Skip to main content

Give It To Me Straight: How, When, and Why Managers Disclose Inside Information About Seasoned Equity Offerings

Abstract Managers’ control over the timing and content of information disclosure represents a significant strategic tool which they can use at their discretion. However, extant theoretical perspectives offer incongruent arguments and incompatible predictions about when and why managers would release inside information about their firms. More specifically, agency theory and theories within competitive dynamics provide competing hypotheses about when and why managers would disclose inside information about their firms. In this study, I highlight how voluntary disclosure theory may help to coalesce these two theoretical perspectives. Voluntary disclosure theory predicts that managers will release inside information when managers perceive that the bene... (more)
Created Date 2017
Contributor Busenbark, John R. (Author) / Certo, S. Trevis (Advisor) / Semadeni, Matthew (Committee member) / Cannella, Albert (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Subject Management / Accounting / Finance / Agency theory / Competitive dynamics / Information disclosure / Seasoned equity offerings / Security analysts / Voluntary disclosure theory
Type Doctoral Dissertation
Extent 121 pages
Language English
Reuse Permissions All Rights Reserved
Note Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2017
Collaborating Institutions Graduate College / ASU Library
Additional Formats MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS

  Full Text
928.9 KB application/pdf
Download Count: 471

Description Dissertation/Thesis