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CEO Power over the Board, Nontransient Investor Ownership, and Risk Taking --An Employment Security Perspective

Abstract Recognizing that CEOs are less capable of diversifying their employment risks than shareholders who could diversify their investment risks through portfolio investments, agency theory assumes that CEOs tend to be risk averse compared with shareholders. Based on this assumption, agency theory scholars suggest that to align the risk preference of CEOs with that of shareholders, CEOs need to be closely monitored and have less power. SEC regulators have been adopting the suggestion and accordingly CEO power has been reduced in the past decades. However, the empirical results are mixed and cannot provide solid support for the suggestion that reducing CEO power could lead the CEO to take more risks.

Considering that managerial risk taking is an... (more)
Created Date 2019
Contributor Zhu, Qi (Author) / Shen, Wei (Advisor) / Zhu, David (Advisor) / Certo, Trevis (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Subject Business administration
Type Doctoral Dissertation
Extent 95 pages
Language English
Note Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2019
Collaborating Institutions Graduate College / ASU Library
Additional Formats MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS

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Description Dissertation/Thesis