Textbooks in Transition:
The Incorporation and Abjection of Race, Class and Gender
in High School American History Textbooks, 1960s-2000s
by
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ABSTRACT

Michael Apple's scholarship on curriculum, educational ideology, and official knowledge continues to be influential to the study of schooling. Drawing on the sociological insights of Pierre Bourdieu and the cultural studies approaches of Raymond Williams, Apple articulates a theory of schooling that pays particular attention to how official knowledge is incorporated into the processes of schooling, including textbooks. In an effort to contribute to Apple's scholarship on textbooks, this study analyzed high school American history textbooks from the 1960s through the 2000s with specific attention to the urban riots of the late-1960s, sixties counterculture, and the women's movement utilizing Julia Kristeva's psychoanalytic concept of abjection to augment Apple's theory of knowledge incorporation. This combination reveals not only how select knowledge is incorporated as official knowledge, but also how knowledge is treated as abject, as unfit for the curricular body of official knowledge and the selective tradition of American history. To bridge the theoretical frameworks of incorporation and abjection Raymond Williams' theory of structures of feeling and Slavoj Žižek’s theory of ideological quilting are employed to show how feelings and emotional investments maintain ideologies. The theoretical framework developed and the interpretive analyses undertaken demonstrate how textbook depictions of these historical events structure students’ present educational experiences with race, class, and gender.
To Michelle with much love and affection.
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Donald, it was only by most tragic of accidents that I had the opportunity to re-take your Critical Social Theory seminar, but an opportunity I remain very thankful for because in doing so I remembered a little bit about who I am. A project that I am sure will be ongoing, but one that I could not have begun without the kindness and learnedness you bring to the study of curriculum and critical theory. Thank you for teaching me that critical theory is not just a theoretical tool, but also something that must be continually experienced and lived.

Jenny, I came to the idea of using Kristeva’s theory of abjection in your Consumerism in Education seminar. In what can only be described as an “aha moment,” I remember a great deal became clear to me the moment I encountered this theory. Such a moment could only occur through the dialogic practice you bring to teaching. Thank you for introducing me to cultural studies and public pedagogy, for pushing me to be a better cultural and educational theorist, and for showing me that there is theoretical life outside of the Frankfurt School.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>INTRODUCTION: THE CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF TEXTBOOKS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION: THE CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF TEXTBOOKS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: TRANSITION—INCORPORATION—ABJECTION</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: TRANSITION—INCORPORATION—ABJECTION</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Sociology of Textbook Knowledge</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incorporation: Whose knowledge?</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structures of Feeling: Who am “I”?</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abjection: Where am “I”?</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>METHODOLOGY: LOOKING AT TEXTBOOKS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>METHODOLOGY: LOOKING AT TEXTBOOKS</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960s Historiography</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doxastic Claim I: Textbooks Include Too Little Knowledge</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doxastic Claim II: Textbooks Include Too Much Knowledge</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Too Many Images in American History Textbooks</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Looking at Race and Poverty: Picturing the Urban Riots of the Late-1960s</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Looking at the Politics of Protest: Picturing Sixites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterculture and the Women’s Movement</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Methodology and Methods</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Findings and Discussion</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shifting the Location of Blame I: Confronting White Racism</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shifting the Location of Blame II: Poverty as Abject</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>THE POLITICS OF PROTEST AND EVERYDAY RESISTANCE: SIXITES COUNTERCULTURE AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Intellectual Origins of the New Left: Adorno and Marcuse</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Radicalism of the Hippie Scene: Hall and Willis</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Findings and Discussion I: Hippies and Sixties Counterculture</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Findings and Discussion II: The Women's Movement and Everyday Resistance</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>CONCLUSION: THE CURRICULAR BODY OF AMERICAN HISTORY</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPENDIX</th>
<th>TEXTBOOKS ANALYZED</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: THE CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF TEXTBOOKS

On Friday, May 21, 2010, the Texas Board of Education adopted a series of amendments before finally approving, in a nine to five vote along party lines, the state’s new social studies curriculum. In the months preceding the final vote, controversy surrounded the adoption of the new standards, which sought to include, and succeeded in doing so, conservative ideas, terms and people from the 1980s and 1990s as well as reorienting American history to stress the specific Christian character of both its founding and founders (Blake, 2010; Shorto, 2010). Proposed amendments to the Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills (TEKS) also sought to exclude, though ultimately unsuccessfully, Cesar Chavez and Thurgood Marshall. The debate in Texas over what to include and exclude in textbooks is only the most recent example of ongoing public debate over what should constitute the official knowledge of American History.

The recent Texas textbook controversy rehearsed previous controversies from the 1990s, most famously over the Department of Education’s National History Standards. Following the release of these standards in 1994, Lynne Cheney decried them as ushering in the “end of history” in a Wall Street Journal editorial (Cheney, 1994). Each of these controversies was in turn an echo of the Kanawha County textbook controversy (1974-1975), which perhaps with the exception of the Harold Rugg textbook controversy of the 1930s has had the single greatest impact on the politics of contemporary official knowledge. The Kanawha Country textbook controversy began when school board member Alice
Moore objected to adoption of a new multiethnic language arts curriculum. Carol Mason (2005) has argued that despite efforts to the contrary, the controversy cannot be explained through appeals to class warfare, anti-modern fundamentalism or racism, but instead can best be understood through an intersectional approach.

The notion that the controversy was enactment of class warfare in which lower income Virginians opposed the new curriculum being forced upon them by middle and upper income school board members ignores that opponents to the new language arts curriculum included both working- and middle-class constituencies and that protestors were organized by Elmer Fike, a chemical engineer who owned his own chemical company, and received funding from outside organizations such as the Heritage Foundation. Additionally, focusing solely on the “class warfare” aspects of the controversy does not explain the reorientation of West Virginian and American politics towards conservative religious values and essentializes protestor violence as inherent among working-class laborers.

Mason (2005) has also argued that, emphasizing “class warfare” positions the controversy as motivated by stay-at-home mothers concerned for the welfare of their children. Such an emphasis ignores that Moore was an outspoken associate of the Christian Crusade, an evangelical organization based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and a follower, if not a member, of the John Birch Society. Like Fike’s involvement, Moore’s ties to outside organizations belie claims that protestors were organized and motivated by indigenous class allegiances.
Similarly, explanations of the controversy that posit protestors were galvanized by a homegrown Appalachian agnosis ignore, Mason has argued, how external ideas, namely Christian millennialism, agitated protestors.

Lastly, while race motivated the Kanawha County textbook controversy, Mason (2005) has maintained, that it was not essentially racist or strictly motivated by African American resentment. Instead, the controversy created a liminal space within which white residents of Kanawha County excised their growing anxiety over school and social integration. The focal point of this anxiety became the inclusion Eldridge Cleaver’s *Soul on Ice* (1968), which Moore, insisted advocated rapping white women, an advocacy which played directly into existent Southern mythologies that sexualized African American men. Fike, on the other hand, while also objecting to inclusion of *Soul on Ice*, was quick to consistently recommend African American literature that more directly conformed to West Virginian and American (white) values. Protestors exhibited fears of both miscegenation and knowledge integration suggested by the new language arts curriculum. The latter of these fears complicates explanations of the textbook controversy that posit Kanawha County residents as racist “hillbillies.”

Against such essentialized explanations, Mason (2005) has argued that what was ultimately at stake for protestors was “‘control of the environmental factors’... which [would] affect the ‘off-spring’ of the protestors” (p. 372).

Taking a somewhat longer historical view of textbook controversies, Moreau (2004) has argued that controversies over whose history textbooks legitimate date to the years following the Civil War. Moreau cites two historical
examples that speak to the historicity of textbook controversies and cite the racial, ethnic, religious, and class conflicts that dominated early American history. First, following the arrival of Catholic immigrants around the turn of the twentieth-century, controversy ensued over how to include Catholicism into existing Protestant American history textbooks. Catholics made strong appeals to what they viewed as the founding of America by Catholic men and the missionary role of the Franciscans and Dominicans in bringing order and infrastructure to the colonies. In turn, Protestant textbook authors stressed the foreign nature of Catholicism including its allegiance to the Pope as an example of Catholics holding a power other than the founding documents and founders in high esteem.

Second (and also around the turn of the twentieth-century), professional historians began rehabilitating the British as transmitters of America’s intellectual and cultural legacy and minimizing British imperialism and tyranny. This turn in official textbook knowledge was aided by the rise of a professional class of new historians who prided themselves on objectivity and discounted the writings of amateur historians for being too infused with patriotism and lacking sufficient scientific rigor. Not surprisingly, this rediscovered American cultural heritage was oppositional to the cultural traditions of newly arriving Eastern European immigrants. These two examples, the recent controversy in Texas, the 1994 debate over the National History Standards, and the Harold Rugg and Kanawha County and textbook controversies demonstrate the controversial nature of textbooks, but they also point to a sociology of textbook knowledge.
In an effort to contribute to the existent scholarship on textbooks, I analyzed high school American history textbooks from the 1960s through the 2000s with specific attention to the urban riots of the late-1960s, sixties counterculture, and the women’s movement utilizing Julia Kristeva’s (1982) psychoanalytic concept of abjection to complement Apple’s (2000, 2004) theory of knowledge incorporation. This combination reveals not only how select knowledge is incorporated as official knowledge, but also how other knowledge is treated as abject, as unfit for the curricular body of American history. To bridge the theoretical frameworks of incorporation and abjection Williams’ (1977) theory of structure of feeling and Slavoj Žižek’s (1999) theory of ideological quilting are employed to argue that emotional investments play a participatory role in maintaining ideologies. The theoretical framework developed and the interpretive analyses undertaken together provide unique insights into how textbooks deny students full participation in making decisions about the quality of their educational experiences.

The chapters that follow explore how textbook knowledge has both changed and remained the same since the 1960s. Taking a diachronic perspective makes visible continuities and discontinuities in textbook knowledge. In the first instance it is telling that certain textbook passages are repeated across textbook editions and series; in the second instance it is important to mark what gets left behind among textbooks editions and series. Before analyzing these shifts, the theoretical perspective I employ is developed in Chapter 2. This chapter first discusses incorporation and the sociology of textbook knowledge. The second
part of this chapter argues that the psychoanalytic theory of abjection provides a more complete understanding of textbook knowledge because it enables discussions of not only what is incorporated into the curricular body of official knowledge, but also what is not incorporated, what is abjected.

Chapter 3 discusses both the methodology employed in first selecting and then coding passages from the fifteen textbooks analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5 as well as some of the more salient trends in Sixties historiography. As already argued, what makes textbooks controversial is disagreement over what knowledge they should include and exclude. In each instance what is at stake is the narrative of American history. As such, Chapter 3 also discusses the two dominant forms of textbook critique—textbooks either include too little or too much knowledge. The latter of these two critiques carries with it criticisms that contemporary textbooks are too visual. In refuting this claim, this chapter outlines the cognitive benefits of visual textbooks and the methodological concerns for visual inquiry into historical photographs before analyzing how textbook photographs incorporate and abject race, class, and gender.

Chapters 4 and 5 are examples of how textbooks incorporate and abject particular types of knowledge. Chapter 4, focuses on the urban riots of the late-1960s and argues that there are notable shifts in both how these riots are discussed and to whom textbooks assign culpability. In noting these historical shifts, this chapter argues first, that textbook render the historical legacy of whiteness invisible and secondly, that textbooks abject intersections of race and poverty. In Chapter 5, what is abjected is politics itself. In incorporating sixties
counterculture, this chapter argues that textbooks textually silence and abject the politics of the Sixties.\(^1\) This is done by individualizing sixties counterculture and placing it in opposition to the common sense foundations of a collective American consciousness.

Chapter 5 is divided into three parts. The first outlines the legacy of the Frankfurt school in formulating an intellectual basis for the New Left. Though dismissive of the New Left, textbooks still tend to validate this type of political action against what they characterize as the inaction of sixties counterculture. The second part of this chapter utilizes two historical studies of hippies (Hall, 1969; Willis, 1978) to analyze the American hippie movement and sixties counterculture generally. In an attempt to speak back to textbook narratives that position hippies as individualized and non-political, this section argues that sixties counterculture practiced everyday resistance and that positioning hippies as individualized and non-political renders them abject to a normalized America and serves the function of stabilizing a narrative of American progress.

The third part of Chapter 5 further problematizes this textbook narrative by arguing that the textual and historical defeat of everyday resistance is particularly troubling for women. By abjecting everyday political resistance, textbooks and official knowledge abject the political itself. That is, in validating the political protests of the New Left, textbooks practice a didactic political

\(^{1}\) This sentence is illustrative of how I use the terms “1960s,” “sixties,” and “Sixties.” I use the term “Sixties” to refer to the symbolic meaning of the historical period and to encapsulate the entirety of the period, which as Jameson (1984) has argued extends beyond the decade marker, “1960s.” I capitalize “Sixties” in referring to the period as proper noun as opposed to its descriptive use (i.e. “sixties counterculture”). I use the decade marker to refer to specific historical events (i.e. “the urban riots of the late-1960s”).
pedagogy that only recognizes certain types of knowledge as liberatory. I conclude this section by discussing how textbooks abject intersections of race and gender. While there are no doubt numerous other historical events that might also serve to demonstrate how textbooks incorporate and abject official knowledge, I hope the events discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 are nonetheless informative.
Chapter 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
TRANSITION—INCORPORATION—ABJECTION

This chapter discusses the two theoretical perspectives that inform this study—incorporation and abjection—as well as how official textbook knowledge transitions from the 1960s through the 2000s. Textbooks play an integral role in the reproduction of the selective tradition of American history. Through incorporating particular types and forms of knowledge, textbooks seek to create cultural equilibrium. While there have been significant advances in how textbooks depict the experiences of previously marginalized groups such as women, African Americans, Hispanics, American Indians, and the poor since the 1960s, textbooks continue to include these groups through the limiting practice of mentioning, which limits the possibility of resistant teachings or readings of textbooks. This is because, as discussed in the last section of this chapter, textbooks abject knowledge deemed unfit for the curricular body of American history. I begin this chapter by outlining the sociology of textbook knowledge before discussing structures of feeling, ideological quilting, and abjection.

The Sociology of Textbook Knowledge

There are two general trajectories of textbook inquiry. The first investigates the pedagogical functions of textbooks, while the second investigates the symbolic functions of textbooks. The sociology of textbook knowledge falls within this latter trajectory and can further be divided into theories of reproduction and resistance (Wong, 2002). Reproduction theories are aligned with
theories of cultural hegemony and argue that textbooks produce and reproduce dominant ideologies through a process of “selective tradition” (Williams, 1973). Michael Apple and Linda Christian-Smith (1991), echoing Raymond Williams’ understanding of hegemony, have described textbooks as “particular constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and organizing that vast universe of possible knowledge” (p. 3). Which meanings and practices culture emphasizes and correspondingly rewards constitute the workings of cultural hegemony. These workings are not abstractly imposed from above, but saturate educational institutions, even when hidden curricula (Anyon, 1979, 1980) do not make these workings immediately visible.

The idea that ideological saturation permeates our lived experience enables one to see how people can employ frameworks which both assist them in organizing their world and enable them to believe they are neutral participants in the neutral instrumentation of schooling [...] while at the same time, these frameworks serve particular economic and ideological interests which are hidden from them. (Apple, 2004, p. 20)

Reproduction theories also maintain that schooling produces and reproduces a particular type of knowledge—high status knowledge or that technical knowledge which conforms to the logic of corporate economies. Apple (2004) argues that high status knowledge by necessity must remain scarce for the same reason that not everyone can be employed under capitalism—if everyone were employed, employment would lose its value. Who tends to possess high status knowledge? The middle classes. With so much high status knowledge being
produced by middle class schooling it would seem that there would be a surplus, enough to be distributed equally among and across schools. Again, the same logic that governs financial capital (profit) also governs high status knowledge or cultural capital. The key to maintaining the value of both lies in their production, not their distribution. High status knowledge and profits do not need to be distributed to have value, only produced. Consequences of privileging high status knowledge include the stratification of knowledge (e.g. subject-centered curricula) and the privileging of knowledge that is macro-economically beneficial over knowledge that does not confirm to existing macro-economic structures.

Schooling, then, is a process of mediation in which certain types of knowledge are rewarded. A rewarding process that is furthered, according to Apple (1986) by stratified knowledge becoming the domain of experts who drive teachers out of the curriculum design process and relegate them to being curriculum implementers. The saturation of high status knowledge and the proliferation of educational experts result in mutually reinforcing schooling tendencies that legitimate each other.

[T]he relative status of the knowledge is linked to the kinds of questions deemed acceptable, which in turn seems to be linked to its non-possession by other individuals. The form of the questions becomes an aspect of the cultural reproduction since these questions can only be answered by experts who already have had the technical knowledge distributed to them. (Apple, 2004, p. 37)
Though mutually reinforcing, there is not, however, a one-to-one correspondence between schooling and economic structures. Instead, high status knowledge thus limits rather than determines official school knowledge.

Textbooks have a key limiting function in the reproduction of high status knowledge through both textbook production and knowledge selection. Apple (1998) has examined the “relationship between the ways in which publishing operates internally” and the “cultural and economic market within which it is situated” (p. 159). Textbook adoption can occur at the local, county or state level. There are currently twenty-one states\(^2\) that adopt textbooks on a state-wide basis of which California,\(^3\) Texas and Florida represent a third of the “elhi” (elementary and high school) textbook market. The recent controversy over Texas’ social studies standards highlights the importance large adoption states, or “closed territories,” can have on the curriculum of the entire country (Blake, 2010; Shorto, 2010). The textbooks adopted by California, Texas and Florida are important because in each state school districts can either only purchase or are incentivized to purchase textbooks from a pre-approved list of textbooks.

The relation between what textbooks these states adopt and those used throughout the country is determined by market share. Because California, Texas and Florida adopt textbooks on a statewide level, textbook publishers have a profit motive to tailor textbooks to meet the standards of these states.

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\(^2\) In total there are twenty-three state-wide adoption states including Washington, D.C. and Hawaii, which could be considered de facto adoption states because despite adopting textbooks on the district level each state has only one school district.

\(^3\) California only adopts textbooks on a statewide basis for grades K-8. High school textbooks are not adopted on a statewide level. Though as LaSpina (2009) makes clear, “no textbook will pass muster now without conforming to state-approved academic content standards” (p. 115).
Additionally, because it is less expensive to publish a single nation-wide textbook than regional or state variant textbooks, publishers mass-produce textbooks designed for adoption in California, Texas and Florida and then sell these textbooks to the entire country. Profit motivations for securing contracts with large adoption states are furthered by the fact that despite comprising a small portion of a publishing house’s total revenue, textbooks are guaranteed revenue compared to trade books. Once states like California, Texas and Florida adopt textbooks, state educational bureaucracies operate as sales intermediaries between publishers and school districts.

Textbooks also play an integral role in the reproduction of high status knowledge through the selective tradition. Williams (1973) has argued that in selecting and reproducing official knowledge, the selective tradition makes knowledge, which is actually the result of specific economic, social, and political negotiations and mediations, appear as the knowledge and as culture tout court. The selective tradition legitimates itself because once official knowledge is selected it is reflected amongst all aspects of culture so that it constitutes a culture’s total ideology. Equally influential to Apple’s (2004) understanding of how hegemony encompasses all facets of lived experience is Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) articulation of habitus or those “structuring structures” that can be “objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without any way of being the product of obedience to rules” and which are also “collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of the conductor” (p. 72). An important
aspect of *habitus* related to how textbooks incorporate historical events is Bourdieu’s development of *doxa*.

Analysis of textbooks over time illustrates important shifts as well as similarities in how moments of crisis are depicted. The urban riots of the late-1960s, sixties counterculture, and the women’s movement discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 are each moments of crises which expose the arbitrariness of American history’s cultural logic or its *doxa*. For Bourdieu (1977), *doxa* function differently in ancient societies and class societies. In ancient societies, *doxa* worked because everyone was engaged in the same misrecognition of why certain cultural logics both existed and functioned in particular ways. In moments of stasis, the reasons for why practices are practiced as such appear self-evident. Moments of crisis, however, introduce *heterodoxy*, which reveal the arbitrariness of the *doxa*. It is in such moments of crisis that rules or *orthodoxy* must be imposed to reestablish cultural equilibrium. The result of this cultural intervention is that prohibitions replace the unspoken, self-evident *doxa*.

In class societies, the field of *doxa* is contested more purposively than in ancient societies. What is at stake in class societies is who will capture exclusive access to the field of *doxa* and as such be able to define the social world. This struggle, which is necessarily a class struggle, is waged amongst competing public discourses each vying for the power to connect their particular discourse to the *doxa*. Who, the dominated or dominant classes, succeeds in this struggle will determine the definition and classification of the *doxa*. 

The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of *doxa* and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of the doxa or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, *orthodoxy*. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 169)

*Doxa* introduces a complexity into the discussion of what Apple (1993, 1998, 2000) and Apple and Christian-Smith (1991) have described as the cultural politics of textbooks. First, those textbook controversies already discussed utilize textbooks as proxies for larger political and social antagonisms. Competing public discourses tend to take two general discursive trajectories (see Chapter 3). The first trajectory argues that not enough knowledge (i.e. experiences of people of color, women and the poor) is included in, or conversely too much knowledge is excluded from, textbooks. The second trajectory argues that too much—too many voices, images, etc.—is included in *textbooks*, which prevents a cogent and coherent narrative from emerging within the text. While each trajectory may speak from a different perspective, they are similar in two respects. First, what is stake for those aligned with either trajectory is the same—the ability to define the *doxa* of American history. Secondly, each trajectory speaks from a position of confusion and frustration with contemporary epistemology, which lacks definitive authority. Textbook controversies thus reflect attempts to alleviate this epistemological confusion and frustration by imposing curricular *orthodoxy*, which fixes curricular authority around determined meanings of historical events.
Apple (1991) has observed that the practice of writing textbooks for particular audiences guides the process of fixing textbook knowledge around determined meanings. In tracing the consolidation of the textbook market following the Civil War, Apple (1991) outlines the rise of curriculum experts. Politically, the seeds for centralization had long existed in the distrust of teachers by governmental officials who believed teachers were incompetent and guided by their own personal agendas. For governmental officials, textbooks served a much-needed regulatory role. In contrast to politics and business as usual, which in the years following the Civil War were governed by corruption and graft (for example, the American Book Company regularly gave superintendents kick-backs for using their textbooks), experts appeared moderate, professional, and most importantly, objective. For all their objectivity, however, experts continued to be heavily influenced by the Populist movement’s concept of “the positive state, in which government played a much more active role in promoting and stabilizing and promoting the economic, cultural, and moral fiber of society” (Apple, 1991, p. 18).

In practice, expert objectivity became a method of incorporating both southern Blacks and poor whites into the southern schooling system. Liberal-minded reformers in charge of education put into practice paternalistic and racist education policies designed, they argued, to elevate southern Blacks and to save southern Whites from racial narrow-mindedness. These dual purposes were served through rigid racial segregation and state regulation of curriculum and textbooks. This regulative enterprise was suspicious of northern publishers, a
residual suspicion also reflective of the Populist movement. This process of southern education centralization becomes important in the twentieth-century as textbook publishers are forced to tailor textbooks to statewide adoption committees (e.g. Texas) who view their role as creating “a clearly defined community that would accommodate a society differentiated by race and class, but one that also possessed unity, cohesion, and stability” (Apple, 1991, p. 20). As already discussed, this sense of “unity, cohesion, and stability” is more often than not achieved through excluding or abjecting those forms of knowledge that encompass the experiences of women, African Americans, Hispanics, American Indians, and the poor.

The second complexity that is introduced by discussion of doxa is that texts do not have unified meanings resulting in textbook teachers and readers producing unique meanings. This process of meaning making is informed by a post-structuralist epistemology and is important for any discussion of the sociology of textbook knowledge because it allows for the agentic potential of both teachers and students to interpret and reinterpret official textbook knowledge while also delimiting any one-to-one correspondence between culture and text and text and reader. The underlying principle of post-structuralist epistemology as applied to textbooks as argued by Luke (1988) is that both texts and readers are doing something, neither is static nor reflective of the other. “Texts do not always mean or communicate what they say” and readers employ differing reading strategies to make sense of and meaning from texts (Luke, 1988, p. 30).
Apple (2000) has discussed three ways of reading a text: dominant, negotiated, and oppositional. Dominant readings accept as given the message of a text. Negotiated readings dispute particular aspects of the message of a text, but still accept its overall message. Oppositional readings reject the message of a text. In doing so readers reposition themselves in relation to the text by taking on the position of the oppressed. What is at stake for Apple (2000) is the degree to which textbooks allow for this last method of reading. Textbooks that enclose meaning necessarily limit the access readers have to oppositional readings because meaning is already proscribed within the text. Attempts to exclude Cesar Chavez from the TEKS is an example of how institutions constrain oppositional readings by limiting the information base from which teachers and students can construct oppositional meanings. The more information that has to be read into American history textbooks, the less likely it is that teachers and students will construct meanings that are oppositional and the more likely the doxa of American history will remain static. Textbook controversies rehearse these two complexities of doxa in struggles to determine whose knowledge is included in and excluded from the official knowledge of American history making textbook knowledge a contested terrain and a site of resistance even if the resultant textbooks are not necessarily resistant themselves.

In contrast to theories of reproduction, theories of resistance are less deterministic in the relationship between knowledge and power. While textbooks may legitimate selective knowledge, the process of knowledge legitimation is always open to negotiation and resistance. Recurrent textbook controversies
provide evidence that textbook content is a contested terrain, a terrain that FitzGerald (1979) has traced back to the 1960s:

Only in the nineteen-sixties did the textbooks finally end their rear guard action on behalf of a Northern European America. The civil-rights movement had shattered the image of a homogeneous American society and, for the first time in the twentieth century, raised profound questions about national identity. (quoted in Wong, 2002, p. 534)

Textbooks published after the 1960s included the people and movements that had fought for social justice and change throughout the period. These new, post-Sixties textbooks included previously absent images and references to women, African American, Hispanics, American Indians, and the poor. Inclusion of previously ignored peoples and histories speaks to the success of the numerous and diverse social movements of the Sixties to counter the master narratives of American History, but such inclusion also reflects the process of mentioning.

The manner in which the knowledge and the perspectives of less powerful groups are incorporated into cultural narratives constitutes a process of mentioning or the integration of “selective elements into the dominant tradition by bringing them into close association with the values of powerful groups” so that they still fit underneath discursive umbrella of dominant groups (Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991, p. 10). Mentioning is a functionality of a culture’s selective tradition. Despite the transformative impact of the Sixties posited by FitzGerald (1979), Banks (1969) has argued that while 1960s high school American history textbooks mentioned African Americans they did not
incorporate African American experiences. Accordingly, more textbook content was devoted to African American achievements in “literature, music, arts, science, industry, sports, entertainment, education and in other fields” than to “any other events which relate to the black man and race relations” (Banks, 1969, p. 963).

While stereotyped and distorted depictions of African Americans had begun to wane by the 1960s, the inclusion of African Americans was almost exclusively limited to heroic individuals who had succeeded in aspects of society that stood apart from politics. Even when textbooks mentioned African Americans involvement in politics, as with Martin Luther King, Jr. and the civil rights movement, they still did not draw connections between the structural and material realities of racism and poverty. According to Banks (1969): “The focus on heroic individuals precludes students from fully grasping the larger social and historical forces which have kept the black man at the lower rungs of the social ladder” (p. 963). Mentioning exposes the incompleteness and limitations of including previously ignored peoples and histories into American history textbooks. That textbooks are not resistant is not meant to suggest that there are not possible resistant teachings and/or readings of textbook knowledge. Bound as this study is though to curricular artifacts directly tied to schooling, I feel it would be disingenuous to posit too great a resistant potential of textbooks.

The incompleteness and limitations of inclusion can also be understood through the cultural rubrics of incorporation (Williams, 1973), structures of feeling (Williams, 1977) and ideological quilting (Žižek, 1999), and abjection
(Kristeva, 1982). Having outlined the sociology of textbook knowledge the following three sections take up in turn what are the primary ways of constituting a text—incorporation and abjection. After outlining the process of incorporation, I discuss structures of feeling and ideological quilting as a way of bridging the functionalities of incorporation and abjection. Each of next three sections involves a different constituting question. For incorporation, the epistemic question is “whose knowledge?” For the section on structures of feeling and ideological quilting the epistemic question asked is: “Who am ‘I’?” The use of “I” beginning in this section and used more throughout the section on abjection is a reference to both the psychic ego and the curricular body of American history. For the final section on abjection the epistemic question asked is: “Where am ‘I’?” The textual self of American history having been constituted by incorporation and quilted together by structures of feeling, there remains something that cannot be incorporated into the curricular body of American history. It is because this remainder is necessarily outside the curricular body of American history that this section asks a locating question. Ultimately, the answer suggested by Kristeva (1982) is that the “I” of American history can be found in that which is abject.

**Incorporation: Whose knowledge?**

Williams (1973) warned against accepting as resistant alternatives that can readily be accommodated by the hegemonic order. Alternatives to dominant culture cannot be made available by that same culture if they are to be oppositional. There is instead a dual functionality to alternatives. Alternatives *qua* different ways of living are often left alone by the hegemonic order because the
material from which such differences are crafted tend to be provided by the hegemonic order itself. From the perspective of those practicing different ways of living the sense of obscurity is reciprocated by a wish to be left alone to practice their alternative lifestyles. Where oppositions differ from alternatives is in the degree to which those practicing oppositional lifestyles wish change society. Where oppositions are similar to alternatives is in their ability to be equally absorbed into the hegemonic ordering of society. In practice, any real distinction between alternatives and oppositions is narrow or is necessarily narrowed by cultural hegemony.

A meaning or practice may be tolerated as a deviation, and yet still be seen only as another particular way to live. But as the necessary area of effective dominance extends, the same meanings and practices can be seen by the dominant culture, not merely as disregarding or disposing of it, but as challenging it. (Williams, 1973, p. 11)

The process of tolerating certain cultural practices and viewing others as challenging speaks what Williams (1973) describes as incorporation, which understood as a process of cultural hegemony means viewing cultural formulations like textbooks as being neither economically determined nor the product of an overtly imposed ideology. Instead, material cultural (textbooks) is the result of a fluid processes, which as already discussed, are mutually reinforcing. Within the sphere of culture “whatever the degree of internal controversy and variation they do not exceed the limits of the central corporate definitions” (Williams, 1973, p. 10). Limits are imposed on what culture
recognizes as alternative and oppositional as well as on the degree to which residual and emergent cultures are tolerated. This second cultural dyad makes critical distinctions between residual-incorporated/emergent-incorporated cultures. In their incorporated formulations each part of Williams’ (1973) residual/emergent dyad are tolerated by cultural hegemony. Thus, while residual cultures may be kept at a distance (spatial and/or ideological) from dominant culture, there are still aspects that are incorporated. The same is true of emergent cultures, which exist in an ambiguous cultural space of being both part of, and not yet part of dominant culture.

The degree to which textbooks accommodate “deviant” knowledge into the selective tradition of American history reflect attempts to maintain cultural equilibrium by incorporating historical moments of crisis into the corporate system (doxa) of American history and is exemplified by the controversy that surrounded Harold Rugg’s series of textbooks published in the 1930s. Central to this controversy, as with its rehearsal in more contemporary textbooks controversies, was to what extent curriculum should be allowed to offer contravening interpretations of society. According to Spring (2003), the answer offered by citizens attending public hearings who voiced fears of damnation if students were allowed to read Rugg’s textbooks was that curriculum should not be allowed to present oppositional interpretations of society.

These citizens were echoing concerns raised in newspapers editorials orchestrated by William Randolph Hearst that denounced the textbook series as well as pamphlets produced by the Advertising Federation of America and
published by the American Legion that argued Rugg’s textbooks taught students American products were “untrustworthy” and that the “American way of life has failed” (Spring, 2003, pp. 133-134). The newly formed Guardians of American Education and the organization’s chair, Augustin Rudd, also weighed in against Rugg’s textbook series, arguing that Rugg was a principal architect of a “new social order” and that his textbooks were the instrumental propaganda of this order (Spring, 2003, p. 134). The controversy surrounding Rugg’s textbook series reveals the workings of incorporation. Rugg’s textbooks that stirred (or were used to stir) so much public ire were not initially opposed. As Spring (2003) has argued, it was only as America sought to expand commercially that Rugg and his textbooks came under scrutiny.

**Structures of Feeling: Who am “I”?**

There is less explicit reference made to Williams’ (1977) theory of structures of feeling by Apple (2000, 2004) or educational scholarship generally. This paucity of discussion is puzzling given the concept’s potential to help better explain not only why selected knowledge is incorporated into the official knowledge of American history, but also why, once selected and incorporated, such knowledge resonates so well among teachers and/or students. Structures of feeling, similar to Bourdieu’s (1977) discussion of *habitus*, posits an “unstructured structure” that holds the field of cultural production together. Where the two concepts differ is in how legitimation is articulated. Structures of feeling provide intersubjective reasons why, for example, teachers and/or students resonate with, and are not oppositional to, particular textbook passages. Or why,
from the perspective of textbook production, racist, classist, and/or (hetero)sexist
textbook passages are continually reproduced.

These intersubjective reasons are associated with feelings, which
“emphasize a distinction from more formal concepts of ‘world-view’ or
‘ideology’” and to allow for discussion of the “characteristic elements of impulse,
restraint, and tone; specifically, affective elements of consciousness and
relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as
thought” (Williams, 1977, p. 132). A structure of feeling is formed from the
material of social experience, but its specific formulation is always in process,
“often not yet recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even
isolating” (Williams, 1977, p. 132). It is through application of Williams’ (1977)
theory of structures of feeling that these private formulations can be understood
socially and historically. “Methodologically, then, a ‘structure of feeling’ is a
cultural hypotheses, actually derived from attempts to understand such elements
and their connections in a generation or period” (Williams, 1977, pp. 132-133).

Structures of feeling thus bridge language (textbooks) and embodiment
(particular teachings and/or readings) while also describing “the ways ideologies
reflect emotional investments that remain unexamined during our interactions,
because they have been woven into what is considered common sense”
(Zembylas, 2002, p. 194). Apple (2004), as discussed above, has noted the later
half of this statement—the way ideologies disappear behind the common sense of
everyday life. What structures of feeling add to discussions of ideology and
*habitus* are the emotional investments (feelings) we lend to ideologies, the
participatory role we play in maintaining ideologies among and across generations. The affective nature of structures of feeling also bridge the sociology of textbook knowledge and the psychoanalytic theory of abjection, a bridge that traverses another psychoanalytic concept—ideological quilting.

Ideological quilting, as the textbook controversies already discussed illustrate, is a retrospective process in which “the free floating of ideological elements is halted, fixed [. . .] by means of which they become parts of the structured network of meaning” (Žižek, 1999, p. 87). Ideological quilting and structures of feeling work because of the support we lend ideology through identification. Slavoj Žižek (1999) gives the example of an iconic Marlboro cigarettes advertisement to illustrate this function. In order for the infamous advertisement featuring a cowboy and the American prairie to have any quilting effect an inversion must occur in which Americans come to identify themselves with the image of America being connoted in the advertisement. Ideological quilting occurs when “America itself is experienced as ‘Marlboro country’” (Žižek, 1999, p. 96). In much the same way, we lend official knowledge ideological currency by embodying it in our everyday practices.

A second feature of ideological quilting is what Žižek (1999) describes as Che vuoi? This question, borrowed from Lacanian psychoanalysis, translates as “What do others want from me?” The answer to this questions is never the object itself (cigarette) or even the potential metonymic expressiveness that might stand-in for the object (America); but rather, “the lost object is ultimately the subject itself, the subject as an object; which means that the question of desire, its original
enigma is not primarily ‘What do I want?’ but ‘What do others want from me?’” (Žižek, 2009, p. 64).

It is in this way that structures of feeling begin to have cumulative effects. That is, we begin to recognize, if not expect, particular ideological formations and historical renderings. Such formations and renderings do not present themselves *ex nihilo*, but are instead only able to exist in their present semantic articulations because behind their meanings exist a series of master-signifiers (e.g. democracy) that affix meaning. These “pure” signifiers are what Žižek (1999) has described as *points de capiton* or those words “to which ‘things’ themselves refer to recognize themselves in their unity” (p. 96). Paradoxically, *points de capiton* totalize ideology by affixing the meaning of floating signifiers, but they are not points of supreme meaning that might serve as stable points of reference. It is this paradox that also reveals *points de capiton* to be tautological. For example, the meaning of democracy is constituted by its descriptive elements (signifiers) and its descriptive elements (i.e. freedom, liberty, etc.) constitute democracy. The *point de capiton* is thus:

>[T]he element which represents the agency of the signifier within the field of the signified. In itself it is nothing but a ‘pure difference’: its role is purely structural, its nature is purely performative—its signification coincides with its own act of enunciation; in short it is a ‘signifier without the signified.’ (Žižek, 1999, p. 99)

Quilting and *points de caption*, like *doxa*, totalize ideology; unlike *doxa*, however, quilting is contingent upon us lending any particular *doxa* meaning
through emotional investment. By participating in and with ideology we answer 

*Che vuoi?* This answer helps explain why racist, classist, and/or (hetero)sexist textbook passages are continually repeated. Ultimately, we welcome these ideological formations and historical renderings because they tell us who we are. Even once identified (c.f. Loewen, 2007), such ideological formations and historical renderings continue to constitute us by quilting floating signifiers into meanings that tell us who we are. Identification, as with incorporation, is never a complete process, which is why both are always contingent, a contingency that is emotionally determined.

We continue to resonate with the structures of feeling that textbooks provide and the ideological quilting they perform, however contingent, because, to expand on the example already offered by Žižek, it is difficult to quit smoking. Aside from the addictive qualities of nicotine, it is so difficult to quit smoking because seeing oneself as a smoker means also seeing oneself as X (cool, sophisticated, hip, etc.). Similarly, in seeing American history in particular ways we see ourselves in particular ways and as such know how to feel. In inverting the images being connoted by the Marlboro advertisement “I” not only begin to identify with it, but perhaps more importantly gain something else, that feeling of X. This unattainable something, while sewn to a *point de capiton* has a stable meaning, but because it is extra, something which is more than the object itself, there always exists a possibility of this X turning into something reviled, something which must be abjected from the self. Carol Mason’s (2007) study of
the 1974 Kanawha County textbook controversy illustrates how in lending ideologies signification, feelings quilt ideologies to points de capiton.

As already discussed, the Kanawha Country textbook controversy began when school board member Alice Moore objected to adoption of a new multiethnic language arts curriculum. What was at stake for Moore, according to Mason (2007), were the eternal souls West Virginian (white) children, which protesters equated to the soul of the nation. In each instance, the inviolable essence of the soul was racialized as white and in need of protection from the external, alien forces of multiethnic education. The controversy would result in a dramatic and profound realignment of Appalachian and American politics toward a conservative spiritual politics of whiteness, which questioned the appearance of white skin as sufficient proof of one’s membership in the white race, demanded instead that “a more invisible character must be proven,” and insisted upon this character being “a spiritual quality, a ‘soul’” (Mason, 2007, p. 104). Said differently, the whiteness of Klu Klux Klan sheets signified “what has been invisible and what must be made apparent because the body alone is no proof” (Mason, 2007, p. 105).

Political realignment involved union and working-class families associating with middle-class entrepreneurs, factory owners, and white supremacists along the axis of racial identity, an association predicated on a shared understanding of the personal soul and a belief that it and the national soul were under attack. Deriving a common (white) soul meant inverting understood notions of labor as soulful work immune for the exploitative practices of
capitalism and repositioning the soul as derivative of capitalism. According to this later formulation, the soul is no longer a historical concept defined by labor, but an “internal power” commodified by capitalism, which allowed protesters to “occupy a position of victimhood and a position of domination simultaneously” (Mason, 2007, pp. 108-109). Whereas previous leftist notions of labor and the soul (Mason references Lukacs) held out an emancipatory possibility of escaping the historical yoke of capitalism, repositioning the soul as internal and derivative of a Weberian spirit of capitalism allowed protesters to evoke an “apocalyptic emphasis on the future, projecting white people forward into a post-white world only to send them back to the future of avoiding the demise” (Mason, 2007, p. 109).

The verbal tense of action is important to understanding both identification and ideological quilting. As a testament of historical resistance, the soul occupied a liminal non-place in which people were exploited, but remained ever hopeful in overcoming their exploitation. As an internal power, however, the soul occupied a vague biblical future in which West Virginians’ alienated labor was repositioned as an alienated future threatened by multiethnic education. Throughout the textbook controversy, the inviolable essence of the soul was a signifier for race and quilted the identity of both the residents of Kanawha County and the nation.

Rather than invoking issues of race, textbook protestors evoked spirituality. Expressing concerns over ‘our’ children’s ‘eternal souls’ was an evocation of spirituality that made their protest of multiracial
curriculum not seem overtly political or racial, but only natural—as natural as a parent’s love. (Mason, 2007, p. 114)

As already discussed, the focal point of the anxiety over the new multiracial curriculum was Eldridge Cleaver’s *Soul on Ice*. In objecting to the book’s inclusion as supplemental reading for senior high students protestors like Moore also seamed “white women (as supposed victims of Eldridge Cleaver’s revolutionary militancy) and ‘our children’ (as supposed victims of Eldridge Cleaver’s revolutionary words)” into “one and the same body needing protection from those ‘filthy books’ that supposedly showcased militant black writers” (Mason, 2005, p. 370). These moments of ideological quilting are not, however, without an abject.

**Abjection: Where am “I”?**

“To worry or to smile, such is the choice when we are assailed by the stranger; our decision depends on how familiar we are with our own ghosts” (Kristeva, 1991).

“Abjection, on the other hand, is immoral, sinister, scheming, and shady: a terror that dissembles, a hatred that smiles, a passion that uses the body for barter instead of inflaming it, a debtor who sells you up, a friend who stabs you” (Kristeva, 1982).

While sewn to a *point de capiton* identification is stable, but because it is extra, something that is more than the object itself, there is always the possibility of the *point de capiton* becoming reviled, something which must be abjected from the self. The contingency of identification also results in the ever-present
possibility of abjecting that which is foreign or Other. Kristeva (1991) has
discussed our relation to the Other through exploring the Freudian psychoanalytic
term *unheimlich* or the uncanny, a term used to describe something that is both
familiar and strange, familiar in its strangeness and strange in its familiarity. The
*unheimlich* does not refer to something foreign or external to the self, but because
the uncanny is strangely familiar, the *unheimlich* is internal to the self. “The
foreigner is within me, hence we are all foreigners. If I am a foreigner, there are
no foreigners” (Kristeva, 1991, p. 192). If the uncanny is not foreign, then why
does the foreign(er) cause anxiety?

Strange indeed is the encounter with the other—whom we perceive by
means of sight, hearing, smell, but do not ‘frame’ within our
consciousness. The other leaves us separate, incoherent; even more so, he
can make us feel that we are not in touch with our own feelings, that we
reject them or, on the contrary, that we refuse to judge them—we feel
‘stupid,’ we have ‘been had.’ (Kristeva, 1991, p. 187)

Left unexamined, these feelings that structure our experiences with the
Other manifest themselves negatively and we often make the foreign(er) account
for the feelings *they make us feel*. The psychoanalytic theory of abjection asks us
to recognize that these feelings are present not because of what is strange and
external, but because of what is strangely familiar and internal. The following
brief sketch of Kristeva’s (1982) theory of abjection is based on this ethic.

Foundational to understanding what is abject is the primal struggle for
individuation, which Kristeva (1982) maintains happens prior to the Lacanian
mirror stage. Indeed, this understanding is her unique contribution to psychoanalysis.

Within the discipline of education, Jane Kenway and Elizabeth Bullen (2001) have referred to abjection as something simultaneously reviled and desired, which helps explain why adults denounce youthful pleasures and also continually desire them. Elsewhere, in discussing the ways girls learn to regard and treat their bodies, Kenway and Bullen (2010) have observed that the abject “provokes the desire to expel the unclean, to restore the boundaries upon which the self or subject depend [. . .] in so far as the abject challenges notions of identity and the social order it ‘must’ be cast out” (p. 163). From an ethical perspective, Jan Jagodzinski (2002) has argued that the abject presents a possibility for an ecological ethic of care, the notion that we are responsible for both our psychical and physical excrement. Because the abject exist in extimate space—as both revulsion and attraction—it is able to illuminate the hypocritical way “the Law can hide the terror it wreaks in the name of ‘the people’; that is to say, the way the Symbolic Order expels its abject to keep its ‘pure’ identity” (Jagodzinski, 2002, p. xxxix).

Jagodzinski (2002) is using Lacanian psychoanalytic language to position the process of abjection as an ethic of care in which we are responsible for, not liable to, the Other. In relation to the above analysis of the sociology of textbook knowledge, the Law is analogous to official knowledge or the selective tradition and functions in much the same way—to obfuscate its own internal workings. In presenting official knowledge as the knowledge and the selective tradition as
culture tout court the violence that incorporation wreaks to continually legitimate itself is concealed. The theory of abjection is an important complement to existing theories that explain how knowledge is legitimized and incorporated because it shines a reflective light on the remainder of this process, on that which is not legitimated and incorporated, on that which is cast out or abjected. Equally important is the subsequent exclusion of the abject from the Symbolic Order, which is analogous to the total ideology that governs our social world. The abject must necessarily remain excluded from the Symbolic Order (official knowledge) because it threatens to expose its illegitimacy, to expose that its identity is contingent and not pure. What follows is a more detailed account of Kristeva’s theory of abjection.

Kristeva (1982) has argued that the struggle for individuation occurs in the pre-symbolic stage of infant development. In traditional Lacanian readings of individuation, the inside/outside boundary is formed when the subject (the infant) sees themselves—or rather their reflection (imago)—in a mirror. In this moment, the Imaginary Order is introduced and by identifying with the imago, the Ego, the “I” is established. For Kristeva, individuation occurs through the infant struggling to separate from the mother while still in the pre-symbolic stage of development. Central to this struggle is a spatial ambiguity in knowing where the border between the self and the mother’s body is. This spatial ambiguity results in an undifferentiated self in which the infant is both part of (inside) and not part of (outside) the mother’s body. Abjection is the infant’s attempt to deal with the
instability of this porous inside/outside border. In the process of self-differentiation, what is abjected is what is not part of the clean and proper self.

Kristeva (1982) is intentionally graphic in describing this process through the metaphor of food loathing.

Food loathing is perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection. When the eyes see or the lips touch that skin on the surface of milk—harmless, thin as a sheet of cigarette paper, pitiful as a nail paring—I experience a gagging sensation and, still farther down, spasms in the stomach, the belly; and all the organs shrivel up the body, provoke tears and bile, increase heartbeat, cause forehead and hands to perspire. Along with sight-clouding dizziness, nausea makes me balk at that milk cream, separates me from the mother and father who proffer it. “I” want none of that element, sign of their desire; “I” do not want to listen, "I" do not assimilate it, “I” expel it. But since the food is not an “other” for “me,” who am only in their desire, I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which “I” claim to establish myself. (pp. 2-3)

Unlike repression, the process of abjection is never complete. Those loathed items are never completely banished from our consciousness, but instead remain forever on the periphery where they continue to both repel and attract us. Also, because part of oneself is abjected in the struggle for individuation, not only can this process never be complete as “I” am always implicated in it, but because part of “I” is also abjected those sites/sights/cites (jagodzinski, 2004) of abjection
become, *points de capiton*, locations of trauma, which are continually revisited because of their ability to simultaneously repel and attract us. The border of the self is threatened because “the abject is alluring enough to crumble the borders of self,” and it is maintained because “the fear of such collapse keeps the subject vigilant” (McAfee, 2004, p. 50). Abjection is an unbounded subjectivity in which there is neither object nor subject, only abject.

Kristeva (1982) express this unboundedness through the metaphor of a corpse (cadaver), which as “death infecting life” is “something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object” (p. 4).

If dung signifies the other side of the border, the place where I am not and which permits me to be, the corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon everything. It is no longer I who expel, “I” is expelled. The border has become an object. How can I be without border? That elsewhere that I imagine beyond the present, or that I hallucinate so that I might, in a present time, speak to you, conceive of you—it is now here, jetted, abjected, into “my” world. Deprived of world, therefore, *I fall in a faint* (Kristeva, 1982, pp. 3-4)

In seeing the corpse, “I” am beside myself in both the literal and metaphorical uses of the expression. “I” fall (*cadere*) into death, just as death invades life. This experience is uncanny and carries with it a feeling of horror of being cut off from

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4 Important for the passage below is Kristeva’s use of the Latin infinitive *cadere*, to fall, the etymological root of the word cadaver.
the Symbolic Order where “I” am a desiring subject and returned to the *chora* of
undifferentiation. The anxiety produced in this encounter reorients the above
further explored in applying abjection to nationness.

Remembering that the abject is always part of the “I”, in abjecting the
foreign(er) we abject what is strange within ourselves. A double bind thus
emerges: On the one hand the foreign(er) generates anxiety because “radical
strangeness is built into our own psyches;” on the other hand, being a subject
depends upon such an encounter with the Other, with the foreign(er) (McAfee,
1993, p. 125). High school American history textbooks are abject curricular
matter in that they are both part of and not part of our national- and self-identity
as well as simultaneous poles of revulsion and attraction. In addition to being
proxies of a larger cultural politics, textbooks are also proxies of individuation.
Textbook criticisms which decry that either too little or too much is included in or
excluded from textbooks (see Chapter 3) are also saying: “‘I’ am too little/too
much.’ This understanding of American history textbooks as abject highlights
how abjection “contradicts the self’s (national and individual) claim to unity and
knowledge” and also how this contradiction “emerges from the gestures with
which the self attempts to assert such a claim” (Moruzzi, 1993, p. 144). Recall: “I
expel *myself*, I spit *myself out*, I abject *myself* within the same motion through
which ‘I’ claim to establish *myself*” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3).
How might the theory of abjection inform textbook readings? It is possible to discern within textbook passages the “thin film” of a “narrative web,” which Kristeva (1982) has argued is constantly threatening to cry-out:

For, when narrated identity is unbearable, when the boundary between subject and object is shaken, and when even the limit between inside and outside becomes uncertain, the narrative is what is challenged first. If it continues nevertheless, its makeup changes; its linearity is shattered, it proceeds by flashes, enigmas, short cuts, incompleteness, tangles, and cuts. [. . .] The narrative yields to a crying-out theme that, when it tends to coincide with the incandescent states of a boundary-subjectivity that I have called abjection, is the crying-out theme of suffering-horror. In other words, the theme of suffering-horror is the ultimate evidence of such states of abjection within a narrative representation. (p. 141)

Abjection points to a possible explanation of why history curricula and textbooks generally dedicate so much space and attention to discussing slavery and the Holocaust. All narratives through their selection of particular elements (signifiers) strive to create a unity, a total whole. However total narratives may be they are never complete because the borders that comprise them are always porous, thus allowing for subject/object and inside/outside to mix. As the narrative totality begins to bursts, it cries out, cries which are heard and rearticulated as points of suffering-horror, which are in turn points of abjection that reintroduce narrative unity. It is for this reason that history curricula and textbooks are able to safely discuss slavery and the Holocaust—their respective
suffering-horrors form a curricular unity. In discussing each, we abject our historical selves. Provided these historical selves remain abjected (though because they are not repressed they never completely disappear from our consciousness); and provided these terrible historical selves never meet our present selves, we can safely discuss slavery and the Holocaust. Temporal borders thus established; slavery and the Holocaust become safe, unifying objects of inquiry.

Whereas incorporation and identification allow selected outside element in, abjection expels certain signifiers and in doing so erects borders around the “I” of American history. Abjection is the other side of incorporation and the contribution I seek to make to existent scholarship on textbooks and official knowledge. The psychoanalytic concepts discussed in this chapter should not be understood as oppositional to the theories of official knowledge and incorporation, but as complementary. The interpretive analyses of textbooks in Chapters 4 and 5 attempts to locate within existing terrain new spaces for analysis, new ways of looking at how high school American history textbooks entomb official knowledge. Before proceeding to specific content analyses of the urban riots of the late-1960s, sixties counterculture, and the women’s movement, Chapter 3 outlines the methodology employed in first selecting and then coding passages from the fifteen textbooks analyzed in these two chapters as well as some of the more salient trends in Sixties historiography. This chapter also discusses the doxastic claims that textbooks either include too little or too much knowledge. Lastly, as a preview of the textual analyses of textbooks in Chapters 4 and 5,
Chapter 3 analyzes how the historical photographs included in textbooks depict race, class, and gender.
Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY: LOOKING AT TEXTBOOKS

Among the questions raised by recent historiographic analyses of the Sixties—when were the 1960s, what were 1960s, who were the 1960s, and where were the 1960s\(^5\)—there is little discussion of how the Sixties are depicted in high school American History textbooks. Existing discussions of how the Sixties are depicted in textbooks are limited to two discussions of college American history textbooks (Goose, 1995; Schulman, 1999). Lending further relevance to the present study is that the most recent diachronic studies of textbooks (Lerner, Nagai, & Rothman, 1995; Loewen, 1995, 2007) do not, given their respective publication dates, analyze textbooks from the 1990s and give little attention to historical issues and events particular of the 1960s. Prior to these studies, FitzGerald (1979) was the most recent diachronic study of American history textbooks.

Before discussing the methodology employed in first selecting and then coding passages from the fifteen textbooks (Appendix A) analyzed in the following two chapters, I first outline some of the more salient trends in Sixties historiography. This section is followed by a discussion of the two dominant forms of textbook criticism—arguments that textbooks either include too little or too much knowledge. This later critique carries with it criticisms that contemporary textbooks are too visual. In refuting this claim, I outline the

\(^5\) See for example the American Historical Review, which dedicated its February and April 2009 issues to “The International 1968.”
historical development of the “visual” textbook and a methodology for visual inquiry into historical photographs included in textbooks before analyzing how textbooks visually depict the urban riots of the late-1960s, sixties counterculture, and the women’s movement. Understanding the historical photographs included alongside textbook passages as “imagetext” (Mitchell, 1994), reveals a visual tendency toward the incorporation and abjection of selective visual knowledge into the curricular body of American history.

**Sixties Historiography**

Heale (2005) has divided the historiography of the Sixties among histories that emphasize protest movements, those that see the decade as concerned with liberalism, and those that emphasize the rise and maintenance of right-wing politics. Histories that emphasize protest movements tend to split the Sixties into “good” (i.e. the New Left) and “bad” (i.e. the Weathermen) periods while being sympathetic to the former for its participatory democracy potential. Protest movement histories also juxtapose the Woodstock Music & Art Fair (August 15-18, 1969) and the Altamont Speedway Free Festival (December 6, 1969) to signify a movement from peace to violence. Problematically, protest histories are susceptible to exaggerated claims by both the political Right and Left. Those on the political Right are quick to use the 1968 protests in Chicago as an example of the violent potential of protests, while those of the political Left tend romanticize protest such that any resistance which does not take place in the street is definitionally not resistant. Another problem with utilizing protest movements to periodize the Sixties is that it ignores, as Hunt (1999) has argued, the anti-war
protests of the early 1970s by organizations such as Vietnam Veterans Against the War and the arguably positive governmental policies that occurred under the Nixon administration (e.g. establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nixon’s 1972 visit to China).

Histories that emphasize liberalism argue that the Sixties owe the New Deal a political debt for the post-war liberal consensus that pervaded the period. This consensus maintained that a liberal economic belief that government should promote a consumer driven economy. Despite liberal consensus, both the New Left and the New Right opposed liberalism. The New Left, as evidenced in SDS’s founding document, the Port Huron Statement, didactically opposed liberalism’s unradicalism and its tendency toward accommodationism. The New Right, as evidenced in Young Americans for Freedom’s founding document, the Sharon Statement, viewed governmental expansion negatively. Within the the Port Huron Statement, it is the unrealized potential for “self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity” that results in subjective alienation—a term best described by the writers' use of the terms like loneliness, estrangement, and isolation—and which is made objective by a structural separation from power (Students for a Democratic Society, 1962/2003). Coming to age under a post-war commercialized economy, members of SDS, according to the Port Huron Statement, did not see modernity as liberating, but rather as an existential death. In seeking to counter the psychic alienation of modernity member of the New Left rejected the promise of government and public institutions as corrupt. A rejection furthered, Jameson (1984) argues, by the assassination of president Kennedy in
1963, which solidified in its horror a strange confirmation that America would not pass the torch of leadership to a younger generation nor would a new politics based on civic idealism be possible.

In addition to the unaccounted for opposition by both the political Left and Right, identifying the Sixties as a continuation of post-war economic policies characterizes the period as non-exceptional—the flip side of periodizing the Sixties with protest movements—and risks glossing over, for example, the urban riots of the late-1960s as testimony of the failings of the liberal-minded War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The shortcomings of these policies were behind the series of riots that occurred in cities across the country between 1965 and 1967. Equally responsible, however, was the rampant poverty experienced by African Americans, which was structurally tied to the expansion of the American post-war economy into the suburbs. Historiographic trajectories that focus on post-war economic policies also ignore Richard Nixon’s “law and order” rhetoric employed throughout the 1968 presidential campaign. Lastly, both protest movement and liberal histories tend to spatially fix the Sixties to either the streets or Congress. However, with the personal becoming increasingly political during the 1970s neither protest movement nor liberal histories adequately articulate the political shift toward a “rights revolution” (Heale, 2005) and tend to ignore the rise of the New Right.

The collapse of the New Deal coalition and fragmentation of the protest movements into competing political interest groups provided political space (though not causal) for the New Right to establish a foothold in American politics.
Histories of the Sixties that emphasize the rise of conservatism (c.f. Hijiya, 2003) argue that the main outgrowth of the 1960s was not the New Left or sixties counterculture, but the vast number of conservative true believers that paved the way for subsequent conservative victories or what Apple (1993, 2000) has described as the “conservative restoration.” Motivated by President Johnson’s 1964 defeat of Barry Goldwater, young conservatives committed themselves to the slow process of organizing and penetrating political institutions. According to Hijiya (2003), the New Right organized themselves around and under older conservative leaders from whom they received mentorship and funding, which enabled young conservatives to dress in business suits and work in office buildings creating a political culture more tailored for the power politics of the decades to follow than the protest movements. This political culture was established early by the founders of Young American for Freedom, who met at the estate of conservative leader William F. Buckley, Jr. in Sharon, Connecticut to draft what would become the Sharon Statement.

The Sharon Statement, which is punctuated with “that” clauses (Young Americans for Freedom, 1960) reads like a piece of legislation and is grounded in the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and the economic theories of Milton Friedman. The purpose of government, the statement argued, is to ensure order and support a free market. Under the tenants of the Sharon Statement, according to Hijiya (2003), the New Right was able to successfully integrate the contradictory positions of libertarianism, traditionalism and anticommunism. Opposition to communism functioned as an ideological quilting point that held
together the otherwise diametrically opposed ideologies of libertarianism and traditionalism. So successful was this point de capiton that disagreements over the role of government—from minimal involvement to authoritarian control—were resolved by appeals to a mutual fear of communism. For libertarians, communism threatened individual liberties and economic entrepreneurship. For traditionalists, communism threatened to unravel the fabric of Western civilization, a fabric that conservatives increasingly viewed as Christian.

Politically, then, what held libertarians and traditionalists together was a shared desire for power and a mutual opposition to notions of egalitarianism. Against egalitarianism, conservatives argued for abstracted notions of liberty and freedom and employed seemingly neutral-sounding descriptors such as “law and order” or “busing” to assert the violation of these precepts. As Heale (2005) noted, such discourses facilitated the spread of Southern-style race politics across the country beginning with the passage of the Civil Right Act in 1964 (see Chapter 4). The debate among these Sixties historiographies continues to be rehearsed in textbook controversies, which reflect two competing doxastic claims—textbooks either include too little or too much knowledge.

Doxastic claim I: Textbooks Include too Little Knowledge

Perhaps the best example of this doxastic claim is James W. Loewen’s (1995, 2007) Lies My Teacher Told Me, which though insightful in highlighting textbook omissions does not discuss textbook knowledge as either resulting from the processes of selective tradition or the legitimation of official knowledge. For example, in a chapter devoted to the invisibility of racism in textbooks, there is no
discussion of the intersections of race, class (poverty) or gender. Instead, Loewen’s over-arching criticism of how textbooks discuss race focuses on the lack of causal connections drawn between the racism that followed Reconstruction, racism during the Jim Crow and civil rights eras and present racism. The lack of historical lines connecting historical and present racism, Loewen argues, isolates racism as a thing of the past.

Correct though Loewen’s (1995) observation is, it does not go far enough. Such an observation about the enduring legacy of racism hints at a discussion of the prevalence of whiteness in American history, though it stops short of suggesting that textbooks privilege whiteness opting for the more palatable criticism that there are not causal connections between historical and present racism. This is the general dual-trajectory this doxastic claim: On the one hand, textbooks exclude peoples and histories that liberal critics wish to see included; on the other hand, textbooks do not draw clear connections between past injustices and their continuation in the present. The second half of this trajectory asserts, in its desire for more knowledge, if textbooks contained broader narratives that described how the past continues in the present, students would be able to identify contemporary social injustices. This is an amenable and ameliorative goal. However, in focusing solely on what is or is not included in textbooks, liberal critics ignore the dual processes of incorporation and abjection.

To be sure, Loewen (1995, 2007) dedicates a chapter to exposing how textbooks are adopted and how this process governs their content. Such findings though ignore the larger cultural hegemonic forces that govern not only textbook
content, but also high status knowledge generally. Additionally, in focusing on who is blame for the current status of textbook knowledge, such criticisms ignore that, “behind the commodity, the book, stands a whole set of human relations” (Apple, 1998, p. 161). There are not deliberative machinations in which publishers conspire to “censor” textbooks, rather textbooks are symptomatic of broader neoliberal and neoconservative trends in American curriculum (Apple, 1993, 2000). In highlighting at once that America has always already had common curriculum and in arguing against contemporary attempts to install a national curriculum, Apple (1993) critically asks: “Who benefits from national and uniform curriculum?”

The answer is the dual political tendencies of neoliberalism and neoconservativism. Tendencies that Apple (1993, 2000) has discussed as part of the conservative restoration of the 1980s and 1990s, but which are arguably continuing, if not intensifying, today. Through appeals to a nostalgic past that never existed, the conservative restoration seeks the installation of a national and uniform curriculum whose major role would be “providing the framework within which national testing can function” and which would enable “the establishment of a procedure that can supposedly give consumers ‘quality tags’ on schools so that ‘free-market forces’ can operate to the fullest extent possible” (Apple, 1993, p. 231). Curricular artifacts like textbooks are not isolated bits of knowledge, they are connected to these larger societal tendencies and hegemonic orderings. In ignoring how textbooks are symptomatic of these larger cultural trends, Loewen (1995, 2007) unintentionally participates in the perpetuation of the conservative
restoration. Important for discussions of textbook knowledge, then, is not just what textbooks include and exclude, but also the processes by which textbooks incorporate as official knowledge and what knowledge is deemed unfit and abjected from the curricular body of American history.

**Doxastic claim II: Textbooks Include too Much Knowledge**

Criticisms that textbooks include too much knowledge, like criticisms that they exclude knowledge, argue that current textbooks have become watered-down and banal learning instruments. Where this doxastic claim differs is where these critics locate culpability for the nature of current textbooks. Diane Ravitch (2003), for example, locates blame for diluted textbooks on political interest groups forcing textbook adoption committees to produce standards that result in censored, “politically correct” textbooks. LaSpina (2009) has observed that during the 1987 History-Social Science Framework adoption process for grades K-5 in California, Ravitch had argued for a World History curriculum centered around classical myths and legends, while simultaneously objecting to a balance among Western and non-Western World History curricula. As a member of the adoption committee, Ravitch also insisted on a curriculum that linked Western civilization to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks. Following arguments that Ravitch makes elsewhere (Ravitch & Viteritti, 2003; Ravitch & Ravitch, 2007), what was at stake in this definition of World History curriculum was its potential to both counteract the effects of a “toxic version of popular culture,” which was destroying the ability of students to understand complex knowledge (Ravitch & Viteritti, 2003) and to reestablish (textual) authority over curricular knowledge.
Concerned about the apparent lack legitimate knowledge, Ravitch has compiled and edited a list of essential readings that, as the title of the compilation suggests, “every literate person needs to know” (Ravitch & Ravitch, 2007).

Ravitch’s (2003) critique of textbook censorship and Ravitch and Viteritti’s (2003) critique of popular culture makes two important concessions. First Ravitch and Viteritti (2003) concede that, “throughout the twentieth century, schools have served as battlegrounds over values that adults could not resolve among themselves” (Ravitch & Viteritti, 2003, p. 7). Apple and Christian-Smith (1991) have made a similar argument in discussing the proxy role textbooks play within a larger cultural politics (see Chapter 1). The primary difference between these two similar sounding positions is that whereas Apple and Christian-Smith (1991) are primarily concerned with examining the politics of knowledge legitimation, Ravitch and Viteritti (2003) concede the political externality of textbook controversies in an attempt to refocus the attention of parents to guard against what aspects of culture their children are viewing.

Ravitch and Viteritti (2003) also concede, by necessity of their position, that popular culture is pedagogical, but that its public pedagogy should not be trusted because popular culture does not teach good values nor build good character. This second concession leads the authors to concede that parental regulation of what children view is not censorship, but if the government dictates proper reading/viewing habits is it an act of censorship. Problematic to these concessions is that they rely on the Western narrative tradition advocated by Ravitch in 1987, which based on Ravitch and Ravitch’s (2007) compilation of
essential readings would include almost exclusive reference to the ways Greek and Roman myths and legends were appropriated by the European tradition. The insistence that abstract knowledge results in students becoming good citizens is ideology disguised as non-ideology though it is still a *point de capiton*.

In opposing the ideologically driven nature of the textbook adoption process, which pits liberals and conservatives against each other and instead calling for a simpler textbook focused on the classical myths and legends, Ravitch (2003) is able to present the *doxastic* claim that textbooks include too much knowledge as an appeal to restore simpler ways of learning and traditional knowledge. What is a stake for criticisms that textbooks include too much knowledge is knowledge itself, constantly under threat from the external epistemological and pedagogical sources of the Internet, music, television, movies, etc. In critiquing the power of political interest groups, Ravitch (2003) is appealing for an epistemological certainty unencumbered by political correctness or multicultural curricula, a certainty found in the classical foundational myths of Western civilization.

**Too Many Images in American History Textbooks**

A second way in which the *doxastic* claim that textbooks include too much knowledge is made is through critiquing the inclusion of visual material in textbooks. This critique generally takes a condescending tone, which laments that hyper-mediation has forced textbooks to include images for students who, assumingly because of the Internet, television, movies, etc., require images to
learn (Woodward, 1993). Problematically, this claim ignores the cognitive benefits of images, while also denying that images are themselves content.

Cognitively, Levin and Mayer (1993) have argued textbook images are beneficial because they aid in the reading-to-learn process or in the comprehension and memory of written material. The inclusion of images in textbooks facilitates the reading-to-learn process because pictorial descriptors dually code complex written messages. Because illustrations are concentrated, concise and concrete they are able to focus (if not replace) lengthy written descriptions. Textbook images also make textbooks more coherent by providing visual organization to narrative prose. For example, in history textbooks, timelines, maps and graphs help to visually organize narrative material. Textbook images further aid in the reading-to-learn process by making complex written material more comprehensible through visual interpretations; and through rendering unfamiliar concepts (e.g. how the human eye works) familiar through analogous pictorial descriptors (e.g. how the aperture of a camera works). A final reason why textbook illustrations are cognitively effective is that they transform written terminology into visual mnemonic queues that aid in the remembering of difficult vocabulary.

While the above explanations may explain how textbook images can be cognitively effective, they do not provide ways to determine when textbook images are cognitively effective. Reading-to-learn performance outcomes depend, Levin and Mayer (1993) continue, on textual and image relatedness. That is, respectively, whether images relate back to the written text and whether the
written text relates back to images. In the former relationship it is important that images correspond to specific textual moments and avoid being decorative. In the latter relationship it is important that students be able to extract from images textual referents. A similar relationship exists between the quality of images and the complexity of the written text. Illustrations should be well drawn and photographs should be focused and framed. Likewise, the complexity of the written material should determine which illustrative techniques are most cognitively effective.

In much the same way that the above explanations of cognitive effectiveness are not able to explain when textbook illustrations are effective, the measures of cognitive effectiveness are unable to determine why certain images are included versus other images or why particular images are repeated across history textbook editions and titles. This is because there is a marked difference between an illustration seeking to explain how the human eye works by an analogous visual reference to a camera’s aperture and a historical photograph. In addition to the above six reasons of how textbook illustrations can be effective, Levin and Mayer (1993) have posited a seventh reason—collective memory or the metonymic use of iconic images to represent whole historical periods. More so than the title or authors, images are integral role in the design of contemporary textbooks. Cover images catch the eye first and do most of the textbook selling. Inside the cover, images signify higher quality.

Opponents of the increased use of images in textbooks object to the ways images are made to carrying content. Gilbert T. Sewall of the American Textbook
Council pointedly expressed this objection in 1992: “The expository nature of the social studies textbook has atrophied. In the place of a strongly written text, textbooks have substituted a nervous, fragmented, kaleidoscope, multivalent learning tool that seems designed, really for nonreaders” (quoted in Laspina, 1998, p. 3). This visual cynicism objects to how images are a “proxy for textbook quality” (Woodward, 1993, p. 132). This objection also concedes that textbooks are driven by market pragmatics. Images allow publishers to release new textbooks without undergoing major textual revisions. The replacement of black-and-white images with color images similarly makes textbooks appear newer without textual revisions. Images also keep textbooks current with shifting political and cultural norms. Challenges to visual cynicism (c.f. Laspina, 1998) interrogate the animosity between word and image. Objections to how images are included in textbooks that acknowledge the interrelatedness of word and image, or what W.J.T. Mitchell (1994) has called “imagetext,” focus on the meaning of visual material and the processes by which readers/viewers make meaning. It is on these grounds that criticisms of textbook images should be leveled. That is, criticisms should focus on what meaning the selected images connote, not whether textbooks should or should not include images.

Made to stand-in for entire historical periods, the historical photographs high school History textbooks employ are problematic first because of the critical problems of documentary photography; namely, that “photography functions to ratify and affirm the complex ideological web that at any moment in historical time is perceived as reality tout court” (Solomon-Godeau, 1991, p. 171). There is
thus a selective tradition to documentary photography as well as structures of feeling that bind photographer and reader/viewer together so that certain images resonate more than others. It is the very realism upon which documentary photography relies that is cause for pause. Rather than portraying people and places realistically, documentary photography legitimizes social values and norms by rendering invisible the social, political, and economic conditions not framed by the camera lens.

The iconic photograph, “Migrant Agricultural Worker’s Family” (1936), makes invisible the systematic failings of the social, political, and economic spheres during the 1930s, but also hides the same failings from view today because the photograph has become a metonym for the Great Depression. This photograph was shot and in turn selected to conjure particular emotions. In the eyes of Dorothea Lange we are meant to see individual misfortune, but also the ability of individuals to persevere in difficult times. What better way to conjure the simultaneous emotions of sympathy and triumph than the Madonnaesque image of a mother cradling her child? What is not in the image is how Dorothea found herself in the middle of a dusty field, where she had come from or where she was going, and why. Such questions point to the systemic ways society failed to address poverty. In veiling the social, political, and economic conditions, documentary photography makes rather than reveals reality, an ideological undertaking that is successful because “the dialectical understanding of the relation between image and the living world [. . .] has simply been severed in thought” (Rosler, 1989, p. 321). Within each step of documentary photography
meaning is being made. The iconic historical photographs often repeated among textbook editions and titles convey a particular way of seeing the history of the urban riots of the late-1960s, sixties counterculture, and the women’s movement.

**Looking at race and poverty: Picturing the urban riots of the late 1960s.**

Among the fifteen textbooks analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5, only *A History of the United States* (1986, 1996, 2005) and *America: Pathways to the Present* (2000) include photographs of the urban riots of the late-1960s. All three editions of *A History of the United States* contain the same photographs of buildings burning in the 1967 Detroit riot and the 2000 edition of *America* includes a photograph from the 1965 Watts riot. Against such sparse visual representation of the urban riots of the late-1960s, nearly every textbook analyzed has photographs of either Martin Luther King, Jr. delivering his “I Have a Dream” speech (August 28, 1963) and/or King and his wife, Coretta, marching from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama (March 7, 1965). Other recurrent photographs are of Malcolm X, and, to a lesser extent, photographs of Black Panther Party (BPP) members. These later photographs are not by themselves problematic, however, there are instances in which they are used to connote thematic messages discussed again in Chapter 4. That is, photographs are employed to either suggest that the urban riots of the late-1960s were not in harmony with existing forms of complaint as practiced by the civil rights movement or that they were motivated by the BPP.
An example of the first message comes from *A History of a Free People* (1967), which dedicates the entire page before discussing the urban riots of the late-1960s to the successes of the civil rights movement. In a series of three photographs, which surround the heading, “The Negro Revolution,” the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, and a line of African Americans waiting to vote in the 1966 Democratic party primary in Alabama are pictured. The first photograph features President Johnson handing a pen to Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP (though his affiliation is not mentioned in the caption). The second photograph features a number of marchers carrying signs. The caption draws attention to a sign outside the focal point of the photograph that reads: “From 1863 to 1963. How much longer?” The third photograph depicts a line of African Americans waiting to vote. The caption to this photograph reads:

One of the results of the Civil Rights Act is graphically portrayed by this long line of Negro voters waiting to cast their ballots in the 1966 Democratic party primary in Alabama. Progress has also been made in school desegregation and equal employment. (Bragdon & McCutchen, 1967, p. 773)

Together, these photographs construct a narrative of racial progress. First, President Johnson’s signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is presented as responding to the complaint, “How much longer?” of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. Second, the photograph of the African Americans waiting to vote speaks to the success of the Civil Rights Act as well as posits successes in
school desegregation and equal employment. It is against this visual content that the urban riots are discussed on the next page of the textbook. Two other textbooks present similar visual/textual juxtapositions. First, *America: Its People and Values* (1985) juxtaposes a photograph of a dancer from the Dance Theater of Harlem with the textual description of the urban riots of the late-1960s again connoting progress (and beauty) against the violence of the urban riots.

Second, *The American Pageant: A History of the Republic* (2006) juxtaposes two images on the same page on which the urban riots of the late-1960s are discussed. The first image is a cartoon featuring an African American man dressed in a business suit walking toward a sign that reads: “Rights of Americans.” Attempting to hold this man back is a large white man also wearing a suit along with a wide brimmed hat and smoking a cigar. The caption to this cartoon reads: “You Don’t Understand Boy—You’re Suppose to Just Shuffle Along” (Kennedy, Cohen, & Bailey, 2006, p. 926). This cartoon directly expresses what the previous two examples only connote—the impatient nature of rioting African Americans. The second image is the iconographic photograph of Malcolm X speaking with both his figure pointing and lips curled in anger and speaks to the second thematic message—the urban riots of the late-1960s were motivated by the BPP. The caption to this photograph reads: “*Malcolm X* The charismatic black leader was a hypnotizing speaker who could rivet and arouse crowds with his call for black separatism. At the end of his life, Malcolm began to temper his separatist creed” (Kennedy, Cohen, & Bailey, 2006, p. 926). The textual descriptors “hypnotizing,” “rivet,” and “arouse” quilt Malcolm X’s
“separatist” rhetoric to the urban riots of the late-1960s by lending his discourse organizing potential.

Another example of this second thematic message comes from *America: Pathways to the Present* (2000), which features a photograph of Black Panther Party members marching in New York City in 1968 to protest the trial of Huey P. Newton on the page before the textbook discusses the urban riots of the late-1960s. Such a juxtaposition connotes at best a causal relationship between the BPP and rioting African Americans; and at worst suggests that rioters were associated with the BPP. The textbook pages of *America* also participate in a separatist logic. For example, the textbook page that discusses the urban riots of the late-1960s includes a small photograph of an African American woman wearing a dashiki. The caption to this photograph reads: “One result of the civil rights movement was the wearing of ethnic African clothing as a symbol of black pride” (Cayton, Perry, Reed, & Winkler, 2000, p. 839). The photographs included in *America* connote a similar affect as those images presented in *American Pageant*—creating a sense of impatience that the BPP utilized to motivate the urban riots of the late-1960s.

Poverty is not pictured among the photographs that surround textual discussions of the riots. Instead, textbook photographs and images tell one of two visual narratives: either the riots were not in harmony with existing forms of complaint as practiced by the *civil* rights movement or they were motivated by the BPP. Visual mentions of African Americans, as with other marginalized groups, are problematic for the same reasons discussed by Banks (1969) in Chapter 2—
they preclude students from understanding the social and historical forces responsible for the marginalization of African Americans. The juxtaposition of images and photographs of African Americans and textual descriptions of the urban riots of the late-1960s are problematic for another reason. That is, such visual mentions connote a link between the urban riots of the late-1960s and, depending of the image(s) or photograph(s) used, Malcolm X, the BPP or African nationalism.

**Looking at the politics of protest: Picturing sixites countercultr and the women’s movement.**

Overwhelmingly, textbooks picture sixties counterculture as well as the student protest movements of the period without movement or action. Exceptions to this general rule include the same picture of a 1964 Free Speech Movement rally depicting movement leader Mario Savio addressing a crowd of Berkeley students included in both *Todd & Curti’s the American Nation* (1995) and *The American Pageant: A History of the Republic* (2006). A third exception is a photograph of “The First Gay Pride Parade, New York City, 1970” also included in *The American Pageant*. The implication of this textbook mentioning the gay rights movement is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Suffice it to say now: this is the only photograph that pictures protest actively. Singled out among the various protest movements of the period, this photograph enlivens the gay rights movement, making it current as opposed to how textbooks picture the student protest movements and counterculture as passive and inactive.
The most common photographs of sixties counterculture are of a woman wearing flowers in her hair dancing and a psychedelic bus with hippies riding on the hood and roof. This later photograph of the psychedelic bus appears in both *American: Pathways to the Present* (2000) and *The American Pageant: A History of the Republic* (2006), but is only identified in *America as the New Buffalo Commune* who were on their way to a 1968 Fourth of July parade in El Rito, New Mexico. The caption for the photograph in *The American Pageant*, in contrast, reads:

**The Counterculture** Psychedelic buses carried hippies, seeking escape from conventional American living, to experimental communes and musical ‘happenings.’ Author Tom Wolfe inspired young people to hit the road with his chronicle of wild bus tours in *The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test*. (Kennedy, Cohen, & Bailey, 2006, p. 934)

The theme of hippies wishing to escape “conventional American living” as well as the juxtaposition of hippies against a normalized America without either interrogating the later or discussing hippies “escaping” in potentially political terms are each recurrent depictions of sixties counterculture among textbook editions and titles. Another theme prominent across textbooks is the individualizing of the both the student protest movement and sixties counterculture. A photograph featured in *The American Way* (1979) is illustrative of this individualistic textual theme. The photograph is of a young man with long hair, wearing tight fitting jeans, and smoking a cigarette standing by himself holding a sign that reads: “Peace Now.” While there is a crowd behind this
“protester,” they have their backs turned to the camera and appear to walking away.

Women and the women’s movement fares much worse than the sixties counterculture in textbook photographs. The two images that dominate textbooks are of Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem. None of the fifteen textbooks analyzed feature photographs of women protesting or of any movement. Additionally, while textbooks tend to name a number of women of color, only Discovering American History (1974) includes photographs of women of color. Two such photographs included in this textbook are photographs of Shirley Chrisholm addressing a political meeting and another of Florynce Kennedy, who is quoted in the accompanying caption as saying: “‘Don’t agonize. Organize’” (Kownslar & Frizzle, 1974, p. 789). The absence of active photographs has the effect of rendering the movement for women’s rights simultaneously inactive and delimiting understandings of the women’s movement to elected officials. The preponderance of photographs of Friedan and Steinem also privileges heroic individuals and the paucity of photographs of women of color denies any possible intersectional understanding of race and gender.

**Methodology and Methods**

The textbooks analyzed below (n = 15; Appendix A) were selected from three sources: Loewen (2007), Lerner, Nagai and Rothman (1995), and Sewall and Emberling (1998). Since Lerner et. al. limited their findings to the top three textbooks from each of the decades they analyzed, and in an effort to limit the research burden of this study, I also limited the number of textbooks analyzed to
three per decade. This allowed for complementary comparisons of textbooks across decades. Where possible I utilized similar textbook titles to make comparisons more direct. This criteria as well as an attempt to equally space textbooks within each decade, were used to break ties if there was more than three textbooks per decade analyzed by Loewen (2007) or Sewall and Emberling (1998). For the textbooks from the 1970s (n = 6), 1980s (n = 10), 1990s (n = 8), and 2000s (n = 6) textbooks were selected using a combination of these two criteria. Beginning with textbooks from the 1980s, titles were increasingly familiar. This observation conforms to Apple’s (1998) observation that to maximize profits, textbook companies tend to produce uniform textbooks. Thus, while the textbooks from the 1960s and 1970s tend to be unique and as such could be considered statistical outliers, the textbooks from the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s represent a solidification of official knowledge among textbook editions and titles.

A simple descriptive coding scheme was developed and used to analyze the high school American history textbooks selected and proceeded in two phases. First, the specific passages describing the urban riots of the late-1960s, sixties counterculture, and the women’s movement were transcribed onto the coding spreadsheet. Next, the text before and after these passages was reviewed for

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Among the textbooks selected and coded, Discovering American History (1974) stands out the most against the other fourteen textbooks analyzed. This textbooks represents a hyper-privileging of experiences complete with individual testimonies and photo-journalistic-style photographs that capture the experiences of and injustices faced by women, African American, Mexican Americans, American Indians, and the poor. Surprisingly, this textbook does not discuss either the urban riots of the late-1960s or sixties counterculture. There is, however, a section devoted to the women’s movement, which is I discuss in Chapter 5.
context. This second phase of coding differed for each of the subsequent chapters.

For Chapter 4, the causes assigned to the urban riots of the late-1960s were noted. Causes identified within textbooks included: failings of the civil rights movement, failings of governmental policies, police, poverty or no direct cause. While several passages alluded to poverty, only those passages that explicitly referenced poverty as a cause for the urban riots of the late-1960s were coded as such. For Chapter 5, attention was paid to how textbooks assigned sixties counterculture and the women’s movement political possibilities.
Chapter 4


In analyzing how American history textbooks depict the urban riots of the late-1960s, this chapter first reviews existing scholarship on how textbooks depict African Americans generally. This review reveals a repeated practice of textbooks omitting (abjecting) African American scholars and scholarship from the curricular body of official knowledge and the selective tradition of American history as well as the process of mentioning. Following this critical literature review, findings are discussed in two sections. The first section discusses how textbooks conceal the historical legacy of whiteness. The second section discusses how poverty is abjected from the curricular body of American history. Each of these sections shifts the location of blame from institutional and structural causes toward individual culpability.

Academic criticisms of how American history textbooks depict African Americans date back to (at least) 1933 and African American historian Lawrence D. Reddick’s Master’s thesis, “Radical Attitudes in the South’s American History Textbooks” (Anderson, 1986). Two years later, W.E.B. Du Bois (1935) would criticize the perpetuation of racist ideologies in history textbooks in Black Reconstruction. From the 1930s to the 1960s there were numerous dissertations written, books published and curriculum recommendations made to address the omissions and stereotyped mentions of African American experiences by American history textbooks. Brown (2010), for example, has shown that there were a number of textbooks written by African American scholars to counter the
racist scientific discourses of the period that constructed African Americans as biologically inferior. These textbooks, written by Carter G. Woodson and Charles Wesley during the 1920s and 1930s, are counter-memories or historical discourses that challenge official knowledge. Complementing the theory of counter-memory is a revisionist ontology or the recognition that because racial groups tend to be overly normed counter-narratives are needed to “repudiate, revise, and reinvent how their racial selves have been constructed” (Brown, 2010, p. 56). The findings discussed below engage in these practices.

Despite these textbooks and the growing volume and accessibility of scholarship by African American historians—for example, the Journal of Negro History began publication in 1916 and provided detailed and non-stereotyped historical accounts of African American experiences—the predominantly white publishing industry continued to produce superficial and distorted American history textbooks and as such were complicit in “rendering African Americans as a group of people who had no history and contributed little to the master narrative of American progress” (Brown, 2010, p. 54). While early twentieth-century American culture *writ large* (e.g. advertising) tended to portray African Americans through exaggerated images of either submissiveness or criminality, textbooks relied on the implicit racist practice of omitting (abjecting) African American experiences. Du Bois (1935) recounted his own difficulty in correcting the historical record of Reconstruction:

The editors of the fourteenth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica asked me for an article on the history of the American Negro. From my
manuscript they cut out all my references to Reconstruction. I insisted on including the following statement:

‘White historians have ascribed the faults and failures of Reconstruction to Negro ignorance and corruption. But the Negro insists that it was Negro loyalty and the Negro vote alone that restored the South to the Union; established the new democracy, both for white and black, and instituted the public schools.’ (p. 713)

Such purposeful omissions of African American scholars from the curricular body of official knowledge and the selective tradition of American history anticipate the more recent textbooks controversies already discussed. Writing nearly thirty years after Du Bois (1935), Banks (1969) provided a similar account of how African Americans' experiences were depicted in American History textbooks: “While textbook authors often attempt to rationalize racial discrimination, they more frequently discuss discrimination without either explaining or condemning it” (Banks, 1969, p. 957). Du Bois had argued:

Our histories tend to discuss American slavery so impartially, that in the end nobody seems to have done wrong and everybody was right. Slavery appears to be thrust upon unwilling helpless America, while the South was blameless in becoming its center. The difference of development, North and South, is explained as a sort of working out of cosmic social and economic law. (p. 714)
As already discussed in Chapter 2, by the 1960s there had been a shift toward greater inclusion of African Americans in the textbooks. Part of the reason behind the increased presence of African Americans in 1960s textbooks apart from growing social and political pressures being applied to American educational institutions by the various protest and social movements of the Sixties was the success of the counter-memories like those of Woodson and Wesley. The inclusion of African American successes in business, science, medicine, etc. as well as the attention paid to reconstruct Africa as culturally, socially, and intellectually vibrant by African American textbook authors was strategic and resistant. This point is well made by Brown (2010) and is a much-needed counter-point to the process of mentioning discussed in Chapter 2. There is a difference between the textbooks analyzed by Brown and current American history textbooks, which reflect the process of mentioning. A possible explanation for such a discrepancy is that while the textbooks written by Woodson and Wesley were primarily intended for African American audiences, contemporary textbooks are written for White audiences. A number of recent criticisms of how textbooks depict African Americans echo Apple and Christian-Smith’s (1991) critique of mentioning.

Hughes (2007) compared an older textbook, John Wiltz’s *The Search for Identity* (1973), against the current textbooks analyzed by Loewen (1995) to argue that current history textbooks do not attend to the historical construction of whiteness, which Hughes defines as “the process of how whites created, sustained, defended, and altered their identity and its related privileges” (p. 205).
Important to this understanding of whiteness is the process of becoming white over time, a process facilitated by the ability to distance oneself from people of color. Hughes’ constructivist analysis highlights that because current American History textbooks treat racism as a “tragedy of the past divorced from other historical issues such as labor, politics, and gender and the contemporary realities of power in American society,” they cannot attend to the historical construction of whiteness and as such participate in the perpetuation of white privilege (p. 203).

This assessment of whiteness parallels Giroux’s (1997) “insurgent multiculturalism” project. The goal of this project is to re-orient multiculturalism toward a critical space that does not simply affirm cultural differences, but re-defines multiculturalism in “pedagogical and political terms that embrace it as a referent and practice for civic courage, critical citizenship, and democratic struggle” (Giroux, 1997, p. 247). A key component of this project is confronting white racism and is one of the shifting locations of blame discussed below.

Alridge (2006) is also critical of the process of mentioning. Consolidating the various “mentionings” of Martin Luther King Jr. in current textbooks into three master narratives—“King as messiah, King as the embodiment of the civil rights movement, and King as a moderate” (p. 664)—Alridge, in language similar to both Banks (1969) and Du Bois (1935), argues against the dominance of master narratives in textbooks because they deny students “a complicated, complex, and nuanced portrait of American history,” and instead present information that is “inaccurate, simplistic, and disconnected from the realities of contemporary local, national, and world affairs” (p. 663.) Alridge’s narrative analysis is important
because it is critical of the *process* by which American history textbooks incorporate African American experiences. That is, while Banks (1969) argued for quantitative and qualitative differences in 1960s textbooks as well as their continued shortcomings, there was not any discussion of the incorporation of selective knowledge into the curricular body of American history.

Alridge’s (2006) first master narrative—“King as messiah”—casts King as the central figure of a Christian passion play in which King is introduced as an “unlikely champion” of the Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955) whose rousing speech at Holt Street Baptist Church “delivers” boycotters. This image of a messianic King delivering the civil rights movement (CRM) continues through the Birmingham campaign (1963) and King’s “Letters from a Birmingham Jail” and the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (August 28, 1963) and his “I Have a Dream” speech. A second important component of this narrative is the attention given to the pretense of death King is said to have demonstrated prior to his assassination April 4, 1968. In discussing King’s assassination, Alridge has argued that textbooks position Memphis the night before King’s death as a kind of *Gethsemane* complete with inserted block quotations from King that spoke to the possibility of him not reaching the promise land. Complementing this master narrative, Alridge continues, is the characterizing of President Johnson as a Pharaoh-like figure who pushed for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The “King as messiah” narrative dovetails with the second master narrative Alridge (2006) identified—“King as the embodiment of the civil rights movement.” As the embodiment of the CRM, King’s life is used to periodize the
movement beginning at Holt Street Baptist Church and ending with his assassination in 1968. Like the first master narrative, the representation of the CRM *qua* King posits a linear progression toward a colorblind society and excludes women, gays (e.g. Bayard Rustin), and the *movement* itself, perpetuating a great (straight) men of history historical narrative echoing the problematic of including heroic African Americans already identified by Banks (1969).

Furthermore, Alridge’s first and second master narratives point to the problematic of incorporation, which through mentioning is a way to safely accommodate resistance. Across the textbooks analyzed, the CRM is positioned as resolving racism through the recurrent citation of King’s dream that his children “will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.” Citation of King’s “I Have a Dream” speech is taken up again in textbook sections that discuss Johnson’s presidency confirming what Alridge had already observed, that Johnson fulfills King’s dream and as such resolves the complaint of the CRM and as such racism.

What textbooks incorporate as official knowledge into the selective tradition of American history is central to Alridge’s (2006) third master narrative of King—“King as a moderate.” The power of this narrative is that by concealing the fact that King was labeled a radical by the U.S. government and regularly surveilled by the FBI, King’s legacy is able to be appropriated by opponents of affirmative action. Such misappropriations of King’s legacy are possible because, as Alridge has argued, textbooks portray King as one-dimensional and ignore the tactical and purposeful shift he made toward discussing poverty issues in the late-
1960s. Equally ignored by such one-dimensional depictions is the fact that King’s moderation as well as the distance he kept from other African American leaders like Malcolm X was strategic. Instead of being discussed within this larger social and political context, King’s moderation is depicted as something inherent to him and an essentialized part of the civil rights movement. The regular juxtaposition of King and Malcolm X and/or the Black Panther Party solidifies King as a moderate. Tragically, the master narrative of King as a moderate has “overshadowed his more radical critique of poverty in the midst of substantial U.S. economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s and his insistence that America live up to the democratic principles it claimed to hold so dear” (Alridge, 2006, p. 676).

The most recent scholarship on the depiction of African Americans in American history textbooks (Brown & Brown, 2010a, 2010b) focuses on representations of racial violence in textbooks. Both of these studies inquire into the sociocultural legacy of racial violence in textbooks utilizing critical race theory (CRT) to theoretically frame and inform their findings. CRT is critical of both the limitations of racial progress and the inclusion of African American experiences into dominant culture discourses. In relation to American history textbooks, CRT maintains, along argumentative lines similar to Alridge (2006), Banks (1969), and Du Bois (1935), that inclusion tends to produce oversimplified texts that avoid controversy and hide more than they reveal, the paradigmatic example of which is *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (1954). In American history textbooks *Brown* and school integration symbolically metonymically
represent racial progress. CRT is critical of this narrative because of the continued persistence of racism and, as Brown and Brown (2010a, 2010b) have demonstrated, racial violence.

Inquiry into the sociocultural legacy of racial violence in textbooks is significant because it elucidates the ways racism continues to be manifested ideologically and maintained institutionally. Brown and Brown (2010a) coded textbooks from Grades 5, 8, and 11 utilizing a coding schema for racial violence and its resistance based upon whether racial violence was committed by individuals or groups, was haphazard or strategic; and if strategic, whether racial violence had structural or institutional links. Resistance was coded using the same individual/group and haphazard стратегический schema. Brown and Brown (2010b), a smaller study by the same authors, analyzed textbooks from Grades 5 and 8 utilizing the same coding schema as the larger (2010a) study and arrived at similar findings.

Brown and Brown (2010a, 2010b) found that across textbooks and grade levels racial violence is depicted as strategic whether committed by individuals (i.e. slave owners) or groups (i.e. the Klu Klux Klan). Based on this finding the authors have argued that textbooks silence institutional and structural causes for racial violence because depictions of racial violence do not interrogate the larger institutions and structures that supported (either actively or tacitly) and benefited from racial violence. Abstracting racial violence thus has the simultaneous effect of denying its materiality and solidifying it as historical. Abstractions allow textbook readers to safely distance themselves from the sociocultural legacies of
racial violence because no one today is as vile as slave owners or the KKK. Yet, as Brown and Brown (2010a, 2010b), illustrate racial violence continues to this day.

The abstraction of racial violence also hides the historical construction of whiteness and the maintenance of white privilege. Where explanations of racial violence are provided by textbooks they tend, as Brown and Brown (2010a) have observed, to focus on issues of controlling Black populations or precluding African Americans from exercising their due political rights. Against strategic racial violence, Brown and Brown (2010b) have argued that textbooks depict resistance to racial violence as haphazard. Connecting the resistance of enslaved Africans, the resistance of freed African Americans during Reconstruction, and the urban riots of the late-1960s reveals a pattern of textbooks depicting resistance to racial violence as haphazard and occurring *ex nihilo*—a pattern already observed by Banks (1969) and Du Bois (1935).

While Brown and Brown’s (2010a, 2010b) analyses of the sociocultural legacy of racial violence provide a counter-memory that interrogates white racism there are limitations to their studies. For example, in discussing the “Civil Rights/Black Power period” Brown and Brown (2010a) do not discuss the series of urban riots of the late-1960s. Arguably resistant, these riots brought into focus the structural and institutional limits of the civil rights movement and governmental policies like the War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In analyzing how American history textbooks depict the urban riots of late-1960s, the second half of this chapter expands the research of Brown and Brown (2010a,
2010b). Just as textbooks obfuscate the structural inequalities and material conditions of racial violence, they also conceal the legacy of whiteness and abject intersections of race and poverty during the 1960s. These connections were being drawn throughout the 1950s and 1960s by King, Malcolm X, the Black Panther Party and especially those African Americans rioting in the streets of Watts, Newark, Detroit and hundreds of other American cities.

**Findings and Discussion**

Among the textbooks selected and coded, the earliest mention of the urban riots of the late-1960s is a reference to the 1965 Watts riots in *History of a Free People* (1967).

In 1964 and in 1965, a series of appalling riots took place in Negro districts in half a dozen northern and western cities. They culminated in Los Angeles in August 1965. In the district of Watts, almost entirely populated by poor Negroes, mobs looted, burned and fought the police for four days. Thirty-four people were killed and nearly 900 injured, and damage was estimated at $100,000,000. (Bragdon & McCutchen, 1967, p. 774)

The numbers cited in this passage, and repeated throughout the other fourteen textbooks, are from a 1965 report, “Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning?,” authored by the McCone Commission, which was appointed by then California Governor, Pat Brown.

According the commission’s report (quoted in Bloom & Breines, 1995), what precipitated the riots was a traffic stop that spilled over into a crowd of
African American spectators. On August 11, 1965, a white California Highway Patrolman, Lee W. Minikus, pulled over Marquette Frye and his brother Ronald, both African American. Upon failing a field sobriety test, Minikus arrested Frye and called for backup and a tow truck. Not wishing to have the car towed Ronald, who Minikus would not allow to drive the car home, walked the two blocks home and got his mother. Upon arriving at the scene, the mother, angered by Marquette’s drunken driving, yelled at him, which in turn caused Marquette to become angry and belligerent toward the police. What happened next is rather quick and erratic. A fight broke out amongst the Fryes, which the arresting patrolman became involved in. The crowd witnessing the skirmish became increasingly agitated and a woman spit on an officer as police were leaving the scene after arresting all three members of the Frye family. Irritated by this action, an officer went into the crowd and grabbed the woman who appeared pregnant because she was wearing a grocery clerk smock. This action further angered the crowd of spectators who never totally dispersed following this second arrest and engaged in violence that night and for the next three days.

Only two textbooks, *Todd & Curti’s the American Nation* (1995) and *America: Pathways to the Present* (2000), cite police amongst the causes for what would become the 1965 Watts riot. Of these two, the reference to police in *America* is particularly unfortunate in how it locates blame for the Watts riot in African Americans not viewing police as “upholders of justice.”

Residents of ghetto neighborhoods viewed police officers as dangerous oppressors, not upholders of justice. James Baldwin remarked that a white
police officer in one of these neighborhoods was ‘like an occupying soldier in a bitterly hostile country.’ Eventually, frustration and anger boiled over into riots and looting. (Cayton, Perry, Reed, & Winkler, 2000, p. 839)

Predominately, textbooks locate blame for the urban riots of the late-1960s among the failings of the civil rights movement, the failings of government policies, and in fewer occasions, the rampant poverty African Americans living in urban centers experienced during the 1960s. The next two sections investigate these shifting locations of blame.

**Shifting the Location of Blame I: Confronting White Racism**

A particular salient example of how textbooks locate blame for the urban riots of the late-1960s can be seen in the 1972 and 1982 editions *Rise of the American Nation* both of which include citations from the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders or the Kerner Commission. This advisory commission was appointed by President Johnson on July 28, 1967 and charged with investigating the causes for the urban riots of the late-1960s. The 1972 edition of *Rise of the American Nation* cites the following findings from the Kerner Commission:

‘Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal,’ the Commission warned. ‘Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the future of every American . . . What white Americans have never fully understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that
white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.’ (Todd & Curti, 1972, p. 827)

Though drastically edited, the 1982 edition of this textbook series also included citation of the Kerner Commission report: “‘Our nation,’ the Kerner Commission reported, ‘is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal’” (Todd & Curti, 1982, p. 803).

Telling of the trend already exhibited between the two editions of Rise of the American Nation, there are only three references to the Kerner Commission among the other thirteen textbooks analyzed. These include: America: Its People and Values (1985), Triumph of the American Nation (1990), and Todd & Curti’s the American Nation (1995). Of these, only America does not reproduce the passage from the 1972 edition of Rise of the American Nation. After describing how “the promises of the Great Society were simply not coming true for blacks,” America goes on to describe the damage caused by the Watts riot as well as mentioning that riots also occurred in Detroit, Cleveland, Baltimore, Newark, and Washington, D.C. before concluding that, “many Americans blamed violence on the new black power groups. President Johnson appointed a commission to find the answer” (Wood, Gabriel, & Biller, 1985, p. 749).

Hughes’ (2007) analysis confirms there were other textbooks during the 1970s that called attention to the historical legacy of whiteness. Similar to the above comparison, Hughes compared the 1973 and 1981 editions of John Wiltz’s The Search for Identity. The 1973 edition of this textbook included an appendix
entitled “Ethnic Viewpoints,” which was comprised of four narrative essays entitled “A Black American Speaks,” “A Puerto Rican American Speaks,” “A Native American Speaks,” and “A Mexican American Speaks.” These essays addressed institutional racism through arguments that located racism in the historical founding of American democracy. For example, Columbus Salley, author of “A Black American Speaks,” argued that there was racism in the very fact that there were debates over “the human worth and status of black Americans” in drafting *The Constitution* (Hughes, 2007, p. 204). Luis Mercado, author of “A Puerto Rican American Speaks,” made a similar historical argument in discussing the colonial past of Puerto Rico, a past that “strongly reflected the plantation mentality, customs, and folkways of the Deep South” (Hughes, 2007, p. 204). The threat such an appendix posed to the hegemonic ordering of racism as historical is evident, Hughes argued, in the deletion of the appendix from the 1981 edition of *The Search for Identity* and the fact that Harper and Row stopped publishing the textbook series altogether after this edition.


*Ironically*, just as the civil rights movement had achieved its greatest legal and political triumphs, more city-shaking riots erupted in black ghettos of several American cities. A bloody outburst in Newark, New Jersey, in the
summer of 1967 took twenty-three lives. Federal troops restored order in Detroit, Michigan, after forty-three people died in the streets. As in Los Angeles, black rioters torched their own neighborhoods, attacking police officers and even firefighters, who had to battle flames and mobs howling, ‘Burn, baby, burn.’ (Kennedy, Cohen, & Bailey, 2006, p. 926, emphasis added)

The word “ironically” in this passage should not be read to mean contrary to plan or expectation, but as something closer to “incongruously,” making the above sentence read something closer to: the urban riots of the late-1960s were not in harmony with existing forms of complaint as practiced by the civil rights movement. This textual shift from the 1972 edition of Rise of the American Nation to the 2006 edition of The American Pageant marks a shift in the location of blame for the urban-riots from the institutionalization of racism to mobs of “howling” African Americans. In shifting the location of blame from institutional racism to individual culpability, The American Pageant conceals the historical legacy of whiteness and maintenance of white privilege. More problematic though is that the passage positions African Americans as wishing the destruction of their neighborhoods. In addition to concealing discussions of whiteness, excluding institutional racism from the selective tradition of American history has the effect of rendering rioting African Americans themselves as abject, “ironically” opposed to the course of normal protest and unfit for the curricular body of American history.
The gradual but continual concealing of institutional racism by textbooks occurred because individuation is an effective quilting point, an effective way of generating understood structures of feeling among textbook teachers and/or students. The textual erasure of institutional racism and the historical legacy of whiteness suggest a willingness to accept, if not expect, certain historical renderings of both the racial violence and resistance, but also of African Americans themselves. Textbooks render rioters as abject because they threaten to rip apart the thin film holding together the narrative web of neoliberalism and as such are deemed unfit for the curricular body of official knowledge and selective tradition of American history. Similarly, textbooks render both the materiality of the rampant poverty experienced by African American communities in the midst of an otherwise affluent society as well as the intersection of race and poverty as abject.

**Shifting the Location of Blame II: Poverty as Abject**

While it is important to confront the historical legacy of whiteness, it is also important to attend to the material conditions of African Americans living in urban centers across the U.S. during the 1960s. Across the textbooks analyzed there are very few explicit references to the poverty African Americans experienced during this period. Among those textbooks analyzed, the first reference to poverty is *The American Way* (1979):

Blacks were disappointed at the reality of the civil rights movement. In Newark, for example, the unemployment rate was twice as high as the figure for the whole nation. In addition, there were twice as many Blacks
out of work as Whites in Newark. The Great Society got money to the people enrolled in programs. But it was not able to get skills to enough of the unskilled. It was not able to get permanent jobs in private business for the poor. (Bauer, 1979, p. 689)

This passage expresses the limitations of both the civil rights movement and the Great Society as causes of the urban riots of the late-1960s. Culpability is expressed in terms of governmental policies unable to deliver the training necessary for African Americans to find employment despite being able to provide welfare.

The intersection of unemployment and poverty is repeated in the three other textbooks that reference poverty—*Rise of the American Nation* (1982), *America: Its People and Values* (1985) and *Triumph of the American Nation* (1990). References in *Rise* and *Triumph of the American Nation* are identical:

Many Americans, black as well as white, blamed the violence on a group of new militant black leaders, but this was by no means the whole truth. The rate of unemployment among black workers the country over was double that of white workers. Among black teenagers in the inner cities the jobless rate was much higher. As the riots demonstrated, poverty from which there seems no escape is a fertile breeding ground for violence.

(Todd & Curti, 1982, p. 802)

While *America* does not explicitly reference poverty, it does take into account the fact that even if employed African Americans still held low paying jobs, thus implicitly referencing poverty.
The promises of the Great Society were simply not coming true for blacks. Unemployment among black workers remained much higher than the national average. Even those blacks who did work often held only the lowest-paying jobs. (Wood & Gabriel, 1985, p. 841)

These passages differ markedly from those in the other textbooks from the 1980s and 1990s and especially from those textbooks from the 2000s. The textbook from the 1980s to yet be discussed, *A History of the United States* (1986), does not cite a direct cause for the urban riots of the late-1960s. Rather, this textbook presents the urban riots of the late-1960s through a lament by President Johnson:

> LBJ was stunned by Watts. He had just signed his great Voting Rights Act into law—and now this. "How is it possible," he asked, "after all we've accomplished?" Johnson was understandably bitter. For the riots hurt his Great Society programs. They seemed so aimless and only served to destroy, when what was needed was to build. They created a backlash among many whites who already felt blacks were receiving too much from the government. This was less a revolution than an explosion. The President tried to understand. "God knows how little we've really moved on this issue," he said, "despite all the fanfare. As I see it I've moved the Negro from a D+ to a C-. He's still nowhere. He knows it. And that's why he's out in the streets." (Boorstin & Kelley, 1986, p. 669)

This passage, repeated verbatim in the 1996 edition of the textbook, is telling of the dual tendencies of curriculum to organize students based upon
arbitrary categories and to reward students based on how well they operate within these categories. Apple (2004) has argued categories that assign culpability abstract institutional and economic contexts. How students are labeled through the various sorting practices schooling employ, for example, intelligence or language acquisition, results in under-performing students being labeled as deviant, a problematic for which individuals, not institutions, are responsible.

Problematically, such labels become essentializing qualities of students until their “entire relationship to an institution is conditioned by the category” (Apple, 2004, p. 128). Applied to how American history textbooks depict the urban riots of the late-1960s a similar functionality occurs: rioting African Americans are depicted as acting impatiently to the gradual successes of the civil rights movement, a behavior which is essentialized as deviant. Additionally, in focusing on individual rioters, textbooks conceal the economic and structural conditions that found African American predominately located in the declining urban centers of the 1960s. This shifting of blame abjects poverty. Even when poverty is explicitly referenced there is no discussion of how or why African Americans lived in poverty or what that poverty looked like.

Brown and Brown (2010a, 2010b) have also argued that depictions like the one just cited have implications in and outside of textbooks in echoing Apple’s (2004) argument that through the process of schooling students come to internalize “visions of both the way institutions should be organized and their appropriate place in these institutions” (p. 134). President Johnson’s lament, then, expresses a “grading” of the civil rights movement based upon how well it
conforms to expected notions of political complaint. This passage denies that the CRM had any effect on improving the conditions of African Americans. Only President Johnson, the “teacher,” was able to improve the grades of his “students.” In erasing the CRM, the above passage confines African American agency to “the streets,” which has the implication of rendering African Americans as prone to rioting. This implication can be seen in the paragraph that opens discussion of the urban riots of the late-1960s in *A History of the United States* (1986).

**Burn, baby, burn.** Hardly had the Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed than Watts, a black ghetto in Los Angeles, exploded in violence. This was only the first of more than 100 riots that would rage across the nation during the long, hot summers of the next three years. (Boorstin & Kelley, 1986, p. 669)

There is no mention of poverty in *Todd & Curti’s the American Nation* (1995) or in any of the three textbooks from the 2000s. As those two passages from the 2000s textbooks already cited in the first section of these findings indicate, causes for the urban rights had become increasingly individualized in the official knowledge of the new millennium. The third textbook from this decade, *A History of the United States* (2005), more so than the other two textbooks from this decade, make culpability for the riots explicitly individual.

By the fall of 1966 the civil rights movement was divided and in disarray. White backlash grew stronger. For the first time in recent years, a civil rights measure failed to pass Congress. The summer of 1967 saw the worst
rioting in United States history. Blacks went on the rampage, destroying their own neighborhoods and leaving smoking rubble in Newark and Detroit. In Detroit alone 43 died and 5000 were left homeless. The Soviet newspaper Pravda gleefully printed a picture of army tanks on the streets of Detroit. (Boorstin & Kelley, 2005, p. 807)

This passage is interesting for two reasons. First, it is a marked departure from the 1986 and 1996 editions of A History of the United States, neither of which provided a direct cause for the urban riots of the late-1960s apart from the above cited lament of President Johnson. While this passage notes the failings CRM and governmental policies (the “civil rights measure” in the above passage is a reference to the Fair Housing Act), the sentence structure is too abrupt and disjointed to be considered as explaining causation. Rather the three sentences that open the above passage read like a listing of events abstracted from the rest of the passage. The only portion of this passage that is causal is, “Blacks went on the rampage . . .” This is also where the passage places culpability for the riots.

Secondly, with causality thus established, the passage ends with an odd reference to the Soviet newspaper Pravda, a references which seemingly shames the rioters for causing the U.S. international embarrassment.

This chapter has analyzed how high school American history textbooks depict the urban riots of the late-1960s. In doing so two initial trends were made apparent. First, the repeated practice of textbooks omitting (abjecting) African American scholars and scholarship from curricular body of official knowledge and the selective tradition of American history. Secondly, when African America
experiences were included, inclusion took the form of mentioning African Americans in arenas kept separate from politics or of solely mentioning heroic individuals (i.e. Martin Luther King, Jr.) who are similarly mentioned apart from particular forms of politics (i.e. discussions of poverty). These dual processes of incorporation and abjection reveal a tendency of textually silencing discussions of institutional racism and the historical legacy of whiteness as a cause of the urban riots of the late-1960s as well as abjecting poverty from the curricular body of American history. This dual process is also evident in how high school American history textbooks depict sixties counterculture and the women’s movement.
Chapter 5

THE POLITICS OF PROTEST AND EVERYDAY RESISTANCE: SIXTIES COUNTERCULTURE AND THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT

This chapter argues that textbooks textually silence and as such abject the politics of the Sixties. This is done by individualizing sixties counterculture and the women’s movement and placing each in opposition to the common sense foundations of a collective American consciousness. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first outlines the Frankfurt School’s intellectual contributions to the origins of the New Left. The second part of this chapter analyzes sixties counterculture utilizing a cultural studies framework. In an attempt to speak back to textbooks narratives which and sixties counterculture as individualized and non-political, this section argues that hippies practiced everyday resistance and that positioning sixties counterculture as individualized and non-political renders hippies as abject against a normalized narrative of American progress. The last part of this chapter analyzes how textbooks depict the women’s movement and argues that textual and historical defeat of everyday resistance was particularly troubling for women. By denigrating everyday political resistance, textbooks and official knowledge abject the political itself. That is, in validating the political protests of the New Left, textbooks practice a didactic political pedagogy that only recognizes certain types of knowledge as liberatory. In concluding this section, I argue that textbooks abject intersections of race and gender.
Intellectual Origins of the New Left: Adorno and Marcuse

“‘By nature,’ the young are in the forefront of those who live and fight for Eros against Death, and against a civilization which strives to shorten the ‘detour to death.’” (Marcuse, 1966)

Clauseen (2010) and Abromeit (2010) have both demonstrated that there were cross-Atlantic influences between American sixties counterculture and the, by then, West German Institute for Social Research throughout the 1960s. The war over, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer had returned to Germany. Adorno took a teaching position in Frankfurt at the new, old home of the Institute where he continued to write and lecture. Though he would occasionally involve himself in West German politics, Adorno remained primarily committed to rigorous intellectual critique. Horkheimer was even less politically involved and refused to allow his earlier writings to be re-published out of fear that West-German students would ignore their specific historical context. Against Horkheimer and Adorno, Herbert Marcuse sought to continually re-politicize theory and as such regularly involved himself in the student protest movements of the 1960s. Marcuse’s involvement in the politics of his day has resulted in him being labeled the “guru” of the New Left (Gold, 1968; Kellner, 1998b) and has facilitated a myth in which Marcuse is remembered as a staunch supporter of the student protests movements’ practice versus Adorno’s opposition to the movements’ lack of theory. Like all myths, there are elements of truth to the opposition cast between these two thinkers, but there is also a great deal of fictionalizing, which creates a false-dichotomy between theory and practice.
exploited by textbooks in their depictions of sixties counterculture and the women’s movement.

The Adorno half of the myth involves him calling the police upon discovering students occupying the Institute for Social Research on January 31, 1969. While Adorno did in fact call the police on these students, the myth has come to signify a rupture in the Frankfurt School that is not entirely historically accurate. Given the curmudgeon-like way Adorno is portrayed in this myth, it is ironic that today he is more widely read than Marcuse (Kellner, 1998b). Abromeit (2010) has persuasively argued that Adorno was in fact an early supporter of student protesters. In 1957 the Institute for Social Research had conducted a study of the political inclinations of West German students and found them to be apolitical. There was a similar lack of political inclinations following World War II among American youth who would come to be known as the “quite generation.” Adorno was also critical of the survival of National Socialism in West Germany because the country had yet to confront its fascist past. So when students became politically involved around exposing the continued fascist tendencies of the West German government, including protesting emergency laws that would have allowed the government to restrict civil rights in times of crisis, Adorno lent student protests, largely organized by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), intellectual support and political solidarity.

In a striking example of this support, Adorno signed onto a letter published April 19, 1968 in the left-liberal weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* following the shooting of the leader of the Berlin SDS, Rudi Dutschke, by Josef Bachmann.
The letter blamed the West German press for Dutschke’s shooting because they had incited Bachman to violence.

One aspect of contemporary society is that—and this is true precisely for the so-called boulevard press—it transforms information into products for consumption; in other words, the information itself provides pleasure in a certain way, or more accurately, ersatz pleasure for those for whom it is intended. Thus, without this anti-intellectualism, especially the resentment against people who are not yet entirely imprisoned within the heteronomy of the labor process, as is the case with students, this agitation, which cannot by any means be completely separated from commercial motives, would not have been possible at all in this form. (quoted in Abromeit, 2010, p. 22)

Published the same year as the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, this letter stands out as a haunting testament against the violence of 1968 and the propensity of ersatz pleasure (Eros) to exhibit itself as violence or Thanatos (death).

What eventually led Adorno to sever his support for student protests and the increasingly volunteeristic West German SDS were a series of “Go-ins” in which students would interrupt the lectures of prominent German professors. Adorno viewed these actions as anti-intellectual. Student protestors, in turn, lumped Adorno in with the authoritarian state. It was not just that Adorno opposed the student protestors’ practice in favor of more rigorous theory. According to Abromeit (2010), Adorno felt that such actions conflated authority
with the mastery of academic knowledge; applied socialist critique in an unmediated way (professors were not exploiting their students in the same way that capitalism exploited workers); and did not distinguish between critical scholarship and direct political action. It was on this latter point that there was greatest disagreement between Adorno and student protestors.

Adorno fundamentally disagreed that there was cause for protesting the fledgling democratic institutions establishing themselves at the time in West Germany and that such protests would only result, as they did both in West Germany and America, in conservative backlash. Adorno’s hesitancy as well as his belief in the promise of democratic institutions stems from his observation that there were qualitative differences between post-war West Germany and the Nazi state, an observation that reflects the influence American liberalism had on Adorno as an emigrant (Claussen, 2010; Jenemann, 2007). It was this belief that gave Adorno pause and most likely what led him to call the police on students in 1968.

The second half of the Adorno-Marcuse myth is that Marcuse was the intellectual, spiritual and political guru of student protesters. As with the Adorno portion of this myth, there is some truth to this observation. Marcuse routinely expressed support for student protesters—perhaps most famously expressing his solidarity with his student Angela Davis in a 1971 letter publish in *Ramparts* (cited in Kellner, 1998b, pp. 49-50)—and regularly spoke at student organized conferences. For example, Marcuse argued against the Vietnam War at student-organized conferences in both America and West Germany in the spring of 1966.
(Kellner, 1998b). But Marcuse’s view on the student protests he observed during the 1960s also fluctuated in important ways. Like Adorno, Marcuse was originally pessimistic about the possibility of transforming what he described as one-dimensional society. In One-Dimensional Man (1964), Marcuse argued that modern capitalism had rendered the possibility of negation, that possibility so central to the critical dialectics of the Frankfurt School, impossible. Instead, what resulted from the surpluses of modern capitalism were only affirmations and the repressive fulfillment of desires. In the original preface to Eros and Civilization (1955), Marcuse cited Horkheimer as the inspiration of his “theoretical position” (Marcuse, 1966, p. xxviii). However, these similarities with the cultural critique of Horkheimer and Adorno ebbed as Marcuse witnessed the rising tide of student protests in Europe and America.

In a speech delivered in 1968 entitled “Beyond One-Dimensional Man” and in the “Political Preface” to the 1966 edition of Eros and Civilization, Marcuse expressed optimism in the possibility of the student protest movements bringing about a qualitative change in society. This qualitative change was a necessary pre-requisite to transforming society, a social-psychological observation Marcuse had made in Eros and Civilization, but one that acquired greater resonance following the events of May 1968. In An Essay on Liberation (1969), Marcuse argued: “The new sensibility has become, by this very token, praxis: it emerges in the struggle against violence and exploitation where this struggle is waged for essentially new ways and forms of life” (as cited in Abromeit, 2010, p. 19). It was over the possibility of practice to further theory
that Marcuse and Adorno disagreed. Where Marcuse saw in the aesthetics of the student protest movements and sixties counterculture the kernels of qualitative change, Adorno saw a lack of much needed theorizing.

Marcuse remained an active intellectual of the various social movements of the 1960s and 1970s arguing at various points during these years for violence, the peaceful refusal of sixties counterculture, and even identity politics as the possibility of a total revolution waned (Kellner, 1998b). Though towards the end of his life, Marcuse would come to echo his earlier self. Writing in the unpublished essay, “The Historical Fate of Bourgeois Democracy” (ca. 1972-73), Marcuse argued, in a tone reminiscent of One-Dimensional Man, that “government of the people and by the people (self-government) now assumes the form of a large scale identification of the people with their rulers” (quoted Kellner, 1998a, p. 167). Identification makes dissent and opposition into problems to be managed. Marcuse here anticipates what political scientists today refer to as political capital. So long as the people continue to identify with the sovereign (as long as the president’s approval ratings are high) he is able to manage away dissent and opposition. The rationalization for this identification is irrational. That is, it is libidinal, the resultant of emotional structures of feeling produced by late-capitalism. Or as Marcuse argued later in the same essay:

In this mental structure are the deep individual, instinctual roots of the identification of the conformist majority with the institutionalized brutality and aggression. An instinctual, nay, libidinal affinity binds, beneath all the rational justification, the subjects to their rulers. The mental structure
involved here is the *sadomasochistic character*. (quoted in Kellner, 1998a, p. 170)

Marcuse’s argument comes at a moment when the hopeful possibilities of May 1968 had crashed to earth and shattered into various political factions that would compete throughout the 1970s and 80s for governmental attention of their respective rights-based policies (Heale, 2005; Jameson, 1984). 1972 also saw the re-election of Richard Nixon. Turning the pages of American history textbooks from the units that discuss the 1960s and 70s to those that discuss the 1980s, readers are routinely confronted with a full-page picture of President Reagan, which in keeping with Marcuse’s above observation is perhaps only fitting. The identification Americans had (and still have) with President Reagan has caused Žižek (2009) to label the fortieth president of the United States the first postmodern president. Reagan came to embody a new type of leader unique to late-industrial capitalism. Where previous leaders had fulfilled roles reminiscent of classical tragedies (e.g. President Nixon was a tragic hero who brought about his own downfall), President Reagan, aided by his famous movie-star charm, remained above the fray despite abuses of power. In describing this phenomenon, Žižek (1999) has employed the phrase “totalitarian laughter” to argue that ruling ideologies are not meant to be taken seriously in contemporary societies despite inflicting tremendous harm on society. Totalitarian laughter echoes Marcuse’s above description of the sadomasochistic character. There is a certain ersatz pleasure inherent in each description.
The Radicalism of the Hippie Scene: Hall and Willis

“If the sound is up loud enough and the colours sufficiently kaleidoscopic, the ‘circuits’ of existing consciousness might simply splinter and fragment.” (Hall, 1969)

A second false dichotomy surrounding sixties counterculture places hippies in opposition to the student protest movements of the same period. As with the Adorno-Marcuse myth, there were not bright lines between the politics of SDS and the aesthetics of hippies. Marcuse (1966), for example, had argued that for there to be significant change in capital relations, there had to a qualitative change in how people viewed and expressed Eros, which existing capital relations were channeling into its opposite Thantos or death. For Marcuse the Vietnam war was the expression par excellence of this libidinal movement. Additionally, as Jameson (1984) has also persuasively argued, the romanticized view of student protest movements obfuscates the postmodern tendencies already embedded within these movements. An example of this tendency is the Yippies. Started by Jerry Rubin, Paul Krassner, and Abbie Hoffman, the Yippies sought to enact a politics that continually played with the word “party.” The group’s name comes from Krassner shouting “yippie” during a political conversation at a New Year’s Eve party in 1967. It was only later that this exclamation was translated into the acronym standing for Youth International Party (DeGroot, 2008). In an effort to speak back to how hippies are depicted in American history, this section locates cultural and political possibilities of the hippie movement utilizing Willis’ (1978)
ethnography of British hippies and Hall’s (1969) phenomenological analysis of the American hippie movement.

While these two members of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies researched cultures on different sides of the Atlantic, these differences are not significant enough to preclude an understanding of what was occurring in the streets of San Francisco through the interviews Willis (1978) conducted with hippies occupying the flats of a “large industrial city” in England. Recent scholarship (Gassert & Klimke, 2009) as well as the reciprocal trans-Atlantic influences of the Frankfurt School and the American student protest movements already discussed have illustrated there were not hard continental lines between the various protest movements of the Sixties. Both Hall (1969) and Willis (1978) have also alluded that there was a common hippie culture, what Bourdieu (1977) might have discussed as a hippie habitus or what Williams (1977) might have described as hippie structures of feeling. In part the sense of togetherness hippies felt was a result of the movement sharing certain middle class (white) values, values the movement would strive to refuse. All of this is to say, that while I focus on the American hippie movement and its depictions in American history textbooks, the following discussion infers a larger hippie culture beyond the intersection of Haight and Ashbury.

Hall’s (1969) phenomenology of the American hippie movement examines the latent meanings of the hippie way of life by exploring the underlying value structures that comprise the lived experiences of hippies. Hall places hippies, as a phenomenon, within “the structure of the growing political
emergences of radical groups and movements within the younger generation” to argue that:

Hippies and their way of life are not the pattern-less, amorphous muddled and confusion which at first they appear to be. The way of life, and the values and attitudes embodied and projected in it, have a consistency and pattern [. . .] [T]he Hippie way of life represents ‘definitions of the situation’ different from, contrary to, those which are maintained as valid and legitimate in the taken-for-granted routines of American middle class society: an island of deviant meanings within the sea of its society.’ (p. 171)

Hall (1969) next posits four criteria to assess the revolutionary potential of the counter-definitions hippies were offering. Counter-definitions must: (1) “be socially located and rooted,” (2) “be centrally situated,” (3) “offer forms of social disaffliction and opposition which lead to social rather than simply personal or individual, rebellion,” and (4) “offer forms of action, life-projects, which embody alternative structures” (Hall, 1969, p. 172). Central to understanding the efficacy of these criteria is an understanding of the lived experiences of hippies, their ways of being in the world. Through this phenomenological practice, Hall (1969) deconstructs the false-dichotomies personal/public and individual/societal as well as the latent value structures of hippie culture.

A salient example of this practice is Hall’s (1969) discussion of Timothy Leary’s famous imperative to “Turn on, tune in, and drop out.” “Turn on” was literally a call to do drugs, particularly LSD, while metaphorically it was a call to
switch to more authentic modes of experience. “Tune in” literally meant to attune to another way of life but also suggested through the playful appropriation of mass media language that straight society was tuned into the wrong station. “Drop out” was a literal imperative to do just that, drop out of the middle class way of life. Within the field of education this reading of Leary’s call to action is problematic given critiques of Paul Willis’ (1977) *Learning to Labor*. Importantly though, dropping out is not meant to be a resistant act in-itself, but rather, as the metaphorical reading of the slogan suggests, only the first step of a larger social life-project in which hippies were to forge identifications with those social groups outside the heteronomy of the labor process.

Hall (1969) deconstructs other latent value structures of the hippie movement including: poverty, Indian themes, mysticism and withdrawal, pastoral arcadianism, togetherness, love, the existential Now, flower power, the doors of perception, and individualism. Willis (1978) similarly ethnographically explored several themes of the “hippy identity,” including: spirituality, subjective experience, powerless omniscience, and “hippy style.” In analyzing each of these themes, Hall (1969) and Willis (1978) explored the hippie ways of being in the world. Applied to the present discussion, a good example of these respective practices is the latent value structure of individualism. This latent value also illustrates divergences over the radicalism of the hippie scene between the two members of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies.

Discussions of individualism are important because any analysis of hippies and their location among the crosscurrent movements that comprised the
Sixties would be incomplete without tackling the tension that existed between cultivating the self and engaging in the politics of the period. The hippie mantra of “Do your own thing!” thus is at once a liberatory expression against the social conformity of the 1960s and also an invocation of the American dream. As such, a significant portion of the hippies’ radicalism is a reenactment of the same American values espoused in the films of the 1960 that emphasized a rebellious anti-hero. Understood from this perspective, hippies qua hippie movement is perhaps a misnomer as doing your own thing was “undertaken, where possible, in the company of others who have been on that ‘trip’ before, but ultimately, a voyage by the self into the self” (Hall, 1969, p. 189).

Willis (1978) encapsulates the tension between rejecting existing cultural conformity as a liberatory practice on the one hand and showing how such actions only reify a cultural logic of individualism on the other. Willis spent a year interviewing and “hanging out” with several hippies recording their conversations on the themes already mentioned. The following interview segment begins with one of Willis’ informants expressing his feelings that there is not room for him in communism (what the informant believed to be the goal of the New Left) because he would not be able to do his own thing and concludes with him expressing his support for New Left though, again, he cannot see himself as participating out of fear of losing his individualism. The middle portion of the interview segment, quoted below, reflects an apprehension about leadership as well as a critique of the New Left in language Adorno might have used to express his own reticence about West German SDS protests.

100
I can’t do anything to change it, ‘cos if I went out in the streets, suppose I found out I was a born leader or something, and went into the street, and got all the people to follow me, and just sort of overthrew the government, a nice little thing, so everything I believe in everyone’s got to live by. Well, I’m just imposing my will on everyone else, the same as they’d do to me. So I just dropped out, and fuck them, I’m not happy. But I’m happier than I was before . . . (Willis, 1978, pp. 132-133)

Perhaps because he is conducting his research in 1972, Willis (1978) is more hesitant than Hall (1969) to locate hippies within the historical dialectics of the Sixties and among the crosscurrent movements of the period. Willis (1978), however, does acknowledge the “distinctive contradiction of the hippy movement is its combination of an undoubtedly radical style with political attitudes which are finally far from radical” (p. 127). There was within hippie style, both in its outward aesthetics and its inward privileging of subjective experience, a critique of capitalism. By rejecting dominant modes of dress, grooming, time, and interpersonal interactions, hippies were also rejecting the modern concept of labor, which relied on a normative understanding of these modalities to maintain its authority. In contrast to proper modes of dress, discourse and behavior (e.g. not taking drugs), hippies practiced what Willis (1978) called organic individualism and what Hall (1969) referred to as pastoral arcadianism. Central to this commitment, in addition to more natural and spiritual modes of interacting with each other and society, was a rejection of work or at very least a recognition that work, and as such, capitalism was just a game.
Another one of Willis’ (1978) informants reflects each of these tendencies in two separate interview segments.

It’s a paranoid system, they’re conditioned to think that they’ve got to get something better all the time, but what they think is better is material things. The conditioned think that material things are better looking [. . .] but for me I need the spiritual side of life. I’m not saying I believe in God or anything like that, but I do need the spiritual side and I think this is what society expressly does not provide for at the moment. (pp. 125-126)

This first half of this informant’s critique of capitalism expresses simultaneously a personal knowing that separated hippies from “the conditioned” (straight society) as well as an alternative spiritual vision of society. Where work was required, either by others or themselves (usually the former), hippies thrived in its experiential qualities and delighted in stealing supplies, time or labor itself from “the company.” After describing with admiration how a mechanic and night watchman each steal during their shifts, the same informant reflects on his own feelings toward work.

I’m saying essentially is that work is a monstrous, ludicrous, fucking game, and it takes a fucking head [a slang term for hippie] to realize it. . . . You know, I fucking realize it. I’m going to treat work as a fucking game, but I don’t give a fuck what anyone says if I get a job. I’m going to enjoy the game, or I don’t work, you know. It’s just something, its like you got a Monopoly set, and you can play or needn’t play, you got a decision to make. (Willis, 1978, p. 131)
Again, this passage contains a personal knowing. Like the ancient Greek prophetess Cassandra, hippies knew about the limitations and dangers of late-industrial capitalism and also the New Left’s inability to properly correct for these limitations through protest. Though Willis (1978) is willing to grant hippies a cultural critique of capitalism, he is less sanguine than Hall (1969) about the political possibilities of the hippie movement.

For Hall (1969), hippies represented a “direct dialectical contra-positioning of alternative values to the sacred values of the middle class;” an insurgent flank movement capable of “destroying the rationale, undermining the legitimacy” of the social ethic holding society together; and were “the first enlisted troops in a new kind of politics of post-modern post-industrial society: the politics of cultural rebellion” (Hall, 1969, pp. 195-196). Hall’s use of militarist language here is an attempt to convey an image of hippies that was just as militant as the student protest movements. Hippies, within the emerging politics of postmodernism, represented to Hall (1969) a recognition that:

And just as it is necessary to retreat, to de-totalise, first in order to advance and re-structure, so the positive possibilities held out for the future in the movement are inhabited by the Hippies as a negation. They are trying to get through to the future by going backwards through the eye of time. (p. 197)

This sense of time as neither past nor future but past/future explains the pervasive presentness of hippies as well as suggesting a nonlinear, postmodern conception of time. DeKoven (2003) and Kellner (1998b) also suggest, in reference to
Marcuse’s work, that the hippie movement’s playfulness with time, for example its desire to recall older pastoral arcadian ways of living while at the same time living technologically assisted lifestyles, expressed the utopianism of the movement. Marcuse (1966) had argued for the liberatory potential of technology to free people to explore and actualize their libidinal instincts rather than sublimating them through labor.

For Hall (1969) this sense of time as past/future must be understood dialectically and historically. Hippies did not emerge as political-cultural force *ex nihilo*, but rather existed in dialectical relation to the growth of a “generational underground” (pp. 190-191). The trajectory of this growth encompassed first the Beats; then the civil rights movement; next campus rebellions including SDS and the political tendencies of the New Left; the next phase of the trajectory is represented by Stokely Carmichael, the urban riots of the late-1960s, and the activism of the Black Panther Party; the final phase of the trajectory is the split that occurred between Black activists concerned with issues of poverty and white activists opposed to the Vietnam War and the draft. It is within the larger cultural politics of the Sixties that Hall locates the hippie movement.

[I]n a negative form, they [hippies] actualize and dramatise in microcosm fragments of that ‘future’ to which the activists point but of which, as yet, they are unable to speak. The Hippie way of life is a broken refraction of the so-far absent of missing ‘content’ of the emergent revolutionary project. (p. 201)
In relating this chapter to Chapter 4, it is the last phase identified by Hall’s (1969) that is most salient. Where hippies sought to refuse their affluence, African Americans living in neglected inner cities sought to continually remind America that its post-war affluence had ignored them. The tension of extolling hippies as the first enlisted troops in the politics of cultural rebellion given the actual rebellion of African American rioters does not go unnoticed. Still, as the above two sections have argued, to ignore the political possibilities of hippies is to repeat the false dichotomies of theory/practice and action/inaction. Additionally, given the manner in which American history textbooks depict hippies, rescuing their politics represents a speaking back to official knowledge and a counter memory of the Sixties.

**Findings and Discussion I: Hippies and Sixties Counterculture**

Among the fifteen textbooks analyzed, the first reference to hippies is in the 1972 edition of *Rise of the American Nation*. In discussing the sense of alienation that affected the youth of the 1960s, the textbook says of hippies:

> These alienated young people reacted in two different ways. One relatively small group, the ‘hippies,’ rejecting the adult world and all it represented, refused to make any commitments or assume any responsibilities. Another small group turned to active rebellion their goal the overthrow of the ‘establishment’ and the creation of what they considered a better form of society. (Todd & Curti, 1972, p. 835)

This passage is problematic for two reasons. First, it does not offer reasons for hippies “rejecting the adult world” nor does it suggest that the world hippies
were rejecting was imperfect or in need of correction. This is a recurrent theme among the textbook passages that discuss hippies. It is hippies, not the world they rejected (dropped out from) that are positioned as failing. Second, the passage draws a connection between disaffected hippies and the various student protest movements of the period. As already argued, Hall (1969) attempted to position hippies as enlistees in a postmodern politics, but this positioning is much different from the above passage, which argues that alienation either manifested itself as shrugging all responsibility or “active rebellion” designed to “overthrow the ‘establishment.’”

Apple (2004), as already discussed in Chapter 4, argued that categories that assign culpability abstract institutional and economic contexts. Applied to how textbooks depict sixties counterculture, hippies are routinely positioned as dropping out of society, an individual choice, rather than reacting against institutions which they viewed as problematic. A similar argument applies to Willis’ (1977) analysis. In focusing solely on the resistant potential of students (lads) who dropped out of school, Willis ignores the dialectics at play in schooling, namely that dropping out served the very institutions being resisted. What is needed in discussing this recurrent theme, then, is an interrogation of the dialectical relationships between hippies and society and hippies and student protest movements.

The location of sixties counterculture within textbooks reveals how textbooks incorporate the official knowledge of the Sixties into the selective tradition of American history. Within textbooks there is a temporal, spatial and
emotive distancing of sixties counterculture from student protest movements, which are almost exclusively discussed in textbook sections dedicated to the domestic reaction to the Vietnam War. Sixties counterculture is either discussed in its own textbook section or is referenced toward the end of sections dealing with social movements and student protests in language that dismisses hippies as disaffected youth. Thus, even though textbooks may reveal biases against student protest movements, the actions of these groups are preferable to the inaction of hippies. The efforts of textbooks to both distance sixties counterculture from the politics of protest and to textually isolate hippies as a small cadre of disaffected youth suggests efforts to incorporate hippies into the curricular body of American history in a manner that abjects their political possibilities.

The most common tactic of incorporating sixties counterculture into the selective tradition of American history is to accentuate their individualism. Embedded within this tactic is an assumption that “most Americans” worked together and were not as individualistic as hippies. In the following passage from the 1986 edition of *A History of the United States*, which is repeated verbatim in the 1996 and 2005 editions of the textbook, the hyper-individualism of sixties counterculture is textually opposed to “normal” American youth.

**Hippies and the New Left.** Different young people reacted in different ways. Most went about their business. They attended classes, read their textbooks, and prepared themselves to make a living. But some joined in the so-called "counterculture," which was opposed to the culture accepted by most Americans. They used drugs, they let their hair grow long, they
wore beads, fringe jackets, army and navy surplus clothes, and long dresses. They wanted to look as different as possible from other Americans. They called themselves ‘hippies’ (from the slang expression ‘hip,’ meaning knowledgeable, worldly-wise, ‘with it’). Hippies often reacted to American life by ‘dropping out’—refusing to be a part of it.

(Boorstin & Kelley, 1986, p. 670-671)

The youth going “about their business” are part of a common project—preparing themselves “to make a living.” “Most Americans,” except for hippies who “wanted to look as different as possible,” shared in this project. The above passage, most explicitly the qualifier “so-called” in front of counterculture, denies any political possibility of sixties counterculture while also refusing to interrogate the business most young people were going about. Additionally, given that textbooks uniformly condemn hippies and sixties counterculture for dropping out of straight society it is curious that textbooks repeatedly describe what hippies looked like.

Both Willis (1978) and Hall (1969) have discussed hippie style as embodying a political characteristic. There were reasons why hippies “wanted to look as different as possible.” The two prominent aspects of hippie style—their hair and clothes—were at once an argument against the conformity of the period and an alternative vision of the world. One of Willis’ informants in discussing his long hair illustrates both the argumentativeness of hippie style and why long hair was an alternative to the status quo. “It’s fuck all, but I like it. Why should I, you, have to get something cut which grows naturally on your body, to get an
unnatural job. . . . I thought Jesus had long hair, and a lot of people liked him” (Willis, 1978, p. 96). Long hair was also a way for hippies to signify their solidarity with groups outside the heteronomy of the labor process. It was an outward manifestation of their critique of dominant culture and an attempt to identify with groups dominated by that same culture.

Clothing had an equally expressive and political characteristic. Describing the effect of hippie style in language reflective of the cultural critique of culture jamming, Willis (1978) posits that hippie clothes were “functionally inappropriate.”

The twentieth-century, utilitarian basis of clothing had been flooded over with incoherent symbols which denied or mocked its logic. It was not that another base was suggested. It was not one fashion competing with another. The symbols were to confused, contradictory and imprecise for this. It was the internal disorganization of fashion. Their clothing was—as with so many aspects of their style—a colourful unseating of conventional wisdom. (p. 97)

While the ultimate political effects of the hippie style are debatable, Cross (2000), for example, has demonstrated how the resistant individual style of hippies would become mass marketed, there is a marked departure from how Willis (1978) and the above passage from A History of the United States (1986) discuss hippie style. Paradoxically, textbooks silence the political possibility of hippie and counterculture aesthetics while repeatedly describing in vivid details what hippies looked like.
What is the purpose of this paradoxical tendency? Already textually marked as deviant, such vivid descriptions serve the function of calling attention to what deviant bodies look like. This labeling matters not only historically, but also for how students reading textbooks today. Labeling students whose dress or appearance departs from what is deemed normal disciplines (in the Foucauldian sense of the term) students to conform to dominant ideologies. Such descriptions render hippie style a unifying suffering-horror capable of ideologically quilting student dress and behavior. By labeling hippies and sixties counterculture as deviant textbooks also reproduce, to quote again from Marcuse’s essay, “The Historical Fate of the Bourgeoisie,” “the deep individual, instinctual roots of the identification of the conformist majority with the institutionalized brutality and aggression (quoted in Kellner, 1998a, p.170).

A particularly salient example of how textbooks reproduce identification with the conformist majority can be found in the 2006 edition of The American Pageant: A History of the Republic. Beginning its discussion of sixties counterculture this text remarks: “But in only a few years, the clean-cut Berkeley activists and their sober minded sit-ins would seem downright quaint” (Kennedy, Cohen, & Bailey, 2006, p. 934). The action/inaction juxtaposition of the student protest movements and sixties counterculture as already been analyzed. The American Pageant goes onto juxtapose these “clean-cut” (white) New Left activists with hippies whom the text describes as: “Beflowerd women in trousers and long-haired men with earrings” who were “stridently opposed to traditional American ways” (p. 934). This passage is a departure from A History of the
*United States* (1986, 1996, 2005) in its not-so-subtle suggestion that hippies were cross-dressers bending traditional gender attire.

Making explicit the historical positioning of hippies as sexually deviant

*The American Pageant* continues:

The 1960s also witnessed a ‘sexual revolution,’ though its novelty and scale are often exaggerated. Without doubt, the introduction of the birth-control pill in 1960 made unwanted pregnancies much easier to avoid and sexual appetites easier to satisfy. The Mattachine Society, founded in Los Angeles in 1951, was a pioneering advocate for gay rights, as gay men and lesbians increasingly demanded sexual tolerance. A brutal attack on gay men by off-duty police officers at New York’s Stonewall Inn in 1969 powerfully energized gay and lesbian militancy. Widening worries in the 1980s about sexually transmitted diseases like genital herpes and AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) finally slowed, but did not reverse, the sexual revolution. (Kennedy, Cohen, & Bailey, 2006, pp. 934-935)

Quoted at length to demonstrate its tortured logic, this passage stands out among the textbooks analyzed for its mentioning of gays and lesbians, but as is to be expected following both Apple (2004) and Williams (1973) the incorporation of gays and lesbians does not occur without the tradeoff of connecting the sexual revolution to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The first sentence of this passage, the topic sentence of the paragraph, does not follow the rest of the passage. This sentence brackets the “straight” sexual revolution, evident in references to birth control and
unwanted pregnancies in the next sentence, from the “gay” sexual revolution responsible for the spread of STDs and HIV/AIDS. The middle portion of this passage serves no real informative function.

The Mattachine Society and Stonewall are mentioned exclusively to introduce gay and lesbians prior to referencing AIDS. Evidence of this claim is that these two middle sentences can be removed and the passage still reads well both grammatically and for comprehension. The meaning, however, changes dramatically revealing the dual functionalities of incorporation and abjection. The politics of the gay rights movement and what this movement was advocating against are not discussed in the above passage. Absent these discussions, the Mattachine Society and Stonewall are simply textual place holders that signify “gay” allowing the reader to connect the sexual revolution of the 1960s to the tragedy of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s. In this passage not only are the politics of hippies aesthetics rendered abject, but gays and lesbians are also deemed unfit for the curricular body of American history.

Though not as explicit as the above passage, Todd & Curti’s *the American Nation* (1995) also contains similar language warning against non-hetero and non-reproductive sex. In discussing the “elements of the counterculture,” this text described hippies as follows:

Many hippies indulged in behavior intended to shock older Americans, such as public displays of nudity and the use of profanity. Most searched for new physical experiences by engaging in permissive sexual behavior
or by experimenting with mind-altering drugs, such as LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), or ‘acid.’ (Boyer, 1995, p. 853)

While it is unclear what “permissive sexual behavior” is, what is clear is the warning against it: “But there was a high price to pay for experimentation of the era, as reported cases of sexually transmitted diseases and drug addiction increased at an alarming rate” (Boyer, 1995, p. 853). While students should be warned about this risk of STDs and HIV/AIDS, this warning would be more genuine if schools practiced sexuality education that did not just preach abstinence. Rather, this passage, like the one from The American Pageant, positions alternative expressions of sexuality as resulting in the contraction of STDs and HIV/AIDS. Depictions of sexuality in these textbook passages obfuscate institutional responsibility and emphasize individual culpability as well as render gays and lesbians abject.

**Findings and Discussion II:**

**Everyday Resistance and the Women’s Movement**

Among the textbooks analyzed the women’s movement is discussed in six of the fifteen textbooks analyzed. These include: Discovering American History (1974), The American Way (1979), Rise of the American Nation (1982), America: Its People and Values (1985), Todd & Curti’s the American Nation (1995), American: Pathways to the Present (2000). Given that these textbooks discuss the women’s movement beginning in the 1960s and continuing into the 1970s, it is possible that the other nine textbooks selected and coded discussed women’s movement outside the periodizing marker of the 1960s. However, since the focus
of the present study is how high school American history textbooks depict the Sixties, only those textbook passages that contextualized the women’s movement during the 1960s were analyzed.

The narrative structure employed throughout the above six textbooks first locates the movement for women’s rights as originating out of the civil rights movement. Textbooks diverge over whether the rise of the women’s movement resulted from the limitations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or from the growing frustration among women that the civil rights movement and the student protest movements of the 1960s were not addressing their concerns. The former originating narrative trajectory positions Betty Friedan’s *The Feminist Mystique* (1963) as providing the intellectual momentum for the women’s movement, which would come to be organized under the National Organization for Women (NOW). *America: Its People and Values* (1985) is illustrative of this trajectory.

Friedan’s book caused many women to speak out. The Civil Rights Movement of 1964, as you recall, banned job discrimination on the basis of sex. Changes, however, were slow in coming. Friedan and others pressured the government to enact new laws. To further this goal, Friedan helped create the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966.

Within five years NOW had over 20,000 members. (Wood, Gabriel, & Biller, 1985, p. 747)

This trajectory is rehearsed in *Todd & Curti’s the American Nation* (1995), which also references Gloria Steinem, *Ms.* magazine, and the founding of the National Woman’s Political Caucus in 1971. This textbook also includes a
quotation from an unnamed activist who in alluding to the second originating trajectory, transitions from the elder Friedan to the younger Steinem as the leader of the movement for women’s rights:

One activist recalled a friend telling her that ‘you’ll never be a radical as long as you don’t see how the system affects you. You always think it affects other people.’ By the late 1960s more women inspired by other movements were beginning to stand up for their own rights. One woman who became so inspired was journalist Gloria Steinem. (Boyer, 1995, p. 856)

While this passage alludes to the second originating trajectory, it still originates the women’s movement in a single heroic woman who both galvanized women and awoke their consciousnesses. The second originating trajectory is only explicitly discussed in America: Pathways to the Present (2000):

As they worked to bring racial discrimination to an end, many women in the civil rights movement were discouraged. They were expected to make coffee and do clerical work while men made most of the policy decisions. Frustrated over their assigned roles, they applied the techniques they had learned in the civil rights movement to address their own concerns.

(Cayton, Perry, Reed, & Winkler, 2000, p. 846)

A second narrative structure employed by textbooks is to describe the goals of the women’s movement in strictly economic or political (electoral) terms. The section of Rise of the American Nation (1982) that discusses the movements for women’s rights, for example, begins: “Reasons for early successes. In part
the movement gained strength because of the growing number of American women who were now employed” (Todd & Curti, 1982, p. 810). *The American Way* (1979) discusses the beginning of the movement for women’s rights in a similar manner:

The Great Society meant hope for women as well. Women had been able to vote since 1920. But many women wanted the right to make the same choices that men could make. These choices were about jobs—with equal pay and an equal chance at promotion—about education, about owning property, about getting bank loans. Women also wanted guarantees of fair treatment in stores, in churches and synagogues, in unions, clubs, and at home. (Bauer, 1979, p. 683)

Politically, the goal of the women’s movement is discussed entirely in electoral terms that emphasize the number of women elected or appointed in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, *Discovering American History* (1974), whose only discussion of the women’s movement is a lengthy excerpt from the article, “Women Who Won,” from the April 1973 edition *Ms.* magazine, which recounted the electoral victories of Jean King, Hawaii, House of Representatives; Betty Benavidez, Colorado, House of Representatives; Arie Taylor, Colorado, House of Representatives; Mary Coleman, Michigan, State Supreme Court; and Hannah Atkins, Oklahoma, House of Representatives. *Rise of the American Nation* (1982) lists the electoral victories of Congresswomen Bella Abzug, Shirley Chisholm, Barbara Jordan, Elizabeth Holtzman, and Nancy Kassebaum; Governor, Connecticut, Ella Graso; Mayor, San Jose, California, Janet Hayes; Mayor,
Chicago, Illinois, Jane N. Byrne as well as the appointments of Carla Hills, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development by President Ford; Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce and Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare by President Carter; and Sandra Day O’Connor, U.S. Supreme Court by President Reagan.

Recent content analyses of how American history textbooks depict women (Clark, Allard, & Mahoney, 2004; Clark, Ayton, Frechette, & Keller, 2005; Frederickson, 2004) also participate in the second wave ideal of including more women in both the pages of textbooks as well as the halls of Congress. Such analyses, as the doxastic claim that textbooks contain too little knowledge has also suggested (see Chapter 3), maintain that more women are needed in positions of power to check the patriarchal over-representation of men. What these analyses neglect to discuss is the process of incorporation or why certain knowledge is legitimated as part of the selective tradition of American history. Such shortcomings also leave unexamined the abj ecting functionalities of incorporating heroines at the expense of the women’s movement and of describing the goals of the movement in terms that allow for success to be overdetermined economically or electorally.

The originating trajectory that positions either Betty Friedan or Gloria Steinem as the galvanizing heroines and intellectual germinators of the movement for women’s rights as well as the tendency of describing the goals of the movement in strictly economic and electoral terms rehearses problems already
identified in Chapter 4. Women, as with African Americans, are incorporated into the curricular body of American history through the use of heroic individuals at the expense of the movement itself. Similarly, women are incorporated so as to distance them from political spheres. In Chapter 4, this consequence was discussed as the problem of mentioning African American success in fields other than politics except for when a heroic individual (i.e. Martin Luther King, Jr.) is positioned so as to define (and periodize) the movement. Similar functionalities of incorporation and abjection occur with how textbooks depict the women’s movement.

Textbooks abject the *movement* from the women’s movement by textually silencing its collective origins and instead discussing the movement’s origins in individualized terms. This dual functionality of incorporation and abjection is also evident in the listing of electoral victories and political appointments, which similarly deny understandings of politics outside electoral manifestations. Even when electoral victories are achieved, their discussion reintroduces the problematic of limiting political discussion to a few heroic individuals. A second problem of limiting political discussion to elected officials and appointees is that it denies the possibility of everyday resistance. Elizabeth Ellsworth (1997) has argued for an epistemic shift in the location of where education scholarship locates learning, an argument that equally applies to where education scholarship looks for resistance and what schooling determines as resistant (c.f. Ellsworth, 1989). If learning occurs in everyday interactions, so too does resistance to the hegemonic orderings of culture. Reorienting educational scholarship’s resistant
gaze means reintegrating everyday resistance into the curricular body of official knowledge.

The functionality of incorporation and abjection also occurs in describing the goal of the women’s movement economically. Jobs take on a similar role as racial equality. That is, jobs and racial equality are each discussed in terms of equality of opportunity, which allows for their respective successes to be achieved without addressing structural or institutional limitations. Women, like African Americans, are given the opportunity to succeed economically. Failures to do so do not point to structural and/or institutional problems that need correcting, but rather, as Apple (2004) has argued, such failures mean individuals have not effectively utilized their opportunities. As already discussed in Chapter 4 and above, the individualizing of culpability results in the abjection of entire populations from the curricular body of official knowledge. In the context of this section, I argue that women of color are specifically abjected from the official curricular body of American history.

Evidence of this process of abjection comes from how textbooks contextualize the women’s movement amongst the other social movements of the Sixties. *The American Way* (1979) argues, “that each civil rights group had a different job to do because not every minority was in the same position” (Bauer, 1979, p. 684). *Rise of the American Nation* (1982) introduces the women of the women’s movement as “the largest group struggling against discrimination” (Todd & Curti, 1982, p. 810). *Todd & Curti’s the American Nation* (1995) posits, “one of the most lasting legacies of the 1960s was its challenge to traditional
views of women” (Boyer, 1995, p. 854). Extolling discrimination against women as well as the legacy of the women’s movement is not itself problematic. Rather, it is the opposition that such praise creates between the arguably white women’s movement and the Black civil rights movement that is problematic. A particularly troubling example of this juxtaposition can be found in *America: Pathways to the Present* (2000).

The women’s movement is discussed toward the end of *America* as not representing African American women:

Some African American women felt that combating racial discrimination was more important than battling sex discrimination. In 1974, NOW’s African American president Aileen Fernandez [sic] acknowledged that ‘Some black sisters are not sure that the feminist movement will meet their current need.’ (Cayton, Perry, Reed, & Winkler, 2000, p. 850)

This quotation, presumably from Aileen Hernandez, the second national president of NOW, along with the manner it is introduced creates an opposition between fighting for women’s rights and the rights of African Americans. This opposition is made more explicit on the next page of the textbook, which ask readers to “Recognize Bias” and provides two excerpts from “articles written during the women’s movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s” (Cayton, Perry, Reed, & Winkler, 2000, p. 851). The first excerpt is from a *New York Times Magazine* article, “What the Black Woman Thinks About Women’s Lib,” authored by Toni Morrison and dated August 22, 1971. The second excerpt entitled, “The America
Woman—Then and Now,” authored by Marjorie Longwell is from the Fall 1969 edition of *Delta Kappa Gamma Magazine (Bulletin)*.

In recognizing bias, students encounter the two excerpts as oppositional assessments of the women’s movement. The Morrison excerpt argued that African American women are rightly suspicious of “woman’s lib” and cites the image of white women shouting at Elizabeth Eckford, an African American student who had enrolled in then segregated Little Rock Central High School in 1957, attempting to attend school. Longwell argues for adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment on constitutional grounds and cites Susan B. Anthony’s 1872 arrest for voting to give her argument historical authority. Rather than attempt to recognize which of these two excerpts, I wish to argue that it is their juxtaposition that contains bias. Following tips for how to recognize bias, this textbook section entitled “Skills for Life,” asks students to identify which excerpt was most biased. Whatever students decide is irrelevant as the textbook as already succeeded in solidifying opposition between African American women (Morrison) and white women (Longwell).

Patricia Hill Collins (1991) has sought to draw attention to the fact that Black women experience oppression at the “intersection of multiple structures of domination” (p. 41). Attention to this intersection has two implications. First, Black feminist thought “shifts the focus of investigation from one aimed at explicating elements of race and gender or class oppression to one whose goal is to determine what the links are among these systems” (Collins, 1991, p. 40). Common to all systems of oppression is dualistic, either/or thinking evident in the
“Skills for Life” section of *America: Pathways to the Present* (2000). Such thinking reinforces systems of oppression by categorizing people in terms of their differences, positioning these differences as oppositional, and asserting the instability and thus subordination of these differences. Against dualistic thinking, Collins has argued for an intersectional approach to sociological inquiry, which identifies “concrete areas of social relations where Afro-American women create and pass on self-definitions and self-valuations essential to coping with the simultaneity of oppression they experience” (p. 43).

It is possible to discern in the above citation of Elizabeth Eckford’s walk to Little Rock Central High School while being shouted at by a crowd of white women the concrete social relations Collins (1991) asks sociological inquiry to identify. Equally important to the citational argument of the above excerpt from Toni Morrison is how self-definitions and self-valuations of African American women’s experiences both suggests that “Black women may overtly conform to the societal roles laid out for them, yet covertly oppose these roles in numerous spheres, an opposition shaped by the consciousness of being on the bottom” and reorients conceptualizations of activism so that “possibilities for activism exist even within such multiple structures of domination” (Collins, 1991, pp. 45-46). As Ellsworth (1997) has also argued, reorienting activism requires returning subjectivity to women in ways not economically and electorally overdetermined.

The oppositional task of recognizing biases in the two excerpts quoted in *America: Pathways to the Present* (2000) is a good place to conclude both this chapter and analysis of how high school American history textbooks depict the
Sixties. Recognizing bias in textbooks involves looking at how the pages of these entombments of official knowledge incorporate oppositional knowledge and how such incorporation results in the abjection of knowledge and bodies deemed unfit for the curricular body of American history. This chapter analyzed how textbooks textually silence and as such abject the politics of sixties counterculture, and the women’s movement. Individualizing hippies and placing them in opposition to the common sense foundations of a collective American consciousness renders them and everyday political resistance abject. In discussing the false-dichotomies praxis/theory and action/inaction that informed both the legacy of the Frankfurt School and sixties counterculture, this chapter also sought to speak back to textbook depictions of hippies by arguing that was an everyday resistance embedded within sixties counterculture. Textually abjecting everyday resistance also has negative consequences for how textbooks depict the women’s movement in addition to abjecting intersections of race and gender.
Chapter 6

CONCLUSION: THE CURRICULAR BODY OF AMERICAN HISTORY

Textbooks deny students the possibility of making decisions about the quality of their educational experiences. Instead of presenting integrated and pluralistic knowledge, textbooks present incorporated knowledge, which treats as abject those events, people and material conditions that call into question the selection and organization of official knowledge. Integrated and pluralistic textbooks would force us to confront not only the fact that American history curricula does not develop individual potential, but more importantly that it textually silences and abjects specific historical voices thus denying students full participation in making decisions about their experiences in the present.

Responsibility extends beyond recognizing that textbooks either do not include enough or exclude to much knowledge (Chapter 3); that they continually construct and maintain of white privilege (Chapter 4); or that they present individualized accounts of resistance that are economically and electorally determined (Chapter 5). Such moments of recognition are necessary, but insufficient conditions for social transformation.

To be sufficient, curriculum and textbooks must practice a transformative pedagogy that assumes “valid, accurate, and comprehensive knowledge about marginalized groups can be used to help them attain freedom and become full citizens and change agents within their nation-states” (Banks, 2006, p. 775). Echoing this appeal, Macdonald (1995) has argued for the integration of
pluralistic life values into the living body of schooling. This means, Macdonald (1995) has argued:

[T]hat programs designed to facilitate human development in culturally pluralistic contexts must be committed to the development of individual potential through the cultural nexus of the specific individual and by utilizing democratic processes which allow for the full participation of the persons in schools in making decisions which determine the quality of their experiences. (pp. 132-133)

Following these recommendations as well as the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, I conclude by calling attention to why textbooks have responsibility not only for what they incorporate into the curricular body of official knowledge and the selective tradition of American history, but more importantly what they do not incorporate, what they abject.

Chapter 4 discussed the urban riots of the late-1960s and argued that there were notable shifts in both how these riots were discussed and to whom textbooks assigned culpability. In noting these historical shifts, this chapter argued first, that textbooks render the historical legacy of whiteness invisible to textbook teachers and/or readers; and secondly, that textbooks abject intersections of race and poverty. This process of abjection parallels the purposeful omission of Du Bois’ (1935) counter-memory of Reconstruction and the failure of early twentieth-century publishing companies to publish textbooks to counter the racist scientific discourses of the period and complements Brown and Brown’s (2010a, 2010b) studies of how textbooks perpetuate the legacy of racial violence. While Banks
(1969) has provided evidence that high school American history textbooks following the protest movements of the 1960s included a greater number of non-stereotyped references to African Americans he also noted, anticipating the analyses of Apple and Christian-Smith (1991) and Alridge (2006), how incorporation of African American experiences reflected the limiting process of mentioning and the restrictive practice of relying on master narratives of heroic individuals.

Abjeting intersections of race and poverty has implications outside the textbook passages analyzed in Chapter 4. According the U.S. Census, as of 2009 30.4 percent of African American families with children under the age of 18 lived below the poverty line. This percentage has steadily increased since 2002 providing a strong indication that the warning of the Kerner Commission is as true now as it was in 1967. More recently, Barbra Ehrenreich (2011), in the Forward to the tenth anniversary release of Nickel and Dimed, has noted the growing criminalization of poverty, a trend that disproportionately impacts African American communities. Textbooks’ abjection of African Americans is repeated in society writ large through incarceration practices such as legal disparities between powdered cocaine and crack possession, mandatory sentencing minimums, so-called “three strikes” laws, and felon disenfranchisement laws.

These practices physically abject African Americans from their communities and place them in often permanent states of incarceration where they remain unseen and unable to participate democratically. Behrens, Uggen, and
Manza (2003) and Wacquant (2004) have persuasively demonstrated correlations between the historical legacy of racism and current practice of felon disenfranchisement. Tracing the originating impetus for disenfranchisement laws to freed slaves being able to vote during Reconstruction, these scholars have illustrated how felon disenfranchisement laws effectively deny entire African American communities suffrage. This problem is exacerbated by increased reliance on private prisons, which are often built in rural areas to incarcerate felons. Because the U.S. Census Bureau allows prisoners to be counted as residents where they are incarcerated, not only are African American prisoners denied the right to vote by felon disenfranchisement laws, their incarceration is also used to artificially inflate the size of rural (mostly white) legislative and congressional districts.

Chapter 5 argued first, that in incorporating sixties counterculture textbooks textually silence and abject the politics of the Sixties by individualizing hippies and placing them in opposition to the common sense foundations of a collective American consciousness. Utilizing Hall’s (1969) phenomenological and Willis’ (1978) ethnographic studies of hippies, this chapter spoke back to textbook narratives that position hippies as individualized and non-political and argued that sixties counterculture practiced everyday moments of resistance, which textbooks render abject against a normalized narrative of American progress. Secondly, the textual and historical defeat of everyday resistance was argued to be particularly troubling for women. By denigrating everyday political resistance, textbooks validate the political protests of the New Left and practice a
didactic political pedagogy that only recognizes economically and electorally determined resistance as resistant knowledge. The implications of denying everyday resistance, while extolling the economic and electoral successes of the women’s movement are first, that resistance is spatially fixed to being employed or elected and; second that intersections of race and gender are abjected through dualistic textbooks passages that place White women and African American women in opposition.

There are also implications for abjecting hippies, women, and intersections of race and gender outside the textbook passages analyzed in Chapter 5. The first reported cases of AIDS were in 1981. Over the next six years President Reagan did not usher a single word concerning the growing AIDS epidemic. Finally, in 1988, near the end of his second term, President Reagan addressed the issue of HIV/AIDS at the Third International Conference on AIDS in Washington, D.C. By the time of this speech, 36,058 Americans had been diagnosed with AIDS and 20,849 had died (White, 2004). Hall (1996/1999) has argued for the relevancy of HIV/AIDS on grounds similar to why textbooks matter.

AIDS is the site at which the advance of sexual politics is being rolled back. It’s a site at which not only people will die, but desire and pleasure will also die if certain metaphors do not survive or survive in the wrong way. (p. 107)

The AIDS epidemic and the silence that surrounded and still surrounds the disease expose both the limits of incorporation and the import of abjection. Non-
normative ways of being in the world, for example how textbook passages depict hippies with specific reference to both their style and lifestyle, expose the degrees to which official knowledge maintains a normative understanding of American values. In describing in detail what hippies looked like, textbooks transform hippies into a deviant category. By identifying historically deviant bodies, textbooks make these bodies culpable for the spread of STDs and HIV/AIDS, a movement that renders these bodies as abject, as unfit for the curricular body of official knowledge and the selective tradition of American history. Similar to how slavery and the Holocaust are rendered safe through their respective suffering-horror, sixties counterculture is also made safe through heavy and detailed description. Such descriptions enable textbook teachers and/or readers to remain safe in knowing that should the thin film of the narrative web of high school American history textbooks become exposed they will be able to identify the Other that caused it and as such abject them from the curricular body of official knowledge and, if needed, from schooling itself.

This interpretive analysis is by no means exhaustive, for example, aside from a passing reference to Cesar Chavez, I do not discuss how textbooks depict Latinos/as including immigrants and Puerto Ricans. Each of these groups received limited mention among the fifteen textbooks analyzed. The limited inclusion of Latinos/as by high school American History textbooks is an avenue of inquiry that deserves future scholarly attention especially given the growing number of immigrant students attending U.S. public schools as well as political efforts to restrict immigrants from receiving social services including education and to
require quick assimilation (incorporation) through English as Second Language educational policies. Increasingly draconian immigration and deportation policies also suggest that entire populations are not only textually rendered abject by textbooks and educational policies, but are physically treated as abject through laws that allow Immigration and Naturalization Services to incarcerate immigrants prior to deportation. Lastly, there is also a possible avenue of inquiry that analyzes the political discourses surrounding immigrant mothers and so-called “anchor babies” using Julia Kristeva’s (1982) theoretical framework of abjection.

While there are no doubt numerous other instances and that might also demonstrate how textbooks incorporate and abject official knowledge, the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, the interpretive analyses undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5, and the implications discussed here have provided unique insights into how, by incorporating select knowledge as official knowledge, but also by treating other knowledge as abject, as unfit for the curricular body of official knowledge, high school American history textbooks deny students full participation in making decisions about the quality of their educational experiences.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A

TEXTBOOKS ANALYZED
1960s


1970s


1980s


1990s


2000s

