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Random Simulations of Braess's Paradox


Abstract This paper uses network theory to simulate Nash equilibria for selfish travel within a traffic network. Specifically, it examines the phenomenon of Braess's Paradox, the counterintuitive occurrence in which adding capacity to a traffic network increases the social costs paid by travelers in a new Nash equilibrium. It also employs the measure of the price of anarchy, a ratio between the social cost of the Nash equilibrium flow through a network and the socially optimal cost of travel. These concepts are the basis of the theory behind undesirable selfish routing to identify problematic links and roads in existing metropolitan traffic networks (Youn et al., 2008), suggesting applicative potential behind the theoretical questions this paper... (more)
Created Date 2015-05
Contributor Chotras, Peter Louis (Author) / Armbruster, Dieter (Thesis Director) / Lanchier, Nicolas (Committee Member) / Barrett, The Honors College / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences / Economics Program in CLAS
Subject Game Theory / Random Simulation / Nash Equilibrium / Traffic / Braess's Paradox
Series Academic Year 2014-2015
Type Text
Extent 58 pages
Language English
Copyright
Reuse Permissions All Rights Reserved
Collaborating Institutions Barrett, the Honors College
Additional Formats MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS


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