Essays in Market Design
|Abstract||I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications
of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning
students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction
where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders
suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to
evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.
In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue
from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments.
|Contributor||Hernandez Chanto, Allan Roberto (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Advisor) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)|
|Subject||Economic theory / Economics / Education / Auctions / College Admission / Externalities / Market Design / Securities / Serial Dictatorship|
|Reuse Permissions||All Rights Reserved|
|Note||Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2017|
|Collaborating Institutions||Graduate College / ASU Library|
|Additional Formats||MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS|