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Essay on Dynamic Matching


Abstract In the first chapter, I study the two-sided, dynamic matching problem that occurs in the United States (US) foster care system. In this market, foster parents and foster children can form reversible foster matches, which may disrupt, continue in a reversible state, or transition into permanency via adoption. I first present an empirical analysis that yields four new stylized facts related to match transitions of children in foster care and their exit through adoption. Thereafter, I develop a two-sided dynamic matching model with five key features: (a) children are heterogeneous (with and without a disability), (b) children must be foster matched before being adopted, (c) children search for parents while foster matched to another parent, (d... (more)
Created Date 2019
Contributor MacDonald, Diana (Author) / Chade, Hector (Advisor) / Bishop, Kelly (Committee member) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Subject Economic theory / Dynamic Matching / Foster Care / Reversible Matching
Type Doctoral Dissertation
Extent 108 pages
Language English
Copyright
Note Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2019
Collaborating Institutions Graduate College / ASU Library
Additional Formats MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS


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Description Dissertation/Thesis