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Analytic Functionalism as a Foundation for the Contention that a Non-Biological Machine (Android) can be Viewed as Both a Legal and a Moral Person

Abstract This Thesis contends that if the designer of a non-biological machine (android) can establish that the machine exhibits certain specified behaviors or characteristics, then there is no principled reason to deny that the machine can be considered a legal person. The thesis also states that given a related but not necessarily identical set of characteristics, there is no principled reason to deny that the non-biological machine can make a claim to a level of moral personhood. It is the purpose of my analysis to delineate some of the specified behaviors required for each of these conditions so as to provide guidance and understanding to designers seeking to establish criteria for creation of such machines. Implicit in the stated thesis are ass... (more)
Created Date 2011
Contributor Calverley, David J. (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Advisor) / Mcgregor, Joan (Committee member) / Askland, Andrew (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Subject Artificial Intelligence / Law / Philosophy / analytic functionalism / android / folk psychology / legal person / moral person / personhood
Type Masters Thesis
Extent 109 pages
Language English
Reuse Permissions All Rights Reserved
Note M.S. Biology 2011
Collaborating Institutions Graduate College / ASU Library
Additional Formats MODS / OAI Dublin Core / RIS

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Description Dissertation/Thesis