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Epistemic Norms and Permissive Rationality


Abstract This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which closely relates to epistemic norms for rational doxastic states. The central issue is whether epistemic rationality is impermissive or not: For any total evidence E, is there a unique doxastic state that any possible agent with that total evidence E should take (Uniqueness), or not (Permissivism)?

“Conservatism and Uniqueness”: Conservatism is the idea that an agent’s beliefs should be stable as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness is the idea that any given body of total evidence uniquely determines what it is rational to believe. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that you should not give special treatment to your beliefs solely because they are you... (more)
Created Date 2016
Contributor Jung, Jaemin (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Advisor) / Portmore, Douglas W (Committee member) / Pinillos, Ángel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Subject Philosophy / Epistemology / Cognitive Decision Theory / Deference / Epistemic Conservatism / Permissivism / Steadfastness / Uniqueness
Type Doctoral Dissertation
Extent 104 pages
Language English
Copyright
Reuse Permissions All Rights Reserved
Note Doctoral Dissertation Philosophy 2016
Collaborating Institutions Graduate College / ASU Library
Additional Formats MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS


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Description Dissertation/Thesis