the nature and scope of foundations’ activities in an effort to determine whether they were undermining the public trust. In a fairly straightforward quid pro quo relationship, the public trusted that the organizations to which tax-exemption was granted were providing a service that in some way benefited society at large. While it took several decades to gather the momentum necessary to implement any significant changes in the way foundations were regulated by the federal Government, the ultimate result of these inquiries is the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which fundamentally changed the way foundations and other benevolent organizations do business.

To our contemporary minds, such pointed attacks on foundations might seem rather antithetical to the generally positive view with which they are regarded today (Steinberg, 1997). Why such public ire? In short, at the heart of this public backlash against foundations is an implicit notion of what benevolent organizations are supposed to be and how they should conduct their business. Clearly members of the public—and soon thereafter the Congress—took umbrage at the unparalleled privilege that was afforded to foundations by way of the ease with which one could achieve tax-exempt status and obtain federal dollars to provide services of a potentially dubious public nature. This is due in no small
measure to the proliferation of foundations established by incredibly wealthy industrialists like the Rockefellers, Andrew Carnegie, Julius Rosenwald, Edward Filene, and more (Sealander, 2006), which had the potential to direct vast amounts of personal (and some would say, ill begotten) wealth at transforming society and which many saw as advancing private interests rather than public ones (Hall, 2006, p. 371). More pointedly, the public ire aimed at foundations in the early part of the twentieth century expresses a sense of a betrayal of trust being perpetrated by not only the foundations themselves, but also by the Government, which facilitated their unmanaged growth, and by their (sometimes) wealthy benefactors, who seemingly felt little obligation to demonstrate their loyalty to the American public. In sum, the reality of what benevolent humanitarianism had become did not accord with the public’s notion of what it was supposed to be.

Advancing a Philanthropic Enterprise

The commonly held notion of what foundations and their activities are supposed to entail is well summarized in this passage from the special Congressional committee formed in 1952 to investigate the activities of foundations:

While the important part they play and have played in palliative measures—that is, in relieving existing areas of suffering—must not be overlooked, their dominant and most significant function has been displayed in supplying the risk or venture capital expended in advancing the frontiers of knowledge. (H.R. Rep. No. 82-2514, 1953, p. 3)
Clearly the primary purpose of a foundation is not to provide direct assistance to the needy, but rather to facilitate the accumulation and distribution of knowledge in various fields. Indeed, the report goes on to laud foundations’ significant contributions in advancing knowledge in fields ranging from medicine to public administration, and from the social sciences to adult education (H.R. Rep. No. 82-2514, 1953, p. 4). The foundation is best viewed, then, as a model philanthropic enterprise.

A philanthropic enterprise should not be confused with a charitable one. Charity is defined as “what we give to alleviate the need, suffering, and sorrow of others, whether we know them or not” (Bremner, 1994, p. xi). Furthermore, charity “expresses an impulse to personal service; it engages individuals in concrete, discrete acts of compassion and connection to other people” (Gross, 2003, p. 31). The very act of alleviating an individual’s suffering connects one human being to another whether a previous relationship existed or not. It comes as no surprise, then, that the modern-day understanding of charity draws from a lineage based in a Judeo-Christian ethic of benevolence toward others in service to God (Veyne, 1990/1976). Philanthropy, on the other hand, which has its roots in Enlightenment thought, seeks “to apply reason to the solution of social ills and needs. … [It] aspires not so much to aid individuals as to reform society. Its object is the promotion of progress through the advance of knowledge” (Gross, 2003, p. 31).

There is debate as to whether charity and philanthropy hold the same meaning. Scholars like Richard Gross and Daniel Boorstin argue that a philanthropic approach to social service differs significantly from a charitable one while other scholars, such as Robert Payton, contend that charity and philanthropy are one and the same (see Gross, 2003, p. 31). As will become evident through the course of my argument, I concur with Gross’ and Boorstin’s viewpoint.
By advancing the rational application of knowledge to cure society’s ills, philanthropy hopes to make charity unnecessary and obsolete.

Historian Richard Gross (2003) asserts that a fledgling United States witnessed the inauguration of a profound turn from charity to philanthropy, which coincided with the emergence of formal voluntary associations. In the years preceding the Revolutionary War, the care and development of individuals took place primarily within families and in communities, as there were very few formal institutions devoted to caring for and serving others. There existed little separation between those in need and the rest of the community. Indeed, the Puritans epitomized the spirit of charitable service in that they regarded providing assistance to others as the embodiment of a godly community. Aid to others was decidedly “direct, personal, [and] concrete” (Gross, 2003, p. 33). With the rise of voluntary associations, however, this approach dramatically changed.

In his *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville captured the beginning of the transformation from individually-based service to institutionally-based service when he visited the new republic in the 1830s. In fact, he famously marveled at the proliferation of nearly innumerable types of voluntary associations (Tocqueville, 1998/1840, p. 150). In the essays that he devoted to voluntary associations and the role that they play in American politics and civil society (e.g., Tocqueville, 1998/1834, 1998/1840), Tocqueville contends that in democratic societies like the United States, voluntary associations can play a fundamental role in maintaining social order. In aristocratic societies, financial dependence upon wealthy benefactors engenders compulsory association. In
democracies, however, individuals are less obliged towards compulsory association since they are afforded more independence in thought and action. In other words, in a democratic society, there exists a fundamental paradox between individual liberty and social obligation. While the promotion of individual equality is fundamental to the exercise of democracy, it also engenders a proclivity toward social alienation rather than cohesion. Accordingly, he also argues that “all … become powerless if they do not voluntarily [italics added] learn to help one another” (Tocqueville, 1998/1840, p. 151). It is only through voluntary association with other citizens that an individual truly has power in a democratic society. Indeed, Tocqueville believed that the power to form associations is even more important than the freedom of the press—which he felt is vital to democracy—because associations have more authority simply through the quantity of their members who collectively amplify one another’s zeal for a cause (Tocqueville, 1998/1834).

It is perhaps for this very reason that voluntary associations were distrusted in the years immediately following the Revolutionary War. Some citizens felt that while associations might be necessary for engendering social cohesion in a new democracy, they also allowed certain interests to become more powerful than others (Hall, 2006, p. 35). Since they represented the collective will of individuals who were interested in pursuing certain (special) interests, voluntary associations did not necessarily represent the will of the majority of individuals. Thus, they were seen as a threat to the very democratic processes they embodied. So, in post-Revolutionary War America, voluntary associations
represented a democratic dilemma: individuals needed associations in order to be heard at times other than on election day, but associations also made some citizens more equal than others by amplifying their wealth, status, and influence (Hall, 2006, p. 36). This perhaps explains why the care and development of individuals continued to take place primarily within families, communities, and congregations while voluntary associations remained primarily the realm of contentious political activism.

It was not until the early decades of the nineteenth century that Americans would turn to the voluntary association as the essential vehicle for facilitating their benevolent work. At that time, “economic and social change eroded traditional communities and family ties [such that] Americans were increasingly willing to experiment with new kinds of formal organizations” to facilitate the “caregiving, healing, [and] educating” of individuals (Hall, 2006, p. 39). This coincided with the aftermath of the Second Great Awakening—essentially a backlash against secularism, which was fueled by a number of activist evangelical congregations. This widespread movement resulted in the increased formation of Protestant-run voluntary associations to counter the government-run and privately-run institutions (i.e., schools, hospitals, asylums, etc.) which emerged in the late eighteenth century in an effort to care for those individuals who had become disconnected from their families and communities as a result of social and economic upheaval.

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8 The first Great Awakening was sparked by fiery evangelical minister Jonathan Edwards in the early eighteenth century. It emphasized individuals’ moral agency while also challenging Governmental oversight of religion (see Hall, 2006, pp. 34-35).
In the early nineteenth century, this new trend in institutionalized charity co-existed alongside the philanthropic enterprises that emerged in the United States in the mid-1700s. Influenced by the ideas of prominent Protestant minister Cotton Mather, Benjamin Franklin took the lead in pre-Revolutionary War America in forming new associations to promote the general welfare and to provide an alternative to charity (Gross, 2003, p. 38). He saw almsgiving as self-defeating and believed that the poor needed to be inspired in order to achieve self-support. If one achieved self-support, then the root cause of one’s own poverty or other unfortunate circumstance would be cured and there would be no need for additional charity. It is worth quoting Franklin at length to illustrate the distinction between his philanthropic approach and the conventional Puritanical approach:

Human felicity is produc’d [sic] not so much by great pieces of good fortune that seldom happen, as by little advantages that occur every day. Thus, if you teach a poor young man to shave himself, and keep his razor in good order, you may contribute more to the happiness of his life than in giving him a thousand guineas. The money may be soon spent, the regret only remaining of having foolishly consumed it; but in the other case, he escapes the frequent vexation of waiting for barbers, and of their sometimes dirty fingers, offensive breaths, and dull razors; he shaves

9 In the early eighteenth century, Mather redefined charity in urban areas by advocating “friendly visiting” of the poor, taking advantage of voluntary associations to support aid, and philanthropic support by the rich to aid the poor through the establishment of schools, colleges, and hospitals (Hall, 2006, p. 34).
when most convenient to him, and enjoys daily the pleasures of its being

done with a good instrument. (Gross, 2003, p. 39)

In this passage we clearly find the philanthropic emphasis on the benefits of
knowledge. In the scenario Franklin presents, the young man lacks the requisite
knowledge to properly care for himself, and thus the only remedy for such a
situation is the appropriate application of knowledge. Once this knowledge has
been imparted to the young man, then he is free to apply it for his own continued
benefit. In other words, knowledge is freeing for the individual. A more charitable
act would presumably only provide the young man with short-lived relief, which
would perpetuate his unfortunate circumstances.

To think that a philanthropic approach to caring for individuals subsumed
a charitable one would be a fallacy, however. Historians have dubbed the early
nineteenth century as the Age of Benevolence, with voluntary associations
proliferating in bids to promote both charitable and philanthropic approaches to
humanitarianism. In fact, since the urban landscape was still fairly small and
personal in its scope, philanthropy could easily be promoted while still being
infused with a charitable spirit (Gross, 2003, p. 39). Many recipients of
philanthropic assistance knew their benefactors. It would take a combination of
religious zealotry, a landmark Supreme Court case involving Dartmouth College,
and the spread of urban poverty to unravel the relatively amenable partnership
between philanthropy and charity.

First, beginning in the 1820s, public opinion began turning against
voluntary associations that had been set up for charitable causes, especially those
that were founded by religious congregations (Gross, 2003, p. 42). Opinion turned against these particular types of organizations because some felt that they had stopped being responsive to public will. In some cases, religious associations were more interested in saving souls (a personal and denominational goal) than in simply feeding the poor in their soup kitchens (a public goal). As Gross (2003) states it, “infused with the religious zeal of the Second Great Awakening, evangelicals enlisted charity in the crusade for Christ. The ‘spiritual food’ of the gospel was now the ‘one thing needful;’ let others run soup kitchens for the poor” (p. 42). Over time this sentiment—once confined to small, local, community-based associations—suffused large, national organizations which had significant influence across state lines, as congregations came together to found large-scale societies that reflected and widely promoted their beliefs. Their beliefs did not necessarily coincide with the majority of public opinion.

At approximately the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a landmark case involving Dartmouth College—an event which seemed to support the public’s fear regarding private benevolent institutions’ ability to perform public functions. In 1816, William Plumer, the governor of New Hampshire, seized control of Dartmouth College, which had been founded in 1769 by the Earl of Dartmouth as a Congregationalist institution of higher learning, in an effort to make it a formally public institution (Hall, 2006, p. 36; see also McGarvie, 2003). Although he was a devout Baptist, Plumer saw the Second Great Awakening and the evangelical-run charitable voluntary associations it produced as a threat to the democratic principles upon which the United States had been founded. By seizing
control of Dartmouth College and reorganizing it, he hoped to spark a counter-revolution to these forces. The sitting trustees of Dartmouth College unsurprisingly did not concur with his sentiments and contested his actions in court. While the New Hampshire Supreme Court initially upheld Plumer’s position, the case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court where the lauded Daniel Webster argued the college’s position. The trustees of Dartmouth College eventually won the case on the grounds that New Hampshire had violated Article II, Section 10 of the Constitution, which forbids states from impinging upon private contractual obligations (Hall, 2006, p. 26). More specifically, while the trustees conceded that the college’s charter was granted by the Government, the Court upheld that the act of donating gifts to the college constituted a private contract which a state could not nullify even if the gifts were made in pursuit of a public purpose such as education.

After this landmark legal decision, the Government was forced to be more careful in the manner with which it regarded private institutions and their ability to carry out public goals. As McGarvie (2003) astutely points out, “to continue to rely on private entities after 1819 risked creating educational, welfare, or infrastructure systems significantly at odds with legislative perceptions of the public interest” (p. 102). Since they could not necessarily control how private institutions carried out public goals, both the states and the federal Government were forced to determine their public welfare priorities, and accordingly devote their own resources to them. Public priorities that were deemed of lesser value were then left to private benevolent organizations to fulfill in their own manner.
Thus, at this time, the Government’s public welfare obligations were effectively and distinctly split from those accorded to private benevolent organizations, especially those of a religious persuasion.

As far as the average citizen was concerned, though, there remained a viable need for private institutions to fulfill public services. As a young America grew and expanded its boundaries and as life became more urbanized over the course of the nineteenth century, traditional ties that bound together families and communities continued to fray. And with the fraying of those ties went sympathy for “the stranger” (Gross, 2003, pp. 43-44). During the nineteenth century, no Governmental programs existed to contend with the human consequences of a free-market capitalist system, and while there is no doubt that some turned to charitable organizations to address these issues, in general the public relied on organizations that were of a more philanthropic persuasion.\(^\text{10}\) Organizations that treated individuals on a case-by-case basis were perceived as being ineffectual in the long run. Only large-scale remedies could improve the large-scale problems that confronted the United States. Consequently, more philanthropic forms of the asylum, the poorhouse, the hospital, the tenement house, the reform school, and so on, began to take hold.

Around the turn of the twentieth century, the preference for philanthropic approaches to humanitarianism became a full-fledged movement called *scientific*

\(^{10}\) Philanthropic institutions were initially resisted in the South, which tended to value more traditional modes of life than in the North (see Gross, 2003, pp. 44-46). Urban Southerners preferred a more personalized approach to humanitarian aid, while more rural Southerners did not welcome philanthropists on principle, for they viewed them as outsiders who were intent on incorporating the more traditional South into the rationalized machinery of the North.
giving, the goal of which is to contend with society’s issues “wholesale” rather than piecemeal (Sealander, 2003, p. 223). Its greatest purveyors were foundations which rose to great prominence in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A number of foundations were still engaged in traditional forms of charitable service, but over time they became increasingly interested in finding ways to distance themselves from their beneficiaries and to contend with overarching social problems. This was particularly true for the industrial barons of the day like John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, Julius Rosenwald, and Edward Filene, who sought to marry the tenets of the Social Gospel,\(^\text{11}\) with which they had been infused from a young age, and the lessons they had learned from successfully navigating the free market and the Industrial Revolution (Sealander, 2003, p. 226). Each of them firmly believed that society could be reformed and that the less fortunate could be lifted up through the widespread application of the mechanisms that fueled capitalism, the Industrial Revolution, and, ultimately, their own success.

**Reining in the Social Machine**

By the early twentieth century, foundations came to represent the fundamental dichotomy that had plagued voluntary associations from the founding of the United States. While they were seen to embody the very spirit of democracy in that they allowed individuals to gather together to more potently

\(^{11}\) The Social Gospel countered Social Darwinism which had become popular in the late nineteenth century. Social Gospel-ers, who hailed from a number of different religious denominations, asserted that “people should not live by the laws of the jungle; rather, they should strive for a higher standard and care for those less fortunate” (Sealander, 2003, p. 226).
address societal issues, they were also viewed as facilitating the rise to prominence of particular, special interests that were perhaps antithetical with those of the public will. While no one advocated for ridding the United States of foundations or one’s ability to form voluntary associations (that would be undemocratic), public fervor clearly indicated that something must be done in order to ensure that these organizations worked to promote the interests of the public. After all, they had been granted a special privilege in the form of tax-exemption. More to the point, the public demanded of foundations that they implement and facilitate philanthropic projects in an effort to combat society’s ills in return for being afforded the privilege of not paying taxes. Not only this, but they wanted assurances that this was indeed taking place. Both the muckraking journalists and Congressional representatives of the day happily took up the mantle of this responsibility.

In the wake of the publication of Sinclair Lewis’ *The Jungle*, a new breed of journalism ruled the free press. Reporters were constantly on the lookout for the next big story to expose corporate greed and an American Dream gone awry. Consequently, they were among the first to raise the alarm regarding foundations and their activities in the early twentieth century. Investigative reports such as Coon’s *Money to Burn* (1938) and Lundberg’s *America’s 60 Families* (1946) and *The Rich and the Super-Rich* (1968) were bestsellers in their day and widely read by the American public (see Hall, 1992). Each report detailed the financial inner workings of some of the biggest foundations of the day, including The Rockefeller Foundation, The Carnegie Foundation, and The Ford Foundation.
Collectively they scathingly concluded that the overwhelming majority of the large American foundations were little more than tax shelters for the very wealthy. For instance, Ferdinand Lundberg (1948) contends that foundations allowed the wealthiest of Americans to: (1) retain control over their personal funds; (2) avoid income and inheritance taxes; and, (3) perpetuate their funds by investing them in corporations (frequently the founders’ own companies) (p. 328). They certainly were not working—at least, not very diligently—to promote the public interest with either their funds or their programs despite the lip service they paid to the Social Gospel.

Even when they were working to promote the public interest, however, some journalists felt that foundations were encroaching upon areas of public life that were outside the purview of the benevolent domain. In *The Foundation: Its Place in American Life* (1930), Frederick Keppel argues that foundations began drawing unwanted attention to themselves when they became involved in areas of public life like education and the social sciences instead of remaining in areas that were more traditionally their milieu, such as the founding of libraries and research.¹² Only The Russell Sage Foundation, along with a number of smaller foundations, seems to escape reporters’ harsh judgment in this arena. In *America’s 60 Families* (1948), Lundberg discusses what makes The Russell Sage Foundation

¹² Alternatively, Laski (1966) laments the role foundations play in funding research. He contends that foundations’ undue influence over university research and administration leads to a loss of ingenuity. To some extent, Lundberg (1948) concurs by advancing the viewpoint that the power of foundations is so insidious that people, “hoping that the lightning of a foundation grant will strike them, consciously or unconsciously shape their attitudes so as to please potential donors” (p. 353). Logic follows that by shaping their attitudes, they also shape their research agendas.
Foundation in particular such an exemplar: “[It] makes social studies, interprets its findings, and disperses the information through publications and conferences with a view to helping people help themselves” (p. 345). In addition, a number of smaller foundations have “accorded decreasing emphasis on individual philanthropy, conventional relief, and conventional education; and [have] increasingly emphasized the … social application of science rather than its prostitution for private profit” (Lundberg, 1948, p. 345). The Russell Sage Foundation and these smaller foundations clearly represent the philanthropic ideal which had come to define “correct” benevolent service in the early twentieth century, which, as Keppel (1930) defines it, is the representation of “a faith in man [sic] and his possibilities for progress” (p. 18).

While reporters were drawing conclusions such as these, the Congress was not too far behind in drawing similar conclusions. As early as 1915, the Congress expressed alarm at the wealth and power of foundations, as well as their inability to regulate them. In fact, in 1915, the Congressional Commission of Industrial Relations issued a report which charged that a small number of foundations—The Rockefeller Foundation and The Carnegie Foundation among them—maintained wealth more than twice the size of the appropriations of federal Government for education and social services (Keppel, 1930, p. 27). This wealth, which was completely exempt from taxation, was aimed at reforming various aspects of public life; yet, it was not subject to any public control whatsoever. The report called for the Congress to institute a number of reforms and regulations of foundations, including inspection and publication of foundation finances, and the
limitation of programmatic functions, but the Congress took no further action at that time.13

With the rise of the Cold War and the influence of McCarthyism, however, the Congress revisited the activities of foundations in an effort to uncover evidence of subversive activities. In the early 1950s, several special Congressional committees were formed to investigate foundations. The first of these committees—formed in 1951 and deemed the Cox Committee in honor of its chairman and progenitor, Representative E. Eugene Cox of Georgia (Andrews, 1973, p. 132)—was charged with determining whether foundations were using their funds for purposes other than what they were originally intended and whether these additional purposes included un-American and subversive activities (H.R. Rep. No. 82-2514, 1953, p. 2). More specifically, the Cox Committee investigated a number of issues with regard to foundations and their activities, including their use of funds, their influence over higher education, their attitude toward internationalism (versus promotion of American interests), their promotion of Communism and other subversive ideologies, and their sense of their own accountability toward the American public. In the end, the committee did not hold foundations entirely blameless for any “un-American” activities that occurred under their auspices, but they also did not find any evidence of

13 Nonprofit historian Peter Dobkin Hall (1992) contends that, during the decades which witnessed two world wars and a worldwide depression, the federal Government was loathe to irritate the great industrialists who founded and oversaw many of the foundations in question, since their great industrial power was desperately needed to facilitate the United States’ war and economic machines.
widespread malfeasance on their part.\textsuperscript{14} And while the committee recommended that the Government institute a number of measures aimed at reducing the opacity of foundations’ activities, including instituting an annual public accounting of foundations’ finances and reforming existing tax laws to close loopholes that allowed tax-exempt organizations of a dubious public purpose to persist, the committee advocated little additional Governmental oversight.

This did not dissuade B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee, a member of the Cox Committee, from strongly advocating the formation of another special committee to investigate foundations. Congressman Reece argued that the Cox Committee had been granted insufficient time with which to conduct its investigation, and therefore an additional inquiry was warranted. He also asserted that the Cox Committee had ignored strong evidence that pointed to “Communist or Communist sympathizer infiltration into foundations … foundation support of Fabian socialism in America … [and the fact that] thousands of foundations unknown to the public are set up generally to avoid payment of taxes” (C.R. No. 1954-0802, 1954, p. 15522). The Congress granted him leave to conduct an inquiry in 1954, the results of which are far less generous than those of the Cox Committee. In a report that exceeds 400 pages (see H.R. Rep. No. 83-2681, 1954), the members of the Reece Committee contend that they had indeed discovered evidence of what they were seeking—Communist infiltration of foundations whose new purpose (as opposed to representing the public will) was to overthrow the federal tax system and spread socialism via its programs and

\textsuperscript{14} See Andrews (1973) for a succinct summary of the Cox Committee hearings and final report.
financial influence. Communist hysteria aside, the Reece Committee’s report clearly indicates a strong continuity with popular discourse regarding the purpose of foundations. In no uncertain terms, the members of the Reece Committee firmly assert that—since they are granted tax-exemption—foundations “must be dedicated to public purposes,” affirm their “public dedication,” and abstain from becoming involved in areas of “the so-called ‘social science’ or … other areas in which our basic moral, social, economic, and governmental principles can be vitally affected” (H.R. Rep. No. 83-2681, 1954, p. 16). Those spheres are designated for the family, community, state or marketplace.

Unfortunately for the Reece Committee (and likely fortunately for foundations), the strident McCarthyism which gripped the nation earlier in the decade fell into disfavor by the mid-1950s. The Reece Committee report and its recommendations went nowhere, and it was not until 1961 that some of the issues it raised were revisited. Alarmed by the unprecedented growth of tax-exempt foundations, Texas Congressman Wright Patman urged the Congress to take “a fresh look at tax-exempt foundations” in order to determine why the number of foundations had grown so precipitously over the course of the twentieth century (C.R. No. 1961-0502, 1961; see also C.R. No. 1961-0508, 1961). Whereas the Cox Committee and the Reece Committee primarily focused their attention on combating Communist subversion within foundations, Congressman Patman

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15 In a strongly worded minority opinion, which is included as an appendix to the final report, Reece Committee members Wayne L. Hays and Gracie Pföst distance themselves from the findings of the committee and urge foundations to meet the challenge posed by the Reece Committee “without timidity” (see H.R. Rep. No. 83-2681, 1954, pp. 417-432; see also Andrews, 1973, p. 147).
focused on economic issues, namely the ease with which individuals could cease contributing to the nation’s coffers through the establishment of a tax-exempt foundation and the economic consequences of doing so. As a result of his unyielding efforts throughout the 1960s—along with public ire that was stoked by the publication of reporter Ferdinand Lundberg’s *The Rich and the Super-Rich* in 1968 and a Treasury Department report published in 1965, which questioned the efficacy of the tax system where it concerned benevolent organizations—the House of Representatives’ Ways and Means Committee began holding hearings into benevolent organizations in 1969 (Hall, 1992, p. 71). Representatives from a number of foundations, including The Rockefeller Foundation and The Carnegie Foundation, testified before the committee, and found they were completely unprepared for the level of public ire aimed at them. Moreover, they grossly miscalculated their stance toward regulation. They were utterly intransigent in their stance toward any proposed Governmental regulation, a position which swayed few members of Congress to their side of the debate (Hall, 1992, p. 73). As a result, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 passed with little opposition.

**The Practice of Benevolence**

Problematizations emerge on the basis of particular regimes of practices of government (Dean, 1999). A *regime of practices of government* is an organized collection of practices which collectively facilitate the production of particular

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16 Only F. Emerson Andrews, the former president of the Foundation Center who testified before the committee out of his personal and professional interest in foundations, acknowledged that the recommendations for tax reform and regulation of foundations set forth by the Treasury Department were reasonable and fair (Hall, 1992, pp. 72-73; see also Andrews, 1973).
truths by way of the development and implementation of technical and practical instruments (Dean, 1999, p. 18; see also Foucault, 1991b). This collection of practices organizes the way we govern ourselves and others in varying contexts. The particular regime of practice that is of interest here is the practice of benevolence—the systematized way we care for and aid others. During the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, the practice of benevolence was clearly problematized. But we return to the question of why: Why was it necessary to ensure that all benevolent organizations engage in a philanthropic mode of caring for and aiding others? Answering this question requires that we move beyond analyses of benevolent institutions, theories of benevolence, and ideologies (Foucault, 1991b, p. 75) related to altruism and goodwill, and instead turn to examining the regime of practice that is in question in and of itself. Only by charting the path of the practice of benevolence over time will we be able to demonstrate how the accepted manner in which we engage in the practice of benevolence is anything but “natural, self-evident and indispensible,” but rather, precarious and part of a “complex interconnection with a multiplicity of historical processes” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 75).

Such an analysis commences with recognizing and laying bare what Foucault (1991b) calls programmes. Programmes act on regimes of practice in a strategic effort to change them using “sets of calculated, reasoned prescriptions in terms of what institutions are meant to be organized, spaces arranged, [and] behaviours [sic] regulated” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 80). In other words, programmes set the agenda for governmental reform. The emergence of the “foundation
problem” in the twentieth century exposes one such programme at work. More specifically, it exposes a programme of philanthropy at work on the practice of benevolence. This philanthropic programme is comprised of technologies, languages, knowledges, and expertise that seek to promote a form of government by which individuals govern themselves and others with an aim toward solving society’s problems through the rational application of knowledge. Foundations—key components of the practice of benevolent beginning in the late nineteenth century—became a primary target of the philanthropic programme.

Here it is important to note that programmes emerge and operate within a milieu that is constituted by systematic ways of thinking about the nature of government (i.e., governmentalities) (Dean, 1999, p. 19). The philanthropic programme is no different. It emerged and took hold in a time when liberal governing rationalities dominated the Western world. Therefore, exploring the development of liberalism is crucial to understanding how the philanthropic programme worked to reform the practice of benevolence and how it then came to constitute the dispositif which defines our current understanding of benevolent service.

The Governmentality of Liberalism

In Western society no governmentality can match the impact of liberalism, primarily because it functions as both a political philosophy and as a specific type of art of government (Dean, 1999; see also Burchell, 1996). As a political philosophy, one can sum up its particular ethos as: “One always governs too much’—or at least, one should always suspect that one governs too much”
(Foucault, 2008, p. 319). In other words, liberalism is skeptical of the benefits wrought by the state’s exercise of superfluous government. It holds at its core a critical and problematizing nature (Burchell, 1996, p. 21), which allows it to position itself against other forms of government and to critique them, no matter the circumstances in which it finds itself (Dean, 1999, p. 49). Intellectual titans such as Emmanuel Kant, Adam Smith, and James Steuart facilitated its historical development during the eighteenth century, as they produced treatises that, in part, focused on “knowability” (e.g., the ability of one to know the universe, or the ability of a sovereign to fully know the processes, institutions, and subjects that comprise his principality) and its limits (Gordon, 1991, p. 16). In particular, Kant argued that humankind is incapable of possessing full knowledge of anything, and thus one’s control over everything is limited—an idea Smith seized upon and applied to the management of the state (p. 16). In time these expositions led to the problematization of two existing forms of governmental rationalities that flourished during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—raison d’Etat (or reason of state) and police—which were declared as impossibilities in practice, thus paving the way for liberalism’s subsequent dominance in political thought.

Foucault (1991a) argues that raison d’Etat as an art of government first emerged in the sixteenth century with the publication of The Prince and the subsequent responses to it generated by contemporary scholars who decried its emphasis on the sovereign and his relationship to the kingdom he ruled. Raison d’État can be understood as a way of thinking about governing without focusing on the sovereign’s role, for its particular emphasis is on management of the state.
More specifically, governing “according to the principle of *raison d’Etat* is to arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent … wealthy, and … strong in the face of everything that may destroy it” (Foucault, 2008, p. 4). Consequently, the state itself—and not the sovereign and his relationship to his principality—must be considered as the target of governance, a development which brings the state to bear as a natural, constituted object and which necessitates that this art of government utilize reason alone in its governing processes, foregoing the pursuit of guidance from God or the sovereign (Dean, 1999, p. 86). It is after all seeking to establish the state on its own merits and not those of a higher power, divine or otherwise. Accordingly, *raison d’Etat* must also recognize that its sole objective is maintenance of the state (p. 86) even though it respects “divine, moral, and natural laws … which are not homogeneous with or intrinsic to the state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 4). To this end, individuals within the state are of use to *raison d’Etat* only with regard to their positive or negative influence on its pursuit of its objectives (Dean, 1999, p. 86). Of course maintaining a state through reason alone assumes that a certain knowledge of the state—primarily regarding its own strengths and weaknesses—exists and can be accessed (p. 86) by which the state can be armed in its struggle for survival against other states.

In practice the state hones and shapes *raison d’Etat* through a system of armed forces and alliances with powerful individuals, institutions, and other states—a “diplomatico-military technology”—and through police (Foucault, 1994, p. 69). While the diplomatico-military technology allows the state to
externally maintain the appearance of strength to other states, it is police that
serves the state’s internal needs (Dean, 1999, p. 89). Prior to the nineteenth
century, the word police did not have the same meaning as it does today (a force
for maintaining law and order). Rather, it was understood as the state’s rationale
and processes for maintaining as well as expanding upon its internal strengths
(Pasquino, 1991, p. 115)—a concept born from the German science
Polizeiwissenschaft, the purpose of which was to develop techniques for
maximizing the state’s wealth by enhancing the productivity of the population
(Gordon, 1991, p. 10). Accordingly, police must accomplish three tasks: (1) keep
and compile statistical information on the population, territory, and the state’s
resources; (2) develop and implement measures to grow and maintain the wealth
of the population and the state; and, (3) maintain public felicity (Pasquino, 1991,
p. 113). In this way police serves as a kind of “economic pastorate” (Gordon,
1991, p. 12) in which the ancient Judeo-Christian imperative to care for all souls
as they are shepherded toward eternal salvation—an influence that Dean (1999)
argues is still strongly felt in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—is turned
on its head so that the state acts to ensure the welfare of all individuals—both
singly and as a cohesive population—as it steers them towards prosperity and
security in this world. In other words, the knowledge and techniques of police
must be both individual and totalizing if it is to be successful in support of raison
d’Etat and its pursuit of the maintenance of the state.

Liberalism, however, rejects as flawed both the underpinnings and
pursuits of raison d’Etat and police. Couched in the work of Kant and Smith,
liberalism plays skeptic to the notion that the state can have full knowledge of its
own strengths and weaknesses and thus shape its future accordingly. Liberalism
argues that the state is in reality faced with managing its affairs in relation to the
more “quasi-natural” domains of the marketplace and civil society (Burchell,
1996, p. 22), as well as the rise of active citizenship (Rose, 1996a, p. 43). The
marketplace, civil society, and the free subject all exist outside the purview of the
state, and thus hold their own intrinsic natures and methods for self-regulation—
they do not need to be regulated by the state in order to correctly function
(Burchell, 1996, p. 22; see also Burchell, 1991, p. 126; Dean, 1999, p. 50). In fact,
they function at a more optimal level when left untouched.

These domains deeply affect the state and the pursuit of its own agenda,
however, and are in many ways necessary to its success. This is a hard reality that
liberalism addresses through the application of the principles and techniques of
laissez-faire—“a principle for governing in accordance with the grain of things
[which] presupposes a specification of the objects of government in such a way
that the regulations they need are, in a sense, self-indicated” (Burchell, 1991, p.
127). Liberalism understands that state interference in any one of these domains
risks adversely affecting their naturally occurring dynamics, which in turn puts
the state itself in jeopardy; yet, at the same time, it also understands that the state
must ensure that conditions are optimal for securing positive outcomes within
these domains (Burchell, 1996, p. 22). Laissez-faire to a large extent solves this
“conundrum of how to establish a viable boundary between the objects of
necessary state action and those of necessary state inaction” and sets both the
“agenda and the non-agenda of government” (Gordon, 1991, p. 18, emphasis in the original). In doing so liberalism metamorphoses from political philosophy into full-fledged art of government replete with processes, technologies, and knowledges all its own.

In practice *laissez-faire* borrows heavily from the technologies of police in that it is both individualizing and totalizing in its pursuit of security of the state, even though it significantly differs from its predecessor by affirming “the necessarily opaque, dense autonomous character of the processes of population [while remaining] preoccupied with the vulnerability of these same processes” (Gordon, 1991, p. 20). More specifically, *laissez-faire* recognizes that the pursuit of individual interests à la *Homo œconomicus* is not only good for the individual, but also for the whole of society as well as the state; however, it also recognizes that these interests must be shaped as much as possible in order to ensure the predictability of individual and collective choices (Burchell, 1991, p. 127; see also Burchell, 1996, p. 23). Consequently, a *laissez-faire* government “depends upon the conduct of individuals who are parts of a population [as well as] subjects of particular, personal interests,” and thus becomes “a government of interests” at the level of both the individual and the population as a whole (Burchell, 1991, p. 127).

Foucault (1990/1978) refers to this development as the introduction of “bio-power” into the forces of history (p. 140). At the individual level, bio-power is made manifest through the “anatamo-politics of the human body,” a system by which disciplinary techniques—perpetrated primarily through the disciplines
associated with the social sciences—optimize the human body for economic pursuits by making it both efficient and docile (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 139; see also Foucault, 1995/1975). A “bio-politics of the population,” however, aims to supervise individuals en masse by systematizing and controlling biological processes like health, births, deaths, life expectancy, and anything that might affect them (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 139). In short, this fundamental control over individual and collective interests in the pursuit of state security is so complete that it amounts to a power over life itself.

*The creation of society.*

To be sure, this development might indicate that liberalism is little more than a passive/aggressive version of *raison d’Etat*, yet the paramount feature of liberalism remains its critical nature (Rose, 1996a, p. 47). It continually questions itself and its intentions in the pursuit of the optimal level of government that exists somewhere between too little and too much. Of course, liberalism is able to critique itself and still survive because it does so in the name of securing the quasi-natural domain of civil society. By questioning in the eighteenth century the efficacy of police and its ability to penetrate all levels of the population in its pursuit of knowledge and security, liberalism recognizes the existence of a “society” that exists outside the purview of the state (see Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996a, p. 9). Liberalism in fact constitutes civil society and allows it to take shape in our consciousness when confronted with the inadequacies of police.

Civil society, then, can be viewed as the product of the processes of emergence and, more specifically, as one of what Foucault (2008) calls *réalités de*
transaction (or transactional realities), the emergence and maintenance of which depends upon the interplay between those entities that govern and those that are governed (p. 297). Indeed, according to Foucault (2008), civil society is not “an historical-natural given which functions in some way as both the foundation of and source of opposition to the state or political institutions. … [I]t is something which forms part of modern governmental technology” (p. 297). Civil society, in fact, provides the non-political frame of reference (Dean, 1999, p. 110) by which liberalism can govern subjects that have both economic and juridical rights.

This situation is made possible by the very characteristics by which civil society is defined. First, civil society establishes a boundary that is concomitant with the idea of a nation, for this boundary acts to establish the parameters of population, territory, and—more abstractly—justice, for which the state is responsible to govern (Dean, 1999, p. 124). Second, liberalism conceives of civil society as a totality, in that certain regularities in behavior, actions, and decisions associated at the level of a population are irreducible to a more limited level, such as the family or the individual (p. 124). Finally, civil society carries with it a “self-rendering unity” (Gordon, 1991, p. 22; see also Dean, 1999, p. 125) that allows both economic and non-economic interests to co-exist, and which promotes “cohesion and solidarity … [as well as] breakdown and dissolution,” such that social norms can exist even in the face of racial, ethnic, political, and gender divisions (Dean, 1999, p. 125). Framed in this way civil society allows Homo economicus and his self-interested nature to co-exist relatively peacefully with Democratic Citizen, Biological Individual, Community Member, and so on,
and still be manageable (Foucault, 2008, p. 296; see also Gordon, 1991, p. 23; Dean, 1999, p. 125). In short, with the advent of society as a formalized concept, liberalism solves its dilemma of how to promote the self-interested behavior that is so vital to the smooth functioning of the marketplace while at the same time retain the political and legal rights of the individual.

*The rise of the welfare state.*

Ultimately liberalism both governs and produces civil society in order to ensure its optimal and natural functioning (Burchell, 1996, p. 25); yet, over time civil society proves to be a remedy unable to withstand every problem faced by liberalism. Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, liberalism becomes viewed as something of a failure, for it has been unable to produce satisfactory economic and social norms (Rose, 1996a, p. 39). For example, poverty remains a troublesome issue, as concerns regarding pauperism—namely the demoralization of the poor, criminality, unhygienic living conditions and disease—arise during this time (Dean, 1999, p. 126). Liberalism proves ill equipped to contend with these issues, even through the routine functioning of the marketplace or through the norms of civil society, for its very nature disallows involvement in the lives of the individuals that comprise the state. There no longer exists a link between the state and the family, or between the state and the individual (only the population), and there are no tools available to liberalism beyond those provided by the economy (Dean, 1999, p. 127). So, the question becomes one of how to bridge the gap between the state and the family, or the state and the individual, and how to do so in a way that maintains
appropriate juridical boundaries between the public and private spheres of life, so that the poor are successfully incorporated into civil society, especially as they pertain to participation in the marketplace and adherence to economic norms.

A solution presents itself through a new form of rule called welfarism or the welfare state (Rose, 1993). Through the governing strategies of the welfare state, politics and various forms of expertise assemble to combat the negative effects of liberalism’s laissez-faire form of rule by way of the reestablishment of the sense of solidarity that is so integral to the continued optimal functioning of the marketplace. In this new form of rule, the state is able to sidestep its inability to act directly on the individual by governing through society. More specifically, the state engenders solidarity by acting upon individuals and their activities in relation to the establishment and promotion of social norms (Rose, 1993, p. 285) by certain experts. Indeed, “political rule [i.e., the state] would not itself set out the norms of individual conduct, but would instill and empower a variety of ‘professionals’ who would, investing them with authority to act as experts in the devices of social rule” (Ibid). Thus, in the welfare state expertise is crucial, for it allows the state to govern at a distance.

The instrument/object of the welfare state is a reformulation of society collectively referred to as “the social” (Donzelot, 1979, p. 88). The social is best understood as a terrain of programs, institutions, technologies, and knowledges that allow for a new kind of government of the individual (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 191). More pointedly, the social is defined as:
The set of means which allow social life to escape material pressures and politico-moral uncertainties; the entire range of methods which make the members of society relatively safe from the effects of economic fluctuations by providing a certain security—which give their existence possibilities of relations that are flexible enough, and internal stakes that are convincing enough, to avert the dislocation that divergences of interests and beliefs would entail. (Donzelot, 1979, p. xxvi)

In other words, the social works on behalf of the welfare state to solve the problems created by liberalism through various techniques that ensure personal security while at the same time promoting social norms. These techniques include designating certain issues as particularly “social” issues, generating disciplines like social work and sociology, creating new socially-oriented legal jurisdictions like juvenile and family courts, and designating new professionals like social workers and sociologists, all of which seek to better the quality of family and individual life (Dean, 1999, p. 53).

The solutions provided by these techniques to maintain security in the face of economic fluctuations and social upheaval are not without cost to the individual. Each technique, program, or institution ensures the supremacy of newly anointed social experts as they act upon the individual to ensure compliance with social norms (Rose, 1996a, p. 40). The techniques of the social are only successful when the individual or family upon whom the intervention is applied acts as an accomplice in her own normalization (Dean, 1999, p. 53). Individuals must exhibit a desire to be functioning members of society—indeed,
to be normal—in order for the social intervention to be deemed truly successful. This ultimately signifies that the network comprised of truth expounding experts and the individuals who play the objects of their interventions allows the state to govern at an arm’s length, thus solving the issues created by liberalism without foregoing its inherent nature.

*Remaking the Social*

The philanthropic mode of benevolent service is an integral component of the social and its processes of normalization. Through philanthropic benevolence, and its constituent organizations and interventions, individuals who require assistance to better their unfortunate circumstances can be provided with immediate relief, but only in exchange for their acceptance of the benefits of certain expertise, such as the “right” way to save money, raise children, and maintain employment (Dean, 1999, p. 128). In this process of exchange there is an inherent expectation that individuals will continue to use the information imparted to them in order to continue bettering themselves and their unfortunate circumstances (recall the young man in Benjamin Franklin’s cautionary tale). So, even though individuals who have been deemed aberrant receive aid, they are also able to maintain a sense of autonomy in their decision-making. Maintaining individuals’ ability to exercise knowledge in their own best interest is vital for the successful functioning of the marketplace (see Cruikshank, 1999). As was the case with Franklin’s unfortunate young man, knowledge frees the individual. Only in these particular circumstances, knowledge frees the individual with the express purpose to facilitate her full participation in the marketplace.
While the philanthropic mode of benevolent service plays an integral part in the social (Donzelot, 1979; see also Dean, 1999) through its provision of a combination of care and knowledge, the application of the philanthropic programme to the practice of benevolent service did not take effect within the social in a completely comprehensive way. To put it simply, “things [did not] work out as planned” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 80). Rather, philanthropy faced “different strategies which are mutually opposed, composed and superposed” to it, which produced “permanent and solid effects which … don’t [sic] conform to the initial programming” (Foucault, 1991b, pp. 80-81). In this case, the opposing strategies consist of two erstwhile discourses which competed with the nascent philanthropic programme. First is the form of benevolent service that is based in individual acts of goodwill: charity. While philanthropy emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the dominant mode of benevolent service, it did not eliminate “the urge to personal service … born of the hunger for personal connection to others” (Gross, 2003, p. 48). Then there is the discourse of *Homo œconomicus* whose self-interested and utility maximizing behavior is on full display in the decision-making processes of the wealthy industrial barons who founded and managed the foundations at the heart of the problematization under examination here.

The existence of these competing discourses is evidence of a much larger issue at work in the social. While the social can be understood as a bounded domain that is the instrument/object of the welfare state, it is also fundamentally diverse, heterogeneous, and replete with assorted institutions, experts, and
knowledges all aimed at responding to the problems posed by liberal government (Dean, 1999, p. 128). In other words, its “guts” are neither coherent nor particularly unified. Rather, it shares only “a common vocabulary [which] was formed [to seek] a general codification of these problems as issues entailing the whole of society” (Dean, 1999, p. 129). More pointedly, according to Donzelot (1988), the social “was never more than the lumping together under a single label of a whole range of concrete solutions to different aspects of social problems. It never succeeded in designating its object, concepts and methods with any rigour [sic]” (pp. 397-398). This is most likely why its various interventions, including the practice of benevolence, remained “tied to the main ideological currents of the nineteenth century,” (Donzelot, 1988, p. 397) including the practice of charity and the self-interested behavior of *Homo œconomicus*.

The inherent instability of the social ultimately serves to undermine the aims of the welfare state. Through the social, the welfare state proves unable to successfully reestablish the sense of solidarity that is necessary to promote the security of the marketplace. Indeed, the welfare state cannot resolve the conundrum posed by interests which are vital to the state’s own security but which also oftentimes operate in contradiction with one another.¹⁷ As a result, beginning in the mid-to-late twentieth century, a collection of governmentalities which are commonly referred to as neoliberalism problematizes the welfare state.

¹⁷ Foucault refers to this as the “welfare state problem,” in which the individual is viewed as both an actor who has equal rights within the political community and a person whose welfare is promoted as part of an ongoing system of integration into society (see Dean, 1999, p. 82). This conundrum is born from the dual imperatives of a Judeo-Christian ethic of care and a Greco-Roman promotion of solidarity through citizenship.
The aim of these particular governmentalities is to supplant the inherent naturalism of liberalism and welfarism with more constructivist tendencies in a rather paradoxical effort to reestablish the predominance of forms of government that work through the quasi-natural domain of the marketplace (Burchell, 1996).

The governmentalities of neoliberalism.

In Europe and the United States, neoliberalism emerged taking on two very distinct—though not altogether dissimilar—forms (Foucault, 2008). In Europe neoliberalism surfaced post-World War II through a series of essays published in the journal Ordo which took aim at socialism and the Keynesian economic policies that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century. In short, European ordoliberalists criticize states that fail to rely on the mechanisms of the marketplace and instead engage with interventionist economic policies that undermine both the natural functioning of the marketplace and the legal rights of citizens. For them the marketplace does not require planning and intervention, and in fact, they assert that Nazism and Stalinism would not have arisen without states’ proclivity toward intervention in the marketplace. The ordoliberalists contend that the marketplace is rather something that can be organized—not planned or directed—through social policy (Gordon, 1991, p. 41) so that it functions optimally but without impinging upon the legal and social rights of those who participate in it. Essentially, they argue for intervention in civil society as a means to organize the marketplace.

18 Hence Foucault’s (2008) labeling of this type of neoliberalism as ordoliberalism and its purveyors as ordoliberals.
In the United States, on the other hand, Foucault (2008) argues that a brand of neoliberalism, which he dubs *anarcho-capitalism*, emerges predominantly through the writings of Chicago School economists. Like their European counterparts, they also object to interventionist economic policies, which in the United States manifest primarily through social programs like the New Deal. They believe these policies result in a welfare state run amok, replete with rigid bureaucracy, a proliferation of top-heavy state institutions, professionals whose authority is unchecked, and a distorted marketplace. Yet, American neoliberals differ from ordoliberals in their solution to excessive government, most likely because—as Foucault (2008) asserts—“liberalism in America is a whole way of being and thinking” (p. 218) and not simply a philosophical approach to government. Rather than manage the marketplace through carefully implemented social interventions as ordoliberals contend, American neoliberals propose the opposite: they propose to extend the rationality of the marketplace to all corners of human existence. In other words, in the United States economics becomes “an ‘approach’ capable in principle of addressing the totality of human behavior, and, consequently, of envisaging a coherent, purely economic method of programming the totality of governmental action” (Gordon, 1991, p. 43). In short, the question of government becomes one not of whether the state should intervene in civil society, but how it can intervene in civil society to achieve optimal results in the marketplace by utilizing the very principles that organize it.
Regardless of the form of neoliberalism, though, a notion that becomes particularly salient to its development in the twentieth century in both Europe and the United States is the injection of the enterprise model into all areas of behavior (Burchell, 1996, p. 29). In economic thought the enterprise is an institution whose purpose is to facilitate supply and demand through competition. In liberal and neoliberal thought, however, the enterprise “is not just an institution but a way of behaving … in the form of competition in terms of plans and projects, and with objectives, tactics, and so forth” (Foucault, 2008, p. 175). Neoliberalism seeks not only to infuse society with the enterprise model so that individuals must engage with it in a variety of capacities, but also to encourage the individual to think of herself and all her relationships through the framework of an enterprise (Foucault, 2008, p. 241). Indeed, the individual herself becomes conceptualized as an enterprise.

Of course, this creation of such an “enterprise society” engenders a number of significant effects. First, it allows the economic model of supply and demand, and competition, to become the model for social and interpersonal relations, thereby extending the economic model into civil society (Foucault, 2008, p. 242). Second, it engenders a highly potent form of self-government:

The idea of one’s life as the enterprise of oneself implies that there is a sense in which one remains always continuously employed in (at least) that one enterprise [the self], and that it is a part of the continuous business of living to make adequate provision for the preservation, reproduction and reconstruction of one’s own human capital. (Gordon, 1991, p. 44)
This signals an enhanced period of “responsibilization” (Burchell, 1996, p. 29) beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century in which individuals actively seek to mitigate the negative impact of their behavior through a responsible practice of freedom and individual choice. In other words, neoliberalism engenders the specification of a new subject (Rose, 1996a, p. 49; see also Rose & Miller, 1992)—one who possesses the ability to freely act, but only in a responsible manner and within a prescribed mode of conduct.

*Community government.*

With the advent of this period of responsibilization and enterprise behavior, the conception of civil society is transformed. While the governing rationalities of both liberalism and welfarism hold that society is a source of needs that “are individually distributed and collectively borne,” neoliberalism views society as “a source of energies contained within individuals’ exercise of freedom and self-responsibility” (Dean, 1999, p. 152). In other words, society is still viewed as a collection of individuals who have a collective impact; but, the source of that impact is not individuals’ needs but rather, the force of their autonomous decision-making—their entrepreneurialism. Accordingly, the manner in which we understand how society should be governed also changes. In liberal society, individual interests are shaped in accordance with the domain’s inherent nature and internal mechanisms. The welfare state, on the other hand, intervenes in society through the use of the experts in order to correct the problems wrought by liberalism’s laissez-faire approach to the management of society. For neoliberalism, however, the interests of society do not need to be regulated.
Rather, the autonomous actions of individuals and groups within society need to be cultivated and facilitated (Ibid) in order to affect a more competitive and efficient—indeed, a more “marketized”—sphere. Ultimately, the aim of neoliberalism is to extend the logic of the marketplace to all areas of life such that all “institutional and individual conduct [is reformed] so that both come to embody the values and orientations of the market, expressed in notions of the enterprise and the consumer” (Dean, 1999, p. 172).

To this end, neoliberalism emphasizes association rather than solidarity, which is at the heart of the aims of both liberalism and the welfare state. While a certain measure of cooperation and esprit de corps amongst individuals and groups is necessary in order to stave off complete anarchy, a sense of kinship at the societal level is not ideal, for it stifles individuality and its consequent entrepreneurialism. The ascendency of the governing rationalities of neoliberalism signals a reassertion of what Cruikshank (1999) calls the science of association (see also Dean, 1999, p. 152). As we have seen, early in the development of the United States, individuals became socially isolated from one another by the very liberty that underpinned the newly formed democratic nation. This social isolation engendered a sense of individualism that undermined the social solidarity that is vital to the successful promotion of nationhood (and to the

19 Here the work of Hannah Arendt is a key touchstone. In her discussion of the social versus the political, Arendt argues that the predominance of the social realm has stifled individual freedom. The social expects a certain kind of behavior from individuals, and thus imposes rules upon them to restrict their behavior. This restriction of behavior—this normalization of individual behavior—stifles individuality and personal achievement. See Cruikshank, 1999, pp. 54-58, for an overview.
operation of the market). An artificial sense of solidarity was engineered through
the formation of and participation in voluntary associations (Cruikshank, 1999, p. 97). If these associations were to be successful in achieving their goals rather than
dissolve into disorder, members had to exercise a certain level of restraint, or self-
government. In other words, voluntary association engenders a certain measure of
esprit de corps by way of members’ exercise of self-government.

The erstwhile science of association is reasserted as a part of a new
“politics of community” (Rose, 1996b). Community has now replaced the social
as the instrument/object of the state. More specifically, with the advent of
neoliberalism, the social fractured into a multitude of “localized, heterogeneous,
[and] overlapping” communities²⁰ (Rose, 1996b, p. 333). As such, the community
is defined by its own set of characteristics which serve to distinguish it from the
social. For instance, while the individual is still self-governing and responsible,
she is also bonded to others in the community—but only in the community—
whereas in the social, one held collective ties and obligations with the whole of
society. In addition, the lines of an individual’s sense of personal identity are
configured through allegiance to the things with which one identifies emotionally
and traditionally—indeed, directly—rather than as a member of an integrated,
national whole, or society (a process of identification which is more indirect in

²⁰ Communities are based on the acknowledgement of a shared fate or a common
claim: “our common fate as gay men, as women of colour [sic], as people with
AIDS, as members of an ethnic group, as residents in a village or a suburb, as
people with a disability” (Rose, 1996b, p. 334).
nature). Ultimately this creates a new field of dividing practices to identify those who are affiliated with the community (i.e., those who have the economic and moral means to be entrepreneurial) and those who are to be marginalized because they cannot enterprise themselves or are part of an anti-community. In either case, these groups—these communities—“no longer mediate between society and the individual but represent a plurality of agents that are put into play in diverse strategies of government” (Dean, 1999, p. 171).

The new politics of community necessitates a revised understanding of the role of expertise in the government of individuals. As Rose (1996b) states it, “social government was [italics added] expert government” (p. 349). In the welfare state, experts governed society with authority bestowed upon them by the state. In the government of community, however, experts, their organizations, and their institutions are being deployed in a new way:

Locales and activities that were previously part of the assemblages of the “social” are being autonomized from the machinery of politics [i.e., the state] and novel devices are being used to govern the activities of those who work in them. In a plethora of quasi-autonomous units, associations, and “intermediate organizations,” experts are allocated and new responsibilities and new mechanisms are developed for the management of professional expertise “at a distance”—that is, outside the machinery of

21 Foucault (1983) argues that an individual becomes objectified in part by what he calls dividing practices, through which “the subject is either divided inside himself [sic] or divided from others … examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’” (p. 208). For a brief but concise overview of this topic and its relationship to other processes of objectification, see Rabinow, 1984, pp. 7-11.
bureaucracy that previously bound experts into devices for the government of the “the social.” (Rose, 1996b, p. 350)

Rather than glean authority from the state to devise and maintain social norms, experts are now largely disconnected from the state\(^{22}\) and must independently deploy their authority to govern the community. More pointedly, they oftentimes find themselves in “quasi-private” \textit{(Ibid)} organizations and agencies such as nonprofits that facilitate the achievement of priorities once considered the domain of the state.

Of course, on its face this arrangement may seem little different than it was in the social. As a territory of government and as a collection of interventions, “the community,” like “the social,” appears to be little more than a bounded domain (or group of domains) whose substance is comprised of a diverse, heterogeneous, and completely unstable collection of individuals, expertise, organizations, and knowledges that are all aimed at addressing community (rather than social) problems. Indeed, the most significant differences between community government and social government are the aims of government (facilitating the exercise of freedom rather than the promotion of solidarity) and the change in venue (community rather than society). All of which begs the question, what is to prevent the instability and heterogeneity that undermined the welfare state from also plaguing neoliberalism? More pointedly,

\(^{22}\) This is not to say that the state does not deploy expertise and experts on its own behalf. The experts and expertise in question here relate to anything formerly referred to as a “social” issue. This is said, however, with the caveat in mind that what is considered a target of “social” or “community” expertise is something of a moving target, as priorities change over time.
how can the neoliberal state effectively govern at a distance—through heterogeneous, unstable communities—while still achieving its aim of promoting the marketization of life?

**Normalizing Philanthropy**

The answer to these questions lies in establishing a philanthropic norm of benevolent service for the experts deployed through the quasi-private associations and intermediary organizations (née benevolent organizations) that govern the community. We have already noticed that the philanthropic mode of benevolent service suits the aims of neoliberalism, in that it works to engender individuals’ full participation in the marketplace. By normalizing the philanthropic mode of benevolent service, the neoliberal state is also able to effectively govern at a distance through benevolent organizations because norms ultimately work to make behavior more predictable. Norms are “a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point … [by] which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself” (Ewald, 1990, p. 154). Norms act as both a measurement and a form of judgment by which individuals within a group can be ordered. Put simply, they establish the rules for behavior and the consequences for deviating from those rules. Group members will adhere to the rules of the norm or pay a price: they will be branded as abnormal. The philanthropic norm establishes the rules of behavior for the practice of benevolence. More to the point, experts engaged in the practice of benevolence and the recipients of their services must engage in the application of
reason to solve problems or risk being deemed abnormal and then excluded\textsuperscript{23} from “normal” society.

While the philanthropic norm is vital to the success of the aims of neoliberalism, the state cannot directly promote its application. After all, the state seeks to govern at a distance. What the state can do, however, is enlist the law to act on its behalf. With the advent of neoliberalism, the law begins to play a particular, centralized role in the administration of the enterprise society. The juridical is seen as being concomitant with the economic, such that the “juridical gives form to the economic, and the economic would not be what it is without the juridical” (Foucault, 2008, p. 163). In other words, in neoliberalism the economic realm is considered not the quasi-natural domain of liberalism, but rather as a realm of activities which must be regulated by the state through law. However, regulation (realized through law) takes on a particular form: “The economy is a game and the legal institution which frames the economy should be thought of as the rules of the game” (Foucault, 2008, p. 173). The law serves to fix and formalize the rules of the game such that both the state, which enforces the laws, and the individuals who play the economic game both adhere to them\textsuperscript{24}. The law

\textsuperscript{23} Dividing practices can literally divide the normal from the abnormal through the practices of exclusion. Exclusion of the abnormal from society can sometimes be spatial (e.g., the removal of the insane to mental institutions), but it is always social in nature (see Rabinow, 1984, p. 8). The abnormal are shunned from participating in “regular” society.

\textsuperscript{24} Some scholars argue that this development has led to the “judicialization” of administration. In particular, Rosenbloom (1987) contends that neoliberalism has signaled a new partnership between the judiciary and public administration in which the judiciary acts to ensure that individuals who are subject to administrative attention are afforded greater legal protections. In other words, the
pursues no particular end except the formalization of the rules of the economic game in and of themselves. To this end, the law has become increasingly associated with the processes of normalization, such that it “operates more and more as a norm … [while] the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory” (Foucault, 1990/1976, p. 144). The law supports and reinforces the normalization process in that it represents both a codified set of norms and the means by which the norms can be coercively enforced. In other words, “laws still partake of a juridical system of law, i.e., law as an instrument of sovereignty,” (Dean, 1999, p. 120) but their primary function has become to enforce the rules (née, norms) of the economic game.

Within neoliberal governing rationalities, the role of law as both codifier and regulator of norms takes on a particular form. Specifically, the state engages in what Foucault (2008) calls “framework policy” in an effort to organize all the mechanisms that surround the marketplace in order to ensure its smooth functioning. While the state cannot work directly on the mechanisms of the market (e.g., price, competition, etc.), it can frame “all that does not arise spontaneously in economic life,” such as individuals’ needs, natural resources, political and legal structures, and scientific knowledge, (Bilger, 1964, cited in Foucault, 2008, p. 140n) so as to bolster the functioning of the market. By transforming through law the scientific, technical, social, and legal bases upon judicial seeks to assert individual rights in relation to the actions of public administrators. In addition, judicialization has resulted in public agencies functioning more like courts such that they make decisions based on legal values (see Rosenbloom, 1983, p. 223).
which the market operates, the state is able to organize the conditions of the
marketplace without directly working on its mechanisms. In other words, the law
is a tool by which the neoliberal state can effectively govern at a distance.

The state has employed framework policy to both codify the philanthropic
norm for the practice of benevolence and to regulate it. First, it codified
philanthropy as a norm for benevolent service by literally establishing it as the
measurement by which all benevolent service should be judged (albeit in an
oblique way). In 1954, the Congress reformed the tax code to establish a section
strictly for the classification of tax-exempt, benevolent organizations. This is the
501(c) section of the tax code. Prior to the passage of these sweeping changes, the
Internal Revenue Code classified all organizations which had some sort of special
dispensation regarding the payment of taxes under one section (Section 101)
without any demarcation of their purpose (see Hall, 2006, p. 53). Thus, Section
101 included organizations ranging from foundations to insurance companies. By
contrast, the 501(c) section of the tax code classifies organizations of an
exclusively benevolent nature into one of twenty-eight categories with twenty-
eight specific purposes, which range from the religious/charitable/educational
(501(c)(3)) to workers’ compensation (501(c)(27). In a 72-page document (see
Department of the Treasury, 2010), the requirements for meeting the designations
of each category are spelled out.

For the state to designate a benevolent organization as a lawful member of
one of these twenty-eight categories and for the benevolent organization to
receive all the benefits that accompany one of these designations (e.g., tax-
exemption, legitimacy from being Government sanctioned, etc.), it must make an
application to the state. The application consists of a 27-page questionnaire in
which a benevolent organization must indicate to the state not only the purpose of
its organization, but also its goals for service and the methods (i.e., its financial,
human, and physical capital) by which it expects to achieve those goals (see
Department of the Treasury, 2006). While no question in the application is so
cheeky as to ask, “By what means do you intend to engage in the application of
reason to empower individuals to responsibly practice their freedom so as to
courage them to fully participate in the market?” the totality of the
questionnaire clearly indicates a singular imperative. If an organization is to
successfully achieve 501(c) status and all the benefits that accompany it, it must
take up a rational approach to organization management and benevolent service.
In other words, a benevolent organization cannot successfully complete the
application process unless it establishes a goal, develops a plan for achieving that
goal, and then orients itself and its resources toward enacting that plan in the most
efficient and effective manner possible.

Of course, the establishment of the 501(c) section of the tax code only
serves to create—or “frame”—a space in which philanthropy has the opportunity
to become the norm for the practice of benevolence. Although few benevolent
organizations can survive (particularly financially) outside the Government’s twin
blessings of legitimacy and tax-exemption, benevolent organizations can still
exercise their freedom of choice. They can choose whether or not to apply for
501(c) status. Of course, if a benevolent organization does choose to become a
501(c), then it must adhere to the norms that accompany that designation. If it cannot do so, then the law must be enlisted to enforce the norm by which the group is measured.

Even in its role as a regulator of norms, however, the state does not act directly on institutions or individuals, but rather on the conditions of their operation. For instance, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 serves to enforce the philanthropic norm for the practice of benevolence not by directly dictating norms of organizational form or service delivery, but by instituting reporting requirements. The law requires foundations to maintain more stringent financial documentation on its operations to submit to the Internal Revenue Service on an annual basis. In order to meet the obligations of these reporting requirements, foundations would be compelled to be more rational in their approach to organizational management—particularly financial management. Yet, as with the establishment of the 501(c) section of the tax code, foundations are free to ignore the rules set out for them, for the law only constructs the space in which foundations operate. Of course, there are consequences for failing to meet the norm established by the law—they risk being deemed abnormal (i.e., non-compliant) and perhaps excluded from mainstream society (i.e., stripped of their 501(c) designation). But they still operate in a space in which they have the ability to exercise their freedom of choice, and so long as foundations still have a choice, the state has met the aims of neoliberal governing rationalities. It is able to govern effectively at a distance through the establishment of a philanthropic norm while at the same time promoting the marketization of all areas of life.
Conclusion

Neoliberalism seeks to extend the logic of the market to all corners of life, and it will endeavor to create markets where none exist in order to accomplish this aim. It seeks to do so because the values of the market, as expressed in the enterprise and the consumer, answer the problems posed by the welfare state (Dean, 1999, p. 172). In other words, the values of the market embody rules of conduct which guarantee an individual’s ability to practice her freedom thereby ensuring her full participation in the marketplace. When the state codified the practice of benevolence through its application of law, the state effectively brought benevolence into the market economy. More pointedly, the state created a new market: a market for benevolence (T.J. Catlaw, personal communication, March 2, 2011). Through the (lawfully sanctioned) organizations that comprise the market for benevolence and through the knowledge and expertise they deploy into communities, the state is better able to ensure that individuals “learn to exercise their freedom on … a market as a consumer” (Ibid, emphasis in the original). So, individuals are able to learn market values not only on the “regular” market, but in the benevolent market, too.

The development of this market for benevolence has engendered a number of significant effects, however. Primary among them is the transformation of the philanthropic mode of service that normalizes the practice of benevolence. With the fragmentation of the social into localized, heterogeneous communities, philanthropy no longer aims to resolve social problems through the application of reason. Now it endeavors to resolve community problems through reason. More
pointedly, each community—which has been formally disconnected from the neoliberal state—works on its own to apply reason to solving its own problems. In doing so, each community *entrepreneurializes* itself. Thus, these communities not only comprise the market of benevolence, they also compete in it. Indeed, as entrepreneurs these communities compete against one another. This signals not only the advent of a market for benevolence, but also the arrival of a marketized practice of benevolence.
CHAPTER 4: STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE

Introduction

An analytics of government is concerned with “how we govern and are governed within different regimes, and the conditions under which such regimes emerge, continue to operate, and are transformed” (Dean, 1999, p. 23). In the previous chapter, we detailed the conditions under which the contemporary regime of the practices of benevolence has emerged. More specifically, we determined that the contemporary regime of practices of benevolence emerged under the auspices of a problematization of a liberal governmentality. Furthermore, we came to understand how a neoliberal governmentality reconstructed the social as a market for benevolence through the establishment of a philanthropic norm for the practice of benevolence. By way of this market for benevolence, the neoliberal governmentality seeks to create a space through which individuals can learn to responsibly exercise their freedom by reforming their behavior to align with market values like entrepreneurialism and competition. The market for benevolence ultimately allows the state to more effectively govern at a distance while at the same time asserting the values of the market in an effort to undo the social government of the welfare state.

In order to continue the work of the analytics of government, we must now turn our attention to understanding how this market for benevolence operates. More to the point, our task now is to examine how the market for benevolence is being constructed. Even though the state effectively demarcated a market for
benevolence through the application of law, we should always keep at the forefront of our analysis the notion that the benevolent market is a *constructed* market. In other words, it does not possess the inherent character of a market, and thus it does not naturally operate like one. To a certain extent it must be “taught” to do so. Which poses the following questions: Who or what is teaching the benevolent domain to act according to market values? How are the lessons being imparted, and what are the lessons to be learned?

I contend that the mechanisms associated with professionalization in large part serve to instruct the benevolent domain on acting in accordance with market values. In other words, the academic journals, professional associations and their codes of ethics, trade publications, and training programs act as a vehicle to train benevolent organizations and benevolent experts in governing themselves and others according to the values of the marketplace. The technologies of professionalization, which I describe below, seek to constitute as authoritative a marketized form of benevolence by *strategizing* the way in which benevolent organizations and benevolent experts care for and aid others. By strategizing the practice of benevolence rather than overtly marketizing it, the technologies of professionalization are able to assert the values of the marketplace which are so vital to the success of neoliberalism while at the same time masking their intent.

**The Technologies of Professionalization**

The marketization of the benevolent domain is in large part being facilitated by the *technologies of professionalization*. Contrary to popular opinion (e.g., Frumkin, 1989; Hall, 1992), the presence of professionalism in the practice
of benevolence did not commence with the Tax Reform Act of 1969. In fact, it had long been under way in one form or another since the nineteenth century.\(^1\) However, in order for the mechanisms of professionalization to facilitate the marketization of the benevolent domain—indeed, to endeavor to constitute the benevolent domain and its component parts as a market—they had to become technological. That is, they had to become oriented toward conduct in such a way that they took “the form of a strategic rationality\(^2\) concerned with the optimization of performance, aptitude and states” (Dean, 1996b, p. 48). According to Dean (1996b), any form of government (including professionalization, which seeks to conduct the conduct of members of a particular occupation) must reach one or more\(^3\) important thresholds in order to be considered technological in nature. In

\(^1\) Nonprofit scholars tend to demarcate the professionalization of nonprofit organizations and managers from the professionalization of fields like social work, which developed into a profession beginning in the nineteenth century (see Trolander, 1987), and charitable fundraising, which became more professionalized in the early twentieth century (see Wagner, 2000). When juxtaposed with the practice of benevolence, however, we find that there is a continuum between the development of professional social workers, professional fundraisers, and professional nonprofit organizations and managers.

\(^2\) The use of the term rationality here equates to a logic or an approach, and is not akin to our notions of, for example, instrumental rationality.

\(^3\) According to Dean (1996b), these technological thresholds are not consecutive and do not occur in a particular order, nor is it necessary that they all occur within a domain or be present at the same time. The other two thresholds he identifies are the force threshold and the orientation threshold. In the force threshold, government moves beyond simply augmenting existing forces; it becomes an integral part of the logistical formation of infrastructures that are necessary for making durable certain social, political, economic, and military institutions over time. After reaching the orientation threshold, government “approaches the force of bodies, and the aptitudes and capabilities of individuals, groups, and populations, as something to be intensified, augmented and optimized” (Dean, 1996b, p. 65) rather than simply something as a requisite for good performance.
the late twentieth century, benevolent professionalization crossed one of these thresholds—the *assemblage threshold*—and I argue that it is currently in the process of crossing the *systems threshold*.

First, at the crossing of the assemblage threshold, government becomes technological when “a complex assemblage of diverse elements, held together by heteromorphic relations, concerned with the direction of conduct” is identified (Dean, 1996b, p. 64). In other words, government becomes technological when various means for governing conduct become *identifiable* as working simultaneously to transform conduct in a particular way. As we have seen,4 in the late twentieth century, various mechanisms commonly associated with professionalization, including professional associations, codes of ethics, academic journals, trade publications, and training programs, assembled to simultaneously reform benevolent organizations and benevolent experts in an effort to make their values and actions more cohesive and consistent. Indeed, scholars have identified them as doing so (see Chapter 1).

Now the mechanisms of professionalization are also being attached to other technologies to form a cohesive system of benevolence. At this threshold—the systems threshold—government becomes technologized when it becomes identified as being an integral part of the processes of larger systems like consumption, communication, production, care, and so on (Dean, 1996b). In other words, specific forms of conduct and ways of thinking about conducting conduct

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4 Refer to Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of the technologies which comprise the technologies of professionalization and how they have manifested in the practice of benevolence.
become attached to “technical objects, money, energy sources, communication networks, texts, humans, professions, expertise, and so on” (Dean, 1996b, p. 64) to form larger systems which maintain explicit objectives. The mechanisms of professionalization have not only assembled together and begun working simultaneously to reform benevolent conduct, they are also in the process of being attached to forms of expertise, technical objects like the audit and other financial reporting mechanisms, laws like the Tax Reform Act of 1969, other professionalized fields like fundraising and social work, and more, to form a larger system (née, a market) for benevolence.

How exactly the technologies of professionalization are working to marketize the benevolent domain is a function of the features which define all technologies of government. First, a technology of government “presupposes the regular application of some sort of relatively systematized knowledge … to the pragmatic problems of the exercise of authority and in the composition of practical rationalities, know-how, expertise, and means of calculation” (Dean, 1996b, p. 59). Oftentimes this involves the application of knowledge drawn from the human and social sciences. Here, however, the technologies of professionalization presuppose the regular application of the logic of the market. More specifically, the values of the market, namely entrepreneurialism and competition, inform how conduct is conducted through the deployment of the technologies of professionalization.

Second, as has already been demonstrated, a technology of government can be viewed as a collection of “different techniques of government, technical
objects, actors, financial and other resources, and ‘sociotechnical’ forces” (Dean, 1996b, p. 59) that are oftentimes “humble and mundane” but vital for making “it possible to govern” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 8). More specifically, a technology of government involves a “complex assemblage of diverse forces—legal, architectural, professional, administrative, financial, judgmental—[to the extent that] aspects of the decisions and actions of individuals, groups, organizations and populations come to be understood and regulated in relation to authoritative criteria” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 183). In other words, once assembled the mechanisms and the effects of the technologies of government begin operating “at quite a different level” (Foucault, 1995/1975, p. 26), and thus are enabled to constitute what is deemed authoritative within a particular domain (e.g., market values). Indeed, as a collection—or, to borrow Foucault’s phrasing, as “a multiform instrumentation” (Ibid)—the technologies of government work to “colonize” a domain or space and “reshape it according to its own requisites … maintain and intensify the relations of authority it makes possible … [and] identify the reverse salient that hinder this ambition” (Dean, 1996b, p. 59). So, not only do the technologies of government constitute what is authoritative within a domain, they also work to defend that constitution of authority from invading

5 Technologies of government can be viewed as networks rather than assemblages. Within the network, technical objects are linked together with human and non-human actors in an effort to affect power distributions. See Dean, 1996b, pp. 55-56.

6 The assemblage of mechanisms into an identifiable technology is an important phase in the processes of discursive formation, which is discussed in Chapter 5.
forces. The manner in which the professionalization of an occupation unfolds \(^7\) is certainly indicative of the processes described here.

Finally, the multiform instrumentation of the technologies of government not only makes possible certain capacities for authority, it also produces more localized effects as it orients itself toward challenging the composite parts of the domain or space which it has colonized. Generally speaking, a technology actively seeks to unlock, transform, and distribute nature’s energy (Heidegger, 1993, in Dean, 1996b, p. 60) in order to compel nature to work on its behalf. In other words, a technology sets upon nature to unlock its energy as part of a demand that it stand by and be prepared to use its energy to perform certain tasks. A technology of government is no different except that it is specifically concerned with unlocking the energy of human action. For a technology of government, human action “becomes an element of the ‘standing-reserve,’ something to be gathered together, so that the powers of its combination and assemblage may be unlocked, extracted, stored, transported and distributed” (Dean, 1996b, p. 60). If the potential of human action can be assembled with other natural and technical resources, then the multiform instrumentation of the technologies of government has the ability—through the power of the combined energies—to transform particular sites or locales within the domain into “power-containers” (Giddens, 1985, in Dean, 1996b, p. 60). It is perhaps not surprising that in a contemporary society where organizational life dominates human association (see Denhardt, 1981) organizations within a colonized domain (e.g., nonprofit organizations

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\(^7\) See Chapter 1 for an overview.
within a benevolent domain) oftentimes act as the power-containers that facilitate the aims of the regime of practices of government upon whose behalf the technologies of government operate.

The Governmentality of Benevolence

Regimes of practices of government possess their own intrinsic logic and demonstrate an orientation toward a particular purpose (Dean, 1999, p. 22; see also Gordon, 1980). In other words, they have a *raison d’être*. To that end, they are comprised of bureaucratic practices; technologies for compiling and disseminating information; knowledges and expertise; ways of seeing and representing the world and the objects contained therein; and, varying forms of agential selves who carry with them particular capacities to govern (Dean, 1999, pp. 26-27) to facilitate the accomplishment of that purpose. Within the language of the analytics of government, these dimensions of a regime of practices of government are referred to as the *techne*, which are procedures for producing the truth; the *episteme*, which are the specific forms of expertise and knowledge that define ways of behaving; the fields of visibility, or ways of seeing who and what is to be governed; and, the subject identities that the *techne* and *episteme* seek to enact (Dean, 1999, p. 23).

The regime of practices of benevolence that the technologies of professionalization are actively seeking to enact is no different in that it possesses a *techne*, *episteme*, fields of visibility, and subject identities which are assembled in a logical way and oriented toward a particular *raison d’être*. More specifically, the technologies of professionalization seek to enact a practice of benevolence
which will underpin a market for benevolence (i.e., its *raison d’être*) by asserting a *techne* and *episteme* which are informed by the values of the market, and then constructing fields of visibility and subject identities which operate according to these values. The technologies of professionalization do not overtly promote these values, however. Rather, what we find is that they are deployed under the guise of the promotion of strategic organization management\(^8\) and service delivery. Only by examining each in turn the elements of the practice of benevolence being asserted by the technologies of professionalization can we uncover the logic of their assembly as a regime of practices of government. Not only this, but ultimately understand how they collectively serve to advance neoliberalism’s aim of constructing a market for benevolence by asserting a strategized rather than a marketized practice of benevolence.

*The Techne and Episteme of Benevolence: Strategy*

The forces for the production of knowledge and expertise, which act to constitute truth and, in turn, our behavior, can be found in the *techne* and *episteme* of government (Dean, 1995; see also Dean, 1996b). The *techne* of government involves the technical, practical, and pragmatic aspects by which authority is constituted. Put simply, it is the collection of techniques by which government accomplishes its ends. By contrast, the *episteme* of government refers to the forms of thought and the forms of rationality that seek to produce truth through certain

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\(^8\) My assertion that the technologies of professionalization seek to enact a *strategized* form of benevolent organization management and service delivery should not be confused with the strategic management of scholars like Ansoff (1979). While the theories and practices of strategic management have figured prominently in the technologies of professionalization in recent years, they do not equate to a strategized mode of governance in the benevolent domain.
knowledges and expertise. This includes but is not limited to political philosophies, ideologies set forth by the social sciences, and theories of management and administration (Dean, 1996b, p. 59). While the techne and episteme of government differ from each other, they fully complement one another in their deployment.

The techne and episteme of the practice of benevolence asserted by the technologies of professionalization is infused with a pervasive concern with strategy. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines strategy in several ways. First it is defined as the “science or art of combining and employing the means of war in planning and directing large military movements and operations” (Flexner & Hauck, 1987, p. 1880). It is also defined as “the skillful use of a stratagem,” which itself is defined as “a plan, scheme, or trick for surprising or deceiving an enemy” or “any artifice, ruse, or trick devised or used to attain a goal or to gain an advantage over an adversary or competitor” (Ibid). Accordingly, strategy is also defined as “a plan, method, or series of maneuvers or stratagems for obtaining a specific goal or result” (Ibid). Collectively these definitions hold in common three understandings. First, that there is an articulated goal. Second, that there is a plan for achieving the articulated goal. And finally, that there exist barriers to achieving the goal, which must be addressed. Ultimately a strategy involves the skillful employment of a particular plan to overcome barriers in the pursuit of the obtainment of an articulated goal. So, the techne and episteme asserted by the technologies of professionalization are concerned with developing goals, devising and implementing plans to achieve
those goals, and locating barriers which might impede progress toward those
goals.

Early on in the deployment of the technologies of professionalization (the
1970s and early 1980s) and continuing through today, the concern for developing
a goal for the benevolent domain has been and remains acute. This concern
manifests itself in discussions of the domain’s purpose or identity. Purposes and
identities asserted for the benevolent domain have included those that are more
market-oriented in nature, such as alleviating information asymmetry in the
marketplace (e.g., Te-eni & Young, 2003) or acting as a bridging or mediating
domain between the state and the marketplace (e.g., Mendel, 2003). These
purposes for the sector align with prevailing economic theories of the domain, all
of which seek to explain the existence of the benevolent organization within the
larger marketplace by analyzing how individuals allocate resources under
conditions of scarcity (see Steinberg, 2006, p. 117). In general, these theories
assert that the benevolent organization is an indirect consequence of such
decision-making processes.

More often than not, however, the purposes and identities proposed for the
sector involve engendering personal (and personalized) interaction. In other
words, the benevolent domain exists to bring communities together to solve
problems (e.g., Cohen & Ely, 1981; Kerri, 1972), to facilitate civic engagement
(e.g., Blum, 2001), or to alleviate the social alienation that comes with dealing
with Government bureaucracy and the marketplace (e.g., Langton, 1981). Langton
(1981) asserts an identity for the benevolent domain along these lines which is
particularly dynamic and multifaceted. In his view, the benevolent domain serves several functions: a prophetic function, a supplemental function, and a modeling function. In its prophetic function, the benevolent domain is expected to address “the conditions of injustice and depersonalization that are present in post-industrial society” (p. 9) such that it becomes concerned with “correcting conditions, policies, and practices in business and government that are hazardous, depersonalizing, or unjust” (p. 10). Benevolent organizations and its experts should also take on the functions that have become associated with the welfare state in an effort to supplement the state’s efforts to provide for citizens—indeed, to reclaim them from the state. In this way, the state becomes less of a “provider of service” and more of a “supporter of services” (p. 11). Finally, Langton (1981) contends that the benevolent domain should actively create “models of organizational life that overcome or reduce depersonalization, bureaucratization, and sterile professionalism that we have come to associate with the [G]overnmental and corporate sectors” (p. 12). All of which is aimed at bringing the care and aid of others back to a more personal and personalized scale.

While Langton’s (1981) proposed purpose for the benevolent domain would no doubt seem appealing to many, it does not serve as the dominant notion of the identity or purpose for the benevolent domain. In fact, no singular proposed purpose or identity reigns. Whether the articulated purpose encompasses correcting market failure or engendering a more personalized space for social interaction to combat depersonalization and bureaucracy, they all co-exist within the technologies of professionalization. These articulated purposes or identities
for the benevolent domain tend to hold in common a number of characteristics, however. First, they assert identities and purposes that are distinctly different from that of the state or that of the marketplace. In other words, the benevolent domain is unique, and as such, it has something different or special to offer to the public. Second, these purposes not only distinguish the benevolent domain from the state and the marketplace, they also oftentimes act to alleviate the (negative) effects engendered by these other domains. In other words, the purpose of the benevolent domain is to aid society (see Sandberg, 2010) when the state and the marketplace fail to adequately provide individuals with the necessities of life. Ultimately, this pervasive concern with developing a purpose or identity which is distinctly different from that of the state or the marketplace serves to orient the work of the benevolent domain toward becoming that identity and achieving that purpose. In short, it becomes a goal to obtain.

If the goal of the benevolent domain is to act as an aide to society, then plans must be formulated and enacted to achieve that goal. Indeed, the technologies of professionalization proliferate with not only techniques for implementing formalized plans and planning processes (e.g., Roller, 1996; Sheehan, 1999), but also discussions as to why benevolent experts should view formal planning as necessary for the success of the benevolent organization and the obtainment of its goals (e.g., Lindenberg, 2001; Siciliano, 1997). In short, it is

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9 Different does not necessarily mean independent. In recent years, the declared and assumed independence of the nonprofit sector (née, benevolent domain) has become an area of critical scholarship. For instance, see Hall, 1987; Salamon, 1987; and, van Til, 1989, all of whom call into question the independence of the so-called “Independent Sector.”
generally asserted that formalized planning leads to more positive outcomes. More pointedly, formalized planning ultimately leads to more effective organizations which in turn leads to more effective implementation of services. For instance, Wortman (1981) argues that benevolent organizations on the whole engage in too little formal planning and thus are more “reactive than proactive” (p. 63)—a state of being that is ultimately ineffectual. He advocates for more strategic, formalized planning, for it allows organizations to “build appropriate organizational structure[s] for … strategic change, and to select and develop suitable personnel capable of providing strategic change” (Wortman, 1981, p. 66). Siciliano (1997) concurs, contending that formalized planning affords benevolent organizations the ability to structure themselves and their experts in such a way that it ultimately leads to more favorable outcomes. In other words, organizations are enabled to meet their goals.

Without information, however, developing plans and enacting them in order to obtain a goal is an arduous task. Information is needed to not only determine the appropriate path toward achieving the goal, but also to assess what if any barriers might stand in the way of the obtainment of that goal. Not surprisingly, then, the technologies of professionalization display a near-obsessive interest in information—not only possessing it, but also acquiring it and using it in formulating decisions, especially with regard to strategic, formalized planning processes. Not any kind of information will do, however. The technologies of professionalization promote a form of information acquisition and usage that is
predominantly rational\(^\text{10}\) in nature. More specifically, they presuppose a positivist perspective on knowledge accumulation by which one endeavors to objectively gather and examine “facts” through direct observation or logical inference in an effort to carefully establish a factual basis for drawing conclusions (Denhardt, 2004, p. 73). In other words, reason is applied to conceive the appropriate means to achieving a predetermined end. Of course, underpinning the rational approach to the accumulation and use of information is an emphasis on objectivity. Rationality assumes that one can act in an objective manner to gather information, and as such, the information that is gathered will be relatively value-neutral. The better able one is to acquire value-neutral information, then the more objective the decision-making process can be for an organization. Being strategic or strategizing, then, clearly involves not only accumulating as much information as possible, but also doing so in an objective manner which then allows one to apply it to decision-making processes in an equally rational way.

The technologies of professionalization are rife with techniques which promote rational methods for gathering, assessing, and evaluating information; however, far and away the most prominent method is program evaluation. In fact, a course in program evaluation makes up a part of the core curriculum for nearly every graduate program in nonprofit management (see Seton Hall University, n.d.), which is in keeping with the curricular guidelines recommended by the

\(^{10}\) Our understanding of rationality here follows from that of Herbert Simon. Rather than take up the ancient philosophical view that human reason is integral to the foundations of human society, we view rationality here as being concerned with coordinating right means to meet pre-determined ends (see Denhardt, 2004, pp. 74-75).
Nonprofit Academic Centers Council (2007). It recommends that nonprofit management programs include a course in “assessment, evaluation, and decision-making methods” that emphasizes “methods … to evaluate performance and effectiveness … and the use and application of … data for purposes of strengthening [benevolent] organizations, the … sector and the larger society” (p. 12). Program evaluation entails the “use of social science research methods to systematically investigate the effectiveness of social intervention programs in ways that are adapted to their political and organizational environments and are designed to inform social action to improve social conditions” (Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman, 2004, p. 116). While various social science research methods can be employed to gather information on an organization’s programs and services and while evaluators increasingly seek to incorporate the opinions of numerous stakeholders in the evaluation process, the primary objective of program evaluation remains methodological rigor (see Fine, Thayer & Coghlin, 2000). The assumption being that methodological rigor promotes and maintains the objectivity that is vital to the processes of rationalized information gathering and usage.

Fields of Visibility: The Benevolent Organization

The benevolent organization and its internal and external environments serve as not only the primary targets of information gathering, but also as the essential vehicles for facilitating the collection of information and decision-making involving accumulated information. They are the objects of study while also housing the examiners (benevolent experts). In other words, they are the
power-containers by which the benevolent domain can achieve its goal of aiding society. In the language of the analytics of government, the benevolent organization and its internal and external environments constitute the field of visibility for a strategized practice of benevolence. Through texts, drawings, maps, charts, tables, and more, a field of visibility constructs our ways of seeing and perceiving, which “make it possible to ‘picture’ who and what is being governed, how relations of authority and obedience are constituted in space, how different locales and agents are connected with one another, what problems are to be solved and what objectives are to be sought” (Dean, 1999, p. 30). Examination of a regime of government’s field of visibility involves understanding how it renders things both visible and opaque.

\textit{The visible.}

In terms of what is rendered visible in the technologies of professionalization, very few aspects of the benevolent organization remain unexamined. More specifically, no stone has been left unturned as both the internal and external environment of the benevolent organization has been exposed to rational examination in an effort to expose any potential barriers to the obtainment of the goal of aiding society. Primary objects of examination include individuals who are vital to the daily functioning of the benevolent organization, such as employees, volunteers, and members of boards of directors. Discussions of individuals such as these often focus on their intrinsic motivations. For example, the technologies of professionalization push to understand what motivates employees, especially with regard to their performance. Is the level of
their performance tied to the mission of the organization (Brown & Yoshioka, 2003), service to others (Ebener & O’Connell, 2010), pay rates (Anft, 2001; Deckop & Cirka, 2000), or the work itself (Borzaga & Tortia, 2006)? Similarly, the technologies of professionalization analyze the motivations of individuals who volunteer with benevolent organizations. This includes members of benevolent organizations’ boards of directors whose motivations and performance seem particularly integral to organizational effectiveness (e.g., Green & Griesinger, 1996; Jackson & Hollan, 1998). The technologies of professionalization seek to expose whether volunteerism is simply a lifestyle choice (Heidrich, 1990; Watts & Edwards, 1983) or if it is something more, such as a measure of one’s psychological or personal makeup (Liao-Troth, 2005) or a choice based in self-interested behavior (Govekar & Govekar, 2002). Ultimately the technologies of professionalization seek to lay bare the motivations of individuals who are integral to the success of benevolent organizations in order to harness their energy and put it to work toward the achievement of goals. In other words, if we can understand the motivations of employees and volunteers, then we can optimize their performance which serves to enhance the overall effectiveness of the benevolent organization as it seeks to obtain its goal.

In much the same way, the technologies of professionalization seek to harness the energy of organizational resources and reduce the risk that they become barriers to the obtainment of goals by subjecting them to scrutiny. Most prominently this includes financial capital. Financial capital is a vital resource for any organization, including benevolent organizations; therefore, the technologies
of professionalization illuminate not only the processes by which organizations acquire financial capital but also the methods required to ensure its successful implementation toward achieving goals. More specifically, the merits of various methods for raising funds are debated. These include corporate matching gift programs (Greene, 2001), for-profit enterprises (Dart, 2004; Pope, 2001), planned giving programs (Blum & Marchetti, 2000), and government funding (Kingma, 1993). At times these methods intersect with a concern for technological resources as is evidenced by the discussions of fundraising trends like e-philanthropy (e.g., Cohen, 2002; Lewis, 2000). The lesson here is that if we can determine which of these methods is the most successful in garnering financial capital, then the better able we might be to enhance the effectiveness of the benevolent organization and its ability to successfully achieve its goals. This also requires that the benevolent organization begin thinking of itself as a financial or “economic enterprise” (Bryce, 2001) such that its own internal financial operations become the subject of scrutiny as well. One must analyze the organization’s “financial self” through budgets, financial statements, and fund allocation (Bryce, 2001; see also Kingma, 1993; Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003) in order to understand how financial capital impacts a benevolent organization’s overall effectiveness.

The organization must also understand itself as a part of a larger environment in which it is but one player amongst many. Thus, the external environment of the benevolent organization is also subject to examination through the technologies of professionalization. More specifically, there is a clear
imperative that benevolent organizations know and understand the potential barriers posed by the state and by other benevolent organizations, including foundations. First and foremost, benevolent organizations must understand the state as both a financial partner and a service partner through the devolution of programmatic responsibilities from the state to the benevolent domain. In both cases, the partnership poses both risks and rewards for the benevolent organization and its pursuit of goals, for the state proves to be a powerful partner who can easily alter the fortunes of a benevolent organization through its offerings of financial capital, administrative support, and legitimacy (e.g., Alexander, 1999; Clobery, 2001; Cohen, 2005; Rosenbaum, 1981; Vanderwoerd, 2003). The benevolent organization should also understand the risks and barriers the state poses through the passage and implementation of law. In other words, the benevolent organization must recognize the state as a regulator (e.g., Berger, Goller & Murphy, 2003; Blum, 2000; Gardner, 1987; Lipman, 2001; Greene, 2003; Wolverton, 2004) who might deter benevolent organizations from the pursuit of their goals. Likewise, other benevolent organizations who are providing services and providing funds (e.g., foundations) can act as barriers to the obtainment of goals. While collaboration between benevolent organizations is often touted in the technologies of professionalization (e.g., Lippett & van Til, 1981; Semel, 2000; Whelan, 2002; York & Zychlinski, 1996), it is done with the understanding that the environment in which they operate is inherently competitive (Lippett & van Til, 1981; York & Zychlinski, 1996). Benevolent organizations oftentimes seek to draw from the same sources of financial and
human capital to facilitate the obtainment of their own goals, thus engendering a collaborative spirit which can prove challenging to overcome in order to facilitate collaborative relationships.

Of course, in order to get information, benevolent organizations must be able to give up information. In other words, in order for benevolent organizations to gather knowledge about themselves and their environment to facilitate plans to achieve their goals, they must conduct their operations in a manner such that information can be easily accessed during the processes of examination and knowledge accumulation. Consequently, the technologies of professionalization strongly emphasize the necessity of organizational transparency and information access. Oftentimes, this comes in the form of financial transparency. For example, the Nonprofit Academic Centers Council (2007) recommends that nonprofit management programs include a course in “financial management and accountability” which emphasizes “financial literacy, transparency and stewardship in the effective oversight and management of … resources” (p. 10). In addition, in their published code of ethics, the Association of Fundraising Professionals (AFP) (2004) strongly asserts that good (i.e., professional, ethical) fundraisers work diligently to provide accurate organizational information both to funders and to their own organizational management. Not only this, but AFP also contends that the professional and ethical benevolent organization is one that makes itself accountable through the provision of information. In other words, the professional benevolent organization “freely and accurately shares information about its governance, finances, and operations, … [and] is open and inclusive in
its procedures, processes and programs”
(http://www.afpnet.org/Ethics/EnforcementDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=3262).
While these directives are oftentimes associated with funder relationships, they are also indicative of a particular mode of operating for professionalized benevolent organizations, namely one that is transparent, accountable, and information driven.

_The invisible._

For everything that is made visible in relation to the benevolent organization as it seeks to determine whether barriers exist to its pursuit of the obtainment of its goal of aiding society, one finds the beneficiary\(^{11}\) of benevolent organizations’ services strangely invisible. The benevolent domain is a varied one in that it encompasses organizations whose aims are to alleviate or end homelessness, feed the hungry, preserve historic landmarks, prevent the abuse of animals, conserve natural habitats, and more. Yet, one finds that individuals who are homeless or hungry, historic landmarks and frail natural habitats that are in danger of being bulldozed, or helpless animals whose very lives are at risk are rarely _directly_ discussed within the technologies of professionalization. Rather, what are discussed are organizational missions and mission statements.\(^{12}\)

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\(^{11}\) I have deliberately chosen the term “beneficiary” rather than “client” or “end user” here so as to not limit the discussion to only those organizations which aim to serve humans. The beneficiaries of the benevolent domain’s services can and do include humans, non-human animals, the natural environment, cultural artifacts, and more.

\(^{12}\) In their examination of the role missions play in measuring success in benevolent organizations, Sawhill and Williams (2001) provide some helpful examples of missions for a number of prominent benevolent organizations: The
Generally speaking, the mission of a benevolent organization encompasses the goal, purpose, or aim of the organization. More specifically, according to organizational guru Peter F. Drucker (1989), the mission of a benevolent organization and its requirements:

… focuses the organization on action. It defines the specific strategies needed to attain crucial goals. It creates a disciplined organization. It alone can prevent the most common degenerative disease of organizations, especially large ones: splintering their always limited resources on things that are “interesting” or look “profitable” rather than concentrating them on a very small number of productive efforts. … A well-defined mission serves as a constant reminder of the need to look outside the organization not only for “customers” but also for measures of success. (p. 89)

Furthermore, the organizational mission and its correlative mission statement serve to define the value that a benevolent organization provides for not only the stakeholders who are involved with the organization (i.e., beneficiaries, funders, employees, volunteers, etc.), but also for society at large (Moore, 2000).

Since the mission of a benevolent organization serves to define the value the organization brings to stakeholders and to society at large as well as to drive the very purpose of its existence, organizational missions and mission statements have become topics of paramount importance in the technologies of

American Association of Retired Persons, or AARP (addressing the needs of people fifty and older); the American Heart Association (reducing disability and death from cardiovascular disease and stroke); The Nature Conservancy (conserving biodiversity); and, The National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy (reducing teen pregnancy by one-third by 2005).
professionalization. More pointedly, achievement of the organizational mission has become a profoundly important topic, which is evidenced by the significant role it plays in discussions surrounding assessments of organizational effectiveness. In particular, these discussions revolve around how best to assess organizational effectiveness in relation to the organizational mission—something which is oftentimes imprecise (i.e., not easily quantifiable) in nature (see Banoli & Megali, 2011; Eisinger, 2002; Krug & Weinberg, 2004; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001; Sheehan, 1996; Sowa, Selden, & Sandfort, 2004; Stauber, 2001), unlike the financial bottom lines of their for-profit counterparts. The result of these discussions has been the proliferation of models and evaluative frameworks which seek to assess the benevolent organization’s “mission impact,” (Sawhill & Williamson, 2001) or the extent to which an organization is able to achieve its mission. To this end, these models include in part searches for an analog to profit (Sawhill & Williamson, 2001), a focus on an organization’s ability to “do the right thing,” (Krug & Weinberg, 2004), checks on “institutional coherence” (Bagnoli & Megali, 2009), assessments of institutional capacity (Eisinger, 2002), and a full-fledged multidimensional, integrated model of nonprofit organizational effectiveness, or MIMNOE (Sowa, Selden, & Sandfort, 2004).

Through these and other like models and evaluative frameworks (e.g., Christiansen & Ebrahim, 2006; Forbes, 1998; McDonald, 2007; Rojas, 2000; Schoichet, 1998; Shaw & Allen, 2009; Wing, 2004), the presence of the

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13 For example, a search for articles and book reviews in the journals Nonprofit Management and Leadership and Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly which discuss missions and mission statements, produced no fewer than 492 and 602 results, respectively.
beneficiaries of benevolent organizations—whether they are humans, non-human animals, cultural artifacts, natural habitats, etc.—is often implied rather than explicit. Their presence is implied because they appear in the discussion of organizational missions and mission achievement nearly solely as performance indicators or as measurements of success as the objects of organizational missions, programs, and services. For example, Sowa, Seldon, and Sandfort (2004) allude to the beneficiaries of benevolent organizations in their MIMNOE by including surveys designed to assess client satisfaction in their evaluation of program effectiveness. Similarly, in his evaluation of The Excellence in Philanthropy Project, Sheehan (1996) touches upon beneficiaries in his discussion of the relationship between a number of benevolent organizations’ mission statements and their corresponding performance measurements which aim to capture whether the organizations are having “mission impact.” For instance, the mission of the Charles County Homeless Services organization is “‘to end homelessness in Charles County,’” a goal whose success is measured by the “‘number of homeless people in Charles County, as reported by county officials’” (Sheehan, 1996, p. 113). Likewise, the mission of the Merle County Infant Nutrition Project is “‘to assure that infants born in Merle County begin life healthy and well-nourished,’” the success of which is measured by “‘county birth weights and county infant mortality rates’” (Sheehan, 1996, p. 113).

The focus here remains squarely on the benevolent organization and on the achievement of its mission through programs and services, so there is little substantive discussion about the individuals or other beneficiaries which are the
objects of these organizations’ missions and whose adherence to organizations’ programs and services is crucial to determining the level of effectiveness with which the organizations achieve their aims. As such, the beneficiaries of benevolent organizations are opaque within the technologies of professionalization, and possess little semblance of the individuality that is bestowed upon other individuals (e.g., volunteers, employees) and acquire little of the import which is accorded to organizational resources and relationships. Rather than entities whose energies can be harnessed toward the pursuit of organizational goals, beneficiaries of benevolent organizations seem to be viewed only as indicators of organizational outcomes or outputs. Only a small handful of nonprofit management programs run contrary to this trend of rendering opaque the beneficiary of benevolent organizations. Nonprofit graduate programs offered by The University of San Francisco (n.d.), Seattle University (n.d.), and Regis University (n.d.) place unambiguous emphasis on individualized service to the benevolent organization’s beneficiary as a core competency for managers within benevolent organizations. Interestingly, each of these universities was founded and continues to operate under the Jesuit Catholic tradition, which maintains its strong historical commitment to charity.

Benevolent Subjects: Info-Managers and Info-Resources

The identity (or lack thereof) assigned to the beneficiary of benevolent organizations’ services is only one such subject identity which the technologies of professionalization seek to enact in support of a strategized practice of benevolence. The technologies of professionalization seek to enact particular
forms of identity and associated forms of conduct on both those who possess authority and those who are governed.\(^\text{14}\) The field of visibility dictates the formation of these identities; therefore, the identities and associated forms of conduct sought by a strategic practice of benevolence are constructed in relation to the benevolent organization and to the acquisition of information about the organization and its environment. In general, in the strategic practice of benevolence, individuals are constituted as either info-managers or info-resources. Info-managers are those individuals with authority who not only facilitate the acquisition of information, but also its usage. They oftentimes also act as info-keepers within an organization in that they are viewed as possessing the information required to make effective decisions, especially with regard to formalized, strategic planning processes. Info-resources, on the other hand, act as the object of information gathering processes. These are individuals who are studied by info-managers and about whom information is gathered to be utilized in goal oriented planning and decision-making processes.

The info-managers.

The primary info-manager in the benevolent domain is the benevolent organization manager.\(^\text{15}\) The technologies of professionalization are primarily

\(^{14}\) Here it is important to note that regimes of practices do not create forms of subjectivity—“they elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents” (Dean, 1999, p. 32). Through the analytics of government, one ultimately endeavors to expose these efforts and gauge how successful they actually are in eliciting their sought-after capacities, qualities, and statuses.

\(^{15}\) There are other individuals and organizations within the scope of the benevolent domain that can be considered information consumers, such as
directed at individuals operating at executive and middle management levels within a benevolent organization, for they are most likely to join professional associations, read the trade publications and journals, and enroll in management courses at their local university. Indeed, they are regarded as the individuals within the benevolent domain who have the requisite authority to implement the practice of benevolence as it is being articulated through the technologies of professionalization. As the primary info-manager, then, the benevolent manager is responsible for (rationally) gathering and keeping information on the risks posed to the benevolent organization and the barriers which might obstruct the attainment of goals. As such, she is expected not only to be well-versed in all areas of the organization and its environment, but also in rational data collection processes. This is no doubt why the curricula which comprises nonprofit management programs across the country (see Nonprofit Academic Centers Council, 2007; see also Seton Hall University, n.d.) includes courses on the scope of the nonprofit sector, nonprofit law, nonprofit finance, public policy affecting nonprofits, fundraising, human resource management, marketing, technology, and, as mentioned, program evaluation and decision-making. If a benevolent manager is to successfully complete a graduate degree in nonprofit management, then she must become intimately familiar with the internal and external workings of her organization and with the benevolent domain as a whole.

members of benevolent organizations’ boards of directors, Government regulators, and watchdog groups; however, within the technologies of professionalization these individuals and organizations are more often than not regarded as information resources. That is, they and their habits, motivations, and actions are objects of analysis.
Clearly the benevolent manager is expected to become the benevolent domain’s expert in (rationally) acquiring information about the organizational field. At the same time, she is also expected to apply what she has learned toward advancing the domain’s goal of aiding society; she must help meet its purpose. Professional development programs like that of Arizona State University’s Lodestar Center for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Innovation stress the applicability of the knowledge of the benevolent domain that they offer to info-managers. With this kind of training, the info-manager will be able to “manage” more effectively, “stretch” limited dollars, “succeed” in a competitive environment, and “make” the media work for them (http://www.asu.edu/copp/nonprofit/edu/nmi_front.htm, ¶6).

The emphasis here is unquestionably on knowledge-in-action. The info-manager is expected to actively use the information she has gleaned about her organization and its environment to ensure that her benevolent organization operates more efficiently and effectively within the wider benevolent domain as it seeks to meet its goals.

There is also an expectation that she will manage and deploy knowledge in an ethical manner. In other words, the info-manager is a rational, active, and (now) ethical expert on the practice of benevolence. Nonprofit management and professional development programs all offer courses or training in ethics and the application of ethical frameworks to decision-making within the benevolent organization. These courses promote learning values such as “trust, stewardship, service, voluntarism, civic engagement, freedom of association and social justice” (Nonprofit Academic Centers Council, 2007, p. 8), all of which accord well with
the purposes and identities for the benevolent domain expressed through the technologies of professionalization, especially those which argue that the purpose of the benevolent domain is to facilitate personal and personalized social interaction. These courses also advocate adherence to “standards and codes of conduct that are appropriate to professionals and volunteers working in philanthropy and the nonprofit sector” (*Ibid*). As we have seen, professional codes of conduct within the benevolent domain tend to emphasize the role of information in ethical, professional behavior (see Association of Fundraising Professionals, 2004). More specifically, ethical, professional conduct is oftentimes associated with the gathering, keeping, and sharing of information in a manner that is open, transparent, and accountable to both the public and to the benevolent organization.

*The info-resources.*

As an employee of a benevolent organization the benevolent manager—while still an info-manager—can also act as an info-resource. In other words, her habits, motivations, and actions can become the object of analysis for use in strategic decision-making processes. As such, she acts as one part of a collection of individuals whose energies serve to provide the benevolent organization with information about its own internal operations. As we have seen, employees and volunteers act as info-resources, as they provide info-managers with data on the best ways to harness their energies (i.e., to motivate them) toward the advancement of benevolent organizations’ strategic aims. They are info-resources within benevolent organizations.
As we have also seen, there exist info-resources \textit{outside} the benevolent organization as well. They include donors, Government regulators, Government agency funders, members of watchdog groups, and representatives of other benevolent organizations who act to provide information on the state of the benevolent organization’s external environment. Info-managers approach info-resources outside the boundaries of the benevolent organization in much the same way as those within the organization (e.g., as data sources), but because they exist outside organizational boundaries, they are regarded more as potential barriers to the obtainment of strategic goals. These info-resources operate outside the benevolent organization, so their motivations are oftentimes unknown. At the same time, they are vital to security of the benevolent organization. In other words, their inscrutability represents a danger to the benevolent organization, and must be assessed as such. So, info-managers endeavor to gather information on whether donors, Government regulators, Government funders, watchdog groups, and other benevolent organizations intend to be collaborators or rivals. By assessing the threat level these info-resources and their organizations pose to the benevolent organization, info-managers and benevolent organizations are better able to design and implement plans to achieve their goals.

Beneficiaries of organizations’ services occupy a gray area both within and outside the benevolent organization. Like the info-resources within the organization, they are vital to the success of the organization in that they provide information about the organization’s operations. Indeed, they provide the info-manager with information on whether the organization is meeting its aims, as they
are primarily viewed as an indication of organizational outcomes or outputs. At the same, however, they can be viewed as existing outside the organization, for unlike other individuals and resources within the organization, their energies cannot be harnessed toward the achievement of organizational outcomes—they are the organizational outcomes. As such, their motivations—like the motivations of other external info-resources—can seem inscrutable and thus dangerous. In other words, they can pose a threat to the security of the benevolent organization. So, beneficiaries of benevolent organizations’ services hold a rather paradoxical subject position in that they are viewed both as vital to the success of benevolent organization (as outcomes of organizational efforts) and as a potential threat toward the achievement of organizational efforts.

**The Strategization of the Benevolent Domain**

If the benevolent domain is to make an effective conversion to a market for benevolence, then it must become marketized. In other words, it must learn to take on the traits of a market and begin functioning like a marketplace. Only then will neoliberalism be able to achieve the cultural transformation it seeks from a social government to one in which the rules of the market dictate individual conduct (Dean, 1999, p. 172). What, then, does strategizing the benevolent domain have to do with marketizing it? To answer this question, we must first understand what it means to operate like a market. At its most basic level, we can understand a market as a space where goods and services are exchanged. Within a neoliberal governmentality, however, acting in accordance with market values and extending the logic of the market to all corners of life takes on a particular
meaning. It distinctly does not entail establishing a “society of commodities, of consumption” by which the exchange value acts as the measure of all things (Foucault, 2008, p. 146). Rather, the marketized society envisioned by neoliberalism is one in which all things are measured by their worth as enterprises and by their ability to compete. It is worth quoting Foucault (2008) at length to appreciate the nuances of a neoliberal market:

The society regulated by reference to the market that the neo-liberals are thinking about is a society in which the regulatory principle should not be so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanisms of competition. It is these mechanisms that should have the greatest surface and depth and should also occupy the greatest volume in society. This means that what is sought is not a society subject to the commodity-effect, but a society subject to the dynamic of competition. Not a super-market society, but an enterprise society. The Homo œconomicus sought after is not the man [sic] of exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production. (Foucault, 2008, p. 147)

Likewise, the benevolent organization and the benevolent expert sought in the marketization of the benevolent domain is not one that acts as the consumer, but rather as the enterprise. More pointedly, the benevolent organization and the benevolent expert desired is one which behaves “in the form of competition in terms of plans and projects, and with objectives, tactics, and so forth” (Foucault, 2008, p. 175).
If becoming marketized entails learning to behave as an enterprise, then it also means learning to contend with the dangers that are associated with competing in the marketplace. To a great extent, becoming entrepreneurial affords one the freedom to behave as she wishes (Foucault, 2008, p. 175) in the marketplace as she employs plans to pursue objectives. Indeed, entrepreneurialism presupposes the existence of a free subject who can act on her needs, desires, interests, and choices (Dean, 1999, p. 165). Full participation in the marketplace through the exercise of free choice in the pursuit of plans and objectives, however, exposes one to the dangers that are posed by the marketplace (e.g., other competitors, environmental effects, production errors, etc.). In other words, by virtue of being entrepreneurial and engaging fully in the marketplace, one places both herself and her objectives at risk. As such, she must do what she can to minimize the risk she faces in the marketplace in order to sustain her plans and objectives—her very ability to be entrepreneurial. In the neoliberal marketplace, this entails learning to be prudent.

O’Malley (1996) refers to the trend of individuals, organizations, and communities assuming responsibility for managing their own risks as a new sense of prudentialism (see also Dean, 1999, p. 166). In the new prudentialism, one assumes responsibility for minimizing one’s own risk by making more prudent choices about individual and institutional behavior. This movement toward the assumption of individual responsibility for risk has required the slow retraction of the social methods for contending with risk that are associated with the welfare state and replacing them with more private methods. These private methods
include not only the acquisition of insurance (see Ewald, 1991) but also behavior modification. One indemnifies herself against potential dangers by behaving in a manner so as not to invite the specters of unemployment, ill health, violence, and crime. In the neoliberal marketplace, privatizing risk in such a manner is seen as more efficient, “for individuals [as well as organizations and communities] will be driven to greater execution and enterprise by the need to insure against adverse circumstances—and the more enterprising they are, the better safety net they construct” (O’Malley, 1996, p. 197). Of course, only those who are active and entrepreneurial are capable of managing their own risks—“target” groups need help doing so (Dean, 1999, p. 166). As such, sovereign and disciplinary techniques accompany these private methods for mitigating personal risk in order to move the individuals, organizations, and communities toward assuming more and more personal responsibility. In short, in the new prudentialism, relying on the state to manage one’s own risk has come to indicate personal failing.

This form of prudentialism is facilitated by what scholars have deemed the technologies of performance and the technologies of agency. The technologies of performance have been most commonly asserted in the rhetoric and practices stemming from movements that advocate, for example, the reinvention of Government (e.g., Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), which includes most prominently the approach to Government referred to as New Public Management (see Barzelay, 2001; see also Kaboolian, 1998; Lynn, 1998). Within this framework, the technologies of performance aim to minimize the sense of privilege that was afforded to experts under the welfare state (Rose & Miller, 1992) by subjecting
their authority to “enumeration, calculation, monitoring, [and] evaluation” in nearly every way (Rose, 1996a, p. 54). This includes the systemic institution of measures for performance evaluation, including benchmarks and performance indicators (Dean, 1999, p. 169), as well as the “monetarization” of the bureaucratic professions such that all individuals and activities become budgeted and, ultimately, calculable in cash terms (Rose, 1996a, pp. 54-55). While the technologies of performance allow the state to govern from above through these indirect means (Miller & Rose, 1990; see also Rose & Miller, 1992), they also establish institutional spaces which are self-managing (Dean, 1999, p. 169) by rendering everything and everyone not only accountable in a quantifiable manner, but also calculable and predictable. In other words, the technologies of performance allow institutions and their experts to independently regulate themselves and their environments as they endeavor to minimize the risks they face as they navigate the marketplace.

The technologies of performance remain useless, however, without the presence of active and free individuals who are informed about the marketplace and engage in it as responsible consumers. While the technologies of performance provide information about institutions, institutional environments, and experts’ activities, the technologies of agency endeavor to create subjects who know how to use information to maintain a sense of individual accountability and risk management. There are two types of technologies of agency: the technologies of

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16 The result is what Power (1997) refers to as an audit society in which trust in bureaucracy and bureaucratic professionals is won only through the rituals of verification provided by the audit and like measures.
citizenship and an enhanced form of contractualism. First, Cruikshank (1999) argues that individuals become citizens through the application of the technologies of citizenship, which are “discourses, programs, and other tactics aimed at making individuals politically active and capable of self-government” (p. 1). These include any programs that promote self-empowerment and aim to engender self-sufficiency. As has already been discussed, successful entrepreneurialism presupposes a free citizen such as the one envisioned by the technologies of citizenship.

The neoliberal marketplace also promotes an enhanced form of contractualism between various entities in an effort to create active, responsible citizens (see Dean, 1999). The ultimate purpose of this enhanced contractualism is to displace the responsibility for risk from the welfare state into communities and onto the individuals and institutions that comprise them. To this end, contractualism is “premised on the active participation of the individual in his or her welfare through a negotiated set of arrangements” (Jayasuriya, 2002, p. 310). In other words, she is “given” agency to act in her own best interest, within reason (i.e., within prescribed contractual limits). Contractualism can encompass both implicit and explicit contracts between the state and individuals or organizations seeking assistance from it, as well as efforts to marketize state institutions by forcing them to purchase in the marketplace through the contracting out of public services to private institutions (Rose, 1996a, pp. 54-55). Oftentimes implicit and

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17 An example of an implicit form of contractualism would be an unemployed person “contracting” with the state to seek work in return for receiving unemployment benefits.
explicit forms of contractualism work in concert with one another to achieve a more “responsibilized” citizenry.

When juxtaposed with the strategized practice of benevolence which the technologies of professionalization present to us, the features of the neoliberal marketplace (i.e., enhanced contractualism, prudentialism, a responsibilized citizenry, technologies of performance, and the central figure of the enterprise) seem kindred spirits with the strategic organization and its dedication to planning, rational information gathering processes, info-managers, and goal of aiding the public. In fact, when viewed side by side (see Table 4.1), we can identify many corresponding characteristics:

**Table 4.1: Characteristics of Marketized v. Strategized Benevolence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Neoliberal Marketplace</strong></th>
<th><strong>Strategic Benevolence</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model</strong></td>
<td>The enterprise</td>
<td>The strategic organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field of play</strong></td>
<td>Marketplace</td>
<td>Market for benevolence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavior</strong></td>
<td>Entrepreneurial, risk</td>
<td>Goal-oriented, planning,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>minimizing, competitive</td>
<td>reducing barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethos</strong></td>
<td>Prudence (i.e., minimization of risk)</td>
<td>Identification of and minimization of barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Personnel</strong></td>
<td>The free, responsibilized citizen</td>
<td>The rational, active, ethical info-manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Tactics</strong></td>
<td>Measuring performance (e.g., audit, performance evaluations, financial statements, budgets, etc.)</td>
<td>Rational information gathering and assessment (e.g., program evaluation tools, financial statements, budgets, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contract</strong></td>
<td>The state/Enterprise</td>
<td>The public/Benevolent domain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What ultimately links together a marketized form of benevolence and a strategized form of benevolence, however, is the twin imperatives of competition and responsibility. In other words, in the end both the enterprise and the strategic
organization are responsible for their own fate as they compete against others to sustain their very existence.

The question remains, however, as to what the purpose of a strategized (as opposed to a marketized) practice of benevolence achieves on behalf of neoliberalism. In other words, what is the ultimate function of a strategized discourse? What does it achieve that a marketized discourse cannot? In the benevolent domain, the terms “market” and “marketize” tend to be dirty words (see Drucker, 1989, p. 89), and they are often associated with “acting like a business.” More to the point, these terms are often associated with acting like a private business whose sole objective is to make a profit. While some in the benevolent domain contend that there are benefits to adopting a more business-like approach to organization management and service delivery (e.g., Kass, 2001; Shoham, Ruvio, Vigoda-Gadot, & Schwabsky, 2006), many others view such an approach as antithetical to the higher (i.e., more laudable) purpose of benevolent organizations (e.g., Eisenberg, 2004; Langton, 1981; McLaughlin, 2008; Rothschild & Milofsky, 2006). The organizations and individuals which comprise the benevolent domain are the inheritors of a complicated, intertwined history of a Judeo-Christian ethic of care and what historian Paul Veyne (1990/1976) calls *euergetism*—a pervasive expectation that the wealthy will use their private gain to benefit their community as a whole—a practice which has its roots in ancient Greece. Together these two conceptions provide the benevolent domain with a mutually reinforcing sense of obligation to care for others in society—indeed, to care for and protect society at large. This legacy persists in the benevolent
domain, and neoliberalism must contend with it in order to effectively assert a marketized form of benevolence.

Neoliberalism contends with this legacy by appropriating it. More specifically, neoliberalism turns an obligation to care for others and for society into a goal for the organizations and individuals which comprise the benevolent domain to achieve. Furthermore, through the technologies of professionalization, it orients the organizations, communities, and individuals which comprise the benevolent domain such that they will not only assume the care of others as a goal, but also enable themselves through training, instruction, and professional norms of service to successfully achieve this goal. In other words, neoliberalism masks its intentions—a tactic which proves critical to its ability to successfully achieve its aims. According to Foucault (1990/1976) “power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. … Secrecy is not in the nature of an abuse; it is indispensable to its operation” (p. 86). By orienting the benevolent domain toward goal-driven behavior rather than the marketized behavior it finds objectionable, neoliberalism is able to make the marketization of the benevolent domain not only tolerable but desirable, for failing to meet one’s goals here means failing to properly care for others and maintain society.
CHAPTER 5: CARING FOR SELF/CARING FOR OTHERS

Introduction

In Chapters 3 and 4, we employed an analytics of government to examine the prevailing discourse of professionalization in the nonprofit sector. The results of this analysis indicate that contrary to prevailing opinion, the professionalization of the nonprofit sector is not the result of a state-initiated effort to rationalize the sector and its service. Rather, it is but one part of a much larger effort of neoliberal governing rationalities to create an enterprise society. For the benevolent domain, this has meant the assertion of a marketized approach to the practice of benevolence through the domain’s technologies of professionalization. This marketized approach to benevolence has resulted in the ascendance of the benevolent organization into a position of paramount importance within the benevolent domain—a development which has occurred at the expense of the individual, most prominently the beneficiary of benevolent service.

In this our final chapter, we turn our attention to determining how we might be able to counteract the efforts of neoliberal governing rationalities to marketize the practice of benevolence through the technologies of professionalization, and in turn reassert a place for the individual within the practice of benevolence. This requires that we revisit Michel Foucault’s notion of power relations, which underpins the analysis that has been undertaken here, in an effort to locate an agential self. Without locating a sense of individual agency within the Foucauldian conception of a pervasive system of power relations, we cannot hope to endeavor to affect change in regard to the technologies of
professionalization or to the overall practice of benevolence. I contend that while locating an agential self in a Foucauldian framework of power relations proves challenging, his work on what he calls the “practices of the self” provides us with an opportunity to do so. I also argue that one formation of the practices of the self—the “care of the self”—specifically allows us to create spaces in which alternate discourses can develop and challenge the marketized discourse which dominates the technologies of professionalization and thus the contemporary practice of benevolence. Only by creating spaces in which alternate discourses can develop to challenge the marketized discourse of benevolence can we also hope to reclaim some sense of the individual, which has become lost in the organization-centric marketized practice of benevolence.

**Change and the Agential Self**

This study was initiated under the notion that if we change the method by which we analyze the nature of events, then we might afford ourselves the opportunity to change what is possible to say about those events. Not only this, but also to create an opportunity to change “what is possible to do, to think, or to be” in relation to those events (Cruikshank, 1999, p. 21). To that end, we have analyzed the prevailing narrative associated with the professionalization and rationalization of contemporary benevolent service through a framework of government. In other words, we have situated the contemporary practice of benevolence as an issue of government. In doing so, we have been able to lay bare some of the historical and political forces that have worked to transform the practice of benevolence over time. We have come to understand that the practice
of benevolence has been informed and transformed over time by liberal governing rationalities and that neoliberal governing rationalities are currently at work through the technologies of professionalization to transform the benevolent domain to constitute a market for benevolence. The consequence has been the marketization of the benevolent communities, organizations, and experts that comprise the benevolent domain, such that the market values of entrepreneurialism, prudentialism, and competition infuse the practice of benevolence. This in turn has served to centralize the benevolent organization in the practice of benevolence, making individuals of secondary import.

Clearly this analysis has demonstrated that the practice of benevolence is changeable. Over the course of several centuries our understanding of what it means to care for and aid others transformed from charity to philanthropy and from philanthropy to strategy. Indeed, each of these modes of benevolent service has in turn been deemed the “right” way to care for others. What these transformations demonstrate is that our understanding of what it means to care for and aid others is not “natural” and “self-evident,” nor is it “indispensable” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 75). In other words, our conception of the practice of benevolence is not finite. The question remains, however: Are we as benevolent practitioners and scholars now better able to change how we think about and engage in the care and aid of others? From what we have seen thus far, the role of the individual in these processes of transformation is not one of change-maker. Rather, she—or more accurately, her identity—seems little more than an object or a product of the larger-than-life historico-political forces which seek to constitute
our understanding of the practice of benevolence. How then can we find a more active role for the individual—indeed, for ourselves—in relation to the practice of benevolence and in relation to the historico-political forces which seek to shape it? Furthermore, how can we find a role for ourselves as benevolent practitioners and scholars that affords us an opportunity to close the loop between our newfound understanding of the practice of benevolence and the ability to actually affect change with regard to it? Answering these questions necessitates that we locate a sense of agency for ourselves within this analytic framework.

Locating the Agential Self

An analytics of government is deployed under the auspices of Michel Foucault’s particular conception of power relations. Prevailing notions of power relations presuppose that power is an asset to be acquired and then used to influence and control organizations, situations, environments, other individuals, and so on. Indeed, influential scholars ranging from Max Weber (1958) to French and Raven (1959) and from Emerson (1962) to Pfeffer (1992) proffer theories on power relations which presuppose power’s inherent nature as an asset. Underpinning this influential literature is the fairly straightforward notion that power—possessing it, in particular—simply means getting other people to do what you want (see Hardy & Clegg, 2006). Michel Foucault’s notion of power, on the other hand, represents a critical alternative to this prevailing stance, in that his conception of power and power relations makes untenable the idea that power can be an asset and thus an object to wield over others. He argues (1990/1976) that power is in actuality a productive and not necessarily negative force—not a
possession or an asset—from which no one is immune. In fact, he contends that power does not function “in the form of a chain;” rather, it is “employed and exercised through a net-like organization” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98) which is virtually inescapable. In other words, power is everywhere, and we engage with it every day and in nearly every context. As we have seen, discourse is central to its operation. More specifically, it is primarily through discourse that the objects of our knowledge (including ourselves) are created, as power and knowledge are conjoined into an irreducible power/knowledge complex.

By challenging the prevailing notion of a sovereign form of power, Foucault makes it possible to envision human relations in such a way that power is “no longer a deterministic resource, able to be conveniently manipulated by [some] against recalcitrant, illegitimate resistance by lower orders” (Hardy & Clegg, 2006, p. 763). Rather, “all actors operate within an existing structure of dominancy—a prevailing web of power relations—from which the prospects of escape [are] limited for dominant and subordinate groups alike” (Ibid). To a certain extent, Foucault’s conception of power relations levels the playing field for human interaction. In terms of locating a sense of individual agency, however, this viewpoint has not proved particularly pragmatic, for Foucault has effectively decentered the role of the individual in his notion of power relations. If one cannot attain—and thus, wield—power and if one is, in fact, constituted by power relations rather than an entity with an intrinsic nature, how then can one act as an agent in her own interests? Newton (1998) explores this very question when he

1 Refer back to Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between power, knowledge, and discourse.
states that “within a Foucauldian framework it is hard to gain a sense of how active agential selves ‘make a difference’” (p. 425).

While locating an agential self within a Foucauldian framework of power is challenging, such a criticism seems somewhat misguided, in that it is implicitly based within a particular conception of agency, one which is individuated and atomistic in scope (see Clegg, 1989). Here agency is equated with the exercise of moral responsibility in decision-making as a measure of one’s intrinsic nature (see Lukes, 2005). More in keeping with Foucault’s contingent conception of reality would be a conceptualization of agency in which the active agent is a product of the relations of power rather than something that is true and inherent within the nature of the individual. If power is a productive force, then power can conceivably produce a subject identity which possesses the capacity to act independently and to make decisions in its own interests. Indeed, Clegg’s (1989) conception of agency asserts as much when he contends that “agency is something which is achieved [italics added]” (p. 17). Individual agency can exist without attributing power (and thus, a sense of inherent moral responsibility) to an individual, for while a system in which power relations “restricts what an agent can do,” it does not necessarily mean that “such a system determines what an agent will do” (Hoy, 1986, in Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006, p. 254, emphasis in original). Thus, individual choice in decision-making can conceptually co-exist alongside a pervasive system of power relations.

Beyond this issue of defining and locating agency within a Foucauldian conception of power relations, however, lays the much thornier issue of the rather
ambiguous connections Foucault makes between discourse, power relations, and the constitution of subject identities. A common and well justified critique of Foucault’s and others\(^2\) genealogical projects is that they “offer much insight into the everyday processes through which … regimes [of government] are accomplished … [but the] hows [by which these regimes of government are accomplished] … are largely missing from their analyses” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2005, p. 492, emphasis in the original; see also Howarth, 2000, pp. 83-84). In other words, they fail to illuminate the more localized mechanisms by which discourses become authoritative and begin to constitute the objects of our knowledge and act to subjectify the individual.

Foucault (1972) contends that certain statements\(^3\) make claims to be knowledge and, more pointedly, to be truth. Sometimes in the course of history complex interrelationships between statements develop, during which time sets of statements assume a sense of regularity through systems of dispersion\(^4\)—a process that Foucault (1972) refers to as discursive formation (pp. 37-38). In other words, through the processes associated with discursive formation, certain statements (i.e., certain serious speech acts, or serious “talk”) become discourses, such that they assume the ability to constitute certain objects. However, what is largely missing from his conception of discursive formations is a discussion of the

\(^2\) Holstein and Gubrium (2005) name the work of Nikolas Rose in particular.

\(^3\) Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) refer to these as “serious speech acts” to avoid confusion.

\(^4\) As opposed to the notion that discourses maintain a unified internal structure due to similarities between ideas, objects, or statements (see Howarth, 2000).
mechanisms by which discourses begin to attach themselves to objects and begin to work on forming their identities. This is a particularly relevant issue for our analysis here, as these connections are necessary to understanding and explaining how power and subjectivity play out in the constitution of agential selves and the individual exercise of choice. As Newton (1989) asserts:

[While] agency may be “a product or an effect,” this does not mean that we can ignore how it affects both the establishment and the deployment of discursive practices. … The problem is that Foucault leaves us with an inadequate framework to explore how agency is played out in particular contexts … or how decisions are made in particular local situations. (pp. 425-426)

Indeed, without such a framework, we are left with few tools to understand not only how we might actually achieve agency, but also how we then might exercise it.

The Practices of the Self

The work Foucault produced in the twilight of his life provides an intriguing entrée by which we can contend with this issue. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Foucault engaged in an extended study of sexuality in the West (Foucault, 1988/1984, 1990/1976, 1990/1984), with the final two volumes of his study (1990/1984, 1988/1984) dedicated to what he terms the practices of the self. This work represents a fundamental shift away from the study of the manifestations of power to “the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself [sic] qua subject”
(Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 6). His work in this arena in large part constitutes the following:

A history of the way in which individuals are urged to constitute themselves as subjects of moral conduct … with the models proposed for setting up and developing relationships with the self, for self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself, for the transformations that one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object. (Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 29)

In other words, the practices of the self articulate the methods by which an individual can become an agent, at least of a particular kind (i.e., a moral agent). Consequently, the practices of the self enable us to tentatively articulate a framework to examine how individuals might make decisions and how their agency might be exercised.5

Understanding the practices of the self and how they might relate to the development of agential selves within a framework of power relations first requires that we situate them within the conception of government which has

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5 I have deliberately chosen to use the word “might” here, for critics such as Newton (1998) argue that Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality does not provide an adequate framework by which to understand agency and subjectivity because he does not provide any clear guidance on how individuals are supposed to engage in decision-making processes or engage in change management (p. 436). I argue that this criticism does not follow the logic of Foucault’s arguments. A phrase like “supposed to” implies that there exists a “true” or “right” way of engaging in decision-making or change management which is utterly antithetical to Foucault’s contingent conception of social reality.
informed our analysis. To recall, within Foucault’s work the term government holds a very particular meaning: it is a form of power that is concerned with the “the conduct of conduct” (Gordon, 1991, p. 2) or any attempt to direct human behavior and actions (Foucault, 1983, pp. 221). This conception of government implies that there exist a host of methods or types of government which can be employed. Gordon (1991) articulates these forms of government as being activities that “could concern the relation between self and self, private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communities, and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty” (pp. 2-3). Foucault contends that these forms of government are interconnected (recall his net-like vision of power relations) and he seeks through his genealogical projects to examine those connections.

While his examination of the practices of the self specifically focuses on government as a relation between the self and the self, it also concerns the methods by which other governmental forms influence these practices. On the whole, the practices of the self are concerned with “the manner in which one ought to ‘conduct oneself’—that is, the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make [a] code [of action]” (Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 26). The ultimate goal of these practices is to generate a relationship with the self such that it involves “not simply ‘self-awareness’ but self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’” (Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 28). Yet, these practices are not born of the self; they are, in fact,

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6 Refer back to Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion of government and governmentality.
produced by certain accepted “truths” regarding the nature of acceptable conduct (Foucault, 2001, p. 285), which are imparted to the individual by an advisor through his/her teachings. In sum, the practices of the self as a form of government, which are produced by socially accepted norms of personal conduct, serve to form the individual as an ethical subject, replete with a set of prescribed beliefs and modes of acting in the world. More to the point, the practices of the self produce an agential self.

How then can we begin to understand the methods by which the individual exercises her agency within a framework of pervasive power relations? Here we are at a disadvantage, for the vast majority of scholars engaging in studies of government and governmentality tend to focus on the processes by which regimes of government produce (in part) particular practices of the self, rather than methods by which particular practices of the self inform individual action and, in turn, serve to influence or produce particular regimes of government at any level within society. To answer our question, then, we must revisit the notion of government as a form of power. Government involves conducting conduct, whether this amounts to one’s own conduct, the conduct of others, or the conduct of political and social institutions. Such a conception of government implies that it is active, mobile, and forever seeking to modify the practices and behavior of others. It also implies that government is active at multiple levels of society—individuals seek to govern others; institutions seek to govern other institutions and the actions of individuals; groups of individuals seek to govern other groups’
behavior, and so on—which is in keeping Foucault’s notion that power is net-like and productive in its scope.

The notion that underlies this conception of power, though, is that government is not only at work at multiple levels of society, but it also does not privilege any of these levels of influence. Scholarly focus tends to be at the institutional level, however, with particular emphasis on political and social institutions and the roles they play in the processes of subjectification. While the technologies of power do become more functional and effective in an institutional setting (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 185), they are not restricted to institutions. The technologies of power are also at work through the individual—particularly in the form of the agential self—and not simply on her by way of the processes of subjectification. Recognition of the notion that government is at work at the individual level through the form of the agential self allows us to understand how power operates at a localized level. More specifically, by analyzing how discursive formations produce particular practices of the self, and then how these practices of the self in turn influence or produce particular interpersonal, social, and/or institutional discursive formations, we can begin to understand how agency can be exercised and thus how change might be affected within Foucault’s system of pervasive power relations.

We have already seen one example of a discursive formation acting to produce particular practices of the self which then seek to create a particular ethical subject. A discourse based in the promotion of market values and spurred by neoliberal governing rationalities is facilitating a formation of the practices of
the self by which individuals learn to conduct themselves according to the morality of the marketplace. By morality, we mean the “set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies” as well as “the real behavior of individuals in relation to the rules and values that are recommended to them” (Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 25). In this case, the values and rules of action by which one is expected to operate are based in entrepreneurialism, prudentialism, and competition, and are promoted by the technologies of professionalization. Ultimately, the ethical subject sought is the responsible entrepreneur.

We can understand how the moral code which neoliberal governing rationalities seek to enact is borne out at the individual level by unpacking the practices of the self they engender. More specifically, we can begin to understand how the marketized discourse of neoliberal governing rationalities affects decision-making at the individual level by examining “the part of ourselves we seek to work upon, the means by which we do so, the reasons we do it, and who we hope to become” (Dean, 1999, p. 17) in relation to the practices in which individuals are engaged. In the language of an analytics of government, these are the determination of the ethical substance, the mode of subjection, the elaboration of ethical work, and the telos of the ethical subject (Foucault, 1990/1984, pp. 26-28). First, the determination of the ethical substance involves understanding what it is that we seek to act upon or govern (Dean, 1999, p. 17; see also Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 26). This can be the body, the soul, individual pleasure, and so on. The marketized discourse we have discussed clearly aims to act on individual
decision-making with regard to the care and aid of others. Second, we must understand the methods by which we govern this substance—the how of governing (Ibid; see also Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 27). This might include surveillance, spiritual exercises, processes of memorization, and more. In our case, this involves the technologies of professionalization and the standards of professional and ethical conduct which they promote. Third, we must locate who we are or who it is we become when we govern ourselves in such a manner (Ibid; see also Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 27). When governed through particular means, we might become the active citizen or the weak individual in the face of worldly temptation. Here we become the strategic manager of benevolence or, ultimately, the entrepreneurial, competitive manager. Finally, the telos of the ethical subject involves why we are governed in such a manner (Ibid; see also Foucault, 1990/1984, pp. 27-28). In other words, what is the goal to be achieved through these processes of governance? The goal of the marketized discourse we have discussed is to underpin a market for benevolence and, ultimately, to promote an enterprise culture.

The form of agential self which is being produced by the practices of the self that are influenced by a marketized discourse is an entrepreneurial one. In other words, our agent here makes choices in relation to the morality of the marketplace. More specifically, within the framework of the morality of the market (i.e., acting in accordance with the values of entrepreneurialism, prudentialism, and competition), the agent-as-entrepreneur is expected to exercise choice in the marketplace as she seeks to strategically place herself and her
organization in more advantageous positions as they compete with other entrepreneurs. Whether and how much the agent-as-entrepreneur acts according to the moral code set forth for her in the marketized discourse of the technologies of professionalization becomes a function of her identity as a particular agential self. Even as she operates within a particular moral code, she still has a choice as to whether she obeys or resists, and respects or disregards the moral code (see Foucault, 1990/1984, p. 25). Of course, failure to follow the moral code will lead an individual to be constituted as “immoral” and thus, as abnormal.

**Beyond Entrepreneurialism**

This may seem a rather contrarian notion of agency and of choice. Indeed, for many the choice between treating everyone and everything as an object of strategic competition and being labeled as abnormal or immoral seems not much of a choice at all. Which brings us back to our original question: Can we find a way to change our understanding of the practice of benevolence and how we engage in it? The answer is a qualified yes. As in, yes, if … We can change our understanding of the practice of benevolence and how we engage in it if alternate discourses exist and if we are willing to challenge our conception of change. We now know that we can locate a sense of agency for ourselves within a pervasive framework of power relations. We also now understand that this sense of agency (i.e., the form of agential self) is dependent upon the formation of discourses and the particular practices of the self and accompanying moral code they engender. So, in order to challenge the prevailing discourse of entrepreneurialism, we need alternate discourses and their accompanying alternate formations of the practices
of the self, moral codes, and agential selves. In other words, we need a space in which “different ways for the acting individual to ‘conduct oneself’ morally, different ways for the acting individual to operate, not just as an agent, but as an ethical subject of this action” (Foucault, 1988/1984, p. 26) exists in order to challenge the dominance of a marketized discourse of benevolence. The existence of alternate discourses, formations of the practices of the self, moral codes, and agential selves serves to constitute a counter-strategy of resistance (see Howarth, 2000, p. 81) against other discourses, thereby precluding the ability of any one discourse or moral code to dominate a regime of government.

Understanding how the mere existence of alternate discourses, practices of the self, moral codes, and agential selves can act as a form of resistance against domination necessitates a revised interpretation of domination and its relationship with power. For some (e.g., Lukes, 2005) power essentially equals domination. In a Foucauldian conception of power relations, however, power and domination are inherently different concepts. To recall, in Foucault’s terms, power “is not a commodity, a position, a prize, or a plot” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 185) to wield over others, but rather a productive force that seeks to modify that with which it comes in contact. As such, it is not an inherently negative⁷ or positive force; it is simply productive in that it engenders new forms and effects. Furthermore, individuals “are in a position to both submit to and exercise … power” (Foucault, 2003, cited in Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, p. 250) because

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⁷ Critics have argued that until the appearance of Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality*, his representations of power in society were nearly uniformly oppressive and repressive, and hardly positive in nature (see Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006, pp. 249-250 for an overview of this issue).
power is “possible only insofar as the subjects are free” (Foucault, 1997, p. 292) to make choices, even if those choices are constrained by the discourses which seek to constitute them.

Domination, on the other hand, entails a situation in which power relations cease to be free-flowing thus constraining one’s ability to make choices:

Power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited. (Foucault, 1997, p. 283)

A state of domination, then, while a distinct possibility in the exercise of power is also entirely preventable, for its existence depends upon the mode of governance employed by an individual or group of individuals.

The existence of alternate discourses ensures that the control of any one discourse remains somewhat mitigated and thus maintains the flow of power relations (see Howarth, 2001, p. 81). At the same time, however, the existence of a multitude of discourses and their corresponding role in thwarting our own domination necessitates a reformulation of how we envision change. We cannot solve a marketized discourse of benevolence. In other words, if we seek to replace a marketized discourse of benevolence with another discourse—something
“better” … perhaps a return to a more charitable form of benevolence or perhaps at least a less rationalized one—the result will simply be the repetition of the cycle already being played out now. In other words, “any struggle designed to modify existing social relations and to institute a new system of domination encounters resistance that has to be overcome ... [and] any drive to create a new system of power will itself be an unstable configuration, always vulnerable to change and transformation” (Howarth, 2001, p. 81). Moreover, by actively seeking to replace one discourse with another, we risk engendering a state of domination ourselves. Rather than the dominance of the market, we would have the dominance of, for example, a Judeo-Christian charitable ethic, which then serves to constrain the choice of those who would disagree with it. What we are left with, then, in terms of affecting change with regard to the contemporary practice of benevolence is an opportunity not to necessarily change the practice of benevolence itself, but rather to create spaces in which alternate discourses on the practice of benevolence can flourish and co-exist. By endeavoring to encourage the presence of alternate discourses, we can maintain the flow of power relations and perhaps at the same time stave off our own domination by any one conception of benevolent service.

*The Care of the Self*

Of course, this naturally leads one to wonder, how exactly does one go about encouraging the presence of alternate discourses to maintain the flow of power relations and stave off domination? In the final volume of his *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault, 1988/1984), Foucault details a particular practice of the
self—the care of the self, or the cultivation of the self—which might hold some answers for us. Foucault argues that the care of the self has been at work since antiquity, and it is “dominated by the principle that says one must ‘take care of oneself’” (Foucault, 1988/1984, p. 43). In late antiquity this theme of taking care of oneself was combined with the ideal of knowing oneself, and through Socrates’ assertion of its import in the *Alcibiades*, this principle became the center of a particular “art of existence”:

> It … took the form of an attitude, a mode of behavior; it became instilled in ways of living; it evolved into procedures, practices, formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught. It … came to constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even to institutions. And it gave rise, finally, to a certain mode of knowledge and to the elaboration of a science. (Foucault, 1988/1984, pp. 44, 45)

As such, the care of the self became not just a principle, but a full-fledged practice that was to be a lifelong pursuit. And this lifelong pursuit is to be understood not just as a method by which one “pay[s] attention to oneself, avoid[s] errors, and protect[s] oneself” but rather as “a whole domain of complex and regular activities” (Foucault, 2001, p. 493). More pointedly, the care of the self became “a duty and a technique, a fundamental obligation and a set of carefully fashioned ways of behaving” (p. 494).

The practices that comprise the care of the self are known as *askēsis*, and they involve training with the purpose to acquire both theoretical and practical
knowledge (Foucault, 2001, p. 316) toward eliciting “the full formation of a full, perfect, complete, and self-sufficient relationship with oneself, capable of producing the self-transfiguration that is the happiness one takes in oneself” (Foucault, 2001, pp. 319-320). Training in thought primarily involves meditating on future evils and imagining the worst thing that might occur as if it were already taking place in the present so as to “convince ourselves that in no way are they real evils and that only our opinion of them makes us take them for true misfortunes” (Foucault, 2001, p. 502). In doing so the meditation acts to nullify both the future and the evil for the individual. Training in the practices of reality, on the other hand, encompasses a number of methods. First there are the exercises of abstinence or physical resistance whose purpose is “to test the individual’s independence in relation to the external world” (Ibid). Only by testing oneself can one truly know whether she has attained self-formation as an ethical subject or whether there is still work to be done. Then there are those practices designed to test oneself in the face of adversity, in order to “know whether or not we are affected or moved by the thing represented and what reason we have for being or not being so affected” (p. 503). These tests are fundamentally designed to control our representations of the world and the phenomena in it. Finally, there is the training for death: “one lives each day as if it were the last;” thus, “by considering oneself as at the point of death, one can judge the proper value of every action one is performing” (p. 504).

In articulating the objectives of these practices, Foucault frequently calls forth the metaphor of an athlete. For example, he states that, “like a good wrestler,
we should learn only what will enable us to resist possible events; we must learn not to let ourselves be disconcerted by them, not to let ourselves be carried away by the emotions they arouse in us” (Foucault, 2001, p. 498). In other words, the practices of askēsis serve to allow the individual to develop and maintain personal control in the face of worldly events. More pointedly, askēsis acts to form certain “true and rational” discourses within the individual such that she is able to “face up to the future” (Ibid). The individual is able to draw upon these discourses when she needs them because they have been fastened “to our minds, to the point of making them a part of oneself, and … through daily meditation, [we] arrive at the point where healthy thoughts arise by themselves” (Foucault, 2001, p. 499). This is more than simply drawing upon memories; rather, this process is akin to drawing upon a potent medicine or the sturdy shoulders of old friends to guide and bolster us through life’s difficulties.

It is important to note that the internalization of these discourses does not represent some hidden truth within the individual, but is rather the result of a number of processes by which the individual appropriates certain accepted truths, which are communicated to her through teaching, reading, and the offering of advice. The care of the self is a fundamentally social practice in which the teacher/student (or, advisor/disciple) relationship is key (see Foucault, 1988/1984, pp. 52-53), for the teacher is responsible for imparting the “truths” associated with the care of the self. Indeed, an advisor’s teachings effectively link together the “truth” and the subject: “it is a question of arming the subject with a truth that he [sic] did not know and that did not dwell within him; it involves turning this
learned and memorized truth that is progressively put into practice into a quasi-subject that reigns supreme within us” (Foucault, 2001, p. 501). In other words, the discourses that comprise the truth of the teachings that are vital to the practice of the care of the self are communicated through social means, and serve to allow the individual to act on her own behalf to form an ethical self.

Supporting and accompanying the practices of askēsis and the relationship between the teacher and pupil are particular forms of listening, reading and writing, and speaking. First, within the care of the self, one must learn to listen properly. This involves mastering certain practices of silence, demeanor, and attention. With regard to silence, one must “impose a sort of strict economy of speech on [herself] … [and] keep as quiet as [she] can” (Foucault, 2001, p. 342). Furthermore, one must learn to be actively silent in relation to speech. In other words, one must “not immediately convert what [she has] heard into speech [but rather] … keep hold of it … preserve it and refrain from immediately converting it into words” (Ibid). When what has been said is immediately converted back to speech rather than retained and contemplated, its power is lost on us. Active silence requires an active demeanor on the part of the listener, one which indicates to the speaker that she is not only calm and able to receive what is being said, but also guarantees her full and active attention. Not only this, but active listening also requires that “we … grasp what is said” (Foucault, 2001, p. 349). More pointedly, we must actively direct ourselves toward understanding what the speaker is actually saying—what Foucault refers to as pragma or the expression’s referent—rather than “the beauty of the form … the grammar and vocabulary …
of philosophical or sophistical quibbles” (Ibid). Only by focusing on the pragma or the referent can the student discern what is most important to the teacher and thus most important for her to understand.

One must also learn to properly read and write in relation to active listening. In the language of the care of the self, reading and writing are considered meditative practices. Here meditation has a particular meaning. It is not “an attempt to think of something with a particular intensity without deepening its meaning;” rather, “it involves … ensuring that [a] truth is engraved in the mind in such a way that it is recalled immediately [when] the need arises … making it a principle of action” (Foucault, 2001, pp. 356-357). In other words, meditation inscribes on the self the truths to which one has been actively listening. Reading texts related to the truths that one has heard and which are being imparted by advisors and then contemplating and memorizing them through practices of personal writing serve to facilitate meditation.

Finally, within the care of the self, there is an obligation on the part of the teacher/advisor to engage in proper speech. While both the teacher and student must engage in active listening, it is the teacher who must learn to properly speak the truth which she is imparting to students. In short, the teacher must obey the principles of parrhēsia, which is “an act of telling all [and involves] frankness, open-heartedness, plain speaking, speaking openly, speaking freely” (Foucault, 2001, p. 366). Engaging in parrhēsia holds a particular moral quality to it for the teacher because her responsibility is to impart the truth to the student. It is worth
quoting Foucault (2001) at length to understand the importance of parrhēsia as a moral undertaking:

If the disciple’s silence is to be fruitful, if the master’s truthful words are to settle properly in the depths of this silence, and if the disciple is to make of these words something of his [sic] own which will one day entitle him to become the subject of veridiction himself, then the master’s discourse must not be an artificial, sham discourse subservient to the rule of rhetoric, seeking only to produce effects of pathos in the disciple’s soul. It must not be a discourse of seduction. It must be a discourse that the disciple’s subjectivity can appropriate and by which, by appropriating it, the disciple can reach his own objective, namely himself. (p. 368)

A teacher’s obligation, then, is not only to speak the truth but to do so in a way which obliges the teacher to the student. In other words, the teacher’s moral obligation is to ensure that through proper speech, the student comes to know the truth, and ultimately, to know herself.

Key to understanding how these practices and how the care of the self overall might allow one to create spaces in which alternate discourse might flourish and maintain the flow of power relations is understanding the care of the self as a practice of freedom—a conception he articulates via the writings of ancient Greek philosophers. In short, freedom finds concrete expression through an ēthos, or an ethical practice: “Éthos [is] a way of being and of behavior. It [is] a mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible to others” (Foucault, 1997, p. 286). In order for freedom to not only become fully
vested as a concrete shape in the form of an ēthos, but also become one that is specifically “good, beautiful, honorable, estimable, memorable, and exemplary,” then “extensive work by the self on the self is required” (*Ibid*). Of course, the care of the self entails extensive training and practice on the self toward the objective of self-formation such that one can face the future and all it entails with a sense of mastery and control. Thus, the care of the self can be considered a practice of freedom in which one engages toward fulfilling an ēthos of freedom that is not only masterful, but good and honorable. More importantly, as a master of one’s own appetites and representations of the world, one can be considered free.

Individual freedom is essential for the proper care of others, for an ēthos of freedom also implies an art of governing. If one is able to master her own appetites and the way with which she views the world through the care of the self, then one is enabled “to occupy his [sic] rightful position in the city, the community or interpersonal relationships, whether as a magistrate or as a friend” (Foucault, 1997, p. 287). This is so because:

If you take proper care of yourself, that is, if you know ontologically what you are, if you know what you are capable of, if you know what it means for you to be a citizen of a city, to be a master of a household … if you know what things you should and should not fear, if you know what you can reasonably hope for and, on the other hand, what things should not matter to you, if you know, finally, that you should not be afraid of death—if you know all this, you cannot abuse your power over others. (Foucault, 1997, p. 288)
And an abuse of power over others essentially engenders domination over them.

**Conclusion**

Nearly a century ago, Mary Parker Follett made a case for foregoing dominating others in favor of cultivating a culture which seeks to enhance others’ individual freedom and choice. Although she believed that power is inevitable, it did not mean that its exercise had to be authoritarian in nature. In fact, she distinguished between two conceptions of power: power-with and power-over. She defined power-over as the “the power of some person or group over some other person or group” while power-with is “jointly developed power, a co-active, not a coercive power” (Follett, 1965, p. 101). While she maintained that one could never fully do away with power-over, she also contended that it behooves one to reduce power-over and promote power-with. Follett ultimately believed that doing so actually facilitates problem-solving and thus efficiency because it allows the situation to dictate the decision rather than the maintenance of authority by one individual over another. Moreover, she maintained that engendering power-with would go a long way toward reinstituting civility, society, and fellowship over rampant individualism.

The agential self that is promoted by the practices of the care of the self seeks to act in accordance with a moral code that is defined by an obligation to engender power-with rather than power-over. Indeed, the “cared-for” agent can be seen as preventing power-over (i.e., domination) and encouraging power-with through the limitation of the exercise of one’s own power. By way of the practices of the care of the self, one can begin to know herself and have mastery over
herself and thereby allow for the cultivation of growth and the facilitation of new possibilities. One encourages states of domination or power-over as the result of an abuse of power, as “one exceeds the legitimate exercise of one’s power and imposes one’s own fantasies, appetites, and desires on others” (Foucault, 1997, p. 288). In such a state one has become a slave to her own appetites and desires, and thus, is not in control of them—the very antithesis of the purpose of the care of the self. The cared-for agent “is precisely the one who exercises power as it ought to be exercised, that is, simultaneously exercising his [sic] power over himself. And it is the power over oneself that thus regulates one’s power over others” (Ibid). In other words, the cared-for agent is able not only to control herself, but also the methods by which she governs others. As such, she is able to maintain the mobile, flowing, and unstable relations of power to prevent a state of domination in which the freedoms of others are limited or eradicated altogether. When the freedom of others is promoted rather than limited then there exists an opportunity for the generation of alternate discourses. And as we have seen, when alternate discourses are present, we are better able to change what we do, what we think, and who we are.

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8 In this respect, the cared-for agent is akin to the conception of the administrator-as-midwife set forth by scholars like Stivers (2002) and Catlaw (2007). Like the midwife, the cared-for agent acts as a facilitator of new possibilities and the cultivator of growth rather than the limitation of them.
REFERENCES


