Executive Labor Market Segmentation: How Local Market Density Affects Incentives and Performance
| Abstract | I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance... (more) |
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| Created Date | 2017 |
| Contributor | Zhao, Hong (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher) |
| Subject | Finance |
| Type | Doctoral Dissertation |
| Extent | 71 pages |
| Language | English |
| Copyright |
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| Reuse Permissions | All Rights Reserved |
| Note | Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2017 |
| Collaborating Institutions | Graduate College / ASU Library |
| Additional Formats | MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS |
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