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Ownership Structure And Executive Compensation Design – An Empirical Study


Abstract In accordance with the Principal Agent Theory, Property Right Theory, Incentive Theory, and Human Capital Theory, firms face agency problems due to “separation of ownership and management”, which call for effective corporate governance. Ownership structure is a core element of the corporate governance. The differences in ownership structures thus may result in differential incentives in governance through the selection of senior management and in the design of senior management compensation system. This thesis investigates four firms with four different types of ownership structures: a public listed firm with the controlling interest by the state, a public listed firm with a non-state-owned controlling interest, a public listed firm a famil... (more)
Created Date 2015
Contributor Gao, Shenghua (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Advisor) / Li, Feng (Committee member) / Shen, Wei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Subject Business / Management / equity distribution degree / Equity structure / executive incentive and restraint mechanism / identity property of controlling shareholder
Type Doctoral Dissertation
Extent 130 pages
Language Chinese
Copyright
Reuse Permissions All Rights Reserved
Note Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2015
Collaborating Institutions Graduate College / ASU Library
Additional Formats MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS


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Description Dissertation/Thesis