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ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations


This collection includes most of the ASU Theses and Dissertations from 2011 to present. ASU Theses and Dissertations are available in downloadable PDF format; however, a small percentage of items are under embargo. Information about the dissertations/theses includes degree information, committee members, an abstract, supporting data or media.

In addition to the electronic theses found in the ASU Digital Repository, ASU Theses and Dissertations can be found in the ASU Library Catalog.

Dissertations and Theses granted by Arizona State University are archived and made available through a joint effort of the ASU Graduate College and the ASU Libraries. For more information or questions about this collection contact or visit the Digital Repository ETD Library Guide or contact the ASU Graduate College at gradformat@asu.edu.


I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable. In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments. Dissertation/Thesis

Contributors
Hernandez Chanto, Allan Roberto, Manelli, Alejandro, Friedenberg, Amanda, et al.
Created Date
2017

One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following situation. A group of people within an organization are completely transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by other organization members who are outside this group. In my dissertation, I try to study how this information sharing would affect the outcome of different organizations. I focus on …

Contributors
Wu, Zhenhua, Friedenberg, Amanda, Manelli, Alejandro, et al.
Created Date
2014

Buyers have private information on auctioning divisible goods. Linearity could be a useful property on measuring their marginal utility on those goods or on their bidding strategies under such a share auction environment. This paper establishes an auction model with independent private-values paradigm (IPVP) where bidders have linear demand. A mechanism design approach is applied to explore the optimal share auction in this model. I discuss the most popular auction formats in practice, including Vickrey auction (VA), uniform-price auction (UPA) and discriminatory price auction (DPA). The ex-post equilibriums on explicit solutions are achieved. I found VA does not generally constitute …

Contributors
Wang, Mian, Manelli, Alejandro, Arizona State University
Created Date
2014