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ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations


This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.

In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.

Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.


Family economics uses economic concepts such as productions and decision making to understand family behavior. Economists place emphasis on the rule of families on labor supply, human capital investment, and consumption. In a household, the members choose the optimal time allocations between working, housework and leisure, and money between consumption of different members and savings. One-Child policy and strong inter-generational connections cause unique family structure in China. Households of different generations provide income transfer and labor support to each other. Households consider these connections in their savings, labor supply, human capital investment, fertility and marriage decisions. Especially, strong intergenerational relationships ...

Contributors
Yue, Yang, Silverman, Daniel, Kovrijnykh, Natalia, et al.
Created Date
2017

This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of different size, by considering boards' costly monitoring of CEOs who have private information about firm output. By incorporating a costly state verification model into a matching model, we have a number of novel findings. First, positive assortative matching (PAM) breaks down as larger firms match with less talented CEOs when monitoring is sufficiently costly despite of complementarity in firms' production technology. More importantly, PAM can be the equilibrium sorting pattern for large firms and high talent CEOs even it fails for small firms and low talent CEOs, ...

Contributors
Li, Zhan, Chade, Hector, Kovrijnykh, Natalia, et al.
Created Date
2015