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I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director

I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the level of monitoring. I find a strong relation between distance and both board meeting attendance and director membership on strategic versus monitoring committees. Increased monitoring, as measured by a reduction in effective distance, by way of addition of a direct flight, is associated with a 3% reduction in firm value. A reduction in effective distance is also associated with less risk-taking, lower stock return volatility, lower accounting return volatility, lower R&D; spending, fewer acquisitions, and fewer patents.
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    Title
    • Evidence on the value of director monitoring: a natural experiment
    Contributors
    Date Created
    2014
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    Note
    • Partial requirement for: Ph. D., Arizona State University, 2014
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-29)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Business administration

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    by Benjamin Bennett

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