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Executive Labor Market Segmentation: How Local Market Density Affects Incentives and Performance


Abstract I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance... (more)
Created Date 2017
Contributor Zhao, Hong (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Subject Finance
Type Doctoral Dissertation
Extent 71 pages
Language English
Copyright
Reuse Permissions All Rights Reserved
Note Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2017
Collaborating Institutions Graduate College / ASU Library
Additional Formats MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS


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Description Dissertation/Thesis