ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.
In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.
Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at email@example.com.
- 2 English
- 2 Public
Schennach (2007) has shown that the Empirical Likelihood (EL) estimator may not be asymptotically normal when a misspecified model is estimated. This problem occurs because the empirical probabilities of individual observations are restricted to be positive. I find that even the EL estimator computed without the restriction can fail to be asymptotically normal for misspecified models if the sample moments weighted by unrestricted empirical probabilities do not have finite population moments. As a remedy for this problem, I propose a group of alternative estimators which I refer to as modified EL (MEL) estimators. For correctly specified models, these estimators have ...
- Xiang, Jin, Ahn, Seung, Wahal, Sunil, et al.
- Created Date
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and ...
- Li, Zhichuan, Coles, Jeffrey, Hertzel, Michael, et al.
- Created Date