ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.
In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.
Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.
- Bharath, Sreedhar
- 1 Arizona State University
- 1 Babenko, Ilona
- 1 Coles, Jeffrey
- 1 Hertzel, Michael
- 1 Li, Zhichuan
- 1 English
- 1 Public
- Business
- 1 Agency problem
- 1 Authority differential
- 1 Corporate governance
- 1 Economics
- 1 Finance
- 1 Mutual monitoring
- more
- 1 No. 2 executive
- 1 Pay gap
- Dwarf Galaxies as Laboratories of Protogalaxy Physics: Canonical Star Formation Laws at Low Metallicity
- Evolutionary Genetics of CORL Proteins
- Social Skills and Executive Functioning in Children with PCDH-19
- Deep Domain Fusion for Adaptive Image Classification
- Software Defined Pulse-Doppler Radar for Over-The-Air Applications: The Joint Radar-Communications Experiment
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and …
- Contributors
- Li, Zhichuan, Coles, Jeffrey, Hertzel, Michael, et al.
- Created Date
- 2012