ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.
In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.
Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at firstname.lastname@example.org.
- 3 English
- 3 Public
This dissertation focuses on democracies governed by a Parliament. In such democracies, the executive branch consists of a subset of parties in the Parliament, called the Government. A key feature is that the Government is only indirectly determined by the voters' electoral decisions. This dissertation address how parliamentary characteristics and institutions influence the composition of the Government and government outcomes. The composition of the Government reflects the size and ideological make-up of the Government. Government outcomes reflect the length the Government survives and the policy consequences of the Government. The literature focuses on the former criterion. The view is that, …
- HU, LIN, Hu, Lin, Friedenberg, Amanda, et al.
- Created Date
This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of different size, by considering boards' costly monitoring of CEOs who have private information about firm output. By incorporating a costly state verification model into a matching model, we have a number of novel findings. First, positive assortative matching (PAM) breaks down as larger firms match with less talented CEOs when monitoring is sufficiently costly despite of complementarity in firms' production technology. More importantly, PAM can be the equilibrium sorting pattern for large firms and high talent CEOs even it fails for small firms and low talent CEOs, …
- Li, Zhan, Chade, Hector, Kovrijnykh, Natalia, et al.
- Created Date
I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable. In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments. Dissertation/Thesis
- Hernandez Chanto, Allan Roberto, Manelli, Alejandro, Friedenberg, Amanda, et al.
- Created Date