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The Signaling Effect of College Quality to Employers

Abstract Upon hiring a new college graduate, employers are left with limited information about the true productivity of the individual, mainly based on the information provided via resume and other related documents. Based on the information, which may include (and is not limited to) education years, grade point average(s), the institution one attended, majors, etc., employers attempt to differentiate between the candidates. Existing employer learning literature, such as Altonji and Pierret (2001) and Peter Arcidiacono, Patrick Bayer, and Aurel Hizmo (2010), have found that employers statistically discriminate upon hiring and estimate wages based on expected productivity conditional to observable characteristics--specifically education. As one's... (more)
Created Date 2016-05
Contributor Nam, Jimin (Author) / Veramendi, Gregory (Thesis Director) / Dillon, Eleanor (Committee Member) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences / Department of Economics / Barrett, The Honors College
Subject Economics / Education / College Quality
Series Academic Year 2015-2016
Type Text
Extent 28 pages
Language English
Reuse Permissions All Rights Reserved
Collaborating Institutions Barrett, the Honors College
Additional Formats MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS

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